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The United States and Global Climate Change
Master thesis: Cand.ling.merc. – International Market Communication & PR, EnglishAuthor: Trine Gram Nielsen
Instructor: Annemarie Backmann
Department of Language and Business CommunicationAarhus School of Business, Aarhus University
December 2010
Ever since the United States (US) refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the country has remained
isolated in the international climate change negotiations. The refusal has had severe consequences
for the global environment as well as the country’s relationship with the rest of the world.
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate what made the US refuse to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, as well as what has changed in the US that might make the country commit itself to a
future internationally binding agreement on climate change to take over when the Kyoto Protocol
expires in 2012.
In order to investigate this, the thesis starts by documenting how the US is affected by climate
change and what the country is doing on its own to cope with the effects of it. It furthermore
introduces the American political system so as to demonstrate what a document like the Kyoto
Protocol will have to go through to be ratified, and it describes the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and
the American political situation during the negotiations in order to clarify the background for the
US’ decision not to be part of the Kyoto Protocol.
The thesis analyses the US’ arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and assesses whether
these arguments can be considered to be valid. Two of the main concerns in the US’ objection to the
Kyoto Protocol were the economy and that fact that it did not include developing countries, which
meant that these were not forced to lower their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As the US is
experiencing an increased competition from especially China - which as a developing country is not
included in the Kyoto Protocol - the US felt that being part of a protocol that did not also include
one of its main competitors would give the country an unfair disadvantage in the global market.
Therefore, as a result of extensive lobbying from the oil, coal and auto industries, the US Congress
passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which meant that a protocol could never be ratified in the US
unless it included developing countries or it could be proven that the American economy would not
be harmed by doing so.
The argument that it would hurt the American economy if the US ratified the Kyoto Protocol has
been furthered by the oil, coal and auto industries, as these were very aware of the impact that
lowering the country’s GHG emissions would have on their bottom-lines, and so this thesis
documents how these industries joined forces and created the Global Climate Coalition (GCC).
Through the GCC, these industries launched maybe the greatest disinformation campaign ever seen
1
Abstract
– a campaign that has had a huge influence on the public, policy-makers and media’s views about
climate change. The aim of the campaign was simple: to reposition global warming as theory rather
than fact. Although the GCC does no longer exist, lobbying on climate change is still widespread in
the US, and has lead to a general scepticism towards global warming among the American public.
In general, not much appears to have changed in the US since its refusal to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, and therefore the question remains what it will take to get the US to be part of a future
international agreement on climate change.
The thesis argues that for the US to become part of a future international agreement on climate
change, the country will first have to pass a domestic climate and energy bill, as it is argued that if
the US is to commit to an internationally binding agreement, it will be one that basically extends
US’ climate policies to other countries. Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol without the support of
the Senate, which meant that the Senate never ratified it. Therefore, in order not to make the same
mistake, President Obama will have to get the support of the US Senate before he can commit to an
international agreement. Ever since he took office in January 2009, creating a domestic climate and
energy bill has been one of the President’s top priorities. However, so far he has not succeeded, and
with the Republican Party’s victory in the 2010 midterm election, the chance of making this happen
in the next couple of years now seems slim.
Keywords: The United States; Kyoto Protocol; Climate change; International climate change
negotiations.
Number of characters excl. blanks: 3.455
2
Content
Acronyms............................................................................................................................................4
Explanation of concepts.....................................................................................................................6
The greenhouse effect.......................................................................................................................6
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)...............................................................6
Annex I, Annex II and Non-Annex I Parties....................................................................................8
Climate sceptics................................................................................................................................8
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................9
1.1 Research approach and structure..............................................................................................11
1.2 Empirical data...........................................................................................................................12
1.3 Delimitations.............................................................................................................................14
2. The US and climate change.........................................................................................................15
2.1 An energy-dependent economy................................................................................................15
2.2 Vulnerability to climate change................................................................................................16
2.2.1 Recent effects of climate change.......................................................................................16
2.3 Reluctance to act on climate change.........................................................................................17
2.4 Climate change policy at state level.........................................................................................18
3. American politics..........................................................................................................................21
3.1. Doing politics in America........................................................................................................21
3.1.1 Political Parties..................................................................................................................23
3.1.2 American ideology and foreign policy...............................................................................26
4. The Kyoto Protocol......................................................................................................................31
4.1 The UN.....................................................................................................................................32
4.1.1 The UN/US relationship.....................................................................................................32
3
4.2 Earth Summit............................................................................................................................35
4.3 COP 1........................................................................................................................................37
4.4 COP 2........................................................................................................................................38
4.4.1 Meetings leading up to Kyoto............................................................................................38
4.5 COP 3........................................................................................................................................39
4.6 COP meetings following 1997..................................................................................................40
4.7 The US political situation during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations..........................................41
4.7.1 The Bush senior administration.........................................................................................42
4.7.2 The Clinton administration................................................................................................43
4.7.3 The Bush administration....................................................................................................46
5. US arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol..................................................................48
5.1 Exemption of developing countries..........................................................................................49
5.1.1 Developing countries’ arguments......................................................................................50
5.2 Harm to the US economy.........................................................................................................51
5.3 Insufficient state of scientific knowledge.................................................................................52
5.4 US attitudes towards climate change........................................................................................54
5.4.1 The media and climate change...........................................................................................54
5.4.2 Media coverage from 1988 and onwards...........................................................................56
5.4.3 Public opinion on climate change around 1997.................................................................58
5.5 Lobbying...................................................................................................................................59
5.5.1 Why lobby against climate change legislation?.................................................................59
5.5.2 Who are the climate sceptics?............................................................................................60
5.5.3 The Global Climate Coalition............................................................................................61
5.5.4 The powerful fossil fuel group...........................................................................................63
6. Prospects for a future international climate treaty with US participation.............................66
6.1 President Obama – will he make a difference?........................................................................66
4
6.1.1 Climate legislation passed under the Obama administration.............................................66
6.1.2 A clean energy future?.......................................................................................................68
6.2 The importance of a US climate and energy bill......................................................................70
6.3 Factors influencing the climate debate today...........................................................................72
6.3.1 Developing countries.........................................................................................................73
6.3.2 The US economy................................................................................................................79
6.3.3 Scientific knowledge..........................................................................................................81
6.3.4 Public opinion on climate change – a partisan issue..........................................................83
6.3.5 Lobbying............................................................................................................................87
6.3.6 Midterm election................................................................................................................90
6.4 The climate debate in an international perspective...................................................................93
7. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................97
7.1 Putting it all into perspective....................................................................................................99
Literature........................................................................................................................................102
Books............................................................................................................................................102
Articles..........................................................................................................................................103
Surveys.........................................................................................................................................106
Reports..........................................................................................................................................106
Appendix 1 – The Kyoto Protocol.................................................................................................108
Appendix 2 – The Byrd-Hagel Resolution...................................................................................129
Appendix 3 – Letter from President Bush...................................................................................133
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Number of characters excl. blanks: 174.425
6
ACES Act - American Clean Energy and Security Act
AGBM - Ad Hoc Group to the Berlin Mandate
ARRA - American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
BTU - British Thermal Unit
CFCs - Chlorofluorocarbons
COP - Conference of the Parties
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC - Global Climate Coalition
GHGs - Greenhouse gasses
IEA - International Energy Agency
IGES - Institute for Global Environmental Strategies
INC - Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee
IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITO - International Trade Organisation
NAPA - National Adaption Programmes of Action
NAS - National Academy of Science
NCDC - National Climatic Data Center
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
NHTSA - National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
7
Acronyms
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC - Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
RPS - Renewable Portfolio Standard
TERI - The Energy & Resources Institute
UN - United Nations
UNCED - United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGASS - United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNRIC - United Nations Regional Information Center
US - United States
USTR - United States’ Trade Representative
WMO - World Metrological Organisation
WTO - World Trade Organisation
WWF - World Wildlife Foundation
8
The greenhouse effect is caused by the Sun’s radiation which is reflected off the Earth’s surface
and trapped by carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in the atmosphere. The
natural greenhouse effect increases the global mean temperature to about 15 degrees Celsius, warm
enough to sustain life on Earth. By burning fossil fuels and releasing more CO2 into the atmosphere,
humans have altered the basic mechanism leading to an additional human induced greenhouse
effect also known as “global warming” (Oberthür, 1999: 3). Climate change, global warming and
the release of GHG emissions all refer to the same process, and are in my thesis used to cover the
concept explained above.
In the Kyoto Protocol, the term GHGs cover six categories of direct GHGs - CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs,
HFCs, and SF6.1 Many authors use the term CO2 emissions instead of GHG emissions, because in
the international negotiations, the different gases are converted into CO2 equivalents in order to have
a common point of reference (Hedegaard, 2008: 26), and because CO2 is the GHG that contributes
the most to the greenhouse effect (OECD (1), 1999: 12). The thesis generally uses the term GHG
emissions, as this is an umbrella term covering all of the gasses included in the Kyoto Protocol.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was set up in 1988 by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Metrological Organisation
(WMO), regularly reviews the state of scientific knowledge on climate change. All states that are
members of the United Nations (UN) and the WMO are therefore members of the IPCC and its
three working groups: Working Group I on the science of climate change, Working Group II on
scientific-technical analysis of impacts, adaptations and mitigation of climate change, and Working
Group III on the economic and social dimensions of climate change. This means that the IPCC is a
hybrid body, partly political-intergovernmental and partly scientific-technical.
The IPCC regularly prepares comprehensive assessment reports of scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant for the understanding of human induced climate change, potential
impacts of climate change and options for mitigation and adaptation. To date, the IPCC has
1 The Kyoto Protocol, appendix 1.
9
Explanation of concepts
completed four assessment reports (1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007), and is currently working on its
Fifth Assessment Report.2 The IPCC does not conduct any scientific research of its own. Its role is
to evaluate studies carried out by thousands of researchers and experts from around the world, and
then to synthesize the results in a form that helps policymakers decide how to respond to climate
change. These experts are nominated by governments as well as intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), but they act in their personal capacity (Oberthür, 1999: 3).
Below is an illustration of the process that a report like the IPCC assessment report has to pass
through before publication.
Source: IPCC : http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data.htm.
2 IPCC: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data.htm (27/07/2010).
10
In 2007, the IPCC and Al Gore were awarded the Nobel Peace Price "for their efforts to build up
and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for
the measures that are needed to counteract such change".3
Annex I, Annex II and Non-Annex I Parties
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) divides all countries
into Annex I, Annex II and Non-Annex Parties.
Annex I Parties include the countries that were members of the OECD in 1992 and countries in
economic transition – called the EIT Parties – which include the Russian Federation, the Baltic
countries, and several Central and Eastern European countries.
Annex II Parties consist of OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. Annex II Parties
are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to reduce their emissions,
and to help them adapt to the effects of climate change. Furthermore, they have to "take all
practicable steps" to promote the development and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies
to EIT Parties and developing countries.
Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are
recognised as being especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, which include countries
with low-lying coastal areas and countries especially prone to drought and desertification. Other
countries, such as those relying heavily on income from the production of fossil fuels, feel more
vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of responding to climate change.4
Climate sceptics: As the term climate sceptics is a term generally used in the climate change
literature, I have chosen to also employ this term. The term is used to cover the minority of people
who do not believe that climate change is real or that it is caused by human activity, and covers
many different categories of people – from scientists to politicians and the public.
3 UN: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/climatechange/index.shtml (27/07/2010).4 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (27/07/2010).
11
Global climate change is by no means a new phenomenon, but it is something that has seen an
increased focus in the news media in recent years. For those who have not previously noticed the
effects of climate change, the summer of 2010 made it a topic very hard to ignore. Pakistan saw the
worst floods in history, with one third of the country being under water and 20 million people
affected by the floods (Ritzau, 03/10/2010), China also experienced extreme floods which led to the
evacuation of 12 million people (Ritzau, 07/08/2010), and Russia experienced more than 50
consecutive days of intense heat which caused severe wildfires and killed several people (Kott,
06/08/2010).
As illustrated here, it is not only small island states that are affected by global climate change. As
the word global indicates, it is an issue that affects every country on Earth. It is also an issue that
has an impact on almost all of today’s most pressing problems – from the economy to poverty and
food scarcity – which is why it is an issue that is discussed in many different forums by scientists,
politicians, multinational companies and citizens. In the months leading up to the most recent
climate change summit - COP 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 - the debate turned to whether
the summit would lead to a successor to when the Kyoto Protocol5 - which requires Annex I Parties6
to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - expires in 2012. From the start, the debate
focused on the role of the United States (US), and it was continuously stressed that the success of a
new climate change agreement would depend on the US (Aagaard and Andersen, 16/11/2009;
Eilperin and Shear, 26/11/2009; Goldenberg, 22/11/2009; McCarthy, 23/11/2009; Tamura, 2006:
289).
As part of the UN delegation working in Copenhagen during COP 15, I closely followed the
negotiations and the debate about the US and a future protocol. In the course of my studies, I had
gained an increasing interest in sustainability and the efforts for a greener future.7 However, it was
not until the autumn of 2009, when I did an internship at the United Nations Regional Information
Centre (UNRIC) in Brussels that I started to seriously pay attention to the debate on global climate
change. During my five months at UNRIC, I worked on the UN information campaign on climate 5 See appendix 1 for the Kyoto Protocol.6For Annex I parties, see “explanation of concepts” p. 8.7 The terms green, green future or going green have become synonymous for the work towards creating a sustainable future.
12
1. Introduction
change, and gained a deep, but also frustrating, understanding of the huge crisis that the world is
facing. As I attended conferences and meetings with key scientists and spokespersons from the
climate change debate, my frustration grew. How can we know so much about both the problem -
and the solutions to the problem - and still not have done more? I soon realised that the US was one
of the key players in this debate, and this became the starting point of my thesis.
In 1992, world leaders decided that it was time to deal with the problem of global climate change
and came together at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The summit resulted in the creation of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – a non-binding framework
requiring Annex I Parties to adopt programmes and policies to stabilise GHG emissions. In 1997,
this convention led to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, which today is signed by every country in
the world – with the exception of the US.8 At the time of the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the US
was responsible for more than one third of the world’s GHG emissions (Arthus-Bertrand, 2009:
130), which underlines the importance of US participation. As climate change is a global problem,
it requires global solutions and cooperation, and, therefore, the fact that the US is not part of the
Kyoto Protocol is a problem with serious consequences. As a world leader and a superpower, the
US was expected to show leadership in the fight against climate change (Chasek, 2007: 371), but
this did not happen. The question therefore remains why the US refused to ratify the protocol and
this thesis is going to investigate some of the main reasons.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate:
The United States’ reasons for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
Together with the rest of the world, the US is now part of the UN climate change negotiations and
the work on a successor to take over when the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. However, that the
US is part of the negotiations does not mean that the country will ratify the agreement. The US was
also an important part of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, but as already mentioned, the country
never ratified the Protocol. Instead of ratifying the Protocol and working on limiting its release of
GHG emissions, the US has instead increased its emissions by 14 % since 1997 (Arthus-Bertrand,
2009: 132). So, the question remains whether there have been any changes in US politics and
attitudes that might make the country commit itself to a future protocol on climate change.
8 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (17/06/2010).
13
Therefore, the thesis also seeks to find an answer to the following question:
Has anything changed in the US since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations that might
make the country commit itself to a future legally binding international agreement
on climate change?
Through this thesis, I wish to clarify not only why the US chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
but also to give an answer to what is needed to get the US to be part of a future protocol on climate
change. In the light of growing global emissions and accelerating climate change, there is a
tremendous need for a new agreement that strengthens the efforts and commitments by everyone.
Whether world leaders – including both the US and China – succeed in creating a new protocol to
take over when the Kyoto Protocol expires will forever have an influence on the world as we know
it today. Therefore, by shedding light on the past and present directions of the US, I wish to clarify
how the US becomes part of a future international agreement on climate change.
1.1 Research approach and structure
In order to answer the first part of the thesis statement, chapter 2 will start by looking at how
climate change is affecting the US, as this will help underline the urgent need for the US to take not
only an interest in, but also a lead, in the fight against climate change. The understanding of the US’
political system and the agents behind the policy-making on climate change is important for
understanding what a document like the Kyoto Protocol will have to go through to be ratified,
which will be the subject of analysis in chapter 3. The chapter will also look at the political parties,
as party affiliation is an important factor in how people perceive climate change. Furthermore, the
chapter will briefly deal with the ideological position behind American political considerations.
This means taking a look at the concepts of realism and idealism. By employing these concepts, I
provide greater understanding of why the US acts the way it does in the international negotiations.
Chapter 4 will deal with the process leading up to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, as this is an
important part of understanding the broader picture of the negotiations. This includes both an
examination of the meetings leading up to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, and an analysis of the
political situation in the US in the years surrounding the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The chapter
furthermore includes a description of the UN - the forum in which the climate change negotiations
14
take place - and an analysis of the relationship between the UN and the US, as this relationship is
important if the US is to cooperate with the UN in reaching an agreement on climate change.
Chapter 5 will focus on the US’ arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Research in the
area will shed light on the reluctance of the US to show leadership in the fight against climate
change, and the arguments behind this reluctance. The chapter then tries to make a critical
assessment of the official arguments.
In order to answer the second half of the thesis statement, chapter 6 will investigate political and
attitudinal changes in the US, and their possible impacts on a future international climate change
agreement. By comparing the situation in the years surrounding the Kyoto Protocol negotiations
with the situations today, I hope to gain insight into what the chances are that the US will ratify a
future protocol on climate change.
Finally, chapter 7 will conclude on the findings.
1.2 Empirical data
I have chosen to use the scientific evidence presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) as background for my investigation, as it was the content of the IPCC Assessment
Reports that established the scientific basis for the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Furthermore, these
reports also provide the background material for the negotiations for a future protocol. This means
that I use the scientific evidence presented in the IPCC Assessment Reports as evidence that climate
change is a real and human-induced threat to the well-being of our planet, thereby underlining the
seriousness of the situation the world is facing today, as the only international climate change
agreement we have expires in a little more than a year, and world leaders have still not agreed on a
successor to take over when this happens.
For statistical material I have mainly used data from the Pew Research Center For The People &
The Press, which is an independent, non-partisan public opinion research organisation. The
organisation studies US attitudes towards politics, the press and public policy issues, and is one of
seven projects that make up the Pew Research Center. Another of the seven projects is the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, which brings together business leaders, policy-makers, scientists
15
and experts to find new solutions to the issue of climate change, and I have used this Center for
finding the latest news about climate change legislation in the US.
For the background material on the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, I have, among others, used The
Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century by Sebastian Oberthür who is
Academic Director of The Institute for European Studies in Brussels, and since 2005, a member of
the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.9 Sebastian Oberthür is a well-
respected expert in this area, and his book, providing a comprehensive description of the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, is therefore relevant for my thesis.
Another valuable source used in the thesis is Al Gore, former Vice President of the US, and
cofounder and Chairman of Generation Investment Management - a firm that is focused on a new
approach to sustainable investing. For more than 30 years, Al Gore has been one of the leading
advocates in the fight against climate change.10 Al Gore’s books are useful and invaluable for
providing a critical view of the American perspective on global warming. Al Gore, being a proud
and patriotic American,11 would not criticise the US unless he truly felt that he had reasons to do so,
and I believe that this, together with his extensive knowledge in the area, makes him a reliable
source.
For the analysis of what it requires to make the US ratify a future international treaty on climate
change, I have used articles from both American and European newspapers, as newspapers covering
the topical issues are the best way to gain insight into the latest developments within the area. As
climate change is a constantly developing issue - both in the international negotiations and in the
US’ domestic negotiations on climate legislation - there are no books containing the latest
developments. This is also the reason why it has been necessary for me to decide on a date to stop
collecting new data, which I did on 30 July 2010. I am still following the debate, but unless big
changes happen, I will not include these in the thesis.
9 IES: http://www.ies.be/user/5 (21/09/2010).10 Al Gore: http://www.algore.com/about.html (21/09/2010).11 14 December, during COP 15, I attended a conference with Al Gore organised by the GoodPlanet Foundation, in which he came across as a man who was very proud to be American.
16
1.3 Delimitations
Global climate change is an extensive topic, and there are other aspects, such as an assessment of
the Kyoto Protocol, that could have been interesting to include in the thesis. However, for reasons
of scope, this has not been possible. The focus of my thesis is not to evaluate the failure or success
of the Kyoto Protocol, but to analyse the US’ reasons for not ratifying it. The Kyoto Protocol has
been criticised for being flawed (Victor, 2004: xi), however, what I argue is that being a world
leader – and one of the biggest polluters in the world – US leadership is essential in the fight against
climate change. If focus is on finding sustainable solutions for developed as well as developing
countries, everybody needs to be on board, and that requires US commitment and leadership.
I am aware that the US is not the only country that has not shown leadership in the international
negotiations. Several members of the EU have also opposed action, and thereby hampered the EU’s
ability to show leadership in the negotiations (Oberthür, 1999: 44). I will, however, not comment on
the EU’s position in the negotiations, as the focus of the thesis is solely on the US’ role in the
international negotiations.
