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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

22 September 2007

SUBJECT: Promulgation TO: All Concerned

1. The Philippine Army Combat Service Support Operations Manual, PAM 4-01, provides principles, operational and functional concepts and methodologies of Army CSS Operations

2. This manual was reviewed by the PA Capability Development

Board and approved by the Commanding General, Philippine Army as official reference on Combat Service Support Operations of the Army.

3. This manual is hereby promulgated for the information and

guidance of all concerned effective this date.

HERMOGENES C ESPERON JR General AFP

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COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE ARMY

Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

FOREWORD

The PHILIPPINE ARMY COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS MANUAL (PAM 4-01) is an official reference containing concrete guidelines on the overall tactical logistics support being provided to the military troops in times of both war and peace. Its provisions were thoroughly tested in the field and validated for use by our organization.

This manual is hereby approved for use by the Philippine Army. I urge all military personnel to adhere to the procedures and guidelines

set forth in this Manual. I likewise encourage all soldiers to contribute to its enhancement by sending their comments to the Doctrine Center, TRADOC, PA

ROMEO P TOLENTINO Lieutenant General, AFP

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AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

1. Proposals for amendment or additions to the text of this manual should be made through the normal channels to the sponsor. A sample format of an amendment proposal is found in Annex P of PAM 8-01. 2. It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the under-mentioned amendment list have been made in this manual.

Amendment List Number Date

Amended by (Printed Name and Initials)

Date of Amending

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose

This manual establishes a fundamental doctrine on Army Combat

Service Support Operation. It is intended to guide the Philippine Army in the pursuit of providing overall tactical logistics support to the Army both in times of war and peace. Its ultimate objective is to enhance national security by providing the necessary weapons and equipment system that are reliable, supportable, in high state of readiness and technologically superior to those of the potential adversaries. 2. Scope and Applicability

This publication intends to provide guidance to the Philippine Army in over all Combat Service Support Operations. By applying the herein concepts and principles in CSS, and integrating allocated resources through efficient and effective CSS management, the Army’s Combat Service Support Operations will provide strategic, operational and tactical support to soldiers in the field. 3. User Information

The proponent of this Manual is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, G4 Philippine Army. Send your comments and recommendations to the Commanding General, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City (Attn: G4) 4. References

This Manual used the following reference materials to come up with concepts and procedures for the Army’s Logistics Management: PAM 8-01 PHILIPPINE ARMY DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT, 1995 PAM 4-00 PHILIPPINE ARMY LOGISTICS, 2000 AFPM 4-1 LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, 1981 AFPM 4-3 HANDBOOK ON LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, 1996 AFPM 4-4 INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT MANAGEMENT,

1997 FM 100-10 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FM 53-2-2 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS FM 63-20 FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION FM 63-21 MAIN SUPPORT BATTALION FM 100-5 OPERATIONS FM 101-5 STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS FM 700-80 LOGISTICS

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ST 101-6 G1/G4 BATTLEBOOK Book Publication COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GUIDE (MAJOR

EDWARDS USA (RET) 5. Rescission

All publications, manuals and directives inconsistent with this manual are hereby rescinded. 6. Gender

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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CONTENTS

Letter of Promulgation i Foreword iii Amendment Certificate v Preface vii Contents ix

Section Title Page CHAPTER 1 – FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBAT

SERVICE SUPPORT

1-1 Introduction 1-1 1-2 Combat Service Support and Logistics 1-1 1-3 CSS Characteristics 1-2 1-4 Combat Service Support Functions 1-4

CHAPTER 2- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

2-1 Principles of Combat Service Support 2-1 2-2 Operational Concepts 2-3 2-3 Concept of Support 2-6 2-4 CSSO for General Types of Operations 2-8

CHAPTER 3 – LEVELS OF CSS AND ITS

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

3-1 CSS in the Levels of War 3-1 3-2 CSS in the Functional Levels 3-5 3-3 Functional Areas of CSS 3-6

CHAPTER 4 – FORCE STRUCTURES OF COMBAT

SERVICE SUPPORT

4-1 CSS in the Division Level 4-4 4-2 CSS in the Brigade Level 4-5 4-3 CSS in the Battalion Level 4-6

ANNEX A - THE CSS OVERLAY A-1

Glossary Abbreviations Record of Changes Recommendation for Changes

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CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Section 1-1 Introduction

Combat Service Support is an integral part of a fighting force. The knowledge of the principles of its provisions and organization is a prerequisite for successful leadership. The role of combat service support as an integral component of combat power deserves study so that its capabilities and limitations will aid in analysis and planning.

The need for integration of efforts in the Philippine Army team structure is greater than ever before as it is likely to fight as part of a combined force in any major war. It will almost always fight as part of joint force or as a combined arms team. Every force we field will be characterized by the integration of components into a unified team.

Section 1-2 Combat Service Support and Logistics

There is neither clear delineation between logistics and combat service support nor a formal pronouncement of what a combat service support is in the Philippine Army. In fact, they are used interchangeably in most readings, manuals and discussions. For the purpose of establishing a doctrinal delineation, a straight-forward definition of Combat Service Support shall be established for this manual to differentiate it from logistics.

Logistics is defined in PAM 4-00, quoting the definition from AFPM 4-1, as the science of planning and executing the supply, movement and maintenance of forces. It includes design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, equipage, distribution and disposal. It is a system established to effectively discharge and dispense supplies and materiel essential in the delivery of the AFP’s mandate. FM 700-80 broadly defined it as the art and science of creating and maintaining a military capability. Its purpose is to create weapons and forces and provide sustained support of these weapons and forces in combat.

On the other hand, FM 100-10, quoting from Joint Publication 1-02, defines “Combat Service Support as the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment of all operating forces on the battlefield.”

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From all the aforementioned definitions above, logistics and combat service support signify two important activities planning and executing the plan. Logistics is more on planning and supervising the plan while combat service support is more on the actual support extended to the combat forces. To provide actual support signifies that there should be a performer to extend the support a person or a unit implementing the support. Moreover, it can be deduced that Combat Service Support is the capability, the functions, the activities, and the task, which have been the result of planning and form part of the execution aspect of the plan in logistics. Therefore, Combat Service Support is the result of logistics planning that provide support to the combat forces to accomplish a mission. The purpose of CSS is to build combat power, expand the commander’s operational reach, and sustain the force.

Section 1-3 CSS Characteristics

Effective and efficient CSS system has several fundamental characteristics that are applied across the full spectrum of operations. These characteristics are consistent with the logistics principles in PAM 4-00. Responsiveness and anticipation are differentiated in PAM 4-00 however; in this manual the two (2) are combined on the premise that critical to providing a responsive CSS system is anticipation of requirements. These characteristics are not a checklist; they serve as a guide in analytical thinking and prudent planning. The characteristics are:

a. Anticipation is being able to foresee future operations and to identify, accumulate, and maintain the right mix, capabilities, and information required for support to the force. Anticipation is the key characteristic of CSS as well as with logistics. Accurate anticipation of requirements can enhance both the agility of the force and its ability to seize and retain the initiative and synchronize activities in depth. Responsiveness is providing the right support in the right place at the right time. It involves the ability to meet changing requirements on short notice. Critical to providing responsive CSS is anticipation of requirements.

Accurate forecasts of potential future operations are necessary to develop a force that is both strategically deployable and fully capable of performing missions it is likely to receive. Though CSS personnel work on anticipating support requirements, no planner can fully predict the course of all future operations. At the strategic level, we live in a society that places shifting requirements on our military. At the operational and tactical levels of war, operations often evolve in unexpected directions as commanders constantly seek to exploit fleeting opportunities and tactical advantages. Therefore, responsiveness rests on anticipation as well as flexibility. Our CSS units and personnel continually stay abreast of operations plans and remain flexible and ready to rapidly tailor available capabilities to meet changing requirements.

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b. Simplicity is avoiding unnecessary complexity in both planning

and executing CSS operations. CSS units and personnel usually operate with constrained resources and severe battlefield conditions as such, planning and executing CSS operations must be understood easily with utmost practicality and economy. Simplicity fosters efficiency in strategic and operational CSS operations. Mission orders, drills, rehearsals, and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity. Emerging CSS information systems and tools can be highly efficient tools to help with such tasks as establishing clear support priorities and pre-allocation of supplies and services.

c. Flexibility is being able to adapt CSS structures and procedures

to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operations. CSS plans, operations, and organizations must be flexible enough to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The CSS force must be able to adapt rapidly to provide support in any environment through the full spectrum of operations. The dynamic nature of operations requires that all its support systems must be dynamic and flexible. Often flexibility requires improvisation.

d. Improvisation is the talent to create, enhance, arrange, or

fabricate what is needed from what is on hand. Improvisation may be necessary to provide sustained and responsive support. CSS personnel cannot anticipate every eventuality; hence they must be prepared to seek innovative solutions to problems. If established procedures cannot meet the CSS requirements of a unit, CSS personnel must be willing and capable of rapidly devising new ones to meet the needs. Extraordinary means may be necessary to get things done.

