Realist Theory Applied to Greek Warfare

DESCENDING UPON US:

CONCEPTUAL APPLICATION OF REALIST THEORY TO GREEK HEGEMONIC STATES

Joshua Schow (PHC Box #336)GOV490 Directed Research

February 25, 2014Word Count: 11,818

Realist Theory Applied to Greek Hegemon 1

Explaining the History of Greek Hegemons: Introduction

Wars and Rumors of Wars for the Spartans and Thebans

To study power is the study the root of all human interactions. Political power is but a

small, yet important, element of life. Since the social, political, and cultural implications of

political power are quite diverse, concentric analysis of particular events helps researchers

explain the disruptive and normative elements of power. The international realists school of

thought has developed remarkably coherent theories regarding the nature of power as it relates to

political systems. These theoretical constructs have potential use in investigating historical case

studies of political power struggles.

While considering the predominant socio-political characteristics of Sparta and Thebes

during the fourth century, this paper represents an attempt to apply analytical comparisons of

realist theory with historical realities. The significance of these two regional hegemons in

military history warrants consideration. The unique discipline of the Spartan military training

contributed to their virtual hegemony over Greece after the Peloponnesian War. While the

Thebans military dominance was short lived, their martial potency was well respected during

their ascendency. The military genius of Epaminondas, the determination of Theban Sacred

Band, and the political willpower of the Thebans all bolstered the war fighting potential of the

Thebans. Additionally, these two states all have similar cultural background and their military

leaders all drew from largely the same history and institutional practices. Greek city-states were

fiercely competitive, but they were also strongly committed to the same mythology, cultural

institutions, and way of life. Thus, it will be easier to establish substantive differentiation on a

granular analytical level.


This paper will utilize a basic realist framework to examine Sparta and Thebes. This

framework is helpful for three primary reasons. First, realist theory emphasizes individual state

behavior in an anarchic international system. This theoretical construction, while seemingly

innocuous, is particularly useful for examining historical periods wherein no specific

international legal structure existed.1 Second, the realist analysis concentrates on the actions of

individual states as they interact with other states. The use of the term “state” here should be

rigidly construed to exclude modern notions of nations and instead embody a looser construction

of authority.2 Finally, the realist’s emphasize interest as defined by power. Thus, war is

conceptualized as a means of pursuing power.

Realist Theory Can Adequately Explain the Transition of Power

During the Greek Classical Period, the successive hegemonic power of the Spartans, and

subsequently the Theban can be understood as an evolution of socio-political power dynamics

triggered by the Spartan hegemony Post-Peloponnesus rather than socially disruptive imperial

changes of authority structures. This paper calls for specific analysis of each state as well as a

comparative synthesis of the respective trends theorists have typically observed regarding realist

theories. Through this analysis, this paper will evaluate the explanatory sufficiency of realist

concepts in the context of the two hegemonic powers in Greece during the fourth century.

There are two primary research questions that will help apply this thesis. First, what are

the basic conceptual models employed by realist theoretical constructs? Since international

theories are based on standard assumptions it is important to establish the accepted thinking

among realist circles. Given the large body of literature that has developed around international

1 While the internationalist school of international theory might argue the respective leagues of the time period constituted an international structure, these affiliations were too weak and abnormal to be considered a legitimate structure for standard international engagement. 2

To do otherwise would require an egregiously anachronistic reading of history.


relations theory, it is important to provide clarity on how the terminology has developed. For the

purpose of this work, the conceptual models utilized in realism will serve as an operational

definition of the theoretical constructs. Second, how well do realist conceptual models explain

the salient historical elements of the Spartan and Theban hegemony? This second question seeks

to provide a logical comparison of the historical narratives of the three hegemonic states. Given

the historical period, there are quite a few similarities as well as substantial difference that make

comparing the two states a productive venture. The trends in the two hegemonic powers

demonstrate how the similar states provide a useful paradigm for using realist concepts.


Concepts of Realist Theory

Constructing and Testing Formal Theories

There are several characteristics of formal academic “theories” that might seem counter-

intuitive to those who are not familiar with the standard terminology used in international

political theory. In fact, some theorists have, rather ironically confused the nature of theory with

the nature of exhaustive reality. In more common vernacular, so-called theories are used to refer

to unconfirmed notions, ideas, and abstract explanations. In formal scientific terminology,

theories are cohesive explanations of phenomena that have been confirmed through hypothesis

testing and rigorous observation. However, international political scientists understand theories

differently. Instead, a theory functions more a rational explanation of reality. As the well

respected international relations theorist, Kenneth Waltz explains, a theory is “a picture, mentally

formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.”3 Theory is cognitively formulated through a

primitive observation of reality. Whereas a scientist is concerned with experimentation, the

political scientist is concern with explaining that reality. Such constructions require individuals

to envision “a pattern where none is visible to the naked eye.”4 Thus, theories in the international

theoretical context are primarily inductive exercises. Although theories predominantly follow the

inductive chain from particulars to universals, Waltz explains that theories cannot be solely

inductive because theoretical notions “can only be invented not discovered…[it] does not explain

3

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 8.

4

Ibid.


or predict anything.”5 As such, it can be said that theories are primarily inductive, but also have

an adductive component as well.

Since the primary purpose of any theory is to describe reality, the value of a theory comes

from its “explanatory and predictive power[s]”, theories themselves do not directly mirror

reality.6 The truth-value of a theory itself is not found in the comprehensiveness, but the

cohesiveness of the theory. Waltz explains this characteristic of theories as the difference

between laws and theories. Of laws, individuals ask if they are true; of theories, individuals ask

about their explanatory power. 7 Thus, “[t]heories explain laws.”8 Theories themselves

necessarily require reductions of reality to conceptual components. While concepts are supposed

to have a comparative correlation to reality, theoretical abstractions are not themselves reality.

Reality is far more complex than any theory could entirely explain. While the scientist

experiments, the theorist explains. All of this is not to suggest theories exist in vacuo completely

stripped of their context in reality. In fact, hypothesis testing is where observation and

interpretation intersects with theory. 9 However, binary evaluations of reality and systematic

explanations of reality are two different issues. The error that some students of international

relations theory make is to always subject theory to experimental validation. Two theorists can

have the same set of data and interpret it in two different ways. Experimental validation provides

little insight in how to resolve the disputing interpretations. Theoretical tests, alternatively,

5

Ibid., 5.6

Ibid., 69.7

Ibid., 6.8

Ibid.9

Ibid., 8.


resolve the dispute by asking which interpretation has explanatory weight, is generalizable to

other situations, and can consistently predict the reoccurrence of the phenomenon. As such, the

question to ask of any theory is can it explain reality, not is it reality.

Formal theories are typically constructed by modeling reality. Models are the

representations of reality through simple formulations of theoretical notions. Any model has

necessary components that build on one another to create a useful narrative. In this manner,

models could refer to either the theory itself or a picture of reality drastically simplified to

atomistic facts.10 The modular expression of any theory contains only the most essential elements

needed to explain phenomenon.11 Theoretical constructions that attempt to explain reality will,

necessarily, not account for every factual piece of information and describe in complete detail

the reality of every situation. Thus, all models will isolate certain facts and ignore others. The

question of a theoretical exercise is never how comprehensively the theory incorporates every

facet of a particular phenomenon into a specific model, but how well the model actually explains

the phenomenon. Waltz explains that this is an important distinction because academics tend to

fixate on whether theoretical modeling is “realistic” or not. He says that “[t]he question, as ever

with theories, is not whether the isolation of a realm is realistic, but whether it is useful.”12 The

assumption with these ideas confuses the formulation of theories with the end result of the

theory. While the purpose of a theory is to explain reality, this does not necessitate that reality

constrain every component of the model. Reality is simply too expansive to force every factual

consideration into a model. That is why “[t]heoretical notions enable us to make sense of the

10

Ibid., 7.11

Ibid.12

Ibid.,8.


data.” 13 To create a model that broadly incorporates every data point is redundant. Since the

purpose of theory is explaining the data, the model must be simple and elegant.