17
The history of US energy demand and the existing resources, infrastructure and institutions make
the US economy as dependent upon fossil fuel as a heroin addict is on the needle.
Steve Rayner.12
As this quote clearly indicates, the US’ reluctance to commit itself to binding emission reductions is
connected to the country’s immense energy consumption. Therefore, this chapter will look at the
history of climate change in the US. This includes looking at how the country is affected by climate
change, as well as the reasons why the country is so reluctant to react on the effects of climate
change. It also includes looking at what initiatives are being implemented to cope with climate
change. Investigating this will help show that the US has – or at least ought to have – an interest in
striking a deal on climate change, and it will shed light on what the US is doing on its own, since it,
until now, has refused to be part of any international agreement that sets binding targets for limiting
GHG emissions.
2.1 An energy-dependent economy
There are several reasons why the US has one of the largest emission rates in the world. First of all,
Robert Henson, writer and editor at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado,
argues that the huge emissions rate of the US is due to a lack of emphasis on energy efficiency and
focus on economic growth as opposed to protecting the environment. Secondly, he argues that
historical factors that are difficult to change also play a role. The US is historically a car-loving and
car-dependent nation, it is an economy built on fossil fuels, and the country is large in both
population and land area. The country’s vast suburban development forces millions of Americans to
drive to work, school, and in general everywhere they want to go outside the home (Henson, 2006:
38).
12 Oberthür, 1999: 19.
18
2. The US and climate change
2.2 Vulnerability to climate change
One might think that one of the reasons why the US is reluctant to engage itself in the fight against
climate change is that the country is not itself experiencing the effects of it. This is, however, not
the case. The US has long been experiencing an increase in extreme weather events, which can be
ascribed to global warming.
North America has experienced locally severe economic damage, plus substantial
ecosystem, social and cultural disruption from recent weather-related extremes,
including hurricanes, other severe storms, floods, droughts, heat waves and
wildfires (IPCC Working Group II, 2007: 619).
As explained here by the IPCC, the US is experiencing extreme weather events, whose occurrences
are expected to increase with global warming. According to the IPCC, global warming is, among
others, likely to have the following affects on North America (ibid):
Decreased snowpack, more winter flooding, and reduced summer flows.
Forests are likely to be affected by disturbances from pests, diseases, and fires, with an
extended period of high fire risk and large increases in areas burned.
Cities that are currently experiencing heat waves are expected to be further challenged by an
increased number, intensity and duration of heat waves, with potential for adverse health
impacts.
Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts
interacting with development and pollution.
Most often, climate change in the US will be experienced through direct effects of local changes,
such as temperature, precipitation and extreme weather events. However, there will also be indirect
effects transmitted among regions by interconnected economies and migration of people and
species. Because of variations in wealth and geography, impacts, vulnerability and capacity to react
will vary (ibid).
2.2.1 Recent effects of climate change
In recent decades, the US has seen an increase in the number of major natural disasters. In January
2005, the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) released a list of the US weather and climate
19
disasters that have cost more than a billion dollars. The list shows that between 1980 and 2004, the
US experienced 64 events that exceeded a billion dollars in cost and damages.13 Below I have listed
three of the most recent events to underline the seriousness of the increase in natural disasters.
The heat wave of the summer of 1980 was one of the country’s most catastrophic prolonged
weather events. Agricultural damage amounted to an estimated 48 billion dollars due to a massive
drought, and 10,000 people died from the effects of the heat wave.
In 1988, a year-long drought ravaged the agricultural economy and was further aggravated by a heat
wave in the summer of 1988, which led to wildfires across the Yellowstone National Park and
Mount Rushmore. All in all it ended up costing the agricultural economy 61 billion dollars.
The most recent extreme natural disaster occurred in August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast. The hurricane left 80 % of New Orleans under water, more than 1,800 people died and
thousands of people lost everything they owned. The inflicted damages are estimated at around 125
billion dollars.14
2.3 Reluctance to act on climate change
The US’ position as the world’s largest producer of coal, oil and gas has been a determining factor
in its stance on climate change (Oberthür, 1999: 18). The country has always relied heavily on the
availability of low-price energy, which has made the US one of the most energy intensive
economies in the OECD, consuming 20 % of the world’s oil.15 Because of the extremely high
energy intensity associated with American technology and lifestyle, low-cost means of saving
energy and reducing GHG emissions are in fact numerous. Even so, the perception – furthered by
representatives from the oil, coal and auto industries - that reducing GHG emissions would be
extremely costly has been widespread in the US (ibid), which I will turn to in chapter 5.
In is not only internationally that the US shows reluctance to engage in climate change agreements.
Traditions and institutions in North America have encouraged a decentralised
response framework where adaptations tend to be reactive, unevenly distributed,
13 Live Science: http://www.livescience.com/environment/050131_weather_disasters.html. To see the entire list go to: http://www.livescience.com/environment/disaster_chronology_1980_2004.html (25/06/2010).14 Live Science: http://www.livescience.com/environment/top-10-natural-disasters-1.html (25/06/2010).15 The White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill (25/06/2010)
20
and focused on coping with rather than preventing problems (IPCC Working
Group II, 2007: 619).
This explains why the US is still not pushing for an agreement that would help cope with climate
change, even though the effects of it have already been extremely costly. The surprising thing is that
even though the proof of climate change is so visible in the US, and climate change has affected
millions of Americans, the public still remains sceptic about whether it is real or not, which will be
developed further in chapter 5.
2.4 Climate change policy at state level
As will be illustrated in chapter 4, the federal government has not succeeded in creating serious
climate policies, but state governments have shown great initiatives in creating innovative climate
solutions. These include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative where eight north-eastern and mid-
Atlantic states have agreed to cap GHG emissions from power plants at 2009 levels by 2015
(Harrison, 2007: 108-109). Especially California has been on the forefront in coming up with new
initiatives to cut GHG emissions. In 2002, California announced a regulation requiring that GHG
emissions from new vehicles be reduced by 30 % by 2016. However, because of the Federal Clean
Air Act, states can only depart from the national vehicle emission standards if the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approves it. In June 2009, the EPA granted California the waiver
necessary to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles within the state. 15 other states have now also
adopted California’s vehicle standards and three more are on their way to do the same.16 In 2006,
California passed the Global Warming Solutions Act, which is an Act mandating that the Air
Resources Board adopts the necessary regulations to return the state’s total emissions to 1990 levels
by 2020. Again, several other states have followed California’s example in setting targets for
emission reductions (Harrison, 2007: 109).
46 states have created financial incentives to encourage both the public and corporations to use
renewable energy or adopt energy efficiency systems and equipment by means of tax reductions. 33
states provide loan financing for the purchase of renewable energy or energy efficiency systems or
equipment, and 22 states and the District of Columbia offer rebate programmes to encourage the
installation of solar water heating or solar panels for generating electricity (Pew, June 2009: 6). 16 To see which states have adopted the CA Vehicle Standards, go to: http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard.cfm (17/05/2010)
21
One of the most important requirements is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).
The RPS requires a gradually increasing percentage of an electricity provider’s
overall generating capacity or electricity sales to come from qualifying renewable
energy sources by a certain date (Bang, 2007: 1288).
The goal of the RPS is to make renewable energy economically competitive with conventional
forms of electric power by stimulating market and technology development. As of March 2009, 33
states and the District of Columbia have established the RPS. State standards vary in their RPS rules
with regards to minimum requirements of renewable energy, implementation timing, eligible
technologies and resources etc. Still, in February 2009, the Union of Concerned Scientists projected
that the state standards will provide support for 76,750 megawatts of new renewable power by 2025
- an increase of 570 % over total 1997 US levels (excluding hydro).17
States with RPS
States with RPS goals18
17 US EPA: http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html (28/07/2010).18 Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE), March 2009: http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html (28/07/2010).
22
As demonstrated in this chapter, the US is experiencing the negative consequences of climate
change - both socially and economically. Therefore, the country ought to have an interest in being
part of an agreement that can help decrease the impacts of future climate changes.
Even though not much has happened at the federal level, states all across the country are
continuously coming up with new initiatives to lower their GHG emissions, illustrating that the
American population is focusing on the problem of climate change, as well as how to solve it.
23
We have nearly all the tools to solve this problem, perhaps with one exception: what we are missing
is the political will that would be required to really affect change. Thankfully, in a democracy like
ours, political will is a renewable resource.
Al Gore.19
This chapter will examine the political landscape in the US, as national politics is both influenced
by and have influence on the international negotiations. Therefore, I will start by briefly explaining
the US’ political system and the process that a document like the Kyoto Protocol will have to go
through to be ratified. The chapter will also look at the political parties, as party affiliation is an
important factor in how people perceive climate change. Finally, the chapter will briefly deal with
the ideological position behind American political considerations. This means taking a look at the
concepts of realism and idealism. By employing these concepts, I provide greater understanding of
why the US acts the way it does in its foreign policy decisions.
3.1. Doing politics in America
The American federal government is the central government entity established by the Constitution,
and it shares its powers with the individual governments of the 50 states that make up the US. The
federal government is split and shared among three branches – the Presidency (the executive
branch), Congress (the legislative branch) and the federal Court system (the judicial branch) - which
each have specific areas of responsibility (Duncan, 2005: 75). In the US, these powers are separated
by a checks and balances system, which means that each branch is dependent on the other.
The policy of the country is very much dependent on the President of the country, as he appoints the
heads of all federal agencies, and thereby creates policy according to the political and ideological
stance of the appointees on everything from the use of natural resources to environmental policies.
In foreign affairs, it is the President who decides who should represent the country, and thereby who
19 Gore, 1992: xx.
24
3. American politics
will negotiate international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol. However, due to the system of checks
and balances, the president himself and his representatives cannot singlehandedly approve
international treaties - these have to be approved by the Senate, as the Senate is in charge of
approving or rejecting all presidential appointments and treaties with foreign countries (Duncan,
2005: 88-92).
The Congress is a bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Because the Constitution sets two-year terms for representatives and six-year terms for senators, it
means that every even-numbered calendar year, all representatives and one-third of senators are up
for re-election (Duncan, 2005: 90). Especially in the House of Representatives, this has
consequences, as it means that representatives are always campaigning for the next election, which
is a factor that might influence policy-making, as members of Congress are more likely to focus on
short-term interests rather than long-term interests - like climate change. However, as Connie
Hedegaard, EU Climate Commissioner and COP 15 Minister, points out, this is a dilemma in all
democracies, not just the American, as politicians are always campaigning for the next settlement,
Budget or general election (Hedegaard, 2008: 17). As John F. Kennedy noted;
A politician’s wish to be reelected might push him to flatter every public whim
and prejudice...to put public opinion ahead of public interest (Duncan, 2005: 91).
Another major issue in American politics is lobbying. Legislators are constantly lobbied by experts
who present them with research and opinion polls, and most often contribute money to their election
funds (Duncan, 2005: 107-108). In general, campaign contributions from special interest groups
play a huge role, and oil and coal companies have always been among the largest contributors. This
was also the case in the 2008 election cycle, where oil and coal companies were among the largest
contributors and the largest television advertisers during the campaign (Gore, 2009: 355).
According to Al Gore, this poses a problem because
the political model conceived by America’s founders presumed that reasoned
debate based on the best available evidence would play the central role in the
nation’s political decision-making process (ibid).
However, Al Gore argues that this is no longer the case as most election outcomes today are
determined by TV-ads. This is a problem in the climate debate. First of all because lobbyists
opposed to climate legislation outnumber supporters by more than eight to one, and second of all
25
because carbon polluters knowingly aim at misleading the public about the dangers of climate
change (ibid), which will be elaborated in section 5.5 on lobbying.
3.1.1 Political Parties
The US political landscape is dominated by the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and this
section will briefly explain the core beliefs and dividing points of these parties.
Source: Carat’s 2008 Consumer Connection Study (CCS).20
The map presented above is a factor analysis by Carat Insight and illustrates the attitudinal
differences among political party affiliation. The factors (blue dots) that are close to each other have
similar profiles, which mean that the closer a factor is to a political party affiliation, the higher its
association is. The further away from the center of the map a factor is, the more unique the factor
20 Carat’s 2008 Consumer Connection Study: http://www.carat.com/carat/Attachment?id=246024 (01/09/2010).
26
is.21 As illustrated by the map, generally speaking, Democrats worry more about global warming
than Republicans, whereas Republicans have stronger religious beliefs and conventional points of
view.
Source: The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press (10 May 2005): The 2005 Political Typology: Beyond
Red vs. Blue.
As illustrated here by The 2005 Political Typology from The Pew Research Center, one of the main
things dividing Republicans and Democrats are foreign policy, and one of the main dividing points
within the parties are environmentalism. According to the Typology, many of the groups that have
been identified in the 2005 Typology are similar to past Typologies, reflecting a continued
importance of key beliefs and values. However, assertive foreign policy is a factor that is now more
important than previously (Pew, May 2005: 1-2). That Republicans favour a more muscular foreign
policy, might help explain the difficulties that the Obama administration is facing in trying to get
the US to be part of an international agreement on climate change, which will be elaborated on in
section 3.1.2.
The Republican Party is often characterized as being pro-business, anti-
regulation, and opposed to broad government programs to assist the poor (Pew,
May 2005: 24).
21 Ibid.
27
As noted in the Typology, enterprises and Social Conservatives make up the core of the Republican
supporters (Pew, May 2005: 27). This helps explain why the Republican Party traditionally is close
to business interests that oppose the Kyoto Protocol (Harrison, 2007: 104), which I will elaborate on
in chapter 5.
As noted above, environmentalism is something that also divides the Republican Party. While most
enterprises (at the time of this survey) believed that the country had done more than enough to
protect the environment, and three-quarters of them saw environmental regulation as hurting the
economy and jobs, eight-in-ten Social and Pro-government Conservatives felt the opposite way –
that we should do whatever it takes to protect the environment (Pew, May 2005: 25-26). As
illustrated below, it should be noted that even though the Democratic Party is generally favourable
towards the environment, there are significant divisions – related to wealth and opportunity - within
the Party, just as there are within the Republican Party (Pew, May 2005: 23-24).
Divisions within the Democratic Party:
Divisions within the Republican Party:
Source: The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press (10 May 2005): The 2005 Political Typology: Beyond
Red vs. Blue.
28
3.1.2 American ideology and foreign policy
This section will briefly examine the ideological position behind the American political
considerations, and will therefore take at look at the concepts of realism and idealism, which are the
two main theories in international politics (Gregersen, 2009: 63). By employing these concepts, I
wish to provide greater understanding of why the US acts the way it does in its foreign policy
decisions.
3.1.2.1 Theory of realism and idealism
Realism and idealism are two different approaches to the definition and pursuit of national interests
abroad.22 American Government & Politics Today distinguishes between moral idealism and
political realism. Moral idealism is described as:
A philosophy that sees nations as normally willing to cooperate and to agree on
moral standards for conduct (Schmidt et al., 2009: 635).
Politicians adopting this philosophy believe that most nations can be persuaded to taking moral
considerations into account when conducting their politics. According to this philosophy, nations
should cooperate to keep peace, and according to Schmidt et al., many of the American foreign
policy initiatives have been based on this idealistic standpoint (ibid). Idealists believe that a set of
objective and universal norms, laws, and principles both could and should apply to domestic as well
as international affairs.23
Political realism is described as:
A philosophy that sees each nation as acting principally in its own interests
(Schmidt et al., 2009: 636).
Politicians adopting this philosophy see the world as a place where each nation fights for its own
interests regardless of moral considerations. By definition, all nations are out to improve their own
situations, and therefore realists believe that the US must be prepared to defend itself militarily
(ibid). Therefore, if national welfare is at stake, realists view human rights as conditional as
opposed to idealist who focus on individual welfare and the general interest of all of humanity.24
22 US Foreign Policy Encyclopedia: http://www.answers.com/topic/realism-and-idealism (15/09/2010).23 Ibid.24 Ibid.
29
Realists accept limits on their intentions and their power to interfere abroad, as they recognise the
barriers that national sovereignty place on their efforts to “improve” the political structures and
domestic decisions made by foreign countries.25 Therefore, the core of realism is most often
described as rationality and state-centrism (Donnelly et al., 2009: 32). Idealists see the world in a
more positive light. They believe that through the right leadership, the world can advance both
morally and politically.26
Schmidt et al. argue that despite these differences, it is important to remember that foreign policy in
the US has always been guided by both moral idealism and political realism (Schmidt et al., 2009:
636). Even though foreign policy is guided by both realism and idealism, I believe that one of the
strains will always have preference over the other, depending on who resides as president, which I
will develop on next.
3.1.2.2 Realism and idealism in the US
According to Richard Stengel, managing editor at the Time Magazine, Americans have never cared
much about foreign policy. As a superpower and a country protected by two oceans, the American
people never showed much interest in what was happening in the rest of the world. However, 9/11
2001 this changed. Suddenly, foreign policy was a matter of national security.
One of the problems with American foreign policy and which policy direction to choose is,
according to Stengel, that the country has never had a true dialog about what its foreign policy
should be and what the national interests and values of the country are. If you do not know which
ideals you are fighting for, it makes it difficult to conduct a rational foreign policy. Stengel argues
that foreign policy should transcend political divides because it is essentially about shared values.
He concludes that:
Realism and idealism are two strains not only in our foreign policy but also in our
character as people. We function best when those two values work hand in hand
(Stengel, 09/11/2006).
25 Ibid.26 Ibid.
30
The basic dividing point between the two theories lies in the belief in progress. According to the
theory of realism, it is the states themselves that are the defining actors in international politics. It is
possible for a state to experience growth internally, but the international system is influenced by
anarchy, and here progress is not possible. In the context of the climate change negotiations, this
means that a state can switch to sustainable production methods in order to reduce its GHG
emissions, but that this does not happen because some supranational authority has decided for it to
happen, but because the state itself has an interest in making this happen. So according to this
theory, an organisation like the UN will never be able to force anyone to limit their GHG emissions.
This development has to happen within the states themselves, and therefore, the UN and the IPCC
are subordinate to the self-interest of the states involved (Gregersen, 2009: 63-64).
In opposition to this, idealists look positively on progress. They perceive states as becoming
increasingly interdependent, and believe it to be a fundamental interest to protect the environment.
And as opposed to realists, idealists recognise that there today are international agents that are not
bound by national states, and who will slowly come to dominate the international scene. These
agents include multinational corporations like Vestas, who sees an interest in making national
governments switch to wind energy. International organisation like the UN and NATO are also
included here. The UN is an important agent in creating a global agenda for the climate, but also
organisations like NATO are focused on the fact that climate change poses a security risk for its
member countries, because climate change, among others, leads to an increase in wars and thereby
also to an increase in the number of refugees (Gregersen, 2009: 64).
Realists believe that there is a clear hierarchy between states, which is determined by the physical
power that they possess. You distinguish between superpowers (the US), big powers (France,
China, Germany, England, Russia) and small states (Denmark). If understood in this way, the
dynamic of the climate debate can be explained by the individual powers’ wish to maintain their
position in the hierarchy. Therefore, according to Gregersen, the US’ passiveness in the Kyoto
process27 throughout the 00s is due to its focus on hard power,28 i.e. military power, where it still
had a unique position in the world. Furthermore, as mentioned, realists act principally on their own
interests, and the reason why the US chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol can be explained by the
27 I refer to the whole process of negotiations leading up to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as the Kyoto process.28 Realists focus on hard power, i.e. military and economic power and on a unilateral approach to foreign policy, whereas idealists focus on soft power like the spreading of values and democracy, and have a multilateral approach to foreign policy (Gregersen, 2009: 67).
31
simple fact that the US did not have an interest in ratifying the Protocol because its wish to keep its
oil, coal and auto industries strong and not lose workplaces was stronger than the wish for an
international agreement to reduce GHG emissions (Gregersen, 2009: 62).
The US is gradually approaching the European progressive stand on climate change. According to
Gregersen, this has to be seen in the light of changed domestic conditions in the US, like for
example Barack Obama - who has a different political agenda than George W. Bush - becoming
president (Gregersen, 2009: 64). George W. Bush’s stand on climate change can be characterised as
a demonstration of hard power and the realist way of thinking. In his years as president, his main
focus was on the war on terror, and the subsequent invasions of first Afghanistan and then Iraq.
When Barack Obama took office in January 2009, it immediately caused a shift in US foreign
policy. President Obama’s approach to the Muslim world has from the beginning been focused on
dialog and diplomacy. He has withdrawn the US troops from Iraq and has plans to do the same in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, climate change has from the beginning been one of his top priorities. He
has been fighting to create a comprehensive domestic climate and energy bill, and, at COP 15, he
took part in the international climate change negotiations as the first US president ever. The climate
change negotiations are based on international cooperation and agreement, which indicates that we
are dealing with soft power. That the US is taking part in these negotiations, and that the Obama
administration is fighting to get the US to be part of a future international agreement on climate
change, clearly indicates a shift in position towards soft power and idealism.