Creative commanders and smart CSS operators learn to anticipate the unexpected and adjust accordingly as rapidly as possible. Plans may be disrupted by enemy action; obstruction of supply routes, and calamities hence, improvisation is required for sustained support. Improvisation in the CSS system will often spell the difference between success and failure in combat operations.

e. Continuity is being able to provide continuous support throughout the area of operations for all phases of campaigns and operations. Interruption in combat service support operations reduces the combat power of a unit. Continuous supply and service support is needed by the operating units to maintain their fighting strength and agility. Continuity is the lifeblood of combat operations at all levels. CSS operations continue even if combat operations experience a period of relative inactivity. Commanders utilize every opportunity to replenish and increase sustaining capabilities.

CSS personnel must work with operations planners to anticipate

requirements over the duration of the operation moreover, they mus work with CSS operators to synchronize provision of required supplies and services throughout. One of the characteristics of ground combat is duration. CSS personnel must be able to attain the minimum combat power required to begin operations and then to follow on with additional resources to sustain operations for as long as required.

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f. Integration is the combination of CSS with Army operations process. Integration of the CSS plan with the operations plan ensures continuous support and synchronization during execution. Support of the commander’s plan is the goal of all CSS efforts. It requires a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and synchronization of CSS plans with the concept of operations. CSS operators must develop support concepts that give commanders the greatest possible freedom of action by enhancing the unit’s agility and versatility.

As the Army operates as part of joint and combined forces, integration of support operations with other major services is imperative. Interoperability of forces and equipment must be developed for smooth execution and synchronization of plans among major services. The Army integrates its CSS operations with other major services in joint operations to take advantage of each services’ competencies and efficiencies, ensure that the highest priorities of the joint force are met first and avoid duplication and wasteful competition for the same scarce resources.

Section 1-4 Combat Service Support Functions

The provision of CSS consists of 11 interrelated functions. The successful execution of one function usually depends on successful provision of several of the others. CSS commanders must carefully plan, manage, and synchronize these functions to accomplish responsive and efficient delivery of CSS. The Army’s present service support system may not be able to provide all of these functions in the next five (5) years but the Army’s logistics system is geared towards undertaking these CSS functions. This section only introduces each function. Each function shall be discussed in future manuals which shall illustrate and explain how each of these functions will be planned, managed and executed in the field. The CSS functions are:

a. Supply involves acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply required to equip and sustain Army forces. It includes a wide-range of functions that encompass the from determination of requirements at the strategic level down to issue of items to the end-user at the tactical level.

b. Maintenance entails keeping materiel in a serviceable,

operational condition, returning it to service, and updating and upgrading its capability. It includes performing preventive maintenance checks and services; recovering and evacuating disabled equipment; diagnosing equipment faults; substituting parts, components, and assemblies; controlled cannibalization; exchanging serviceable materiel for unserviceable materiel; and repairing equipment. The ultimate key is to anticipate requirements.

c. Transportation is moving and transferring units, personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the concept of operations. Transportation

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incorporates military, commercial, and civilian capabilities. Transportation assets include motor, air and water modes and units; terminal units, activities, and infrastructure; and movement control units, activities, and systems.

d. Combat Health Support maintains medical force protection by

preventing disease and non-battle injuries; clearing the battlefield of casualties; providing far forward medical treatment; providing enroute care during medical evacuation; ensuring adequate Class VIII supplies and medical equipment are available; and providing veterinary, dental, and laboratory services. The combat health support mission in Army operations is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, disease, and psychological stresses on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. A proactive preventive medical program and a phased health care delivery system can accomplish the mission (based on capabilities) that extends from actions taken prior to and at the point of injury or illness through evacuation from the combat zone for treatment at a hospital, be it a civilian hospital or a military hospital depending on its proximity and criticality of the patient’s condition. The primary objective of combat health support is to conserve the commander's fighting strength and maintain operational readiness and morale of troops. CHS in Army operations requires continuous planning, coordination, and training to ensure prompt, effective, and unified health care efforts.

e. Field Services involve feeding, clothing, and providing personal services for soldiers. It consists of clothing exchange, laundry, shower, textile repair, and food services. The unit commander determines the priorities for field service support in coordination with the area commander.

f. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Support provides the

capability to neutralize conventional and improvised explosive devices (IED) which present a threat to military operations, military and civilian facilities, materiel, and personnel. EOD support for all Army units is provided by the EOD Battalion, ASCOM, PA through its EOD teams are strategically deployed all over the country.

g. Personnel Support provides all the activities and functions to

sustain personnel manning of the force. Manning the force ensures availability of trained personnel in the right quantities when and where they are required for operations. It involves personnel readiness management, replacement management, and career management. Personnel Service Support includes providing personnel information system (PIS); conducting personnel processing; performing personnel actions; conducting casualty management; conducting human relation programs; conducting postal operations; and providing morale, welfare, and recreation support activities.

h. Finance Service Support makes financial resources available

when and where they are needed, and assist the commander in maintaining fiscal responsibilities. It ensures prompt payment of pay and allowances and other financial obligations of the Army specially the troops in the field units. Finance Service Support operation is necessary to maintain the morale of troops and provide sustenance to their families who are left behind. Finance

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Service Support for all Army units is provided by the Finance Center, PA through its Finance Service Units established nationwide.

i. Religious Support entails providing and performing religious

support operations for the commander in order to protect and uphold the free exercise of religion for soldiers, family members, and authorized civilians. This includes pastoral care and ministrations, religious and moral education, worship and religious services, guidance and counseling, social and cultural leadership, and advising the command on matters of religion, morals and ethics, and morale. Religious Support for all Army units is provided by the Chaplain Service, PA.

j. Mortuary Affairs is a broadly based military program to provide

for the necessary care and disposition of deceased personnel. It provides mortuary supplies and associated services for permanent disposition of the remains and personal effects of deceased military and paramilitary personnel. It also provides for the care and maintenance of burial sites and for the handling and disposition of personal effects. This program provides for the search, recovery, and evacuation of remains to collection points and further evacuation to a mortuary. It provides for identification and preparation of remains in a mortuary and shipment to a final destination as directed by the next of kin.

All commanders are responsible for the search, recovery, tentative identification, care, and evacuation of remains to the nearest collection point or mortuary. Each division has a small mortuary affairs element (two to three personnel) organic to the SSBn. During hostilities, the mortuary affairs personnel organic to the division operate collection points.

Mortuaries are being maintained by the FSSUs of ASCOM and they have organic personnel assigned to provide mortuaries services to deceased personnel. Graves Services Unit, ASCOM, PA is the primary unit of the Army tasked to provide mortuarial and memorial services to deceased AFP and other authorized non-military personnel. The unit augments the personnel of the FSSUs as may be necessary to facilitate the processing of remains.

k. Legal Service Support provides operational law support to all personnel especially for legal cases that were incurred while in pursuit of their mission. The Army Judge Advocate provides legal services to Army units and personnel and assigns legal officers to the major subordinate units of the Army in order to assist the personnel in the field.

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CHAPTER 2

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Section 2-1 Principles of Combat Service Support

1. General. It is best to determine the basic principles that guide the Philippine Army to ensure the successful execution of Combat Service Support in times of peace and war. This chapter shall discuss the basic guiding principles of CSS, and its operational concept in terms of orchestrating CSS efforts, logistics preparation in the battlefield and considerations for operational reach.

Stated below are the basic guidelines to be followed for effective combat service support operations. The successful use of these guidelines depends on how operating logisticians in the field put into practice the theories in the execution of integrated logistic support in the tactical environment.