Formal models are created through a simplification of facts of reality. Proper

simplification yields conceptually useful model for explaining the reality of a phenomenon.

Waltz explains that simplification typically occurs in four ways: (1) isolation; (2) abstraction; (3)

aggregation; and (4) idealization.14 Isolation of events means theorists will assume all things are

equal in a theoretical model and focus on a narrow set of actions and interactions. Isolation is a

necessary precondition to theoretical construction because, as previously explained,

incorporating all of reality into a model is impossible.15 Abstraction is more of the intentional

selection of facts for the purpose of constructing a theory. This does not mean facts are selected

arbitrarily or by force of preference. Instead, the selection of facts is based on contextual

relevance and meta-narrative significance. Similarly, aggregation involves grouping similar

elements together for the purpose of categorizing them based on criteria. Aggregation is

primarily comparison-based simplification. Idealization operates under the assumption that under

the bounded model perfection is attainable or in some way reachable. Hegemony, for instance, is

never actually attained because a state never completely dominates all political capital. However,

theorists regularly refer to hegemonic states as if they had achieved domination of political

capital. The end of simplification, and thus the end of constructing a theory, is to “seek the

essential factors where innumerable factors are present.”16 Once a theorist develops a sound

13

Ibid.,10.14

Ibid.15

Ibid.,8.16

Ibid., 10.


understand of the central tendencies in a specific phenomenon, they have a working model for

the theory.

The purpose behind exploring how theories are formed is two-fold. First, it helps clarify

how realist theory developed as an academic discipline. Given the epistemological questions that

typically arise about theoretical foundations, this exploration provides a key groundwork for

exploring the axiomatic assumptions imbedded in the theory. Second, it helps avoid

misunderstandings about the essence of theory. Realist theorists, as with any theoretical school,

deal with the fundamental constraints of any academic discipline. There is a tendency to take

theory, especially realist theory, to be a Weltanschauung for international events. This is a far too

expansive reading of theory. Theorists never claim that their theory explains all of reality, nor do

they even claim it is irrefutable. Instead, they typically take a subdued position that their

scholarship offers the best explanations for the phenomena students of international relations

observe in the world. Their theory best explains the data.

While understanding the formulation and the purpose of theories is important, there is

also a need to test the validity of theories against specific phenomenon. Here, theory most

closely intersects with the empirical. Waltz also provides a useful seven-step framework to

properly test theories: (1) Explain the theory; (2) infer hypotheses from the theory; (3) test the

hypotheses with experiments and observations; (4) utilize definitions according to how the

theory defines the terms; (5) eliminate or control the variables that theory does not consider; (6)

test the theory from multiple angles; and (7) if the theory fails a test, consider whether the theory

“flunks completely, needs repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its

explanatory claims.”17 Perhaps the most common error of experimental tests from countervailing

17

Ibid., 13.


theories is that the tests fail to operationalize the theoretical concepts correctly, or they

completely misread the theoretical concepts entirely. Another common error of theoretical

criticism is improperly re-evaluating the theory once it fails a theoretical test. Occasionally a

theory can easily absorbed an empirical failure with little consequence. A theorist might assume

that a specific empirical fact that seems to contradict a particular facet of a theory weakens the

overall usefulness of the theory, but instead the apparent contradict is of no consequence. For the

realist, if a particular state does not behave rationally in response to political signals, this does

not necessarily weaken the theories explanatory power because intervening variables or systems

noise could easily explain the aberration without crippling the realist theories. The necessary

requirements for theoretical failure require far greater failures than apparent contradictions.

The basic hypotheses of realist theory are defined by the fundamental concepts present in

realist scholarship. These concepts rationally constrain theoretical – as well as historical –

explanations of international phenomenon to certain parameters. The question to ask about each

concept is not whether there are particular cases that might disprove the rule, but whether these

concepts function as rationally coherent understandings of general behaviors of individuals,

states, and international bodies.


Concept One: The Anarchic International System

Realists argue that the structure of international interactions between states is inherently

anarchic. A domestic polity has a final locus of power - be it in a democratically elected

legislature, a collective federal system, or a unitary dictator. The end result of a domestic system

is the same; decisions are made on the highest level of authority. The power in the system is well

defined.18 However, the international scene is the exact opposite so it is “governed and

circumscribed by the struggle for power.” 19 Any alliances, institutions, and legal authorities are

artificially constructed. No matter how powerful any political institution becomes, it still cannot

operate as a sovereign over other nations. Hence theorists use the term “hegemon” to describe a

particularly powerful state. The rise of international institutions in modern times have been a

result of internationalist theories attempting to provide a legal framework to building an ordered

international system. Although these institutions have become increasingly sophisticated, they

still have not altered the fundamental realities of the international system in that individual states

operate as units. These units are “functionally similar” and seek to maintain their own

autonomy.20 In a way, alliances functioned as a quasi-legal structure for the Greek states in the

fourth century, however, the primary power center where decision were made rested with the

individual states. Alliances were a process for advancing hegemonic interests, rather than an

attempt to reduce hegemonic influence into a sovereign legal structure.21

18

Even in unstable nations, a vertical hierarchy of authority still exists in a muted form. Anarchy exists when there is no legitimate sovereign. Thus, a nation is said be in anarchy only when legitimacy of existing hierarchies of authority decay..

19

Martin Wright, Power Politics, (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004), 102.

20

Waltz, “Theory,” 104.21

Ibid., 114.


Kenneth Waltz describes the international system as one of “self-help” wherein “units

worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior.”22 This means the anarchic

international order is defined by competition, not cooperation among states. Each state has its

own interests and seeks to advance those own interests independent of other states (who in turn

have their own set of interests). The respective difference of states means that states must rely on

their own devices in order to preserve themselves. 23 As such, the interests of ones own state

defines how an individual state interacts with others. While they might work to serve a “greater

good,” states will make decisions based on the primacy of their own self-interests.

This is not to say a state that operates in isolation is the strongest unit in an international

system. Rather, the strongest hegemon is one that successfully projects its own political control

over other states while appealing to “some design of international unity and solidarity.”24

Hegemon’s become dominant powers when they “can measure strength against all its rivals

combined.”25 Most states seek to centralize power in order to maintain their influence in an

international system. As power is centralized, incentives to control the international system

increase because states wish to preserve their control of their own interests. 26 International

harmony arises when states are able to advance their interests without conflicting with the

interests of other states. Harmony thereby is an international equilibrium that services the

22Ibid., 105. 23

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159.24

Wright, 36.25

Wright, 34.26

Waltz, “Theory,” 112.


greatest number of interests for respective states. 27 Powerful states are those which can

assimilate the interests of other states into their own spheres of authority in order to maximize

their self-interests.

While states invariably prefer stable, peaceful international interactions, interests are

bound to clash and this makes conflict inevitable. Consequently, harmony is not the normal state

of affairs in the international system. Instead, states – being the final arbiters of their own causes

– will opt to use force if they determine it will serve their goals better. 28 This also means other

states must be prepared to counter force of other states with their own force. Typically, states

exercise force by coercing other states to comply with their demands. While typical state

interactions seem to require direct threats from one actor, coercion need not be overt to compel

other states to act. All that is needed for coercion to occur is when one actor acquiesces on one of

their stated interest to the advantage of another actor. 29 The necessary conflict of interest in the

international realm mean that war is the inevitable last resort for defending national interests.

