Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 February ... · This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:20:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 February 2007–15 May 2007Author(s): Michele K. EspositoSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Summer 2007), pp. 136-164Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2007.36.4.136 .

Accessed: 30/03/2015 11:20

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:20:44 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palstud

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2007.36.4.136?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY

16 FEBRUARY–15 MAY 2007

COMPILED BY MICHELE K. ESPOSITO

The Quarterly Update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and internationalevents affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The main focus of this quarter was onPalestinian efforts to form a national unitygovernment joining Fatah and Hamas. Asthe quarter opened, Palestinians were cau-tiously optimistic that the 2/8 Mecca accordbetween the 2 factions (see Doc. B2 in JPS143) would result in a government that theinternational community would view as ful-filling the Quartet’s 1/06 demands to haltviolence, recognize Israel’s right to exist,and adhere to previous agreements, therebyallowing the lifting of the U.S.-led boycotton the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA)that was strangling the Palestinian economy.Palestinians equally hoped that a function-ing unity government, with Fatah and Hamasworking in cooperation, would restore pub-lic faith in the democratic process and lawand order to the streets of Gaza, bringing thePalestinians back from the brink of civil war(Quarterly Update in JPS 143).

The accord, however, was vague on howportfolios would be allocated and control ofthe various security forces delegated, whiledisputes between PA Pres. Mahmud Abbas(Fatah) and PM Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas;charged by Abbas with forming the newcabinet) raised concerns about the durabil-ity of the agreement. Meanwhile, as Israel’snear-total blockade of the Strip reached its1-year anniversary, Israeli-Palestinian cross-border violence in Gaza was on the rise,though both sides maintained that incidentswere isolated and reiterated intentions tocontinue adhering to the Gaza cease-firethat took effect on 11/26/06 (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 143). In the West Bank, bycontrast, Israeli military actions continuedunabated. As of 2/16, at least 5,027 Pales-tinians (including 46 Israeli Arabs and 17unidentified Arab cross-border infiltrators),1,029 Israelis (including 317 Israel DefenseForces [IDF] soldiers and security personnel,

208 settlers, 504 civilians), and 60 foreign na-tionals (including 2 British suicide bombers)had been killed since the start of the al-Aqsaintifada on 9/28/00.

Intra-Palestinian violence in Gaza pittingFatah against Hamas immediately taperedoff after announcement of the 2/8 Meccaaccord but still simmered, threatening toerupt anew should hopes be dashed of asuccessful new unity government and liftingof the siege. Violence between the 2 move-ments had been exceptionally high sincemid-12/06, exacerbated by new U.S. effortsto arm Abbas’s security forces to coun-terbalance the much smaller but equallywell-armed and far more disciplined Hamascadres (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143).By 2/16, at least 147 Palestinians had beenkilled in intra-Palestinian political violencesince the fighting first began to take on thetones of civil war in 10/06.

Abbas, Olmert, and Rice MeetBy pledging to bring Hamas and Fatah to-

gether in a ruling regime, the Mecca accordwas essential to reversing the deterioratingintra-Palestinian political situation. At thesame time, however, it flew in the face ofU.S. and Israeli policy aims of uniting “mod-erates” in the region against “extremists”and was seen within the administration ofU.S. Pres. George W. Bush as complicatingits goal of achieving progress on the peaceprocess before the end of his second term in1/09. Many in the Bush admin. questionedwhether to continue supporting Abbas af-ter he had agreed to a national unity plan,which they viewed as bringing him closerto Hamas and strengthening Hamas’s posi-tion rather than the other way around. U.S.Secy. of State Condoleezza Rice reportedlyviewed Abbas’s role at Mecca as backtrack-ing on his pledges to her to take steps toremove Hamas from the government alto-gether (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143).

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Summer 2007), pp. 136–164, ISSN 0377-919X, electronic ISSN 1533-8614.C© 2007 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissionto photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’sRights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2007.XXXVI.4.136.



QUARTERLY UPDATE ON CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY 137

In any case, the U.S had to choose betweensitting back and letting the conflict fester(further undermining its regional policy) ormoving ahead with new plans to move thesituation forward.

In this situation, Rice pressed within theadministration to go forward with her plans(announced during her visit to the region inmid-1/07; see Quarterly Update in JPS 143)to hold a trilateral meeting with Abbas andIsraeli PM Ehud Olmert on 2/19. Rice’s origi-nal goal for the meeting was to shore up bothAbbas and Olmert, the U.S.’s “moderate” al-lies, who were rapidly losing support amongtheir domestic constituencies—Abbas be-cause of the stagnated peace process, theeconomic impact of the ongoing boycott,and the deteriorating internal security sit-uation in the territories; and Olmert as aresult of the unpopular 7–8/06 Lebanon warand a spate of domestic political scandals(see Quarterly Update in JPS 143). Rice’s 2-pronged plan, drafted in close coordinationwith Israel’s FM Tzipi Livni (see QuarterlyUpdate in JPS 143), called for (1) revivingand accelerating implementation of the 2003road map to give Palestinians a sense of theendgame of negotiations (ideally by creatinga Palestinian state with provisional bordersby the end of 2007) while not setting a dead-line for final status negotiations so as not topressure Israel into a permanent deal; and(2) reviving the 2002 Arab League initiative(proposing full Arab normalization of rela-tions with Israel in exchange for full peacebased on a return to 1967 borders, creationof an independent Palestinian state with EastJerusalem as its capital, and an agreed solu-tion to the Palestinian refugee issue) to giveIsrael a parallel sense of the “political hori-zon” and ideally to encourage Arab states toopen immediate diplomatic contacts withIsrael.

Olmert, who had originally agreed tothe 2/19 meeting only under U.S. pressure,wanted to cancel the talks following an-nouncement of the Mecca agreement, butRice pressed him to go forward (though shestopped urging him to make major gesturesto aid Abbas) and took steps to dampen pub-lic expectations by referring (2/18) to thetalks as only “informal discussions.” In therun-up to the meeting, the U.S. sought to re-assure Israel that it would not ease pressureon Hamas or the PA: Bush phoned (2/16)Olmert to assure him that the U.S. wouldshun the new Palestinian government un-less it explicitly met the 1/06 Quartet de-mands, an assurance the U.S. team reiter-

ated (2/17) when it arrived in the regionfor preparatory talks. Meanwhile, Rice pri-vately pressed (2/18) Abbas on the cabinet’smakeup (Hamas was allotted a certain num-ber of seats, but Abbas held veto power overHamas’s choices for key positions; see Quar-terly Update in JPS 143). Nonetheless, Livni(2/17) and Olmert (2/18) informed Rice thatwhile Olmert would go ahead with the meet-ing, he would not discuss anything relatedto final status or agree to hold further talkswith Abbas until the new Palestinian gov-ernment recognized Israel’s right to existand renounced violence. Abbas, meanwhile,pressed (2/18) Rice to promote the immedi-ate launch of regular Israeli-Palestinian talksto explore creation of a Palestinian state.

Ultimately, no understandings werereached at the 2/19 meeting in Jerusalem,though Olmert (again under pressure fromRice) and Abbas pledged to hold bilateraltalks on Palestinian movement and accesssoon. Neither Olmert nor Abbas attended ascheduled press conference afterward, leav-ing Rice to tell reporters that the talks hadallowed the two leaders to “clear the air.”Separately, Palestinian officials described(2/19) the meeting as “tense and difficult,”with Rice later admitting (3/25) that mostof the meeting had consisted of Olmertdenouncing Abbas for agreeing to join a gov-ernment with Hamas, with little time spenton discussing options for moving ahead.

Immediately following the trilateral talks,Abbas traveled (ca. 2/21–24) to London,Paris, Berlin, and Brussels to encourage EUstates to support the new unity govern-ment once it was announced by lifting theboycott, stressing that he and the new gov-ernment could not succeed without interna-tional backing and a quick improvement inPalestinian living conditions. The EU statesindicated that they would deal with “sensi-ble” Hamas members in a unity governmentbut would not restore direct aid to the PAuntil Quartet demands were met.

On his return, Abbas resumed discus-sions (e.g., 3/4, 3/5) with PM Haniyeh overportfolio assignments in the new cabinet,and the two quickly neared an agreement(though Abbas vetoed 2 of Haniyeh’s choicesfor the crucial interior min. post, responsi-ble for overseeing the PA security forces).While reports indicated that a governmentslate could possibly have been announcedby the 3/8 deadline set by the Basic Law(the provisional Palestinian constitution),Abbas reportedly delayed the deal until heand Olmert held their first bilateral meeting



138 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

(scheduled in the meantime) on 3/11, fear-ing that once Fatah was authorized to joina government with Hamas, Olmert wouldrefuse to meet. Consequently, Abbas for-mally granted (3/9) Haniyeh a 2-week exten-sion (permitted under the Basic Law) until3/22.

Meanwhile, immediately after Rice leftthe region on 2/20, Olmert authorized theIDF to escalate military operations in theWest Bank, assassinating 4 Islamic Jihadmembers in Jenin (1 on 2/21, 3 on 2/28)and launching (2/25) its largest offensive inthe West Bank since 7/06, named Opera-tion Hot Winter, targeting Islamic Jihad inNablus. Between 2/25 and 3/1, when theoperation was “suspended,” the IDF sealedNablus, imposed a round-the-clock curfew,bulldozed and damaged some 250 Pales-tinian homes and shops to widen streetsfor easier IDF access to the Old City, con-ducted house-to-house searches, arresteddozens of Palestinians, occupied media out-lets, and barred access to hospitals, all thewhile clashing with local militants, killingat least 2 unarmed Palestinians and leav-ing at least 14 Palestinians and 3 IDF soldierswounded. Overnight on 3/6-7, the IDF raidedthe PA Military Intelligence headquarters inRamallah and detained 18 wanted mem-bers of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB) whowere taking refuge there along with 50 Mil-itary Intelligence officers and employees.(Most were released after interrogation.) InHebron, a Jewish settler was fatally stabbed(2/25) by a suspected Palestinian assailant.In Gaza, the cease-fire technically held, ac-cording to both Israel and the PA, thoughthere were near-daily incidents of Palestinianrocket fire into Israel, causing no damage orinjuries, and of the IDF firing into Gaza, level-ing land, and firing on Palestinian fishermen,leaving 1 Palestinian dead and 2 wounded(see Chronology for details). By 3/10, thecomprehensive death toll had reached 5,038Palestinians and 1,030 Israelis since the startof the second intifada.

Bilateral Talks and a NewGovernmentUnder U.S. pressure, Olmert received

Abbas at his residence in Jerusalem on 3/11for 2 hours of talks aimed at keeping linesof communication open. The leaders dis-cussed reviving peace talks, exchangingprisoners, and addressing Israeli concernsregarding the Palestinian national unity gov-ernment, but no agreements were reached,and Olmert refused to discuss extending the

Gaza cease-fire to the West Bank. ThoughOlmert pledged to continue contacts withAbbas after a unity government was formed,he said that Israel would not cooperate withany other members of the government, in-cluding Fatah and independents. As a gestureto Abbas, Olmert pledged to extend the oper-ating hours of Gaza’s Qarni crossing and saidthat he would “treat seriously” the 2002 Arabinitiative if re-endorsed by the Arab Leagueat its session on 3/28–29 (though he urgedthe section calling for “an agreed, just solu-tion” to the refugee issue in accordance withUN Res. 194 to be “reconsidered”). Soon af-ter the meeting, Israel’s announcement (late3/12) that it was reviving Operation HotWinter in Nablus initially raised tensions,though the operation was “suspended” againafter a day, leaving no reported injuries.

With the Olmert talks over, Abbas andHaniyeh announced (3/14) their agreementon a new government, adding that the Pales-tinian Council (PC) would be convenedon 3/17 for a confidence vote. On 3/15,Haniyeh publicly released the cabinet slate.In a slight change from what was agreedto at Mecca, of the 24 seats (not includ-ing PM and pres.), 11 were allocated toHamas, 6 to Fatah, 3 to independents, and4 to smaller parties. (Hamas originally wasto get 9 seats and independents 5; no rea-son was given for the change.) Among thosenamed to influential posts, Fatah’s Azzam al-Ahmad was appointed dep. PM; independenttechnocrat Hani al-Qawasmi (nominated byHamas, supported by Fatah) interior min-ister; independent Ziad Abu Amr (close toHamas but nominated by Fatah) FM; ThirdWay’s Salam al-Fayyad finance minister; andthe Palestinian National Initiative’s MustafaBarghouti information minister. Haniyeh alsoreaffirmed (3/15) the government programagreed upon in Mecca 2/8, which “respects”previous agreements signed with Israel butdoes not explicitly recognize Israel, autho-rizes Abbas as PLO head to conduct negotia-tions with Israel, and reiterates the Palestini-ans’ right under international law to resistoccupation (as well as their right of return),though he vowed to make efforts to extendthe Gaza cease-fire to the West Bank.

On 3/17, the PC approved (83–3, with 1abstention, 41 PC members jailed by Israelunable to vote, and 4 not attending becausethey were either sick or wanted by Israel)the new government, and Abbas swore in itsmembers (see Doc. B1). In his address to thePC, Abbas urged the international commu-nity to lift the boycott and called on Israel




to resume final status negotiations immedi-ately, stating that the new government was“extending its hand wide open, calling forpeace and equality,” and encouraging Israelto make “a mutual commitment to stop allviolence.” Haniyeh also reiterated the Pales-tinian right to “resistance in all its forms”against occupation.

In a gesture aimed at securing U.S. andIsraeli support of the government, Abbasissued (3/18) a presidential decree ap-pointing their ally, Fatah’s Gaza strongmanMuhammad Dahlan, to head the PA nationalsecurity council and restructure the secu-rity services. The move angered newly ap-pointed Interior M Qawasmi, who felt his au-thority was being undermined, and Hamas,which had never forgiven Dahlan for leadinga violent crackdown against Hamas whenhe headed Gaza’s Preventive Security Force(PSF) in the 1990s.

Reactions to the new government werevaried. Israel denounced it even before itwas sworn in, stating (3/15) that it wouldnot deal with any of its members (includ-ing Fayyad and Abu Amr, with whom it hadworked closely in the past) and that it un-dermined Abbas’s standing as a partner forpeace. An anonymous Israeli official stated(3/15), “Abbas promised us several timesthat he would not agree to a national unitygovernment. . . . But then he sold the storeto Hamas.” Another Israeli official claimed(3/15) that Abbas had privately promisedOlmert on 3/11 that he would secure the re-lease of captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit be-fore installing the new government and thathis failure to do so raised questions abouthis general ability to deliver on future deals.The Israeli cabinet relented slightly afterthe unity government was sworn in, voting(3/18) unanimously (2 members abstaining)to have limited interaction on security coor-dination and humanitarian concerns, rulingout peace negotiations unless the Quartet’s1/06 demands were met. The Israeli cabi-net also decided to continue to withholdaround $55 m./month in value-added taxescollected on the PA’s behalf. Chief Palestiniannegotiator Saeb Erakat expressed deep dis-appointment over the cabinet’s rejection ofnegotiations, noting that they would be un-der the jurisdiction of the PLO, which didnot include Hamas.

Several countries took immediate stepsto reengage with the PA. Norway announced(3/17) recognition of the government andsaid it would lift its sanctions. NorwegianDep. FM Raymond Johansen traveled to

Gaza to meet with Haniyeh on 3/19, mark-ing the first official diplomatic meeting withthe new government. (Israel then refused tomeet with Johansen.) France invited (3/17)FM Abu Amr to Paris. Italy’s FM phoned(3/19) PM Haniyeh to express Italy’s con-gratulations. On 3/31, the EU as a wholeannounced that it would maintain ties withall PA officials who were not members ofHamas.

