Rawls' Principles of Justice in the Original Position

Omar Siddiqui (1067327)

Submitted to Dr. Seaman

Poli Sci 4FF3

April 11th, 2014

Why would persons, in Rawls' view, choose his two principles of justice in the original position?

In John Rawls' A Theory Of Justice, he sets out several conceptions to follow in the social

contract tradition set out by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Rawls' variation on

the social contract is the initial situation (also known as the original position), in which all individuals

are situated behind a veil of ignorance. The reason for such a position is so that John Rawls may

demonstrate his two principles of justice, and argue that in such a circumstance, individuals would

accept these principles due to the fact that they are simply the best possible principles. In this paper I

will first examine how the original position and the veil of ignorance operate. Then I will critically

analyze both of Rawls' principles of justice, before moving onto an explanation of why individuals in

the original position would opt for his principles.

Rawls gives several definitions for his two principles of justice. He begins by defining the

concept of principles of justice as principles “that free and rational persons concerned to further their

own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their

association” (Rawls, 11). Before setting out to describe what these two principles of justice are, it is

first important to examine Rawls' original position. In regards to the aforementioned principles, Rawls

posits that these principles are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This veil, much like the original

position itself, is a hypothetical scenario in which all elements of social distinction are unknown.

Specifically, Rawls describes the situation of the veil of ignorance as follows:

Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class

position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and

abilities, his intelligence, strength, … their conceptions of the good or their special psychological

propensities (Rawls, 12).

According to Rawls, this ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles

by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances” (Rawls, 12). What he

means by this is that since no one knows their particular condition, it is impossible to design principles

which favour their particular condition. Rawls provides the example of a man is relatively wealthy

(Rawls, 18-19). This man might find that taxes for welfare are unjust, and thus wish to advance a

principle which does not take away his wealth. Yet he has no knowledge of the fact that he is wealthy,

so there would be no opportunity for him to make such a claim. In contrast, a rather poor person would

most likely propose the opposite principle: that taxes for welfare are necessary and completely just. Yet

again, this individual does not know his own situation with regards to wealth, so he could not make this

claim. As he states, it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one’s own case

(Rawls, 18). This seems similar to the question of how to ensure that a person cutting a cake does so

equally. The answer to this scenario is that the cake cutter is made to choose his piece last. If he was to

cut the cake unevenly (in able to take the largest piece for himself), this would be unjust. However, if

he was forced to be the last to choose his slice, being a rational self-interested individual, he would

make it so that all slices were equal. As a result of this, everyone would benefit, rather than one person

taking a larger slice.

In Rawls' case, the same is true of those choosing the principles of justice: we do not know our

circumstances, so we cannot possibly choose principles which would benefit only us. Thus it is best to

choose principles which benefit everyone. He provides his own example of this: the two principles,

according to Rawls, are “those a person would choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is

to assign him his place” (Rawls, 152). Although he is quick to announce that we should not base our

reasoning off of this premise of an enemy in charge of society, as this is a false premise. However, the

analogy of the cake cutter as well as the example proposed by Rawls both demonstrate how we are to

go about deciding which principles of justice to choose. Rawls adds that “we should insure further that

particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conception of their good do not affect the principles

adopted” (Rawls, 18). As added incentive, Rawls insists on the finality of the agreement made in the

original position: “since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second

chance” (Rawls, 176). There is a rather large burden of commitment here: these are the standards which

will govern the life prospects of the individual, and so there is an incredible amount of pressure to

ensure that the correct principles are chosen. Indeed, Rawls writes that the parties must stick by their

commitment no matter the circumstances, otherwise they will not have acted in good faith (Rawls,

176). The principles of justice are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests

would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and

natural contingencies” (Rawls, 19). In a hypothetical situation (the veil of ignorance) where all men are

of equal liberty, the choice they would make is what determines the principles of justice (Rawls, 12).

