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Put Process Safety First
Process Safety eHANDBOOK
TIGERFLEXISO 9001-2000
REGISTERED QMS
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THE ASSOCIATION FOR HOSE ANDACCESSORIES DISTRIBUTION Made In USA
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CHEMICAL PROCESSING
BY
TABLE OF CONTENTSTurn Up Process Safety Performance 6
Implementing an effective operational discipline program can help
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management Compliance 16
Random inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucial
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review 23
Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review
before operating new or updated units
Additional Resources 27
The emergency relief system (ERS) tools have
been updated with FERST software powered by
ChemCAD FERST is a complete package that
combines the easy-to-use interface and cal-
culation methods from the PrEVent [Practical
Emergency Vent Sizing] software and the material
property thermodynamic and software develop-
ment expertise from Chemstations
It offers improved GUI functionality in file handling results reporting and customizable
plotting capabilities It also provides a staged approach to ERS design allowing users to
quickly obtain a vent size for reactive upset scenarios or nonreactive fire upset scenarios
and then build upon the design by refining the analysis
PRODUCT FOCUS
EMERGENCY RELIEF SYSTEM TOOLS GET SOFTWARE UPDATE IMPROVED GUI FUNCTIONALITY
FAUSKE amp ASSOCIATES LLC | 877-FAUSKE1 | WWWFAUSKECOM
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp3
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Trust KNF for proven liquid and gas pump performance in safety-critical applications
bull Suited for NECCEC Class 1 Division 1 Groups C amp D IEC EX ATEX
and other protection levels available
bull Choose from a broad range of pump head and diaphragm materials
Learn more today at knfusacomExProof
EXPLOSIONSGOOD IN MOVIESNOT AT YOUR FACILITY
AD INDEXFauske amp Associates bull wwwfauskecom 22
KNF Neuberger bull knfusacomexproof 4
Kuriyama of America bull wwwkuriyamacom 2
REMBE Inc bull wwwrembeus 15
The Q-Rohr flameless system is certified to handle organic dusts
melting dusts fibers metal dusts hybrid mixtures and gases It
can vent indoor and outdoor combustible dust hazards through
specially designed stainless steel mesh This metal mesh absorbs a
combustible dust explosionrsquos energy prohibiting any flames or hot
embers from exiting Because of the metal meshrsquos efficient energy
absorption the explosion noise and pressure wave are reduced to
an insignificant level The surrounding area thus is safe from a com-
bustible dust explosion allowing for a flexible facility layout
Flameless venting eliminates the need for vent ducts Additionally this passive safety system
cannot be turned off ensuring constant protection of the process It is ATEX- and FM-approved
and NFPA-compliant Click here for more info
PRODUCT FOCUS
INDOOR FLAMELESS VENTING OFFERS NONSTOP PROTECTION
REMBE INC | 704-716-7022 | WWWREMBEUS
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp5
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
hygienically designed hose fittings clamps gaskets and acces-
sories for use in the food beverage dairy cosmetics and
pharmaceutical industries
The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
ity and manufactured with a smooth (32 Ra) polish on food
contact surfaces Finepointtrade Barb Ends eliminate areas where
transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
pendently lab tested after manufacturing to ensure quality
For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
SANITARY FITTINGS SUIT HYGIENIC APPLICATIONS
KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
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copy R
EMB
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ight
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ed
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Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
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TABLE OF CONTENTSTurn Up Process Safety Performance 6
Implementing an effective operational discipline program can help
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management Compliance 16
Random inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucial
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review 23
Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review
before operating new or updated units
Additional Resources 27
The emergency relief system (ERS) tools have
been updated with FERST software powered by
ChemCAD FERST is a complete package that
combines the easy-to-use interface and cal-
culation methods from the PrEVent [Practical
Emergency Vent Sizing] software and the material
property thermodynamic and software develop-
ment expertise from Chemstations
It offers improved GUI functionality in file handling results reporting and customizable
plotting capabilities It also provides a staged approach to ERS design allowing users to
quickly obtain a vent size for reactive upset scenarios or nonreactive fire upset scenarios
and then build upon the design by refining the analysis
PRODUCT FOCUS
EMERGENCY RELIEF SYSTEM TOOLS GET SOFTWARE UPDATE IMPROVED GUI FUNCTIONALITY
FAUSKE amp ASSOCIATES LLC | 877-FAUSKE1 | WWWFAUSKECOM
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp3
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Trust KNF for proven liquid and gas pump performance in safety-critical applications
bull Suited for NECCEC Class 1 Division 1 Groups C amp D IEC EX ATEX
and other protection levels available
bull Choose from a broad range of pump head and diaphragm materials
Learn more today at knfusacomExProof
EXPLOSIONSGOOD IN MOVIESNOT AT YOUR FACILITY
AD INDEXFauske amp Associates bull wwwfauskecom 22
KNF Neuberger bull knfusacomexproof 4
Kuriyama of America bull wwwkuriyamacom 2
REMBE Inc bull wwwrembeus 15
The Q-Rohr flameless system is certified to handle organic dusts
melting dusts fibers metal dusts hybrid mixtures and gases It
can vent indoor and outdoor combustible dust hazards through
specially designed stainless steel mesh This metal mesh absorbs a
combustible dust explosionrsquos energy prohibiting any flames or hot
embers from exiting Because of the metal meshrsquos efficient energy
absorption the explosion noise and pressure wave are reduced to
an insignificant level The surrounding area thus is safe from a com-
bustible dust explosion allowing for a flexible facility layout
Flameless venting eliminates the need for vent ducts Additionally this passive safety system
cannot be turned off ensuring constant protection of the process It is ATEX- and FM-approved
and NFPA-compliant Click here for more info
PRODUCT FOCUS
INDOOR FLAMELESS VENTING OFFERS NONSTOP PROTECTION
REMBE INC | 704-716-7022 | WWWREMBEUS
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp5
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
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sories for use in the food beverage dairy cosmetics and
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The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
ity and manufactured with a smooth (32 Ra) polish on food
contact surfaces Finepointtrade Barb Ends eliminate areas where
transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
pendently lab tested after manufacturing to ensure quality
For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
SANITARY FITTINGS SUIT HYGIENIC APPLICATIONS
KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
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copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
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as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
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nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
TABLE OF CONTENTSTurn Up Process Safety Performance 6
Implementing an effective operational discipline program can help
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management Compliance 16
Random inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucial
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review 23
Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review
before operating new or updated units
Additional Resources 27
The emergency relief system (ERS) tools have
been updated with FERST software powered by
ChemCAD FERST is a complete package that
combines the easy-to-use interface and cal-
culation methods from the PrEVent [Practical
Emergency Vent Sizing] software and the material
property thermodynamic and software develop-
ment expertise from Chemstations
It offers improved GUI functionality in file handling results reporting and customizable
plotting capabilities It also provides a staged approach to ERS design allowing users to
quickly obtain a vent size for reactive upset scenarios or nonreactive fire upset scenarios
and then build upon the design by refining the analysis
PRODUCT FOCUS
EMERGENCY RELIEF SYSTEM TOOLS GET SOFTWARE UPDATE IMPROVED GUI FUNCTIONALITY
FAUSKE amp ASSOCIATES LLC | 877-FAUSKE1 | WWWFAUSKECOM
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp3
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Trust KNF for proven liquid and gas pump performance in safety-critical applications
bull Suited for NECCEC Class 1 Division 1 Groups C amp D IEC EX ATEX
and other protection levels available
bull Choose from a broad range of pump head and diaphragm materials
Learn more today at knfusacomExProof
EXPLOSIONSGOOD IN MOVIESNOT AT YOUR FACILITY
AD INDEXFauske amp Associates bull wwwfauskecom 22
KNF Neuberger bull knfusacomexproof 4
Kuriyama of America bull wwwkuriyamacom 2
REMBE Inc bull wwwrembeus 15
The Q-Rohr flameless system is certified to handle organic dusts
melting dusts fibers metal dusts hybrid mixtures and gases It
can vent indoor and outdoor combustible dust hazards through
specially designed stainless steel mesh This metal mesh absorbs a
combustible dust explosionrsquos energy prohibiting any flames or hot
embers from exiting Because of the metal meshrsquos efficient energy
absorption the explosion noise and pressure wave are reduced to
an insignificant level The surrounding area thus is safe from a com-
bustible dust explosion allowing for a flexible facility layout
Flameless venting eliminates the need for vent ducts Additionally this passive safety system
cannot be turned off ensuring constant protection of the process It is ATEX- and FM-approved
and NFPA-compliant Click here for more info
PRODUCT FOCUS
INDOOR FLAMELESS VENTING OFFERS NONSTOP PROTECTION
REMBE INC | 704-716-7022 | WWWREMBEUS
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp5
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
hygienically designed hose fittings clamps gaskets and acces-
sories for use in the food beverage dairy cosmetics and
pharmaceutical industries
The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
ity and manufactured with a smooth (32 Ra) polish on food
contact surfaces Finepointtrade Barb Ends eliminate areas where
transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
pendently lab tested after manufacturing to ensure quality
For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
SANITARY FITTINGS SUIT HYGIENIC APPLICATIONS
KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
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ight
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wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
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as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
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PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
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bull Suited for NECCEC Class 1 Division 1 Groups C amp D IEC EX ATEX
and other protection levels available
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Learn more today at knfusacomExProof
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The Q-Rohr flameless system is certified to handle organic dusts
melting dusts fibers metal dusts hybrid mixtures and gases It
can vent indoor and outdoor combustible dust hazards through
specially designed stainless steel mesh This metal mesh absorbs a
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absorption the explosion noise and pressure wave are reduced to
an insignificant level The surrounding area thus is safe from a com-
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Flameless venting eliminates the need for vent ducts Additionally this passive safety system
cannot be turned off ensuring constant protection of the process It is ATEX- and FM-approved
and NFPA-compliant Click here for more info
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wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp5
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
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The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
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transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
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For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
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KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
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copy R
EMB
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All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
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KNF Neuberger bull knfusacomexproof 4
Kuriyama of America bull wwwkuriyamacom 2
REMBE Inc bull wwwrembeus 15
The Q-Rohr flameless system is certified to handle organic dusts
melting dusts fibers metal dusts hybrid mixtures and gases It
can vent indoor and outdoor combustible dust hazards through
specially designed stainless steel mesh This metal mesh absorbs a
combustible dust explosionrsquos energy prohibiting any flames or hot
embers from exiting Because of the metal meshrsquos efficient energy
absorption the explosion noise and pressure wave are reduced to
an insignificant level The surrounding area thus is safe from a com-
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Flameless venting eliminates the need for vent ducts Additionally this passive safety system
cannot be turned off ensuring constant protection of the process It is ATEX- and FM-approved
and NFPA-compliant Click here for more info
PRODUCT FOCUS
INDOOR FLAMELESS VENTING OFFERS NONSTOP PROTECTION
REMBE INC | 704-716-7022 | WWWREMBEUS
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Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp5
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
hygienically designed hose fittings clamps gaskets and acces-
sories for use in the food beverage dairy cosmetics and
pharmaceutical industries
The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
ity and manufactured with a smooth (32 Ra) polish on food
contact surfaces Finepointtrade Barb Ends eliminate areas where
transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
pendently lab tested after manufacturing to ensure quality
For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
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KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
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ight
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wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Even highly trained people make
mistakes Some errors have minor
consequences mdash but others poten-
tially can lead to catastrophic incidents
especially in a high-hazard chemical
process An effective process safety man-
agement (PSM) program anticipates that
people will make mistakes As Figure 1 [1]
depicts such a program includes the three
crucial elements process safety systems
that describe how to do work safely and
correctly a focus on safety culture and
leadership and an operational discipline
(OD) program to help ensure correct exe-
cution of system requirements and cultural
priorities every time
OD is essential to achieve excellent process
safety performance Excellent perfor-
mance means well-designed process
safety systems that function day-to-day as
intended and the prevention or effective
mitigation of incidents that could result in
fatalities serious injuries business interrup-
tion and environmental harm Of course