At all times, logisticians must follow the push system rather than the pull mode. They must not wait for and fill request from the tacticians in the battlefield. Victory on the battlefield will not spring from hoarding supplies and demanding correct paper work and proper justification before providing support. Subsequently, tactical logisticians must anticipate the needs of supported combat formations push service towards them, even before the need arises. Tacticians must anticipate needs in the following areas: contingency load, fuel requirements, ration break points, road networks and other support areas. In terms of supply operations the following supplies:

a. Class I (Ration) Support. Food must always be supplied at sustained rate. Every soldier must receive sufficient food to maintain effectiveness in the battlefield. Logisticians must not wait for ration request or personnel reports to determine the amount of supply to be sent forward. Today’s strength report is of little value in ensuring that there is sufficient food supply for today and tomorrow. In the sustained rate approach, logisticians continue to supply rations in the same quantity as in previous issues.

b. Class II (General Supply) Support. Class II items must be

separated into two categories: combat essentials and not necessary to stock. Class II items can take up much tonnage and storage room to the troops. Two principles that apply to this class are high-use item stock forward and coordinated forward delivery.

High-use items must be initially identified based on the demand history of supported units. Logisticians must stock items which have high usage among the supported troops.

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c. Class III (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants) Support. Fuel tanks

and fuel tankers must remain as full as possible in the battlefield. An empty fuel tank is a liability, subsequently, a full one is an asset. Keeping the tankers full is the process of maintaining stockage at operational levels. On the contrary, an unhealthy situation occurs when there is a feast-or-famine surge in which a shortage replaces a glut.

Furthermore, support units must also store other petroleum

products such as grease, oil, solvents and weapon lubricants in reasonable quantities as far forward as possible.

d. Class IV (Barrier Materials) Support. Support units usually

handle barrier units as throughput from the rear, directly to the site of need. The response to this need must be rapid. However, tonnage is so extensive that creating forward stocks is impractical.

e. Class V (Ammunition, Explosives) Support. Brigade-size units

must have ammunition transfer points (ATPs). Ammunitions stored in ATPs must be high-use and high-demand items. More importantly, these ammunitions must remain in trucks and must never be downloaded. ATPs must remain as close as possible to the troops.

ATP may contain part of the unit basic load (UBL) as initial stockage. The UBL is a quantity of ammunition issued to one unit before the onset of combat. UBL is based on the estimated threat, the quantity is assumed sufficient for initial battle. Once unit are engaged, commander estimate the units’ ammunition requirement and submits request as required supply rate (RSR).

f. Class VI (Personal Demand Items) Support. Personal supplies, such as razor blades, cigarettes, matches, soaps and so on, arrive on the battlefield in the form of sundry packs. Logisticians supply these packs forward as required by troop’s strength. Normally, logisticians distribute sundry packs through the ration break point in the brigade area to ease the strain on transportation assets.

g. Class VII (Major End Items) Support. A major end item is a

piece of equipment that can stand alone and does not lose its identity through use, such as vehicles or weapon system. As much as possible, logisticians must put major end items from the rear through the using unit as these items are forward support elements that units do not have the capability to store and maintain them.

h. Class VIII (Medical Supplies) Support. Coordination and

distribution of medical supplies runs through medical channels. Normal means of delivery is through return trips of ambulances after evacuation details. Forward medical units are not allowed to issue large quantities of medical supplies from established stock but they can attempt to support emergency needs from on-hand stocks.

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i. Class IX (Repair Parts) Support. It is virtually impossible to carry

all repair parts of units in the battlefield; however, a stock of combat essentials must be available in the combat authorized stock age list (ASL) in the forward area. ASL must contain dead lining parts that would bring equipment to combat readiness.

A major concept in support system is to have the highest possible number of major assemblies required to support the force as forward as the supported unit can. How forward can a unit get depend on the tactical situation supported by density of equipment, number of trucks and the experience of the support personnel?

Section 2-2 Operational Concepts

2. Orchestrating the CSS Effort. The purpose of Army CSS is to build Army combat power, extend operational reach, and sustain the force. To fulfill these, functions, it requires orchestrating CSS activities to plan, prepare for, and provide CSS to Army forces. CSS involves working with operations planners to determine requirements, acquire resources, and distribute them. This is not a one-time event; support personnel continually integrate activities with operations staff to adapt plans and activities to meet the changing needs of the commander. This chapter discusses the planning of CSS, preparation activities, acquisition considerations, and distribution. It also includes an overview of how automated systems play a role, and how civilian and contractor activities are integrated into the CSS effort to supplement the activities of CSS units. 3. CSS Planning. CSS is vital to the successful execution of an operations plan. Planning involves critical decisions concerning the interface of combat, CS, and CSS at all levels. CSS planning and operations must be versatile; they must complement combat plans and operations, thus enhancing the ability of the supported commander to accomplish his mission. Commanders must anticipate their units' mission requirements and provide responsive support. They must assess what resources and capabilities are available in the theater and tailor follow-on forces accordingly. Deploying units should be self-sustaining in the theater of operations until LOC are established or other support can be provided from within the area of operations.

The Area Commander’s support plan is based on a campaign plan. As an Area Commander of a unified command develops his strategic concept of operation, he concurrently develops, in coordination with his UC4s and other Service component commanders, a concept of support. They and their respective staff consider a myriad of support factors that affect the ability of forces to conduct operations. At the campaign and major operation planning level, support can be a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations.

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In planning and executing operations, the UC4s’ focus is on generating

combat power by moving forces and materiel into theater as well as the sustainment of the forces during theater campaigns and operations. The UC4s, in concert with their associated geographic combatant commanders, are responsible in identifying CSS requirements, coordinating resource distribution from the strategic base or local sources, allocating necessary CSS capabilities, and authorizing stockage list to establish the requisite Army CSS command and control relationships within the theater of operations.

CSS planning should be centralized, comprehensive, adjustable, flexible, and continuous. Many of the factors planners must consider are embedded in the descriptions of CSS throughout this manual. Planners also consider the use of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) in the theater or afloat, thereby reducing requirements in theater and providing earlier force closure for operations. CSS planning undertakes the following activities.

Planning considerations for ODSS as well as other operations are in

Chapter 3. Considerations for processes within force projection operations are also in Chapter 3. Some additional considerations include APS, HNS agreements, containerization, and weapons of mass destruction

a. Identifies significant time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources necessary to support the OPLAN.

b. Identifies the capabilities, vulnerabilities and limitations of the

aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs), sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), sea ports of embarkation (SPOEs), and their reception and clearance capabilities.

c. Identifies support methods and procedures required to meet the needs of the commander.

d. Identifies vulnerabilities of certain types of systems and forces and to weapons of mass destruction.

e. Provides for coordinating and controlling onward movement of arriving forces and materiel.

f. Plans on reasonably assured barangays and cities. g. Identifies sustainment capabilities by measuring national ability

to fill materiel requirements. 4. Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield. Logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) is a key tool available to personnel in building a flexible theater strategic/operational support plan. It consists of the actions taken by CSS personnel at all echelons to optimize means--force structure, resources, and strategic lift--of supporting the UC4s' plan. These actions include identifying and preparing forward operating bases; selecting and improving LOC; projecting and preparing forward logistics bases; and forecasting and building

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operational stock assets forward and afloat. They focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. A detailed estimate of requirements, tempered with logistics preparation of the theater, allows support personnel to advise the Area commanders of the most effective method of providing support that will not fail to provide adequate, responsive support, while minimizing the CSS footprint.

Often, the identification and preparation of an initial lodgment or support base has a major influence on the course of the campaign. Lodgments should be expandable to allow easy access to strategic sealift and airlift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitate transshipment of supplies, and be accessible to multiple LOC. Thus, lodgments are often established near key seaports and airports in the theater. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations may augment undeveloped or damaged facilities or provide ports where none exist. Conducting LOTS operations from anchorages becomes more important if the enemy has the capability to deliver long-range, highly destructive fires. Split-based operations and modular operations are often requirements during the establishment of an initial lodgment

Seldom does an initial lodgment or support base contain the ideal mix of desired characteristics. The UC4s, in concert with the JOC, must make difficult choices when organizing support for the operation. One of the most difficult is whether to stockpile supplies forward in the theater or rely on " time definite delivery" from logistics central facility or an intermediate staging base. For example, stockpiling places supplies in relatively close proximity to units but may place a burden on the theater support structure in terms of having to move, protect, and handle large quantities of support resources on a repetitive basis. On the other hand, while responsive distribution reduces this burden significantly, it is highly dependent on the availability and responsiveness of limited airlift assets to deliver critical supplies in a timely manner to ensure that fighting forces are able to sustain the desired operational tempo. The commander must weigh the risks and benefits of both of these options and then decide which can best fulfill the support requirements of his operations plan. Depending on the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, time available, and civilian considerations (METT) factors, he may transition from one option to the other or adopt a combination of both.

