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READINGSCARTER CH 14 , BEASLEY CH 2 -4 , KAGAN,
MORAVCSIK, BRZEZINSKI
US FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE
Guiding Questions
What unified the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War era?
What conceptions of power shape British foreign policy? French foreign policy? German foreign policy?
What is the state of the transatlantic relationship in the post Cold War era?
Can the relationship be saved?
Cold War US/Europe Relations
Acceptance of CW boundaries in Europe resulted in the creation of two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europe was crucial for
US foreign policy goals. In theory, relations should have
been relatively easy to maintain. The US and Europe shared similar
identities. European governments wanted the
protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Most governments agreed that economic cooperation was necessary to rebuild economies.
In practice, the relationship was not always so simple. Rebuilding Germany, Suez Crisis,
Nuclearization of NATO, Ostpolitik, French Third Way
Both sides questioned the resolve of the other
Mutual Tensions
US provision of public goods promoted shirking. Once nuclear umbrella
provided Europe unlikely to pay
Anti-Washington position-taking by European governments.
Dependence on the US would make Europe a “junior” partner. France ‘s “Third Way”
Fear over US commitment to fight a continental war over Europe. US “Forward Defense”
strategy scared Europe. Fostered “glass plate/trip
wire” strategy to keep US in Europe.
US CONCERNS EUROPEAN CONCERNS
The End of the Cold War
November, 1989 The Berlin Wall came down. Germany eventually unified
Neorealists expected Europe to “return to history” War would break out in the
absence of a common threat Instead, Europe has remained
mostly peaceful. Integration seen as a way to
“mitigate” the effects of anarchy
Raises questions about whether or not the transatlantic relationship is obsolete
Whither the Transatlantic Relationship?
What is the role of NATO? Euro-American antiterrorism alliance? Should it be disbanded?
What is the future of European-American relations? Disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War. Increasing economic competition
What is the future of the European Union? Increased political integration. How far east will it expand? Ukraine? Russia? Will it challenge the US as an “alternative soft power” superpower?
What is the status of ESDF? Praline Summit sought to balance NATO. Current British, French and German governments seek ESDF that
compliments NATO
Europe as an Idea
Habermas and Derrida 2003 Protests surrounding second Iraq War prompted authors to determine what
constitutes a “core Europe” mentality UK and eastern Europe often not included in any discussion of “core
Europe” European “political mentality” includes:
1) Privatization of faith 2) Acceptance of state/distrust of markets
State should step in to correct market failures 3) Limitations on the value of technological progress
Progress vs. traditional forms of life 4) Struggle for “social justice”
Support for the welfare state 5) “Sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity”
Be it on the battlefield or by the state (i.e. ban on death penalty) 6) Support for multilateralism (via the EU, UN, etc.)
STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS
Power: UK as a middle power Suez Incident made this apparent.
Institutions: Globalization has constrained
state autonomy. EU membership makes European
institutions key players in the British policy process.
Ideas: Concept of insularity
Very Eurosceptic Atlanticism (Special Relationship) “Bridge building” approach to
project a larger role in the system.
The PM/Government key actor in shaping foreign policy. Blair’s decision to call for a
vote in Parliament over Iraq was precedent setting; increased role of Parliament.
Opposition historically sides with the Government on issues of national security. EU splits this bipartisan
consensus. Public opinion:
Broad support for Atlanticism Iraq has strained this to some
extent.
British Foreign Policy
The “Special Relationship”
First classified as “special” by Churchill in 1946. Common language, heritage,
etc often cited as a basis for this relation.
Response post Suez Crisis: repair relations with the US. Wanted to act like the “older
brother” who could advise the US. Ended up in the position of “junior
partner” With the exception of the
Heath government, maintaining this relationship has been the top priority of British foreign policy. Although the current coalition has
suggested that the relationship should be re-calibrated.
Anglo Saxon Consensus?
Politically, the US and the UK are not all that similar Blair paid a high political
price for maintaining the relationship.
Came at a cost: greater distance between the UK/EU.
Brown sought to maintain the relationship. Particularly with Obama
Re-evaluation occurring under Cameron. Cameron believes the
relationship is special but should be re-evaluated.
Clegg believes the UK should focus more on the EU.
Anglo Saxon Consensus?
STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS
Power Middle power. Suez incident made this
apparent.Interdependence
Boost EU presence to project influence
Ideas Maintain or boost French
status. Nuclear force.
(Pre-Sarkozy) Multipolar world with a European pillar.
President is critical in the field of foreign policy.
Political elite consensus on foreign policy goals.
Focus strongly on maintaining strong ties with Germany to boost EU influence.
French Foreign Policy
EUROPEAN SECURITY HUMAN RIGHTS
Diplomacy key tool in France’s arsenal Budget would not support military
reorganization. French national security is tied to its
relationship with Germany, the EU, and NATO. Franco-German relationship key
Chirac began the debate on a French “re-think” over NATO Pushed the possibility of allowing
European control of some forces under circumstances where the US does not want to intervene.
Expanding ESDI takes place within this discussion over NATO.
Chirac publicly accepted responsibility for the Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany. Publicly chastised the
entrance into government of the Freedom Party in Austria.
Began distancing France from its colonial ties France was often seen as
propping up unsavory dictators in Africa.
Often seen as possessing a special role in African and Middle Eastern diplomacy.
French Foreign Policy Emphases
Evaluating French Foreign Policy
EU remains fundamental; Franco German relations key despite personality conflicts with Merkel Hollande: Talk of “re-evaluating” EU monetary and budgetary policies does not
go down well in Berlin Uses connections within the Middle East and Africa to boost
French influence in multilateral negotiations Chirac: Theoretical rationale for avoiding Iraq conflict well founded Sarkozy: Criticism between the US and France should be done in the
appropriate manner Sarkozy: France first state to recognize Libyan rebel forces
Increased Atlanticism under Sarkozy Brought France back into NATO Sent French troops to Afghanistan EU should not “balance” the US
Hollande has suggested that he will not alter this relationship
Improving France/US relations a means to the same ends Projecting French influence
STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS
Power Germany is too big to ignore. Unification was Cold War goal.
Interdependence Strong commitment to alliances. Motor of the EU; Accepted
integration and EMU for unification.
Ideas Committed to preservation of
human rights. Committed to democracy. Collective/cooperative action. Germany as a civilian power.
Chancellor and the cabinet shape foreign policy.
Party leaders from both the government and opposition parties play large roles in shaping public policy. Big decisions usually made by
unanimity. Basic Law prohibits the
mobilization of the German army outside of regional, collective security purposes. Federal Constitutional Court has
been critical regarding military intervention.
Public opinion: pacifism, humanitarianism, opposition to nuclear weapons exert a large influence over policy.
German Foreign Policy
PERSIAN GULF SOMALIA
Hyde-Price 2003 US asks Germany to provide troops
for Operation Desert Shield. Articles 24 and 87 of the Basic Law
appeared to preclude a German role within the conflict. Forbids military involvement
outside of region Changing the Constitution was a
no go as the opposition controlled the Bundesrat.
SOLUTION: Government agreed to provide
monetary support to states most effected by the war.
Refused to send troops or direct military aid.
Hyde-Price 2003 UN voted for a relief mission to
Somalia to provide humanitarian aid. UN asked for assistance in the
form of financial aid and troops Kohl: wanted to send 1,600 troops
but was unsure a consensus could be reached.
Opposition refused to sign on without a change to the Basic Law.
SOLUTION: Start talks to change the Basic
Law (abandoned) Commit troops under the UN as
part of a multinational force Buy time to allow for support
while dealing with constitutional issues
Evolution of Postwar German Foreign Policy
Interpreting the Basic Law
Hancock and Krisch 2009; Hyde-Price 2003 Case initiated by the SPD/Greens who argued that
intervention outside of the region and that peace enforcement extends beyond the Basic Law CDU/CSU/FDP: Collective security missions are allowed
under the Basic Law regardless of location. 1994: Constitutional Court rules:
1) German military involvement in peace enforcement and peace keeping missions is acceptable No distinction between the two
2) German military participation within a collective security arrangement outside of the region is acceptable Necessary to maintain alliance cohesion
3) Governments require majority support in the Bundestag for intervention Informal agreements codified by parliament in 2004
KOSOVO AFGHANISTAN
1998: SPD/Greens enter government. Majority in the Bundestag to
allow German forces to deploy against Serbia
Air attacks were the first military offensive since WW2.