poorly designed or implemented process
Turn Up Process Safety PerformanceImplementing an effective operational discipline program can helpBy James A Klein ABSG Consulting Inc
FOUNDATION OF PROGRAMFigure 1 Three elements contribute to an effective process safety program Source Ref 1
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp6
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
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pharmaceutical industries
The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
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For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
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KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
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ight
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ed
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Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
safety systems and a weak organizational
safety culture can significantly undermine
the value of an OD program
The US Occupational Safety and Health
Administrationrsquos PSM regulation is over
25 years old and many companies in the
United States and elsewhere have imple-
mented PSM systems For several years
companies also have focused on safety
culture and leadership to help achieve their
process safety goals OD efforts mdash the com-
mitment by everyone in an organization to
always follow the systems and procedures
that have been developed mdash often receive
less attention but are crucial for reducing
human error If a company isnrsquot satisfied
with its process safety performance a new
or renewed effort on OD may represent one
of the best opportunities for improvement
HUMAN ERROR AND OD In an incident investigated by the US Chem-
ical Safety Board (CSB) [2] an operator
opened the bottom valve of an operating
polymerization reactor apparently bypassing
an active pressure interlock instead of open-
ing the bottom valve of a nearby reactor that
was being cleaned A large release of flam-
mable material from the reactor ignited the
resulting explosion led to five fatalities and
major damage to the facility The CSB con-
cluded among other findings that the facility
ldquodid not adequately address the potential for
human errorrdquo Of course human error often
is a major contributor to incidents [3 4] as
The KOA Sanitary Advantage line consists of high-quality
hygienically designed hose fittings clamps gaskets and acces-
sories for use in the food beverage dairy cosmetics and
pharmaceutical industries
The line is certified to meet the 3-A Sanitary Standard for sani-
tary fittings gaskets and complete sanitary hose assemblies
Materials are made from 316L stainless steel with traceabil-
ity and manufactured with a smooth (32 Ra) polish on food
contact surfaces Finepointtrade Barb Ends eliminate areas where
transferred materials can become trapped Fittings are inde-
pendently lab tested after manufacturing to ensure quality
For more information visit httpbitly2p5fG86
PRODUCT FOCUS
SANITARY FITTINGS SUIT HYGIENIC APPLICATIONS
KURIYAMA OF AMERICA INC | (847) 755-0360 | WWWKURIYAMACOM
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp7
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
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ight
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PROTECTYOUR
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T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
shown by industry investigations of incidents
and near-misses
There are many causes of human error
Some common ones include [1]
bull human fallibility capability complacency
and commitment
bull training issues including procedure quality
and training effectiveness
bull workplace environment including accessi-
bility of information and distractions
bull familiarity with the work being done and
the time since it was last done
bull fitness-for-duty considerations such as
alcohol drugs stress and fatigue
bull urgency for completing a task quickly and
bull lack of risk recognition or sense
of vulnerability
The reality is that a company should antic-
ipate human error and provide appropriate
systems and safeguards to ensure errors
donrsquot lead to serious injuries and other
consequences especially if
work tasks include higher-risk
activities involving significant
process hazards OD addresses
human behavior in following
required systems and proce-
dures correctly every time to
consistently achieve safer and
more reliable operations Devel-
oping an OD program [5ndash9]
intended to support day-to-day
commitment by all company
personnel mdash in combination with
well-designed process safety systems and
a strong safety culture mdash can help both to
minimize the potential for human error and
confirm that process safety (and other) pro-
gram requirements are rigorously followed
A strong OD program can provide benefits
in a variety of areas [1] including
bull Environmental health and safety mdash pre-
vention or reduction of workplace injuries
occupational exposures process incidents
environmental releases and associated costs
bull Operations mdash decrease in unscheduled
shutdowns poor process utilization
inefficient use of staff incident-related
downtime and associated costs and
bull Quality mdash reduction in off-specification
product rework and waste lower yields
poor quality customer complaints and
associated costs
The safety triangle (Figure 2) illustrates
qualitatively that significant consequences
SAFETY TRIANGLEFigure 2 Minimizing lapses lower in the triangle often can help forestall more-serious events Source Ref 1
Catastrophic IncidentsInjuries
Serious IncidentsInjuries
Minor IncidentsInjuries
Near-misses
Unsafe Acts
Undesirable Acts
Focus of Operational Discipline
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp8
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
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wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
such as serious injuries or catastrophic inci-
dents (at the top of the triangle) often (but
not always) are the result of or predicted
by a larger number of smaller near-miss
events or unsafe acts and behaviors (at the
bottom of the triangle) Focusing on min-
imizing or eliminating potential problems
frequently can help prevent the more-se-
rious events An effective OD program
works to reduce undesirable actions at
the bottom of the triangle by encouraging
and supporting correct actions in follow-
ing program systems and procedures
This is especially important for higher-risk
activities involving significant process (or
other) hazards where the base of the tri-
angle may be very narrow mdash meaning that
even one mistake or unsafe action can lead
directly to a serious injury or other conse-
quence Ultimately OD programs aim to
help reduce the frequency and associated
risks of human error
PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICSA program must focus on both orga-
nizational and personal OD [167]
Organizational OD involves developing
the programs and work environment to
support strong OD as well as providing
resources for OD improvement efforts
Organizational OD efforts closely relate
to good safety culture and leadership
practices and supplement associated
management systems to promote and
achieve program goals Personal OD
characteristics target worker activities
at all levels of the organization to ensure
workers know what they need to do and
perform their work correctly and safely
every time
Good OD performance doesnrsquot happen on
its own It requires continued management
attention [7] mdash to demonstrate personal
attention and dedication provide appropri-
ate resources as needed implement and
use effective systems monitor and evalu-
ate actual performance and develop and
support effective processes to facilitate
employee understanding engagement and
follow-through
Organizational OD possesses four charac-
teristics [1]
bull Leadership focus Leaders emphasize and
provide a positive work environment
managing processes and resources for
effective programs and employee engage-
ment Leaders are personally involved
and passionate for safety and model the
behaviors they expect from everyone in
their organization