Realists thereby see war, not as a disruption of the international order, but as a natural

component of the international system. Power politics make war a socio-political necessity. 30

This is why the father of modern political science, Niccolo Machiavelli, said the only designs

and sole study of a prince should be the study of the art of war and the disciplines of war

27

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1992), 102.28

Waltz, “The State and War,” 161.29

Mesquita and Lalman, 102.30

Wright, 104.


making.31 Because of the natural state of competition, an international actors primary concern is

about gaining and maintained power within the international system.

Concept Two: Interests Defined as Power

Hans Morgenthau, one of the leading international relations theories in the 20th century,

argues the central tenant of realism is that states are concerned with “interest defined in terms of

power.”32 Morgenthau finds this principle a foundational assumption that grounds international

politics in a rational order because it considers the reality of human nature while grounding

discussions of international politics in its own “autonomous sphere” much like economists,

ethicists, legal theorists, and religious scholars have done for their subjects of study. 33 He

explains that any psychoanalytical attempts to determine the particular motives of particular

statement are futile and deceptive. Not only is it nearly impossible to determine precise

motivations of certain statesmen, it is also equally impossible to substitute the motivations of one

single actor for the motives of a nation.34 Defining international relations in terms of interests

also avoids another common fallacy of attempting to predict foreign policy from the

philosophical proclivities of individual statesmen. Political realism instead relies on strictly

rational considerations of political interests. Realism also draws “a sharp distinction between the

desirable and the possible” in that a realist will always consider what political ideals and moral

principles are used to rationalize international actions, but will never assume these principles are

31

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. William L. Marriott, (London, UK: Harper Press, 2011), 65.

32

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th edition, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 5.

33

Ibid.34


what controls political happenings in the international realm. 35 Since reality is “replete with

contingencies and systemic irrationalities,” Morgenthau acknowledges that there are inherent

limitations to realist theory.36 Even with these limitations, political realism provides a cohesive

explanation of international relations in rational terms.37

Since power is such a central concept of realist theory, it is important to understand how

realists define the dynamics of political power. In its most basic formulation, power in the

international context is simply “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over

man.”38 The important distinction here is that politically the conceptual significance of power is

not a static notion indiscriminately applied. In fact, power is a shifting concept in realism

“determined by the political and cultural environment.” 39 The subjective nature of power is best

understood under conceptual prism of political power.40 Although manifestations of political

power are quite diverse, the foundational element of all political power is the “psychological

relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.”41 This become

complicated once theorists add concepts such as nations acting rationally as would an individual.

The situation becomes all the more confusing when one considers the competing dynamics of

35

Ibid., 6.36

Ibid., 9.37

Ibid., 9-10.38

Ibid., 10-1.39

Ibid., 11.40

The use of the term “actor” encompasses a breadth of theoretical applications. It could refer to a single individual, a state, or even a large international body. For the realist, the state is the most important concept. Thus, when they utilize the term, it almost invariably refers to a state actor.

41

Ibid., 31.


multiple states all trying to navigate similar politically complex environments. Here it is

important to recall that Waltz specifically cautioned against overcomplicating theoretical

constructs. While the dynamics of psychological relations between nations are indeed further

removed from the simplicity of two individual actors, there is enough similarity between

individual human interactions and international behaviors to afford comparison.

Typically, the source of political power is driven by three different psychological forces:

(1) expectation of reward, (2) fear of reproach and punishment, and (3) respect.42 This is true of

individuals and nations. How actors choose to exploit these forces is contingent on a plethora of

factors. Depending on which force actors rely on, the actor may rely on “orders, threats, the

authority or charisma of a man of an office, or a combination of any of these” to accomplish their

ends. 43 Often, nations will undertake certain policies for reasons entirely unrelated to uses of

political power, but these actions do not concern the socio-political dynamics of international

relations. For the realist, it is completely acceptable for them to admit that nations adopt

international policies that have no perspective toward political power.44 This could be something

like an economic policy undertaken for the sake of financial concerns within a nation. Of these

actions, Morgenthau explains that they should be evaluated according to their proper subject

matter. However, when actions do influence national power the value of said actions ought to be

judged according to how they contribute to the political power of the nation. The success of

international endeavors rises and falls in how useful the policy serves national interests. Without

this context, most international policies would seem completely irrational.

42

Ibid.43

Ibid.44

Ibid., 34.


Morgenthau explains that national power is defined by a set of seven elements:

Geography, Natural Resources, Industrial Capacity, Military Preparedness, Population, National

Character, and National Morale. It is important to note that these elements vary in regard to their

stability and consistency. Morgenthau classifies the elements in two categories: “those that are

relatively stable and those that are subject to constant change.”45 In reality, the elements – aside

from perhaps geography – exist on a variable continuum. Other scholars have constructed similar

lists.46 Geography is relatively self-explanatory element of national power. Natural resources

include both agricultural capacity to produce food and raw materials such as metal and oil.47

Having resources, however, is not enough to advance national power. A nation needs to be to

exploit them for useful purposes. This is where industrial capacity comes into play.48 Even with a

robust industrial capacity, nations still need a military presence. According to Morgenthau,

“[m]ilitary preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign

policies pursued.”49 He explains that military preparedness includes technological capabilities

and leadership aptitude as well as the quantity and quality of armed forces.50 As to the more

variable elements, population is an important factor that governs all the others. Population is not

merely a fact of numbers, but also distribution and trends in growth.51 National character, though

45

Ibid., 122.46

Wright, 26.47

Morgenthau, 124-31.48

Ibid.,131-3.49

Ibid.,133.50

Ibid., 133-7.51

Ibid., 137-140.


often difficult to define, is an essential element of national power. There is no disputing that a

nation with more militaristic sentiments will be far more agile, and adept at waging war than a

nation with pacifist preferences. Imperial Russia has a much different national character than

Republican Germany. National morale is tangentially related to national character. Morgenthau

identifies morale as “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign

policies of its government in peace or war.”52 This is by far the most transitory element of

national power. It is subject to the subtlest shifts and whims of the public. However, it is still an

undeniable element of national power.

Concept Three: Vital Interests and Prestige

While all interests of the state are to secure power, the interests that are essential to the

preservation the state – what the realist call “vital interests” – play a central role in determining

state behavior. In any system governed by power politics, that which is deemed necessary for

preserving the independent control of power commands absolute respect.53 Decision-making in

the international context must serve the vital interests of the state regardless of ideological

commitments of the state. While states cast their rhetoric in high-minded ideals, the real political

decisions are made according to what advances the political power of the state. When it comes to

a conflict of ideas and interests of the state, the interests of the state will always win. Vital

interests are existentially necessary components of state power; thus they are the prime

commitments of any state.

Honor and prestige are concepts that continue to guide political thought today. Most

theorists would refer to state honor and prestige as international influence. In the English

52

Ibid., 147.53

Wright, 95.


tradition, honor was used in the context of allegiance whereas in the Germanic tradition, it

referred to level concepts. 54 In the realist context, honor is used almost exclusively used to mean

the latter. Closely related to honor is prestige. International prestige is “the influence derived

from power.” 55 According to Morgenthau, prestige has only two ultimate objectives: (1) prestige

for its own sake or (2) to support current state efforts and political ends.56 While prestige is an

important instrument of international influence, actors rarely act based solely to advance their

own prestige. Collecting prestige should serve an end. The most effective policies are ones that

end up promoting “not the reputation for power but the substance of power.” 57 Although most

states do not adopt courses of action for the sake of prestige for reputation alone, they do

voluntarily restrict their behavior to preserve their prestige. When states see the advantage of

foregoing use of force to preserve international reputation, they frequently choose to adopt the

least coercive means possible. Simply because power exists within a state does not mean the

state will necessarily act. 58 This is why the international system is one of intrigue and subtlety. It

is by choosing when and how to exercise authority that states are able to advance their own

political influence.