The selection and improvement of LOCs are essential aspects of maintaining uninterrupted CSS throughout all phases of an operation or campaign. The operational commander must understand the relationship between stockage, time, LOCs, and forward combat power. Time spent in deliberate preparation--projecting and preparing forward support bases and positioning resources in them--can result in shorter LOCs and greater operational capability in the future. On the other hand, the age-old problem of overextended LOCs and supply shortages can have a detrimental impact on a large force trying to conduct offensive operations.

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5. Considerations for Operational Reach. Supply at the operational level involves the requisitioning or acquiring, receipt, storage, protection, maintenance, distribution, and salvage of supplies. Supply planners and managers must understand the Area commander’s priorities and the requirements for support of campaigns and major operations. Requirements include consideration of the needs of joint and multinational forces..

Supplies are throughput whenever possible from the POD or local sources to the appropriate supply support activity (SSA) or receiving unit. Multiple consignee cargo comes to a supply activity to sort cargo before transshipment to the appropriate SSA or receiving unit.

The supply system depends on an efficient and effective materiel management system. Materiel management centers (MMCs)/materiel managers must know the prioritized requirements of the force and the status of available resources. They manage distribution in coordination with movement control elements who know the capabilities of the transportation system to move required supplies. This management requires an effective automated supply system as well as extensive coordination. Materiel managers will be linked to strategic and tactical supply and transportation elements to provide total asset visibility.

Section 2-3 Concept of Support 6. Service Support Annex to the OPORD. This paragraph will provide an over all visualization of the concept of support. Its intent is to provide the non-CSS commanders and their primary staff a visualization of how the operations will be logistically supported.

a. A brief synopsis of the support command mission b. Support command headquarters/support area locations

including locations of next higher logistics base, if not clearly conveyed in the CSS overlay

c. The next higher’s support priorities and where our units fit those priorities

d. Priorities, if they remain the same throughout the operation

e. Unite(s) in the next higher CSS organizations supporting our unit

f. Significant/unusual CSS issues that impact on the overall operation phases

g. Any significant risk.

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7. Essential Elements of Information. Once a contingency country or geographic region is known, CSS planners begin to build a CSS information data base. When completed, the information in the data base can be used to develop a comprehensive plan for the LPT. The relative priority of this effort depends on the overall concept of operations, along with other command priorities. Because it is a complex and time-consuming function, CSS planners cannot afford to wait until deployment begins to start the LPT. Anticipation by CSS planners at the national and unified command levels can preclude inserting soldiers into a completely "cold" base.

Planning must provide for the timely arrival of CSS assets, which is balanced according to the mission. Strategic lift assets are extremely limited and commanders cannot afford to squander even one sortie on movement of unnecessary supplies, equipment, or personnel. A well thought-out LPT plan, along with the time required for proper execution, allows better use of scarce strategic lift capability. A detailed LPT plan covers all areas:

a. Geography: Gather information on climate, terrain and endemic diseases in the AO to determine types of equipment needed and when they are needed. Use water information to determine the need for such things as early deployment of well-digging assets and water production and distribution units.

b. Supplies: Gather information on supply items that are readily

available in the AO and can be used in support of Philippine forces. Subsistence items, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials are the most common. Include information on the allied/coalition countries' armed forces' supply systems such as compatibility and availability of equipment.

c. Facilities: Gather information on availability of such things as

warehousing, cold-storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, hospitals, sanitation capabilities, and hotels. Availability of such facilities could reduce the requirement for deployment.

d. Transportation: Collect information on such things as road and rail nets, truck availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, and MHE as well as traffic flow, choke points, and control problems.

e. Maintenance: Collect information on maintenance facilities that could support FMS or allied/coalition equipment. Examine the allied/coalition countries armed forces such as ability to supplement our capability, commonality in equipment and spare parts and possible production of repair parts.

f. General Skills: Collect information on the general population of

the AO. Information such as the dominant dialect in AO, availability of interpreters and availability of labors pools that would prove to be valuable.

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Section 2-4 CSSO for General Types of Operations

8. Range of Military Operations. There are two categories of military operations: war and OOTW. OOTW is an aspect of military operations that focuses on deterring war and promoting peace. While joint doctrine provides broad categories of military operations, Army doctrine is more specific due to the decentralized nature of land operations. To adequately describe the complex nature of decentralized Army operations, the terms offense, defense, stability and support operations are nested within the context of OOTW. The predominance of ODSS operations vary according to the PA’s goal. Offense and defense are the predominant Army actions in war. Stability and support dominate Army actions in OOTW. Figure 1-1 shows how ODSS meshes within the context of war and OOTW. Figure 1.1 Range of Army Operations.

9. War. When diplomatic, informational, economic, and limited military means fail to achieve national objectives and protect national interests, the National Security Council (NSC) may commit the armed forces to combat. The goal in war is to win and win quickly while preserving the force for future operations. Army forces conduct stability operations and support operation in times of war. However, since war’s purpose is to defeat the enemy, the Army’s major effort is the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. 10. Operations Other Than War. OOTW encompasses a wide range of military actions to deter war, resolve conflict, and promote peace. During peacetime, combatant commanders employ military forces continuously. The physical presence of Army forces, combined with their potential to intervene decisively, deters hostile action and helps achieve strategic aims. OOTW may include offensive and defensive operations, but major effort are generally geared towards the conduct of stability operations and support operations.

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The types of CSS required during OOTW are often similar to those required in war. Support personnel perform many of the same functions. They provide supplies, purify water, move people and materiel, repair equipment, treat injury and disease, replace personnel, manage distribution, and so on. However, there are differences. First, the quantities of particular types of required CSS differ as discussed below depending on the types of Army operations. Also, the level of hostility and its associated risk may be lower in OOTW, allowing greater use of such sources as contracted support. Integration with civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be more prominent than in war.

Army commanders at all echelons may combine ODSS operations,

simultaneously and sequentially, to accomplish assigned missions in war and OOTW. Stability and support operations are predominant when the Philippines is not at war, but they can also be a part of a war effort. Army forces are capable of rapidly shifting from offensive or defensive operations to stability or support operations and back again.

CSS planning for support of ODSS operations requires a thorough mission analysis, careful identification of the force supported, and a understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations. CSS planners must consider all specified and implied requirements and be aware of resources available including other Philippine Services, regionally available commercial support, supporting multinational forces, and other agencies both civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs). 11. CSS in Offense Operations. CSS in the offense is characterized by high intensity operations that require anticipatory support as far forward as possible. Offensive operations must be well planned and synchronized to ensure that the momentum of the operation is not stifled or hindered by inadequate support. The primary purpose of the offense is to destroy or defeat the enemy. Types of offensive operations include attack, movement to contact, exploitation, and pursuit. Plans should include agile and flexible CSS capabilities to follow exploiting forces to ensure continuity of support.

Offense operations present challenges in many CSS functions. The two (2) most critical supplies for offensive operations are typically Class III and Class V. The CSS sustainment and movement planners direct the movement of resources to resupply planned or forecasted requirements, as stated in the service support plan. Commanders and staff must plan for increased quantities of fuel and selected other classes of supply, as well as plan for maintenance and recovery of damaged equipment. Planners must consider casualty rates and pre-position medical treatment and evacuation capabilities forward to efficiently clear the battlefield. In supporting a rapidly moving force, providing CSS may be the biggest challenge to CSS planners as the lines of communications lengthen. Transportation assets must be

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closely coordinated to ensure that the required assets are at the right place at the right time.

CSS assets must be prepared to follow exploiting forces to ensure continuity of support. Total asset visibility will help commanders make timely decisions to reprioritize assets as changing situations dictate. CSS must be planned throughout all phases of the offense to enable CSS assets to react quickly to changing needs. Also as advancing combat formations extend control of the AOR, personnel elements must meet the increased challenge of reconciling and reporting command strength information, reporting casualty information, and conducting replacement operations.

12. CSS in Defense Operations. CSS in the defense is characterized by resupply and repositioning so that combat forces are fully prepared to defeat an enemy attack. The purpose of the defense is to defeat the enemy's attack by buying time, to economize forces, or to develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Three main types of defense are mobile, area, and retrograde. CSS assets must be positioned so that they are able to support both the forces in the defense and survive.

The most critical supplies for the preparation of the defense are Classes III, IV, and V. CSS requirements in the defense will depend on the type of defense. For example increased quantities of ammunition and decreased quantities of fuel characterize most area defensive operations. However, in a mobile defense fuel usage maybe a critical part of support. Barrier and fortification materiel to support the defense often has to be moved forward, placing increased demands on the transportation system. The maintenance effort focuses on returning primary weapons systems and critical equipment to mission capable status. Defensive operations may provide the opportunity to provide field services and refit unfilled units. CSS planners and operators must also make necessary preparations to resume support to the offense when forces transition back to the offense.