Leadership focus provides the foundation of any OD program
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp9
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
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ight
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ed
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Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
bull Employee engagement Employees at all
levels of the organization understand
and value the importance of safe work
activities and contribute to organizational
programs and activities
bull Procedure principles Correct ways of
doing work are defined and work is com-
pleted as planned following reviewed and
authorized systems and procedures
bull Housekeeping and workplace standards
Standards are established for maintain-
ing safe equipment tools and facilities
Employees are proud of their work envi-
ronment and consistently maintain high
levels of housekeeping
While related to safety culture these
characteristics serve to emphasize the OD
aspects of effective programs Leadership
focus provides the foundation of any OD
program mdash without it priority and support
for OD improvement canrsquot exist Leader-
ship also must promote strong employee
engagement too many uninvolved or
uninterested employees will limit an
organizationrsquos ability to achieve robust
performance An important part of lead-
ership focus therefore is providing the
culture and work environment to engage
employees at all levels of the organization
involving them as active participants in
safety programs and in achieving strong
performance The most visible results of
leadership focus and employee engage-
ment are employees following approved
systems and procedures operating
equipment within safe operating limits
and maintaining equipment and work
areas in safe operating condition
Personal OD has three characteristics [6]
bull Knowledge The employee understands
how to do the work task correctly
and safely
bull Commitment The person commits to
doing the tasks the right way every time
bull Awareness The individual anticipates
potential problems and recognizes
unusual situations
As Figure 3 highlights all three personal
characteristics are essential for achieving
high levels of OD performance a deficit in
one area can increase the risk of an error
The goal is to have a prepared skilled and
suitable work effort that can effectively
and safely deal with the existing work
environment rather than an unquestioning
focus on strict adherence to procedure
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICSFigure 3 A deficit in any one area can undermine OD performance Source Ref 6
Knowledge Commitment
Awareness
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp10
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
middot Over 45 years of innovation in comdust explosion protectionmiddot Venting and isolation to protect personnel and plantmiddot Customized indooroutdoor protection for dust collectors and more
copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
when circumstances differ or change Of
course procedures and training should
cover possible deviations and the correct
ways to respond to them to help mitigate
any potential negative consequences
Efforts on personal OD necessarily relate
to other major programs for reducing
human error including human factors
analysis behavior-based safety human
performance technology and human reli-
ability assessment
ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAMOD issues and problems typically are spe-
cific to an organization and local site often
varying in priority widely within
the same organization or facility
based on different safety cul-
tures leadership work activities
hazards geographic locations
and other factors While common
issues may exist within a larger
organization mdash for example no
current focus on OD mdash improve-
ment activities which should not
be prescriptive must be evaluated
locally to help identify and prior-
itize improvement opportunities
and goals For example one site
may have poorly developed pro-
cedures while another site may
lack housekeeping standards
Both factors can affect OD perfor-
mance but improvement requires
different approaches Effective
OD programs depending on the size of the
organization or site should consider one
umbrella goal for example implementing
an OD improvement program mdash but the
details of specific activities for achieving
better OD should be developed prioritized
and pursued based on specific local condi-
tions and issues as appropriate
Figure 4 [1] shows a recommended
approach for developing an effective OD
program The primary steps include
bull Focusing on OD improvement Without
specific management attention organi-
zationally and locally OD is unlikely to
improve in a sustained way
IMPLEMENTATION STEPSFigure 4 Following this approach can foster the development of an effective OD program Source Ref 1
Sustain improvements
Incidents Injuries Metrics
Self-assessment Surveys
Focus on OD improvement
Raise OD awareness
Prioritize improve-ments set goals and
provide resources
Evaluate OD performance
Monitor progress
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp11
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
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copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
bull Raising OD awareness Introduce all
employees to what OD is and why itrsquos
important You can do this by discussing
OD with employees in special workshops
or meetings safety meetings shift meet-
ings etc reinforcement day-to-day in
the workplace by management atten-
tion and practices is important Solicit
employee input on OD to help raise
awareness and identify specific issues
causes and possible solutions for fur-
ther evaluation
bull Evaluating OD performance Assess
current OD performance to establish a
starting point and identify potential OD
improvement opportunities based on
review of performance metrics incident
data audit results quality data and
potentially targeted surveys
bull Prioritizing OD improvements Focus on
key areas for enhancing performance
and opportunities that can produce
tangible results quickly Engage site
employees for input establish specific
goals and timing milestones and provide
resources Given the many competing
priorities for resources itrsquos generally
better to limit the initial number of
projects to help ensure success Then
identify and add new projects as current
ones finish
bull Monitoring progress Establish metrics
to check progress toward improvement
goals and schedule periodic manage-
ment reviews to support successful
project completion Also pay attention
to the greater work environment and
when appropriate modify project goals
based on new informationconditions
Recognize progress and successful proj-
ect completion and continue to engage
employees to support and provide input
on progress
bull Sustaining improvements As proj-
ects are successfully completed there
always will be additional improvement
opportunities Periodically repeat the
previous steps as needed to identify
prioritize and implement new projects
Ensure that gains made are supported
and preserved
Making significant progress on improv-
ing OD takes time A mix of projects
to achieve quick and relatively easy
improvements as well as longer-term
more-substantial progress is ideal to
establish value for the OD effort and
build momentum For example simpler
projects such as developing checklists
for higher-risk activities take less time
than needed for larger projects such as
Making significant progress on improving OD takes time
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp12
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
middot Over 45 years of innovation in comdust explosion protectionmiddot Venting and isolation to protect personnel and plantmiddot Customized indooroutdoor protection for dust collectors and more
copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
significantly revising operating procedures
or adding evaluation of OD in incident
investigations or audits
Improving OD is a continuous process It
involves a repeating cycle of identifying
completing and sustaining opportunities
and then pinpointing new opportunities to
pursue You always must assess changes