Concept Four: Unitary Decision Making of the State

54

Ibid.,96-7.55

Ibid., 97.56

Morgenthau, 90-1.57

Ibid., 91.58

Wright, 99.


Since international interactions are a composite of an innumerable number of actions and

decisions converging for particular points in time, realists reduce political decision making to the

singularity of the state. In this manner, realist theorists conceptualize states as unitary acting

units in the international scene. 59 Because foreign policy considerations require one single

response, states require unity in order to provide a single voice.60 Singular rational actors select

acceptable goals and strategies to pursue vital interests within the international sphere. This is

particularly critical when it comes to crisis situations such as war. Although unity is not absolute

within a domestic polity, states that “attempt[] to achieve a nearly unanimous backing for foreign

policy are most likely to be successful.” 61 Such an assumption has become particularly useful in

modern contexts because of the centripetal force of national power. However, the unitary actor

assumption is not dependent on the existence of a nation-state. 62

Of all the realist concepts, the unitary actor assumption has probably been the most

harshly criticized on an empirical level. The dispute comes from defining exactly how much

discretion is assumed in setting state agendas. Scholars Mesquite and Lalman point out that the

unitary actor model requires that a single decision-maker set goals and strategies. Domestically

constrained models add the nuance that “goals are determined by the domestic political process

in each state.” 63 Thus, the single rational actor can only select strategy. They point to empirical

evidence gained from the past two centuries of international conflict, concluding that the

59

Waltz, “The State and War,” 175-6.60

Ibid.,179.61

Ibid.,178-9.62

Ibid.,178.63

Mesquita and Lalman, 27.


evidence “provides no support for the general outlines of the realpolitik perspective” of a single

unitary actor in international relations. 64 Furthermore, they criticize realist theory because “when

domestic factors play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy demands, the opportunity for

uncertainty to ameliorate relations between states is a boon not available in a world controlled by

realist imperatives.”65 From a theoretical perspective, the concept of unitary rational actor can

technically accommodate the domestic political perspective without undermining the

assumption. Most realist theorists merely avoid parsing domestic and international interests

ultimately suggesting that the individual state acts within its own interests – be it domestic or

international. However, Mesquita and Lalman’s perspective does highlight the limits of the

unitary actor assumption.

Concept Five: Morality in Realist Political Thought

Realists understand the role of morality in political actions as a secondary matter to the

socio-political realities of international interests. While the existence of universal moral

principles is not necessarily questioned, the realists suggest that filtering decisions through a

moral framework distorts the political realities of decision-making. Whereas power politics asks

of politics “what is,” morality considers “what ought to be.” Realists suggest that these are two

separate considerations. While they would not decouple morality from political decision making,

the realist would adamantly discourage politicians from constructing power struggles in terms of

moral absolutes.

There are several aspects to this conception of morality. Context must be given to any

moral claims. Morgenthau argues that realism requires that universal moral principles cannot be

64

Ibid., 266.65

Ibid., 269.


arbitrarily applied to state actions unless they put into proper context of time and location. 66

Likewise, realists also have a very clinical view of historical events. As explain by Edward Carr,

“condemnation of the past on ethical grounds has no meaning.”67 It is the belief that the facts of

history cannot be judged as morally right or wrong that place realists in direct opposition

utopianisms. The realist objects to political utopia not only because it is political naïve but also

because it is an exercise in international egoism. The utopianist argues that they are concerned

with the greater good, however they define the greater good by what their state believes is the

greater good. 68 Another manifestation of the moralizing phenomenon is when states cast conflict

in moral language while creating a political advantageous frame. Geoffrey Blainey explains that

war is replete with opportunism from before the war begins, during the war, and especially after

the war concludes. 69 Real motives are “concealed beneath rhetoric and the façade of morality” 70

The net effect of this behavior actually obscures effective political decisions.

The realist understands the duplicity of casting every political action in moral language.

The problem is not that morals are being used, but that such behavior is misguided at best and

manipulatively disingenuous at worst. Even the utopianist cannot cast a world that is not defined

by the interests of his own nation. The fact is most states behave opportunistically, regardless of

their moral thinking. In the context of war, it is useless to blame on side for causing the war and

the other for being a victim of the war because such neither side is entirely innocent. “All we can

66

Morgenthau, 12.67

Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1949), 66-7.

68

Ibid., 75-6.69

Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 173-4.70

Ibid., 162.


say is that one nation initiated or started or opened the war, but that is description, not

explanation of the beginning of a war.”71Thus the pitfall realist wish to avoid is not morality, but

the naïve syncretism of claiming the national interest of ones own nation are abstract principles

with absolute moral goods. 72 Here the fault of human psychology is evident. Waltz notes men

are “born and reared in insecurity” yet seek to create security by inventing theories that attempt

to provide universal systems.73 When absolutized, the political system itself becomes a moral

framework. Realists reject this idea, opting for a more nuanced understanding of international

power dynamics.

Internationalists and moralists alike criticize the concept of limiting moralization in

international politics on the ground that it validates immoral political decision-making.74 Indeed,

realism does have a tendency to amoral political opportunism. The best instance of this is

Machiavelli’s admonition to rulers to cast aside false humility and accomplish his own agenda

because the ends justify the means.75 However, criticizing all political realists as amoral

Machiavellians is misguided. The realists are not denying the moral significance of individual

political actions, but they are resistant to crass oversimplification of decisions to simple binary

decisions between good and evil. 76 Furthermore, the realist seeks to explain how the

international system functions, not how it ought to function. Thus, moral considerations will

71

Ibid., 173-4.72

Carr, 88.73

Waltz, “The State and War,” 21.74

Carr, 87-8.75

Machiavelli, 80.76

Morgenthau, 12.


always be secondarily considered. The realist argues that morality may play a role in the

decisions of individuals in their personal interactions, but when it comes to international units,

moral concerns have no bearing. That which advances the power of the state is what governs the

international system.


How to Apply Realist Theory to Greek City-States in the Fourth Century

Clearly, the conceptual significance of the “state” was much different in ancient Greece

than it is in modern context. Thus, there is an element of anachronism to apply modern

theoretical constructs to ancient socio-political history. While most realists would claim

Thucydides as the original scholar of realist thinking77, his political realism was far less

formalized than the modern notions of power, influence, anarchic order, and vital state interests.

However, applying realist theory to ancient Greece actually has several productive ends.

First, while it would be a disservice to both history and realist theory to carte blanche port

realist theory to the fourth century without particular sensitivity to historical differences, using

the explanatory models of realism to explain the events of the fourth century can provide useful

insight into several puzzling questions such as how the political leaders of the Greek powers

controlled power dynamics, why hegemonic influence was so volatile among Greek powers, and

why socio-political power shifted from Sparta to Thebes to Macedon. Scholars such as Martin

Wright argues that power politics emerged out of sixteenth century with the dissolution of

Christendom as states began operating as sovereigns with the only legitimate authority to

exercise political power. 78 The centralization of power within the state effectively made all social

organization political in nature. Consequently, loyalties to the state have dramatically increased

so that no other association commands as much fealty as does the modern state. 79 Thus, power

politics are a necessary element of modernity. While power politics became readily apparent

during the development of the modern state, elements of power politics were critical components

77

Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally), 1964, 139.78

Wright, 2579

Ibid.


of the ancient political conflicts between Sparta, Thebes, and Macedon. States were concerned

with their respective spheres of influence and how loyal their citizens were to their authority. As

such, modern realist theory is a useful theoretical tool for investigating the history of ancient

Greece.

