Q Poli Tips

1. Yung issue ng us and china na dumaan sa manmade island ng china, sabi ni sandoval, highseas daw yun res communes tapos yung mga pwedeng iexercise under res communes: freedom of navi-gation

Freedom sa mining

Fishing

Laying of cables

Scientific research

2. Issue ni grace poe

Maquiling case v. Manzano case ☑

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philip-pines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte

Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a for-eigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration indicating the national-ity of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.

Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning can-didate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who gar-nered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnado is disqualified to hold elective office?

HELD:

YES, The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Fil-ipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presump-tion does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizen-ship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authori-ties of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "di-vest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Ar-nado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing him-self as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented him-self as an American citizen by using his US passport.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which vio-lates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are re-quired to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

***Maquiling is not a second-placer ashe obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still re-spected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifica-tions of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not pos-sess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

MERCADO v. MANZANOG.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

FACTS:Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqual -ification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citi-zen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective po-sition. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he at-tained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.

RULING: NOThe court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual alle-giance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loy-alty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an in -dividual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is in-imical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the ter -mination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effec -tively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Repub-lic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determina-tion whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resi-dent or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philip-pines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, pri-vate respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philip-pine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citi-zenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sus-tained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commer-

cial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subse-quently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3. Diplomats v. Consul depende sa immunity na granted sa kanila!☑

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Internal v external self-determination❌

Ombudsman Act -Secs 21, 24, 14, 27

-relate to Sec 40, LGC

-EXCEPTION: Lingating v Comelec☑

LIGATING v. COMELEC

FACTS:

The records of the case reveal that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, malversation. . .

In the May 1992 elections, respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur despite the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May elections, respondent Sulong ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur.

ISSUE:

whether or not the administrative constitutes a ground for the disqualification of Sukong as a candi-date in the elections [of May 14, 2001].

HELD:

While it is true that one of the disqualifications from running in an elective position is re-moval from office as a result of an administrative case, said provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected to another term.

Obviously, the re-election of [r]espondent Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tanta-mount to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision which found him guilty of dis-honesty, malversation of public funds etc

Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed their will when they cast their votes in the recent elections as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong to have won con-vincingly.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection oper-ated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to re-move him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, the decision in the administrative case, was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to ap-peal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

Election protest v quo warranto☑

A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC

2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS IN-VOLVING ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

Sec. 3 Explanation of Terms

(u) Election protest – refers to an election contest involving the election and returns of municipal elective officials, grounded on fraud or irregularities committed in the conduct of the elections, i.e., in the casting and the counting of the ballots, in the consolidation of votes and in the canvassing of returns, not otherwise classified as a pre-proclamation controversy cognizable by the COMELEC. The issue is who obtained the plurality of valid votes cast.

(v) Quo Warranto under the Omnibus Election Code – refers to an election contest involving the qualifications for office of an elective municipal official, on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The issue is whether the respondent possesses all the qualifica-tions and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.

Loong v comelec☑

BENJAMIN T. LOONG, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Benjamin Loong filed with the Comelec his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Gover-nor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region. Ututalum and Edris were also candidates for the same position.

Ututalum filed a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006) seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days from the date Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.

Edris, filed a "Petition in Intervention" in the said SPA No. 90-006, raising therein issues similar to those raised by Ututalum in his main petition.

On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Au-tonomous Region. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July 1990 to annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990, is-sued in SPA No. 90-006.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Loong was filed within the period prescribed by law.

HELD:

NO

We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for brevity) provides that the certificate of candi-dacy of the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth of said person. Section 78 of the same Code states that is case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false rep-resentation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the time the certificate was filed.

Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Om-nibus Election Code.

Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits any act declared by law to be a ground for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate

The petition filed by private Ututalum with the Comelec to disqualify Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by Commission which, although a constitu-tional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modified or alters the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on ac-count of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the pe -tition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the elec-tion laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any re-gional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Depart-ment. The petition may be filed within ten (10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a cer-tificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such mis-representations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepre-sentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the dis-covery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the can-didate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, ac-cording to it, it unnecessary and should be remedied.

It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest — whether quo warranto or election contest — is mandatory and jurisdictional.

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and def-inite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes.

Miranda v abaya☑

Miranda vs. Abaya

On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Com-elecs action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only an offi-cial candidate of a registered or accredited political party may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Com-elec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into of-fice.

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the con-cept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requi-site sine qua non.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and sea-sonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to al-low the so-called substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond the pe-riod for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

*** Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disquali-fied.

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be con-sidered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified can-didate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the re-sults under the circumstances.

(pp. 782-783)

Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).

Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to petitioner as the electors choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the perti-nent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said election results point to the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of the peo-ple of Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession un-der section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision relevantly states:

SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian mem-ber, or, in case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, volun-tarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Vidal v comelec (en banc, de castro ponente)☑

VIDAL v. COMELECG.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada ex-plicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. On November 30, 2009, for-mer President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was op-posed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Gov-ernment Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). In a Resolu-

tion dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualifica-tion holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes inter-vene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and pray-ing that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public of-fice as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

RULING: NOThe COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic-tion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were is-sued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and politi-cal rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unam-biguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remit-ted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the par -don that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were ex-pressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary par-don or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

Territorial sea v contiguous zone v eez☑

TERRITORIAL SEA v. CONTIGUOUS ZONE v. EEZ

The territorial sea is a belt of sea outwards from the baseline and up to 12 nautical miles beyond. For many years, the “cannon-shot” rule, or a 3-mile territorial sea was recognized as Customary In-

ternational Law. At present, under the LOS Convention, every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the base-line (Art. 3) and in the case of an archipelagic State, the breadth of its territorial sea shall be mea-sured from its archipelagic baseline (Art. 48). Even the United States, which did not sign the LOS Convention, now recognizes this 12-mile rule consistent with the LOS Convention. (Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 [1988]).

The contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of a coastal State which may extend up to 24 nautical miles from the same baseline that is used in measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. In this zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:

a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;

b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or terri-torial sea. (Id., Art. 33)

(Note: It should be understood, however, that, according to the International Law Commission’s Commentary on the Draft, the power of control given to the littoral state does not change the na-ture of the waters. Beyond the territorial sea, the waters are high sea and are not subject to sovereignty of the coastal state.)

The exclusive economic zone is an area extending not more than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline. The coastal state has rights over the economic resources of the sea, seabed and subsoil – but the right does not affect the right of navigation and overflight of other states. This is a compro-mise between those who wanted a 200-mile territorial sea and those who wanted to reduce the pow-ers of coastal states. The provisions on the EEZ are both a grant of rights to and an imposition of obligations on coastal states relative to the exploitation, management and preservation of the re-sources found within the zone.

Baselines law in re: scarborough shoal -res communes, freedom of navigation and overflight☑

BASELINES LAW (In re: Scarborough shoal)

The baseline is “the low-water line along the coast as marked on large scale charts officially recog-nized by the coastal State.” (Sec. 5, 182 LOS) The width of the territorial sea is measured from the baseline.

Two ways of drawing the baseline:1. Normal Baseline – this line follows the curvatures of the coast.2. Straight Baseline – instead of following the curvatures of the coast, straight lines are drawn

connecting selected points on the coast without appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast.

RES COMMUNES

Things res communes are available for the use of all, as an incident of personality, but cannot, by nature, become the property of any persons or person.