This is akin to the social contracts of Hobbes and Locke, however the difference is that in this case,

“the content of the relevant agreement is not to enter a given society or adopt a given form of

government, but to accept certain moral principles” (Rawls, 16). The use of the word contract is

essential here, because it implies a certain publicity to the agreement. If a contract is made, by

definition, two or more people agree upon it and have knowledge of the details therein. The most

crucial aspect of this definition is that we as individuals are not left wondering whether or not others

abide by the contract: if the principles are the outcome of an agreement, citizens have a knowledge of

the principles that others follow.

Having explained the original situation, I will now turn to Rawls' two definitions of the

principles of justice. His first definition of the principles of justice is as follows:

The persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the first requires

equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and

economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority, are only just if they

result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members

of society.” (14-15)

He reiterates and adjusts these principles several times throughout his book under revised definitions.

The second time, they are as follows: (i) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive

basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others, and (ii) social and economic inequalities are to

be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b)

attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls, 60). It is important to note that these principles are

lexical, that is to say, the first takes priority over the second (Rawls, 244). The final, full definition

given by Rawls for the two principles of justice also takes into account the lexical priority and the

distribution of social goods:

In order to understand the first principle, it is necessary to examine what Rawls means by basic

rights and duties. Rawls lists the basic liberties of the citizen: “Political liberty (the right to vote and to

be eligible for public office), together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and

freedom of thought; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of

law (Rawls, 61). Since the citizens of a just society are required to have the same basic rights, these

liberties are all required to be equal. The second principle is a littler more difficult to understand. At

first glance, it is jarring to hear Rawls claim that social and economic inequalities may be considered

just under any circumstance. Yet he clarifies this in the second definition listed above; the inequalities

must be arranged in such a way that they are to everyone's advantage. What Rawls means by this is

that inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long-term

expectations of the least fortunate group in society (Rawls, 151). As a final definition for this paper, the

first principle requires each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal

basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (Rawls, 302). The second principle

requires “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest

benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to the offices

and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 302).

The reason for choosing Rawls' two principles of justice is simply that it is the best way of

enabling a well-ordered society in which even the least advantaged benefit from social distribution.

Justice as fairness requires that all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal

distribution would be to everyone’s advantage (Rawls, 150). These social goods in question include

liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect (Rawls, 303). This type of

well-ordered society would be able “eliminate or at least to control men’s inclinations to injustice …,

and therefore warring and intolerant sects, say, are much less likely to exist, or to be a danger, once

such a society is established” (Rawls, 245). He is claiming that his two principles of justice would lead

to a society in which everyone was not only better off in terms of social circumstances, but also safer.

On an individual level, Rawls states that the decision to choose his principles of justice is simply a

rational one. It is not reasonable for someone to expect more than an equal share in the division of

social goods. This would be unfair and impractical, seeing as no one has any knowledge of their social

circumstances or the amount of social goods (i.e., income, wealth, opportunity). Nor is it rational for

someone to agree to less than an equal share, as this would intentionally place them at a disadvantage.

Since Rawls is referring to individuals who are not only disinterested in other people's interests, but

also self-interested, it would be illogical for them to agree to a lesser share of the aforementioned social

goods. Thus the sensible thing to do is to "acknowledge as the first principle of justice one requiring an

equal distribution” (Rawls 150). This way, everyone benefits, but as Rawls insists, it is crucial to look

at the system from the standpoint of the least advantaged representative man (Rawls, 151). If, from the

perspective of the least well off member, society is considered to be just, than the principles of justice

must necessarily be just.

Furthermore, the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society men’s desire to

treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves (Rawls, 179). Though this point is rather

contentious, as Rawls is assuming men have a desire to treat each other as ends-in-themselves, Rawls'

definition is far more simple than that: it means treating men in accordance with the principles to which

they would consent in an original position of equality (Rawls, 180). Of crucial importance here is that

we as individuals do not sacrifice our individual liberties in order to obtain greater economic or social

gain. Rawls creates a rule of First Priority, also known as the Priority of Liberty, which is as follows:

The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted

only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the

total system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those

citizens with the lesser liberty” (Rawls, 302)

The second rule of priority is that of Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare, and it is listed as

follows:

The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of

maximizing the sum of advantages, and fair opportunity is prior to the different principle. There

are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the

lesser opportunity, and (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of

those bearing this hardship (Rawls, 302-303).