Second, applying realist concepts to fourth century Greek states affords an opportunity to

test the explanatory sufficiency of multiple realist assumptions. The strength of any theory is not

in the true of a single premise, but in the overall cohesiveness of the theory. Realist theory, as

with any theory, increases in credibility when it successfully passes a multiplicity of tests.80

Using the events of the fourth century, it is possible to test the rigor of realist theoretical concepts

such as interest defined as power, anarchic state structure, and unitary actor decisions. The

purpose of using realist concepts is to test whether “expected behaviors and outcomes are

repeatedly found where the conditions contemplated by the theory obtain.”81 The following

analysis demonstrates that realist theory provides a relatively strong explanation of the events of

the fourth century – more so than one might initially assume. As with any theory, there are also

several theoretical weaknesses that do not account for historical realities. However, these

weaknesses do not undermine the theoretical soundness of realist theory even when it is applied

to fourth century Greek states.

80

Waltz, 124.81

Ibid., 123.


Late Spartan Period

The Military Ethic of the Greek States

Much has been made of the Spartan ethos in popular literature. The war fighting

techniques of the Spartan have come to represent the quintessential essence of the martial spirit.

In some fashion, the glorification of Sparta is really an overgeneralized praise of Greek military

ideals. War was an extremely important writ for almost all Greek states. Tradition going as back

as the Homeric legends championed the raw match of strength between warriors.82 Fair and open

battle were said to be the ideal for the Greeks. Warfare itself took on a rather mythical quality.

The warrior ideal is an oft-discussed element of academic scholarship on Greek war fighting.

The persistent theme among all Greek states is that the warrior is celebrated for his masculine

strength, disciplined, courageous, and noble. 83 In the ancient times, warriors displayed these

characteristics through heroic conquest and daring feats. 84 Gradually however, the heroism of the

Archaic order gave way to the adoption of the phalanx. While champions and individual skill in

combat were not the focus of classical Greek combat, the phalanx was a symbolic representation

of the collective strength of the city-state. The phalanx was a political extension of individual

combat because every solider acted part of a single unit. 85 By the fourth century, the phalanx was

the primary means of combat for all Greek city-states. As the political structures of Greece

became more communitarian, the Greeks developed the idea that defense of one’s community

82

J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 41.

83

Hans Van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities, (London: Duckworth, 2004), 39.84

Ibid., 81-2.85

Lendon, 65.


was a moral duty. 86 Traditionally, the duties attached to war rested with the political elite, with

the non-elite simply fighting because of command or the authority of state. Now however, every

citizen had a duty to the polis. In this way, the Greeks advanced their intensely competitive spirit

while promoting loyalty to their city. 87

While the dynamics of military obligations transformed during the Classical Period, the

central principles of excellent soldiery were solidified. Andreia – roughly meaning manliness –

was always an important Soldiers of the phalanx stood in tightly packed formation with shields

overlapping holding their spears in either an overhand or underhand position. 88, 89 The depth of

formations for other Greek city-states varied, but typically, the Spartans would line up twelve

men deep. 90 Lines would typically advance toward each other at a metered pace, and then close

the final several hundred yards at a run.91 Front rank soldiers would physically push opponents

with their shields.92 In phalanx style fighting, discipline and cooperation are key. Hoplite combat

thereby required soldiers who could not only suppress their fear, but also temper their aggression

so as not to break formation and destroy the cohesion of the phalanx. 93 The proper hoplite was

one of high honor. Shame played a major role in war. From a practical perspective, the soldier

86

Wees, 81-2.87

Lendon, 65.88

Lendon, 41.89

Wees, 189.90

Ibid., 185.91

Xenophon, Hellenica 4.3.17.92

Ibid., 6.4.12-14.93

Wees, 192-3.


that retreated jeopardized the entire unit because it meant the phalanx would break down.

Courage to stand and fight was a military necessity. Phalanx warfare was the ultimate

competition because once the phalanx was engaged, retreat meant total loss.94 Thus, the solider

of the classical era was acutely adverse to shame while striving for honor.

94

Lendon, 53.


The Uniqueness of the Spartan Ethic

While there is a considerable commonality of war fighting sentiments among Greeks, the

Spartan did have a unique advantage. While other city-states would general training of hoplite

soldiers might occur in time of emergencies, most Greek states left the military matters to only

the most elite. Peace was the desired state of life, so war was only considered when it was thrust

upon the citizen. 95 Not so with Sparta. Beginning at age 7, young boys left home in groups to

train for military service.96 Training consisted of intentionally harsh, survivalist environments.

The Young boys would sleep in barracks together, but trusted no one. They were whipped so that

they would learn respect. They were starved to make them resilient. They were taught to endure

silently that they might understand self-control. 97 At age 18, the boys would were eligible for

military service and would be brought before a unit of 15-20 men called a syssitia. If he was

accepted into the group, he would become one of the soldiers of the Spartan army. War was not a

primitive necessity for Sparta, it was secret craft to be practiced and learned well. The techne of

war was their way of life. It was the brutal training and focus on martial discipline that was said

to “make Spartans brave.”98

Realist concepts have much to explain about the Spartan approach to war. The realist

would say that the idyllic vision of the warrior upheld by Greeks was an idealization of the war

fighting tactics of the Greeks after the battle of Marathon. While there might be some truth to

95

Ibid., 108.96

Sarah B. Pomeroy, Stanley M Burstein, Walter Donlan, Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Ancient Greece: a Political, Social, and Cultural History, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1999), 139.

97

Lendon, 112.98

Ibid.


that claim, it appears that the Greeks, be they Spartan, Athenian, Corinthian, or Theban did have

a very mythical understanding of war. Their religious myths even compelled them to see war in a

more ritualistic fashion. This conception of war still held sway over the minds of prominent

Spartans such as Lysander were obsessed with the classical myths and building themselves up to

glory. Others such as Agesilaus had grand aspirations to become the net Agamemnon.99 The

obsession with personal glory directly competes with the notion of interests defined as power.

Defining interests in terms of power concerns the overall well being of the state, not the

individual. When individual leaders aggrandize themselves, they typically weaken to overall

interests of the state. Such is the case with Lysander who, by his own will achieved such success

that he excited the jealousy of his fellow Spartans.100 The realists typically assume that if glory is

being sought, it is being sought for the state in the form of prestige. However, this is clearly not

always the case.

Alternatively, the Spartan conduct of military affairs strongly reinforces the realist

conception of the role of morality in international systems. The Spartans – as a collective – were

acutely aware of power dynamics and thereby constantly seeking to work them in their favor. A

fact Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars quickly points out.101 In fact the

perpetration of the Spartan mirage in classical historians was in part because the

Lacedaemonians carefully encouraged their fellow Greeks to see Sparta as an egalitarian state

with boundless courage.102 They also displayed a remarkable propensity to dispose of idealized

99

Noreen M. Humble, “Xenophon's view of Sparta: A study of the ‘Anabasis,’ ‘Hellenica’ and ‘Respublica Lacedaemoniorum,’” Open Access Dissertations and Theses, 1997, 186.

100

Bury, 516.101

Thucydides 1.88.102

Pomeroy et. al., 132.


notions once they became impractical. For example, the orators made much of Sparta’s citizen

militia. The Spartans took great pride in their army of citizen. However, the Spartans were not

above using helots or otherwise non-citizens for their hoplite divisions. In fact, as Hans Wees

notes, “the Spartans structurally relied on large numbers of hoplites who did not enjoy full

citizen-rights, in flagrant disregard of the ideals of the citizen militia.”103 It is here that the realist

will say it demonstrates the artificiality of applying idealized notions to power politics. When

ideals conflict with vital interests, vital interest will win. The realist would not say that Sparta’s

reliance on non-citizens was hypocritical, they would only note merely that necessity trumps

ideology. While the Spartans might wish wars were fought with only citizens, prevailing social

and political factors militated against that assumption. 104 Overall, military mindset of the

Spartans provides an adequate confirmation of realist ideas.