Of res communes, Justinian said “[jure communia]…the things which are, by natural law, common to all are these: the air, running water, the sea…for they are not subject to the law of nations [jus gentium] as also the sea.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

PRESIDENT Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed the Philippine Archipelagic Baseline law

that excludes the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal from the

archipelagic baseline. The new law, Republic Act 9522, instead classifies them as

“regimes of islands.” A regime of islands is defined by the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea as islands or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water

that remain above water during high tide. The enactment of the law immediately drew

“strong opposition and solemn protest” from China. The Chinese embassy in Manila

called the Philippines’ sovereignty claim over Kalayaan Islands off Palawan and Scar-

borough Shoal in the western seaboard “illegal and invalid.” It said the two areas “have

always been parts of Chinese territory and that the People’s Republic of China has in-

disputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters.” Executive Secre-

tary Eduardo Ermita told the weekly press conference the new law reaffirms the coun-

try’s claims to its territorial waters, including its extended continental shelf, economic

zones, and the Kalayaan Islands off Palawan and the Scarborough Shoal in the western

seaboard. The two contested areas are wholly or partly claimed by Taiwan, China, Viet-

nam, Malaysia and Brunei.

Ermita said RA 9522 was enacted in time to meet the May 13 deadline of UNCLOS for

countries and archipelagic states to submit their claims to their extended continental

shelf. Department of Foreign Affairs’ Henry Bensurto, secretary general of the Commis-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Innocent PassageInnocent passage means navigation through the territorial sea of another State for the purpose of: (a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facil-ity, and so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. It shall take place in conformity with the LOS Convention and with other rules of International Law. (UNCLOS, Arts. 18, 19)

Ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another State. (Id., Art. 17)

ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY v. FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY

Absolute Immunity is when a state is immune for all purposes and proceedings without exception. The absolute immunity rule is almost gone now, only a few States still use it. It created confusing cases in scenarios of nationalised industries, such as those of the socialist market economies.There is a trend now to replace absolute immunity with qualified or restrictive immunity.This means that foreign States can only be immune in respect of their governmental acts (acts juri imperii) but not in respect of their commercial acts (acts jure gestionis).

Ratione materiae or functional immunity reflects Sovereign equality, it continues to exist even after leaving political office. It it a blanket application to all state officials, but only for official acts.

absolute v functional immunity (liang v pp)☑

Absolute v functional immunity

Absolute immunity is a form of legal immunity for government officials that confers total immunity from criminal prosecution and lawsuits so long as they are acting within the scope of their duties.

Absolute Immunity

Absolute immunity is not available to most officials. Unlike qualified immunity, the nature of the act is not as important as the position of the official. Generally, only judges, prosecutors, legislators, and the highest executive officials of all governments are absolutely immune from liability when acting within their authority. Medical peer review participants may also receive absolute immunity. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 1999).

Absolute immunity only applies to acts committed within the scope of the official's duties. Usually, this will not include acts that are committed by the official with malice or corrupt motives.

Absolute immunity is freedom from suit, and can be invoked on a pretrial motion. Judges and judi-cial officers, for example, enjoy a broad absolute immunity which is not abrogated even by a state's tort claims act. Fisher v. Pickens, 225 Cal. App. 3d 708 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1990). The immunity bars all civil suits for money damages against judicial officers such as judges and prosecutors.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Absolute Immunity. Louisiana State University Medical and Public Health Law Site.

Functional Immunity

Immunity from prosecution is a doctrine of international law that allows an accused to avoid prose-cution for criminal offences. Immunities are of two types. The first is functional immunity, or im-munity ratione materiae. This is an immunity granted to people who perform certain functions of state. The second is personal immunity, or immunity ratione personae. This is an immunity granted to certain officials because of the office they hold, rather than in relation to the act they have com-mitted.

Functional immunity arises from customary international law and treaty law and confers immunities on those performing acts of state (usually a foreign official). Any person who in performing an act of state commits a criminal offence is immune from prosecution. This is so even after the person ceases to perform acts of state. Thus it is a type of immunity limited in the acts to which it attaches (acts of state) but will only end if the state itself ceases to exist. This type of immunity is based on respect for sovereign equality and state dignity.

The offices usually recognised as attracting this immunity are Head of State or Head of Govern-ment, senior cabinet members, Foreign Minister, and Defence Minister.[1] Such officers are im-mune from prosecution for everything they do during their time in office. For example, an English court held that a warrant could not be issued for the arrest of Robert Mugabe on charges of interna-tional crimes on the basis that he was a presently serving Head of State at the time the proceedings were brought.[2] Other examples are the attempts to prosecute Fidel Castro in Spain and Jiang Zemin in the USA.

However, the moment accused leaves office, they are liable to be prosecuted for crimes committed before or after their term in office, or for crimes committed whilst in office in a personal capacity (subject to jurisdictional requirements and local law). Pinochet was only able to come to trial be-cause Chile and the UK had both signed and ratified the UN Convention Against Torture through which such immunities were waived.

LIANG v. PEOPLEG.R. No. 126855, January 28, 2000

FACTS:Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC re-leased him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is cov-ered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a MR which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the

MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

RULING: NOFirst, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that peti-tioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by im-munity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be pre-sented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants per-forming missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming peti-tioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

ICJ v ICC ☑

Jurisdiction of ICC, principle of complementarity☑

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE v. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the UN’s principal judicial organ. It is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the League of Nations. Its jurisdiction comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.

Limitations on the Jurisdiction of the ICJa) Only States may be parties in contentious cases before the Court; andb) The consent of the States is needed for the court to acquire jurisdiction.

The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. As it is not a criminal court, it does not have a prosecutor able to initiate proceedings.

The International Criminal Court (ICC), located in The Hague, is the court of last resort for prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Its founding treaty, the Rome Statute, entered into force on July 1, 2002. The ICC is intended to complement existing national ju-dicial systems and it may therefore only exercise its jurisdiction when certain conditions are met, such as when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals or when the United Na-tions Security Council or individual states refer investigations to the Court.

The Principle of Complementarity

The principle of complementarity means that the Court will only prosecute an individual if states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Therefore, if legitimate national investigations or proceedings into crimes have taken place or are ongoing, the Court will not initiate proceedings. This principle applies regardless of the outcome of national proceedings.[75] Even if an investigation is closed without any criminal charges being filed or if an accused person is acquitted by a national court, the Court will not prosecute an individual for the crime in question so long as it is satisfied that the na-tional proceedings were legitimate.

1. What is the International Court of Justice?The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established by the United Nations Charter, signed in 1945 at San Francisco (United States), and began work in 1946 in the Peace Palace, The Hague (Netherlands).The Court, which is composed of 15 judges, has a dual role: in accordance with international law, settling legal disputes between States submitted to it by them and giving advisory opinions on legal matters referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.The official languages of the Court are English and French.2. Who may submit cases to the Court?Only States are eligible to appear before the Court in contentious cases. At present, this basically means the 192 United Nations Member States. The Court has no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations, corporations or any other private entity. It cannot provide them with legal counselling or help them in their dealings with the authorities of any State whatever.However, a State may take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which its national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter; the dispute then becomes one between States.3. What differentiates the International Court of Justice from the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council

The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. As it is not a criminal court, it does not have a prosecutor able to initiate proceedings.This task is the preserve of national courts, the ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the United Nations (such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) or in co-operation with it (such as theSpecial Court for Sierra Leone)), and also of the International Criminal Court, set up under the Rome Statute. What is the International Criminal Court?The International Criminal Court (“the ICC” or “the Court”) is a permanent international court established to investigate, prosecute and try individuals accused of committing the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.How does the ICC different from other courtsThe ICC is a permanent autonomous court, whereas the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as other similar courts established within the framework of the United Nations to deal with specific situations only have a limited mandate and jurisdiction. The ICC, which tries individuals, is also different from the International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations for the settlement of disputes between States. The ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice also have their seats in The Hague.Which crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC?The mandate of the Court is to try individuals rather than States, and to hold such persons accountable for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, when the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the latter are fulfilled.What is the Principle of Complimentarity?The Principle of Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International CrimesOslo, 4 September 2009Seminar conceptThe complementarity principle on which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based entails that the ICC can only investigate and prosecute core international crimes when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so genuinely. The principle reflects a realization that it is preferable that such crimes are investigated and prosecuted in the country where they occurred. It was created as an admissibility principle of the ICC. Universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is a jurisdictional basis of last resort which many national criminal justice systems provide for, when core international crimes can not be prosecuted on the basis of the principle of territoriality (in the state where the crimes occurred), active nationality (in the state of the alleged perpetrator) or passive nationality (in the state of the victim). In its pure form, universal jurisdiction enables prosecution of core international crimes committed in a foreign state, by a foreign citizen, against foreign victims, when neither has a personal link to the forum state.

