Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies

d/b/a Mark Yanalitis CC Some Rights Reserved

Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies

2012 Information Systems Security Organization (ISSA) Information Security Forum

Dave and Buster's180 E Waterfront Dr

Homestead, Pennsylvania

Presenters: Mark Yanalitis CISSP, IT Infrastructure Architect, PNC Bank

Bill Johnson CPP, Director of Corporate Security and Employee Safety, Highmark Inc.



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Goals for today• Define Red Teaming and its’ rationale • Discuss differences between commercial and

full-spectrum Red Teaming • Discuss differences between commercial and

full-spectrum methodologies• Examine common engagement risks• Application of Red Teaming methods • A companion document exists as

supplemental reading resource for this presentation

Friday May 4th, 2012



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Red Teaming Definitions“An array of activity where the overall goal is to understand the adversaries perspective in order to identify one's own vulnerabilities and challenge one 's own assumptions.”1

“Authorized, adversary-based assessment for defensive purposes.“2

“Review of control design and threat-based penetration testing to simulate actual attacks.”3




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Commercial v. Full Spectrum

Commercial engagements• Threat-based modeling• Compliance mandates• IT Audit adjunct testing• Goal is quick penetration• Cost and time driven• Automation dependency• Survey the known

Full-Spectrum engagements• Capabilities-based or

hybrid modeling• Simulations• Goal is understanding• Risk analysis driven• Human in the loop• Expand the knowable by

parsing the unknown


Lets explore the motivating factors for commercial and full-spectrum red

teams



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Methodologies


Targeting

Client EngagementMaster Service

AgreementStatement of WorkRules of

EngagementBond of

IndemnityIdentify Scope

CompromiseReport

Reconnaissance

Scan & Attack

Reload

Commercial

Full Spectrum

Source: Sandia National Laboratories IDART, 2011



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The Intelligence Process


40%

5%

30%

20%

5%

Adversary (Full Spectrum Red Team) Time Expenditure

Intelligence and Logistics

Live System Discovery

Detailed Prepa-rations

Testing and Practice

Attack Execution

4 Schudel, G. and Wood, B. (RAND, SANDIA & GTE: 2000)



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Intelligence CycleA full-spectrum red team will focus upon likely adversarial courses of action as well as current capabilities.

Internally to the team, a need exists to have common doctrinal understanding of resource identification, intelligence collection, collection management, training, and leadership.




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Finished Product

Phase 6

Revision Tracking and Real-Time Group Review

Phase 5

Desktop Publishing and Word Processing

Production of Graphics, Values, and On-line Briefs

Phase 4

Collaborative Works

Note-taking and Organization of Ideas

Structural Argument Analysis

Phase 3

Interactive Search and Retrieval of data

Graphic and Map-based visualization of data

Modeling and Simulations

Phase 2

Clustering and linking Relational databases

Statistical Analysis to reveal Anomalies

Detection of changing trends

Detecting of Alert Situation

Phase 1

Conversion of paper documents to digital form

Automated Foreign Language translation

Processing Image, Video, audio, signal data

Auto-extraction of data elements from text and images

Standardizing and converting data formats

Intel Fusion Approach


5 Adapted from Steele, Robert, D. (New Craft of Intelligence: 2002)

A red team collects and produces intelligence at variable rates and differing fidelities. The red team leader must be prepared for these eventualities.



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Bias in the Intel processSources of cognitive error

Sources of cognitive error can be found in individual minds, the collective agreement of the team, team composition, and in the quality of support given to the effort. Each individual team member carries both a cognitive bias as the known outsider pre-judged by their own past experiences, as well as the bias of their culture.

Organizational and environmental bias indicatorsThe assignment is not taken seriouslyThe team or sponsor becomes too removed from the decision-making processA lack of interaction with the blue teamInsufficient access to the details of the targetLoss of team confidences The team fails to capture the details of the adversary, and instead mirrors itselfThe red team does offers no challenge to the blue teamThin top cover: the lack of a robust channel to act on findings in a timely manner, or consider findings with any seriousness.Applied post-event after many bodies already have been thrown at the problemThe wrong team targeting the wrong problem (Threat-based team vs. a capabilities based problem)A lack of clarity on the urgency of issues at handThe red team approach is a one-time activity


6 Defense Science Board. Task Force Report on The Role and Status of Red Teaming Activities: (DoD: 2003)



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Role play the AdversaryLets explore the difference between a threat-based adversary model and capabilities-based

adversary model.

Threat – A threat represents a known quantity, a known effect singular in origin, essentially a Pathogen-Antigen model. A threat is an X-Y direct, or inverse relationship.

Capability – Actors (or a confederation of multiple actors) capable of achieving a singular goal either due to access to resources, or some form of institutional support. The force multiplier effects of capability-based actors behave like an algebraic expression where leading factors have orders of magnitude, possibly even having orders of operation.




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Adversarial Modeling


Red Team A

Red Team B

Adversary A

AdversaryB

AdversaryC

The Universe of Actors and ActionsIn the full-spectrum Red Team context, the sponsor may need more than one type of red team to realistically model the capability. In the commercial world, modeling capability-based actors is the exception, not the norm.

Source: Sandia National Laboratories IDART, 2011



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Adversarial Prototyping


Relative sophistication across adversaries

Soph

istic

atio

n

Naive Novice

AdvancedNovice

Professional Hacker

OrganizedCrime or Cyber-

Terrorist

ForeignIntelligence

7 Op. Cit. Schudel, G. and Wood, B. : 2000

‥



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Threat Profiling


8 Duggan, et. al. SANDIA, 2007



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Attack Trees


9 Schneier, Bruce. Modeling Security Threats (Dr. Dobb’s Journal: 1999)



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Smart Grid Attack Diagram


10 Penn State University SIIS Laboratory. (Network and Security Research Center: 2010)

CorporateNetwork The Internet

DDR PSTN DID1-(724)-got-powr

128K CSU/DSULink over carrier



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Smart Grid Attack Tree


11 Ibid. Penn State University SIIS Laboratory: 2010



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When to Use Red Teaming


Don't use RT methods for, Do use RT methods for,

Simple systems or processes Complex systems or complex system of systems

Undefined environments Hostile and well-defined environments

Low consequence systems System with unknown consequences

Problems already identified Adaptable adversaries

Compliance and certification suffices Informing on security trade-offs

When unready to receive an extreme answer Training and doctrine

12 Atkins, William. Read Teaming – It's Good to be Bad. (Missouri S&T ACM SIG in Security: 2010)



18Friday May 4th, 2012

Ok, you try it now. Target: A reciprocating high-speed gas compressor

Source: BPI Compression 2011

http://www.bpicompression.com/



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Case Study Client SituationA new foreign multi-national corporation (OCONUS) enters Southwestern PA as a result of a purchase and repackage of a number of leases sold by Chesapeake Energy. Almost all of these functional wells remain capped, and lack the infrastructure to get the gas to market.

The corporations‘ local CONUS office has orders to open several fields and secure the infrastructure needed to handle gas compression and transfer. The local office issues an RFP, and engages a low-bid contractor solution. The preferred corporate contracted insurer does not feel the site protection solution adequately protects their underwriting investment of leased equipment. The insurer will not offer favorable rates until the site security concerns resolve to their satisfaction.

Home office Corporate Security comes into the conversation late, and recommends that the site protection solution for the compressor be turned over to a Red Team/Blue Team for evaluation.




20Friday May 4th, 2012

The red team simulation revealed complete destruction of the compressor and block house site plan in 10 minutes. What was the solution? Where are the vulnerabilities? why did the solution work?

½ ton pickupA cinderblockFender JackStump RemoverMentosDuct TapeMagnesium Ribbon 2 black Super Fan SuitsFive 2L bottles of ColaOne 2L bottle of Clorox 1 Large Sling ShotEstimated 3 weeks of site observation and rehearsal

Flood light and CCTV camera

No buried fence

It frequently rains here



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Case Study Red Team Solution

The full red team observed and collected intelligence on the target site for 3 weeks developing a number of information collections and applying information analysis techniques. They chose their best scenario.

During the preparation phase, the pair melted down Stump Remover, which contains Potassium Nitrate, the main ingredient in smoke bombs. By adding in some refined sugar, the two made 2 baseball size smoke bombs on a kitchen stove. Magnesium ribbon, bought at an online camping store with a stolen credit card, served as the wicks. The Cola was cut with 20% Clorox and the tops were taped over with Mentos in the bottle necks then loosely capped. The two planned to tape the bottle bombs into the seats and floors of the truck on site, and tie in place the steering wheel.

Two red team members drove a rental car and a stolen pickup to the nearby target site. The red team members changed into black superfan suits (to prevent any hair, shoe, or clothing fibers from falling into the truck). The pair drove lights-out, a sanitized 3/4 ton stolen pickup truck (interior scrub-down, second stolen plate, and tire replaced with junk bald tires) to within 30 yards of the block house on a rainy night.

On site, the truck rear was jacked up. While one threw/shot the lit smoke bombs at the base of the fence near the camera, the other placed the cinder block on the accelerator and turned on the ignition, and put the truck in drive. When enough smoke obscured the camera, the jack was kicked out and the truck sped forward ramming the fence and crashing into the block house at high speed. The Mento/Cola/Clorox bombs burst inside the cabin of the truck spoiling the interior environment defeating most physical forensic analysis. The truck destroyed the compressor, and brought most of the block house down on the target. The two fled on foot to the get-away car, and then later burned their suits in to black plastic lumps and discarded them.


http://www.wonderhowto.com/how-to-build-orange-smoke-bombs-271797/

http://www.theodoregray.com/PeriodicTableDisplay/Elements/012/index.s7.html

http://www.superfansuits.com/

http://www.stevespanglerscience.com/experiment/original-mentos-diet-coke-geyser

http://www.stevespanglerscience.com/experiment/original-mentos-diet-coke-geyser



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Case Study: Blue Team Counter-Measures




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Case Study: Blue Team Counter-Measures




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Thank you for listening, are there any questions or comments?



25Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies

Use your powers for the greater good, not evil.


Fight the Good Fight



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References1 McGannon, Michael. Developing Red Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. (Red Team Journal: APR 2004). Internet.

Found at http://redteamjournal.com/2 Sandia IDART Methodology. http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/index.html3 Price Waterhouse Coopers. Is your critical infrastructure safe? (PWC LLP:2010) Internet. Found at

http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/utilities/assets/cyber-attacks.pdf 5.4 Schudel, G. and Wood, B. Modeling the Behavior of a Cyber Terrorist. (RAND National Security Research Division

proceeding of workshop. Appendix C: Santa Monica, California: 2000) 49-59. Internet. Found at http://www.csl.sri.com/users/bjwood/cyber_terrorist_model_v4a.pdf.

5 Steele, Robert, D. The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats . (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute: 2002). 34-36.

6 Department of Defense Science Board. Task Force Report on The Role and Status of Red Teaming Activities (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Washington, D.C. 20301-3140:2003). Internet. Found at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dsb-redteam.pdf

7 Op. Cit. Schudel and Wood, 2000.8 Duggan, David, P., Thomas, Sherry R., and Veitch, Cynthia K.K., and Woodward, Laura. Categorizing Threat - Building and

Using a Generic Threat Matrix. (SANDIA National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM. REPORT SAND2007-5791: September 2007). Internet. Found at http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/materials/Adversary_Modeling/SAND2007-5791.pdf

9 Schneier, Bruce. Modeling Security Threats - Attack Trees (Reprint Dr Dobb’s Journal: 1999. Counterpane Internet Security: 1999). Internet. Found at http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html

10 Penn State University SIIS Laboratory. Advanced Metering Infrastructure Security. (Penn State University Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Computer Science and Engineering (CSE) Network and Security Research Center (NSRC): 2010). Internet. Found at http://siis.cse.psu.edu/smartgrid.html

11 Ibid. Penn State University, 201012 Atkins, William. Read Teaming – It's Good to be Bad. (Missouri S&T ACM SIG in Security. SANDIA Critical Infrastructure

Systems Department, NM, 10 FEB 2010). Internet. Found at. http://acm.device.mst.edu/security-files/2010-02-10-Red_Teaming.ppt

‡ See the supplemental paper that accompanies this presetation titled : Yanalitis, Mark. RED TEAMING APPROACH, RATIONALE, AND ENGAGEMENT RISKS (self-published: 2011).


http://redteamjournal.com/

http://redteamjournal.com/

http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/index.html

http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/utilities/assets/cyber-attacks.pdf

http://www.csl.sri.com/users/bjwood/cyber_terrorist_model_v4a.pdf

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dsb-redteam.pdf

http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/materials/Adversary_Modeling/SAND2007-5791.pdf

http://idart.sandia.gov/methodology/materials/Adversary_Modeling/SAND2007-5791.pdf

http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html



http://siis.cse.psu.edu/smartgrid.html

http://acm.device.mst.edu/security-files/2010-02-10-Red_Teaming.ppt

Documents

Red Teaming Approaches, Rationales, Engagement Risks and Methodologies