The U.S. said (3/18) it would limit inter-action with PA officials to Abbas but wouldconsider meeting others not connected toHamas on a case-by-case basis. On 3/20, U.S.Consul General Jacob Walles met with Fi-nance M Fayyad in Ramallah, marking thefirst U.S. meeting with a PA official otherthan Abbas since Hamas took over the PA in3/06. On 3/21, the U.S. announced that itwould trim the $86.4 m. that it was seekingfrom Congress for the PA security forces un-der Abbas’s control (see Quarterly Update inJPS 143) to $59 m., fearing that some of themoney might go to Hamas; $20 m. would beredirected for future Palestinian elections,upgrading security measures at the Qarnicrossing, and other nonsecurity projects.(As of 5/4, the $59 m. had been released butnone of it used.) The same day, the Quar-tet ended (3/21) 2 days of discussions inWashington, slightly moderating its positionby stating that it would judge the new gov-ernment not only on its “composition andplatform, but also its actions,” urging the PAto demonstrate a “clear and credible” com-mitment to peace if it wanted the boycottlifted.

Creating MomentumDays after the new Palestinian govern-

ment took office, Rice announced (3/19)plans to return to the region 3/24–27 (herfourth visit in 4 months) to press for a revivalof the peace process. She began her trip inAswan, Egypt, meeting with officials fromEgypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (re-ferred to by the U.S. as the Arab Quartet),and then spent 2 days (3/25–26) shuttlingbetween Olmert and Abbas, with sidebar dis-cussions in Amman with King Abdullah on3/26. After realizing that Olmert, post–unitygovernment, would not agree to sit withAbbas to map out a shared vision of a “po-litical horizon,” Rice outlined instead a newproposal for U.S.-led parallel talks with eachside on forming a Palestinian state. Rice alsoenvisioned that the Arab states would work“in parallel” with these U.S.-led talks, specif-ically by reaffirming the 2002 Arab initiative




at the 3/28–29 Arab League summit andthen quickly offering to normalize relationswith Israel. (She did not ask the Arab statesto modify sections of the original proposalon refugees, reportedly having sought suchchanges previously without success.) As aconfidence-building measure, she recom-mended an immediate, significant prisonerexchange, including the release of IDF Cpl.Shalit. Rice also tried to lay groundwork fora future meeting of the Quartet with the par-ticipation of the Arab Quartet, Israel, and PAthat could serve as a mini–peace summit. Fi-nally, she stated that the U.S. would not ruleout presenting its own peace initiatives inthe future.

Reaction to Rice’s proposals was not pos-itive. Olmert rejected the parallel formatand the scope of the proposed talks (onceagain refusing to discuss final status issues)and demanded instead that the Palestini-ans take prior steps to halt violence, releaseShalit, and recognize Israel. Olmert (whoseapproval rating stood at 3%) stressed thathe was too weak politically to make ges-tures to the PA or take controversial peacesteps before the release (set for 4/30) ofthe Winograd Commission’s preliminary re-port on the summer 2006 war and the Laborparty primaries (set for 5/28), which couldlead to the collapse of his coalition govern-ment. Abbas, meanwhile, favored talks butcould not accept Israeli preconditions. Fi-nally, the Arab Quartet rejected normalizingrelations with Israel in parallel to final statustalks, noting that the 2002 initiative presentsnormalization as the endgame of successfulpeace negotiations.

There was room to maneuver, however.Rice reportedly emerged from her talks withthe Arab Quartet believing that Saudi Arabiawould consider an official meeting withIsrael if Israel accepted the 2002 initiative,and she believed after talks with Olmert thatIsrael would consider wide-ranging peacetalks if Saudi Arabia would start a diplomaticprocess with Israel, perhaps within a UN orother multilateral framework. During Rice’svisit, the Arab League FMs meeting (3/26)in preparation for the 3/28–29 Arab summitagreed to reaffirm the 2002 initiative and toestablish a working group to promote theplan as a basis for resuming negotiations—amove that the U.S. called (3/26) “a very pos-itive and welcome development” and thatIsrael deemed (3/26) “significant.” (In addi-tion, Hamas leader Khalid Mishal told Saudiofficials in Riyadh on 3/25 that Hamas wouldnot oppose a relaunching of the 2002 plan.)

In leaving the region on 3/27, Rice an-nounced that Olmert and Abbas had agreedto meet on a biweekly basis beginning inmid-4/07 to discuss humanitarian issues andconfidence-building measures only while“leaving the door open to discussion of allissues.” Olmert’s spokeswoman Miri Eisinstressed (3/27) that the leaders “may be talk-ing about the political horizon [in terms of]the steps needed before peace negotiationscan begin. . . . But there will not be discus-sion of final status issues.” Rice also pledgedto make periodic visits to the region to helpthe efforts along and to continue to pressboth sides to move into direct talks on theirvision of an endgame.

On 3/29, the Arab League reaffirmed its2002 initiative and pledged to create a follow-up group as planned. At the summit, SaudiFM Prince Saud al-Faisal warned (3/28) Israelto embrace the initiative or inevitably facefurther conflict, stating that both sides mustmake equal effort toward peace and “if Israelrefuses, that means it doesn’t want peace.”(He also stressed that Saudi Arabia had noplans to open direct diplomatic channelswith Israel.) The Israeli FMin. issued (3/29)a statement that Israel was “sincerely inter-ested in pursuing a dialogue with those Arabstates that desire peace with Israel, this inorder to promote a process of normalizationand cooperation,” but it did not endorse theArab League plan. On 3/30, Olmert praisedthe Arab League decision as “a revolution-ary change in outlook” but stated that Israelwould not allow a single Palestinian refugeeto return to what is now Israel, had no re-sponsibility for the refugees, and would notreturn to the 1967 borders.

Meanwhile, Israeli-Palestinian violencewas on the rise. On 3/19, days after instal-lation of the unity government, Hamas firedguns and mortars across the Gaza borderinto Israel for the first time since 11/19/06,wounding 1 Israeli. Some analysts (see al-Mezan and New York Times 3/20) viewedthis as an angry response by some Hamas el-ements to Abbas’s appointment of Dahlan asnational security adviser (see above). Hamasofficials quickly reiterated (3/19) their inten-tions to continue to abide by the cease-fire,and Israel did the same (3/19), though itwarned of diminishing patience with thelow-level cross-border attacks. (The IDF con-firmed on 3/30 that no further Hamas firinginto Israel had taken place.) Over the follow-ing days, Israel stepped up military activity inGaza: IDF cross-border fire into Gaza nearlydoubled, leaving 10 Palestinians wounded




by 3/31 (see Chronology for details). In ad-dition, on 3/28, the IDF directed artilleryfire on n. Gaza for the first time since the11/06 cease-fire went into effect, killing 1Palestinian and wounding 6. In the WestBank, the IDF continued home demolitions,house searches, and arrest raids, occasion-ally clashing with Palestinian gunmen, espe-cially in Jenin and Nablus (though OperationHot Winter was not officially resumed). Asof 3/31, the number of Palestinian deathssince the beginning of the second intifadahad reached 5,054, while the Israeli toll re-mained 1,030.

In addition, Fatah-Hamas violence, whichhad been sporadic since 2/8 (see Chronol-ogy), escalated on 3/21 for a week, leaving4 Palestinians dead and at least 42 wounded(see intra-Palestinian section for details).

U.S. Plans and StagnationThe weeks after the Arab League summit

were marked by what could be called high-profile stagnation. For all the senior-levelexchanges and declarations, there were nofundamental changes in policy or interac-tion. The result was an increase in tensionsbetween Israel and the Palestinians and be-tween Fatah and Hamas.

On 4/15 in Jerusalem, Abbas and Olmertmet for what was to be their first biweeklymeeting, as pledged to Rice in 3/06. Theleaders first met along with their aides fortalks on security, economic, and humanitar-ian concerns. Abbas briefed Olmert on hisplans to rebuild the PA security forces andaugment his presidential guard to counter-balance Hamas, in keeping with U.S. securityenvoy Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton’s recommenda-tions (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143), andshared ideas for halting rocket fire and smug-gling across the Gaza border. He also urgedOlmert to resume final status talks and imple-ment the 11/05 agreement brokered by Riceto guarantee Palestinian freedom of move-ment. Olmert once again refused to discussfinal status and, concerning restrictions onmovement, agreed only to keep Gaza’s Qarnicrossing open an additional 4 hours/dayand to allow the Rafah crossing to open“several days a week.” Abbas and Olmertthen met alone for an hour, reportedly todiscuss the economic and governmentalstructures of a future Palestinian state; nodetails were released. Afterward, they an-nounced plans to hold their next session inJericho, but no date was set, and no furthermeetings were held before the end of thequarter.

Meanwhile, encouraged by Rice’s 3/24–27 talks with Arab officials, Israel and theU.S. focused on persuading the Arab states,particularly Saudi Arabia, to take immediatesteps toward normalization with Israel todemonstrate their seriousness about peaceand to give Abbas political cover for con-cessions to Israel. To this end, Israel andthe U.S. argued that the Arab states should“show flexibility” (Israeli FMin. 4/18) onthe Arab League initiative by agreeing toopen talks on different forms of normal-ization and the possibility of normalizingin stages: if the Arabs were “prepared fora discussion and a dialogue and not a pre-sentation on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,” theinitiative could be “very important and his-torical” (chmn. of the House Committee onForeign Affairs Tom Lantos to King Abdullahof Saudi Arabia on 4/5). On 4/1, Olmert pub-licly invited Arab leaders to meet with himin Jerusalem to discuss ways of settling theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict, and he stated that“if the Saudi king initiates a meeting of headsof moderate [Arab] states and invites me andthe head of the Palestinian Authority, I willbe glad to attend.” (The Israeli FMin. didnot follow up with a formal invitation.) Inmid-4/07, Rice sent letters to several Arabstates (including the UAE and Saudi Arabia)calling on them to open diplomatic con-tacts with Israel, specifically requesting thatthe Arab Quartet, the PA, and Israel meetwith the Quartet in 5/07 to discuss how torestart the peace process. At an FMs meet-ing on 4/18, the Arab League responded bycharging Egypt and Jordan, named co-chairsof its follow-up team, to “clarify” its standon the initiative with Israel, stressing onceagain that the plan offered full normalizationin return for full peace, noting that Israelwas thus far unwilling to endorse this asa common goal. Separately, Egypt stronglyurged (4/17) that the Arab Quartet not meetwith Israel, as it would be “tantamount tonormalizing relations” prior to a peace deal.

On the Israeli-Palestinian level, the U.S.pressed forward with plans to buttress Ab-bas against Hamas, as if the unity govern-ment had never been formed. On 4/25,the U.S. confidentially presented Israel andAbbas aides with a document entitled “Ac-celeration Benchmarks for Agreement onMovement and Access As Well As on theGaza Security Situation” (see Doc. D1) andinformed the parties that Rice planned toreturn to the region around 5/15 to discussimplementation. The document (drafted byGen. Dayton, along with U.S. Amb. to Israel




Dick Jones and U.S. Consul Gen. Walles, atRice’s request after her 3/07 visit and ap-proved by her) contained two importantaspects: The first and most prominent wasa detailed 5–8/07 timetable for Israel to re-move roadblocks and open passages forPalestinian travel; the second, vaguely ref-erenced in the text but far more crucial,focused on upgrading security forces loyalto Abbas, specifically calling on Israel tosupport Dayton’s requests for arms, ammu-nition, and equipment for Abbas’s forces inan “immediate and ongoing” manner. ThePA was also tasked with drafting plans tohalt rocket fire from and cross-border smug-gling into Gaza. The U.S. presented this asan accelerated implementation of stage 1of the road map and in keeping with the11/05 Agreement on Movement and Access(cf. Doc. A4 in JPS 138), which Israel hadnever implemented. The PA reportedly en-dorsed the plan in principle, while Olmertemphasized Israel’s interpretation of theroad map as requiring the PA to halt all Pales-tinian violence before Israel had to take anysteps.

On 5/4, the confidential document wasleaked to the Israeli daily Ha’Aretz, spark-ing a flurry of backpedaling by the U.S. TheState Dept. immediately stated (5/4, 5/8)that the document constituted informal rec-ommendations only; that it was meant to“help facilitate discussion”; and that therewas no deadline for the sides to acceptit. Rice also cancelled (5/8) plans to visitthe region, officially citing “Israeli politi-cal turmoil” after the release (4/30) of thehighly critical Winograd interim report onthe 2006 Lebanon war (see Lebanon sectionbelow).

Some analysts (e.g., Conflicts Forum5/10) indicated that the benchmarks doc-ument was deliberately leaked by the U.S.to cover up the leak of a far more damagingU.S. document several days earlier. That doc-ument, titled the “Action Plan for the Pales-tinian Presidency,” was reportedly in thedrafting stages when leaked to the Jordanianweekly al-Majd in late 4/07. The newspa-per had planned to publish the text on 4/30,but the Jordanian government banned thepublication of that week’s edition and confis-cated the original. Al-Majd stated (4/30) thatits high-level source had said the plan wasdrawn up by “Arab and American parties”and had been “presented to . . . Abbas by thehead of an Arab intelligence agency” (mostlikely Egypt’s Omar Sulayman). The planreportedly outlined economic, political,

and security steps to increase Abbas’s po-litical strength, “avoiding the wasting ofvaluable time trying to alter the ideology ofHamas,” with the aim of “building up Ab-bas’s political stock” so that he could callnew legislative elections in fall 2007 and de-feat Hamas at the polls, legally sideliningthe movement. It also reportedly called for“internal reforms in Fatah, including elec-tion of a new Fatah Central Committee withmore representation from the New Guard.”The document mentioned the 2/8 MeccaAccord and the “expected . . . March 2007”Rice visit, indicating it was drafted in 2/07 orearly 3/07. Sources close to the PA confirmed(5/10) that various versions of the documenthad been circulating but would not con-firm who had been involved in drafting theplan.

The broad U.S. goals set out in the twodocuments were not new and indeed hadbeen germinating since Hamas took controlof the PA in 3/06 (see Quarterly Updates inJPS 140–43). The documents’ importance isthat they set out frankly and in writing an ac-tual U.S. “action plan” to mold a Palestiniangovernment to its and to Israel’s liking, withthe active cooperation of Abbas and certainArab states, and to either directly manipu-late or ignore where necessary the Pales-tinian democratic process to achieve thatend. Hamas immediately (5/5) “forcefully re-ject[ed]” and vowed to resist by “any andall means” what it called the U.S.’s “abjectlyterrorist plan.”

Fatah-Hamas Relations DeterioratePalestinians, meanwhile, were not seeing

any improvement following creation of thenational unity government. Despite the lim-ited diplomatic approaches to the new PA,the international boycott remained in place,as did Israeli restrictions on Palestinian move-ment, causing continuing deterioration inGaza’s economic situation.

In addition, Abbas was taking his ownactions to consolidate power, particularly inthe security sphere, in line with U.S. plans.The moves not only frustrated Hamas andsome independents in the unity governmentbut also perpetuated PA inefficiencies, oftenat the expense of the Palestinian public,fraying the optimism engendered by the 2/8Mecca accord.