These principles address the fact that there is a lexical priority to the principles of justice in which

liberty (the first principle) takes precedent over the second principle. This is because the basic liberties

in question are for the most part inalienable in the sense that, they take priority over social and

economic equality: “A departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle

cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages” (Rawls, 61).

Overall, individuals in the original position would choose Rawls' principles of justice because they are

self-interested and they know nothing about their circumstances. Rawls contrasts this with

utilitarianism and the concept of utility itself, in which we as individuals must be interested in the good

of others. Yet perhaps this is a major flaw in utilitarianism: while we are no doubt interested in the well-

being of others, as Rawls demonstrated by claiming we have an interest in treating others as ends in

themselves rather than means to an end, we also are more concerned with our own interests. If we can

maximize our social goods, our wealth and income, our opportunities, we will. Yet in the social

position we are blind to the advantages or disadvantages we have, and so we are forced to take a

gamble by accepting rules which will benefit others as well as us. Yet we choose these principles

because in the long run they will benefit us.

People would choose these principles of justice because they are not malicious towards others:

Rawls believes the principles of justice are a force for good. While there may still be injustice after the

fact, that is another matter. No principles are chosen which intentionally put others at a disadvantage.

His principles, he argues, are the best available, and they serve the interests of free, mutually

disinterested, equal, and rational human beings. All the other choices, he argues, feature holes for the

least well off in society to stay disadvantaged, rather than be addressed by the social structure. The

equality of men in the original position requires two things: that systems of ends are not ranked in

value, and that each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon

whatever principles are adopted (Rawls, 19). Rawls argues that what makes this theory most alluring to

individuals is that even though the original position never existed, it is a point of referral for which we

may all check the justice in our society. He writes that “Our social situation is just if it is such that by

this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules

which defines it" (Rawls, 13). He further elaborates: "whenever social institutions satisfy these

principles, those engaged in them can say to one another that they are co-operating on terms to which

they would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one another were

fair” (Rawls, 13). These two statements sum up the bulk of the pragmatic nature of Rawls' theory of

justice. There is an expectation that all will follow the principles of justice, because, given that they

emerged in the form of a hypothetical contract in the hypothetical original situation, they are known to

all. Essentially, Rawls is saying that we can refer back to a hypothetical time in which we did not know

our advantages and disadvantages. At this point in time, would our conception of justice fit in with our

current social system? If the answer is no, changes need to be made. It is by a lack of dissent, rather

than explicit agreement, that we show support for the rules of justice. While no society, especially in

the modern day, was built on a group of men banding together with no knowledge of their

circumstances and setting out principles of justice as fairness, Rawls argues that this is as close as we

will come to a just society; “Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close

as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons

would assent to under circumstances that are fair” (Rawls, 13). Thus, Justice as Fairness.

Rawls has set out to show that a system of justice which follows his two principles, aptly named

justice as fairness, would provide for a socially beneficial system in which all members of society

flourish and thrive, including the least well off. He does so by allowing inequalities, yet only in the

circumstance that such inequalities are to the advantage of the least well off. Furthermore, he ensures

that the principles of justice treat all men with their basic liberties, following in a long tradition of

liberal thought. Individuals who were in such a position would no doubt choose Rawls' principles,

simply because they offer the best opportunities under the definitions that Rawls himself has set out.

Whether or not such a position (including a modern metaphorical position in which we remove

ourselves from our social positions for a minute to think back to a hypothetical time) would ever be

possible is another question.

Works Cited

Rawls, John. A Theory of justice. Original ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 20051971. Print.