The task of medical units is to stabilize the wounded, sort them, and evacuate patients. Medical treatment facilities should be located away from points of possible hostile actions. The use of contractors in forward areas may be an unacceptable risk, but if not, they may provide necessary support to rear area units. 13. CSS in Retrograde Operations. Planning the support for a division for retrograde operations is particularly complex and challenging.

A retrograde operation is an end in itself. Establishment of a new line of defense in a new area is a normal end to this kind of operation. Thus, an all inclusive operation requires the CSS staff officer to plan for the support of at least three (3) phases or for support of three (3) distinct areas.

Centralized control is one of the primary elements of retrograde operations centralized control of the combat, combat support, and combat support service operations is a necessity due to the complex nature of

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retrograde operations. A multiplicity of mission, the movement of large forces, and time and space phasing all contribute to the requirement for enhanced centralize control.

With the logistics area, this control is accomplished through precise management of plan execution. The logistics staff must supervise priority shifts to accommodate the division retrograde plan. Units and materials must be moved in accordance to shifts in plans. Medical support must be closely tied to retrograde plans to ensure preservation of support capabilities for successful operation. 14. CSS In Stability Operations. CSS in stability operations will range from CSS operations by themselves in support of Philippine forces within and beyond Philippine Territories, to support of large-scale Army operations in support of national policy. The ability to tailor CSS to match the requirements of the operation will be the key to success. Stability operations may be based around CSS to other agencies and may be conducted by small task organized forces that operate far from traditional hierarchical lines of command. In some cases the CSS provided may serve as a form of assistance to other agencies that lack the ability or sufficient resources to sustain themselves. These operations may or may not involve a direct risk of hostile action to PA forces. CSS in stability operations may also include large-scale support operations that support peace keeping and peace enforcement operations. These operations may be large in scale and have nearly the same CSS requirements as offensive or defensive operations. The use of contracted services and support may augment Army CSS operations

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CHAPTER 3

LEVELS OF CSS AND ITS FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Section 3-1 CSS in the Levels of War

1. General. Combat Service Support (CSS) system is very essential in any operation. CSS activities and flow of operation varies depending on the level of war. It is the level of war that determines the executable exercises appropriate for the situation to ensure successful CSS operations. It is however notable to mention that the levels of war and activities are linked. It is imperative that proper measures of preparation must be considered by the personnel of CSS to ensure successful operations.

The levels of war, namely, strategic, operational, and tactical levels-

provide a useful framework for defining activities within Area of Responsibility. The levels are defined by the intended outcomes, authorities, scopes, responsibilities, and concepts. It helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Each level is defined by the outcome intended and not by the level of command or the size of the unit. 2. CSS in the Strategic Level. Strategy involves the art and science of employing armed forces with other instruments of national power during peace, conflict and war to ensure national security. At this level of war, CSS links the nation’s resources, people and industry to its military operations in theaters. Combat Service Support in the strategic level uses the national interest to determine the nation’s strategy to ensure an effective, responsive and national power projection capability.

CSS supports all Area commanders. It is at this level that national political and military-strategic leaders, including civilian and military suppliers and contractors pool their resources together to enable the nation and particularly its armed forces to achieve its goals. Integrated efforts of all segments of strategic CSS system enable the commandant to project and sustain forces.

Activities at this level includes establishing national objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risk for the use of military and other elements of power; develop plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities. Support Personnel at this level focuses on meeting the needs of Area commanders. CSS activities at this level include the following:

a. Identifying mobilization requirements and mobilizing resources.

b. Providing strategic mobility

c. Establishing the Area Command base and communications zone

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d. Concentrating forces and CSS assets prior to the campaign

e. Reconstituting the nation’s military capability

f. Demobilizing forces

Strategic agility depends on deployment capability and the deployability of Army strategic forces. Deployment begins at posts, camps, and stations, continues over routes to ports of embarkation, includes strategic movement, and culminates with the discharge, reception, and onward movement of forces in an Area Command. Posts, camps, and stations must become launch platforms for force projection. Installations with deployable units treat deployment as their primary mission. They must be as capable of quick response as the force they support. Installations, acting as reserve component mobilization stations must be able to rapidly provide the forces required by the Area Command commander. Deployment capability also depends on the ability of the national infrastructure to move forces to and through ports of embarkation to Area Command staging areas. This capability requires an adequate national infrastructure and efficient use of both government assets and commercial resources 3. CSS in the Operational Level. It is the skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives within the Area Command through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of Area Command strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. The operational level of war is that level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish strategic objectives. These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than activities at the tactical level.

Support personnel at the operational level identify requirements to

strategic CSS personnel and coordinate distribution of resources with them. However, they also look forward to the tactical level to ensure that requirements are met. Operational CSS encompasses the support required to conduct supporting campaigns, major operations, and other military operations within an area of operations. Operational CSS personnel attempt to balance current requirements with the needs of subsequent operations. They sustain the force in Area Command consistent with the Area Commander’s strategic priorities. Military units augmented by DND civilians, contractor personnel, and available resources comprise the organizational structure of elements that operate at this level. CSS at this level differs from tactical CSS in terms of longer planning and preparation period is normally involved and the supported operation lasts longer. Its effects are measured over weeks and even months rather than hours and days. Yet, like CSS at the tactical level, it deals with the entire area of operations. The operational commander conducts operations to defeat the main enemy force. He also deals with deep targets and activities in order to thwart the enemy’s future

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plans. In addition, he must protect his rear support bases. CSS personnel must support those three (3) aspects of operations, the close, rear, and deep operations. Their main concerns are:

a. Reception of Army forces and onward movement of units, personnel, and equipment.

b. Distribution of materiel.

c. Allocation, management, and redeployment of units and

soldiers.

d. Reconstitution of capabilities when operations demand and the situation allows.

e. Establishment and management of medical facilities, and medical materiel management.

f. Planning, coordination, management, and supervision of the positioning and security of CSS activities.

The commander’s concept for a campaign or other major operation is

the basis of CSS planning. It proceeds concurrently with operations planning lest commanders and operations officers develop plans that available resources cannot support. CSS planners must consider a host of factors and variations in planning. Their goal is to ensure that operations succeed. Army operational and Area Command strategic support personnel work closely with each other. For instance, operational CSS personnel focus on reception and onward movement of Army forces in the Area Command of operations. That role is closely related to Area Command reception and onward movement. Like Area Command strategic CSS, operational CSS is almost always a joint effort. 4. Sustaining forces at the operational level are:

a. Lines of Support. Determination of lines of support must be undertaken to complete CSS plans. Interior or Exterior line of support may be selected, however, their advantages and disadvantages must be taken into consideration. Interior line of support allows the location of large, key CSS facilities at central point, and as such, requires fewer transportation resources since distances are shorter between support bases and the supported combat formations. However, it heightens vulnerability of centrally located facilities. On the other hand, exterior lines of support originate from multiple support bases and normally require a greater redundancy of CS and CSS units and facilities. On the plus side, those units and facilities provide redundancy of support and make enemy interdiction more difficult.

b. Staging. Staging activities may differ depending on its stages

and phases of operation. Initial staging area may be located outside the area of operation, or may occur at a later stage as operation advances.

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Establishments of forward support bases such as improvement of railroad, railways and storage facilities may also be required in some phases of operations. A decision not to stage support forward can result on longer LOCs with attendant increased requirements for transportation and decreased responsiveness. The decision making process involves constant awareness of CSS status. It is a continuous process, that involves continuous dialogue between staff sections and the commander.

c. Altering lines of communication. The diversity of battlefield will

provide unprecedented opportunities to exploit the enemies’ weakness and vice versa. Often, in these activities require shifting LOCs. The decision to shift LOCs is often a operational decision, but has greater implication on CSS leaders. Shifting requires very careful planning and intensively managed execution. There is the usual problem of continuing to provide support while moving support resources. In addition, there is a major movement control effort when maneuver units use routes over which support normally flows. The best way to support LOCs’ shifts is to be aware of their likely occurrence and have continuously revised plans ready.

d. Sustainment priorities. It is rare that armies have enough of everything, particularly on such resource-hungry battlefields as such that we are likely to face in the future. To ensure depth in operations, must establish and, at all times, ruthlessly enforce support priorities which are normally given to vital organization entities involved in the operation. Assigning or shifting priorities always involved some disadvantages and risks. The disadvantages are that lower priority decisions are, then, considered and risk are identified. 5. CSS in the Tactical Level. CSS at the tactical level comprises activities required to support the conduct of battles and engagements. It involves the synchronization of all support functions required to sustain soldiers and their weapon systems. It normally involves support to corps and smaller formations. CSS at this level is more immediate than operational CSS. While operations may last for weeks, they are normally measured in days or even in hours. Military units organic to or supporting the deployed tactical force make up the bulk of the CSS organizations at this level. However, support may also come from PA, civilians, and civilian contractors. In any case, flexibility and innovation are crucial. CSS organizations at battalion and higher level are largely multifunctional; one organization can deliver nearly total support. This allows supported units to deal with a single point of contact for support. CSS leaders form and revise task organizations to support the tactical commander’s plans. The execution of tactical CSS should enhance the commander’s momentum. The CSS system must fuel, arm, fix, and man weapon systems at the place and time most supportive of force operations. The aim of tactical CSS is the removal of inhibitors to the tactical commander’s scheme of operations. This includes taking action to ensure the survivability of scarce CSS assets at the tactical level.