Call for ground troops threatened the government’s support. Support tenuous within the
Green party. SOLUTION: Continue the air war
(support NATO) and seek a diplomatic solution (bring Russia to the table). Bundestag sent troops on a
peacekeeping mission after the war.
Expressed solidarity with the US following 9/11
Schröder proposal to provide German military support for NATO efforts created a backlash Red/Green backbenchers balk
Previous support for involvement depended upon CDU votes
SOLUTION: Authorization a vote of confidence Willing to use political means to
force desired outcome Exposes German soldiers to risks Reduced role over time; irritates
others NATO members
Evolution of German Foreign Policy
Schröder Merkel
Willingness to use German foreign policy, to achieve civilian AND national ends. Involvement in multilateral endeavors
promotes collective security (civilian) while also advancing national goals (permanent UN seat)
German-US relations Close ties before Iraq war ended
after 2002 elections German-French relations
Critical; Push for ESDP that could balance NATO
German-Russian relations Bridge between EU and Russia Dependence on oil creates
vulnerability
Also willing to use German foreign policy (including military) to achieve civilian AND national ends. Support for Afghanistan mission
(civilian) advances national goals (permanent UN seat)
German-US relations Sought to repair relations with the US ESDP should compliment NATO
German-French relations Personality conflicts exist Willing to work with other nations
where necessary German Russian relations
Takes a much tougher line on Russia (pushes democracy and human rights)
Evaluating German Foreign Policy
Can This Relationship Be Saved?
Moravcsik 2003Pundits say Iraq killed NATO; both sides
realized something…. Terror is a threat for the US, not for the EU. Unilateral intervention proves US can act without the
EU But, winning the peace is rougher than winning the
war. Is this a question of diverging ideologies or temporary
differences in domestic political situations?
Mars vs. Venus?
Kagan 2003 US and EU view threats in
fundamentally different ways US is Mars and the EU is Venus
US embracing the use of power in an increasingly anarchic world (Hobbesian). Technological gap in capabilities
boost willingness to fight. Prefer to act with others but are
not compelled to do so. Sees the world in black and
white. Strength and perspective make it
the primary target. Seeks to share defense burden with
the EU. US is BOTH a military and
economic power; EU is not
Mars vs. Venus?
Kagan 2003 EU is moving “away from power”
towards international law (Kantian). Support UN Security Council
legitimation of conflict. Push for universal applicability of
ICC. See the world in shades of gray.
Nuanced view privileges diplomacy rather than force.
Do not believe that 9/11 really targets them directly.
Strategic dependence on the US for military resources; unwilling to spend on defense. Economic but not a military
power. Domestic politics prevents
increases in defense spending.
Should It Be Saved?
Kagan 2003 Yes; But be realistic; the nature of the relationship has changed. Fundamental worldviews of both sides are unlikely to change. BUT, these differences are not as unmanageable as they appeared after the
Iraq war. Moravcsik 2003
Yes; Transatlantic cooperation remains the most important diplomatic relationship in the world.
Three possible paths: “agree to disagree”, part ways, or good cop/bad cop. The latter has the greatest potential for returns; ending the alliance would
require Europe to build its own military. Brzezinski 2012
Yes; A renewed west is key for enhancing the principles of the West US must promote unity within the West and be able to balance and
conciliate the East US/EU connections could pull Russia and Turkey into the orbit of the West Critical for US/Asian relations
Conclusions: Repairing the Rift
Kagan 2003US/EU cannot allow the relationship to deteriorate.
US can provide military might while the EU can provide legitimacy.
EU must realize: US will sometimes have to act unilaterally.
US hegemony is good for the EU. Should build up at least a token force; would help EU shoulder
some of the defense burden.US must realize:
A strong Europe is a good thing. Pay respect to multilateral institutions Needlessly provoking the EU is counterproductive
Build political capital for use when you have to act unilaterally.
Conclusions: Repairing the Rift
Moravcsik 2003 Preventive interventions
US should avoid when possible; commit to quiet consultation without public attacks
UN Security Council EU cannot use UN to restrain the US (UN wasn’t intended
to do this). US cannot keep thinking that WW2 gives them a blank
check Push for EU Defense Force?
Unlikely; Would just duplicate the US capabilities Develop comparative advantage
US brings military strength and the EU brings civilian strength (access to economic markets)
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