to technology operations hazards etc
these may provide additional needs for
OD program efforts
A variety of similar approaches are avail-
able for spurring organizational change
Here as an example are the best prac-
tices for leadership efforts to implement
and sustain effective OD programs in the
FLAME model [1]
bull Focus Develop a vision to enable
appropriate focus on OD effectively com-
municate it to develop awareness and
engage site personnel and provide daily
reinforcement through leadership atten-
tion and priorities
bull Leadership Leaders act as role models
committed to continuous improvement
and excellent OD performance through
use of effective consistent leader-
ship practices
bull Accountability Organization team and
individual goals include a focus on OD
with clear expectations on performance
feedback and recognition as appropriate
bull Measurement Metrics audits and other
tools are defined to periodically assess
site activities performance and progress
toward goals
bull Engagement Leaders provide a work
environment that fosters the engage-
ment and support of site personnel
based on good communication pro-
cesses employee input and involvement
and interdependent behaviors Site
personnel know they are important to
success and that their contributions
are valued
It may make sense to assign an OD
leader to give additional focus and
accountability on achieving an effective
program especially for larger companies
or facilities Ultimately the OD program
should provide
bull Tools to document and support effec-
tive work practices such as procedures
checklists fitness-for-duty programs
management systems etc
bull Training both initially and via periodic
refreshers to confirm that workers
understand how to complete their work
correctly and safely build value and
commitment for following established
procedures and systems every time
and support workers in anticipating and
planning for potential work problems
bull Time for building capability and experi-
ence completing work in a timely manner
and maintaining awareness of the work
environment
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp13
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
middot Over 45 years of innovation in comdust explosion protectionmiddot Venting and isolation to protect personnel and plantmiddot Customized indooroutdoor protection for dust collectors and more
copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
A VALUABLE PROGRAMPeople make mistakes sometimes with
potentially catastrophic consequences
Effective process safety programs mdash built
on foundations of safety culture and
leadership management systems and
operational discipline mdash anticipate and
manage the likelihood of human error
As Jim Collins stated in ldquoGood to Greatrdquo
[10] ldquoSustained great results depend
upon building a culture of self-disciplined
people who take disciplined actionrdquo If
your metrics tell you that improved pro-
cess safety performance is desirable to
meet company goals then an effective
OD effort as part of your process safety
program may provide the greatest oppor-
tunity for improving performance
JAMES A KLEIN is Minneapolis-based senior
consultant for ABSG Consulting Inc Email
him at jkleinabsconsultingcom
REFERENCES1 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K
ldquoProcess Safety Key Concepts and Practical
Approachesrdquo CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2017)
2 ldquoVinyl Chloride Monomer Explosionrdquo Report
No 2004-10-I-IL US Chem Safety Bd
Washington DC (2007)
3 Kletz Trevor ldquoAn Engineerrsquos View of Human
Errorrdquo 3rd ed CRC Press Boca Raton Fla
(2001)
4 ldquoGuidelines for Preventing Human Error in
Process Safetyrdquo Ctr for Chem Proc Safety
AIChE New York City (1994)
5 Klein James A ldquoOperational Discipline in the
Workplacerdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 228ndash235
Vol 24 No 4 (Dec 2005)
6 Klein James A and Vaughen Bruce K ldquoA
Revised Model for Operational Disciplinerdquo
Proc Safety Progr pp 58ndash65 Vol 27 No 1
(March 2008)
7 Klein James A and Francisco Eduardo M
ldquoFocus on Personal Operational Discipline to
Get Work Done Rightrdquo Proc Safety Progr
pp 100ndash104 Vol 31 No 2 (June 2012)
8 ldquoConduct of Operations and Operational
Disciplinerdquo John Wiley amp Sons Hoboken NJ
(2011)
9 Vaughen Bruce K Klein James A and
Champion John C ldquoOur Process Safety
Journey Continues Operational Discipline
Todayrdquo Proc Safety Progr pp 478ndash492
Vol 37 No 4 (Dec 2018)
10 Collins Jim ldquoGood to Great Why Some
Companies Make the Leaphellip And Others
Donrsquotrdquo HarperBusiness New York City
(2001)
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp14
59929 Brilon Germany | inforembede | wwwrembede
middot Over 45 years of innovation in comdust explosion protectionmiddot Venting and isolation to protect personnel and plantmiddot Customized indooroutdoor protection for dust collectors and more
copy R
EMB
Ereg |
All r
ight
s re
serv
ed
| Charlotte NC 28217 USA | inforembeus | wwwrembeusInc
Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
PLANT
T +1 704 716 7022T +49 2961 7405-0
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
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ight
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Consulting Engineering Products Service
PROTECTYOUR
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wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A 1984 event shattered any concepts
of how much tragedy could occur
from a single industrial incident
such as a chemical leak Until then most
Americans probably never had heard of
the city of Bhopal India However a leak
in December of that year became known
forever simply as the Bhopal Disaster
Approximately 45 tons of dangerous methyl
isocyanate gas escaped from an insecti-
cide plant and spread airborne to heavily
populated areas thousands were killed and
countless others suffered health effects
Bhopal had a major impact on current and
future generations in the United States through
the Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion set forth by the US Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA)
Simply stated its purpose is to regulate
highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs) to
reduce the possibility of or completely
prevent such a major chemical-related
incident from occurring again OSHA
Standard 29 CFR 1910119 focuses strictly
on potentially lethal HHCs not low-
risk releases
In addition the US Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) created a Risk
Management Program (RMP) as part of
the Clean Air Act in response to major
chemical accidents in Bhopal and Institute
West Virginia
OSHA promulgated its final PSM standard
on February 24 1992 and the EPA issued its
RMP rule on June 20 1996
Avoid Issues in Process Safety Management ComplianceRandom inspections now make meeting all requirements even more crucialBy Adam Jackson ACS Engineering
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp16
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
Both OSHA and the EPA essentially were on
the same track in moving to protect plant
workers and the public from HHC releases
The EPArsquos RMP has four sections offsite
consequence analysis where companies
must outline worst-case scenarios five-year
accident history (detailing only the most
serious accidents) prevention program
(similar to OSHArsquos PSM) and emergency
response program Many facilities mistakenly
think EPA and OSHA prevention programs
are the same However OSHArsquos PSM remains
the driving force in preventing or mitigat-
ing high-risk chemical release incidents
As stated by OSHA ldquoThe main purpose of
PSM of hazardous chemicals is to prevent
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals
especially [where] employees and others
[could be exposed] to serious hazards An
effective PSM program requires a systematic
approach to evaluating the whole chemical
processrdquo The single overriding point is that
a facility canrsquot exceed a threshold of certain
chemicals found on OSHArsquos HHC list
KEY ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCEThe first step in a PSM program is properly
understanding its fourteen essential com-
ponents mdash because compliance isnrsquot a brief