Post-Peloponnesian Power Dynamics and the Hegemonic State

At the conclusion of the Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta was the undisputed victor in Greece

having just soundly beaten the Athenian-led Delian League. While the Athenians had previously

controlled a majority of Greek states, Sparta quickly became the regional hegemon. However,

the Spartan victory did not come exclusively from Spartan power alone. Indeed, the Persians

helped them considerably during the Peloponnesian war, much to the ire of other Greeks. 105 The

assistance of Persia did not come without political concessions. In 411 BC, when Sparta was

attempting to win Persian financial aid, the Lacedaemonians agreed to recognize the sovereignty

of Persia over the Greek cities along the Aegean coast, which the Athenians had liberated almost

103

Wees, 84.104

Ibid., 85.105

J.B. Bury. A History of Greece To the Death of Alexander, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan & Co.), 1963, 516.


seventy five years prior.106 With the financial backing of the Persian empire, it was much easier

for Sparta to defeat the Athenians and in 404 BC the Spartans and Athenians negotiated terms of

peace that were particularly advantageous to the Spartans.107 Immediately following the peace,

the Spartan leader and former admiral Lysander moved to solidify Spartan authority by installing

oligarchs in the Aegean states, levying taxes, and garrisoned troops in city-states around Greece.

108 Unlike most of his Spartan comrades, Lysander had designs for expanding Spartan imperial

control to the Aegean and northern Greece. 109 Both Spartan kings, however, preferred to restrict

the Spartan hegemony to the Peloponnesus and restrict Athens from obtaining more power.110

However of the time being, they saw the need to establish some control so they allowed

Lysander to establish his decarchies.

Lysander’s policies meant that Sparta had to act as a more aggressive hegemon in the

Aegean region. Although the Lacedaemonians had agreed to turn over the cities to Persia, when

the Persian general Tissaphernes began moving into the area and taking over land, the Spartans

resisted. Instead of stepping aside, the Spartans dispatched Thibron with an army to defend Ionia

and the other city-states along the coast.111 The Spartans had decided to project their hegemony

in order to preserve their own political prestige. Though it might not have been a particularly

popular decision, the Spartans knew they had to maintain their military image. While the

106 Charles D. Hamilton, “Sparta,” in Lawrence A. Tritle, The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 42.

107

Ibid., 45-6.108

Ibid., 46-7.109

Bury, 515.110

Hamilton, 47.111

Hamilton, 50


Spartans definitely promoted their own power, they struggled diplomatically. Both Thebes and

Corinth had been growing weary of Spartan aggression and Lysander’s policies continued to

alienate other Greek states.112 By 395 BC, the Athenians, Corinthians, and Thebans were openly

hostile to Sparta.

But Lysander’s ambitions to project the influence of Sparta beyond the Peloponnesus

could not last. Lysander was quickly dispatched to Boeotia to deal with the new aggression from

the Thebans. While in Boeotia, Lysander planned to overtake the town of Haliartus with King

Pausanias. When Lysander’s forces arrived at the town, Pausanias’ forces were nowhere to be

found, but Lysander chose to assault the walls of the town anyway. However, unbeknownst to

Lysander, a sizeable Theban force was camped nearby. When his soldiers began assaulting the

wall, the Thebans moved in and trapped the Spartan forces. In the ensuing battle, Lysander was

slain and his forces were scattered. 113 For almost a decade the Spartans struggled against united

enemies in what was known as the Corinthian War. At first, the conflict seemed to favor the

Spartans with their superior skills and battlefield discipline. In 394 BC, the superior training of

the Spartans at the battle of Nemea meant that the Spartans were able to turn what would have

otherwise been a tactical stalemate into a decisive victory. During the battle, when the two

phalanx lines of the armies met, the right wings of both armies broke through the opposing line.

While the anti-Spartan Confederates continued to pursue the fleeing wing, the Spartan wheeled

around and began picking off the Confederate soldiers once they began returning from their

pursuit.114 However, that same year, the Spartans suffered a crushing naval defeat at the hands of

112

Pomeroy et. al., 333.113

Bury, 541.114

Bury, 543.


the Persian fleet now allied with the anti-Spartan Confederacy at Cnidus.115 Forced to face the

reality that the Corinthian War had reached a standstill, the Spartans and Athenians agreed to a

peace mediated by the Persians. The idea of barbarians mediating a peace between Greeks was as

humiliating as it was indicative of the ferocity of hostilities between the respective powers. For

most Greeks, the King’s Peace was a humiliation of Greek ideals. 116

From the realist perspective the Spartan hegemony and the outbreak of the Corinthian

war highlight the anarchic nature of the international order. The self-help nature of international

systems prioritizes competitive interactions among states. Sparta’s dependence on Persia quickly

moved beyond mere utility into long-term dependence. Much of Sparta’s hegemony was

overshadowed by Persian mechanizations for and against Greek states.117 The political interests

of the Greek city-states also validate the soundness of conceptualizing political interests in terms

of power. War is said to be the continuation of political relations by other means.118 In this

manner, Sparta’s conflict with other nations was an attempt to maintain their hegemonic power.

The political and military actions of the respective Lacedaemonian leaders were all clearly

designed to preserve the vital interests of their state amidst formidable opposition.

The Declining Power of the Spartan Hegemony

At the conclusion of the King’s Peace, the Spartan king Agesilaus became the preeminent

political force in Spartan politics in 387 BC. Thoroughly aware of the rising power of Thebes,

Agesilaus moved quickly to dissolve the Boeotian league and impose Spartan influence in

115

Pomeroy et. al. , 335.116

Bury, 554.117

Ibid., 516.118

Wright, 104.


Mantinea. 119 Despite the set backs of the Corinthian war, he managed to consolidate Spartan

control of the Peloponnesus quite well. However, Agesilaus’ success was short lived. Until

around 382 BC, the Spartans had been relying on the pro-Spartan factions in Thebes to keep

more radical policies at bay. Leontiades was particularly sympathetic to the Spartans. But the

Thebans were increasingly hostile toward the pro-Spartan factions in their midst. During the

summer of 382 BC, the Spartan general Phoebidas seized control of the Theban acropolis, began

prosecuting political prisoners, and installed pro-Spartan officials into power. 120 This was the

final impetus for revolution. In 379, seven Thebans exiles entered the city by the cover of night

and assassinated Leontiades and the other reigning boeotarchs. 121 Upon hearing of the successful

assassination, two Athenian regimes supported the Theban liberators in expelling the Spartan

garrison from the city.122

It was then the Spartans knew the political tides had turned. In an attempt to reverse the

course of events, the Spartan king Cleombrotus marched his army to Thespiae in an attempt to

muster forces to retake Thebes. However, with the Athenians cooperating with the Thebans,

Cleombrotus realized there was little he could do. 123 Sensing the political weakness of Sparta,

the Athenians created the Second Athenian Confederacy and war began anew against Sparta.

Athens won a major naval victory at Naxos in 376 BC. 124 In the spring of 375 BC, the a small

119

Hamilton, 53.120

Mark Munn, “Thebes and Central Greece,” in Lawrence A. Tritle, The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 76.

121

Ibid., 77.122


Ibid., 78.124


band of 300 Thebans managed to defeat a much larger Spartan force in the Battle of Tegyrae. 125

By this time, the Spartans, Athenians and Thebans were ready to discuss terms of peace. That

same year, they agreed to terms of Common Peace, but was very short lived.126 Conditions for

Sparta continued to decay as they faced their own troubles with other states and they had little

appetite for what they saw as a meaningless war so they reopened negotiations for peace in 371

BC.127 Both the Spartans and Athenians wished to check the rising power of Thebes as much as

possible. However, Thebes was intent on promoting itself as the hegemon of Boeotia. When the

Theban general Epaminondas insisted that Thebes represent all of Boeotia Agesilaus adamantly

refused and struck Thebes name from the treaty entirely.128 The failure of negotiations set the

international scene for the fateful battle of Leuctra.