At the tactical level, support personnel focus most of their attention forward while maintaining proper links with the operational level of CSS. They must also take steps to ensure survivability of support assets. Tactical CSS,

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like operational CSS, includes support to the three elements of the battle--close, deep, and rear. Just as the tactical commander conducts operations throughout the depth of his area of responsibility, the CSS commander is responsible for supporting the battle in those three areas. While CSS principles remain the same in supporting the various forms of maneuver, different techniques are used in each. The goal of CSS at all levels is to deliver combat power at the tactical level. The focus of the support system is ultimately on the functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. These functions all depend on distribution and the effective management of CSS operations, which in turn rely on a highly refined command, control, and communications system. Distribution is not a separate function; it is the integrated system which pools together all the required CSS activities to deliver required capabilities to the tactical commander.

Section 3-2 CSS in the Functional Levels

6. CSS in Management Levels. Functional Areas of Command Management related to Combat Service Support Operation and the OPORD. The relationship between combatants and the supporting elements (providing service support) is intertwining in the Operation Order, whether as a format or as a process of producing one. It is intended to amplify this relationship, and to foster relationship that would link the combat forces and the support elements. 7. CSS in Operating Levels. Functional Areas of Logistics as part of the Combat Service Support Operations. Combat service support has mandatory activities performed to successfully accomplish a mission. This manual will identify and elaborate those activities and relate them to the concept of AFP/PA logistics system.

It is at the operational level that CSS focuses logistics capabilities on force reception, infrastructure development, distribution, and the management of materiel, movements, personnel, and health services. Contractors and civilians provide support from within as well as from outside the Area Command of operations. The Area Commander provides strategic guidance and priorities for operations while the support component commanders identify strategic and operational requirements to the national industrial logistics base. Deployment and integration of forces and logistics in the Area Command are based on the commander’s campaign plan. Centralized management and distribution of supplies and materiel at the strategic level facilitate decentralized execution of logistics at the operational and tactical levels. Operational logistics encompasses those support activities required to sustain campaigns and major operations. It enables success at the tactical level of war.

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Section 3-3 Functional Areas of CSS

Logistics operations at the strategic and operational levels, namely manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving and mortuarial, make the execution of logistics at the tactical level possible.

a. Manning. Manning the force involves the personnel support activities that ensure the commander has the personnel required to accomplish his mission. It involves management of personnel readiness, replacements, and casualties. Managers must take into account civilian personnel as well as soldiers. Also, the manning systems must be able to interface with joint and multinational systems. Personnel managers coordinate with materiel and movement managers, and with the medical and mortuary affairs systems personnel to ensure that the right people are where they need to be at the right time.

The manning challenge is getting the right soldier with the right

capabilities to the right place at the right time. It is a process that combines anticipation, movement, and skillful positioning of personnel assets. It is the commander’s “troops available” part of the TOE formula. Present-day battlefield requires us to divide manning into five critical tasks: Predicting, Resourcing, Monitoring, Assessing, and Adjusting. These tasks are iterative and do not follow a prescribed order or sequence. These organizations have minimum assets necessary to conduct the tasks required at their echelon. The four (4) critical personnel systems/functions combined together to form the five (5) critical manning tasks are personnel readiness management, personnel accounting and strength reporting, replacement management, and personnel information management.

b. Arming. During intense combat, arming the force is a critical,

demanding, and time-sensitive logistics function. Army forces use a wide variety of weapon systems that consume large quantities of ammunition during combat. The arming system must be able to meet these needs through integration of supply, transportation, and maintenance functions. The system must be flexible enough to provide a surge capability to meet the high requirements of combat.

Ammunition planning must be included in the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is essentially the responsibility of the logistics personnel at all levels of command. It requires close coordination among tactical commanders, their operations and logistic staff officers, and logisticians external to the command. Logistics officers must advise the tactical commander on the availability of ammunition in the area, proximity of potential storage area to transportation networks, validity of demands, and other related factors.

c. Fueling. Like arming, fueling the force is demanding and requires a surge capability during combat operations. The mobility so critical to tactical success depends on the provision of large quantities of fuel.

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However, the routine/admin requirements for fueling are significant throughout all Army operations, not just during combat operations. All operations depend on movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, as well as the operation of equipment. Such activities are only possible if logisticians are able to accurately forecast and effectively provide the fuel to meet these needs when required. Measures to reduce the varieties of required fuels greatly reduce the complexity of fueling the force.

d. Fixing. Fixing the force is a vital component of ensuring

maximum availability of scarce equipment to the commander. It involves maintaining, recovering, repairing, and replacing equipment. Such activities require managers to integrate several CSS systems. The personnel system provides soldiers and civilians with the required skills. The supply system ensures repair parts as well as tools and equipment are available. Transportation assets must be effectively controlled to move maintenance personnel as well asequipment, parts that need work to maintenance sites. Typically, these sites are positioned forward to facilitate responsive support.

e. Moving. Movement is inherent in the operations of all Army

elements. The tactical logistics function of moving the soldiers, equipment and supplies is essential in the combat service support operation. Moving must be rapid and in sufficient quantities. Tactical actions require timely concentration of units while materiels are often short-noticed and required to ensure rapid movement of large forces and major shifts in directions. While moving, CSS units must protect themselves to provide logistical support to combat units. Planning, controlling and executing transportation operations require detailed preparation and extensive training of CSS staffs and units. The complicating effects of terrain, weather, and enemy interdiction demand well-planned engineer support as well as great flexibility of transportation planners and operators.

f. Mortuarial. Mortuarial services are immediately necessary in

combat service support operations. The way it is performed may have direct impact on the morale of soldiers and their dependents. It includes all phases of remains processing, from search and recovery to final disposition. The Grave Registration (GREGG) elements of Grave Services Unit (GSU), ASCOM, PA is tasked to perform a dignified the mortuarial and memorial services to the deceased AFP and other authorized non-military personnel. These services are provided as recognition to their faithful and dedicated service to the country.

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CHAPTER 4

FORCE STRUCTURES OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1. CSS in the PA Level. The primary role of Army CSS is to support Army forces within the joint force during combat operations. The CSS effort is successful only if it concentrates and supports forces as required to meet the commander’s intent. Though many of the CSS functions performed in war are the same as in OOTW, the scope of operations is generally much broader and involves more risk. Modern warfare consumes large quantities of resources. CSS elements must provide those resources as effectively and economically as possible.

In force projection operations, strategic support elements fill the distribution pipeline with personnel determining support requirements. CSS in the PA level includes the following activities:

a. Acquiring resources while forging strategic alliances. b. Coordinating industrial base activity.

c. Integrating personnel, medical, financial management, materiel,

services, and distribution management information systems of the Army with other Major Services and Governmental agencies.

d. Providing base support and services.

e. Maintaining national-level medical services and facilities.

f. Determining requirements for stockpiling and pre-positioning resources afloat and on land all over the archipelago.

g. Deploying and maintaining forward presence forces.

h. Identifying mobilization and demobilization requirements and resources.

i. Providing strategic mobility. 2. Army and Army Strategic-Level Commands. The Commanding General, Philippine Army, like Major Services Commanders is responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to combatant Area Commands. He fulfills his responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the major subordinate unit commanders of the Army OPCON to combatant Area Commands. The Major Services exercise authority and responsibilities, directives, and joint doctrine, which also describe the command relationships between combatant and component commanders. The Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, under their respective Chiefs and the Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation, are responsible for the following CSS-related functions.