As evident from this chapter, the president and his party affiliation play a huge role when it comes
to policies on climate change – both nationally and internationally. However, it is evident that if the
president does not have the support of Congress, he will not get far in the international negotiations.
The next chapter will focus on Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the different US administrations at
the time of the negotiations, as the US negotiation position was clearly influenced by whoever
resided as president of the US at the given time.
32
The evidence gathered by the [Stern] Review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong
and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting.
Nicholas Stern.29
This chapter will look at the history of the climate change meetings and negotiations leading up to
the passing of the Kyoto Protocol. This includes investigating when the world first realised that our
climate was changing and decided to react upon it. These investigations are important as they will
help explain what made the world decide on the creation and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol,
and thereby help stress why it is so important to have every country in the world – including the US
– agree on an international treaty on climate change. The chapter also includes an analysis of the
political situation in the US in the years surrounding the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, as the
political landscape in the US is connected to the position the country chose in the international
negotiations.
Governments are the key players in the Kyoto process, as it is the governments of the world that
will have to adopt the final protocol. This means that the negotiation process is not only influenced
by the state of scientific knowledge, but also by the national interests of the different governments.
These interests vary substantially - especially among countries heavily dependent on the production
and use of fossil fuels and countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Even within
these groups, “polluter interests” and interest in climate change mitigation30 and adaptation31 varies
accordingly (Oberthür, 1999: 13). Besides from governments, there are a number of non-
governmental and international organisations who invest considerable resources to influence the
process. Even though they do not participate directly in the intergovernmental negotiations, they
29 Stern, 2007: xv.30 The IPCC defines mitigation as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.” http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=466 (27/10/2010). 31 The IPCC defines adaptation to climate change as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/454.htm (27/10/2010).
33
4. The Kyoto Protocol
influence government actions by providing information and advice, and making policy
recommendations (Oberthür, 1999: 29).
The UN is the forum in which the climate change negotiations take place, and, therefore, I will start
by an introduction to the UN and the UN’s relationship with the US.
4.1 The UN
In 1945 – just after the end of the Second World War - the UN was founded by 51 countries
wanting to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations
and promote social progress, better living standards and human rights. The international character
of the UN allows it to take action on a wide range of issues and provides a unique forum in which
its 192 Member States can express their views.32 In the context of global climate change, the UN
has taken the lead and has created the forum in which the climate change negotiations take place.
The UN and the US are two of the world’s greatest powers. However, their powers are of different
character, as the US is mainly a military power, whereas the UN is a “moral” power focused on
bringing nations together through dialog. Therefore, it is only natural that the interests of these two
powers sometimes conflict, which the next section will develop on.
4.1.1 The UN/US relationship
This section describes the relationship between the UN and the US. As the UN is the forum in
which the climate change negotiations take place, and the US is the largest financial contributor to
the UN (Chasek, 2007: 382-383), good relations are important to make the cooperation between the
two work. The secretary-general of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, recently stated that the partnership
between the UN and the US is vital to the functioning of the UN (Schlesinger, 2010: 93).
4.1.1.1 The president and the secretary-general
The relationship between the UN and the US is closely related to who resides as president of the US
and as secretary-general of the UN. President Clinton had a close relationship with Kofi Annan, the
32 The UN: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (27/07/2010).
34
former secretary-general, and this was reflected in the overall relationship between the UN and the
US. Under the Bush administration, the relationship between the US and the UN was strongly
neglected, and when Obama took office, hopes were that he would restore the relationship with the
UN. Even though things have changed in the US policy towards the UN, President Obama has not
developed as close a relationship with Ban Ki-moon as it was hoped. Obama has been preoccupied
by domestic issues such as the financial crisis and health care reform, and, according to author and
political commentator, Stephen Schlesinger, there is a general feeling in the US that the UN is not
acting as strongly as it should be in the international arena (Schlesinger, 2010: 87-88). This might
be explained by some Americans focus on hard power. As explained in section 3.1.2.2 on realism
and idealism in the US, the Bush administration focused primarily on realism and hard power,
which might explain why George W. Bush and Ban Ki-moon did not develop a close relationship.
The international and moral power of the UN is a clear demonstration of soft power, and even
though it is argued that foreign policy in the US has always been guided by both realism and
idealism, I also argued that one of these strains always has preference over the other. As argued,
President Bush had a clear focus on hard power with his invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas
Barack Obama’s focus is on dialog and international relations i.e. soft power.
4.1.1.2 Criticism of the US
As the world’s most powerful country, it can be argued that the US has few obvious incentives to
rely on global institutions like the UN, and that it runs few risks in bypassing these institutions,
whereas weaker countries are more dependent on multilateral cooperation, as this gives them the
opportunity to have their voices heard. Due to its status as a superpower, some argue that the US
has a unique responsibility to preserve global order, and to do so, it should not be held back by
global rules and institutions. This has led to criticism from many of the UN member states, claiming
that the US attempts to control the UN in its own self-interest by promoting its values to the rest of
the world – especially those concerning liberalism and democratisation (Chasek, 2007: 364-365).
According to Chasek, Director of International Studies and an Associate Professor of Government
at Manhattan College in New York,
the US tends to champion a policy of picking and choosing from the menu offered
by international organisations only those items that enhance America’s power
and of rejecting those items that might constrain it (Chasek, 2007: 365).
35
This is supported by Jessica T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, who writes that the á la carte multilateralism - in which the US decides which issues it is
willing to cooperate on – is not an approach that goes down easily in the rest of the world
(Gelbspan, 2004: 100).
As the structural setting of the UN mirrors power reality, the critics are not without reason when
they argue that the US might have too much control of the UN. Because of its sheer size and
involvement in what is going on in the world, the US’ power within the UN cannot be compared to
that of small countries, say Janos Tisovszky, deputy director at UNRIC.33
4.1.1.3 US recognition of the UN
Because of the growing complexity and interdependence in international politics today – especially
when it involves economic and environmental issue – as these involve large elements of mutual
advantage that can be achieved only through cooperation (Chasek, 2007: 365), some argue that the
US does in fact recognise the value of the UN. The interdependence in international politics means
that if the US wishes to realise its foreign policy objectives, it has little choice but to cooperate with
other countries and institutions like the UN (ibid). Janos Tisovszky agrees with this assessment and
explains that the days of unilateralism are over, as no parts of the world remain remote or
untouched. No country can adopt a stance that completely shuts out the rest of the world, and
therefore, the US has to use all its disposable forums.
The US prefers to cooperate with like-minded countries, but this is not always easy in a forum like
the UN, where all small countries have a say – something that they would not have on bilateral
level. But in the forum of the UN, countries are able to feel that they are equal because the UN is a
platform for countries to vend their frustrations, and the US is by far the largest receiver of the
criticism often expressed by small countries.
Janos Tisovszky argues that one needs to remember that the US wants exactly the same from the
UN as every country wants – a platform that they can use to trigger national interests. However, the
US is a country that through its sheer power has more power to do so. According to Janos
Tisovszky, the relationship between the UN and the US is often complicated by their differences in
33 Notes from a lecture by Janos Tisovszky on the relationship between the UN and the US, which he gave while I worked at UNRIC.
36
style. Where the US’ way of doing politics is direct, the UN’s style is diplomatic. This is also the
reason why the US is often rejected within the UN – simply because other countries dislike the style
of the US, and not because they dislike the suggestions made by the country. At times, this
approach by the US hinders agreement. Because there are 192 members of the UN, compromise is
at the heart of the UN, and something the organisation strives to reach. However, in the US,
compromise is a negative word that connotes giving up. This in itself poses challenges for the
cooperation between the UN and the US.34
Another important factor in the US’ attitudes towards international cooperation with multilateral
institutions is its focus on cost-benefit analysis, meaning that it might be useful for the US to
cooperate with the UN because it is likely to achieve specific objectives at a lower cost when
cooperating, than if it took a unilateral approach. So when the US chooses to cooperate with
institutions like the UN, it will most often be because domestic actors in the US find it to be an
effective way of promoting American objectives (Chasek, 2007: 365).
As already mentioned, American support is highly important for the UN. Not only is the US the
UN’s largest financial contributor, it is also the most powerful country on Earth. Furthermore, when
the US refuses to ratify treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, it becomes an excuse for other countries to
do the same. The only thing that will most often hold a small country from following the example
of the US is that a small country will not be able to get away with this. There is not much that can
force a country to abide by the rules of the UN, as the UN is only a “moral” power. However, no
country wants to be named and shamed – which might be the consequence of not abiding to the
rules of the UN - and there is a bigger chance of this happening to a small country than to the US.
Having described the somewhat complicated relationship between the UN and the US, the next
section will turn to the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol.
4.2 Earth Summit
The issue of climate change and the relationship between economic development and environmental
degradation was first raised at the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in
34 Lecture by Janos Tisovszky.
37
Stockholm in 1972, when the international community came together to consider the global
environment and development needs. One of the most important outcomes of UNCHE was the
formation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
However, negotiations for a protocol that would set internationally binding targets for reducing
GHG emissions did not begin until 20 years later, when heads of states and governments from 172
countries met at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also
known as Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Around 2,400 NGO representatives and
17,000 people attended the parallel NGO Forum. Furthermore, 10,000 journalists helped spread the
message around the world that nothing less than a transformation of our attitudes and behaviour
would bring about the necessary changes.35 Governments realised that they had to redirect
international and national plans and policies to ensure that all economic decisions took into
consideration the environmental impacts they might cause.
Three important agreements were established at the Earth Summit:
1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was
produced as a first step on the road towards tackling the problem of climate change. The
Convention does not set legally binding emission targets for the Parties, but require Annex I
Parties to adopt programmes and policies that aim to stabilise GHG emissions (OECD (2),
1999: 18).
2. The Convention on Biological Diversity – an international treaty to sustain the diversity of
life on Earth.
3. Agenda 21 – a non-binding comprehensive programme for global action in all areas of
sustainable development (Schreurs, 2003: 173).
21 March 1994, the UNFCCC, which was agreed upon at the Earth Summit in 1992, entered into
force. The aim of the Convention was to set an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts in
tackling the challenges posed by climate change. However, because of US opposition, the
Convention did not set specific GHG emission reduction targets or timetables for achieving
reductions (ibid).
The entering into force of the Convention also came to mean that the Parties to the Framework set
by the Convention meet annually in Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to assess the progress made
35 UN: http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (01/05/2010).
38
in tackling climate change. Next, I will briefly go through the COPs leading up to the signing of the
Kyoto Protocol.
4.3 COP 1
The first Conference of the Parties (COP) was held in Berlin in the spring of 1995. Because of
domestic opposition and a landslide victory in the US Congress by the Republicans, and the
economic recession and unwillingness of several European governments to support stringent action
on climate change, the lead up to the Berlin Conference lacked leadership. With no major
industrialised nation pushing for development, this meant that discussions proceeded at a very slow
pace (Oberthür, 1999: 44).
The Parties agreed that the commitments made in the UNFCCC were inadequate, and therefore they
started negotiating for an agreement that would set targets and timetables for reducing GHG
emissions for Annex I Parties. This resulted – after intense negotiations and blocks from several
different sides - in the establishing of the Berlin Mandate.36 In order to secure support from
developing countries, the Mandate stated that no new obligations for developing countries would be
introduced in the next round of talks. The plan was to have a draft for this new agreement ready for
COP 3, which Japan offered to host in Kyoto. In preparation for this, an Ad Hoc Group to the
Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was established (Oberthür, 1999: 43-47). The aim of the AGBM was to
work out a protocol or another legal instrument that included targets and timetables for GHG
emission limitations and reductions of industrialised countries (Oberthür, 1999: 47). The group was
set to meet eight times in order to have a draft protocol ready for the Kyoto meeting in 1997.
The AGBM negotiations leading up to the meeting in Kyoto gained even greater importance when
the IPCC released its Second Assessment Report in December 1995. The content of this report
ended up establishing the scientific basis for the Kyoto process (Oberthür, 1999: 4). The Report
stated that:
The balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on
global climate (Oberthür, 1999: 51).
The IPCC Second Assessment Report had drawn heavily on US research results, and – as opposed
to the First Assessment Report from 1990, which the US administration flatly rejected (Armitage, 36 For more information on the negotiation process and the different groupings blocking it, see Oberthür chapter 4.
39
2008: 140) - the US administration acknowledged and publicly supported the findings of the Second
Assessment Report (Oberthür, 1999: 51). Of course it has to be noted that the administration that
rejected the First IPCC Assessment Report was the sceptic Bush senior administration, and that it
was the climate friendly Clinton administration that supported the findings of the Second IPCC
Assessment Report.
4.4 COP 2
COP 2 was held in Geneva in July 1996. Here the progress of the first four AGBM meeting was
reviewed, and further directions were provided for the final four meetings. Besides from this, the
COP did not lead to any immediate acceleration of the negotiations. The majority of countries
wanted to use the IPCC report as the basis for elaborating a protocol, which OPEC members -
because of prevailing uncertainties - did not find acceptable. After lobbying from the Global
Climate Coalition (GCC)37 and the Climate Council, Russia joined forces with OPEC, and Australia
also expressed reservations. As the Rules of Procedure were not yet adopted, it meant that a
decision could not be based on a vote, which was why the majority started looking for other ways of
guiding the Kyoto process. This led to the majority of countries deciding to adopt the Geneva
Ministerial Declaration. Because of the Clinton administration’s attempt to change the
environmental profile of the country, the US supported the Declaration.38 This altered the
distribution of power between the progressive and laggard forces, leaving OPEC and Russia
isolated, which in the end enabled agreement on the Geneva Ministerial Declaration (Oberthür,
1999: 52-55).
4.4.1 Meetings leading up to Kyoto
Climate diplomacy before the Kyoto meeting extended far beyond the eight AGBM meetings.
There were hardly any high-level international meeting before the final COP 3 in Kyoto where
heads of state, foreign ministers and economic ministers, environment ministers and others did not
discuss climate change (Oberthür, 1999: 59).
37 For information on the GCC, see section 5.5.3.38 The Declaration recognised the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC as currently the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate change. It also committed Annex I Parties to adopt quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations and significant overall reductions within specified timeframes (Oberthür, 1999: 53).
40
At the AGBM meetings following COP 2, an intensely debated issue remained whether the policies
and measure to be included in the agreement would be legally-binding or not. Even though this
issue had been settled by the Berlin Mandate, the US in particular kept pushing for commitments by
developing countries (Oberthür, 1999: 49-51). In June 1997, the UN General Assembly Special
Session (UNGASS) met to review the implementation of Agenda 21 from the Earth Summit in Rio
in 1992. However, one of the most important things that happened at UNGASS was President
Clinton’s speech in which he took a firm stance on climate change. In his speech he commended the
European leadership in the climate change debate and made it clear that his own inability to exert
international leadership on climate change was due to domestic conditions - especially opposition
from the US Congress. He committed himself to convince the American people and the Congress
that the climate change problem is real and imminent (Oberthür, 1999: 61). This was a strong
message to his opponents as well as the negotiating partners that the US administration would keep
fighting for a deal in Kyoto. In general, it was primarily the major nations’ domestic options and
constraints that influenced the prospects of reaching a successful deal in Kyoto (Oberthür, 1999:
65).
4.5 COP 3
When delegates arrived in Kyoto in December 1997, many issues for a protocol still remained
unresolved (Oberthür, 1999: 79). There had been uncertainty about whether Al Gore would attend
the conference or not, so when he arrived in Kyoto for the Ministerial Segment39 at the beginning of
the second week, it illustrated both his personal commitment and the US administration’s
commitment to reach an agreement (Oberthür, 1999: 85). After negotiating non-stop for 24 hours,
the negotiators adopted The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. The Protocol ended on reduction targets saying that the US and EU should reduce
their GHG emissions by 7 % and 8 %, respectively, relative to 1990 levels to be achieved between
2008 and 2012 (Harrison, 2007: 101). The Protocol opened for signature on 16 March 1998, and –
as much work still needed to be done on the Protocol - COP 6 was set as the deadline for
transforming the Kyoto Protocol into something that governments could ratify and implement
(Victor, 2004: 124).
39 During the first week of a COP meeting, the delegates of each nation negotiate on behalf of their country. During the second week of the negotiations, the ministers and heads of state of each country arrive at the COP to finalise the negotiations.
41
4.6 COP meetings following 1997
In order to illustrate the amount of work that still needed to be done on the Protocol after COP 3,
this section will briefly go through the COPs following the meeting in Kyoto.
Because the Kyoto Protocol left many procedural issues open, the Clinton administration kept
pushing for meaningful participation from key developing countries, but these still remained
exempt from new emission reduction commitments (Tamura, 2006: 294-295).
COP 4 took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November 1998. Here the Parties adopted The
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, with the aim of setting up a programme to figure out the operational
details for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Work on The Buenos Aires Plan of Action
continued at COP 5 in Bonn, Germany, in October/November 1999, and at COP 6 in The Hague in
November 2000.40 As the Parties were not able to reach an agreement on a range of issues, they
decided to meet again at a resumed session of COP 6 to try and solve the differences.
The US presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore took place at the same time as
COP 6 in The Hague. However, due to confusing ballots and problems with the counting machines,
it took a month to determine who had won the presidential election. This meant that the US
delegates in The Hague were negotiating on behalf of an unknown president, and there was bound
to be a huge difference in the US position on climate change depending on whether it was Al Gore
– who as vice-president was already in charge of White House climate policy – or George W. Bush
who won. Even though Congress had passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (see section 4.7.2.1),
people were unsure of whether a new president who supported the Kyoto Protocol could get it
through Congress (Victor, 2004: 125).
When George W. Bush, after winning the presidential election, announced his exit from the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, the EU and other key industrialised nations had to work even harder to find a
way beyond the deadlock at The Hague (Victor, 2004: 128).
COP 6 part II took place in Bonn in July 2001. The parties finally agreed on key issues and
succeeded in adopting The Bonn Agreement on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of
40 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/cop7/issues/briefhistory.html (17/06/2010).
42
Action.41 The Marrakesh Accords were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in
October/November 2001, and stipulated the details for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.42
When the Kyoto Protocol closed for signature on 16 March 1999, it had received 84 signatures.
However, Article 22 of the Protocol stipulates that Parties to the UNFCCC that have not signed the
Protocol may do so at any time.
Finally, in 2005, Russia signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which meant that 16 February 2005
– more than seven years after COP 3 in Kyoto - the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. Article 25 of
the Protocol states that:
This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in
Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon
dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.43
Today there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which leaves the total
percentage of Annex I Parties emissions at 63.7 %. The US remains the only party not to have
ratified the Protocol.44
4.7 The US political situation during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations
This section will analyse the political situation in the US in the years surrounding the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, starting in 1988 when George H. W. Bush was elected president, as he was
president of the US when the negotiations began, and was the first president to clearly mark the
sceptical position of the US in the climate change negotiations.
41 Ibid.42 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (17/06/2010).43 The Kyoto Protocol, appendix 1, article 25, paragraph 1.44 UNFCCC: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (17/06/2010).
43
4.7.1 The Bush senior administration
During his presidential election campaign in 1988, Republican George H. W. Bush talked about the
power of the White House in addressing the greenhouse effect. However, at a climate change
conference convened at President Bush’s initiative in Washington, DC, in April 1990, Bush stated
that no action should be taken before the science was more certain (Schreurs, 2003: 150).
Despite scepticism and opposition to action in both the US and other countries, formal international
negotiations on climate change began in February 1991. The UN General Assembly established an
Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) to prepare a framework convention that would
expand internationally agreed upon understandings of the problems and the actions to be taken
(ibid). At the first INC meeting, the US quickly established its position. The US delegation made it
clear that it felt that the science of climate change was still too uncertain to use as background for
establishing quantifiable targets. According to the Bush administration, action to address global
warming should only be taken if it posed minimal costs to society and at the same time was
beneficial in other areas, such as energy conservation (Schreurs, 2003: 151). At the 1992 Earth
Summit, President Bush declared that the American way of life is not negotiable (Wheeler,
03/08/2004). At this point in time, facts were that the US was home to only 4 % of the world
population, but consumed 25 % of its oil – making the American way of life a very unsustainable
one (ibid).
Much of the US scepticism about including GHG emission reduction targets in the Framework
Convention came from George H. W. Bush’s key advisors. These were very sceptical about the
climate science and concerned about the economic costs because they feared that regulatory action
on climate change would hurt the American industrial competitiveness. At the same time they were
pressured by opposition from the oil, coal and auto industries (Schreurs, 2003: 152). Therefore,
instead of a convention setting internationally binding targets, the US pushed for an agreement
under which states would be required to set their own national strategies for reducing GHG
emissions. In the end, just three months after the Earth Summit in Rio, the US Senate unanimously
ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This was not
least due to the fact that the Convention’s goal of stabilising emissions at 1990 levels was non-
binding because US negotiators had succeeded in keeping emission targets and timetables for GHG
reductions out of the agreement (Harrison, 2007: 98). However, the US refused to sign the
44
Convention on Biological Diversity, as it felt that the Convention did not protect the pharmaceutical
industry and intellectual property rights (Schreurs, 2003: 175).