The most striking example was Abbas’ssidelining of his new independent interiorminister, Qawasmi. Qawasmi’s first moveupon assuming office on 3/17 was to drafta 100-day plan for bringing order to Gaza




that called for integrating the predominantlyHamas Executive Support Force (ESF) intothe Abbas-controlled units and for deploy-ing the combined forces in major securitydetails to restore law and order. (The ESFhad been created by former interior min-ister Said Siyam in 4/06, when Abbas hadrefused to deploy security forces under hiscontrol to police Gaza in an effort to under-mine the new Hamas-led government; seeQuarterly Update in JPS 140.) Although the100-day plan was endorsed by the PC on4/14, Abbas’s forces ignored subsequent or-ders by Qawasmi to integrate and deploy,indicating they would answer only to Abbas.Meanwhile, Abbas was strengthening Fatahforces with U.S. assistance. Fatah officialsconfirmed (ca. 4/1) that Dahlan had com-pleted the first stage of forming a new 1,400-member Fatah Special Force to act as an“intervention force” against Hamas shouldclashes erupt again, with nearly 1,000 ofAbbas’s presidential guardsmen and otherelite Fatah forces having undergone specialtraining in a new U.S.-managed PA trainingbase in Jericho or Egypt. Already slighted byAbbas’s appointment of Dahlan as nationalsecurity adviser (see above), Qawasmi re-signed on 4/23, stating that he could notfulfill his duties given the lack of coopera-tion from Fatah-dominated security forces(especially from Dahlan’s deputy in chargeof internal security, Rashid Abu Shibak).Haniyeh initially rejected Qawasmi’s resig-nation, and Qawasmi agreed to stay on inhopes of positive change.

On 5/10, however, Abbas made a pub-lic show of announcing the deploymentof 3,000 PA security forces in central andnorthern Gaza as part of a new crackdownto “improve law and order.” The move, takenwithout informing the Interior Min., infuri-ated Qawasmi, who walked out of a meetingwith Abu Shibak in protest when informedof the orders. On 5/11, Fatah security forcesstarted setting up roadblocks, stopping carsfor random security checks, and conduct-ing high-profile patrols across Gaza, refusingto coordinate efforts with the Interior Min.or ESF. The Fatah actions quickly sparkedclashes with Hamas and ESF members be-ginning on 5/11 and escalating throughthe end of the quarter, leaving at least 24Palestinians dead and scores injured. Amidthe heaviest intra-Palestinian violence in 2months, Dahlan ordered (5/15) 500 Fatah re-inforcements being trained in Egypt underthe Dayton plan to return to Gaza to defendAbbas’s forces. Israel immediately approved

their entry through Rafah, stating, “The ideais to change the balance [of power], whichhas been in favor of Hamas and against Fatah.With these well-trained forces, it will helpright that imbalance.” Qawasmi resigneddefinitively on 5/14, leaving it to Haniyeh totake up his duties.

Meanwhile, Israeli-Palestinian violencewas also on the rise. On 4/3, Israeli DM AmirPeretz had authorized the IDF to resume“pinpoint operations against terrorists” inGaza. Within hours, IDF soldiers on theGaza border fatally shot (4/4) an IslamicJihad member placing a roadside bomb nearthe border fence n. of Bayt Hanun and senttroops into Gaza to dismantle the bomb,though Israel stressed it was not endingthe cease-fire. On 4/6, the IDF fired mis-siles at armed Palestinians near the Gazaborder fence e. of Jabaliya, killing 1; andPalestinians fired a rocket-propelled grenadeat an IDF tank entering Gaza to level landn. of Bayt Hanun, causing no injuries butraising tensions. On 4/7, the IDF made ahelicopter strike on Islamic Jihad and Demo-cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestinemembers planting roadside bombs along theborder near Jabaliya, killing 1 and wound-ing 2; the armed men returned fire withautomatic weapons and rocket-propelledgrenades (RPGs) and detonated the explo-sives they had planted, causing no injuriesbut marking the heaviest exchange sincethe cease-fire went into effect. The IDF alsostepped up bulldozing operations inside theGaza border and continued to fire frequentlyon Palestinians (civilian and armed) whoneared the border fence, as well as on Pales-tinian fishermen heading out to sea (seeChronology), leaving another 7 Palestiniansdead and 6 wounded between 4/1 and 5/15.In the West Bank, the IDF stepped up assas-sinations as of 4/17, killing 3 AMB members(1 on 4/17, 2 on 4/21) and 3 Islamic Jihadmembers (1 on 4/21, 2 on 5/4), while contin-uing arrest raids, house searches, and housedemolitions apace.

In response to the assassinations, IslamicJihad and the AMB sharply escalated rocketattacks from Gaza into Israel as of 4/18, av-eraging more than 20/week through theend of the quarter (lightly injuring 2 Israelison 5/6). On 4/24, when Israel marked itsindependence day and Palestinians com-memorated the Nakba, Hamas for the firsttime since the 11/06 truce fired rocketsfrom Gaza into Israel, causing no dam-age or injuries. Hamas’s political wing is-sued a statement that it was attempting to




secure the cease-fire, indicating that ele-ments of its military wing may have beenacting independently, and Israel agreed(4/24) to hold off on a major retaliationuntil “the position of Hamas as a wholebecomes clearer.” As the situation in Gazadeteriorated, Olmert convened his secu-rity cabinet on 5/13 for talks on how todeal with the situation. No decisions werereached immediately, and internal discus-sions were ongoing at the end of the quar-ter. On 5/15, as intra-Palestinian violenceescalated, Hamas fired more than 20 rocketsfrom Gaza into Israel, hitting a house and anempty school and wounding 2 Israelis (1 seri-ously), virtually guaranteeing a heavy Israeliresponse.

Intifada Data and TrendsDuring the quarter, at least 60 Palestinians

and 1 Israeli were killed in Israeli-Palestinianviolence (compared to 92 Palestinians and3 Israelis last quarter), bringing the toll at5/15 to at least 5,087 Palestinians (includ-ing 46 Israeli Arabs and 17 unidentifiedArab cross-border infiltrators); 1,030 Israelis(including 317 IDF soldiers and securitypersonnel, 209 settlers, 504 civilians); and60 foreign nationals (including 2 Britishsuicide bombers) since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada. Meanwhile, Palestinian fatali-ties from intra-Palestinian political violencewere down to around 44 from around 117last quarter (see Intra-Palestinian Dynamicssection below).

Overall, major attacks by both Israelis andPalestinians (assassinations, suicide attacks,air and rocket strikes, etc.) were significantlylower this quarter. At the same time, how-ever, Israel’s occupation continued to take aheavy toll on the Palestinians through eco-nomic isolation of Gaza, tight restrictions onPalestinian movement, and daily IDF arrestraids, house searches, house demolitions,closures, settler harassment, and the like.Trends are outlined below; for details, seethe Chronology.

Assassinations, Suicide Attacks, andHeavy Attacks

At least 10 deaths this quarter were clearassassinations (a drop from 11 last quarter),1 of which wounded a bystander. Amongthose assassinated this quarter were theAMB’s Ashraf Hanaysha (4/17), Muhammadal-Dumaj (4/21), and Ahmad al-Issa (4/21);and Islamic Jihad’s Mahmud Abu Obeid(2/21), Ashraf Saadi (2/28), Mahmud AbuNaa’sa (2/28), Ala’ Baryala (2/28), Mahmud

Ghalail (4/21), Mahdi Abu al-Khayr (5/4),and Khalid Ashur (5/4).

There were no Palestinian suicide bomb-ings or other suicide attacks this quarter,compared to 2 last quarter.

Palestinian use of mortars and rocketsoverall was low this quarter, averaging about12/week until the IDF stepped up assassi-nations on 4/17. Thereafter, and throughthe end of the quarter, rocket fire averagedaround 25/week. In total, 4 Israelis wereinjured (2 on 5/6, 2 on 5/15; 1 of themseriously) and property was damaged in 7incidents (3/1, 4/7, 5/5, 5/5, 5/7, 2 on 5/15).As in previous quarters, the AMB and Is-lamic Jihad were responsible for most ofthe rocket fire, while Hamas observed theGaza cease-fire until 4/24. Hamas rocketbarrages on 4/24 and 5/15 may have beenstaged by renegade elements of the Izzed-din al-Qassam Brigades, without permissionfrom upper echelons. Israel, meanwhile, vir-tually ceased artillery and air strikes on Gazauntil Hamas’s 4/24 attack, and even thenstaged only around a dozen air and artillerystrikes, down significantly from last quar-ter. The IDF, however, did target the Stripon a near-daily basis (see Chronology for de-tails), firing across the border into Gaza onat least 32 occasions, killing 9 Palestiniansand wounding at least 23; sending tanks andbulldozers into Gaza to level land along theborder at least 26 times; and firing on Pales-tinian fishing vessels off the Gaza coast atleast 21 times, wounding 3 fishermen, tem-porarily detaining 56, confiscating 14 boats,and damaging 5 others. The IDF also con-ducted 1 arrest raid into Shuka in s. Gaza on5/9.

Restrictions on Palestinian MovementThe IDF continued to impose severe

restrictions on Palestinian movement thisquarter, especially imposing tight limits onthe import and export of goods to Gaza.Gaza’s Rafah and Erez crossings, the maincrossings for individuals, remained almostcompletely closed, with Rafah partially openfor only 35 of 89 days, and Erez open only toselect VIPs and medical cases as of 3/12/06.Qarni, the main industrial transport point,was open through most of the quarter forlimited imports and very restricted exports.Sufa crossings (the sole import point forconstruction materials) was open for only32 days during the quarter for humanitariangoods, food, and some construction mate-rials, while Kerem Shalom, the other entrypoint for import of humanitarian goods, was




open for only 17 days. Palestinian fisher-men generally were barred from sailing (asthey have been since 6/25), and Palestini-ans in the Strip were still receiving only 6–8hrs./day of electricity and 2–3 hrs./day ofrunning water due to damage inflicted at thestart of Operation Summer Rains in 6/06 (seeQuarterly Update in JPS 141). The Nahal Ozpipeline was open for regular imports of fuel.In the West Bank, IDF restrictions on move-ment remained tight. The IDF continued tobar all Palestinian males from Jenin, Nablus,and Tulkarm between the ages of 16 and 30(some 106,000 men) from traveling south ofNablus without special permission. For mostof the quarter, the Jordan Valley remainedentirely off limits to nonresident Palestinians(as it has since 10/11/06), except for thosewith permits to work in Jewish settlementsthere. But by 5/1, the IDF had reportedlystopped requiring special permits for Pales-tinians to enter the Jordan Valley, but accesswas still only possible on public transporta-tion through 4 checkpoints. For a sense ofhow Israeli restrictions have effectively can-tonized the West Bank, see the map belowby the UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Paltrade and the Peres Center for Peace re-ported (3/14) that Israeli restrictions on Gazacrossings had caused trade through Gaza’smain economic transfer point, the Qarnicrossing, to drop to a 7-year low in 2006,with the wait for incoming shipments beingas long as 3 months and the average ship-ments processed per day at 65, comparedto a target of 450 under Rice’s Agreementon Movement and Access brokered 11/05.The report noted that the resulting bottle-neck had allowed middlemen with ties toauthorities at the crossing to charge up to$7,100 per container to jump the waitingline. The World Bank issued (5/9) a reportstating that Israel’s matrix of road blocksand restrictions on Palestinian travel in theWest Bank had gone beyond Israel’s securityneeds to facilitate the expansion of Jewishsettlements. The report also noted that im-pediments to Palestinian travel (road blocks,barriers, flying checkpoints) had increased44% since the Agreement on Movement andAccess was brokered by Rice in 11/05.

One incident this quarter is worth not-ing as illustrative of the deteriorating Gazainfrastructure and economic situation result-ing from the U.S.-led boycott and the severeIsraeli restrictions on the entry of construc-tion material to Gaza, as well as from years ofpoor use of international donor aid (both by

the PA and by donor countries themselves):On 3/27, the retaining wall of a sewage pondin n. Gaza collapsed after heavy rains, flood-ing the village of Um al-Nasser, killing at least5 Palestinians (including 2 boys, ages 2 and5), injuring 20, and leaving 333 Palestinianfamilies homeless. (The UNRWA set up atemporary camp to house them.) The UNhad warned of the dangers posed by localsewage ponds and treatment facility since2004, noting that they were designed toserve a population of 50,000, while the pop-ulation of the area had grown to 190,000.

Palestinian DetaineesThe Israeli FMin. reported (3/10) that the

IDF detained 6,968 Palestinians (39% fromHamas, including 39 Change and Reform PCmembers) in 2006, up from 4,532 in 2005(an increase of approximately 35%). Ac-cording to the PA Information Min., 10,400Palestinians were being held by Israel as of4/14. Of those, 86% were from the WestBank, 7% from Gaza, and 7% from Jerusalem;4,575 (46%) had not undergone trial, 4,430(44%) had been sentenced by Israeli militarytribunals, and 950 (10%) were being heldin administrative detention; 376 were chil-dren under the age of 18; 118 were women;and 40 were PC members. The Israeli hu-man rights groups B’Tselem and Hamokedreleased (5/6) a joint report accusing Israel’sShin Bet of routinely ill treating—and in somecases torturing—Palestinian detainees, over-stepping the bounds of a 1999 Israeli HighCourt ruling that permits the use of “mod-erate physical pressure” in cases of “tickingbombs.” The report concluded that abuse,humiliation, and psychological pressure ondetainees was routine, while use of actualphysical torture, such as beatings and sleepdeprivation, was “not negligible, even if notroutine.”

House Demolitions and De-ArabizationIsraeli house demolitions were low this

quarter, with all reported incidents takingplace in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.In total, at least 32 homes were demol-ished: 11 in East Jerusalem, 8 in Hebron, 6 inTulkarm, 4 in Bethlehem, 2 in Qalqilya, and 1in Nablus. In addition, 2 apartment buildingsunder construction in al-Tur, in the E-1 areaoutside East Jerusalem, were demolished on2/28. Israeli authorities also issued (5/13)an eviction order to the Palestinian al-AnsariLibrary in Jerusalem (one of the largest col-lections in Jerusalem, with 45,000 books),slating the building for demolition to make




West Bank Segmented Map (Source: OCHA)


http://www.jstor.org/action/showImage?doi=10.1525/jps.2007.36.4.136&iName=master.img-000.jpg&w=281&h=538



way for a train station. The Israeli cabinetannounced (5/13) several new measures tomark the 40th anniversary of the “reunifica-tion of Jerusalem,” including a $1.5-b., 5-yearspending package to enhance Israeli controlof the city that would include moving moregovernment offices to Jerusalem, building anew court complex and school of Jerusalemstudies, and eliminating an employer’s taxto encourage businesses to move to the city.

Also of note: The Association for CivilRights in Israel (ACRI) and B’Tselem issued(5/13) a report (see Settlement Monitor)estimating that Palestinians had abandonedmore than 1,000 homes and at least 1,829businesses in the center of Hebron due topressure by the IDF, Israeli police, and Jewishsettlers. Many have fled since the start ofthe al-Aqsa intifada in 9/00. The report alsonoted a “routine of violence and harassment”by the IDF against Palestinian residents inHebron, noting that in the period 9/00–9/03, the IDF imposed 377 curfew days onthe center of Hebron.

Inside Israel, Israeli Palestinian residentsof Jaffa protested (4/27) actions by the IsraelLand Administration (ILA) over the previ-ous year to evict some 500 Arab familiesfrom the al-Ajami and Givat Aliya neighbor-hoods who had lived there for decades.Protesters claimed that the ILA sought theprime seafront properties for developers forrental to wealthy Jews, further de-Arabizingthe city. The ILA called (4/27) the Pales-tinian families “invaders” who built on thesites illegally.