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a. Exercising authority to conduct all of the Major Service affairs, to

include organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining forces.

b. Preparing forces and establishing reserves of manpower,

equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and operations other than war (OOTW).

c. Recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands.

d. Conducting research; developing tactics, techniques, and organizations; and developing and procuring weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of their assigned functions.

e. Planning for the use of other Services' intrinsic capabilities that may be available. This could include planning for and executing inter-Service cross-servicing agreements for supply, maintenance, and transportation operations.

f. Providing common item support, as directed for other Branch of Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.

g. Training, administering, and providing common-item support of their forces wherever employed. The latter is accomplished through the CSS planning portion of the crisis action and deliberate planning processes. Logistics preparation of the theater combines peacetime planning actions taken by CSS personnel at all echelons to maximize support to the commander’s plan.

h. Operating organic land vehicles, aircraft, and ships or craft. However, the Services’ logistics assets could be subject to the geographic combatant commander exercising directive authority for logistics over the assets.

i. Determining Service force requirements and recommending force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet the unified combatant commands’ operational requirements.

3. Operational Level CSS. This focuses on theater support operations that involve force generation, force sustainment, and redeployment. The initial focus is on generating a force prepared to conduct operations. Sustainment begins during force generation but becomes the primary focus once operations begin. Key functions associated with the operational level include:

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a. Reception, staging, and onward movement of units, personnel,

supplies, and equipment. b. Materiel management, movement control, and distribution

management.

c. Allocation, management, and redeployment of units and soldiers.

d. Management and conduct of in-theater contracting to acquire supplies and services to support the mission.

e. Reconstitution of capabilities in accordance with the UC4’s guidance.

f. Sustainment maintenance of Army theater stocks that support the supply system.

g. Establishment and management of medical facilities, and medical materiel management.

h. Planning, coordinating, managing, and supervising the positioning and security of CSS activities.

i. Army support to other Services, multinational partners, and agencies.

The operational level of CSS is the focus for the majority of general

support operations. Key elements of the Army's CSS structure at the operational level include dedicated transportation, general support supply, sustainment maintenance, Echelon III medical (with in-theater hospital facilities), and personnel support elements. Direct support elements also support forces operating in this area. Many of the stocks to support the AO are stored within the operational level, allowing CSS units at the tactical level to remain as mobile as possible. Support at this level includes common support to joint forces as required. A wide variety of sources contribute to these support functions.

Tactical CSS elements provide coordinated, tailored support for the war fighter. These elements provide support as close to the point of need as possible. They control austere inventories and the maintenance, transportation, personnel, CHS, finance, legal, chaplain, and field service capabilities necessary to satisfy specific tactical requirements. This section covers multifunctional organizations at this level. . 4. Army Support Command (ASCOM). As the logistics support command assigned to the Army, the ASCOM executes an extensive portion of the Army CSS plan. It coordinates logistics elements in support of regimental forces or the current operational plans of unified or joint commands. It organizes different types of logistics units into a support package to meet the

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mission requirements of the supported force. The ASCOM provides logistics support to the Army force and to other units, Services, or allies as directed, to include a corps slice to offset shortages associated with building division/brigade structures with dependency on passing back specific CSS functions to higher echelons. Depending on their assigned TOE, the ASCOM’s units perform the following in support of its logistics mission.

a. Supply support functions. In general, ASCOM units provide DS and GS supply support to non-division units. They provide GS supplies to the divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments.

b. Service support functions. The ASCOM provides mortuary

affairs support; shower, laundry, and clothing repair support; and tactical post-exchange.

c. Maintenance support functions. The ASCOM maintenance support mission includes maintenance management; direct support (DS) maintenance and aviation intermediate maintenance to non-division units; reinforcing DS maintenance and to the divisions, separate brigades and calibration support.

d. Transportation support functions. The ASCOM army-wide transportation support functions consist of movement control; mode operations; cargo transfer operations; terminal operations (to include water terminals when augmenting higher echelons; and aerial delivery support.

e. Combat health support (CHS) functions. The ASCOM medical unit provides medical treatment on an area support basis, medical evacuation to include medical regulating, hospitalization, combat health logistics (Class VIII supply and re-supply, medical equipment, and medical equipment repair and maintenance) to include blood management, preventive medicine, dental, and veterinary services, CSC, and medical laboratory support.

Section 4-1 CSS in the Division Level

Units in the Division Rear report their status and needs through their S4 channels to the Division G4 and the FSSU. Based on the forecast received from the S4 of customer units, the division G4 and the FSSU transmit the consolidated forecast to the UC4.

The FSSU coordinates and synchronizes logistics and medical requirements and activities (horizontally and vertically) inside and outside the division. The FSSU commander directs the flow of support before, during, and after operations. At the Division level, the Division Service Support Battalion (SSBn) replaces FSSU’s. SSBn provides CHS, to include preventive medicine, combat stress control (CSC), and optometry support, on an area support basis to division rear area troops; transportation support to the entire division; and DS supply and maintenance support to the division

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headquarters. It also provides support to the SSBn itself, artillery battalions, military intelligence, signal battalion, and military police (MP) company. Unlike the FSSUs, the SSBn does not provide support to the forward service support teams (FSSTs) for the other classes of supply.

The FSSU has medical, maintenance, and supply companies (See Fig. 1.2) The FSSUs provide direct support to maneuver brigade and area support within its capability to other units the brigade area. It has no forward support companies; the maneuver battalions have CSS assets to provide unit-level support.

The forward service support teams (FSST’s) provide direct support to brigade-level combat units. The FSST may function in a highly dispersed manner, with some FSST elements close to the maneuver unit and others near the brigade rear area. The FSST provides logistical support and coordinates the entire spectrum of supplies and services for the maneuver brigade. For the infantry brigades, all CSS assets for maneuver units have been consolidated into the new FSST design. This new FSST, with centralized CSS, better enables CSS team leaders to task organize CSS assets to support the brigade commander’s intent. FSSUs must have forward support companies (FSCs), a base support company (BSC), and a medical company (MC). These companies provide multifunctional support directly to a maneuver battalion task force.

Section 4-2 CSS in the Brigade Level

The interim brigade combat team is a full spectrum, combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. However it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-and and mid range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. This brigade has an organic brigade support team (BST) which provides direct support to the brigade.

CSS functions are almost entirely consolidated under the command and control of the BST. The BST is designed to perform distribution-based, centralized CSS functions in accordance with the prevailing concepts, although its distribution capability is limited. Its effectiveness depends on the employment of the latest advances in CSS C2, enhanced CSS situational understanding, and the exploitation of locally available resources.

The support provided by the BST is rigorous; it does not provide the same level of support that FSSTs provide to divisional maneuver brigades. The BST has a limited capability to distribute resources to brigade elements. The BST’s distribution manager synchronizes delivery schedules with brigade units to minimize the offload/upload time.

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Section 4-3 CSS in the Battalion Level

The support team is the logistics and operator in the brigade. The team provides supply, maintenance, motor transport, and medical support to units. When augmented, it also provides field services. The team elements have the same deployment capability as the rest of the brigade. The team missions require the capability to support incrementally and be highly versatile and mobile as. The team is structured to support a particular brigade. Generally, all of the separate brigades require the same CSS. The support teams all have maintenance, supply and transportation, and medical sub teams.

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ANNEX A

THE CSS OVERLAY

The CSS overlay will provide a graphic representation of the tactical array of logistical support areas (LSAs) and units. Ideally, it accompanies copies of the OPLAN/OPORD distributed to subordinate headquarters and is used as graphic backdrop to the general concept of support briefing.

The CSS overlay should include (as a minimum):

a. Location of current and proposed support areas b. Boundaries for CSS responsibilities

c. Main supply routes (MSRs)(division level and above) and supply

routes (SRs) (brigade level and below)

d. Locations of major headquarters

e. Locations of CSS installation and units

f. Locations of critical resources (potable water, etc.)

The CSS overlay will not only depict the tactical array of CSS units/nodes, but it is also an integral part of the overall OPLAN/OPORD graphics and must be synchronized with the operations overlays.

a. A brigade CSS overlay would include (as a minimum):

1) The BSA location and, using type using symbols, the CSS units and headquarters located therein.

2) Locations of alternate/proposed brigade support areas

(BSAs)

3) The SRs from the BSA to the logistics release points (LRPs) and/or maintenance collection points

4) The MSR from the division support area (DSA) to the BSA.

b. A division CSS overlay would include (as a minimum):

1) The DSA location and, using type symbols, the CSS units and headquarters contained therein, whether they are divisional or nondivisional.