a-b-c exercise but may pose quite a few
challenges According to OSHA all the ele-
ments are interlinked and interdependent
The N 630 diaphragm vacuumcompressor pump series deliv-
ers high pressure and gas tightness It offers a long service
life vacuum down to 074 inHg (25 mbar abs) positive pres-
sure to 174 psig (12 bar rel) and a flow rate to 24 CFM (68 L
min)
The series is available in four variants either one- or two-
headed and connected in series or parallel as a vacuum pump
or as a compressor All models come with EPDM or chemically
resistant PTFE-coated diaphragms for durability They handle ambient and media temperatures
down to 41 degF (5 degC) Head water cooling systems make them suitable for use at ambient and
media temperatures up to 140 degF (60 degC)
The pumps are equipped with IP55-rated motors designed to be operated via a variable fre-
quency drive (VFD) which allows their rotational speedperformance to be set
PRODUCT FOCUS
VACUUMCOMPRESSOR PUMPS AVAILABLE IN FOUR VARIANTS
KNF NEUBERGER INC | 609-890-8600 | KNFCOMENUSN630
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp17
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
In brief the 14 components are
1 Compiling adequate process safety
information This requires developing
and maintaining written safety materials
identifying workplace processes and
equipment issues
2 Conducting a process hazard analysis
The assessment may include pinpointing
potential accidental release sources deter-
mining the location of previous releases
that could have become catastrophic and
estimating effects of such releases
3 Consulting with employees about assess-
ments and chemical accident prevention
plans and providing appropriate access
to these materials
4 Setting up a system to respond to work-
place hazard-assessment findings
5 Reviewing the workplace hazard and
response system
6 Developing written procedures for the
chemical processes including procedures
for each operating phase operating limita-
tions and safetyhealth considerations
7 Providing written safetyoperating infor-
mation and training for employees
8 Giving contractors and contract employ-
ees appropriate information and training
9 Educating and training employ-
ees and contractors in emergency
response procedures
10 Establishing a quality assurance program
to ensure that initial process-related
equipment maintenance materials and
spare parts are fabricated and installed
consistent with design specifications
11 Creating maintenance systems for criti-
cal process-related equipment to ensure
ongoing mechanical integrity
12 Performing pre-startup safety
reviews of all newly installed or modi-
fied equipment
13 Putting in place written procedures for
change management relative to pro-
cess chemicals technology equipment
and facilities
14 Investigating every incident resulting in
or that could have resulted in a major
accident and reviewing findings for
modifications they may suggest
Because OSHArsquos PSM program deals with
such a serious issue HHCs the penalties
for non-compliance can be steep Compa-
nies may incur fines of up to $500000 and
individuals may get hit with fines of up to
$250000 for wide-ranging non-compli-
ance including reportable releases injuries
and even simply not meeting paperwork
requirements Additionally they may face
civil lawsuits and in a worst-case scenario a
company may be forced to shut down
Given the complexities involved compa-
nies canrsquot address compliance simply on
an ad-hoc or low-priority basis but should
develop a risk mitigation program to satisfy
OSHArsquos PSM
OSHA stresses that companies canrsquot meet
compliance standards on a shoestring
budget and should allocate approximately
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp18
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
3 of gross revenue to the task OSHA
actually affords companies some flexibil-
ity in spending Over a five-year period
large companies should spend 11 of
their gross revenue and small compa-
nies 32 These arenrsquot rigid figures but
underscore that compliance should not
be unbudgeted or have an unrealistically
low budget
Every company subject to PSM should
designate a suitable individual to be in
charge during the entire compliance pro-
cess Typically most companies lack a
ldquoglove fitrdquo employee but at chemical
companies the person chosen preferably
should be an engineer ideally one special-
izing in mechanical integrity If a company
doesnrsquot have an appropriate individual
a common-sense approach is to retain a
PSM engineering consultant with at least
five years of experience The consultant
may continue on a permanent basis or
temporarily until the company can fill the
position internally
Finally a crucial element in every PSM
compliance process is developing a
cost-effective and reasonable plan for
accomplishing the goals Success is ldquoall
in the detailsrdquo Companies find that a
well-managed highly functional program
more than meets expectations for being
in compliance and avoiding penalties In
other words effective management is key
to compliance
COMMON MISTAKES The road to compliance can lead to many
potential wrong turns Indeed companies
make a number of common mistakes Letrsquos
look at six and how to remedy them
bull Believing training of everyone is the
all-purpose answer Itrsquos not After training
companies must effectively police the
system to help ensure that all the compli-
ance efforts are proceeding as intended
bull Over-emphasizing efficiency Too many
projects appear to fly through hazard and
operability (HAZOP) reviews but donrsquot
work once they are completed Focus on
the details and take the time to do the
job right
bull Taking the attitude that ldquoanything within
the fence line is considered by the com-
pany to be part of PSMrdquo Although an
interesting concept it can create prob-
lems Once such a policy is formally
stated regulatory inspectors must accept
the policy at face value which may be
to the companyrsquos detriment Re-evaluate
what actually applies to PSM
bull Failing to consider the Facility Car Seal
Program (which mandates that all pres-
sure valves must be car sealed open) as
part of PSM Realistically to be effective
a car seal program must be regularly
verified documented and audited Con-
sider any car seal found broken or any
safety-critical manual valve found in an
improper position as a PSM ldquonear missrdquo
bull Not performing mechanical integrity
inspections on schedule Many people
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp19
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
clearly understand the potential negative
consequences but delays still happen
all too often Audits usually reveal that
a percentage of pressure vessel tank
instrument and rotating equipment
inspections are overdue Companies
should recognize this reality and take
the appropriate action When an inspec-
tion must be postponed initiate a
management-of-change procedure to
determine what if any additional safe-
guards are required until the delayed
inspection occurs If overdue inspec-
tions are a continuing problem perform
a formal root cause analysis to deter-
mine why
bull Paying inadequate attention to compe-
tency standards These are expressed
in terms of outcome and specify both
the knowledgeskill necessary and its
appropriate application for adequate per-
formance in the workplace When properly
addressed competency assurance can
lead to significant improvements and
ensure requirements are met For more on
this topic check out ldquoDiscover the Bene-
fits of a Competency-Based Approachrdquo
httpgooglDeL9fs
A RECENT WRINKLEAs sometimes occurs with major reg-
ulations details get fine-tuned or
substantially revised over time Between
the mid-1990s and 2007 the PSM pro-
gram spurred improvements but some
catastrophic incidents still occurred So
OSHA decided to revise the PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP)
In 2011 a new Chemical NEP went into effect
following the success of a pilot program for
the petroleum industry that was implemented
in 2007 Identified as OSHA Instruction CPL
03-00-14 PSM Covered Chemical Facilities
National Emphasis Program it generally is
called CHEMNEP The NEP for refineries and
CHEMNEP which are similar but not identical
programs both involve an in-depth look at