The complexity of shifting power dynamics is rather striking. In the span of thirty years,

three leagues129 were either formed or dissolved, two major wars were fought with a third major

conflict developing, and Sparta went from a dominant hegemon to a state in crisis. The political

sea change was dramatic.130 What is clear is that Spartan did not have an adequate capability to

sustain their hegemony for an extended period of time. While there are many potential

Ibid., 79.125

Ibid.126


John Buckler, The Theban hegemony, 371-362 BC, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 47.

128

Ibid., 54.129

The Peloponnesian League, Delian League, and Boeotian League.130

In the Peloponnesian War the Spartans fought with the Corinth and Thebes with the backing of Persia against the Athenians. In the Corinthian Wars, Sparta found itself opposing all of these states. In the coming conflict, Thebes found itself opposing both Sparta and Athens.


explanations of the failure of Sparta, realists would attribute many of the failings to the

internecine conflict between leaders within Sparta. Noreen Humble explains that the “common

desire for personal glory” was present among the Spartan leaders at the expense of “what is best

for the state.” 131 This competitive spirit is an embodiment of the ethos of Greek city-states which

was more aggressively expressed in Sparta.

As mentioned previously, the competitive spirit of Sparta creates a theoretical tension

against the realist concept of unitary state actors, but this very tension is the element of state

power, which explains the imminent collapse of the Spartan hegemony. Thus, realist theory has

some difficulty integrating this fact into its theoretical model. This is not to say that the

competitive spirit of Sparta entirely negates the unitary actor assumption. It only means the

unitary actor model has its limitations. However, as a collective whole realist provides a

remarkably adequate explanation for how Sparta chose to conduct its politics as well as

demonstrating the necessity of the self-help in an anarchic international order. Of the five

theoretical concepts, four strongly support the Sparta hegemonic narrative.

131

Noreen M. Humble, “Xenophon's view of Sparta: A study of the ‘Anabasis,’ ‘Hellenica’ and ‘Respublica Lacedaemoniorum,’” Open Access Dissertations and Theses, 1997, 186.


The Rise of Theban Hegemony

The Battle of Leuctra and Its Political Significance

Most scholars agree that the Battle of Leuctra was the critical event that signaled the end

of the Spartan hegemony and the ascendancy of the Thebans. When Agesilaus went into

negotiations with Athens and Thebes, he also sent Cleombrotus with an army to the fields of

Phocis to ensure a favorable outcome. 132 Once the peace treaty was signed without Thebes being

a party to the treaty, Cleombrotus sent massagers to Sparta asking for advice on whether he

should move on Thebes. At the urging of Agesilaus, Cleombrotus began to march on through

Phocis to the Corinthian Gulf, taking out several Boeotian garrisons along the way. 133 The goal

was to march on Thebes in order to compel them to dissolve the Boeotian Confederacy. 134 The

Theban leaders were divided on what to do. While they all agreed they could not capitulate, the

leaders feared that they would lose any pitched battle with Sparta. Epaminondas argued that if

they did not face Cleombrotus in pitched battle, they would lose the support of their allies. 135

Eventually, Epaminondas won out so he and their allies marched to Leuctra. When the Spartans

drew up their lines in standard formation with the Spartans at the place of honor (infantry

numbered somewhere between 9,000-10,000) and placed his cavalry in front of the line (800-

1,000 strong). 136 Epaminondas adopted a slightly different tactic. He placed the Thebans on the

left flank of his line so that they would directly face the Spartans and instead of lining up the

132

Ibid., 48-9.133

Munn, 83.134

Buckler, 54.135

Ibid., 62.136

Ibid., 63


Thebans in the standard twelve shields deep formation, he put them fifty shields deep.137 At the

front of Epaminondas line stood the 300 soldiers of the Theban Sacred Band. After the Theban

cavalry drove off the Spartan cavalry, Cleombrotus attempted to outflank the Theban line. But

Epaminondas ordered his line to advance in an oblique rotation so that they would meet the

Spartans head on. When the lines met on the battlefield the Thebans and Spartans were the first

wing to clash. The fighting was frenetic and intense, but eventually the Spartan line broke and

scattered and the rest of the army fell back to their camp. Of the 700 estimated Spartans present

at the battle, 400 were killed along with their king Cleombrotus.138

The immediate consequence of Leuctra was that Sparta’s reputation was entirely ruined.

The image of the powerful Spartan warrior had been completely shattered. Sparta never

politically recovered their loss at Leuctra. The Thebans capitalized on this humiliation of Sparta

by consolidating their power in central Greece, first taking a stronghold of Thespian exiles, next

eliminating Orchomenus, and then assimilating the Phocians into the Boeotian League.139 Their

closest rival, Jason of Pherae in Thessaly, was the only central Greek threat to the Theban

ascendancy. Conveniently for the Thebans, Jason was soon assassinated.140 Meanwhile, in the

Peloponnesus, the state of affairs was rapidly declining for Sparta. Sedition was proliferating

throughout the area with the most prominent insurrection of Mantinea, Tegea, and city-states in

Arcadia formed their own league to oppose Lacedaemonian control of the area.141 As state new to

137


Munn, 84.139

Ibid., 86.140

Buckler, 67.141

Pomeroy et. al., 340.


hegemonic power, the Thebans initially concentrated most of their efforts on internal security as

opposed to expanding their influence to other states. Consequently, the distraction of external

dissent in the Peloponnesus provided adequate peace from Spartan encroachment into Boeotia.

Because the battle of Leuctra singled such a gravitational shift in political power, there is

wide latitude for testing realist concepts against these events. The application of the anarchic

international order provides an elegant test for the conditions leading to the battle itself. The

political power struggle between Sparta and Thebes gives us a good instance of how competing

states attempt to leverage their own power in an anarchic system. The violence inherent in the

transfer of hegemonic status is to be expected in anarchic international systems. 142 Peace is still a

legitimate option for any state. As with the Kings Peace negotiated by Persian, the Theban

agreement to peace in 374 BC was another instance of the process of negotiation was subsumed

in the interests of the state. The same was true of Spartan interests in peace. However, the peace

accords broke down rapidly because the Thebans continued to displace significant vital interests

of the Spartan state. Since the controlling interests of Thebes were to continue expanding its own

power, conflict of interests was inevitable. This means the second concept – interests defined as

power – is also equally verified.

While the initial disagreement of Theban leaders about the proper course of action after

the breakdown in negotiations in 371 BC might seem to compromise the unitary actor

assumption, concept is not at all jeopardized. Here the unitary actor assumption is not

compromised because the assumption does not require an absence of disagreement – such

assumption would be absurd – but that a state acts with one decision. The reason the Spartan

behavior calls the unitary actor assumption into question is because the competing interests

142

Mesquita and Lalman, 186.


frequently produced a multiplicity of responses. Here that problem is nonexistent because

Epaminondas actually acted in the end without any contradictory output.