4.7.2 The Clinton administration
When Democratic President William J. “Bill” Clinton assumed office with Vice-President Albert
Arnold “Al” Gore in 1993, things changed in the White House. Al Gore was considered one of the
greenest politicians ever to enter the White House, which meant that expectations among
environmental groups were high, as was fear among industry groups.
It was clear that the Clinton-Gore team was going to change US’ position on key international
environment issues. On Earth Day45 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which George H. W. Bush had refused to sign (Schreurs, 2003: 177).
Furthermore, the Clinton-Gore team came up with several environmental initiatives. The first one
was to propose a tax on the energy content of fuels, known as a British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax, in
an effort to penalise heavy GHG polluters (Schreurs, 2003: 178). Even though Democrats were in
majority in Congress during the first two years of the Clinton administration, the BTU tax did not
make it through Congress, as a result of effective lobbying from the coal, oil and auto industries.
These argued that an energy tax would give the American competitiveness an unfair disadvantage
on the global market, as the American economy is designed to run on cheap energy. Instead the
proposal was reduced to a 4.3 cent a gallon tax on gasoline (Harrison, 2007: 99). In October 1993,
the Clinton-Gore team released a Climate Change Action Plan. Yet, because of the opposition from
Congress, the Action Plan relied exclusively on voluntary programmes to make industry and
government improve their energy efficiency, reduce GHG emissions, and promote renewable
energies as these did not require legislative action (ibid). Even though there was not much power
behind the Action Plan, it led to the formation of the US Country Studies Program which was set up
to help developing countries assess their GHG emissions sources (vegetation that releases carbon
dioxide) and sinks (vegetation that absorbs carbon dioxide), and to the Initiative on Joint
Implementation - a non-regulatory pilot program set up to promote international partnerships to
combat GHG emissions (Schreurs, 2003: 178).
45 Earth Day takes place every year on 22 April to aspire awareness and appreciation of the Earth’s environment.
45
By the mid-1990s, with the approach of COP 3 in Kyoto, domestic opposition in the US had
strengthened, and the GCC was working hard to convince the President and the American public
that energy prices could rise by as much as 20 % if the President signed a deal with the UN. The
Clinton-Gore team met opposition from the Republican Party who had won control of both
chambers of Congress in the 1994 midterm election, which made it very difficult for environmental
policies in the White House (ibid). Along with expressing disapproval of the direction of the climate
negotiations, one of the first things that Congress did was to make it clear that they would not ratify
the Convention on Biological Diversity that Clinton had signed (Schreurs, 2003: 178). However, it
was not only Republicans who expressed opposition to climate change legislation. Opposition also
came from Democrats who were concerned about the impacts a climate agreement might have on
employers in their constituencies (Harrison, 2007: 99).
In the re-election campaign in 1996, the Clinton administration succeeded in raising its
environmental profile, and in 1997 it stepped up the domestic efforts on climate change. The
administration launched the White House Initiative on Global Climate Change campaign with the
aim of generating public awareness and support for action on climate change. The campaign
included regional conferences across the country which helped generate media coverage on the
issue. In October 1997, President Clinton toured the country, explaining the need for action. The
administration was supported by environmental NGOs which helped raise the profile of the
campaign and consistently kept challenging the arguments coming from a small group of climate
sceptics (Oberthür, 1999: 68-69).
4.7.2.1 The fossil fuel lobby
The Clinton administration was not the only one launching a new campaign. The fossil fuel lobby –
through the GCC and the Climate Council - sponsored a 13 million dollar media-campaign, which
denounced the scientific basis of climate change, and stated that emission reductions by
industrialised countries would be meaningless because of dramatically rising emissions in
developing countries. The fossil fuel lobby knew that developing countries would never agree to set
emission limitations for themselves, and the Berlin Mandate stipulated that they did not have to.
Therefore, this argument was, according to Oberthür, strategically aimed at sinking the international
process of reaching an agreement in Kyoto (Oberthür, 1999: 69-70).
46
The result of this followed in July 1997 when the Senate made any possibility for an agreement in
Kyoto with US participation impossible by unanimously (95-0) passing the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
The Resolution states that the Senate would not ratify any international treaty that:
(A) mandate(s) new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.46
That the resolution was passed unanimously clearly demonstrates the seriousness of the opposition
that the Clinton-Gore team was facing from both Republicans and Democrats. Although violating
the consensus of the Berlin Mandate, the Clinton-Gore team was left with no choice but to adapt
their negotiating position to be in line with the Senate’s request. This meant the US participation in
the Kyoto Protocol was made dependent on participation from key developing countries. At the
same time, President Clinton called for stabilisation of GHG emissions on 1990 levels by 2008-
2012, which was the most progressive of the proposals under consideration by the US (Oberthür,
1999: 70).
It was not only in the US that the fossil fuel lobby tried to affect the outcome of the meeting in
Kyoto - it also lobbied in the developing world. However, the message communicated to developing
countries - and especially Asian developing countries - was somewhat different than the one
communicated in the US. Asia - a major emerging market for the fossil fuel industry - was entering
an economic crisis in the late 1997, and the fossil fuel lobby took advantage of this by advising
these countries that they could neither afford emission limitations for themselves nor emission
reductions for the industrialised countries as both of these scenarios would limit their economic
development. At the World Petroleum Congress in October 1997 in Beijing, China, the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Exxon Corporation, Lee R. Raymond, called upon developing
nations to “work with us to resist policies that strangle economic growth.” Raymond - with no
regard for the scientific evidence of climate change - declared that poverty was the most pressing
environmental problem for developing countries, and that addressing this would “require economic
growth, which will necessitate increasing, not curtailing the use of fossil fuels” (Oberthür, 1999:
46 See appendix 2 for the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
47
73). The aim of lobbying both sides of the Pacific in this way was to play both parties out against
each other.
If the US insisted on developing country commitments and China and others were
sceptical even of emission limitations in the industrialised world, the Kyoto
process would eventually lead nowhere (Oberthür, 1999: 73).
At COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, the presence of Vice President Al Gore helped the negotiation
process as this showed that the US was serious about reaching an agreement. Clinton did sign the
Kyoto Protocol, but already the morning after the signing, the US Congress held a news conference
declaring that the Senate would never ratify it, as it did not satisfy the provisions set forth in the
Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Because of this, the Clinton administration kept pushing for some kind of
commitment from developing countries. Even though the US was in a strong bargaining position
because it accounted for 36 % of 1990 Annex I emissions and the Protocol could not enter into
force until it was ratified by countries accounting for at least 55 % of Annex I 1990 emissions, it
still faced opposition from the EU on this issue. At the same time, Congress kept defeating every
bill that so much as mentioned climate change, and to attach “anti-climate-policy riders” to various
other bills in an effort to tie the administration’s hands (Harrison, 2007: 103).
4.7.3 The Bush administration
When Republican George W. Bush won the presidential election in 2000, the White House’s
perspectives on climate change changed dramatically. During his election campaign, George W.
Bush stated his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, but to respond to his Democratic opponent Al
Gore’s strong environmental profile, he proposed that electric utilities should be legally bound to
lower their CO2 emissions as these account for about 40 % of US GHGs (ibid). However, in March
2001, two months after his inauguration, President Bush wrote a letter to four Republican Senators
in which he turned down his pledge to regulate GHG emissions (Harrison, 2007: 104).
Part of President Bush’s opposition to environmental policies can be found in the fact that he,
besides from being Republican, is from Texas, which is an oil state. Furthermore, he appointed
several of the climate change deniers who were part of the GCC’s disinformation campaign to key
positions in his administration. His Vice President, Dick Cheney, had previously been CEO of the
world’s largest oilfield support company (ibid), and Philip A. Cooney, whom he put in charge of
48
environmental policy in the White House, had led the disinformation programme for the American
Petroleum Institute (Gore, 2009: 365).
After announcing that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush asked the
National Academy of Science (NAS) to review the state of climate science. After having reviewed
the Second IPCC Assessment Report, NAS confirmed the IPCC conclusion that
there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the
last 50 years is attributable to human activities (Harrison, 2007: 104).
However, the report also concluded that a causal linkage between the buildup of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere and the observed climate change during the 20 th century cannot be unequivocally
established (Harrison, 2007: 105) – a sentence that the White House chose to embrace time and
again. In 2003, an internal memo from the US EPA was leaked. In this memo, EPA staff
complained that the White House had edited an EPA climate chapter to the extent that it no longer
reflected the scientific consensus on climate change. It was later found that the White House editor
was Philip A. Cooney who had no scientific credentials. Cooney resigned, and the next day he was
employed by Exxon Mobil (Harrison, 2007: 105).
The Bush Administration did launch a Global Climate Initiative, but according to Victor, this was
merely a series of voluntary measures and underfunded technology programs designed mainly to
give the appearance of a credible response (Victor, 2004: 130). After 11 September 2001, the main
focus of the Bush administration became the war on terror. Before the twin towers fell, the US
remained isolated and under serious pressure from the rest of the world to take action on climate
change. However, the broad public pressure for the US to take action, which had been mounting,
disappeared immediately. According to Victor, the only positive thing that came from the US’
withdrawal from the Protocol was that it was no longer actively interfering with the rest of the
world’s effort to create a Protocol to combat climate change (Victor, 2004: 130-131).
As illustrated in this chapter, the Kyoto Process was very much influenced by the US. The process
was slowed by a continued pressure from the US, as it wanted developing country commitments
before it was willing to make any commitments of its own. When this did not happen, the US
Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution which made ratification of the Kyoto Protocol impossible.
49
At a crucial moment in history, when the rest of the world was requesting and eagerly expecting
American leadership – not to mention vision – our nation found itself embarrassed and isolated at
Rio.
Al Gore.47
This chapter will go into depth with the US arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, and
give an assessment of whether these arguments can be considered to be legitimate.
That the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol was a direct effect of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution48
passed in July 1997. In 2001, EPA Administrator, Christine Todd Whitman, started pushing for
Bush to honour his campaign promise of reducing GHG emissions. Because of this, George W.
Bush wrote a letter to the four senators, Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts in March 2001, in which
he turned down his earlier pledge, made during his presidential election campaign, to regulate
emissions, and gave three arguments for why the US would still not ratify the Kyoto Protocol:49
1. It exempts 80 % of the world, including major population centers such as China and India,
from compliance.
2. Ratifying the Protocol could potentially cause serious harm to the US economy because of
the country’s reliance on coal for more than half of its electricity.
3. The state of the scientific knowledge on the cause of and solutions to global warming is too
incomplete to rely on.
As mentioned in chapter 3, public opinion plays a big role in US policy-making, and Steurer argues
that the Bush administration’s choice not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol also has to be seen against the
backdrop of weak public support for climate policy and the political power of numerous well
organised special interests (Harrison, 2007: 111). Therefore, along with analysing the three points
presented above, this chapter will also analyse the concepts of public opinion and lobbying, to find
out what role these concepts played in the US’ decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
47 Gore, 1992: xiii.48 See appendix 2 for the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.49 See appendix 3 for Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts.
50
5. US arguments for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
5.1 Exemption of developing countries
This section will analyse the argument of not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts
developing countries from any commitments – an argument which was also widely discussed in the
papers in the months leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009.
As noted in the letter from President Bush to the four senators, international factors played a role in
the US’ decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The prospect of losing competitiveness to other
countries was one of the central aspects in the opposition to ratification. This became very clear
with the passing of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, where competitiveness with developing countries
was one of the two defining factors for whether the US Senate would ratify the Protocol or not. The
Resolution states that exemption of developing countries is inconsistent with the need for global
action on climate change and is environmentally flawed.50 Therefore, because of significantly rising
emissions in developing countries, the US felt that emissions reductions without participation from
the developing world would render any emissions reductions by industrialised countries
meaningless (Oberthür, 1999: 69-70). The US has a valid point when it argues that because climate
change is a global problem, the world cannot afford a deal that exempts developing countries
(Victor, 2004: 33). Reality is that global carbon emissions are estimated to double between 1990
and 2020, and much of this growth is the result of an increasing energy demand from developing
countries (Fisher, 1998: 86).
In 1990, Annex I countries contributed almost 70 % of global CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion. However, by around 2016 emissions from developing
countries are projected to overtake those from Annex I countries and by 2020
developing countries will contribute about 52 % of global emissions (Fisher,
1998: 86-87).
Therefore, it can be argued that the only way to stabilise “greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate
system” – the objective of the UNFCCC – is by engaging developing countries in the process.51 The
US was not the only country to feel this way, but as Connie Hedegaard argues, even though there
was agreement that a protocol that did not include the developing countries would not have the
needed effect, it was the best obtainable result for a protocol at the time (Hedegaard, 2008: 105).
50 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, appendix 2.51 UNFCCC, Article 2: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php (23/11/2010).
51
5.1.1 Developing countries’ arguments
China and India have been leading the way for the developing nations, refusing to accept any
limitations on their GHG emissions (Victor, 2004: 34). Especially China has long been suspicious
of the international climate change negotiations because it fears that the industrialised world will try
to hinder the growth of the country (Gøttske, 23/07/2010). The argument most used by the
developing countries is that they did not cause the situation that we are in today, and therefore they
should not pay to restore it.
Historically, industrialised nations are responsible for nearly all the emissions of
greenhouse gases that have slowly accumulated in Earth’s atmosphere – causing
global warming today and also committing future generations to climate changes
that they cannot escape for centuries (Victor, 2004: 33).
Therefore, developing countries argue that it cannot be their responsibility to restore something that
they did not cause - an argument that through the Berlin Mandate52 has been accepted by most of
the world, and which has kept the developing world from having to commit to any emission
reductions. At the beginning of the 1990s, 3/4 of the world population living in developing
countries accounted for less than 1/3 of global GHG emissions, which has made some people
classify developing countries’ emissions as “survival emissions” and contrast them with the “luxury
emissions” of the industrialised countries (Oberthür, 1999: 27). In the beginning of the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, the Protocol did mentioned developing nations and urged these to commit to
lowering their emissions. However, in Kyoto, developing nations succeeded in having this phrase
deleted from the Protocol, which only worsened the gap between the developing world and the US
(Victor, 2004: 34).
As illustrated in this section, because the developing world’s emissions are expected to overtake
those of the developed world by 2020, the US clearly had a point in arguing that every country -
including developing countries - needed to be part of the Protocol. However, seen from the point of
view of the developing nations, which, as mentioned, have not caused the immense rise in GHG
emissions that we are witnessing today, committing to an agreement that leaves out the biggest
polluter of them all hardly seems like a fair agreement. Had the US chosen to show leadership and
commit to reducing its GHG emissions, the situation might have been different.52 See section 4.3 for information on the Berlin Mandate.
52
5.2 Harm to the US economy
This section will analyse the argument that the ratification of an international climate treaty would
cause harm to the US economy, because of its reliance on coal and oil.
“I will not accept a plan that will harm our economy and hurt American workers.
Because first things first are the people who live in America. That’s my priority.”
George W. Bush, Los Angeles Times, 30 March 2001.
As noted in the letter to the four senators as well as in this quote, George W. Bush accordingly
chose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because of concern for the American people (Harrison, 2007:
104).
The argument that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol would harm the US economy is closely related to
the argument of scientific uncertainty. According to Henson, the argument was based on the fact
that it could not be said with absolute certainty how much it was going to warm, or what the local
and regional impacts would be, and therefore it was better not to commit the country to costly CO2
reductions (Henson, 2006: 249). However, many decisions of importance to nations are made in the
absence of absolute certainty, which is why it can be argued that this argument is not valid.
Evidence points to the fact that reducing GHG emissions will far from harm the economy.
American lifestyle is, as already explained, associated with very high energy intensity, which is
why Oberthür argues that there are numerous low-cost means of saving energy and reducing GHG
emissions. Still, the perception – which has been furthered by the oil, coal and auto industries - that
reducing the country’s GHG emissions would be extremely expensive is widespread in the US
(Oberthür, 1999: 19).
Part of the problem is that it is impossible to say exactly how much it will cost a given country - or
the world - to reduce its GHG emissions. There are no immediate economic gains in reducing the
country’s GHG emissions, and as a rational player, the US does not want to commit itself to
something that does not show results in the short-term. Climate polices will affect the country in the
long-term, but rational players are prone to focus on short-term gains. As explained in section
3.1.2.2 on idealism and realism in the US, George W. Bush’s focus was on realism and hard power,
which helps explain why he did not find it to be in the interest of the country to commit to reducing
53
the US’ GHG emissions. Furthermore, Al Gore argues that because we have nothing to compare the
climate crisis with, i.e. no emotional reference point of the past, the rule of reason is given more
weight than if we had previously experienced something similar that we could compare the situation
to (Gore, 2009: 304).
In the long run, reducing GHG emissions are likely to be money-saving, Henson argues. New
energy technologies are likely to stimulate job growth and thereby be of advantage to the US
economy (Henson, 2006: 250). In the IPCC Second Assessment Report from 1995 – which
established the scientific basis of the Kyoto Protocol, and of which the US administration had
publicly supported the findings - it is argued that reducing GHG emissions does not have to cause
harm to the economy. According to the report, 10-30 % energy-efficiency gains above the present
levels (1995) would be feasible at no or little cost in many parts of the world over the next two-
three decades. The report also states that, if using the most advanced technology, energy-efficiency
gains of 50-65 % would be technically feasible in many countries over the same time period
(Oberthür, 1999: 51).
As argued in this section, the IPCC Second Assessment Report – which had drawn heavily on US
research results (ibid) – concluded that reducing GHG emissions did not have to cause harm to the
US economy. Therefore, as the US publicly supported these findings, I argue that the administration
did not have sufficient evidence to claim that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol would end up harming
the economy. As I will illustrate in section 5.5 on lobbying, only certain industry groups would be
harmed by limiting GHG emissions, and these industry groups happened to be some of the most
powerful and influential in the US.
5.3 Insufficient state of scientific knowledge
According to President George W. Bush’s letter from March 2001, the third reason for not ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol was that the state of scientific knowledge was insufficient. However,
insufficient knowledge has not previously prevented the US from taking action when it comes to
international environmental policies.
54
In 1987, the US participated in adopting The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, even though there were significant scientific uncertainties about the ozone depleting
effect of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which is accepted today. At the time of ratification, the ozone
hole had been detected, but its cause was unknown. However, on the basis of the available
evidence, governments – including the US government – decided that the best solution would be to
limit the use of CFCs, in order not to take any risks (Oberthür, 1999: 11).
According to the IPCC Second Assessment Report, the balance of evidence suggests that there is a
discernible human influence on global climate (Oberthür, 1999: 4). The IPCC findings represent a
broad international scientific consensus because it is based on assessments of the state of scientific
knowledge from thousands of scientists from across the globe (Oberthür, 1999: 10). Furthermore,
according to Fisher et al., there was a widespread acceptance of the climate science in the year
leading up to the Kyoto negotiations. The debate was not about whether the science was accurate or
not, or whether to set targets for reducing GHG emissions or not, but about the most cost-effective
way of meeting the targets (Fisher et al, 1998: 88).
This illustrates that scientific uncertainties were in fact not a valid reason for choosing not to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol. The scientific evidence was there, and the US had earlier ratified an
international agreement on the environment even though the scientific evidence was not strong.
However, as it was the governments that were the decisive players in the Kyoto process and not the
scientists, it is obvious that the negotiating behaviour of the governments was not just influenced by
the state of scientific knowledge, but also by their national interests (Oberthür, 1999: 13). In fact,
according to Oberthür, it was primarily the domestic options and constraints of the major players’ in
the Kyoto process that influenced the prospect for a successful outcome (Oberthür, 1999: 65). As
the US is the world’s largest producer of oil, coal and gas, its stance on climate change was very
much influenced by this (Oberthür, 1999: 18), which will be developed on in section 5.5.
5.4 US attitudes towards climate change
Although the scientific community has known since 1995 that we are changing our climate, the US
press has done a deplorable job in disseminating that information, and all its implications, to the
public.
55
Ross Gelbspan.53
This section will focus on how the public perceives climate change, because this, as argued, affects
whether it will be a policy priority for members of Congress. Before doing this, I will examine one
of the most important factors influencing how climate change is perceived by the public – the
media.
5.4.1 The media and climate change
There are several different factors influencing how the public perceives the danger and seriousness
of climate change. I argue that the most important factor in shaping public opinion is the media.
Both Connie Hedegaard and Al Gore are criticising the way the media operates today (Gore, 2009:
362; Hedegaard, 2008: 16). They argue that there is no longer time for serious journalism, which
means that it is up to the individual to evaluate who is right and who is wrong in the climate debate.
This means that whoever does the best job in convincing the public of his or her standpoint is seen
as being right. Moreover, in today’s media, you often have to make your case understandable to the
public in a very short span of time, which means that it is easier to communicate the provocative
square point of view, than explaining complicated scientific results, measures and analyses in
laymen terms (Hedegaard, 2008: 16).