BBL - Art X, Secs 1, 15, 18☑

BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW (R.A. 9054)

ART. XTHE BANGSAMORO JUSTICE SYSTEM

Section 1. Justice System in the Bangsamoro. – The justice system in the Bangsamoro shall con-sist of Shari’ah law which shall have supremacy and application over Muslims only; the traditional or tribe justice system, for the indigenous people in the Bangsamoro; the local courts; and alterna-tive dispute resolution systems.

For Muslims, the justice system in the Bangsamoro shall give primary consideration to Shari’ah, and customary rights and traditions of the indigenous people in the Bangsamoro.

Nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of non-Muslims and non-indigenous peoples.

Section 15. Special Bar Examinations for Shari’ah. – The Supreme Court shall continue to ad-minister Shari’ah Bar examinations for admission of applicants to the Philippine Bar as special members thereof, with due consideration for the special nature of the Shari’ah system and utmost regard to the proposals of the Bangsamoro Shari’ah High Court on this matter.

Section 18. Shari’ah Public Assistance Office. To provide free legal assistance to indigent party litigants, the Bangsamoro Parliament shall create a Shari’ah Public Assistance Office for the differ-ent Shari’ah courts in the Bangsamoro.

Prov of north cotabato case in re:associated state☑

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOV’T OF THE REP. OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962, 14 October 2008

FACTS:President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negoti-ations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) secu-rity aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any eco-nomic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It de-scribes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, in-cluding the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.‖ With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was de-scribed as ―associative‖. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotia-tion and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public con-sultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws

RULING: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Gov-ernment. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehen-sive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative‖ relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―as-sociation‖ in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative‖ in the MOA-AD.

The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade rela-tions with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s partic-ipation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to partic-ipate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the is-lands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not con-template any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Min-danao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as ter -ritorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a perma-nent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association -runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE be-ing itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provi-sions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.‖

The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region‖ in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and pro-motes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and de-velopment.‖ An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a sem-blance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instruc-tions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

Guys please check Q74, poli preweek, answer in first question re: montoya v varilla::

See LRTA v salvana, gr192074, jun10,2014.

"Party adversely affected includes disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying original decision..."

"Parties adversely affected by a decision in an admin case who may appeal shall include the disci-plining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either overturned or modified."

1. R.A. 9225 ☑

Republic Act No. 9225 otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003” declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who become citizens of another coun-try shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.

3. Sections 77 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code☑

Omnibus Election Code, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited po-litical party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certi-fied by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party con-cerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualifica-tion should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candi -date, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the instances wherein substitution may be allowed: They are death, disqualification and withdrawal of another. A candidate whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted. This was the clear ruling in Miranda v. Abaya.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclu-sively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

In Mitra v. Comelec, the nature of a petition under Section 78 was further explained as follows: Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the candidate’s stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COC’s denial or cancellation if any false representation of a material fact is made. The false representation that these provi-sions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and resi-dence. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mis-lead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the elec -tion laws.

In Fermin v. Comelec, it was stressed that “a ‘Section 78’ petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a ‘Section 68’ petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.” In the said case, it was written: While a person who is disquali-fied under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certifi-cate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all.

4. Japzon vs. COMELEC☑

JAPZON VS COMELEC

Issue: WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.

Held: YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily re-gain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Mu-nicipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when, immedi-ately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Munici -pality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was reg-istered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.

5. Lucy Torres Gomez vs. HRET ☑

LUCY TORRES GOMEZ VS HRET

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO vs. HRET AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COM-ELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of pri-vate respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private re-spondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Sec-tion 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until dis -qualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

7. Immunity of Diplomats and Consuls☑

Immunity of diplomats and consuls

The doctrine of diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest notions of foreign relations and the fun-damental rule of diplomatic law. This rule was mentioned under article 29 of the Vienna Conven-tion in 1961. The diplomatic agent who goes to the receiving state to serve as a medium of com-munication between his country and the receiving state must be given immunity in order to carry out their duties effectively. Therefore it seems necessary for the diplomatic agent to enjoy the im-munity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction in the receiving state. In general there are various types of persons in the diplomatic mission some of whom should be granted a higher protection

than others. The immunity for diplomats was established before by the rule of customary interna-tional law. However, the immunity from jurisdiction in modern practice is regulated by the ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation, 1961'. It is important to emphasize that the rule of customary international law will continue to apply if any matter is not regulated by the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relation 1961.

8. Acts not considered as innocent passage (Check Bernas Book)

INNOCENT PASSAGE

The term “innocent passage” under Section 3 of the UNCLOS stated that, the right of innocent pas-sage that is subjected to the Convention is “ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, en-joy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea” (Article 17). Stated under Article 19 of the same section in the Convention, “passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.

Stated under the same article, passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the costal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the fol -lowing activities; Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of interna-tional law embodied in Charter of the United Nations; Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind, Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of defense or security of the coastal State; Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft or on any military device; Loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; Any fishing activities; Carrying out of research or survey activities; Any act aimed at interfering with any system of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; Any other activity not having a direct bearing on the passage.

9. Acts allowable in High Seas☑

Araullo v aquino

Araullo vs. Aquino

FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Accelera-tion Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be with-drawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stim-ulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attrib-uted to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the im-peachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and sev-eral other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the valid-ity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a pro-gram by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury other-wise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropri-ated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presi-dent’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable na-tional government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make re-alignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their re-spective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being trans-ferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an ex-isting project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally aban-doned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certi-fication was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be ap-

plicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Tagolino VS. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez

FACTS:Upon holding by the COMELEC that Richard Gomez is disqualified in running into office as a Representative in the 4th district of Leyte- due to lack of residency requirement- a few days before the election, his wife Lucy filed a COC, together with a Certificate of Nomination and Ac-ceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its adminis-trative functions, approved the substitution.

Her candidacy was opposed, the crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for. COMELEC ruled that the disqualifi-cation of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the can-didate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

In view of the substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of Lucy and as a result, she won.

Juntilla, a losing candidate, filed a Petition to oust Gomez from position claiming that, among oth-ers, she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio. HRET ruled in favour of Gomez.

ISSUE: should substitution not be allowed when the candidate substituted is in fact unqualified to run?

HELD:The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a peti-tion for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. While the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications re-quired for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualifica-tion; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifica-tions or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. It must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the per-son’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. While a disqualified candidate un-der Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is

deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disquali-fied. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitu-tion proceeds. It necessarily follows that if a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted

Resident Mammals vs. Reyes

FACTS: Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tanon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mam-mals in the Tanon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the in-terests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

ISSUE: Whether a service contract for oil exploration, development, and production issued by the government of the Philippines in the protected area of the Tanon Strait was unconstitutional

HELD: Yes.the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves to-wards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be per-formed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlaw-ful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Be-cause Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tanon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area.