the now well-known fourteen major elements
As a whole CHEMNEPrsquos intent is to conduct
focused inspections at randomly selected
facilities nationwide chosen from a listing
of sites that likely have covered processes
Because the pilot CHEMNEP uncovered
many problems similar to those discovered
in the Petroleum NEP OSHA expanded the
program nationally both to increase aware-
ness of dangers and push employers more
forcefully toward preventing HHC releases
The ldquotop tenrdquo points to know about the new
CHEMNEP for chemical plant operators in
no ranking order are
bull It became effective immediately with no
expiration date
bull CHEMNEP now encompasses all OSHA
regions Unlike the pilot programs chemi-
cal plant operators must participate
bull Targets include types of workplaces simi-
lar to those in the pilot that had submitted
Program 3 Risk Management Plans to the
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp20
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
EPA have an NAICS code for explosives
manufacturing are in OSHArsquos data-
base for being cited previously for PSM
issues and are known to be operating a
PSM-covered process
bull In determining what to inspect OSHA will
select the ldquomost hazardous processrdquo based
on several factors including age chemical
quantity in the process how many workers
and contractors are present ongoing main-
tenance and incident or ldquonear missrdquo reports
bull Each OSHA office nationally must
complete 3ndash5 programmed CHEMNEP
inspections annually mdash one must relate
to ammonia refrigeration and the rest to
ldquootherrdquo PSM-covered processes
bull OSHA stresses that implementation out-
weighs documentation
bull The new CHEMNEP features dynamic list
questions which rotate from time to time
and arenrsquot disclosed publicly
bull Employers must produce multiple types
of documents including a listing of
PSM-covered processes itemization of
the plantrsquos units and maximum-intended
inventories three years of OSHA 300
logs summary description of the compa-
nyrsquos PSM program details about process
and safety systems and PSM incident
reports for selected units
bull Even a single issue potentially may yield
multiple citations For example one
valve change could impact eleven differ-
ent elements
bull Abatement verification and documen-
tation now are mandatory unlike in the
pilot NEP
EMBRACE PSM COMPLIANCE The very concept of regulation especially
in the industrial sector typically engen-
ders only grudging compliance out of
necessity and threats of penalties Yet
few events galvanize such support for
change and regulation as did the Bhopal
and Institute tragediesrsquo heavy loss of life
and widespread non-fatal injuries So
although OSHArsquos PSM doesnrsquot garner uni-
versal acclaim the chemical industry and
other industries with potential for major
HHC incidents largely support it
Likewise while critics may complain that
any regulation is too complicated or dis-
tracts too much from work devoted to
profitability the general consensus on
PSM is that continuing to do ldquobusiness
as usualrdquo puts employees and the public
at needless risk from HHCs and a new
direction had to be taken because the
issue is just too important Following the
PSM regulations can be done sensibly
either internally or by calling in outside
experts
ADAM JACKSON is vice president engineering and
technical services for ACS Engineering Houston
E-mail him at adamjacksonacsengineeringcom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp21
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
Reaction Calorimetry
wwwfauskecom infofauskecom +1 630 323 8750
bull THT-RCbull Mettler-Toledo RC1bull ChemiSens CPA 202
To determine required cooling capacity understand process changes and scale-up implications FAI performs reaction calorimetry using
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Heat of Reactionbull Instantaneous Heat Flowbull Heat Capacitybull Kinetics
bull Adiabatic Temperature Risebull Maximum Temperature of Synthetic Reaction (MTSR)bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
Key Uses Understanding thermal potential of desired reactions designing cooling systems scale-up and process optimization by adjusting temperature recipe and addition rates
Adiabatic amp Isothermal Calorimetry
To determine critical safety parameters to avoid undesired reactions FAI performs heat flow and adiabatic calorimetry using
bull Vent Sizing Package 2 (VSP2TM)
bull Advanced Reactive System Screening Tool (ARSSTTM)
bull Thermal Activity Monitor (TAM)
bull Setaram C80bull Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARCreg)bull Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC)bull Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA)
Safety Parameters Obtainedbull Activation Energybull Rate Constantsbull Non-Condensable Gas Generationbull Vapor Pressure
Key Uses Thermal hazard screening compatibility studies safe operating temperatures (TMR ADT24) safe transport (SADT) quantify shelf life oxidation studies emergency relief system (ERS) design and process scale-up
Ref Stoessel Thermal Safety of Chemical Processes
Thermal hazards testing aims to collect reaction rate data to assess whether a specified quantity of a material can be safely used while avoiding runaway chemical reactions This data is important when considering processing long-term storage or shipping of a material Fauske amp Associates LLC (FAI) uses many tools to understand and eliminate undesired reactions accommodate process upset scenarios and optimize a clientrsquos desired process chemistry A list of tools and their applications are provided below
FAUSKEamp A S S O C I A T E S L L C
Thermal Hazards Testing
FAIrsquosAdvanced Reactive
System Screening Tool (ARSST)
FAIrsquosVent SizingPackage 2
(VSP2)
bull Heat of Reaction of Desired and Undesired Reactions
bull Measured Adiabatic Temperature Rise
bull Pressure Relief Vent Size
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR)
is a critical element of the pro-
cess safety management (PSM)
program mandated by the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) However due to time
constraint and budget pressures the temp-
tation to rush or completely neglect the
PSSR often exists
OSHA implemented the PSM program in
1992 It spelled out the need for a PSSR
in 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations)
1910119(i)
1910119(i)(1) mdash The employer shall perform
a pre-startup safety review for new facilities
and for modified facilities when the mod-
ification is significant enough to require a
change in the process safety information
1910119(i)(2) mdash The pre-startup safety
review shall confirm that prior to the intro-
duction of highly hazardous chemicals to
a process
1910119(i)(2)(i) mdash Construction
and equipment is in accordance with
design specifications
1910119(i)(2)(ii) mdash Safety operating
maintenance and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate
1910119(i)(2)(iii) mdash For new facilities a
process hazard analysis [PHA] has been
performed and recommendations have
been resolved or implemented before
startup and modified facilities meet the
requirements contained in management
of change paragraph (l)
Perform a Proper Pre-startup Safety Review Protect personnel and processes by conducting a thorough review before operating new or updated unitsBy John C Wincek DEKRA Process Safety
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp23
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
1910119(i)(2)(iv) mdash Training of each
employee involved in operating a process
has been completed
The PSSR frequently is the last line of
defense before bringing an updated or new
process online to ensure
bull It has been designed properly
bull The equipment and process information is
complete and available
bull The equipment is installed per the
design specifications
bull A PHA has been conducted and associ-
ated documented recommendations have
been addressed
bull Documented safety operating mainte-
nance and emergency procedures are
adequate and complete
bull All training of operations personnel has
been finished
One item not specifically spelled out in
this regulation but probably included in
the intent for equipment is the safety
instrumented system (SIS) with associ-