According to Victor, there are big differences in how European and American newspapers report on
climate change. Where the European newspapers constantly report new findings on climate change
science, American newspapers are relatively silent when it comes to climate change (Victor, 2004:
127-128). A general criticism has been the way the climate debate is portrayed in the media. When
climate change does appear in the US media, it suffers from the media paradigm - which is very
pronounced in the US – that seeks to give equal weight to both sides of a story, with an advocate
from each of the opposing groups expressing his or her point of view. Journalists are taught to abide
to this norm of balance - telling both sides of the story. However, while this is especially honoured
in the political debate, it creates a false picture in the climate change debate, as this type of
reporting conveys a misleading sense that the sceptics represent half of the world’s climate
scientists rather than a small group of sceptics (Henson, 2006: 252; Boykoff, 2004).
53 Gelbspan, 2004.
56
By giving equal time to opposing views, the major mainstream newspapers
significantly downplayed scientific understanding of the role humans play in
global warming. Certainly there is a need to represent multiple viewpoints, but
when generally agreed-upon scientific findings are presented side-by-side with
the viewpoints of a handful of sceptics, readers are poorly served (Boykoff,
2004).
Gelbspan goes as far as describing balanced reporting in the climate change debate as journalistic
laziness (Gelbspan, 2004: 73). He writes that when it is a question of opinion – like the war in Iraq
or whether abortion should be legal or not – balanced reporting is required in order for the journalist
to be ethical. However, when it is a question of fact, the reporter is obliged to dig into the story and
find out what the facts actually are (ibid). But, just like the policy-makers and the public, journalists
too were influenced by the fossil fuel group’s disinformation campaigns, which will be developed
on in section 5.5.
Povl Frich, special advisor to the Danish Energy Agency and Denmark’s official contact in the
IPCC, also criticises the way the media is portraying the climate debate – not just in Denmark, but
in general. According to him, the media is distorting the scientific knowledge which shows that
global warming is caused by human activities. He states that even the most insignificant criticism
from commentators, editors and climate sceptics is being blown out of proportions by the press
(Aagaard and Andersen, 12/02/2010).
In an article in Energy Policy from 2007, Guri Bang et al. argue that an increase in damage caused
by climate change might create a domestic push for climate change legislation. However, they argue
that this will only happen if the media links these events to global warming, which has often not
been the case in the US news coverage. Therefore, a majority of Americans do not link for example
the increase in hurricanes to global warming. But if the link between the increase in extreme
weather events and global warming should be scientifically documented and communicated
effectively to the public, public opinion might change and thereby also trigger a change in climate
policy (Bang, 2007: 1287).
57
5.4.2 Media coverage from 1988 and onwards
This section will briefly describe how media coverage has developed from the years surrounding
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and onwards, in order to illustrate what influence this has had on
the public, and thereby also on the public’s attitudes towards being part of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the study “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the U.S. Prestige Press” published in July
2004, Maxwell Boykoff and Jules Boykoff analysed articles about human contributions to global
warming appearing between 1988 and 2002 in the US prestige press: The New York Times,
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Wall Street Journal. 636 articles were analysed and they
found that the majority of these articles were structured after the journalistic norm of balanced
reporting, giving the impression of a great debate in the scientific community about whether climate
change is caused by natural variations or human factors (Boykoff, 2004). This means that,
throughout the 1990s, when the Kyoto Protocol negotiations took place, the US media consistently
created a picture of scientific uncertainty.
Source: Climate Progress (18/12/2009): Public Opinion Stunner: WashPost-ABC Poll Finds Strong Support for Global
Warming Reductions Despite Relentless Big Oil and Anti-Science Attacks.
As illustrated here, from the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and until today, the picture that there is a
general disagreement between scientists about whether global warming is happening or not has
remained stable. About 62 % of the population continues to believe that the science is not yet settled
on the issue. This is supported by a study conducted by Malka et al. at Stanford University. The
58
study explored the impact of including sceptics in the media coverage, and found that adding
sceptics to the mainstream scientific message among other things made people:
Less likely to believe that scientists agree that global warming is happening;
Less certain that global warming has been happening;
Ascribe less personal importance to the issue of global warming;
Less likely to believe that global warming is a very serious issue.
The study also found that even though only one sceptic was featured, respondents generalised from
watching this one sceptic to scientists more generally, and concluded that this form of balanced
news coverage was partly responsible for the inconsistency between how people perceive climate
change and the actual agreement in the scientific community (Malka et al., 2009).
Even though the public remains sceptic, much has changed in the US media since the 1990s, but it
was a shift that was slow to arrive - especially in the editorials and opinion pages of right-wing
papers such as The Wall Street Journal. Often readers will not realise that in opinion-editorial
pieces there often is a connection between sceptical authors and major corporations. This was the
case in an editorial in The Washington Post in 2003 by James Schlesinger who is a high-ranking
official in several US administrations. In his editorial he claimed that the science isn’t settled
(Henson, 2006: 261) and stressed uncertainty, implying that global warming could not be attributed
to human-produced GHGs. However, the article did not mention the fact that James Schlesinger
was on the board of Peabody Energy, the world’s largest coal company (ibid).
One of the first concrete signs of change in the US media was a front-page story on 13 June 2005 in
USA Today entitled “The debate’s over: Globe is warming.” According to Henson, this was a major
development for the sceptic-friendly US press (ibid).
5.4.3 Public opinion on climate change around 1997
Even though the media continuously gave a misleading picture of the dangers of climate change
throughout the 1990s, the public was not as sceptical as one might think. This has to been seen in
the light of a huge effort from the Clinton administration. Supported by various environmental
NGOs, the administration consistently challenged the arguments of the climate sceptics.
59
A New York Times poll published on 28 November 1997, only a few weeks before COP 3 in Kyoto,
showed that 65 % of US citizens supported steps to cut GHG emissions “regardless of what other
countries do” (Oberthür, 1999: 69). The same poll also showed that 49 % of people attributed global
warming to the release of GHGs and only 16 % to normal climate fluctuations (ibid).
According to the survey “Americans support action on global warming” from the Pew Research
Center For The People and The Press from November 1997, most Americans at that time said that
the US should support other countries in setting standards for improving the global environment,
even if it meant an increase in the gasoline price. However, when it became known that the US
would have to bear a larger burden than the poorer countries to restore the damage already done,
public support declined immediately. Fully 70 % of the respondents felt that rich and poor countries
alike should bear the same burden in the cleaning up efforts – even though they were aware that the
American per capita emissions were far higher than that of other countries - compared to just 19 %
who believed that the poorer countries should be allowed to bear less of the burden.
The report also showed that the support for international standards on global warming did not
originate in a concern for the global environment, but in personal environmentalism. The report
showed that fewer people were concerned about global warming in 1997 (24 %) than in 1990
(30%). This might be connected to the fact that the poll showed that very few people pay attention
to news about US policy on global warming. Only 1 % cited the environment as the most important
problem facing the country, and those who worried about global warming were also the same as
those who paid attention to the news in the policy debate surrounding the subject. In fact, Pew
reveals that from 1992 to 1997, the country saw a decline in support for environmental regulation
(Pew, November 1997: 1-3). Interestingly, the survey also showed that the loss of American
sovereignty was a larger obstacle to the international efforts than higher gasoline prices (Pew,
November 1997: 2).
Henson argues that even though people were concerned about the effects of climate change, they
were not sufficiently concerned to force the issue up the political agenda. The fact that fossil fuels
are used in practically every area of modern life, and climate change threatens to affect every
country on Earth in one way or another, makes it very hard for people to grasp. The issue is so
intangible because GHGs cannot be seen, touched or smelled, and the many options for political
and personal action to fight this intangible issue may be too much to process (Henson, 2006: 240).
60
Furthermore, attitude surveys have shown that even though people see climate change as a major
threat, not many are willing to change their way of life in any significant way (Giddens, 2009: 2).
As illustrated in this section, the US public has remained sceptical towards the issue of global
warming. This scepticism has mainly been conveyed to the public through the US press, which, just
like most other people in the US, was influenced by the disinformation campaign put forth by the
fossil fuel industries, which the next section will turn to.
5.5 Lobbying
Everyone is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.
Late Senator Pat Moynihan.54
When looking at the continuing misconception-campaigns in the US, it seems that there are people
who continue to confuse facts with personal opinion. This is why this section will focus on the
important role that lobbying from the oil, coal and auto industries (the fossil fuel group) has played
in the climate change debate in the US.
5.5.1 Why lobby against climate change legislation?
As Krugman, an American economist, columnist, author, and winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economics, writes; if you want to understand opposition to climate action, follow the money
(Krugman, 25/07/2010). As explained in section 5.2, one of the arguments for not ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol was that it would harm the US economy, which I have argued would not be the
case. Krugman argues that the economy as a whole would not be significantly hurt by putting a
price on carbon, but certain industries – especially the oil and coal industries – would, and nobody
knows this better than the top executives of these industries. Therefore, these industries mounted a
huge disinformation campaign in order to protect their businesses’ bottom lines, and as I will
54 Gore, 2009: 24.
61
demonstrate, this disinformation campaign has had a huge influence on the climate debate in the
US.
5.5.2 Who are the climate sceptics?
As already explained, the huge disinformation campaign was mounted by the fossil fuel group, but
who are the climate sceptics and scientists who supposedly agree with them? According to
Krugman, the answer is simple:
Look at the scientists who question the consensus on climate change; look at the
organizations pushing fake scandals; look at the think tanks claiming that any
effort to limit emissions would cripple the economy. Again and again, you’ll find
that they’re on the receiving end of a pipeline of funding that starts with big
energy companies, like Exxon Mobil, which has spent tens of millions of dollars
promoting climate-change denial, or Koch Industries, which has been sponsoring
anti-environmental organizations for two decades (Krugman, 25/07/2010).
The same is true when it comes to politicians who oppose climate change legislation. They need
campaign money, and as well-known, the oil and coal industries have always been generous
sponsors (ibid).
It has long been known that the main climate sceptics were supported by the fossil fuel groups. In
1995, a report was published on the funding of the main sceptics, such as Professor Richard
Lindzen55 and Fred Singer.56 The report stated that fossil fuel groups, like the Western Fuel
Association, heavily supported both their public appearance and their studies. Since then, new
evidence has appeared showing that these climate sceptics are funded by Exxon Mobil, Mobil Oil
55 Richard Lindzen is Professor of Meteorology and worked on the IPCC Second Assessment Report published in 1995, and publicly voiced his scepticism towards the report. He has frequently aired his scepticism in testimonies before Congress, and his 1991 trip to testify before Congress was paid for by Western Fuels. Dr. Lindzen is a member of the Advisory Council of the Annapolis Center for Science Based Public Policy, which has received large amounts of funding from ExxonMobil and smaller amounts from Daimler Chrysler, according to a review of Exxon's own financial documents and 990s from Daimler Chrysler's Foundation(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hotpolitics/reports/skeptics.html). 56 Fred Singer is a physicist and electrical engineer. Singer has written extensively about his doubts about global warming science and is the author of the Leipzig Declaration signed by many sceptics. Furthermore, he has published his doubts about the links between second hand smoke and lung cancer and between UV rays and skin cancer. His organization, the Science and Environmental Policy Project, has received multiple grants from ExxonMobil, according to a review of Exxon's own financial documents and Greenpeace's Exxonsecrets.org(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hotpolitics/reports/skeptics.html).
62
and other fossil fuel industries (Oberthür, 1999: 10). In his book, The Carbon War, Jeremy Leggett
dubbed this group of climate sceptics – including Richard Lindzen and Fred Singer – the Carbon
Club and described them as the foot soldiers for the fossil-fuel industries (Boykoff, 2004). The fact
that these sceptics are funded by the fossil fuel industry does of course weaken their credibility.
Still, in the US, these sceptics have been received much more positively than in the rest of the world
(Oberthür, 1999: 10).
5.5.3 The Global Climate Coalition
Doubt is our product, since it is the best means of competing with the “body of fact” that exists in
the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy.57
This sentence is from a memo from the tobacco industry explaining the purpose of the approach
once taken by the same industry to convince the public that smoking does not cause health
problems. The fossil fuel group used the same strategy that the tobacco industry used – the strategy
of doubt. The best way to fight the scientific consensus concerning the threat of climate change is to
create an environment of doubt and confusion.
In the late 1980s, global warming had captured the attention of the world and the general public was
starting to realise that this was a serious problem - and to vote accordingly. Then in 1989, Amoco,
the American Forest & Paper Association, Chrysler, Cyprus AMAX Minerals, Exxon Mobil, Ford,
General Motors, Shell Oil, Texaco, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce joined forces and created
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) (Gore, 2009: 363). Together they launched a massive
disinformation campaign designed to undermine the integrity of the scientific evidence on global
warming, and to deny any connection between global warming and human activities. The goal of
the campaign was simple: to reposition global warming as theory rather than fact (Gore, 2009: 358).
The GCC lobbied at UN meetings and was often quoted in US news reports. Furthermore, in the
time leading up to COP 3 in Kyoto, the group financed commercials warning that “Americans
would pay the price” if the US became part of the Kyoto Protocol (Henson, 2006: 243). The
campaign grew to become one of the largest deception campaigns ever seen.
However, by the late 1990s, several oil companies with headquarters in Europe were beginning to
reassess their position on climate change because of growing support for action. Because of this, for
57 Gore, 2009: 355.
63
the first time - at AGBM 3 in the spring of 1996 – the business community could not agree on a
joint statement. Then in May 1997, in a speech delivered at Stanford University, BP’s Group Chief
Executive John Browne became the first oil industry official to admit that “it would be unwise and
potentially dangerous to ignore the mounting concern” about climate change. On the same occasion,
he also declared that BP would expand its investment in solar power where it already held a 10 %
share of the world market. Cautiously, several other industry officials started to follow BP’s
example (Oberthür, 1999: 75).
By the end of 2000, the GCC - which had represented more than six million businesses - fell apart.
The reason was that many of the large corporations, like Shell and BP, began to fear that if they
continued their membership of the GCC, it would permanently taint their public image (Gelbspan,
2004: 40). Activists saw this as a huge victory for the climate, but this victory did not last long.
By 2001, many of the same industry associates and companies had a direct
pipeline into the White House (Gelbspan, 2004: 41).
Shortly after Bush had sent the letter to the four senators, Bush charged his vice president, Dick
Cheney – former CEO of Halliburton, the US’ largest oil field services firm – with establishing a
task force to create a new national energy plan. In May 2001, the first draft of the administration’s
new energy plan was revealed (Gelbspan, 2004: 45-46).
The plan called for an expanded role for nuclear power, the opening of the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge for oil exploration, and the construction of between
1,300 and 1,900 new power plants – most of them powered by coal and nuclear
energy – over the next twenty years (Gelbspan, 2004: 46).
Not only did the GCC’s disinformation campaign have an effect on the new energy plan, it had,
according to Henson, also had an effect on the Bush administration’s choice not to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. A 2001 memo written by US under-secretary of state, Paula Dobriansky, to Exxon Mobil,
and later obtained by Greenpeace, stated that Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol “partly based on
inputs from you [the GCC]” (Henson, 2006: 243).
There is a general agreement in the literature that the low support for comprehensive climate change
legislation is due to a very successful misconception campaign carried out by the oil, coal and auto
industries (Gore, 2009; Harrison, 2007; Henson, 2006; Krugman, 2010; Oberthür, 1999; Tamura,
64
2006). The campaigns succeeded in convincing large parts of the public, policy-makers and
journalists that the climate threat is overrated. It was especially apparent during the years of the
Bush administration that this general public scepticism towards climate change had an effect on
policy-making.
The White House’s selective citations and Congressional leaders’ efforts to give
equal time to the minority perspectives of sceptical scientists are suggestive of a
deliberate strategy to manufacture uncertainty (Harrison, 2007: 111).
5.5.4 The powerful fossil fuel group
There are several reasons why groups, like the GCC opposing climate legislation, have been
particularly influential in the US. First of all, the fossil fuel market is dominated by a small - and
still decreasing - number of big companies, most of which have headquarters in the US. This has
made the fossil fuel group able to facilitate effective organisation of their interests. Second of all,
the “open” US political system has provided the fossil fuel group with wide access to the country’s
policy-makers. And finally, because US politicians are dependent on financial support in order to
run election campaigns, it has provided the fossil fuel lobby with a voice in Congress (Oberthür,
1999: 19). Tamura argues that it is especially the interests of the coal industry that have been
influential in Congress, as politicians have a strong personal interest in protecting the economic
welfare of their states. The huge domestic coal reserves in the US influence the structure of energy
supply and demand. For generations, coal has been a dominant energy source for electricity
generation, accounting for 50 % of electricity generation in 2002. There are two factors that give the
coal industry political influence – the broad range of geographical distribution and the high level of
labour intensity (Tamura, 2006: 296). However, there are also other factors that have made the
climate an easy target for the fossil fuel group.
“Nobody believes a weather prediction twelve hours ahead. Now we’re asked to
believe a prediction that goes out 100 years into the future” (Henson, 2006: 248).
This quote by Michael Crichton – author of the bestselling novel State of Fear – clearly illustrates
another of the reasons why the fossil fuel group has been so successful. The very concept of climate
change is so intangible that it is hard to grasp, and therefore it is only natural that people question
whether scientists can actually predict what is going to happen 100 years from now. When you then
65
add the American newspapers’ inability to link extreme weather events to climate change, then you
would need to be more than generally interested in the topic to find heads and tail in what are facts
and what are business interests speaking.
There are also two other important reasons why the GCC’s campaign grew to become one of the
largest deception campaigns ever seen. First of all, the GCC represented some of the largest
corporations in the world – corporations with money and expertise – which meant that these had the
ability and the means to get their message across. The second reason for the success of the
campaign was that it found a receptive audience among citizens who, not surprisingly, prefer to
believe that global warming is just something made up by scientists, rather than to face a very
frightening reality of global climate change (Gore, 2009: 358).
As argued in this chapter, only the argument that developing countries should not be exempt from
commitments can be said to be legitimate. There is no proof that reducing GHG emissions would
cause harm to the US economy, and if looking at the long-term costly effects of climate change that
the US was already at that time experiencing, it can be argued that focusing on clean energy would
be a wise decision. Because of the climate sceptics’ disinformation campaign, attention to global
warming was diverted away from the IPCC consensus on the human contributions to global
warming, which allowed for politicians to call for more research before making any radical
decisions.
The US opposition towards being part of a binding international agreement on climate change has
to be seen from the perspective of a superpower. The US is the only superpower in the world – a
status that it does not want to give up – and being part of an agreement that exempts one of its main
competitors - China - from compliance could potentially mean loss of sovereignty. Therefore, I
argue that concerns for the environment was the last thing on the mind of President Bush when he
wrote that the US could not be part of a deal that exempts huge population centers like China and
India from compliance. The letter has to be seen from the perspective of a superpower determined
to keep its position as the world’s only superpower – something that not only the Bush
administration but, according to the Pew survey presented earlier, also the public found to be
important.
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The greatest uncertainty is no longer scientific, but political and social: Will we be able to react
quickly and effectively enough?
Yann Arthus-Bertrand.58
This chapter will examine the chances of the US being part of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol,
drawing on the conclusions made in the previous chapters. It will start by looking at the Obama
administration, what it has accomplished, and whether it has the needed support to get a climate and
energy bill through Congress, which, I argue, is a necessity if the US is to be part of any
international agreement. To assess this, I will compare the situation in the US today, with the
situation in the US around 1997, when first the Senate and then George W. Bush chose to block any
chances of the US being part of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, I will end the chapter by looking at
where the Parties to the Protocol are in their negotiations for a protocol to take over when the Kyoto
Protocol expires in 2012.
6.1 President Obama – will he make a difference?
This section will investigate what President Obama has managed to do in terms of climate
legislation during his first two years as President of the US, and it will try to assess whether he will
be able to make the difference needed to get the US to be part of a future climate change agreement.
6.1.1 Climate legislation passed under the Obama administration
The US clean energy economy is still in its infancy, but environmental policies have again risen to
the political agenda after President Obama took office in January 2009. Obama has set the goal of
reducing GHG emissions by at least 80 % by 2050, and by 2025, 25 % of the nation’s energy
supply should be derived from renewable sources (Pew, June 2009: 7).