Of note: A poll of Israelis sponsored byIsrael’s Center for the Campaign AgainstRacism and conducted in 12/06 by the Geo-cartography Institute was released on 3/27.Among the findings: 50% of Israeli Jewsbelieve the government should encouragePalestinians citizens to emigrate; asked theirreaction to hearing Arabic spoken, 50% ofIsraeli Jews reported feeling fear and 30% re-ported feeling hatred (in 2005, 17.5% saidthey felt hatred); and 50% said that theywould refuse to report directly to an Arabboss (up from 3% in 2005).

Settlers and SettlementsReports of Jewish settler violence nearly

doubled this quarter. Incidents included set-tlers beating or otherwise attacking Pales-tinians and international peace activists(2 on 2/17, 2/19, 2/28, 2 on 3/3, 3/4, 3/13,3/23, 2 on 3/24, 4 on 3/28, 3/30, 3/31, 4/5,4/6, 4/8, 4/10, 4/14, 4/16, 4/17, 2 on 4/18,4/19, 4/20, 4/26, 2 on 4/27, 4/28, 2 on 5/5,5/11, 5/12); occupying Palestinian homes

and land (2/16, 3/19, 4/14, 4/15, 5/5, 5/6);attempting to occupy homes (4/19, 4/20);vandalizing property (2/16, 2/17, 2/19, 3/3,3/13, 2 on 4/6, 4/19, 4/20, 4/28); uproot-ing trees (2/17, 2/25) and burning crops(5/6, 5/8); bulldozing land for expansion ofsettlements or creation of new settler-onlybypass roads (3/16); and blocking roads toPalestinian use (3/3, 4/24) or barring Pales-tinian access to their lands or religious sites(3/19, 3/28, 4/16). There were also 5 inci-dents of settlers opening fire on Palestinians(4/13, 2 on 4/17, 4/27, 5/13), wounding 2Palestinians, and one report of a deliberatehit-and-run by a Jewish settler (3/19) thatseriously injured 1 Palestinian. (The stab-bing death of a Palestinian in Nablus on 3/25might have been carried out by a settler.)Of 57 confirmed incidents (up from 36 lastquarter), most continued to occur in Hebron(39), with a handful of incidents in Nablus(7), Qalqilya (3), 2 each in Bethlehem andTulkarm, and 1 each in Jenin, Salfit, and thecentral northern West Bank near Homesh.

In addition, some 2,000 right-wing Jew-ish settlers and activists marched (3/26) tothe Homesh settlement site in the n. WestBank, evacuated during the Gaza disengage-ment in 2005, and some 450 reoccupied itfor 2 days, declaring intentions eventually torebuild the settlement. The YESHA settlerscouncil did not endorse the protest, whichwas timed to coincide with Rice’s secondvisit to the region to maximize embarrass-ment to the Olmert government. The IDFmobilized 4 brigades to monitor and con-tain the protesters, threatening to forciblyremove them if they did not leave peacefullyon 3/27. Most left on 3/27; Israeli policeremoved the rest on 3/28 without incident.Thousands of settlers attempted to reoccupyHomesh again on 4/24, but the IDF declaredthe area a closed military zone and barredthem from reaching the site.

Of importance: Israel’s Jerusalem Con-struction and Planning Comm. approved(5/9) plans to build 3 new ultra-Orthodoxsettlements on the outskirts of occupiedEast Jerusalem to create territorial contigu-ity between Jerusalem and Gush Etzion s. ofBethlehem, and between Jerusalem and BeitEl n. of Ramallah. The plans called for 20,000housing units in the new settlements, plus500 new units for settlers in Abu Dis.

Of note: Israel’s Peace Now updated(3/14) its estimates released last quarter(see Quarterly Update in JPS 143) of thepercentage of private Palestinian lands inJewish settlements and other West Bank ar-eas that Israel intends to keep under final




status. Based on new data through the endof 2006 provided by Israel’s Civil Adminis-tration by court order, the new overall figureis 32.4% (instead of 39%). Most of the dropwas the result of updated figures for Ma’aleAdumim that put private Palestinian landthere at only 0.54% (data for 2004 put thefigure at 86%). Peace Now asked the gov-ernment to explain the discrepancy, but thegovernment did not reply.

Separation WallThis quarter, construction of the West

Bank separation wall concentrated on seg-ments outside Qalqilya, Salfit, and Ramal-lah; in East Jerusalem around Ma’ale Adu-mim settlement; and along Route 60 outsideBethlehem. Work began on a new segments. of Wadi Rihan near Bethlehem on 3/27.The Israeli DMin. reported (3/10) that Israeladded 68 mi. to the separation wall in 2006,meaning that 252 mi. of the 491-mi. plannedroute had been completed since work be-gan in 6/02. The Alternative InformationCenter reported (4/30) that more than 92%of the lands confiscated for the wall were inthe Jerusalem area, that the wall had alreadycaused more than $1 b. in direct incomeloss for the Palestinians, and that it wouldcontinue to cause $194 m./year in damages.

As of 4/4, Israel reportedly was con-sidering a major change to the proposedwall route to make it run west of some ma-jor Jerusalem settlements (including Ariel,Emmanuel, and Keddumim), with secondaryperimeter fences to their east, forming three“special security areas” to facilitate settle-ment defense. The U.S. reportedly was press-ing for the change to bring the separationwall more closely in line with the Green Line.

Of note: The weekly nonviolent demon-strations against the separation wall at Bil‘inmarked their second anniversary on 2/23,with dozens of Palestinian, Israeli, and in-ternational peace activists taking part in theprotest. As occurs every week, the IDF firedrubber-coated steel bullets, tear gas, and per-cussion grenades to disperse protesters; 12demonstrators and a CNN cameraman wereinjured. Also this quarter, Palestinians fromvillages affected by wall construction aroundBethlehem began (4/6) holding similar non-violent protests in Um Salamuna village,meeting the same response from the IDF.

INTRA-PALESTINIAN DYNAMICS

Once again this quarter, the high levelof Fatah-Hamas violence and Fatah’s posi-tioning for control of the PA raised serious

concerns of possible civil war. Nearly asmany Palestinians were killed in internal po-litical violence (44) as in clashes with Israel(60), bringing the total number of deaths inintra-Palestinian violence to at least 191 since10/06. As in previous quarters, lines wereblurred between Hamas and the ESF andamong Fatah, the PA security forces (partic-ularly the PSF and presidential guard), andthe AMB, with individuals at times actingin their official capacities and at others infactional roles.

As already noted, intra-Palestinian vio-lence suddenly tapered off with the an-nouncement of the 2/8 Mecca accord.Though isolated shooting and bombing inci-dents took place in late 2/07 (see Chronol-ogy), the level of violence did not startcreeping up until mid-3/07. While unhappi-ness with the new national unity agreementamong hard-line elements in both Fatah andHamas likely played a role in rising ten-sions, the upsurge was triggered when Fatahmembers fired on the car of a Change andReform PC member in the West Bank on3/10, wounding a bodyguard. The next day(3/11), Fatah and Hamas exchanged heavyfire in Bayt Hanun, Gaza, with Hamas deto-nating explosives and setting fire to severalFatah and PSF offices, leaving 1 Palestiniandead. After further exchanges in Bayt Hanunon 3/12, suspected Fatah members assassi-nated a senior Izzeddin al-Qassam Brigadesmember in Gaza City on 3/13. SuspectedHamas members then detonated (3/13) alarge bomb outside the home of a promi-nent Fatah supporter in n. Gaza, causingheavy damage but no injures, and Fatah andESF members exchanged fire (3/13) in BaytHanun, each firing RPGs at the homes of ri-val members, wounding 3 Palestinians. Overthe next several days, serious isolated inci-dents took place: ESF members fatally shota local Fatah leader in Bayt Lahiya in a drive-by shooting (3/14); Hamas kidnapped a PAGeneral Intelligence officer in Bayt Lahiya,shooting him in the legs before releasing him(3/14); suspected Hamas gunmen ambushedand shot execution-style a Fatah-affiliated PAintelligence officer in Dayr al-Balah (3/16);and Fatah and the ESF engaged in heavy ex-changes of fire in Bayt Lahiya (3/21), leaving1 dead and 17 wounded. Over the next week,serious Fatah-Hamas fighting occurred dailyacross Gaza, leaving 3 Palestinians dead andat least 25 injured. The factions were onlyable to rein in the fighting on 3/28, aftera bystander and the wife and young chil-dren of a senior Izzeddin al-Qassam Brigadesmember were seriously wounded in a Fatah




assassination attempt on the Hamas com-mander in Bayt Hanun.

Tensions remained very high, however,especially following revelations on 4/1 thatAbbas had authorized Dahlan to build anelite strike squad, the Fatah Special Force, totarget Hamas (see above). Isolated Fatah andHamas attacks, often gangland-style, contin-ued through 4/07 into early 5/07 but did nottrigger a cascade of fighting (see Chronologyfor details). These included heavy cross-firein ‘Abasan on 4/6 that left 11 Palestinianswounded; the shooting death of a PSF offi-cer in Khan Yunis and the kidnapping andmalicious wounding of a PA police officeron 4/10; the shooting and wounding of aPA intelligence officer in Qalqilya on 4/19and of an ESF officer in Nussayrat on 4/21; agrenade attack on a PA General Intelligencejeep in Gaza City on 4/21; the carjacking ofa PA security officer in Khan Yunis and araid on an ESF post in Gaza City on 4/22; abombing at a PA police officers’ club in Gaza;drive-by shootings targeting a PSF officer’shome on 4/30 and a Fatah-affiliated prison-ers’ club on 5/5; and several kidnappings ofmembers of both factions. In total, at least2 Palestinians were killed and 23 woundedbetween 3/29 and 5/10.

As noted above, the violence spun out ofcontrol again on 5/11, after Abbas orderedthe Fatah-affiliated PA security forces underhis control to deploy across Gaza in a show offorce meant to embarrass and sideline Hamasand the ESF and to physically assert Fatah’scontrol over the streets. Between 5/11 and5/15, the fighting intensified exponentially,leaving another 24 dead and at least 30wounded.

Adding to the mix, the tiny and relativelyunknown Army of Islam exploited the dete-riorating Gaza security situation to increaseits power. Though little more than a clan-based militia started by Gaza City’s MumtazDaghmash after Israel’s 6/8/06 assassinationof Popular Resistance Comm. (PRC) headJamal Abu Samhadana created a local powervacuum, the group gained disproportionalsway when it participated with Hamas andthe PRCs in the 6/25/06 cross-border attackon the IDF’s Kerem Shalom base that re-sulted in the capture of the IDF’s Cpl. Shalit.(Hamas and the PRCs had since distancedthemselves from the deed, and while Egypt,Hamas, and the PA made numerous attemptsto broker a deal, no one had been able to per-suade the group to release Shalit.) The groupat times had claimed affiliation to al-Qa‘ida,though a connection has not been reliably

established. In its first operation since theKerem Shalom attack, the Army of Islamkidnapped (3/12) the BBC’s Gaza correspon-dent Alan Johnston, reportedly seeking $5m. and control of a parcel of prime PA-heldland in exchange for his release. (They alsodemanded the release of several al-Qa‘ida fig-ures, which the PA interpreted as a publicitystunt to cover the Daghmash’s crass demandfor cash.) The group also bombed the Amer-ican International School in n. Gaza on 4/21(causing no reported injuries) and attackeda Fatah lawmaker attending a year-end cele-bration at a UNRWA school in Rafah on 5/6(denouncing the celebration for “the mix-ing of adolescent boys and girls, which isforbidden in Islam”). In the melee, the law-maker’s bodyguards opened fire, killing 1 oftheir own and leaving 2 teachers, 2 students,and 2 demonstrators wounded. At the closeof the quarter, the BBC’s Johnston was stillbeing held by the Daghmash, marking thelongest Palestinian kidnapping of a foreignnational to date.

In addition, as was the case last quarter,many groups, particularly those affiliatedwith Fatah, staged sit-ins and strikes, typi-cally demanding jobs or the back salariesthat the Hamas-led government had beenunable to pay due to the U.S.-led boycott.Fatah members demanding jobs in the PA se-curity forces held demonstrations in Bureij(3/8), Gaza City (3/8), Jenin (3/10), andRafah (3/13). PA-salaried healthcare work-ers began an open-ended strike demandingback pay on 2/16 that lasted through theend of the quarter. Palestinian Red CrescentSociety employees held a sit-in demandingsalaries on 3/27 in Gaza. The predominantlyFatah 80,000-member Government Employ-ees Union staged a 1-day strike on 5/2. Other1-day municipal strikes over salary paymentswere staged in various parts of Gaza on 4/10,4/16, 4/18, 4/19, and 4/30. In Gaza City on3/12 and 3/19, the families of Palestinian pris-oners in Israel held demonstrations callingon the PA to do more to free their relatives.

Meanwhile, Hamas was not the onlyparty unhappy with Abbas. By early 5/07there were reports (see Mideast Mirror5/4) of growing “widespread disaffection”within Fatah’s ranks over Abbas’s leadershipof the party, particularly his tendency tomake major decisions and senior appoint-ments without consulting the party base,as Yasir Arafat had done. Many within theparty reported their growing sense thatAbbas, Dahlan, and other Fatah officials(e.g., Ahmad Qurai‘, recently named by




Abbas as commissioner in charge of Fatah’smobilization and grass-roots organization)were “working towards a situation wherethe movement’s founding principles are ig-nored.” Indicative of the discontent, a groupof Fatah commanders sent (ca. late 4/07) aletter to Abbas demanding that he resign asFatah head immediately. There was no evi-dence that Abbas took any action to addressthe complaints.

There were also indications that somePalestinians were positioning themselves forpossible early elections, perhaps to take ad-vantage of the $42-m. aid program that theU.S. announced in 10/06 to support Hamaspolitical opponents by fostering politiciansand parties opposed to Islamism (see Quar-terly Update in JPS 142). In Ramallah on3/21, political science professor MohammedDajani Daoudi, director of al-Quds Univer-sity’s American Studies Institute, announcedthe formation of a new Palestinian politicalparty, Wasatia (from wasat, Arabic for “in thecenter”), which he billed as “the first Islamicreligious party to advocate a peaceful, ne-gotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinianconflict and a tolerant, democratic society athome.” Wasatia’s platform calls for the cre-ation of a Palestinian state in the West Bankand Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital,but rejects the right of return. At the inaugu-ral event, Dajani stated, “We want to fostera culture of moderation so that our childrendo not grow up just with the literature ofhate and violence,” adding that “I would sayto the refugees: ’Move on with your life.’ Wecannot let the past bury the future, eventhough it should always be remembered.”

PALESTINIAN OPINION

The following data are excerptedfrom a poll conducted by Near EastConsulting (NEC) between 22 and 24May 2007. Results are based on a sur-vey of 801 men and women from theWest Bank (including East Jerusalem)and Gaza. The poll, the 16th in a se-ries, was taken from NEC’s Web site atneareastconsulting.com.