Theban Status as a Hegemonic Power

Within a year, Thebes had consolidated power in central Greece and was preparing to

project its influence into the Peloponnesus itself. Before invading the region however, the

Thebans secured the cooperation of Argos, the Arcadian League, and Elis. 143 With a ring of

hostile states threatening their power, the Spartans used the pre-text of settling civil unrest in

Tegea to launch a campaign against the Arcadian League. The Thebans responded in kind by

mobilizing their army in the Peloponnesus.144 The 6,000 Boeotian troops eventually came to

Laconia and Epaminondas deployed his strategy to conduct a four-pronged attack on Sparta. 145

Upon hearing of the impending invasion, the Spartans managed to muster an additional 4,000

men from allies. This was not enough men to mount a counter-attack on Epaminondas’ forces,

but it was enough to dissuade the army from attacking Sparta directly. While in Laconia,

Epameinondas’ men encountered significant resistance from the helots and perioikoi.146 The

destruction the Boeotian army wrought on the land appalled the inhabitants who saw them not a

liberators, but as a foreign plague. Eventually, the Spartans managed to convince the Athenians

to send a full levy of troop into Corinthia which eventually encouraged Epaminondas to leave the

Peloponnesus to push the Athenians out of their territory before they menaced Thebes. In the

summer of 369 BC, Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnesus again with the intent to isolate

143

Buckler, 73.144

Ibid., 74145

Ibid., 77.146

Ibid., 85.


Sparta politically and diplomatically. By the end of Epaminondas’ second campaign, all of the

Peloponnesian states – save Corinth and Phlius – continued to participate in the war against

Thebes. 147

During his invasions of the Peloponnesus, the Thebans demonstrated an acute awareness

of their own expanding power as hegemon. Machiavelli would likely have praised their

fortuitous protection of their own interests in isolating their enemies and dismantling their key

elements of power. The Thebans directly deprived the Spartans of their natural resources,

industrial capacity – to the extent “industrial” capacity existed in classical Greece – and military

prepared while simultaneously demoralizing the Lacedaemonians. The threat of force became a

reality for the Thebans. Although Epaminondas never managed to conquer Sparta, he did not

need to. The destruction he visited on the surrounding territory crippled the Spartan military

system. 148 Theban prestige during their hegemony was high. As other city-states began to

recognize the coming shift of political power, they quickly sent envoys to Thebes in order to

secure the favor of Thebes. 149 It is likely that other city-states – especially those in the

Peloponnesus were motivated more by their distaste for Spartan than their appreciation of

Thebes. But from the realist perspective these motivations are secondary concerns. The

important element is that Thebes had secured its status as hegemon.

147

Ibid., 101.148

Ibid., 90.149

Ibid., 72.


The Battle of Mantinea and the Decline of Thebes

However, after the invasions of the Peloponnesus Thebes began gradually retreating from

Peloponnesian politics. The retreat allowed several disputes to fester and allowed the Arcadians

to being reasserting themselves. 150 Eventually Arcadian gathered enough political power to begin

politically challenging Thebes status as hegemon. The peace treaty between Thebes and the

Arcadian League did not specify a legal hegemonia, but the Thebans instead functioned as a de

facto hegemon throughout their alliance. 151 However, Lycomedes of Mantinea now argued that

Thebes did not have a right to claim that solution. To avoid this political question Epaminondas

devised a simple solution: he would declare an invasion of Achaea and the Peloponnesian allies

would have to commit troops to the effort and the question of hegemony would be resolved. The

Achaean campaign would also serve to stabilize relations between Arcadia by resolving ongoing

disputes between other city-states. 152 When Epaminondas announced the invasion, all of their

allies promptly obeyed. As events progressed, Epaminondas found himself invading Arcadia

preparing for a battle against a united Mantinea, Sparta, and Athens. On the plains of Mantinea

Epaminondas drew up his army of 30,000 infantry and cavalry to faced 22,000 infantry and

cavalry from the coalition forces. 153 Epaminondas quickly arrayed his forces like he had at

Leuctra with the Thebans on the left wing. He then immediately ordered his line forward. This

immediate action caused some confusion among the Spartan ranks. The cavalry divisions of each

army began fighting, but the more sophisticated Boeotian cavalry easily prevailed, driving their

150

Ibid., 105.151

Ibid., 186.152

Ibid.153

Munn, 94.


opponents back into their own battle lines.154 While the cavalry were engaged, Epaminondas’

wing struck the Spartan line. As at Leuctra the Thebans prevailed over the Spartan line, however,

as soon as the line began to break, Epaminondas, who had been fighting at the front of his wing

was struck and killed. 155 The Boeotians immediately ceased their pursuit. While the battle was a

tactical victory, the engagement proved to be fatal to the Thebans. Without the decisive

leadership of Epaminondas, the Theban hegemony quickly evaporated.

The realist perspective provides two useful insights about the end of the Theban

hegemony. First, while the political leadership of Epaminondas was a welcome advantage to

Thebes, the absence of any suitable successors crippled the political power of the Thebans. From

a theoretical points of view then, the Theban hegemony was rather thinly constructed because it

was not based on strong political power, but a singular personality. In fact, the competitive spirit

of the Greeks probably limited the effectiveness of any hegemony, be it Spartan, or Theban.

With no institutional state to perpetrate the power of the Thebes, there is no way to sustain

political hegemony. In this way, the classical Greeks deferred sharply from the nation-state

system in which political realism tends to thrive. Second, while the Theban hegemony definitely

confirms the necessity of prestige, it also highlights the limitation of the concept. The Theban

reliance on their own prestige to maintain their status could not be sustained on a finite supply of

power from a single individual.

154

Buckler, 218.155

Ibid., 218-9.


Realist Concepts as Applied to the Fourth Century Greeks

The exercise of applying realist theory to the Spartan hegemony and Theban confirms the

validity of realist concepts of international politics. The Spartan behaviors related to the

treatment alliances and processes of negotiation confirm that they understood the nature of a self-

help anarchic international system. Similarly, the Thebans reliance on their own political capital

illustrates the importance of understanding that states organize accordance to power dynamics. In

this way, the anarchic system is an “organic” method of organizing political interactions.

Sparta’s reliance on Persian support further illustrates the necessities of self-help in such an

organic system.

Conceptually, interests defined, as power has been the strongest notion. The entire

political framework of both Sparta and Thebes essentially assume that the chief end of their

system is to maximize power and minimize threats to their own existence. Every political action

is organized according to this principle. The Spartans were particularly adept at asserting their

image and promoting positive images of their culture to advance their power. The Thebans

understood the nature of competition meant that they had to secure themselves and secure their

objectives as a matter of political necessity.

In the same vein, this study has also confirmed the conceptual soundness of states

pursuing their vital interests. The prestige of Sparta’s military might and martial spirit did much

to advance their position among their fellow Greeks. When it came interacting with other states,

particularly rivals, both Lysander and Agesilaus both had an understanding of which interests

they needed to serve in order to maintain the hegemony of the Spartan state. Likewise,

Epaminondas’ understanding of the interests of Thebes led him to solve political questions with

ease.


Perhaps the weakest concept in realist theory is the unitary actor assumption. Given the

Spartans competition among leaders for personal glory, it is sometimes impossible to deduce a

singular actor with final authority. The concept is less problematic in the Theban context.

Nevertheless, the unitary actor assumption is still a useful model for understanding how political

decisions are made. While it might not always be clear where to vest unitary decision making

from a theoretical perspective, it is still essential to providing a useful explanatory model of

reality.

Finally, the minimized role of the morality in politics has been confirmed as well. Both

the Spartans and Thebans, while they might have invoked moral language or noble ideals, clearly

acted according to their own self-interests. They obeyed custom, protocol, and treaties when it

was in their best interests. However, when it inhibited the interests of the state they were quick to

abandon them. Sparta’s outright disregard for the treaties – even though the breach of a treaty

was a sacred offense – demonstrates their self-interests were relevant factors for their decisions.

Hegemonic power is quite unique in that it involves complex interaction of unperceivable

social behaviors and an innumerable amount of strategic moves. Realist theory is a useful tool

for reducing those infinite complexities to a systematic, coherent model of reality. If power is the

root of all human actions, then realist theory provides a useful paradigm for understand the

essential elements of human interactions.

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Realist Theory Applied to Greek Warfare