ated distributed control system (DCS)
programmable logic controllers (PLC)
and stand-alone digital or analog con-
trollers and alarm systems It provides
alarms to alert operators if the process is
starting to get out of control and inter-
locks to take certain actions intervene
or even stop the process if necessary
Ensuring the automated valves associ-
ated process instrumentation alarms and
interlocks are active and functioning as
designed can require significant time and
effort before starting a new or updated
process or restarting a process after a
major shutdown
INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE IMPORTANCEIn March 2005 the BP Texas City refinery
suffered a major disaster that killed 15 and
injured more than 170 others (For details
see the report issued by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CSB) httpbitly2RumKXU)
BP hadnrsquot properly conducted safety criti-
cal checks The CSB investigators found an
inoperative pressure control valve a defec-
tive high-level alarm and an uncalibrated
sight-glass level transmitter as well as por-
table trailers with non-essential personnel
located too close to the process
In incidents at two other sites improperly
conducted PSSRs of process control and
system settings led to equipment and pro-
cess damage with financial and business
impact Fortunately neither caused deaths
or injuries
In the first event equipment manufactured
in Europe and shipped to the United States
had a 50-Hz motor setting remaining from
preliminary testing overseas That setting
should have been changed to 60 Hz for
US operations Failure to alter the set-
ting caused the motor to run slower and
resulted in a process shutdown due to high
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp24
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
temperature Operational steps taken while
cooling the process led to a propagating
fireball explosion that caused extensive
damage to the outdoor process equipment
and some siding on the building
In the other incident a manufacturing opera-
tion replaced a circuit board treating this as
an in-kind change although the board actu-
ally was an updated version The site didnrsquot
conduct a PSSR and thus didnrsquot uncover
that several critical interlocks werenrsquot oper-
ational due to the board replacement The
result was a damaged shaft plus repair and
replacement cost and the associated lost
production time (8ndash10 weeks)
Properly performed PSSRs would have
prevented these three events Ensuring
a thorough PSSR requires both qualified
employees and knowledgeable safe-
ty-minded management The PSSR also
should get reviewed and approved before
allowing processes to be brought online
or restarted
Effectively conducted PSSRs can prevent
incidents and the resultant harm to per-
sonnel equipment damage and loss of
production and profits According to OSHA
the ultimate responsibility lies with plant
or facility management to ensure a PSSR is
properly conducted before a covered pro-
cess is started
Unfortunately some common errors often
undermine efforts
bull failure to conduct a PSSR after process
modifications or a prolonged equip-
ment outage
bull assembling a team without the necessary
knowledge and skills to adequately per-
form the PSSR
bull skipping or forgetting parts of the PSSR
needed to ensure the process is com-
pleted and ready to start
bull omitting critical safety features from the
review or not checking them for proper
installation and operation and
bull lack of appropriate approval steps for the
PSSR before proceeding to start or restart
the process
Following good practices can help ensure
a PSSR is performed properly Five key
ones are
1 Assign a leader to be in charge of the
PSSR team This person should have
sufficient authority to delay the startup
if the team identifies a significant defi-
ciency Given that such a delay could
lead to a serious financial loss very
strong pressure to allow a deficient pro-
cess to start up may arise So the leader
must have the personality skills knowl-
edge determination and organizational
authority to resist such pressure
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp25
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
2 The leader should assemble an appropri-
ate multi-disciplined team of personnel
(design and construction engineering
instrument and controls maintenance
operations safety and supervisors) to
complete the PSSR and the additional fol-
low-up activities
3 The team should use a checklist or other
suitable PSSR form to verify all required
parts of the PSSR are completed
4 Ensure the team understands all the
process equipment subject to the PSSR
This should include tanks vessels reac-
tors mixers connecting piping etc as
appropriate as well as the associated
instrumentation and controls including
the DCS or PLC
5 If necessary consider using third-party
contractors and consultants to supply
necessary information or technical
expertise on the equipment or process
under review
A CRITICAL STEPA PSSR may resemble a hazard analysis
although itrsquos not aimed solely at identifying
new hazards Rather the PSSR is intended
to ensure the plant or process about to be
started is safe and operable
Donrsquot treat a PSSR as just an exercise in
filling out a form or ticking boxes on a
checklist Sometimes itrsquos necessary to per-
form nondestructive or other appropriate
tests on the equipment instrumentation
and control systems in the field before
starting a process You must do whatever
is required to have high confidence the
equipment and associated instrumentation
and control systems function properly as
designed and intended and critical safety
devices canrsquot be bypassed
A PSSR mainly serves for verification not
the identification of new hazards It pro-
vides the last opportunity for the team
associated with a project to ensure the
possibility of an unsafe condition doesnrsquot
exist before the process goes into opera-
tion and potentially hazardous chemicals
are introduced In addition it enables the
team responsible for the design operation
and maintenance of the process including
facility management to check mdash before
starting up mdash that effective procedures
have been written and the operators and
maintenance personnel have been trained
on the process
JOHN C WINCEK is consulting manager process safety
Americas for DEKRA Process Safety Princeton NJ
Email him at Johnwincekdekracom
wwwChemicalProcessingcom
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp26
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27
Visit the lighter side featuring draw-
ings by award-winning cartoonist
Jerry King Click on an image and you
will arrive at a page with the winning
caption and all submissions for that
particular cartoon
ADDITIONAL RESOURCESEHANDBOOKSCheck out our vast library of past eHandbooks that offer a
wealth of information on a single topic aimed at providing
best practices key trends developments and successful
applications to help make your facilities as efficient safe
environmentally friendly and economically competitive
as possible
UPCOMING AND ON DEMAND WEBINARSTap into expert knowledge Chemical Processing editors
and industry experts delve into hot topics challenging
the chemical processing industry today while providing
insights and practical guidance Each of these free webi-
nars feature a live QampA session and lasts 60 minutes
WHITE PAPERSCheck out our library of white papers covering myriad
topics and offering valuable insight into products and solu-
tions important to chemical processing professionals From
automation to fluid handling separations technologies and
utilities this white paper library has it all
PROCESS SAFETY WITH TRISH amp TRACITrish Kerin director of IChemE Safety Centre and Chemical
Processingrsquos Traci Purdum discuss current process safety
issues offering insight into mitigation options and next steps
ASK THE EXPERTSHave a question on a technical issue that needs to be
addressed Visit our Ask the Experts forum Covering
topics from combustion to steam systems our roster of
leading subject matter experts as well as other forum
members can help you tackle plant issues
JOIN US ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Process Safety eHANDBOOK Put Process Safety Firstemsp27