1. Will the crisis between Fatah andHamas end completely or explode outof control?

West Bank Gaza Totala. End completely 27.2% 21.6% 25.0%b. Explode out of

control 72.8% 78.4% 75.0%

2. Is the conflict in Gaza betweenHamas and Fatah or between individualpeople?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Between Fatah

and Hamas 43.0% 46.3% 44.3%b. Between

individuals 57.0% 53.7% 55.7%

3. Is the crisis in Gaza the result of fac-tional differences or family differences?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Factional

differences 63.2% 70.3% 66.0%b. Family

differences 20.8% 9.0% 16.1%c. It is both 16.0% 20.7% 17.8%

4. Can Fatah and Hamas put an end tothe current crisis?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Yes 50.9% 46.4% 49.1%b. No 49.1% 53.6% 50.9%

5. What should Abbas do to end thecurrent crisis?

West Bank Gaza Totala. Leave the

situation as it is 8.5% 17.6% 12.1%b. Dissolve the PA

and declarea state ofemergency 41.8% 32.2% 38.1%

c. Call earlyelections 49.6% 50.2% 49.9%

FRONTLINE STATES

JORDAN

Jordan’s King Abdullah was very activethis quarter in supporting U.S. efforts torevive the peace process. Following thesigning of the Mecca Accord on 2/8, Ab-dullah granted an interview to Israeli TV inwhich he assured (2/24) the Israeli publicthat there was “broad Arab agreement” that aPalestinian national unity government mustadhere to the 1/06 Quartet demands, stat-ing that Israel “is not alone on this. . . . [T]heArab countries are also expecting the newPalestinian government to adhere to the poli-cies that we have set out in the Quartet, and




in the Arab Quartet also,” referring to Egypt,Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

King Abdullah then began (2/25) a tourfor consultations aimed at restarting theIsraeli-Palestinian peace process, with stopsin Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the U.S.During his 5-day visit to the U.S. (3/7–11),the king met with Pres. Bush and seniorU.S. officials and addressed a joint sessionof Congress. He urged the U.S. to grasp the“historic opportunity” to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, stressing that it is the“core issue” for regional stability. Privately,he urged U.S. officials to press Israel tosupport the 2002 Arab League initiative andto drop its “fortress mentality” in dealingwith other regional states.

After the Arab League reendorsed its2002 initiative on 3/29, the FMs of Jordanand Egypt were designated (4/18) to leadthe follow-up team to promote the initia-tive as a basis for resuming Israeli-Palestiniantalks, but the team took no action this quar-ter. Instead, King Abdullah took the lead inpromoting the plan. In addition to hostingdelegations from the U.S. Congress (4/2),the U.S. Naval War College (4/15), the U.S.-based Israel Policy Forum (4/17), and Pales-tinian peace groups (4/16) for discussionson the initiative, Abdullah invited (4/13)and received (4/19) an Israeli delegation ledby acting Israeli pres. and Knesset speakerDalia Itzik and several Israeli peace activistsfor talks on how to revive the peace process.No details were released, but Itzik invited(4/19) Abdullah to visit Israel and addressthe Knesset; he reportedly agreed, thoughno date was set.

The king’s efforts to promote the Arabplan and the renewal of peace talks contin-ued through the end of the quarter, witha tour of European capitals (ca. 4/11) anda meeting with U.S. Defense Secy. RobertGates and a phone call to Olmert on 4/17 tourge them to take steps to keep up the mo-mentum. (Talks with Gates also addressed bi-lateral issues and Iraq.) In late-4/07, Abdullahgranted a second interview to Israeli TVand a separate interview to the Israeli dailyMa’ariv, highlighting that the Arab initia-tive’s language calls for an “agreed solution”to the refugee issue, stressing that the Arabstates were not demanding preconditions onrefugees to resume talks and had no intentionof imposing a solution on Israel. Abdullahalso attended (5/10) a meeting in Aqaba ofJordanian and Israeli peace activists, hostedby PM ‘Abd al-Salam al-Majali, to discussways of promoting the Arab initiative among

Israelis to revive the peace process. TheIsraeli and Jordanian activists agreed to holda follow-up meeting soon that would includetheir Palestinian counterparts.

Abdullah had also scheduled his firstvisit to the occupied territories in 7 yearsfor 5/13 to meet with Abbas in Ramallah,but he called off (5/13) the trip at the lastminute (his advance team was already inRamallah), citing “bad weather.” (Officials atJordan’s Queen Alia International Airport re-ported that the weather was clear and thatall other flights were taking off as sched-uled.) Sources speculated (see New YorkTimes 5/16) that the cancellation may havebeen prompted by Abbas’s rejection of hissuggestion, presented by his advance team,that discussion include possible Jordanianstewardship of (but not sovereignty over)the West Bank. The sources claimed that theking’s idea was based on the belief that Israelcould not withdraw or make peace unlessthe Palestinians “put their house in order”and that if the situation made this impossi-ble, Jordan could step in. As a result of theking’s cancellation, Abbas canceled his plansto attend a 5/15 gathering of Nobel laureatesin Petra, where he intended to meet infor-mally with Abdullah and Israeli PM Olmertto discuss ways of reviving peace talks andbolstering Abbas’s regime. Abdullah andOlmert met alone instead; no details werereleased.

Also of note: The Israeli cabinet autho-rized (3/11) Vice PM Shimon Peres to resumecontacts with Jordan and the PA regardingregional development projects initiated un-der the Oslo accords but suspended afterthe outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Theseinclude a water carrier from Elat to the DeadSea to replenish the latter; joint agriculture,tourism, desalination, and electricity pro-duction projects in the Wadi ‘Araba area;expansion of the Aqaba airport into a jointIsraeli-Jordanian “peace airport” straddlingthe border; linking the Israeli and Jordanianrail networks between Beit She’an and Irbid;and creating an agricultural industrial zonein the Jericho area and an Israeli-Palestinianindustrial project in the n. West Bank.

LEBANON

Events in Lebanon continued to be col-ored by the 2006 Israeli war on Hizballah thatdevastated the south and intensified internalpolitical divisions, leaving the governmentnearly paralyzed, with PM Fuad Siniora’sU.S.-backed coalition at loggerheads withthe Hizballah-dominated opposition.




Lebanese Internal PoliticsThis quarter, the Hizballah-led sit-in

protest continued outside the Lebanese gov-ernment headquarters in the Grand Serailcalling for a new unity government. Theopposition, which launched the peacefulprotest on 12/1/06 (see Quarterly Update inJPS 143), demanded 11 seats in the 30-member cabinet (thereby giving it vetopower). The governing coalition led by PMSiniora was willing to give it 10, with the11th seat “ostensibly neutral.” Though thedemonstration had already lost its momen-tum (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143), itcontinued without any real hope of reach-ing a resolution.

Lebanese parliamentary speaker NabihBirri (Amal, aligned with the opposition)continued to refuse to convene parliamentto vote on the UN proposal (approved bythe reduced cabinet in 11/06; see Quar-terly Update in JPS 143) for an internationaltribunal to try suspects in the 2/05 assassi-nation of former PM Rafiq Hariri. UN chieflegal adviser Nicholas Michel unsuccess-fully held talks (ca. 4/23) with the Sinioragovernment and the opposition regardingthe UN plans, hoping to find a formulathat would allow both sides to accept thetribunal.

Birri, as the head of Amal (Shi‘i), andLebanese Sunni leader Saad Hariri, leader ofthe March 14 coalition, met (3/7) for thefirst time in 4 months for talks on reducingSunni-Shi‘i tensions. No agreements werereported. The meeting was seen as a directproduct of a meeting between Iranian pres.Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Saudi Arabia’sKing Abdullah on 3/3 in Riyadh (see Iransection below).

Meanwhile, domestic political violencecontinued, fueling concerns of growingsectarian divides. Lebanese police found(4/26) the bodies of 2 Sunnis (ages 12, 25),both from families loyal to coalition mem-ber Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who hadbeen kidnapped in Beirut on 4/23. The pairreportedly were abducted by a Shi‘i clanto avenge the death of a family memberwho was apparently killed by a Jumblattsupporter for backing Hizballah. Hizballahdenounced (4/26) the “horrific killing” ofthe Sunnis, with spiritual leader Grand Ay-atullah Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallahcalling it a “major crime whose perpetratorsshould be prosecuted.”

On 3/13, Lebanese authorities an-nounced that they had arrested 4 membersof Fatah al-Islam and were searching for 2

others in connection with the bus bombingsin Bikfaya on 2/13 that killed 3 Lebanese(see Quarterly Update in JPS 143). The 4reportedly were captured after explosiveswere found in an apartment in the Chris-tian neighborhood of Achrafieh in Beirut.Little is known about Fatah al-Islam, whichapparently broke away from the Fatah Up-rising, a splinter group of Fatah sponsoredby Syria, in 11/06, when it became apparentthat Fatah Uprising was gaining no popu-lar support among Palestinians in Lebanon’srefugee camps. Fatah al-Islam’s ideologyand support base are in dispute, though itsleader, Shakir al-Abssi, reportedly has con-nections to al-Qa‘ida and is thought to havereceived funding from Salafi groups in Iraq,Jordan, and the Gulf states. He is wantedon terrorism charges by Jordan for plottingand training gunmen involved in the assas-sination of USAID administrator LawrenceFoley on 10/28/02. His group is thought tohave 150–300 members, including Algerians,Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Saudi Arabians, Su-danese, Syrians, Yemenis, and possibly somefrom Western European countries; as few as10% are Palestinians. Its primary bases arein ‘Ayn al-Hilwa r.c. and Nahr al-Barid r.c. On3/13, Abssi denied any connection to the2/13 attack and said he had no plans to stageattacks in Lebanon.

On 3/17, Palestinians in Nahr al-Baridr.c. held a sit-in to protest the presence ofFatah al-Islam in the camp, declaring thatthe group was not Palestinian and did notrepresent Palestinian aims. Days later, theLebanese army set up (3/19) checkpoints tosearch cars entering and leaving the campand, suspecting that Fatah al-Islam memberswanted in connection to the 2/13 bomb-ings were inside, vowed to keep securitymeasures in place until the men were cap-tured. The deployment sparked clashes inthe camp between angry refugees and Fa-tah al-Islam members, leaving 1 refugee and1 Fatah al-Islam member dead. Palestiniansheld a second sit-in protest against the groupon 3/20. No further violence was reportedthrough the end of the quarter, though ten-sions remained high.

Of note: A report by the Lebanese re-search group Information International esti-mated (4/3) that 60,000 Lebanese Christians(total Christian pop. of ca. 850,000) had leftLebanon since the summer 2006 war andthat more than 100,000 had submitted visaapplications to foreign embassies out of fearthat a Sunni-Shi‘i civil war might be looming.Similarly, 22% Sunnis and 26% of Shi‘a polled




said that they were considering leaving thecountry.

The Status of the Truce with IsraelUN Secy.-Gen. Ban Ki-Moon issued (3/14)

his third periodic report on the implemen-tation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Res.1701 that ended the 2006 Lebanon war. Hewelcomed the completion of UNIFIL’s sec-ond stage of deployment (to 12,431 troops,including a 1,772-unit maritime force, from29 countries as of 2/20) and the Lebanesearmy (55,000 troops) in s. Lebanon, butexpressed concern over Israeli reports (asyet unconfirmed) of cross-border arms ship-ments to Hizballah and the danger posed toLebanese civilians by unexploded IDF clus-ter munitions. He also criticized Israel’s dailyoverflights of Lebanese territory, which hecalled a “continuing violation of resolution1701.” Ban noted that wording was beingfinalized concerning a “temporary securityarrangement” for n. Ghajjar, the disputedborder area where IDF troops were still de-ployed, that would allow their withdrawal.(The UNSC on 4/17 urged Israel and Lebanonto fulfill their pledges to finalize the arrange-ments, but by the end of the quarter theIDF was still deployed in the town; for back-ground on the Israeli presence there, seeQuarterly Update in JPS 143.) He also statedthat progress was being made on delineat-ing control of the disputed Shaba‘ Farmsarea.

Israel continued to challenge Lebanesesovereignty with daily surveillance over-flights, stepping up the number of flights/dayin late 2/07, prompting the Lebanese armyto fire (2/21) on an unmanned IDF dronenear Tyre. The UN reiterated (2/21) that Is-raeli overflights constitute a violation of UNRes. 1701. The IDF also challenged the UNmonitoring force patrolling Lebanon’s coaston three occasions, raising protests from theUN, which saw the military moves as a chal-lenge to its authority and a violation of UNRes. 1701: On 4/29, an Israeli naval vesselapproached a Swedish patrol boat. On 4/30,an Israeli naval vessel sped toward a Germanfrigate that was part of the UN monitoringteam without identifying itself; the Germanboat signaled that it was “ready for combat”and the Israeli boat veered away. On 5/9,Israeli fighter jets buzzed another Germannaval vessel.

Investigations of IDF ActionsThe ramifications of the 2006 war contin-

ued to be felt in Israel as well, as several moreinvestigations into the Olmert government’s

handling of the offensive released their con-clusions (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143 forearlier investigations). Most significant wasthe interim report of the Winograd Commis-sion issued on 4/30, covering the first 5 daysof the war. (The government received thefull classified report, while an official sum-mary was released to the public: see Doc.C1. The final report was due out in 7/07.)The interim report concluded that Olmert,DM Peretz, and then IDF Chief of Staff Gen.Dan Halutz (who resigned in 1/07 over inter-nal IDF investigations criticizing his role; seeQuarterly Update in JPS 143) gravely mis-handled events, calling Olmert’s decisionto launch a major campaign a “misguidedand rash judgment,” criticizing Peretz for notgrasping “the basic principles of using mil-itary force to achieve political ends,” andfaulting Halutz for “impulsively” seeking an“immediate, intensive military strike.” (Thereport did not mention FM Livni, whomOlmert previously criticized as not beingfully supportive of his war decisions.) Ac-cording to the findings, Halutz and Peretzthrew out standing IDF plans for dealingwith the type of incident that triggered thewar on 7/12/06. While the standing planscalled for a limited retaliation followed bya lull to allow Hizballah to stand down andthe situation to dissipate, Halutz and Peretzrecommended initial heavy assaults, whichwere approved by the Israeli cabinet despiteIDF, Shin Bet, and Mossad warnings of thelikely dangers.

Israeli reaction to the report was strong.Public opinion polls released on 5/2 showed65–72% of Israelis thought Olmert shouldresign. Some 100,000 Israelis took part in anationwide march and vigil (5/1–3) urgingthe same. One Labor minister resigned (5/1)his cabinet portfolio, refusing to remain inthe coalition with Olmert. Olmert’s Kadimaparty colleagues Livni and Avigdor Itzchakiurged (5/2) him to step down; Itzchaki re-signed as head of Kadima’s Knesset factionwhen he refused. Nonetheless, Olmert sur-vived 3 Knesset no-confidence motions bywide margins (though 16 of his coalitionpartners either voted against him, abstained,or were absent, demonstrating a weakenedcoalition).

Of note: Sources within the Winogradcommission released (3/8) to the press ex-cerpts of Olmert’s 2/1 closed-door testimonyto investigators in which he stated that asearly as 3/06 he planned a “broad militaryoperation” against Lebanon in the event thatIDF soldiers were captured on the border.




He also confirmed speculation that he in-tensified the ground war on 8/9/06 afterreceiving the draft of UN Res. 1701 in thehope of obtaining a more favorable UNSCdraft (see Quarterly Update in JPS 141). Pub-licizing the excerpts was roundly criticizedby Olmert supporters as playing politics, butcommission sources defended the move, say-ing it was in the public interest and that thematerial was not classified.

Separately, Israeli state comptroller MichaLindenstrauss concluded his investigationinto the government’s performance in pro-tecting the “home front” during the 2006war, but he delayed (3/6) release of his finalreport under pressure from Olmert, vowingto release it within 4 months.