58 Arthus-Bertrand, 2009: 12.
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6. Prospects for a future international climate treaty with US participation
When Barack Obama ran for president, he laid out a set of principles for how the US could move
towards energy independence, and in June 2009, the House of Representatives passed the American
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act) based on these principles. The legislation includes new
investments in clean energy technologies needed to achieve the transformation to a low-carbon
economy, to help the US adapt to the effects of climate change, and create new green jobs to drive
economic growth (Climate Action, 2010: 3). According to Obama, this bill will make it profitable
for US businesses to focus on clean energy.59 Legislation similar to the ACES Act is under
consideration in the Senate. In June 2009, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
passed The American Clean Energy Leadership Act which addresses several energy issues,
including many of those addresses by the ACES Act. In November 2009, the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee passed The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act which also
draws from the ACES Act and establishes a cap-and-trade system.60
In February 2009, the federal stimulus bill – The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
– was introduced. This bill includes a wide range of provisions to jump start energy generation and
energy efficiency businesses, jobs and investments.61 In May 2009, Obama announced a national
standard for passenger vehicles that will be set through a joint rulemaking process between the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the EPA. This means that by 2016,
the federal standard will achieve the same fuel economy improvements as California, and the 15
states that have followed California’s example, strive to do. Therefore, from 2012-2016, all states
will have to conform to the federal standards, after which they are free to conform to their own
standards. Furthermore, the standard implemented by the NHTSA and the EPA also includes a
GHG emission limit per vehicle.62
Both Democratic and Republican senators continue to release bills that are slowly moving the
debate towards a single piece of comprehensive climate legislation.63 When the Senate reaches an
agreement on a single bill, differences between the Senate and the House will have to be reconciled,
so that the final bill can be passed by both houses, and in the end signed into law by the President.
59 Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP oil spill: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill (25/06/2010).60 Pew Climate: http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress (26/06/2010).61 For more information on what is included in the ARRA, see The Clean Energy Economy – Repowering Jobs, Businesses and Investment Across America from the Pew Charitable Trusts.62 Ibid.63 To read more about the different bills released by the Senate, go to http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress.
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When and if this happens still remains to be seen, but the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
remains positive that Congress is on the right track to passing a climate and energy bill.64
6.1.2 A clean energy future?
On 15 June 2010, President Obama held his first speech from the Oval Office, in which he
addressed the administration’s ongoing response to the BP oil spill and America’s clean energy
future. Among other things, he stressed the urgency to act now;
For decades, we have known the days of cheap and easily accessible oil were
numbered. For decades, we’ve talked and talked about the need to end America’s
century-long addiction to fossil fuels. And for decades, we have failed to act with
the sense of urgency that this challenge requires. Time and again, the path
forward has been blocked - not only by oil industry lobbyists, but also by a lack of
political courage and candour.65
Obama stressed that the consequences of the inaction of the US were very clear. He pointed to
China – a country, which because of its status as a developing country, is not included in the Kyoto
Protocol, which was one of the specific reasons why the US did not ratify the Protocol. China is
now investing in clean energy jobs and industries, which, according to Obama, could have been
placed in the US, had the country just chosen to do something about climate change. He stressed
that the transition to clean energy could help the US recover from the recession by creating millions
of new jobs, but that for this to happen, the US has to accelerate that transition now.66
Now, there are costs associated with this transition. And there are some who
believe that we can’t afford those costs right now. I say we can’t afford not to
change how we produce and use energy - because the long-term costs to our
economy, our national security, and our environment are far greater.67
When listening to President Obama’s speech, you get the feeling that the US - or at least the Obama
administration - has now finally realised the danger of climate change, but also the opportunities
that switching to renewable energy bring. However, as President Obama mentioned himself, he is 64 Climate Action in Congress: http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress (07.07.2010).65 The White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill (25.06.2010)66 Ibid.67 Ibid.
69
not the first president to stress the need for new energy sources. When looking back over the
previous seven presidents, every single one of them has stated that they wanted to make the US less
energy-dependent:
George W. Bush - 31 January 2006: By applying the talent and technology of America, this
country can dramatically improve our environment, move beyond a petroleum-based
economy, and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.
Bill Clinton - 28 June 2000: We need a long-term energy strategy to maximize conservation
and maximize the development of alternative sources of energy.
George H. W. Bush – 18 August 1988: There is no security for the United States in further
dependence on foreign oil.
Ronald Reagan - 18 February 1981: We will continue supportive research leading to
development of new technologies and more independence from foreign oil.
Jimmy Carter - 15 July 1979: This intolerable dependence on foreign oil.
Gerald Ford - 15 January 1975: New stand-by emergency programmes to achieve the
independence we want.
Richard Nixon - 30 January 1974: We will break the back of the energy crisis. We will lay
the foundation for our future capacity to meet America’s energy needs from America’s own
resources.68
All of the previous seven presidents of the US have stated that the US has the know-how and
technology to make America independent of foreign oil. The reason why these presidents have
wanted the US to be less dependent on foreign oil is - with a few exceptions - because it poses a
security risk, and, in most of the cases, not because of concerns for the climate. The US is
dependent on the Middle East for its oil import, and with the volatile political situation in many of
these countries, there are great economic risks associated with this dependency. These risks are
associated with increases in oil prices due to supply distribution or increasing demand from
developing countries, and according to Bang, this dependency could become enough of a burden to
trigger national policies that focus on renewable energy (Bang, 2007: 1287).
All of these previous presidents have set timeframes for when it was possible to get the US off
foreign oil – starting with Richard Nixon setting the timeframe for getting the country off foreign
68 Source: “The Daily Show” 16 June 2010: http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-june-16-2010/an-energy-independent-future.
70
oil by the year 1980, to George W. Bush setting the goal of replacing more than 75 % of the US oil-
import from the Middle-East by the year 2025.69 So far nothing has happened. As a result, while
being encouraged by Obama’s words, it still makes you wonder why this president should be the
one that makes it happen. Therefore, in the following, I will explain why I argue that the first step
on the road towards getting the US to be part of an international agreement on climate change will
be to get a domestic climate and energy bill through Congress.
6.2 The importance of a US climate and energy bill
As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, I believe that the US will first have to get a climate
and energy bill through Congress, before it can start focusing on being part of an international
climate change agreement. Al Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol without the support of the Senate,
which meant that the Senate never ratified the Protocol. Therefore, because of the political system
in the US, a first step towards being part of an international agreement must be to have agreement
between the executive and the legislative branches. The consequence of disagreement between the
two branches is that the negotiating parties never know whether the US will in fact end up ratifying
an internationally agreed upon commitment or not, which makes the US unreliable in the
international negotiations. As described in chapter 3, members of Congress are likely to focus on
short-term and district-specific concerns, which – as seen from the Kyoto process – can end up
preventing the executive branch from making rational foreign policies. What complicates the
problem further is that the executive and legislative branches are elected separately, and, therefore,
cooperation between the executive branch and the ruling party in the legislative branch is not
always a given. In the international climate change negotiations, the US delegation mainly consists
of staff members from the executive branch, and therefore reflects the policy preferences of the
president and his administration. Kentaro Tamura, who has a PhD in International Relations from
London School of Economics and Political Science and has been part of the Climate Policy Project
of the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), argues that the way to make the
executive branch credible in foreign policy is by including the legislative branch in international
cooperation. This will give the Senate an opportunity to have a say in the matter, as opposed to just
blocking foreign policies from being ratified (Tamura, 2006: 291-293).
According to Tamura, one of the most important lessons learned from the Kyoto process is that
69 Ibid.
71
effort to introduce international solutions before domestic consensus emerges on
climate change is likely to backfire in US domestic politics (Tamura, 2006: 290).
Therefore, if Obama is to succeed in getting the US to be part of an international agreement, he has
to achieve a broad domestic support, while at the same time reaching an agreement internationally
that is acceptable to both other countries and to key US constituents. The Clinton administration
tried to bring an international agreement to the domestic scene, which was still very immature in
regards to climate policies – a strategy that turned out to be counter-productive (Tamura, 2006:
295).
The struggle between these two branches of government is constitutional. Article II, Section 2 of
the Constitution gives the president power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.70 According to Ambrose, this
sentence provides for a constant struggle between the executive and legislative branches for control
over foreign policy (Ambrose, 1992: 124) – a struggle that will continue as long as the Constitution
lasts (Ambrose, 1992: 136).
Tamura argues that given that climate change affects almost all social sectors of society, it would be
only natural that institutions allowed for the executive, the legislative, and representatives from a
wide range of social sectors to work together. This would mean that representatives from various
sectors could help legislators identify the different constituency concerns, and these could in turn
convey these concerns to the chief negotiators. In this way, the interactions would be
institutionalised and everybody would have a greater degree of information about present and future
behaviour of the other actors involved (Tamura, 2006: 298). This could be a way for the executive
and legislative branches to work together in order to pursue goals - such as climate protection - that
can only be achieved through international cooperation.
Examples do exist in which the legislature created new domestic institutional mechanisms in order
to balance the interests between the two branches. One of the most prominent examples is the one
of international trade.
The international trading system is a “bottom-up” regime: countries maintain
considerable control over their own national trading systems, and interests
70 The US Constitution: http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a2_sec2 (17/10/2010).
72
between the systems have been established according to bilateral content
(Tamura, 2006: 299).
Some argue that the success of the post-war international trade regime can be attributed its
structural features and argue that the same approach could be used in the international climate
regime (Tamura, 2006; Victor, 2004). Changing the domestic institutions played an important role
in this. In the late 1940s, the US delegation signed the Charter of the International Trade
Organisation (ITO), but like with the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate never ratified it. Because of this,
the post-war international trade regime started out with a more moderate international institution –
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, more than 50 years passed before
the US in 1994 ratified an agreement on trade – the World Trade Organisation (WTO). For this to
happen, the US had changed its domestic institutions in order to close the gap between the
negotiating parties and the legislators at home, so that the interests of these different parties were
more in line (Tamura, 2006: 299).71
This took more than 50 years, but it illustrates that if the US succeeds in settling its own course of
domestic climate policy, its international climate policy will naturally come from this domestic
basis. History shows that when the US has been successful in its foreign policy, it has most often
been in areas where there was consensus on the subject (Ambrose, 1992).
Having argued that the first step towards getting the US to become part of an international
agreement on climate change will be to first pass a domestic agreement, the following sections will
assess the prospects of this happening by investigating whether the factors that blocked for the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol are still of concern today.
6.3 Factors influencing the climate debate today
This section examine the factors that were given as reason for why the US chose not to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, and compare them to the situation today, to see if they are still valid. I argued that it
was only the argument that the world could not afford a deal that exempts developing countries that
could be classified as legitimate. However, this section will also take a look at the two other
arguments given, because even though I did not find these arguments to be legitimate, the US public 71 Among other things, this included the establishment of the US Trade Representative (USTR) which keep consultations with Congress and has five members of each House appointed as Congressional advisors. Furthermore, additional members are appointed depending on the issue (Tamura, 2006: 299).
73
and policy-makers did, and it is therefore relevant to investigate whether these arguments still have
an influence on the climate change debate in the US. This means that I will look at:
1. The US relationship with the developing world and whether there are any chances that these
parties could cooperate.
2. The US economy.
3. The scientific knowledge.
Again, I will also examine the concepts of public opinion and lobbying, because as argued, these
concepts will always influence policy-makers in their decisions.
As argued above, the precondition for the US being part of an internationally binding agreement on
climate change is that the country first passes a domestic climate bill. In late July 2010, it became
clear that - because of continued opposition from Republicans and also some Democrats from states
with heavy fossil fuel production - the US is not going to get a climate bill through Congress this
year. Senator Harry Reid, Nevada Democrat and majority leader, said that the Senate would instead
pursue a more limited measure focused on responding to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and
tightening energy efficiency standards.72 This means that the plans for comprehensive climate
change legislation were put on hold until later in 2010 or the beginning of 2011 (Politi,
22/07/2010). However, in the midterm election on 2 November 2010, Democrats lost control of the
House of Representatives, which is likely to have serious consequences for the passing of both
national and international climate change policies. Therefore, along with focusing on the above
mentioned five points, this section will also focus on what consequences this may have for future
international negotiations on reaching an agreement on climate change.
6.3.1 Developing countries
There is a general agreement that if the US is to engage in a new climate treaty or protocol, it will
be based on whether the country has a domestic bill, as it is argued that a new protocol with US
involvement will be one that basically extends US policies to other countries (Bang et al., 2007;
Nielsen, 26/10/2009; Tumara, 2006). This of course requires that the Kyoto countries accept
72 The New York Times: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/energy-environment/climate-and-energy-legislation/index.html (23/07/2010).
74
replacing the Kyoto Protocol with an alternative treaty, which is most likely not going to happen
(Bang, 2007: 1283).
The US in unlikely to be part of an agreement that is based on the Kyoto Protocol as developing
countries are not included in it (Bang et al., 2007: 1282) and because the US has a tradition of not
ratifying internationally binding agreements (Nielsen, 26/10/2009). This places the US in sharp
opposition to the developing countries, as it is very unlikely that these will accept a new treaty that
is not based on the Kyoto Protocol. In the Kyoto Protocol they are not legally forced to any
emission reductions, which also mean that there are no penalties for not meeting the stated
reduction targets, and they want to keep it this way.73 However, it is not only the US who believes
that the developing world should somehow be included in a future international agreement on
climate change. Connie Hedegaard writes that if we are to solve the climate crisis, then all major
polluters have to somehow commit to change the situation that we are in today (Hedegaard, 2008:
109). Also the OECD writes that the actions of Annex I Parties alone will only have a marginal
influence on the global climate if the Non-Annex I Parties continue to grow at the expected rate and
without thinking about the environmental footprints they leave (OECD (1), 1999: 10). According to
the IEA, our energy consumption will in 2030 have grown by 55 % if we continue as we have up
until now, and by 2020, the OECD countries will be responsible for approximately 1/3 of global
emissions (Hedegaard, 2008: 109). Connie Hedegaard argues that it is the countries that are right
now experiencing a huge growth that has the largest economic potential to develop in a more
sustainable manner than the industrialised world has (Hedegaard, 2008: 121).
The common G7774 approach to climate change policy is that it is first and foremost the
responsibility of the industrialised countries to mitigate their emissions because climate change is
primarily caused by them (Bang, 2007: 1284). However, unlike the Bush administration did, the
Chinese and Indian governments do not deny the reality of climate change, but they want to make
sure that everyone plays an equal role in the efforts to solve the problem of climate change (Arthus-
Bertrand, 2009: 150).
The BASIC bloc countries - Brazil, South Africa, India and China - continue to stress that the
agreement reached in Copenhagen – the Copenhagen Accord – is not legally binding. After a 73 If a country does not comply with its emissions limitation, then the country is required to make up the difference plus an additional 30 %.74 The G77 was founded in 1964 by 77 developing countries with the aim of promoting their collective economic interests and enhancing their joint negotiation capacity on major international economic issues within the UN. Today the group consists of 130 developing countries (http://www.g77.org/doc/) (11/11/2010).
75
meeting between the ministers of the BASIC countries on 24 January 2010, India’s environment
minister, Jairam Ramesh, said;
We support the Copenhagen Accord. But all of us were unanimously of the view
that its value lies not as a standalone document but as an input into the two- track
negotiation process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Devraj, 26/01/2010).
He explained that the Copenhagen Accord was merely meant to facilitate the two-track negotiating
process,75 which, according to him, is the only legitimate process to reach a legally binding treaty at
COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico. At the press conference it was also stressed that the BASIC countries
will take the lead in large-scale emission reductions, which they also pledged to do at COP 15
(ibid). This is a huge step for the developing countries as these have consistently resisted any form
of commitment to limit their GHG emissions (Bang, 2007: 1283).
In general, developing countries are focusing on climate change and strategies for how to mitigate
the effects of it.
More than 40 of the least developed countries have developed National Adaption
Programmes of Action (NAPA) that identify urgent and immediate adaptation
needs and actions (Waskow, 15/10/2009: 4).
These countries, and many others, have also embarked on broader and long-term adaptation
planning processes. According to David Waskow, Climate Change Programme Director for Oxfam
America, developing countries often have the strategies in place to fight climate change, but they
need resources to carry out their plans. In his Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic
Affairs, and International Environmental Protection, he stated that supporting these vulnerable
countries now would be a wise investment for the US. It would pay for itself many times over as it
would reduce the costs of disaster response, food assistance, and security engagements (ibid).
75 Ever since the climate summit on Bali in 2007, the negotiations have followed two parallel tracks. The first one is the Kyoto track where the 37 industrialised countries discuss a continuation of the Kyoto protocol and, in that connection, their new judicial commitments. The second one is the Convention track where all countries discuss an updated clarification of the goals of the Climate Convention. This means that when the negotiators meet, two parallel talks are going on at the same time (Nielsen, 26/10/2009).
76
There are several advantages for the US in getting the developing countries to be part of a new
treaty. First of all, the economies of major developing countries like China and India are
increasingly posing serious competition to the US, and binding emission targets would even the
playing field between the US and these countries. Second of all, the US feels that their efforts to
reduce GHG emissions would be pointless if emissions continue to grow in other parts of the world
(Bang, 2007: 1283). This is not the attitude of the US alone. In 2007, the Stern Review stated that
even though the industrialised world takes responsibility and cuts its absolute emissions by 60-80 %
by 2050, the developing world would still have to also take significant action. However, the review
also stated that the developing world should not bear the costs of this action alone (Stern, 2007:
xwii).
6.3.1.1 Developing nations going green
In June 2007, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency released preliminary data from
2006 showing that China had surpassed the US as the nation in the world that emits the most CO2 –
emitting 8 % more than the US. Still, there are different factors that need to be taken into
consideration when looking at numbers like these. Country size of course matters, which is also the
reason why the US, Europe, China, India and Russia are in the top 5 of the largest CO2 emitting
countries. A comparison from 2006 between China, the European Union (15) and the US shows that
per capita CO2 emissions were roughly about 5, 10 and 20 ton CO2 per capita, respectively.76 Much
of China’s increase in CO2 emissions is due to China’s increasing share in the production of goods
for the global market, and when taking into consideration that 70 % of China’s energy consumption
is derived from coal (Hedegaard, 2008: 114), it is not surprising that its emissions rate has sky-
rocketed.
76 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency: http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emissionsinperspective.html (26/07/2010).
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Comparison of energy consumption in China and the US.
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 2010.
Preliminary data from the IEA, released in July this year, shows that - due to the phenomenal
growth that has taken place in China over the past decade – the country has now overtaken the US
as the world’s largest consumer of energy. Since 2000, China’s energy demand has doubled, but its
per capita basis is still only one-third of the OECD average,77 and one-fourth of the US per capita
basis (Gøttske, 23/07/2010). Considering the low per-capita consumption level in the country that is
home to 1.3 billion people, there are strong prospects for further growth.
According to the IEA, the energy demand of China would be even greater if it was not for the
progress made by the government in reducing the energy intensity of the country. China has quickly
become one of the world leaders in renewable energy, particularly in wind power, solar energy and
nuclear energy.78 There are several reasons for China’s focus on renewable energy. One of them is
that China - just like the US - sees its dependence on imported energy as a security risk, and
therefore wishes to be less dependent on foreign energy. Another reason is that China is very
sensitive to its status as the world’s biggest polluter, and does not wish any more negative publicity,
as this increases the pressure from the developed world in the international negotiations. Even
though China has not exactly been praised for its participation in the international negotiations, the
country has invested heavily in green technology and renewable energy. This role as a leader in the
market for renewable energy could very well boost global development of green energy as other
countries are likely to follow this development. According to the IEA chief economist, Fatih Birol,
77 IEA: http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479 (28.07.2010).78 Ibid.
78
China’s investment in electric and hybrid cars is bound to also be reflected in the production of cars
in the rest of the world (Gøttske, 23/07/2010).
In 2009 China invested $ 34.6 billion in renewable energy, and in July 2010 the country announced
that it plan to invest $ 738 billion in the development of renewable energy over the next decade.
According to the UN, this makes China the number one investor in the world when it comes to
renewable energy and green technology (ibid).
With China’s continued growth, the competition for energy sources increases, and according to Yan
Xuetong, head of the Institute for International Studies at the Tsinghua University in Beijing, what
is at stake for China is its ability to continue its economic growth. Rising energy consumption, and
thereby also an increase in GHG emissions, is an inevitable side-effect of this development.
Because of this, the industrialised world will continue to find it harder to cooperate with China, as
the country is acting solely on its own interests. This, among other things, means that China will
hesitate to join the sanctions against nations like Iran, who delivers oil to China. It also means that
China is increasingly competing with the US. This year China caught up with the US in terms of
having the world’s largest market for cars, and the country is now the world’s largest exporter of
goods - a status that used to belong to Germany (ibid).
As illustrated, the US surely has a point in arguing that China, and the rest of the emerging
economies in the developing world, should somehow be included in the Protocol. However, these
countries do not have the same resources as the industrialised world, and so I argue that had the US
shown leadership and shown that it was ready to support the developing world, it would have been a
good starting point. As illustrated, the developed world is clearly focused on sustainable economic
growth, and on not making the same mistakes as the industrialised world. Therefore, I believe that if
the US chooses to lead by example in the future negotiations, this could lead to a strong
international agreement on climate change. However, at the moment, the chances of reaching an
agreement that is acceptable to the developing countries and sufficient enough to get the US
involved seem slim. A treaty that extends US policy to other countries will most likely receive
Congressional support, but will most likely not be acceptable to other countries. Since the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, the GHG emissions of the developing world - and especially China - have
79
risen significantly, which means that the pressure to get the developing world to be part of a future
agreement is growing.