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2) Locations of alternate and/or proposed DSAs.

3) The MSRs from the corps rear area to the DSA and from

the DSA to each BSA.

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GLOSSARY

Army – refers to the Philippine Army which is one of the three (3) Major Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Assembly Areas – An area specified for organizations, maintenance, supply, issuance of orders, and rest. The command assembles in an assembly area to prepare for operations. Axis of Advance – An arrow drawn on a tactical map indicating the general axis of movement of an attacking unit. Boundary – A designated line marking an area of tactical responsibility. Boundaries are very specific and clear lines to prevent confusion, but they do not prevent fires on enemy forces simply because those forces are on the other side of a boundary. Capability – A measure of the ability of a system to achieve the mission objective. Capability specifically addresses the performance spectrum of the system. Check Point – A reference point used to facilitate control of units .Check points may be selected throughout a zone of action or along an axis of advance or direction of attack. Contact Point – A designated place where two or more units are required to make physical contact. Coordination Point – A designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent units or formation must make contact for purposes of control and coordination. Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) – A line beyond which all surface-to-surface fire support means (mortar, field artillery, and naval gunfire) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. Usually established by brigade or division, but also battalion, its purpose is to expedite attack of targets beyond the CFL. Direction of Attack – A specific direction or route for the main attack or the main body of an attacking force to follow, normally used at battalion or lower levels. Direction of attack is more restrictive control measure than axis of advance, and units are not free to maneuver off the assigned route. It is usually associated with the infantry units conducting night attacks, units involved in limited visibility operations, or units in counterattacks. Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) – The forward limit of the Main Battle Area (MBA). Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) – A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces at a specific time.

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Line of Communication (LOC) – All the routes (land, water and air) that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Line Contact (LC) – A general trace delineating the location where two opposing forces are engaged. Line Departure (LD) – A line designated to coordinate the commitment of attacking units or scouting elements at a specified time of attack; a jump off line. It should be a terrain feature that is easily recognizable on the ground, generally perpendicular to the direction of attack and under friendly control. Logistics – AFPM 4-1 defined it as a science of planning and executing the supplies, the movement, and the maintenance of forces, while FM 700-80 defined it as the art and science of creating and maintaining a military capability. Main Battle Area (MBA) – That portion of the battlefield extending rearward from the FEBA where the decisive battle occurs. Designation of the MBA may include lateral and rear boundaries. Main Supply Route (MSR) – The route or routes designated within an area of operations upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. Maintenance – the work required to sustain existing components of facilities or equipment This includes, but is not limited to, renewal of disposal filters, paints and preservatives. Materials – expendable commodities used by the government in the process of manufacture or construction, including parts or remnants from destroyed or damaged fixed assets. Materiel – all items necessary for the equipment, maintenance, operations and support of government and military activities without distinction as to their application for administration or combat purpose. Military Operation on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) – All military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction is the dominant feature. It includes combat-in-cities, that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-to-street fighting in towns and cities. Objectives – An area to be controlled or captured by an attack. Objectives are normally assigned in an attack to battalions of a brigade. They may be the only control measures assigned and are used to direct the efforts of attacking units. Planning – the determination of the basic goals of the organization, the evaluation of alternative courses in action, and selection of the programs best calculated to achieve these goals.

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Repair – the replacement, in whole or in part, of components of facilities or equipment, or the overlay of components of facilities, after normal wear and tear, decay, dilapidation or destruction. Supplies – includes all kinds of property, except real state, which may be needed in the transaction of official business or public use, whether it is a furniture, stationery, construction material, livestock and such other properties of similar nature, or equipment for issue to troops, units and installations. Supply Management – the supply actions of an office or individual, encompassing requirement determination, planning and programming, procurement, receipt, storage, maintenance while in storage, control and distribution, packaging and disposal of supplies. Transportation – the conveyance of sediment materials or solid particles from one place to another on or near the earth’s surface by water, air or gravity.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACS AREA COMMAND STAFF AFP ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AFPMC AFP MEDICAL CENTER ALO AIR LIAISON OFFICE AO AREA OF OPERATION AOR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY APS ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCKS APOD AERIAL PORTS OF DEBARKATION APOE AERIAL PORTS OF EMBARKATION ASCOM ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND ASL AUTHORIZED STOCKAGE LIST ASP AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT ASR ALTERNATE SUPPLY ROUTE ATM AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE ATP AMMUNITION TRANSFER POINT BDAR BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT & EPAIR BSA BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA BSC BASE SUPPPORT COMPANY BST BRIGADE SUPPORT TEAM C2 COMMAND AND CONTROL CEB CLOTHING EXCHANGE AND BATH CHS COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT CMO CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS COA COURSE OF ACTION COL COMBAT OFF LOAD CP COMMAND POST CS COMBAT SUPPORT CSR CONTROLLED SUPPLY RATE CSS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CSSO COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PERATIONS CVO CIVILIAN VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATION DAO DIVISION AMMUNITION OFFICER DND DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DO DISBURSING OFFICER DS DIRECT SUPPORT DSA DIVISION SUPPORT AREA DSS DIRECT SUPPLY SUPPORT DTO DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICER EDP ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EOD EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL EPW ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR FAU FIELD ACCOUNTING UNITS FCPA FINANCE CENTER PHILIPPINE ARMY FLOT FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS FMS FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FSC FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FSSU FORWARD SERVICE SUPPORT UNIT FSST FORWARD SERVICE SUPPORT TEAM

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FSU FINANCE SERVICE UNIT FWD FORWARD GREGG GRAVES REGISTRATION ELEMENTS GS GENERAL SUPPORT GSB GOVERNMENT SERVICING BANKS GSU GRAVES SERVICES UNIT HET HEAVY EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER HFCPA HEADQUARTERS FINANCE CENTER,PHIL. ARMY HSS HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IDSM INTERMEDIATE DIRECT SUPPORT MAINTENANCE IGSM INTERMEDIATE GENERAL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE IPB INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF BATTLEFIELD ISO INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS LOC LINE OF COMMUNICATION LOTS LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE LPT LOGISTICS PREPARATION OF THE THEATER LRP LOGISTICS RELEASE POINT MBA MAIN BATTLE AREA MC MEDICAL COMPANY MCO MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER MCP MAINTENANCE COLLECTION POINT MCT MOVEMENT CONTROL TEAM METTT MISSION, ENEMY, TIME, TERRAIN & TROOPS

AVAILABLE MHE MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT MIA MISSING IN ACTION MMC MATERIEL MANAGEMENT CENTERS MOS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY MP MILITARY POLICE MRE MEAL READY TO EAT MSR MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE MST MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TEAM MTW MAJOR THEATER OF WAR NCO NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER NEO NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION NSC NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OOTW OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR OPLAN OPERATIONS PLAN OPORD OPERATIONS ORDER PA PHILIPPINE ARMY PAF PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE PDS PATIENT DECONTAMINATION SITE PIS PERSONNEL INFORMATION SYSTEM PLL PRESCRIBED LOAD LIST PME PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PN PHILIPPINE NAVY PNP PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

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POL PETROLEUM, OIL AND LUBRICANTS PSS PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT RSR REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE RTD RETURNED TO DUTY SALV SALVAGE COLLECTION SJA STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE SOF SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES SOO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OFFICERS SPOD SEA PORTS OF DEBARKATION SPOE SEA PORTS OF EMBARKATION SR SUPPLY ROUTES SSA SUPPLY SUPPORT ACTIVITY SSBn SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALION SSC SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCY SST SYSTEM SUPPORT TEAM SVC SERVICE TAA TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA TBn TRUCK BATTALION TCP TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT TF TASK FORCE TOC TACTICAL OPERATION CENTER TOE TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT UBL UNIT BASIC LOAD UC’4 UNIFIED COMMAND LOGISTICS OFFICER WSRO WEAPON SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Identification of change or Correction and Reg. No. (if

any)

Date Entered

By Whom entered (Signature, Rank, Grade, Name or Rate, Name of

Command)

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RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGES

_____________________________________ ________________________________

_________________________ (Originating Agency)

________________ (Date) SUBJECT: Recommendation for Changes TO: Commanding Officer

Doctrine Center, TRADOC Fort Bonifacio, Makati City The following recommendation is submitted for improvement of _____________________________________________________________

(Short Title)

________________________________ __________________________ (Long Title) page ________________________________ __________________________

Article Para. No. Line Sentence ________________________________ Figure No. Comment: Recommendation:

_____________________________ (Signature of CO)

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