Liang vs. People

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two counts of grave oral defamation. Pe-titioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that peti-tioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agree-ment) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a MR which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.


HELD: NO.First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity peti-tioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants per-forming missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:


The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA proto-col and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.



Hontiveros vs. Regulatory Board

FACTS: Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 11121 in or-der to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the opera-tion of toll facilities by the private sector. P.D. 11132 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977.TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement,3 which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. P.D. 1113 was amended by P.D. 1894,which granted PNCC the right, privilege, and authority to construct, maintain, and operate the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto. The term of 30 years provided under P. D. 1113 starting from 1 May 1977 remained the same for the North and the South Luzon Expressways, while the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Express-way (MME) provided a term of 30 years commencing from the date of completion of the project.

PNCC entered into an agreement CITRA, a limited liability company organized and established un-der the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement was supplemented with a related undertaking on the part of CITRA. CITRA was to provide a preliminary feasibility study on the Metro Manila Skyways (MMS) project, a system of elevated roadway networks passing through the heart of the Metropolitan Manila area. In order to accelerate the actual implementation of both the MME and the MMS projects, PNCC and CITRA entered into a second agreement.7 Through that agreement, CITRA committed to finance and undertake the preparation, updating, and revalidation of previous studies on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the projects.

PNCC and CITRA submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines.8 The JIP embodied the implementation schedule for the financing, design and construction of the MMS in three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro Manila Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.

The TRB reviewed, evaluated and approved the JIP, particularly as it related to Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and development of the projec-

t.The Republic of the Philippines – through the TRB – as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter’s obligations under the STOA.CMMTC com-pleted the design and construction of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which was oper-ated and maintained by PSC

REPUBLIC through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Sup-plemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA incorporated the amendments, revi-sions, and modifications necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.

Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 49714 Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA

PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement providing for the successful and seamless assumption by SOMCO of the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the MOA, PSC received the amount of 320 million which was used for the settlement of its liabilities arising from the consequent retrenchment or separation of its affected employees. The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) to SOMCO authorizing the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007.

Petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department Workers Organization (PTMS-DWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting.The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute

Petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was for injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, and sought to pro-hibit the implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll opera-tions by SOMCO.

Petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government. They later filed an Amended Complaint, additionally praying that PSC be allowed to continue the toll op-erations. With the exception of TRB, all defendants therein filed their Opposition.However, RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary in-junction. According to the RTC, petitioners were seeking to enjoin a national government infra-structure project.

Under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8975,25 lower courts are prohibited from issuing a temporary re-straining order or preliminary injunction against the government – or any person or entity acting un-der the government’s direction – to restrain the execution, implementation, or operation of any such contract or project. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that it could no longer issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, considering that the act sought to be restrained had already been consummated. The ASTOA, the MOA, and the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO took

effect at 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007, while petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO sought to prohibit their implementation only on 3 January 2008.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE:Whether petitioners have standing

HELD: Not all petitioners have personality to sue.Standing is a constitutional law concept allowing suits to be brought not necessarily by parties personally injured by the operation of a law or official action, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in the public interest. Determining the standing of concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters requires a partial consideration of the sub-stantive merit of the constitutional question,76 or at least a preliminary estimate thereof.

In this case, petitioners raise the power of Congress to grant franchises as a constitutional question. They allege that the execution of the ASTOA and the MOA, the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary and the issuance of the TOC infringed on the constitutional power of Congress, which has the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities.

This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate.Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authoriza-tions and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case, there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.

It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Considering the foregoing, we find that the petition raises no issue of constitutional import. More particularly, no legislative prerogative, power, or privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no standing to file the instant petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.82 Standing is accorded to them only if there is an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

FACTS: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr, eta al as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cyber-crime Act.

Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitu-tionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of commu-nications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of leg-islative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure;

Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeop-ardy;

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to en-gage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and vio-lates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and

Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, in-fringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.

ISSUE: Whether the said sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” are unconsitutional

HELD: Unconstitutional provisions

Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:

• Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications

• Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data

• Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data

The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence – was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.

Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."

Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.

Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.

A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not apply in cer-tain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.

Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto explained to Rap-pler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."

Aiding and abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover certain players in the online industry.

Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was declared unconstitu-tional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography.

The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding on Section 7.

Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child pornography is punish-able by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.

A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the coverage of a single law.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Ar-royo) extendedexecutive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada “received and accepted”6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for local elective post of Mayor of the City of Manila.

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before theCOMELEC.). Risos- Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that “[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Dis-qualification. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that “having taken judicial cognizance of the consoli-dated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled mat-ter lest indulged in wastage of government resources.”

On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition.

ISSUES:Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him byformer President Arroyo.

HELD:

The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elec-tive office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former Presi-dent Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Pe-nal Code.

Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpre-tation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Of-fice of the President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provi-sions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was con-victed by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the ac-cessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we ap-ply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory.

Diocese of Bacolod vs.COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this peti-tion by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount and tran-scendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as respondents are the Commission on Elec-tions (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon. On 21 Feb-ruary 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the messageConscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin).

The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates. In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by respon-dent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed oversizedTeam Patay Tarpaulin

of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal. On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from re-moving the Team Patay Tarpaulin.

ISSUES:

1. Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay Tar-paulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property.

2.Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpau-lin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and State en-shrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property: o the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign materials,” stressing that the mentioning of candidates’ name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’ campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress; The subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader constitu-tional guaranty of freedom of expression and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and regulations”. Petition-ers “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of Bacolod”

The RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern and a legiti-mate subject of general interest and of discussion,citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998), the petitioners’ argued that that public concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know…”

The content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad is-sues of interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic community” and that the subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill and the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the exercise of the people’s right of suffrage” in the advent of the 2013 polls; considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the message being conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression to the public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution; o not being candidates or po-litical parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or the political party; o there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will be en-dangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.

2. The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpau-lin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and State en-shrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution: o petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise of its freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”; o the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the is-sue of the RH Law as part of her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings; o in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the peti-tioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its mem-bers and followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life;

considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of expression and of conscience, but also of the right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings which should be insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials; Sec-tion 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of separation of Church and State; at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma; o the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim the culture of life for the common good of society; the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and con-stitute serious violations of the principle of separation of Church and State which the State and its officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.

Go vs. Republic

FACTS: Dennis (Go), a Chinese citizen born to the spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese na-tionals, filed a petition for naturalisation with the RTC of Manila, alleging that he is a resident of Oroquieta St., in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalisation. During the hearing he presented as witnesses Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita, and Juan Go. Dr. Anlacan testified that Dennis had no psychi-atric abnormality; Dr. Toredesillas claimed that Dennis’s medical results were normal; Silvino, on the other hand testified that being their neighbour in Sto. Cristo Street, he knew Dennis since child-hood, through association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita alleged that he knew Dennis since birth, being the son of her brother-in-law. Juan attested that he knew Dennis person-ally and executed an Affidavit of Support in his favour.

OSG posed no objection to the relevancy of the document, and requested that the case be submitted for resolution based on Dennis’s evidence. Later, the OSG moved for reopening of the trial, based on an NBI report that Dennis failed to comply with the laws on naturalization, to which Dennis ob-jected, averring that he had been issued an NBI clearance and he was not the same Dennis Go al-luded to in the NBI Investigation Report. The RTC admitted the evidence in question, but denied OSG’s motion to re-open trial. It granted Dennis’s petition for naturalization. The OSG, on the other hand, moved for reconsideration and re-opening of the trial, this time submitting a Back-ground Investigation Report by the Bureau of Immigration stating that Dennis’s parents were still Chinese nationals; his aunt refused to grant them an interview and arrogantly treated them, and his retail business should be subjected to review for tax deficiencies. When the RTC denied its motion

for reconsideration, the OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that Dennis failed to prove that he had all the qualifications for naturalization; that his character witnesses were credible; that his witnesses were not able to prove his qualification for grant of citizenship; and that failure to state all his previous residences was fatal to his petition. Dennis opposed the appeal, averring that the OSG had all the time to contest his evidence, yet failed to do the same during trial, and in fact resorting to piece-meal presentation of evidence. The citizenship of his parents had nothing to do with his petition.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling, holding that Dennis failed to prove that his wit-nesses were credible. He was not able to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.Dennis ele-vated the ruling of the CA to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes. Filipino citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indis-pensable that an applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a coun-try deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and sentiment.

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political communit.The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in gov-ernment principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens3. Among those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citi-zenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper natural-ization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Repub-lic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Spe-cial Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certifi-cate of naturalization4. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philip-pines as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law5. The reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves politi-cal status; hence, every person must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a natu-ralization case is not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest

of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and for-mal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations

In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines8, the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:

1.That they are citizens of the Philippines

2. That they are “credible persons”;3. That they personally know the petitioner;4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the

period of time required by law;5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a

citizen of the Philippines; and8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of the Natu-

ralization Law.

In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a wit-ness, for purposes of naturalization, must be a “credible” person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the candidate9. The Court, in Ong, explained:

a “credible” person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose “affidavit” or testimony is not incredible. What must be “credible” is not the decla-ration made, but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner.

In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic, the Court explained that the “law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary compe-tence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent and reli-able. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him.” The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary ac-quaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be compe-tent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifica-tions and none of the statutory disqualifications.

In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioner’s failure to prove that his witnesses are credi-ble.

HIGH SEAS

• Article 1 of the Geneva Convention Definition

• "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State."

• The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked; and no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. (ld., Art. 2; UNCLOS, Art. 89) Moreover, the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. (UNCLOS, Art. 88)

• The highs seas are subject to six freedoms: (1) freedom of navigation; (2) freedom of over-flight; (3) freedom of fishing; (4) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (5) free-dom to construct artificial islands and structures; and (6) freedom of scientific research.

• The first four of the above freedoms were mentioned in the 1958 Convention of the High Seas and the last two added by the 1982 LOS. But these two are subject to some restrictions. The flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its ships on the high seas to the extent not lim-ited by agreement. By legal fiction, a ship is a floating part of the flag state. The law of the flag state is applied to it "on the pragmatic basis that there most be some law on shipboard, that it cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the state that owns it.”

• Freedom of overflight belongs to both civilian and military aircraft

• Freedom of fishing also includes the duty to cooperate in taking measures to ensure the con-servation and management of the living resources of the high seas.

• Article 86 of the 1982 LOS, on the six freedoms, says: "The provisions of this part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state." This, however, is not a definition of the scope of the area called "high seas." As noted above, the contiguous zone is part of the high seas. What Article 86 does is to specify the areas. that are not covered by all the six freedoms.

Mare liberium principle

This is the principle espoused by Hugo Grotius in 1609 in his paper which also bears the name "Mare Liberium." it was a plea for freedom of seas, but it was primarily written to support Dutch in-terests. It arose because of a dispute with Portugal, Grotius argued that Portugal couldn't occupy the sea as the sea is incapable of occupation therefore the sea must be free for everyone, but should be-long to none. Grotius put forward the following reasons why the sea couldn't be occupied:

a) its resources were inexhaustible;

b) physical occupation is impossible;

c) demarcation of boundaries is impossible; and

d) the oceans are to immense that conflicting resource use is impossible.

The following shall have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State which they are in the high seas:

• Warships

• Ships owned and operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial services

Duties of all States relative to the high Seas:

• Duty to render assistance

• Prohibition of the transport of slaves

• Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy

• Duty to cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub-stances

• Duty to cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas

Q:What State has penal jurisdiction in cases of collision or any other incident of navigation in the high seas?

A: In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or discipline, responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, penal and administrative jurisdiction is now limited to:

a) The flag State of the vessel alleged to be responsible; and

b) The State of nationality of the accused. Na arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag.

Hot Pursuit

Article 111 allows hot pursuit of a foreign vessel where there is good reason to believe that the ship has violated laws or regulations of a coastal state. The pursuit must commence when the foreign vessel is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial waters or the contiguous zone of the pursuing state. It may continue into the high seas if the pursuit has not been in If the for-eign ship is is the contiguous zone, it may be pursued only for violations of the rights of the coastal state in the contiguous zone.

Mutatis inatandis, the right of hot pursuit shall also apply to violations of applicable laws and regu-lations of the coastal state in the elusive economic zone or the continental shelf including the safety zones of the shelf.

Hot pursuit must stop as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial waters if its own state or of a third state. Hot pursuit may be carried out only by warships or military air-craft, or any other ship or aircraft properly marked for that purpose.

Settlement of Disputes

Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory. Under Part XV of the the 1982 Convention States are required to settle peacefully disputes led concerning the Convention. If a bilateral settlement fails, Article 285 requires submission of the dispute for compulsory settlement in one of the tri-

bunals clothed with jurisdiction. The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal as constituted under the Convention.

Togolino vs comelec

Tagolino VS. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez

FACTS:Upon holding by the COMELEC that Richard Gomez is disqualified in running into office as a Representative in the 4th district of Leyte- due to lack of residency requirement- a few days before the election, his wife Lucy filed a COC, together with a Certificate of Nomination and Ac-ceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its adminis-trative functions, approved the substitution.

Her candidacy was opposed, the crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for. COMELEC ruled that the disqualifi-cation of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the can-didate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

In view of the substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of Lucy and as a result, she won.

Juntilla, a losing candidate, filed a Petition to oust Gomez from position claiming that, among oth-ers, she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio. HRET ruled in favour of Gomez.

ISSUE: should substitution not be allowed when the candidate substituted is in fact unqualified to run?

HELD:The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a peti-tion for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. While the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications re-quired for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualifica-tion; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifica-tions or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. It must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the per-

son’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. While a disqualified candidate un-der Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disquali-fied. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitu-tion proceeds. It necessarily follows that if a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted

Resident mammals vs reyes

Resident Mammals vs. Reyes

FACTS: Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tanon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mam-mals in the Tanon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the in-terests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

ISSUE: Whether a service contract for oil exploration, development, and production issued by the government of the Philippines in the protected area of the Tanon Strait was unconstitutional

HELD: Yes.the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves to-wards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be per-formed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlaw-ful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Be-cause Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tanon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area.

Liang v people

Liang vs. People

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two counts of grave oral defamation. Pe-titioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that peti-tioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agree-ment) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a MR which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.


HELD: NO.First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity peti-tioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants per-forming missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:


The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA proto-col and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.



Hontiveros v regulatory boatd

Hontiveros vs. Regulatory Board

FACTS: Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 11121 in or-der to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the opera-tion of toll facilities by the private sector. P.D. 11132 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977.TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement,3 which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. P.D. 1113 was amended by P.D. 1894,which granted PNCC the right, privilege, and authority to construct, maintain, and operate the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto. The term of 30 years provided under P. D. 1113 starting from 1 May 1977 remained the same for the North and the South Luzon Expressways, while the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Express-way (MME) provided a term of 30 years commencing from the date of completion of the project.

PNCC entered into an agreement CITRA, a limited liability company organized and established un-der the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement was supplemented with a related undertaking on the part of CITRA. CITRA was to provide a preliminary feasibility study on the Metro Manila Skyways (MMS) project, a system of elevated roadway networks passing through the heart of the Metropolitan Manila area. In order to accelerate the actual implementation of both the MME and the MMS projects, PNCC and CITRA entered into a second agreement.7 Through that

agreement, CITRA committed to finance and undertake the preparation, updating, and revalidation of previous studies on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the projects.

PNCC and CITRA submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines.8 The JIP embodied the implementation schedule for the financing, design and construction of the MMS in three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro Manila Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.

The TRB reviewed, evaluated and approved the JIP, particularly as it related to Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and development of the projec-t.The Republic of the Philippines – through the TRB – as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter’s obligations under the STOA.CMMTC com-pleted the design and construction of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which was oper-ated and maintained by PSC

REPUBLIC through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Sup-plemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA incorporated the amendments, revi-sions, and modifications necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.

Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 49714 Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA

PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement providing for the successful and seamless assumption by SOMCO of the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the MOA, PSC received the amount of 320 million which was used for the settlement of its liabilities arising from the consequent retrenchment or separation of its affected employees. The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) to SOMCO authorizing the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007.

Petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department Workers Organization (PTMS-DWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting.The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute

Petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was for injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, and sought to pro-hibit the implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll opera-tions by SOMCO.

Petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government. They

later filed an Amended Complaint, additionally praying that PSC be allowed to continue the toll op-erations. With the exception of TRB, all defendants therein filed their Opposition.However, RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary in-junction. According to the RTC, petitioners were seeking to enjoin a national government infra-structure project.

Under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8975,25 lower courts are prohibited from issuing a temporary re-straining order or preliminary injunction against the government – or any person or entity acting un-der the government’s direction – to restrain the execution, implementation, or operation of any such contract or project. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that it could no longer issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, considering that the act sought to be restrained had already been consummated. The ASTOA, the MOA, and the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO took effect at 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007, while petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO sought to prohibit their implementation only on 3 January 2008.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE:Whether petitioners have standing

HELD: Not all petitioners have personality to sue.Standing is a constitutional law concept allowing suits to be brought not necessarily by parties personally injured by the operation of a law or official action, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in the public interest. Determining the standing of concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters requires a partial consideration of the sub-stantive merit of the constitutional question,76 or at least a preliminary estimate thereof.

In this case, petitioners raise the power of Congress to grant franchises as a constitutional question. They allege that the execution of the ASTOA and the MOA, the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary and the issuance of the TOC infringed on the constitutional power of Congress, which has the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities.

This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate.Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authoriza-tions and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case, there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.

It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Considering the foregoing, we find that the petition raises no issue of constitutional import. More particularly, no legislative prerogative, power, or privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no standing to file the instant petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.82 Standing is accorded to them only if there is an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.

Disini case

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

FACTS: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr, eta al as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the

Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cyber-crime Act.

Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitu-tionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of commu-nications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of leg-islative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure;

Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeop-ardy;

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to en-gage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and vio-lates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and

Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, in-fringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.

ISSUE: Whether the said sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” are unconsitutional

HELD: Unconstitutional provisions

Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:

• Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications

• Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data

• Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data

The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence – was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.

Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."

Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.

Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.

A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not apply in cer-tain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.

Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto explained to Rap-pler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."

Aiding and abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover certain players in the online industry.

Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was declared unconstitu-tional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography.

The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding on Section 7.

Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child pornography is punish-able by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.

A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the coverage of a single law.

Pardon - Erap

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

FACTS:On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Ar-royo) extendedexecutive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada “received and accepted”6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for local elective post of Mayor of the City of Manila.

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before theCOMELEC.). Risos- Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that “[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Dis-qualification. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that “having taken judicial cognizance of the consoli-dated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled mat-ter lest indulged in wastage of government resources.”

On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition.

ISSUES:Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him byformer President Arroyo.

HELD:

The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elec-tive office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former Presi-dent Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Pe-nal Code.

Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpre-tation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Of-fice of the President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provi-sions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was con-victed by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the ac-cessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we ap-

ply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory.

Diocese of B vs comelec (team buhay, team patay)

Diocese of Bacolod vs.COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this peti-tion by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount and tran-scendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as respondents are the Commission on Elec-tions (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon. On 21 Feb-ruary 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the messageConscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin).

The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates. In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by respon-dent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed oversizedTeam Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal. On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from re-moving the Team Patay Tarpaulin.

ISSUES:

1. Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay Tar-paulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property.

2.Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpau-lin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and State en-shrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property: o the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign materials,” stressing that the mentioning of candidates’ name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’ campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress; The subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader constitu-tional guaranty of freedom of expression and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and regulations”. Petition-ers “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and beliefs

by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of Bacolod”

The RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern and a legiti-mate subject of general interest and of discussion,citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998), the petitioners’ argued that that public concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know…”

The content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad is-sues of interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic community” and that the subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill and the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the exercise of the people’s right of suffrage” in the advent of the 2013 polls; considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the message being conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression to the public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution; o not being candidates or po-litical parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or the political party; o there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will be en-dangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.

2. The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay Tarpau-lin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and State en-shrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution: o petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise of its freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”; o the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the is-sue of the RH Law as part of her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings; o in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the peti-tioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its mem-bers and followers not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life;

considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of expression and of conscience, but also of the right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings which should be insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials; Sec-tion 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of separation of Church and State; at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma; o the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when there is a great conflict between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim the culture of life for the common good of society; the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and con-stitute serious violations of the principle of separation of Church and State which the State and its officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.

Go v republic

Go vs. Republic

FACTS: Dennis (Go), a Chinese citizen born to the spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese na-tionals, filed a petition for naturalisation with the RTC of Manila, alleging that he is a resident of Oroquieta St., in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalisation. During the hearing he presented as witnesses Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita, and Juan Go. Dr. Anlacan testified that Dennis had no psychi-atric abnormality; Dr. Toredesillas claimed that Dennis’s medical results were normal; Silvino, on the other hand testified that being their neighbour in Sto. Cristo Street, he knew Dennis since child-hood, through association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita alleged that he knew Dennis since birth, being the son of her brother-in-law. Juan attested that he knew Dennis person-ally and executed an Affidavit of Support in his favour.

OSG posed no objection to the relevancy of the document, and requested that the case be submitted for resolution based on Dennis’s evidence. Later, the OSG moved for reopening of the trial, based on an NBI report that Dennis failed to comply with the laws on naturalization, to which Dennis ob-jected, averring that he had been issued an NBI clearance and he was not the same Dennis Go al-luded to in the NBI Investigation Report. The RTC admitted the evidence in question, but denied OSG’s motion to re-open trial. It granted Dennis’s petition for naturalization. The OSG, on the other hand, moved for reconsideration and re-opening of the trial, this time submitting a Back-ground Investigation Report by the Bureau of Immigration stating that Dennis’s parents were still Chinese nationals; his aunt refused to grant them an interview and arrogantly treated them, and his retail business should be subjected to review for tax deficiencies. When the RTC denied its motion for reconsideration, the OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that Dennis failed to prove that he had all the qualifications for naturalization; that his character witnesses were credible; that his witnesses were not able to prove his qualification for grant of citizenship; and that failure to state all his previous residences was fatal to his petition. Dennis opposed the appeal, averring that the OSG had all the time to contest his evidence, yet failed to do the same during trial, and in fact resorting to piece-meal presentation of evidence. The citizenship of his parents had nothing to do with his petition.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling, holding that Dennis failed to prove that his wit-nesses were credible. He was not able to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.Dennis ele-vated the ruling of the CA to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes. Filipino citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indis-pensable that an applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a coun-try deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and sentiment.

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political communit.The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in gov-

ernment principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance

No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens3. Among those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citi-zenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper natural-ization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, Repub-lic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Spe-cial Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue a certifi-cate of naturalization4. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philip-pines as a sovereign nation.

It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law5. The reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves politi-cal status; hence, every person must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it. Verily, a natu-ralization case is not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.

Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and for-mal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations

In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines8, the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:

1.That they are citizens of the Philippines

2. That they are “credible persons”;3. That they personally know the petitioner;4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the

period of time required by law;5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a

citizen of the Philippines; and8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of the Natu-

ralization Law.

In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a wit-ness, for purposes of naturalization, must be a “credible” person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the candidate9. The Court, in Ong, explained:

a “credible” person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the

past; or whose “affidavit” or testimony is not incredible. What must be “credible” is not the decla-ration made, but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner.

In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic, the Court explained that the “law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary compe-tence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be competent and reli-able. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him.” The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be not mere ordinary ac-quaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be compe-tent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifica-tions and none of the statutory disqualifications.

In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioner’s failure to prove that his witnesses are credi-ble.

High seas (lahat daw ng tungkol dito aralin)

HIGH SEAS

• Article 1 of the Geneva Convention Definition

• "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State."

• The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked; and no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. (ld., Art. 2; UNCLOS, Art. 89) Moreover, the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. (UNCLOS, Art. 88)

• The highs seas are subject to six freedoms: (1) freedom of navigation; (2) freedom of over-flight; (3) freedom of fishing; (4) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (5) free-dom to construct artificial islands and structures; and (6) freedom of scientific research.

• The first four of the above freedoms were mentioned in the 1958 Convention of the High Seas and the last two added by the 1982 LOS. But these two are subject to some restrictions. The flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its ships on the high seas to the extent not lim-ited by agreement. By legal fiction, a ship is a floating part of the flag state. The law of the flag state is applied to it "on the pragmatic basis that there most be some law on shipboard, that it cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the state that owns it.”

• Freedom of overflight belongs to both civilian and military aircraft

• Freedom of fishing also includes the duty to cooperate in taking measures to ensure the con-servation and management of the living resources of the high seas.

• Article 86 of the 1982 LOS, on the six freedoms, says: "The provisions of this part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state." This, however, is not a definition of the scope of the area called "high seas." As noted above, the contiguous zone is part of the high seas. What Article 86 does is to specify the areas. that are not covered by all the six freedoms.

Mare liberium principle

This is the principle espoused by Hugo Grotius in 1609 in his paper which also bears the name "Mare Liberium." it was a plea for freedom of seas, but it was primarily written to support Dutch in-terests. It arose because of a dispute with Portugal, Grotius argued that Portugal couldn't occupy the sea as the sea is incapable of occupation therefore the sea must be free for everyone, but should be-long to none. Grotius put forward the following reasons why the sea couldn't be occupied:

a) its resources were inexhaustible;

b) physical occupation is impossible;

c) demarcation of boundaries is impossible; and

d) the oceans are to immense that conflicting resource use is impossible.

The following shall have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State which they are in the high seas:

• Warships

• Ships owned and operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial services

Duties of all States relative to the high Seas:

• Duty to render assistance

• Prohibition of the transport of slaves

• Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy

• Duty to cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub-stances

• Duty to cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas

Q:What State has penal jurisdiction in cases of collision or any other incident of navigation in the high seas?

A: In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or discipline, responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, penal and administrative jurisdiction is now limited to:

a) The flag State of the vessel alleged to be responsible; and

b) The State of nationality of the accused. Na arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag.

Hot Pursuit

Article 111 allows hot pursuit of a foreign vessel where there is good reason to believe that the ship has violated laws or regulations of a coastal state. The pursuit must commence when the foreign vessel is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial waters or the contiguous zone of the pursuing state. It may continue into the high seas if the pursuit has not been in If the for-eign ship is is the contiguous zone, it may be pursued only for violations of the rights of the coastal state in the contiguous zone.

Mutatis inatandis, the right of hot pursuit shall also apply to violations of applicable laws and regu-lations of the coastal state in the elusive economic zone or the continental shelf including the safety zones of the shelf.

Hot pursuit must stop as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial waters if its own state or of a third state. Hot pursuit may be carried out only by warships or military air-craft, or any other ship or aircraft properly marked for that purpose.

Settlement of Disputes

Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory. Under Part XV of the the 1982 Convention States are required to settle peacefully disputes led concerning the Convention. If a bilateral settlement fails, Article 285 requires submission of the dispute for compulsory settlement in one of the tri-bunals clothed with jurisdiction. The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal as constituted under the Convention.

Dean Albano preweek, nov.3

A. Citizenship

1. Bengzon v HRET

A. Citizenship1. Bengzon (Bengson?) vs HRET

Facts:Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San

Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable-was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of alle-giance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Com-monwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among oth-ers, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citi-zenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then run-

ning for reelection. Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd Dis-trict of Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengson’s MR was likewise denied.

Issue:Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,

can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held:YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same

in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citi-zenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by repatriation, and3. by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:1. desertion of the armed forces;2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a natu-ralized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Fil-ipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or ac-cepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reac-quire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he re-sides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a re-nunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a sta-tus which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philip-pine citizenship.

2. Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Facts:Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks be-

fore the election. Private Respondent Lee, another candidate for the said position, filed a peti-tion to disqualify Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines.

A week before the election, Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition of Lee.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which remained unacted until after the elections. Thus, his candidacy continued and he was voted during the elections. Few days after the Election, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the promulgated resolution of the Second Divi-sion. Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the said election. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Lee was then proclaimed as Governor.

Frivaldo filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that he had already taken his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philip-pines which he filed a couple of months ago before the election. Frivaldo’s motion was recog-nized and was then proclaimed as Governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC En Banc.

Issues:Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. If it, did was it able to cure

his lack of citizenship. If not, may it be given a retroactive effect?

Held:The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of COMELEC.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: A Citi-zen of the Philippines

The court held that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the can-didate must possess citizenship. At the same time, literally speaking, such qualification of citi-zenship should thus be possessed when the “elective [elected] official” begins to govern. In the instant case, Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of office of gover-nor (and other elective official) began; he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

3. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration

Facts:Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines

was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same does not posses all the qualifications required of appli-

cants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has proven that she does not suffer any disquali-fication there under.

Issue:Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.

Held:Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, na-

tive born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her hus-band the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to un-dergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Fil-ipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

4. Tabasa vs. CA

Facts:Petitioner Tabasa herein was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When Petitioner

was seven years old his father Rodolfo Tabasa became a naturalized citizen of U.S.A. By deriv-ative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American Citizenship. In 1995, Petitioner arrived in the Philippines; thereafter the latter was arrested and detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the US informed The Bureau that the Petitioner’s passport has been re-voked and that the latter has pending federal warrant of arrest. After an investigation was conducted by a special prosecutor he was charged of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner contends that he reacquired Philippine Citizenship through repatriation under the R.A 8171.

Issue:Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.

Held:RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost

Their Philippine citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor chil-dren, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizen-ship through repatriation.

Petitioner here failed to prove that his parents abandoned their Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Petitioner likewise contends that as he reacquired Philippine Citizenship he is not an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation. The Court in its decision held that the theory of the Petitioner is im-proper as the latter is not entitled for repatriation under R.A 8171for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law. The Petitioner’s petition for review is dismissed by the SC.

B. Dual citizenship

C. RA9225

- Right to own lands (dual citizen/ naturalized/ former natural-born)

D. Application for registration

E. Bill of rights

- due process clause

- Patero v BOC (total lack of notice= lack of opportunity to be heard)

- olaguer v military tribunal

- cruz v enrile

E. Bill of Rights

1. Due Process ClauseArticle III, Section 1.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (1987 Constitution)

2. Paterok vs BOC

Facts:

In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2) contain-ers, one with used household goods and the other with two (2) used automobiles (one Bour-getti and one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC).

In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the said Mercedes Benz, the petitioner received a notice 3 of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the former that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to

Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.

While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on April, 1988, a letter in-forming her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. The petitioner had not been in-formed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, an office likewise under the Bureau of Customs

The petitioner later found out that on November 13, 1986, a Notice of Hearing set on De-cember 2, 1986, concerning the said Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port Area, Manila.

Issue:Whether or not the posting on the bulletin board constituted sufficient notice that com-

plied with the due process requirements.

Held:We agree with the petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the

public respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and proce-dural due process.

Although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied upon by the public respondent, namely, Sec-tions 2304 and 2306, captioned "Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is specifically allowed

If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable diligence to ascertain from their own records the identity and address of the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of the property in question, the necessary information could have been easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the notice of hearing properly and legally. Then, the peti -tioner would have been afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present her defense which is the essence of procedural due process. But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.

3. Olaguer vs. Military Commission

Facts:

On December 24, 1979, petitioners who are civilians were arrested by the military au-thorities and initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently trans-ferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan. Petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent judge and the approval of the re-spondent Minister of National Defense. Respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed against the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate Presi-

dent, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) con-spiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Hence, the instant petition for prohibition and habeas corpus were being filed by herein petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and function-ing.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians, which fell under the competence of the ordinary civil courts even during the period of martial law. The judgments of the military tribunals in these cases were, therefore, invali-dated and the petitioners released.

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philip-pine judicial system.

4. Cruz vs. EnrileFacts:

The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceed-ings had against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Their plea is for the grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil courts, where their right to due process may be accorded respect. The writ of habeas corpus issued on July 31, 1987, two weeks after an amended petition was filed with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this Court of the lack of jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule, as declared in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al., entitled the petitioners to be uncondition-ally freed from detention.

Issue: Whether the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining

their creation may be declared unconstitutional

Held: Yes. In Olaguer, this Court in no uncertain terms ruled that —

… a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and

void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned (People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274 [1975]). For the same reasons, Our pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Com-mission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA 546) and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned.

Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable in these cases.

1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in favor of the 26 petitioners who were admittedly in the military service. 17 Over them the courts martial yardly exercised jurisdiction. It need only be said that these tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel, and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly challenged on consti-tutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either expressly or impliedly. 18 As to these petitioners, the writ is thus unavailing.

2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other hand the application thereof to all civil-ians, without distinction, who were haled before military tribunals. To be sure, due consideration was given to the submittal that the doctrine is, or should be declared as, limited in aplicability to “political of fenders,” and not “ordinary crimes” such as those of which the civilian petitioners were convicted. 18a But distinction should not be set where none were clearly intended. The issue in Ola-quer, as here, is the jurisdiction of courts martial over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive or military process. Conformably with this holding, the disposition of these cases would necessarily have, as a premise, the invalidity of any and all proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian petitioners. There is all the more reason to strike down the proceedings leading to the con-viction of these non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice in the first place, as their offenses are totally unrelated to the insurgency avowedly sought to be con-trolled by martial rule.

Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of the proposal to merely give “prospective effect” to Olaquer. No distinction should be made, as the public respondents propose, between cases still being tried and those finally decided or already under review. All cases must be treated alike, regardless of the stage they happen to be in, and since according to Olaquer, all proceedings before courts martial in cases involving civilians are null and void, the court deems it proper to ad-here to that unequivocal pronouncement, perceiving no cogent reason to deviate from the doctrine.

- equal protection clause

- right against self-incrimination

2 kinds of immunity statue:

Use and fruit / Transactional

- COMELEC v espano

5. COMELEC vs Español

Facts:

Bautista filed before the Law Department of the Comelec a complaint against certain indi-viduals for vote buying. By virtue of a resolution, an information was filed against respon-dents with the RTC. Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against Bautista's witnesses for vote selling.

The Law Department of the COMELEC later on recommended that the resolution of the Of-fice of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified because the accused are exempt and that the prosecution of election offenses were under the sole control of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by COMELEC and the

subsequent request for its nullification was proper.

Held:

Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered toinvesti-gate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by theConstitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecuteelection offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine,orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elec-tion. Under Section 265 of the OmnibusElection Code, the petitioner, through its duly autho-rized legal officers, has theexclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offensespunishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. Thepeti-tioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the governmentbut as held in Margarejo vs.Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of theProvincial or City Prosecu-tors stays.

The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is concomi-tant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioner’s exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

- right to be informed

- enrile v sandiganbayan

- pp. V crisologo

6. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandi-

ganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance

Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Pe-titioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surren-der, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed res-olution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

Issue:Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is

punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

Held:1.

YES. Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretionRight to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bail-able. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion per-petua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regard-less of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not pun-ishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the of-fense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with no-tice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the ap-peal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion per-petua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch dis-cretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the ac-cused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hear-ing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily deter-mine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/am_rtj_97_1387.htm

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/oct1994/am_rtj_93_1052_1994.html

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/am_rtj_94_1183_1995.html

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the ac-cused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail -bond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international commu-nity arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which pro-vides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for hu-man rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legal-ity of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authori-ties are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be ad-mitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the ac-cused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

7. People vs. Crisologo

Facts:Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf-mute, was charged for robbery and homicide

committed on 1 May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was al-

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/apr2007/gr_153675_2007.html

legedly informed of the charged against him through sign language but apparently no sign lan-guage expert or representative was available. The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reason-able doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was given due process of law.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his funda-mental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; against him, and, fur-ther to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing this constitu-tional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is based.

- right to bail

A. Matter of discretion

B. Matter of right

"When the evidence of guilt is strong"

"Doctrine of constructive custody"

Sabi ng friend ko na under kay atty Gabriel, dun daw sa bail ni enrile, tignan din daw ung Dela Rama vs People's Court.. Lumang case na daw yan pero connected daw.. (Sisses na incharge sa tips pacheck na din hihi! Love you!!)

Thanks sis kim!!!!

1.Rtational scheme of appntment

2.sep of chrch/state

3.lemon tst

4.Vcancy if Poe dq bec of ctiznship reqt

5.invrse cndmnation sps tecson

6.tax exmption

Recognizance act

Administrative matter 12-11-2

Functional immunity vs absolute immunity (re: consuls and diplomats)

Permanent court of arbitration in the hague

Regime used in high seas

intl crim court

RESIDENT MAMMALS. Hehe walang kamatayan

Ombudsman with regard sa admin disciplinary powers nya. How to appeal etc

Preventive suspension and dismissal (reg binay)

Foundlings

Mayor Erap re his qualification to run again (absolute pardon given by GMA to him)

FWD:Paps nagbigay ng tips samin dito si sandoval sa starbucks::::

Forecast Dean Albano:

1.Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

2. Nuisance candidates

3. Intergenerational responsibility to preserve our natural resources to promote

4. Separation of church and state

5. Incorporation theory (laws)

6. Immunity of state from suit

7. Separation of powers

8. Non-delegation of powers

9. 3 departments. (know the qualifications and powers of each)

10. Pres. Power (concentrate on appointment, pardoning and appropriating powers)

11. DAP/ PDAF

12. powers of the judiciary/ removal

13. Confirmation of COA

FW: Idagdag nyo pala ung sa Garcia vs Lim ung constitutionality daw ng VAWC ung issue dun abt sa test rationale basis test

Documents

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