SYRIA

This quarter, Israel and the U.S. (both theWhite House and Congress) slightly loos-ened their policy of isolating Syria. Mostnotable in this regard was the U.S. deci-sion to participate alongside Syria and Iran(see below) in two meetings of Iraq’s neigh-bors to discuss regional security issues—amid-level meeting held in Baghdad on 3/10and a FM-level meeting in Sharm al-Shaykh5/3–4—marking Washington’s first high-level public diplomatic contact with Basharal-Asad’s government since 2005. U.S. par-ticipation in the 2 meetings was seen astacit acknowledgement by the Bush admin.that its former policy of completely isolat-ing Syria and Iran had not helped to achieveU.S. regional aims and had possibly harmedthem. Though the U.S. did not hold sidebartalks with Syrian officials at the 3/10 session,Secy. of State Rice met with Syrian FM WalidMouallem on 5/3 for talks limited to Iraq.(U.S. officials traveling with Rice praisedSyria for taking positive steps to secure itsborder with Iraq.) Afterward, she describedthe exchange as “very constructive” and af-firmed U.S. interest in improving ties withSyria but added that “there needs to be somebasis for a better relationship,” hinting atprevious calls for Syria to end support forHizballah and Palestinian militant groups. InDamascus, the Syrian FMin. warned (5/3)that Syria would not tolerate being “lec-tured, ordered, or instructed to do any-thing regarding any neighbor, particularlyIsrael.”

Congressional VisitsMeanwhile, members of Congress un-

dertook several outreach missions to Dam-

ascus. House speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)led (4/3–5) a bipartisan delegation to Syria,following up on the recommendations ofthe Iraq Study Group (ISG; see Doc. C3 inJPS 142) to reach out to Syria for help inreducing violence in Iraq. (Two previouscongressional delegations visited Syria im-mediately after the release of the ISG reportin 12/06; see Quarterly Update in JPS 143.)Pelosi’s group—which included Reps. KeithEllison (D-MN), Tom Lantos (D-CA), NickRahall (D-WV), Louise Slaughter (D-NY),Henry Waxman (D-CA), and David Hobson(R-OH)—hosted a dinner for Syrian opposi-tion figures and members of parliament atthe now-vacant U.S. ambassador’s residencein Damascus (the ambassador was recalledin 2005, following the Hariri assassination inLebanon).

Asad met with the group on 4/4 for talksfocused on regional security issues, includ-ing Syria’s support for Hamas and Hizballahand its alliance with Iran. The high point ofthe visit was Pelosi’s transmittal of a messageto Asad from Israeli PM Olmert (with whomthe group met on 3/30) that Israel would bewilling to resume peace talks with Syria ifSyria halted support for Hizballah and Pales-tinian militias. Asad reiterated Syria’s callfor a resumption of talks without precon-ditions and invited the delegation to returnfor further talks. (Lantos stated that they had“every intention of going back.”)

While the White House had not pre-vented the high-profile congressional visit,it made its displeasure known, with VP DickCheney calling (4/4) the visit “bad behav-ior” and the ranking House Republican,Jon Boehner (OH), stating that the group’sagenda was “to embarrass the president.”Pelosi’s statement (4/4) in a Damascus pressconference that “the road to Damascus is aroad to peace,” prompted a sharp responsefrom National Security Council spokesmanGordon Johndroe in a press briefing on AirForce One. According to Johndroe, the ad-ministration believed that “unfortunately,that road is lined with the victims of Hamasand Hizballah, and the victims of terroristswho cross from Syria into Iraq. It’s lined withthe victims in Lebanon, who are trying tofight for democracy there. It’s lined with hu-man rights activists trying for freedom anddemocracy in Syria.” Israel also issued (4/4)a statement saying that “although Israel isinterested in peace with Syria, that countrycontinues to be part of the axis of evil anda force that encourages terror in the entireMiddle East.”




Asad also received (4/1) a Republicancongressional delegation comprising Reps.Robert Aderholt (AL), Joe Pitts (PA), andFrank Wolf (VA). Rep. Darrel Issa made hisown visit on 4/5. Syria welcomed (4/3) thevisits as a “positive step” but said it did notexpect that they signaled a change in U.S.policy.

Peace FeelersOlmert’s 3/30 message to Asad began

a series of indirect public exchanges be-tween Israel and Syria, apparently followingseveral weeks of similar back-channel mes-sages passed through Turkish officials. Thefeelers from both sides (though most werereportedly sent by Israel, with Syria oftennot responding) expressed the desire to re-sume peace talks, but neither party changedits baseline positions on the requirementsfor resumption: Israel demanded that Syriafirst end support for Hizballah and the Pales-tinian factions and that peace talks be helddirectly, while Damascus refused precon-ditions and wanted indirect negotiationsthrough the U.S. or another third party (soas not to grant Israel official recognitionbefore an agreement).

On 4/12, soon after the Pelosi transmis-sion, Syrian American Ibrahim Suleiman,who was involved with former Israeli FMin.dir. gen Alon Liel in drafting the semi-officialSyrian-Israeli peace initiative leaked to thepublic on 1/16 (see Quarterly Update inJPS 143), addressed the Knesset Foreign Af-fairs and Defense Comm., stating that Syriawas serious about resuming peace negoti-ations with Israel and that he believed acomprehensive bilateral agreement couldbe achieved within 6 months if the sideswere serious. (The meeting, scheduled for 1hour, lasted nearly 3.) Olmert’s office reiter-ated Israel’s position that Syria must provethat it is serious by halting all support forPalestinian groups and Hizballah. Syria didnot endorse Suleiman’s visit and stressedthat he was acting on his own.

Other Diplomatic ContactsUN Secy.-Gen. Ban met (4/25) with Asad

in Damascus to ask him to “play a construc-tive role” in the peace process, endorseformation of a UN tribunal to try suspectsin the Hariri case, cooperate with UN Res.1701 regarding the disarming of Hizballah,and generally give assurances of Syria’s com-mitment to work for peace and security inthe region. Asad said that Syria would ac-cept a tribunal approved by a “broad-based”Lebanese government (see Lebanon section

above for the internal Lebanese debate onthe subject) and promised to revive a long-stalled process to mark the Syrian-Lebaneseborder. No further details were released,though Ban said (4/24) the visit was verypositive.

Syrian pres. Asad made (2/17–18) a 2-dayvisit to Tehran where he met with Iranianpres. Ahmadinejad and Grand Ayatullah AliKhamenei. No details were released.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

The Arab states’ main efforts on the peaceprocess this quarter revolved around reaf-firmation of their 2002 initiative calling forfull normalization with Israel in exchangefor full peace (see above). Though this wasthe main item at the 3/28–29 Arab Leagueheads of state summit in Riyadh, discussionsalso included the crises in Iraq, Lebanon, andSudan, and concerns about Iran’s nuclear am-bitions. In his address to the opening session,host King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia pointedlyblamed Arab heads of state for the civil strifeand divisions plaguing the region, calling fora return to Arab unity. He also called the U.S.presence in Iraq an “illegitimate foreign oc-cupation,” prompting a quick condemnation(3/29) by the White House and State Dept.(The Saudi government publicly replied thatthe king’s words represented “a statementof fact and not a change in Saudi policy.”)Also of note: Lebanon sent 2 delegations tothe summit, highlighting the country’s inter-nal conflict: the official delegation was ledby Pres. Emile Lahoud and included severalopposition MPs who resigned in 12/06, in-cluding Hizballah members; the other washeaded by Western-backed PM Fuad Siniora,who attended as a personal guest of theSaudi king.

As conditions in Gaza deteriorated, Egyptbecame increasing concerned that Pales-tinian violence would spill over into its ter-ritory. Fears were heightened in late 2/07,when Egyptian authorities confiscated (ca.2/21–23) 1 ton of explosives (TNT recoveredfrom land mines) and arrested 57 Egyptiansand Palestinians in Egyptian Rafah and n.Sinai who allegedly were planning bomb-ings in the Sinai targeting Israeli touristsas well as suicide bombings inside Israel;3 of the Palestinians allegedly confessed tobeing Islamic Jihad members. As the Gazasituation worsened, Egypt—which has longbeen concerned about ties between Hamas(which emerged from the Palestinian branchof the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Egyptian




Muslim Brotherhood (Pres. Husni Mubarak’smain opposition)—informed (4/22) Haniyehthat any Hamas member entering Egyptmust meet 3 conditions: (1) refrain fromcontacting Muslim Brotherhood membersin Egypt, (2) keep accompanying body-guards and aides to a minimum, and (3)refrain from holding press conferences orseminars on Egyptian soil. On 4/30, angryPalestinians stormed the Egyptian legationin Gaza City demanding the release of 3Palestinians whom Egypt had arrested forcrossing the border illegally; Egypt said theywere Hamas members, while Palestinianssaid they were individuals seeking medicalcare.

More than 1,000 Egyptian bedouin held(4/26) an antigovernment demonstrationon the n. Egyptian border following thedeaths of 2 bedouin in clashes with Egyptianpolice. The protesters urged Israeli soldiersto allow them into Israel as refugees, butIsraeli authorities did not respond.

Egypt’s trial of accused spy for IsraelMuhammad al-Attar opened in Cairo on2/24. Attar allegedly confessed that Mossadhad helped him obtain residency status inCanada under a false name, found him ajob at a bank, and paid him $56,000 to spyon Egyptians and Arabs (especially CopticChristians) traveling in Canada and Turkey.Attar said (2/24) his confession was obtainedunder torture and denied the charges. ThreeIsraelis were also being tried in absentiain the case. Israel denied any involvement.On 4/17, Egypt announced that it had ar-rested Egyptian nuclear engineer Muham-mad Sayyid Saber Ali for allegedly stealingdocuments from Egypt’s nuclear agency andselling them to Israel’s Mossad for $17,000.Israel did not comment.

Israel Infrastructure Min. Benjamin Ben-Eliezer postponed (3/5) a trip to Egypt afterEgyptian media ran reports that during the1967 war, a unit he led may have executed250 captured Egyptian soldiers instead ofholding them as prisoners of war. Ben-Eliezerwas supposed to discuss importing Egyptiannatural gas to Israel.

The Baghdad-based Palestinian MuslimsAssociation reported (4/24) that Palestini-ans who had sought refuge in Iraq’s Anbarprovince, where they had been relativelysafe, were now coming under harassment.Shi‘i militants had recently placed noticeson the doors of Palestinian homes in Ramadi(capital of Anbar province) giving residentsa week to leave or face expulsion, and ru-mors circulated that 2 Palestinian girls had

been raped by Shi‘i militants in Ramadi as a“warning” to Palestinians to leave the area.As a result, at least 17 families had fled toal-Walid r.c. near the Syrian border, seekingasylum in Syria, while others headed backto Baghdad, believing they would be saferthere, even though the predominantly Pales-tinian neighborhoods of Baladiyat, Hurriya,and Iskan had been under attack for months(see Quarterly Update in JPS 143 and Doc.C1 in JPS 142).

INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES

U.S. focus this quarter was on revivingthe Israeli-Palestinian peace process and but-tressing Abbas against Hamas. To this end,Secy. of State Rice continued the “active en-gagement” efforts begun last quarter, makingher third and fourth trips to the region in asmany months (see above). In an address toJewish Republicans in Washington on 5/10,U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser ElliottAbrams stated that the new U.S. efforts onthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict were aimedat reducing pressure from Arab and Euro-pean states for the U.S. to do more to pushthe peace process forward, adding that thetalks are sometimes simply “process for thesake of process.” Attendees publicly stated(5/10) afterward that Abrams gave them theimpression that Rice’s current initiatives didnot have the full backing of Pres. Bush andassured them that the pres. would act as an“emergency brake” if necessary to preventIsrael from being pressed into a deal. The Na-tional Security Council declared (5/10) that“it is inaccurate to suggest that the WhiteHouse and State Department are at odds onthis issue.”

In a notable policy shift, Rice announced(2/27) that the U.S. had accepted an in-vitation from Iraq to participate in talkson regional security that would includereps. from all of Iraq’s neighbors, includingIran and Syria, with whom the Bush ad-min. had no high-level diplomatic contact.The first meeting took place in Baghdadon 3/10, and a second, attended by Rice,took place in Sharm al-Shaykh 5/3–4. Ricemet with Syrian FM Mouallem but not withher Iranian counterpart (see Syrian sec-tion above and Iranian section below fordetails).

U.S.-Israeli Bilateral RelationsIn late 2/07, an Israeli delegation (Bank

of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer, Finance




Min. Dir. Gen. Yarom Ariav, Foreign Min. Dir.Gen. Aharon Abramovitch, Israeli NationalSecurity Council head Ilan Mizrahi, and IDFreps.) came to Washington to discuss withU.S. officials a multiyear U.S. military aidpackage to begin in FY 2008. Israel had sig-naled to the U.S. over the previous 6 monthsits intention to seek significant new mili-tary aid, and Washington had conveyed itspreference that Israel at this stage presentits needs in general terms only, withoutspecific dollar amounts. The previous aidagreement for FYs 1998–2007, negotiatedby PM Benjamin Netanyahu, intially grantedIsrael $3 billion—$1.8 b. annually in militaryaid and $1.2 b. in economic aid. The agree-ment stipulated, however, that economicaid was to be reduced by $120 m./year andmilitary aid increased by $60 m./year untileconomic aid was eliminated in FY 2007 andmilitary aid the same year totalled $2.4 b. Is-raeli DM Peretz held (3/13) follow-up talkswith U.S. Defense Secy. Gates, but no agree-ment had been reached by the end of thequarter.

As of early 4/07, a major U.S. arms sale(estimated by experts to be between $5b. and $10 b.) to Saudi Arabia and sev-eral Gulf nations, considered as a moderateSunni bulwark against Iran, was reportedly(New York Times 4/5) on hold because ofobjections from Israel, which said the ad-vanced weaponry (including satellite-guidedweaponry and Joint Direct Attack Munitions)would erode its regional military superior-ity. In 3/07, the administration scheduled2 briefings for the Senate Foreign RelationsComm. on the package it planned to sub-mit, but it canceled both under pressurefrom Israel. Reportedly concerned that Israelwould urge Congress to block the sale, theWhite House dispatched Defense Secy. Gatesto Israel (4/17–18) to stress the U.S. positionthat the arms sale was necessary to confrontIran and (arguably) would improve Israelisecurity. The U.S. was also reportedly con-sidering allaying Israeli concerns by giving ita big military package as well. There was nofurther word on the deals by the end of thequarter.

From 3/10 through mid-4/07, Israel andthe U.S. held their annual joint military ma-neuvers, called Juniper Cobra, to practice in-tercepting missiles equipped with weaponsof mass destruction. This year the drills didnot include intercepting live ballistic mis-siles “due to logistical constraints associatedwith last summer’s Lebanon war and U.S.deployments.”

The Israeli military contractor Rafael won(3/5) a $37 m. contract to provide the U.S.Marine Corps with 60 Golan armored vehi-cles for service in Iraq. The shipments wereto be delivered in 5/07.

Of note: The U.S. declined an invitationto attend a special session of the Knesset on5/14 celebrating “40 years of reunificationof Jerusalem.” The Israeli FMin. said that 20of 80 ambassadors had accepted invitations.

Congressional ActionAs noted above, two congressional del-

egations visited Syria this quarter: a high-profile bipartisan group organized by Housespeaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) on 4/3–5, anda small Republican delegation on 4/1. Whilethe White House strongly criticized Pelosi’smission, it did not comment on the Republi-can tour or a separate visit (4/5) by Rep. Dar-rel Issa (R-CA). Pelosi’s group also visited Is-rael (ca. 3/30–4/1), Ramallah (4/2), Lebanon(4/3), and Saudi Arabia (4/5); the Republicandelegation also traveled to Jordan (4/2).