6.3.2 The US economy
To deny the greenhouse gas effect is to avoid responsibility and to impose preventative action
against human greenhouse gas emissions.
Yann Arthus-Bertrand.79
One of the fears associated with passing a climate and energy bill is the fear that it will slow
economic growth and raise energy costs, which would ultimately lead to a change in the American
way of life (Talley, 18/11/2009; The Editors, 16/01/2010).
According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, 32 % of all adults in the labour force are
currently unemployed or have been out of work sometime since the recession started in December
2007. Furthermore, 42 % of all currently employed workers have been forced to take unpaid leave,
have seen their full-time jobs shrink to part-time or had their pay cut or hours reduced (Pew, June
2010: 56). This leaves the American population with the general attitude that this should be dealt
with before even starting to consider things like a climate and energy bill.
In the beginning of the year, Indiana Senator Evan Bayh stated that; “We need to deal with the
phenomena of global warming, but I think it’s very difficult in the economic circumstances we have
right now” (The Editors, 16/01/2010). This contradicts the Pew report: The Clean Energy Economy
– Repowering Jobs, Businesses and Investment Across America, which states that
strong federal policies [on reducing GHG emissions] will accelerate the growth
of this economic sector by generating jobs and businesses that develop clean
energy and increase energy efficiency (Pew, June 2009: 1).
Just like in the years surrounding the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the economy is again of central
concern because of the economic recession. However, Paul Krugman argues that it was not
economic concerns that blocked US legislation on climate change in July this year. He writes that:
79 Arthus-Bertrand, 2009: 50.
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It has always been funny, in a gallows humour sort of way, to watch conservatives
who laud the limitless power and flexibility of markets turn around and insist that
the economy would collapse if we were to put a price on carbon (Krugman,
25/07/2010).
He continues by explaining that all serious estimates point to the fact that limiting GHG emissions
could be phased in with almost no impact on the economy’s growth rate (ibid). This is supported by
the fact that several of the world’s largest companies have cut their emissions in recent years, and
have saved money by doing so. Furthermore, many of these companies are working hard to capture
the economic opportunities offered by focusing on clean energy (Gore, 2006: 11).
In an analysis conducted by the US Geological Survey and the World Bank, it is concluded that
investing $ 40 billion in reducing disaster risks will prevent disaster losses of $ 280 billion.
Furthermore, a study by the British International Development Agency has found that every $ 1
invested in pre-disaster risk management activities in developing countries can prevent $ 7 in
disaster losses (Waskow, 15/10/2009: 8).
In the Stern Review, Nicholas Stern, former Vice-President of the World Bank and chair of the
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at London School of
Economics, argues that delay makes the problem much more difficult and action to deal with it
much more costly (Stern, 2007: xiii), which means that the US tendency of being reactive rather
than proactive – as described in section 2.3 - is not wise strategy. Stern argues that it should be
remembered that dealing with climate change does not only pose economic challenges, but also
economic opportunities (ibid), and states that ignoring climate change will eventually damage
economic growth (Stern, 2007: xvii). Even though the federal government has not paid much
attention to these opportunities, the clean energy economy in the US has grown considerably.
Research by the Pew Charitable Trusts shows that the clean energy economy now extends to all 50
US states and that it has engaged a wide variety of workers and generated new industries. It also
shows that between 1998 and 2007, the job growth rate within the clean energy economy grew at a
faster rate than overall jobs (Pew, June 2009: 3).
The question remains whether the argument would be different if the US – like the rest of the world
– was not facing an economic recession. As argued in chapter 5, the perception that reducing GHG
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emissions would cause harm to the US economy is furthered by the oil, coal and auto industries for
obvious reasons, and if anything, the economic recession has only helped these in their arguments,
as people will not risk anything that could potentially worsen the economic situation. Therefore, I
argue that – no matter the economic circumstances – the climate sceptics will always use the
economy as an argument for why the US should not commit to reducing its GHG emissions – an
argument that resonate easily with people in a time where the fear of losing one’s job is greater than
anything else. However, as illustrated, all evidence point to the fact that in the long run, reducing
the country’s GHG emissions will be money saving.
6.3.3 Scientific knowledge
Rather than dwelling on the elimination of all remaining uncertainty, we need to communicate the
essence of why we already know more than enough to begin acting urgently.
Al Gore80
When reading through the scientific literature on climate change, there seems to be no doubt left
that our climate is in fact changing and that this change is caused by human activities. In 2007,
Nicholas Stern expressed it very clearly when he stated that the science of climate change is
reliable, and the direction is clear (Stern, 2007: xiii-xiv). He also stated what I believe to be the
problem in all of this, and that is that no one knows exactly when and where particular impacts will
occur (ibid). Because climate change is global, and because there are so many variables that you
cannot predict exactly what is going to happen where, it becomes very difficult to convince the
public about the dangers of climate change, as it is simply too hard to comprehend. Therefore it is
easier – and much less frightening – to believe the sceptics.
In 2009, the EPA concluded that “climate change is real, is occurring due to emissions of
greenhouse gases from human activities, and threatens human health and the environment.”81 After
the so-called “climategate” where scientists were accused of fabricating false evidence of climate
change, and climate sceptics argued that the climate science cannot be trusted, the EPA was set to
80 Gore, 2009: 316.81 EPA: http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/56eb0d86757cb7568525776f0063d82f!OpenDocument (29/07/2010).
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review the scientific findings again. On 29 July 2010, the Review concluded that climate science is
credible, compelling, and growing stronger.82 This conclusion is supported both by America’s
Climate Choice83 from the National Academy of Sciences, which is the most recent assessment of
the full body of scientific literature on climate change, and by the State of the Climate84 report from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
It is safe to say that the scientific evidence can no longer be used as an argument for not wanting to
be part of an international agreement on climate change. Neither can it be used as an excuse for not
creating domestic policies on climate change.
In an opinion-editorial in the New York Times on 25 July 2010, Paul Krugman wrote that
insufficient scientific knowledge was not the reason why the Obama administration did not succeed
in getting a climate bill through the Senate. He writes that every piece of evidence points to a
continuing rise in global temperatures that might very well be accelerating. The scandal where
climate researchers were accused of fabricating data - the so called “climategate” - is not to blame
either, he writes, as this has been proven to be yet another stunt by the opponents of climate action
(Krugman, 25/07/2010).
It might come as a surprise how much of the basic science behind global climate
change is rock-solid and accepted by virtually all parties (Henson, 2006: ix).
As stated in this quote – no matter what people might think - the debate is no longer about whether
climate change is real and human induced but about interpretation. It is about how warm it will get,
which computer projections for the year 2050 are the most accurate, and how best to adapt to these
unavoidable changes. In other words, the debate is about the nature of global climate change, not
about its mere existence (ibid). The uncertainties are due to the complexity of climate change. This
is in part due to the fact that you cannot project how individuals, corporations and governments will
change their GHG emissions over time (Henson, 2006: 5).
As stated before, the IPCC Second Assessment Report from 1995 included a sentence that made the
world news: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.”
By 2001, when the IPCC issued its Third Assessment Report, the evidence had grown even
82 Ibid.83 To see a summary of the report, go to: http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Informing_Report_Brief_final.pdf. 84 To see a summary of the report, go to: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100728_stateoftheclimate.html.
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stronger: “There is now new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last
50 years is attributable to human activities (Henson, 2006: 9),” and by 2007, when the IPCC
released in Fourth Assessment Report, there seemed to be little doubt left: “Global GHG emissions
due to human activities have grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70 % between
1970 and 2004” (IPCC, 2007: 4).
As illustrated in this section, the science of climate change has only grown stronger since the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations. No one can deny that climate change is actually happening, as the science is
simply too strong to ignore. The question remains whether these facts have reached the American
public and thereby created a change in attitudes towards global warming, which the next section
will focus on.
6.3.4 Public opinion on climate change – a partisan issue
According to Riley E. Dunlap, Gallup scholar for the Environment with the Gallup Organisation,
and Aaron M. McCright, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Environmental Science and Policy
Programme at Michigan State University, historically, support for environmental protection in the
US has not been related to party affiliation. However, in the early 1980s, the Regan administration
labelled environmental protection as a burden for the economy, and tried to weaken previous
environmental legislation and reduce its enforcement. When the Republican Party took control of
Congress in 1994, the anti-environmental orientation again became salient and sparked a negative
reaction with the public. During the George W. Bush administration, the anti-environmental trends
were again amplified, although with only modest political costs for George W. Bush, as the war on
terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated the political agenda during his term as
president. However, these trends have caused a growing divide along party lines over
environmental protection. As noted by Dunlap and McCright, the divide has been more noticeable
among members of Congress than among the general public, as members of Congress tend to be
more ideologically polarised. A Gallup poll spanning a decade - from the passing of the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 to 2008 - shows that the gap between Democrats and Republicans has widened
substantially during this period, reflecting voters’ tendency to follow their party leaders and
political experts (Dunlap and McCright, 2008).
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As illustrated above, the 34 % gap between how many Republicans and Democrats saw the effects
of global warming in 2008, is in stark contrast to the 6 % gap in 1997. So while the number of
Democrats who indicate that global warming is already happing has risen from 52 to 76 %, the
number of Republicans who believe the same has fallen from 46 to 42 %. The reason for this
difference between Democrats and Republicans might very well be an effect of Democratic and
Republican parties choosing clear sides in the climate change debate (Dunlap and McCright, 2008).
According to a survey from October 2009 conducted by the Pew Research Center For The People &
The Press, over the past couple of years, there has been a decline in the percentage of people who
believe that there is solid evidence that the Earth is warming, and fewer people now see climate
change as a serious problem. This trend has turned out to be closely related to party affiliation.
Source: The Pew Research Center For the People & The Press (22 October 2009): Fewer American see solid evidence
of global warming.
As illustrated above, the percentage of Democrats who see solid evidence of global warming is
down from 91 % in 2006 to 75 % in 2009, and the percentage of Independents who see solid
evidence of global warming is down from 79 % to just 53 %. Republicans remain the most sceptic,
and in 2009, just 35 % saw solid evidence of global warming, compared to 59 % in 2006.
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Despite this scepticism towards global warming, the survey finds that there is more support than
opposition for legislation that sets limits for GHG emissions. 50 % of Americans favour a policy
that makes companies pay for their emissions, even if it may lead to higher energy prices. 39 %
oppose limits on GHG emissions under these circumstances (Pew, October 2009: 1-2). Only among
the Conservative Republicans do a majority (60 %) oppose setting limits for GHG emissions. Most
moderate and liberal Republicans (51 %) also favour this policy, as do Liberals (51 %) and a
majority of Democrats (58 %) (Pew, October 2009: 8).
Even though fewer people now see global warming as a serious problem, the majority (65 %) sill
believe that it is a very serious (35 %) or somewhat serious (30 %) problem, and again the partisan
divide is evident.
As would be expected, views about the seriousness of global warming is related to whether people
think there is solid evidence of global warming, and whether it is human induced. This means that
97 % of those who say that there is solid evidence of global warming also see it as a serious
problem. These figures have remained stable since 2008 (Pew, October 2009: 5-6).
As the next section will illustrate, the public might support climate change legislation, but it is a
priority that is at the bottom of the list of what the federal government should focus on.
6.3.4.1 Global warming – a priority at the bottom of the list
Ever since the global recession began, the focus of priorities has changed in the US. This not only
means that Americans now see the economy and job creation as the top priorities for the Obama
administration and Congress, global warming has fallen to be the lowest priority on at list of 20
issues.
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Source: The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press (22 January, 2009): Economy, Jobs Trump All Other
Policy Priorities in 2009.
In January 2009, the public ranked global warming at the bottom of the list of priorities for the
President and Congress for the year 2009. However, more than twice as many Democrats (45 %) as
Republicans (16 %) ranked global warming as a top priority, and global warming was the lowest
priority for both Republicans and Independents, and ranked 16 for Democrats among 20 issues
(Pew, October 2009: 6).
Even though global warming was ranked at the bottom of the list of priorities, two months before
COP 15 in Copenhagen, a majority (56 %) of Americans still said that the US should join other
countries in setting standards for addressing climate change, while 32 % said that the US should set
its own standards (Pew, October 2009: 2). These numbers are roughly the same as when the public
was asked the same question in 1997 and 2001 (Pew, October 2009: 9).
Strikingly, as illustrated below, despite the fact that 62 % of the public believes that the climate
science is not yet settled, the majority still believe that the government should regulate GHG
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emissions, even if it means an increase in the monthly energy bill (Climate Progress, December
2009).
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & The Press (14/06/2010): Fueling Both Sides of the Energy Debate.
As illustrated in this section, beliefs about global warming are strongly connected to party
affiliation. This is important as it can have serious consequences now the Republican Party is in
majority in Congress. If the Republican trend towards an increased scepticism continues in the
years to come – especially if outspoken party leaders and right-wing media continue to portray
climate change as a fraud and a plot to introduce increased regulation with corporations - it has
serious consequences for public support for regulations to limit GHG emissions. However, it is
worth noticing that even though fewer people see global warming as a very serious problem, the
majority still support legislation to limit GHG emissions.
6.3.5 Lobbying
This section will investigate lobbying in the US today to find out whether oil, coal and auto
industries are still actively lobbying and have a voice in Congress.
Many of the large corporations that were once members of the GCC have now long been focusing
on sustainability and how to change their corporation’s image. Big oil companies like Shell and BP
have sustainability sections on their websites and make an effort in trying to communicate their
concerns for the environment, illustrating that these have realised that they will have to change their
business if they wish to be able to compete with the emerging green industries.
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However, not all companies have given up on the disinformation campaigns once successfully
carried out by the fossil fuel group. In 2006, the Royal Society of London – a scientific academy
housing some of the world’s most prominent scientists – publicly asked Exxon Mobil to stop
misrepresenting the science of global warming and giving misleading views to the public.85 The
Royal Society also provided documentation showing that Exxon Mobil still gave millions of dollars
to 39 groups who continue to misinform the public about climate change. In 2008, Exxon Mobil
stated that it would “discontinue contributions to several public-policy research groups whose
position on climate change could divert attention from the important discussion” on how to produce
energy in ways that do not harm the global climate. However, in 2009, it was found that Exxon
Mobil, despite its pledge, had continued its practice of supporting climate sceptics (Gore, 2009:
366).
It is a well-known fact that powerful vested interests and those opposed to action
on climate change are working overtime to see that they can stall action for as
long as possible (Pachauri, 04/01/2010).
In an article in The Guardian, Rajendra Pachauri, former chair of the IPCC and director-general of
The Energy & Resources Institute (TERI), writes that climate sceptics and lobbyists are working
hard in an effort to slow the progress made towards reaching a binding agreement at COP 16 in
Mexico. He states that in the end science will triumph, but that the delay made by lobbyists can
have serious consequences for especially the poorest countries in the world, as it will worsen the
impacts of climate change (ibid).
In the article “An army of Lobbyists Readies for Battle on the Climate Bill,” Marianne Lavelle, an
investigative reporter at The Center for Public Integrity, a non-profit, nonpartisan, digital news
organisation specialising in investigative journalism and research on public policy issues, writes
that after President Obama took office and climate change legislation again rose to the agenda,
companies and interest groups have been hiring lobbyists at an intense pace. According to an
analysis conducted by the Center for Public Integrity in 2008, more than 770 companies and interest
groups has hired around 2,340 lobbyists in an effort to influence federal policy on climate change.
So for every member of Congress there are now four climate lobbyists. This means that on one side
you have lobbying by the interests that oppose climate legislation, and on the other side you have
85 The Royal Society of London: http://royalsociety.org/Report_WF.aspx?pageid=8256&terms=exxonmobil&fragment=&SearchType=&terms=exxonmobil (27/10/2010).
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the renewable-energy sector which is devoted to putting a price on carbon pollution. However, the
renewable-energy sector put together with environmental groups are still outnumbers by 8 to 1 by
the interest groups opposing climate legislation (Lavelle, 16/03/2009).
If it sounds like the power business is divided among itself, that's because it is
(ibid).
Lavelle concludes that with the increased number of lobbyists, it will require strong political
leadership to keep the interest of solving the climate crisis in the forefront, while leaving the
interests of the opponents behind (ibid). However, as mentioned in the quote above, American
businesses are increasingly divided over the issue, which the next section will develop on.
6.3.5.1 Pressure from the business community
The US federal government is today facing an increasing demand for action on climate change from
US companies that have been disadvantaged by the absence of clear-cut national policies for
controlling GHG emissions. Because capital investments have long time horizons, it means that
current investment decisions may have to be changed if the federal government adopts a mandatory
climate policy, which can end up being extremely costly for the companies. Furthermore,
companies with global operations in countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol will have to
meet the Kyoto mandated emission reductions, but cutbacks made in the US will not count because
the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Companies do not have to have global operations to be
influenced by the lack of a domestic climate treaty. If companies are operating across multiple
states within the US, they are subject to different regulations from the state governments, which
increase the cost of conducting business (Bang, 2007: 1287). This has intensified companies’
pressure on the federal government for a well-defined national climate policy.
More than 6,000 businesses across the US were once members of the GCC. Today the tides have
changes, and more than 6,000 businesses are now members of American Businesses for Clean
Energy – an organisation that also includes corporations like American Electric Power and Duke
Energy, the first and third largest GHG emitters in the US.86
86 Pew Center on Global Climate Change: http://www.pewclimate.org/blog/julianit/can-6000-businesses-all-be-crazy (12/11/2010).
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27 May 2010, 60 of the leading businesses and organisations in the US sent a letter to the President
and the Senate, in which they urged them to take action on climate change. They stressed that
creating comprehensive climate and energy legislation is an opportunity to get the US back on track
and create new jobs in the low-carbon economy, which would bring not only environmental but also
economic rewards. They ended the letter by concluding that:
It’s time for Democrats and Republicans to unite behind bipartisan, national energy
and climate legislation that increases our security, limits emissions, and protects our
environment while preserving and creating American jobs.87
As demonstrated, there are still lobby groups trying to exert influence on Congress. During the
midterm election several candidates from states heavily dependent on oil and coal were
campaigning against climate legislation, as this would mean a loss of workplaces. Despite this, it
seems that most companies have realised that whether they want it or not, they will have to start
focusing on clean technology and sustainable solutions in order to keep up with the rest of the
world. The individual states are already creating legislation in the area, and, at some point, the
federal government can no longer ignore the states in their wish for comprehensive legislation.
Nevertheless, the lines are sharply drawn for a battle between these states and states dependent on
oil and coal.
6.3.6 Midterm election
Besides the factors mentioned above, there are other things that are bound to have an influence on
the passing of a future international climate change treaty. 2 November 2010 was the date of the US
midterm election – an election that left not only Democrats, but most like also the climate as the big
losers.
Republicans won control of the House of Representatives and moved in on the Senate where
Democrats managed to maintain a slim but reduced majority. With an unemployment rate at 9.6 %
nationwide, voters’ major concern was the economy (Balz, 03/11/2010). Therefore, the result of the
midterm election might very well be understood as the American peoples’ way of telling President
Obama to focus on the economy and creating new jobs, and forgetting about foreign policy. 87 Letter to the President and members of the Senate: http://www.us-cap.org/PHPages/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Leadership-Letter-5.27.2010.pdf (12/11/2010).
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In terms of energy legislation, all analysis so far characterise climate legislation in the US as going
nowhere for the next two years (Kirchgaessner, 07/11/2010; Ritzau, 03/11/2010; Sørensen and
Andrew, 03/11/2010). Obama did not succeed in passing comprehensive energy legislation during
his first two years as president, and with Republicans in control of the House of Representatives,
there is most likely no chance that he will succeed in passing comprehensive energy legislation
anytime during the next two years. As I argued in section 6.2, the US’ participation in an
international climate change treaty is dependent on the US first passing its own climate legislation,
which, as argued, is highly unlikely to happen anytime soon. This means that the US delegates at
COP 16 in Mexico will not have a clear negotiation position, as they will most likely be paralysed
by the domestic situation, and will therefore not be able to bring any constructive suggestions on
how to solve the climate crisis to the table. Even if the Obama administration were to sign a deal in
Mexico, it would still had to be approved by 2/3 of the Senate, and according to Jørgen Henningsen,
former Head of Environment in the EU Commission and part of the team negotiating for the Kyoto
Protocol, it is 100 % certain that a binding international agreement will not be ratified in the US
Senate. Also former UN climate change chief, Yvo de Boer, recently said that he would be very
surprised to see climate legislation rise to the agenda again in this presidency - i.e. before 2012
(Nielsen, 19/09/2010).
One theoretical possibility for the president to commit the US to a future climate change agreement
that does not require ratification by the Senate remains. Lawyers at the Center for Climate Change
Law at Columbia University have pointed out that 60 votes in the Senate can give the president
carte blanche to commit the nation to a legally binding international agreement. However, as the
president has not dared to put his party’s climate legislation before a vote in the Senate, it does not
seem likely that he would make use of a mandate like this, Nielsen writes (ibid). Furthermore, it
seems unlikely that the Obama administration would be able to gather 60 votes in the Senate, as
there are only 51 Democrats left in the Senate after the midterm election.
One thing needs to be kept in mind, however. Most senators realise that they have to act on climate
change soon, else they risk that the EPA will start regulating GHG emissions on its own – which it
can do if it finds that GHGs pose a danger to the public health - and then Congress will be left
entirely out of the process (The Editors, 16/01/2010). On 7 December 2009, the EPA formally
published its findings on GHGs and concluded that they do pose a danger to public health. As a
result, on 25 October 2010, the EPA and the NHTSA proposed a joint rule establishing a historic
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national program that aim to dramatically reduce GHG emissions and improve the fuel economy for
new cars and light trucks sold in the US.88 But with Republicans in control of the House of
Representatives, Kirchgaessner argues that;
The new Republican majority will now – with strong support from some
Democrats from coal-rich states and business lobby groups – try to rein in efforts
by the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate carbon emissions
(Kirchgaessner, 07/11/2010).
What will happen with the proposed EPA regulations remains unsure, but one thing is certain, the
legislative agenda in Congress is going to change radically with the Republican victory.
Another thing not to be forgotten is the individual states. Just because policy-makers in Washington
are most likely not going to pass comprehensive climate change legislation in the next couple of
years, it does not mean that the whole country has given up on the climate. California – which has
always been a frontrunner in the debate over environmental protection – will soon be implementing
a cap and trade system and other measures to lower the state’s GHG emissions, which is an
indication that the issue of climate change is not going to disappear just because of a change in
power in the federal government. Voters in California strongly rejected Proposition 23 - a measure
created to suspend implementation of the Air Pollution Control Law (AB 32) requiring major
sources of pollution to reduce their GHG emissions89 - and instead they elected a governor who in
his campaign promised to implement the AB 32. Tim Juliani, Director of Corporate Engagement at
the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, writes on his blog that his advice to US corporations is
to keep focusing on climate and sustainability as part of their core corporate strategies. That the
federal government has not succeeded in passing comprehensive climate legislation does not change
the fact that reducing GHG emissions creates both bottom-line benefits as well as reputational
benefits, and he believes that companies do realise this.90
He concludes by stressing that the federal government’s policies do not change the science on
climate change, and writes;
The reality is that regardless of the state of policy, the climate continues to
change, impacts are already being felt in our own backyards, and by not acting
88 EPA: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html (25/10/2010).89 Voter Information Guide : http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/23/ (11/11/2010).90 Pew Center on Global Climate Change: http://www.pewclimate.org/blog/julianit/days-after (11/11/2010).
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we continue to load the dice in favour of deeper floods, longer droughts, and
bigger wildfires. While politicians move at one pace, nature does not react to
polls or get voted out of office.91
The pressure from the public and US businesses might in the end force policy-makers to take action
on climate change. But for now, it seems that the public’s choice in the midterm election has made
it impossible for the US to commit to anything in the future rounds of the international climate
change negotiations. However, as the pace of the international negotiations in 2010 has been
extremely slow, it seems uncertain whether the Parties to the UNFCCC will even have a climate
change agreement ready to sign after COP 16 in Mexico, which will be developed further in the
next section.
6.4 The climate debate in an international perspective
This section will briefly examine what the chances are that the Parties to the UNFCCC will have an
agreement ready to sign by the end of COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010.
In an article in The Financial Times on 8 Marts 2010, both Connie Hedegaard and Yvo de Boer
argue that there will be no climate treaty ready to sign this year. Connie Hedegaard told The
Financial Times that the negotiations were simply not progressing fast enough to have a treaty
ready to be signed at COP 16 in Mexico, but that this is more likely to happen at COP 17 in South-
Africa in 2011. According to the article, this has to be seen against the backdrop of a resurgence of
climate change scepticism, which has emerged due to a series of mistakes made by climate
scientists (Harvey, 08/03/2010). However, the flaws made by the climate scientists seem to have
been blown out of proportions by the media. Connie Hedegaard defends the scientists saying that
the few flaws found in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report from 2007 and the e-mails in which
scientists talked of concealing data does not affect the large body of scientific evidence collected
over decades (ibid). Povl Finch, special advisor to the Danish Energy Agency and Denmark’s
official contact in the IPCC, agrees with Connie Hedegaard and says that climate sceptics are
blowing it all out of proportions in an attempt to undermine the credibility of the IPCC. He states
that one of the problems is that the press has not yet figured out that there is no substance to the 91 Ibid.
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criticism (Aagaard, 12/02/1020). Also UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, emphasises that the
criticism going on in the media does not change the fundamental scientific consensus on climate
change (Ejsing, 11/03/2010).
According to Waskow, a successful outcome of the international climate change negotiations will
depend on whether the US and other industrialised countries are ready to support the developing
countries in their efforts to adapt to climate change (Waskow, 15/10/2009: 11). If you are to believe
President Obama, the US is now ready to do this. As opposed to the Kyoto process, the US
administration now recognises that the industrialised world needs to financially help the developing
world adapt to the effects of climate change. When President Obama spoke at COP 15 in Bella
Center, Copenhagen, 18 December 2009, he said that:
We must have financing that helps developing countries adapt, particularly the
least-developed and most vulnerable to climate change. America will be a part of
fast-start funding that will ramp up to $10 billion in 2012 (Schlüter, 18/12/2009).
This is a definite change in attitude. When the American public in 1997 found out that the US
would have to bear a larger share of the burden to restore the damage already caused by climate
change, public support to be part of the Kyoto Protocol declined immediately. As described in
section 5.4.3, 70 % of the US population felt that rich and poor countries alike should bear the same
burden.
After the last round of preliminary talks before COP 16, the US was again criticised for its lack of
commitment. Kyle Ash, Greenpeace US energy policy analyst, said that:
The US posture on climate negotiations continues to reflect not only a lack of
leadership and political will, but a hubris that is counterproductive to
accomplishing anything (Eilperin, 11/10/2010).
Even though steps were made in the right direction, the cornerstones of emissions goals and
accountability still remain an area of great discussion. Eilperin writes that agreement in Cancun will
require that the US comes true on the promises made in Copenhagen (ibid). In Copenhagen,
President Obama committed the US to cut its emissions by approximately 17 % by 2020, and by
more than 80 % by 2050 (Schlüter, 18/12/2009), which is the goal President Obama - as described
in section 6.1.1 - set for the country when he took office.
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In his speech in Bella Center, President Obama’s final words were:
There is no time to waste. America has made our choice. We have charted our
course, we have made our commitments, and we will do what we say. Now, I
believe that it's time for the nations and people of the world to come together
behind a common purpose (Schlüter, 18/12/2009).
Taking the political situation in the US into consideration, it looks like he will have a hard time
living up to these words. It seems that no one believes that the parties are going to reach an
agreement at COP 16 in Mexico (Kragh, 16/11/2010), but hops are that they will come to agreement
at COP 17 in South Africa in 2011. At this time, the political landscape in the US will still not have
changed, and therefore, at this moment, the path of the future negotiations seems more uncertain
than ever.
As illustrated in this chapter, the US’ participation in an international agreement is dependent on the
passing of a domestic climate and energy bill. However, the involvement of China and other key
developing countries will continue to play a leading role in what the US will agree to commit to.
Where 65 % of the public in 1997 supported the US’ participation in an international climate
change treaty, 56 % were in favour of US participation before COP 15 in December 2009, which
means that the majority of US citizens continues to support participation in an international climate
change agreement. However, public opinion so far has not made the US commit to anything
concrete. This might be explained by the fact that even though the public supports legislation to
reduce GHG emissions, there are still other things they find more important, and at the moment,
nothing is more important to the American public than the economy.
Even though all estimates, as argued in section 6.3.2, point to the fact that introducing climate and
energy legislation will not hurt the US economy, but will help create new jobs and in the long run
be profitable for the US, Republicans and states heavily dependent on the production of oil and coal
keep fighting legislation in the area. As long as some groups of people continue to neglect to see the
larger picture in the debate over climate legislation, this fight will continue as the transition to a
clean energy economy is bound to affect some parts of the US population.
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Even though the IPCC and several climate scientists have been criticised this year, it seems like the
issue of scientific uncertainty is no longer a main issue in the US debate over climate change
legislation. There are several reasons for this. One of them is that the change in administration has
meant that climate change is again treated like a serious matter. As described in section 6.3.4,
opinion about global warming is closely related to party affiliation, although it is also an issue that
divides people within the different parties. However, this has meant that global warming – with the
election of a Democratic president – has again risen to the agenda and thereby triggered debate and
awareness among the American people. Another point is that the evidence of global warming is
becoming increasingly hard to ignore. The science is settled and every time you open the newspaper
or turn on the TV, you are faced with the effects of global warming – severe droughts, wildfires and
floods etc. However, the picture is complicated by the intense lobbying still going on in the US. As
described in section 6.3.5, lobbying on global warming is still widespread in the US, which means
that the public is continuously presented with a false picture of the nature of climate change,
thereby making it difficult to mount public support for climate legislation, as the public is not sure
what to believe.
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I believe that the essence of the struggle to fight global warming can be compared to the struggle
wind turbine manufactures face. Who will ever argue that wind energy is not a good solution to
lower the amount of GHGs being released into the atmosphere? No one. Everyone believes that it is
a great idea – as long as no one places a wind turbine in their backyard.
We only believe that it is a good idea to invest in green infrastructure as long as it does not affect
our comfortable lives. And why should we even consider changing our lives if people in other parts
of the world continue to live their lives as usual, without any change on their behalf?
As described in section 5.4.3, only a few weeks before COP 3 in Kyoto, 65 % of US citizens
supported steps to cut GHG emissions “regardless of what other countries do.” However, when it
became known that the US would have to bear a larger burden than the poorer countries to restore
the damage already done, public support declined immediately, and 70 % of respondents said that
they felt that rich and poor countries alike should bear the same burden. This clearly illustrates the
point presented above - that the majority of people refuse to make personal changes unless these
changes apply to everyone.
The opinion of the well-funded fossil fuel industry - acting through the GCC - carried maybe the
greatest weight in the US Congress’ decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Through extensive
lobbying and a huge misconception campaign, the GCC managed to convince policy-makers that
the US economy would be severely harmed if they ratified a protocol that did not also include
developing countries. There is no evidence that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol would harm the US
economy, but it is a matter of course that the fossil fuel industry would be severely affected if the
US Congress decided to put a price on carbon. Because it requires a 70 % cut in carbon fuels to
stabilise the climate, the very survival of these industries are at stake (Gelbspan, 2004: xix), and no
one is more aware of this than the top executives of these industries. Therefore, in order for the
Republican controlled Congress – heavily supported by the fossil fuel industry - to make sure that
the Kyoto Protocol could never be ratified in the US, they passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution and
thereby hindered US ratification of a protocol that did not also include developing countries or
could in some way harm the US economy. As the Kyoto Protocol does not commit developing
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7. Conclusion
countries to limit their GHG emissions, the Protocol was dead in the US even before Al Gore signed
it.
In general, the US has remained one of the most climate sceptic countries in the world. This is not
least due to the US media, which has been just as affected by lobbying from the oil, coal and auto
industries as the public and policy-makers. The media has been heavily criticised for its way of
reporting on climate change, as the norm of balanced reporting, which most journalists abide to, is
not suitable for reporting on climate change. By portraying both the sceptics and the scientists’
points of view side by side, the public gets the impression that the science is not yet settled and that
scientists are still debating whether climate change is human induced or not. When the press covers
a topic thoroughly and consistently, then the public responds. Therefore, as argued in section 5.4.1,
had the press chosen to deal with the topic of climate change differently, it might have caused the
public to demand action from the US federal government in a way that it could not ignore.
Ever since the country refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the US has remained isolated in the
climate change debate. However, when President Obama took office in January 2009, it caused a
change in the US administration’s attitude towards climate change. Since his inauguration,
President Obama has been fighting to get a comprehensive climate and energy bill through
Congress, and as described in section 6.3.5, this immediately caused a rise in the hiring of lobbyists
by companies and interests groups opposed to climate change legislation. At the same time, the US
public is becoming increasingly sceptic about the concept of climate change, and with the economic
recession and an unemployment rate of 9.6 %, it is becoming increasingly hard to imagine the US
supporting anything that does not pay off in the short term. As section 3.1 describes, the US tends to
focus on short-term rather than long-term gains. This is connected to the political system in the US,
and as we have seen in the 2010 midterm election, the political agenda of the country can change
overnight if control of Congress changes hands.
Even though 13 years have passed since the US refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and world
leaders are right now negotiating for a successor to the Protocol, not much has changed in the US.
The country still keeps pushing for the developing world to commit to lowering their GHG
emissions, but as with the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, it is unlikely that these will commit to
anything unless the US does the same. The country is in a deep economic crisis, which has made it
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easy for the fossil fuel industry to use the economy as an argument for not committing to an
internationally binding agreement. The public is as mentioned becoming increasingly sceptic, but
just like during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the majority still supports climate change
legislation. However, as described in section 6.3.4.1, even though a majority of the US public
believes that it is more important to protect the environment than to keep energy prices low, the
economy remains the number one concern. This means that even though the public supports action
on climate change, there are few people actually pushing for action. This again is a result of the fact
that even though people see climate change as a threat, few are willing to change their lives in any
significant way. Furthermore, the voices of the fossil fuel industry have been louder than the voices
of the American public. The main reason for this is that the fossil fuel industry is one of the largest
campaign contributors, and as argued by Krugman in section 5.5.1 – money speaks. During the
years of the Bush administration, lobbying wore off as a result of the climate sceptic Republican
George W. Bush’s focus on hard power and the war on terror and his disregard for climate change.
But now when the world is negotiating for a new protocol on climate change with Democratic
President Barack Obama, lobbying has again increased. At the moment, President Obama seems to
be in the same situation as former Democratic President Bill Clinton. In the 1994 midterm election,
President Clinton lost his majority in Congress, which made it impossible for him to get any climate
policies passed in Congress. All analysis so far indicates that President Obama, for the next couple
of years, will be facing the same difficulties as former president Clinton did. As argued in section
6.2, the chance of getting the US to ratify an internationally binding climate change agreement
before the introduction of a comprehensive domestic climate and energy bill seems slim. Getting
the US to commit internationally will require that the country first passes a domestic bill, as it will
only agree to ratify an international agreement which is based on US legislation. At the moment, the
passing of a domestic climate and energy bill in a Republican controlled Congress seems very
unrealistic.
7.1 Putting it all into perspective
On 7 December 2009, from the platform in Bella Centre, Connie Hedegaard expressed what we
seem to be witnessing today. She addressed the political leaders saying;
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“This is our chance. The political will has never been stronger and if we throw it
away, it can take years before we get another chance – if we ever get one”
(Nielsen, 19/09/2010).
The chance was wasted, and now political leaders are afraid to take any big risks, as they fear
staking everything on one throw once again, and once again see it fail. The international NGO’s are
moving focus away from the COP meetings as you can only use the slogan “this is our last chance
for an internationally binding agreement” so many times before it starts sounding hallow. The
international media hardly mention climate change anymore. Compared to September 2009, there
are not even half as many stories about climate change and the upcoming climate change meeting in
Mexico. Because of a lack of pressure from the media, other countries, NGOs and the public, focus
has turn from climate change to the global economic recession and how to create economic growth
(ibid).
Although Copenhagen did not lead to a binding agreement on climate change, it led to the
Copenhagen Accord, and today all major GHG emitters have signed the Copenhagen Accord –
including the US, China, EU, India and Russia. Even though the Copenhagen Accord is non-
binding, there is reason to be just a little optimistic as the contending parties - the US and China -
have both signed it, and in this way showed their willingness to cooperate. However, the Parties
continue to disagree about where to go from here. One the one side of the table we have the US who
wants the Copenhagen Accord to be a central part of a new agreement, as it does not commit the
industrialised world to specific reduction targets. On the other side of the table we have China and
India leading the way for the developing world and insisting that rich countries be bound by clear
reduction targets (Prasz, 31/03/2010).
British political philosopher, John Gray, said before the beginning of COP 15 that the only crucial
meaning Copenhagen would have was that it would be the final illusion in the dream of solving the
climate crisis and reducing GHGs. However, there are those who believe that we will eventually get
an internationally binding climate change agreement. John Nordbo, climate chief at the World
Wildlife Foundation (WWF), still believes that we will see a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, but
says that things are progressing at a very slow pace and with no one taking the lead, and therefore it
is hard to say whether a new climate change agreement will be ready before or after the next IPCC
Assessment Report which is scheduled to be published in 2013 or 2014 (ibid).
101
Even though there is a general disagreement about whether the world will see a successor to the
Kyoto Protocol, no one believes that the COP meetings to come should be cancelled. The UN
continues to be the place that gives a voice to the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries,
and if you leave the forum of the UN, there is a chance that the interests of these countries will be
forgotten (ibid).
Connie Hedegaard writes;
The Stone Age did not end because of a lack of stones. The same can be said
about the fossil era. The climate crisis is just an eye opener for something that we,
in any case, will have to relate to and change (Hedegaard, 2008: 253).
I believe that Connie Hedegaard hits the nail on the head with the above conclusion. Even though
climate change has been significantly downplayed in the media recently and the Obama
administration did not succeed in getting a climate and energy bill through Congress, all over the
world corporations, private persons, institutions and policy-makers are focusing on sustainability
and green technologies. Climate sceptics and lobbyists may be able to slow the process, but it is a
process that is already so much underway that it is impossible to ignore in the long run. At some
point, the US will come to this conclusion too. For years the world was negotiating for the Kyoto
Protocol without the participation of the US, and it seems like once again the world might have to
negotiate for a treaty without knowing whether the US is willing to cut its GHG emissions.
However, one thing is certain and that is that a new protocol without the participation of the US will
never make the difference needed. If the US does not commit to an internationally binding
agreement on climate change, then there is no chance that China and India will commit to one, and
then the world will be left with an agreement that does not include the three largest GHG emitters in
the world.
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Appendix 1 – The Kyoto Protocol
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Byrd-Hagel ResolutionSponsored by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE)
Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a
signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations... (Passed by the Senate 95-0)
105th CONGRESS1st SessionS. RES. 98
[Report No. 105-54]
Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 25, 1997
Mr. BYRD (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. WARNER, Mr. FORD, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. BURNS, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. GLENN, Mr. ENZI, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. BOND, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. DEWINE, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. GORTON, Mr. HATCH, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. CLELAND, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. JOHNSON, Ms. LANDRIEU, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. FRIST, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. GRAMM, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. LOTT, Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. ROBB, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr.
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Appendix 2 – The Byrd-Hagel Resolution
SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. REID, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. THOMPSON, and Mr. CAMPBELL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 21, 1997
Reported by Mr. HELMS, without amendment
July 25, 1997
Considered and agreed to
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Whereas the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (in this resolution referred to as the `Convention'), adopted in May 1992, entered into force in 1994 and is not yet fully implemented;
Whereas the Convention, intended to address climate change on a global basis, identifies the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), including the United States, as `Annex I Parties', and the remaining 129 countries, including China, Mexico, India, Brazil, and South Korea, as `Developing Country Parties';
Whereas in April 1995, the Convention's `Conference of the Parties' adopted the so-called `Berlin Mandate';
Whereas the `Berlin Mandate' calls for the adoption, as soon as December 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, of a protocol or another legal instrument that strengthens commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions by Annex I Parties for the post-2000 period and establishes a negotiation process called the `Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate';
Whereas the `Berlin Mandate' specifically exempts all Developing Country Parties from any new commitments in such negotiation process for the post-2000 period;
Whereas although the Convention, approved by the United States Senate, called on all signatory parties to adopt policies and programs aimed at limiting their greenhouse gas (GHG)
131
emissions, in July 1996 the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs called for the first time for `legally binding' emission limitation targets and timetables for Annex I Parties, a position reiterated by the Secretary of State in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on January 8, 1997;
Whereas greenhouse gas emissions of Developing Country Parties are rapidly increasing and are expected to surpass emissions of the United States and other OECD countries as early as 2015;
Whereas the Department of State has declared that it is critical for the Parties to the Convention to include Developing Country Parties in the next steps for global action and, therefore, has proposed that consideration of additional steps to include limitations on Developing Country Parties' greenhouse gas emissions would not begin until after a protocol or other legal instrument is adopted in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997;
Whereas the exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is environmentally flawed;
Whereas the Senate strongly believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission reductions, could result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof; and
Whereas it is desirable that a bipartisan group of Senators be appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate for the purpose of monitoring the status of negotiations on Global Climate Change and reporting periodically to the Senate on those negotiations: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would--
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
132
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and
(2) any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification should be accompanied by a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed financial costs and other impacts on the economy of the United States which would be incurred by the implementation of the protocol or other agreement.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.
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Appendix 3 – Letter from President Bush