After the PA national unity governmentwas installed (3/17), Reps. Robert Wexler(D-FL) and Elton Gallegly (R-CA) organizeda letter signed by 237 members of Congressthat was given (3/20) to visiting EU foreignpolicy chief Javier Solana calling on the EUto maintain its diplomatic isolation of andban on direct assistance to the PA. The letterwas strongly supported by American IsraelPublic Affairs Comm. (AIPAC).

In early 3/07, Reps. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Nita Lowey (D-NY) led a call bymembers of Congress for an investigationinto several projects funded by USAID thatthey alleged funneled “U.S. tax-payer dol-lars . . . toward institutions that support ter-rorism,” specifically Hamas. The grants in-cluded 49 scholarships for students at theHamas-affiliated Islamic University in Gaza;millions of dollars for projects administeredby Americans for Near East Refugee Aid(ANERA), including providing computersto Islamic University’s library; and $2.3 m.for Gaza’s al-Quds University, which has stu-dent groups affiliated with Hamas. USAIDadamantly denied (3/5) that it had violatedany laws, noting that the $2.2 m. in scholar-ships given to al-Quds University was part ofa State Dept. program to provide “assistanceto moderate Palestinian leaders.”

Positioning for the 2008 PresidentialRace

While more than a dozen presidentialhopefuls had their campaigns underway by




this quarter, Sens. Barack Obama (D-IL) andHillary Clinton (D-NY) led the pack in so-liciting support from the pro-Israel lobby.Obama was particularly concerned aboutshoring up his pro-Israel image after hisunsuccessful 2000 run for Congress, duringwhich he was widely criticized by Jewish vot-ers for advocating an even-handed approachto the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. (Duringhis successful campaign for Congress in2004, he told leading Palestinian activistAli Abunimah, “I’m sorry I haven’t saidmore about Palestine right now, but weare in a tough primary race. I’m hopingwhen things calm down I can be more upfront.”)

Both Clinton and Obama made significantgestures to Israel before the 3/11–13 AIPACpolicy conference (see Pro-Israel Groupssection below). On 3/1, Clinton introducedS. Res. 92 calling for the immediate, uncon-ditional release of IDF soldiers held captiveby Hamas and Hizballah. (The res. was acompanion measure to H. Res. 107, whichwas introduced in the House by her Demo-cratic colleague Rep. Ackerman of New Yorkon 1/30 and passed by voice vote on 3/13,during AIPAC’s conference.)

Meanwhile, Obama made (3/2) a speechto AIPAC in Chicago, stating that “we mustpreserve our total commitment to ourunique defense relationship with Israel byfully funding military assistance,” calling Is-rael “our strongest ally in the region andits only established democracy.” He alsoasserted that the 2/8 Mecca accord was dan-gerous and that any Palestinian governmentmust respect the 1/06 Quartet demands.At a small gathering in Iowa on 3/11, how-ever, Obama stated in response to a directquestion about the Palestinian situation that“nobody is suffering more than the Pales-tinian people,” that he hoped to see positivechange in the PA government so that di-rect aid could resume, and that Israel shouldhelp by easing travel restrictions. The com-ments drew immediate criticism from insideand outside the Democratic party, prompt-ing Obama’s spokesman quickly to “clarify”that Obama meant that Palestinians weresuffering because of their Hamas-dominatedleadership.

At the AIPAC conference itself, Obamaand Clinton hosted (3/13) simultaneous re-ceptions for AIPAC delegates, both stress-ing their support for Israel and theirconcern about Iran. While both partieswere well-attended, some AIPAC membersopenly complained about Barack’s 3/11

remarks, questioning his worthiness as acandidate.

Pro-Israel GroupsThis quarter, the main effort of pro-Israel

lobbying in the U.S. and by American Jewishgroups abroad was to highlight the potentialthreats from Iran.

Iran was the theme of AIPAC’s annualpolicy conference in Washington 3/11–13.Among those representing the Israeli gov-ernment were Israeli PM Olmert (speak-ing via satellite), FM Livni, and DM Peretz.Olmert’s comments focused on the threatposed by Iran, but he mentioned in clos-ing the unacceptability of any Palestiniangovernment that includes Hamas. In herspeech, Livni stressed the division of theregion into “moderates” and “extremists,”stating that while Israelis “are moderates bydefinition,” for others, “being a moderateis a title that has to be earned” by takingsteps to confront terror, supporting the two-state solution, “preparing the Palestinianpeople for the compromises,” and recogniz-ing Israel’s right to exist. Other speakersincluded VP Cheney, House speaker Pelosi,Senate majority leader Henry Reid (D-NV),Senate minority leader Boehner, and Sen-ator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), as well asPastor John Hagee, founder of ChristiansUnited for Israel, who each stressed the im-portance of preserving close ties with Israeland ensuring Israeli security. In his addressto AIPAC on 3/12, House Foreign AffairsComm. chmn. Lantos urged AIPAC delegatesto lobby their representatives to pass a billhe introduced calling for tougher sanctionson Iran and removal of a presidential waiverallowing the president to ignore sanctionsat his discretion. Some 6,000 AIPAC dele-gates had already planned to spend 3/13lobbying members of Congress to increasegovernment penalties on companies, banks,and nations that trade with Iran and to di-vest state pension funds from companies(such as France’s Total and the British-DutchRoyal Dutch Shell) that do business withIran. Israeli DM Peretz also met (3/12) withmembers of Congress on the sidelines of theconference.

Some 700 members of Norpac, a NJ-basedpro-Israel political action comm., partici-pated (5/9) in Norpac’s 14th annual lobby-ing trip to Washington, where they met with475 members of Congress (96 senators and85% of reps.) to urge Congress to increaseaid to Israel, back sanctions on Iran, andsupport the U.S.-Israel Energy Cooperation




Act (which would create grants for alterna-tive energy technology research in Israel byapproving $140 m. in grants for Israeli scien-tists). Delegates were briefed in advance byAIPAC staffers.

An American Jewish Committee (AJC)delegation led by Exec. Dir. David Harristoured the Gulf and Israel in mid-3/07.In Doha, the group was received (3/11)by Qatari emir Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifaal-Thani at his palace for talks on theregional situation, including Arab-Israelipeace prospects, the situations in Iran andLebanon, and the need for interreligious dia-logue. In Jerusalem, Olmert received (3/15)the delegation, which reported that theyhad been impressed by the peaceful mes-sages regarding Israel that they heard fromArab officials. No other details of the AJCtour were released.

On 2/25, the Amana Settlement Move-ment, the settlement arm of the Israeli’sright-wing Gush Emunim, held a real estatefair in Teaneck, NJ, to encourage AmericanJews to buy homes in nearly a dozen Jewishsettlements in the Hebron, Jerusalem, andBethlehem areas, offering to rent the prop-erties if owners did not plan to live therethemselves and stating that if the houseswere dismantled as part of final status, theowners would be reimbursed for the cost oftheir homes (the Israeli government refusedto comment on this). The event markedthe first such marketing campaign targetingDiaspora Jews. Under the 2003 road map,Israel pledged to the U.S. to halt settlementgrowth, which the U.S. officially calls an “ob-stacle to peace.” The American host of theAmana event, Rabbi Steven Pruzansky of theB’nai Yeshurun synagogue, stated (2/25),however, that “Peace is an illusion. . . . Byhaving Jews live there, we are strengthen-ing the land, adding a safeguard.” Amanareported (3/8) that 8 houses were sold asa result of the event and that dozens ofattendees were considering buying (includ-ing NY State Assemblyman Dov Hikind).More events were planned across theU.S.

The American nonprofit organizationFriends of the IDF (FIDF) held (3/28) itsannual gala at the Waldorf Astoria in NewYork City, raising $18 m. for Israeli soldiers.FIDF raised $46 m. for the IDF in 2006. FIDFstates its mission as the “support [of] social,educational, and recreational programs andfacilities for the young men and womensoldiers of Israel who defend the Jewishhomeland.”

Legal ActionsNew York state’s highest court ordered

(4/2) a $30-m. bank account held by thePalestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) to beunfrozen and to allow the PMA to resumeoperations in the U.S. The account hadbeen frozen in 2005 when the PA failedto pay $116 m. awarded to the family ofan American rabbinical student killed in a1995 Hamas attack; the family had sued onthe grounds that the PA was responsible forthe death by failing to prevent the attack.The 4/2 ruling judged that the PMA is aseparate entity from the PA and therefore itsmonies could not be seized for payment ofthe claims. At the close of the quarter themoney had not been released.

The U.S. Commerce Dept. announced(3/9) that it had fined the New York branchof the National Bank of Egypt $22,500 forcomplying with the Arab boycott of Israelafter learning that the bank had providedinvoices to a Syrian firm guaranteeing thatcertain goods had not been produced inIsrael. U.S. law prohibits firms from coop-erating with the boycott. The CommerceDept. also reported (3/19) 31 incidents in2006 (up from 8 in 2005) in which theU.S.-backed Iraqi government took steps torestrict trade with Israel in keeping with theArab boycott. Incidents typically includedasking U.S. companies to certify their ad-herence to the boycott when applying toregister their intellectual property rights inIraq, to verify that their products containedno components made in Israel, and to at-test that they have not done business withIsrael.

The State Dept. announced (4/24) newsanctions barring for 2 years (renewable)U.S. assistance, government contracts, andexport licenses to 14 foreign individuals,companies, and government agencies withalleged ties to the development of Syrianand Iranian missile technology and weaponsof mass destruction. Among the 14 areHizballah, Syria’s navy and air force, 2 Syriandefense contracting agencies, and Iran’s De-fense Industries Organization (a conglomer-ate of state-run arms manufactures). Expertsbelieved (see Washington Times 4/24) thatthe new sanctions were largely for show,because existing restrictions under the Iranand Syria Nonproliferation Enforcement Actof 2005 already hinder such cooperation.

Also of note: On 3/15, the Faculty of theCollege of Arts and Sciences of Washington,DC’s Howard University voted (25–2, with6 abstentions) to endorse a resolution for




divestment of university funds from compa-nies supporting the Israeli occupation.

RUSSIA

As in previous quarters, Russia largelylimited its involvement in the peace pro-cess to the Quartet and, while having strongdifferences with the U.S. over the boycottof Hamas, once again signed onto Quartetstatements demanding that Hamas complywith its 1/06 demands to recognize Israel’sright to exist and halt all violence before theinternational boycott be lifted. While Russiaagreed to the final statement of the Quartet’s2/21 meeting in Berlin reiterating the 1/06demands, Russian FM Sergei Lavrov told thepress both before and after the session (ca.2/20, ca. 3/1) that Russia thought the timewas overdue for the boycott on the Hamas-led PA to be lifted. Moscow also approveda request for a meeting by Hamas leaderKhalid Mishal, who traveled to Moscowwith aide Musa Abu Marzuq on 2/26 for“consultations.” While no details were re-leased, Russia reportedly pressed Hamas torelease captured IDF soldier Shalit. Mishalinsisted that Shalit would be freed only aspart of a larger prisoner exchange.

EUROPEAN UNION

In addition to its regular involvement inthe Quartet, the EU, headed by Germany thisquarter, sent at least 2 special delegations tothe region to keep up positive momentumon the peace process. EU external relationscommissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner vis-ited the region (Egypt, Israel, the occupiedterritories, Jordan) in early 3/07 to encourageformation of a Palestinian national unity gov-ernment acceptable to the Quartet. Germanchancellor Angela Merkel toured (beginning3/31) Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and the occu-pied territories to stress the importance ofbuilding on the progress of Rice’s 3/24–27visit and the Arab League’s 3/29 reendorse-ment of its 2002 initiative. Of note: The EUwas among 60 invitees (including the U.S.)that declined an invitation to a special Knes-set session on 5/14 celebrating “40 years ofreunification of Jerusalem.”

The EU-Israel Association Council, theministerial body that monitors EU-Israel re-lations in the framework of their 2000 as-sociation agreement, held (3/5) its annualsession, attended by Israeli FM Livni, EUforeign policy chief Solana, and GermanFM Frank-Walter Steinmeier (the rotating EUpres.). Israel expressed interest in joining Eu-ropol (an EU policing body that coordinates

activities on combating terrorism and orga-nized crime), Eurojust (an EU legal body thatfacilitates investigations and prosecutionsof cross-border and organized crime cases),and the European Environmental Agency,as well as in participating in EU culturalprograms. No agreements were reached.

On a bilateral level, several groups inBritain took action to boycott Israel inprotest over its occupation of Palestinianterritories. The most significant of these wasBritain’s 40,000-member National Union ofJournalists, which at its annual conferenceon 4/14 approved (with 150 regional reps.voting 66 to 54) a measure calling for “a boy-cott of Israeli goods similar to those boycottsin the struggles against apartheid in SouthAfrica,” urging Britain and the UN to imposesanctions on Israel. The measure did not callfor a boycott of contacts with Israeli journal-ists. The union also passed by a wide margina measure condemning Israel’s 2006 waron Lebanon and actions in Gaza. On 4/21,130 British doctors published a letter in theGuardian calling for a boycott of the IsraelMedical Association and its expulsion fromthe World Medical Association, noting that“persistent violations of medical ethics haveaccompanied Israel’s occupation.”

In early 3/07, 27 Roman Catholic bishopsfrom Germany made a mission to Israel topromote reconciliation between Jews andGerman Catholics. On their return home,however, 3 of the bishops sparked the out-rage of Jews worldwide by calling Israel’streatment of the Palestinians “almost racism,”and by comparing West Bank enclaves withthe Warsaw Ghetto and the separation wallto the Berlin wall. After the Israeli govern-ment lobbed charges of anti-Semitism atthe church, Germany’s top Catholic official,Cardinal Karl Lehmann, sent (3/7) a letterto Israel’s Yad Vashem Holocaust memorialdenouncing the bishops’ remarks.

A Paris court convicted (3/13) ShimonSamuels, the Simon Wiesenthal Center’sParis-based dir. for international relations, ofdefamation and fined him 1 euro ($1.30) forwrongfully accusing the Committee of Wel-fare and Aid to the Palestinians of financingterrorism and sending funds to families ofsuicide bombers. Samuels, who stands byhis accusations, said he would appeal.

UNITED NATIONS

Newly installed UN Secy.-Gen. Ban made(3/24–4/2) his 1st official tour of the re-gion, stopping in Israel, the West Bank,Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.




Ban spent 3/25 touring the West Bank toassess the plight of the Palestinians, alsomeeting with Abbas and urging the new PAgovernment to demonstrate a “true commit-ment to peace.” In his meeting with Olmerton 3/27, Ban expressed concern regardingthe Palestinian humanitarian situation, calledon Israel to halt construction of settlementsand the separation wall, and criticized ongo-ing Israeli violations of Lebanese air space(which violate UN Res. 1701). Israeli DMPeretz asked (3/24) Ban to take steps againstHizballah and Syria, which Israel claimedwere jeopardizing the UN-brokered cease-fire in Lebanon by rearming Hizballah. In hismeeting with PM Siniora, Ban urged (3/30)Lebanon to enhance border security in lightof Peretz’s claims, which the UN has notbeen able to independently verify. Siniorastated that there had not been a single in-cident of smuggling uncovered since thesummer 2006 war, but agreed that bordersecurity should be strengthened. Ban alsotoured UNIFIL posts and met with UN inves-tigator Serge Brammertz regarding the Haririassassination case.

Israel underwent (2/22–23) 2 days ofquestioning before the UN Committee onthe Elimination of Racial Discrimination(UNCERD) as part of its quadrennial review.The comm. focused in particular on Israel’scontroversial new construction at the Haramal-Sharif/Temple Mount (see Quarterly Up-date in JPS 143), questioning whether Israelprotects places considered sacred to reli-gions other than Judaism. The comm. notedthat all 120 cities Israel has declared to dateas holy sites are Jewish. Israel was also askedto explain whether it provides equally forJewish and non-Jewish citizens in housing,education, public services, land rights, andlegal protection against acts of violence.Israel submitted a statement reaffirmingits democratic principles and support forthe Convention to End Racial Discrimina-tion, but stated that because of its uniquesecurity concerns, “resources that shouldbe spent on implementing the Conventiontherefore often [have] to be used for secu-rity purposes.” UNCERD country rapporteurMorten Kjaerum made a lengthy statement(see Doc. A1) acknowledging Israel’s ef-forts and the conditions under which itoperates, but strongly criticizing the biasesevident in Israel’s judicial system, land po-lices, and economic development plans andIsrael’s treatment of the Palestinians in theoccupied territories. The comm. regrettedthat Israel’s statements related only to Israel

proper and not to the occupied territories,as requested. After reviewing Israel’s submis-sions, the UNCERD issued (3/9) its conclud-ing observations (see Doc. A1), highlighting25 areas of concern and recommendationsfor better compliance, including makingequal rights part of Israel’s Basic Law, ensur-ing equality in the right of return and rightto own property, improving equal access toresources (including education), and curb-ing Jewish settler abuses of Palestinians. Thereport also reiterated the illegality of Jewishsettlements and the separation wall.

The UNESCO team sent to Israel to inves-tigate Israel’s new excavations at the Haramal-Sharif/Temple Mount in 2/07 (see Quar-terly Update in JPS 143) released (3/14) its fi-nal report. While concluding that Israel wasconducting the work in full transparencyand that the digging had not jeopardized theHaram al-Sharif, the report urged Israel tohalt excavations immediately until the pro-cess could be coordinated with Waqf officialsand UNESCO. The team also called for ongo-ing international monitoring of the projectand strongly criticized Israel for not consult-ing and coordinating with Waqf authoritiesand UNESCO in advance. The UNESCO teamhad been invited by Israel.

In Rome, the UN Committee on theExercise of the Inalienable Rights of thePalestinian People closed (3/23) a 2-day in-ternational conference in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace by affirming the interna-tional community’s obligation to supportunconditionally the new Palestinian unitygovernment and end the boycott against thePA, saying that the unresolved conflict fueledregional and international tensions.

Addressing the UN Human Rights Council(UNHRC) in Geneva, special rapporteur forhuman rights in the occupied territoriesJohn Dugard, a South African lawyer, equated(3/22) Israel’s treatment of the Palestinianswith apartheid and recommended that anew International Court of Justice advisoryopinion be sought on the legality of Israel’scolonization and occupation of Palestinianterritory. U.S. Amb. to the UN in GenevaWarren Tichenor called Dugard’s statementsand recommendations “unhelpful.”

The UNHRC voted (3/26) to end routinemonitoring of Iran and Uzbekistan on humanrights. The move had been expected, sincethe majority of the 47 members of the newlyreconstituted UNHRC have long protestedsingling out individual states for review inspecial closed-door, confidential sessionsunder what is called the “1503 procedure.”




The U.S., however, called (3/26) the move“deeply regrettable.”

IRAN

This quarter, the international commu-nity, led by the U.S. and Britain, kept up thepressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program.Significantly, however, the U.S. backtrackedon its policy of refusing all diplomatic con-tact with Tehran, and for the first time inyears allowed U.S. delegations to engagewith Iran (alongside Syria) in regional secu-rity talks with Iraq’s neighbors on 3/10 and5/3–4 (see also Syria section above). Secy. ofState Rice represented the U.S. in the 5/3–4meeting in Sharm al-Shaykh, where, accord-ing to the State Dept. (5/3), she intended toapproach Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottakiinformally at a 5/3 dinner to ask Iran to stopsupporting Shi‘i militias in Iraq, but the FMleft before she could do so. Rice reportedlydid speak with Iran’s ambassador to Egypt,but no details were released.

Meanwhile, on 2/21, the 60-day deadlineset in UN Res. 1737 for Iran to halt ura-nium enrichment and reprocessing of spentnuclear fuel (see Quarterly Update in JPS143) passed without Iranian compliance.That day, the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) issued a report documentingincreased activity within Iran’s enrichmentprogram. The IAEA issued a follow-up reporton 2/28, stating that it was not convincedthat Iran’s nuclear program was intendedsolely for civilian purposes.

In response, the 5 permanent membersof the UNSC and Germany (the P5+1) heldan emergency session in London on 2/26 tobegin drafting a new UNSC res. to imposeadditional nonmilitary sanctions on Tehran,even while stating (2/26) that they were“equally committed” to seeking a negotiatedsolution to halting enrichment. After sev-eral follow-up meetings of the P5+1 (e.g.,3/3, 3/12), the UNSC unanimously passed(3/24) UN Res. 1747 banning all Iranian armsexports, freezing assets of 28 Iranian indi-viduals and entities linked to its military andnuclear agencies, and threatening additionalsanctions if Iran did not halt nuclear activ-ities and provide verifiable assurances thatit was not seeking nuclear weapons within60 days. Although Russia and China blockedthe tough trade, travel, and military sanc-tions sought by the U.S. and EU, the U.S.expressed (3/24) satisfaction with the textand said it got more from the negotiationsthan it expected. On 4/16, in a step that

went beyond Res. 1747, the EU announceda freeze on assets of a group of officialslinked to Iran’s nuclear program.

As debate on Res. 1747 drew to a close,Iran seized (3/23) 15 British sailors andmarines near al-Faw peninsula, claimingthey had entered Iranian territorial waterswhile on routine patrol inspecting merchantships in Iraqi waters. Britain denied (3/23)the charge, accusing Iran of seizing theseamen as a ploy to influence voting onthe new sanctions package. Other analystsspeculated (see Washington Post 3/24) thatthe seizure was retaliation for a 1/07 U.S.raid on the Iranian liaison office in Irbil, Iraq,during which 5 Iranian consular staff weredetained. The Iranians were still being heldat the end of the quarter, but Iran releasedthe British seamen on 4/3.

Meanwhile, Israel held (ca. 2/24) discus-sions with the U.S. on “contingency plans”for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facil-ities, reportedly seeking U.S. preapprovalto overfly U.S.-controlled Iraqi air space;no details were released. In Israel, U.S. De-fense Secy. Gates held (4/17–18) talks onIran with Israeli PM Olmert, DM Peretz, andFM Livni, but stated afterward that militaryoptions had not been discussed. He addedthat the U.S. did not rule out military actionbut wanted to exhaust diplomatic optionsfirst.

In late 3/07, Iran informed the UN byletter of its decision to withhold certaininformation requested by the IAEA for fearof attack by Israel and the U.S., stating thatthe UN had repeatedly allowed confidentialinformation on Iran to be leaked. The letterand a confidential reply from the IAEA urgingIran to reconsider were posted on an internalUN Web site and leaked to the AssociatedPress on 3/30.

Also of note: After weeks of talks betweentheir envoys, Iranian pres. Ahmadinejad met(3/3) in Riyadh with Saudi Arabia’s KingAbdullah for talks on sectarian conflicts inIraq and Lebanon, and he agreed not to takeany steps that would exacerbate or spreadsectarian strife. Saudi Arabia also encouragedIran to halt uranium enrichment.

VATICAN

A plenary-level meeting of the Israel-Vatican Bilateral Permanent Working Com-mission set for 3/30 (see Quarterly Updatein JPS 143) was postponed at Israel’s requestbecause the timing coincided with Rice’svisit to Israel and the Arab League summit.The Holy See expressed (3/30) deep regret




and hoped the meeting would be resched-uled soon.

On 4/12, Vatican amb. Archbishop Anto-nio Franco declared that he would not attendIsrael’s Holocaust memorial ceremony at YadVashem in Jerusalem on 4/15, citing his per-sonal rejection of the museum’s portrayal ofPope Pius XII as apathetic about the fate ofJews during World War II, which he said of-fended the Catholic Church. The Vatican hascomplained about the text of the museum’sdisplay since it opened in 2005. The museumhad said it was willing to consider revisionsif researchers were allowed to study churcharchives for new information, stating thedisplay represented “the historical truth onPius XII as is known to scholars today”; theChurch did not respond. After public uproarover his announcement, Franco reversed hisposition and attended the ceremony.

OTHER

The International Comm. of the RedCross issued (5/14) a confidential report(leaked to the New York Times the sameday) on East Jerusalem and its environs ac-cusing Israel of “general disregard” for “itsobligations under international law” and offurthering “its own interests or those of itsown population to the detriment of the pop-ulation of the occupied territories.” Israelrejected (5/14) the report’s conclusions onthe grounds that Israel does not considerJerusalem occupied. The full text of thedocument was not released.

The World Jewish Congress (WJC), thenonprofit group that led efforts to com-pel Swiss banks to pay billions of dollarsin restitution to Holocaust survivors andtheir families, fired (2/15) its long-time secy.gen. Israel Singer after a 3-year investiga-tion concluded that he at the least “violatedhis fiduciary responsibility” and possibly in-tended to steal nearly $1.2 m. of Swiss bankrestitution funds that were routed throughsuspicious transfers to a bank account inLondon held by an Israeli lawyer. Singer alsoused WJC funds to cover personal expenses.Soon after, Edgar Bronfman felt compelledto resign (5/7) as WJC pres., a position hehad held since 1979, raising concerns aboutthe future of the organization. WJC officersestimated that the group would need $5 m.in donations over the next 2 yrs. to survive,which would be difficult given Singer’s fi-nancial improprieties and the departure ofbillionaire Bronfman, who had personallycovered 15% of the WJC’s annual budget inrecent years.

The newly reconstituted North AmericanCouncil of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI)met (3/19) in New York to discuss ways ofdoubling the $140 m. in donations JAFI re-ceives annually from individual donors inthe U.S. to help cover its $317 m. budget.The bulk of JAFI’s budget is covered by theUnited Jewish Communities (UJC, which it-self raises $2 b./year from North Americandonors), which has drafted new fundraisingplans that would increase the membershipdues paid by UJC’s 189 Jewish federationsand 400 independent communities in theU.S. JAFI fears this could lead to a declinein UJC membership, and hence in UJC rev-enue and the portion allocated to JAFI. JAFIchmn. Ze’ev Beilski stated (3/19), however,that “the pie is so big,” referring to the donorbase in North America, he personally wasconfident JAFI could increase its revenuestream. He noted in particular how UJC wasquickly able to raise $360 m. in summer2006 for its Israel Emergency Campaign tohelp Israeli families affected by the war onLebanon. JAFI’s purpose is to facilitate Jewishimmigration to Israel and aid Jewish commu-nities in Israel, while the UJC’s mandate isto provide humanitarian support to Jewishcommunities worldwide and “to strengthenthe relationship between North AmericanJews and the Israeli people.”

Spurred by Israel’s use of cluster bombsin Lebanon during the 2006 war, 46 nationsmeeting in Oslo signed (2/22) a nonbindingtreaty banning the use of cluster munitionsand expressed hope that they could con-clude a binding treaty by 2008 that would“prohibit the use, production, transfer, andstockpiling of those cluster munitions thatcause unacceptable harm to civilians.” China,Israel, Russia, and the U.S. declined to attendthe session. Of those participating, Japan,Poland, and Romania refused to sign.

DONORS

Because of the ongoing U.S.-led boycottof the PA, most donor activity this quar-ter involved the Temporary InternationalMechanism (TIM), established by the EUin 6/06 to route assistance to the Pales-tinians while bypassing the Hamas-led PA.(On 3/21, the EU approved an extension ofthe TIM mandate to the end of 6/07.) Atthe local level in the territories, the maindonor working groups focused on human-itarian assistance, economics (e.g., 2/26),infrastructure, and governance and reformcontinued to meet regularly, with subgroups




meeting on election reform (3/20), judicialreform (4/18), private sector developmentand trade (2/22), health (3/14), agriculture(2/19), energy (2/20), and education (3/28).No details of these meetings were released.

The IMF reported (3/20) that aid to thePalestinians had increased in 2006 as donorsattempted to prevent economic catastro-phe stemming from the U.S.-led sanctionson the PA: The UN increased aid from $1 b.(including $350 m. in direct budgetary sup-port) in 2005 to $1.2 b. (including $740 m.in direct budgetary support) in 2006; theU.S. increased aid from $400 m. to $468 m.(including aid directly to Abbas and madethrough the UNRWA); the EU subsidizeda quarter of the population in the occu-pied territories at a cost of $916 m. ($711m. through TIM, the rest through UN agen-cies); and Arab states gave an estimated $400m. (including $140 m. in direct budgetarysupport).

The IMF report also stated that in 2006, inthe West Bank and Gaza combined, the GDPdropped 6.6% (the World Bank put the figureat 8% on 3/6), poverty rose 30%, unemploy-ment reached 30% (the World Bank put thefigure at 25% overall and 35% in Gaza), and49% of the population was dependent onfood aid for subsistence. On 3/6, the WorldBank put the figures for the decline in GDPat 8% and for unemployment at 25% over-all and 36% in Gaza. The World Bank alsowarned (3/6) that the PA’s existence couldbe in jeopardy if it continued to increase thepublic payroll (up by 9% in 2006) despite de-clining revenues, recommending that the PAimpose a hiring freeze, reduce salaries, andencourage voluntary retirement to bring itswage bill down to $80 m./month from $93m./month. A separate World Bank reportwarned (4/16) that PA industry was “boundto fail” if Israel did not lift restrictions onPalestinian movement of people and goodsin the occupied territories.

Early in the quarter, the EU announced(2/25) plans to expand donations throughthe TIM for new projects, including upgrad-ing Qarni crossing and helping the Pales-tinian judiciary and electoral commission

(both controlled by Abbas). The EU moneyfor Qarni’s expansion was meant to aug-ment the money pledged by the U.S. forthe project as part of Rice’s new $86.4 m.aid package, not to offset it after a congres-sional hold imposed on the $86.4 m. lastquarter (see Quarterly Update in JPS 143).On 4/11, newly appointed PA Finance MFayyad met with EU officials in Brussels torequest $1.3 b. in EU aid for the remainderof 2007 to prevent an “acute financial crisis”in the territories. The EU had not respondedby the end of the quarter. On 5/2, however,Fayyad announced that Saudi Arabia had in-formed the PA of the imminent transfer ofthe first $250 m. of the $1 b. the kingdompledged at the Mecca talks in 2/07 (see Quar-terly Update in JPS 143), after receiving U.S.assurances that it would not be penalized un-der U.S. law for sending the money, providedit went to PLO bank accounts.

Fayyad’s first act on being sworn in for his2d term as finance minister was to consoli-date all domestic revenue under the FinanceMin.’s sole operating account, where ex-penditures could be tracked and audited inkeeping with international financial stan-dards. Fayyad had complained (3/10) thatthe auditing and financial oversight mecha-nisms he put in place when he last servedas finance minister before the 1/06 electionshad been completely eroded because of theU.S.-led boycott, when Abbas diverted for-eign aid away from the Hamas-led FinanceMin. to accounts under his control. As a re-sult, Abbas’s use of the hundreds of millionsof dollars in foreign aid received for generalbudget support could not be accounted for.In Fayyad’s first meeting with Rice on 4/17in Washington, he stressed the need for allforeign donations to stop running throughTIM or to accounts held by Abbas and tobe brought back to the ministry’s sole op-erating account, to guarantee transparency.This did not happen before the end of thequarter, though the U.S. informed (5/14)the EU that it was willing to discuss therecommendation. There was no word onwhat this would mean for the future of theTIM.



Documents

Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 February ... · This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:20:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions