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Paper completed for a senior seminar of the Psychology of Terrorism.
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Reducing Risk and Rehabilitating Terrorists: Clinical Psychology’s Use to the War on Terror
Jessica DeitzerPennsylvania State University
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During Guantanamo Bay repatriations, offenders were released to what seemed to be an
unusual program at first glance. Ibrahim al-Rubaish and Said Ali al-Shihri were among these
former terrorists, released to a Saudi rehabilitation program for terrorists. The Advisory
Committee Counseling Program involves three parts: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare.
This program also involves four subcommittees, described as addressing security, psychological
and social, religious, and media issues (Boucek, 2008). The terrorists in this program partake in
art therapy, are counseled in groups, take courses that redefine their religious theologies, and
when released, are re-integrated into society with support.
On second glance, the Saudi program is not entirely unique. Rehabilitation programs are
being implemented, planned, or otherwise incorporated in Egypt, Yemen, Indonesia, Colombia,
Singapore, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Afghanistan,
Thailand, Pakistan, and more. The Advisory Committee Counseling Program of the Saudi’s is
not alone. In Yemen, the Religious Dialogue Committee functions according to the belief that
terrorism has “faulty intellectual foundations” and therefore, debate to make a change. Al-Hitar
leads the committee, which strives to weaken terrorism by refuting it’s beliefs. In Indonesia,
former terrorists such as Ali Imron, who took part in the Bali bombings, help “deprogram other
jailed terrorists” by attacking the understanding of Islam and Jihad by Jemaah Islamiyah, a
terrorist organization. They strive to encourage disengagement through changing attitudes,
beliefs, and misconceptions. Colombia’s Disengagement and Reincorporation Program operates
by the theory that people acting on behalf of a terrorist organization lose their personal identity
and have difficulties making their own decisions (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The program at
Pakistan incorporates psychiatry, education, and religious to encourage terrorists to disengage.
“The basic concept is to provide them all their comparative education, where they are able to
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decide for themselves what is right and what is wrong, that whatever was told to them previously
is not true,” said Pakistani Colonel Iman Bilal (Raddatz, 2010).
Nonetheless, not all terrorists decide that what they knew was wrong and what they are
now told is right. Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the Saudi repatriated to the rehabilitation program, fled
Saudi Arabia to join al Qaeda in Yemen, supposedly with eleven other former Guantanamo
detainees (Horgan & Altier, 2011). Said al-Shihri is suspected of being an al Qaeda leader,
organizing a bombing of the US embassy in Yemen (Goldman, 2010). Recent media outlets have
taken a cynical approach to rehabilitation programs, calling them a “summer camp” and
questioning the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs in changing the ways of terrorists. Is it
truly worth our while? Recently, scholars from psychology and other related fields have taken an
interest in terrorist rehabilitation programs, also known as terrorist de-radicalization or
disengagement programs. The field of psychology can help us evaluate these claims.
What does Psychology have to do with it?
In the face of such tragic and unfortunate circumstances such as Shihri’s attack on the
United States embassy, there are many questions to be addressed. Clearly an emotional and
loaded topic, the difficulty lies in remaining objective in our search for truths. It’s easy to
discount rehabilitation and condemn all former individuals involved with terrorism to any extent
to lifelong incarceration at sites such as Guantanamo Bay. It’s easier still to doubt the application
of psychology, a wildly misunderstood discipline, to the ever-present violence of terrorist
attacks. Like fighting fire with fire, reoffending terrorists cause us to want to lash out, threaten
retaliation with our financial aid, military, or even bombs. However, that doesn’t put out the fire.
The psychology of terrorism could be the water that saves countless precious lives.
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During this semester’s course on the psychology of terrorism, it seemed, again and again,
the “answer “ to posed questions started out with “Well, it’s really a complex issue….” As
frustrating as it may seem, terrorism in and of itself is complicated. If it wasn’t, we would be
closer to a solution. Inherently slow in issues so wide spanned and repeated throughout history,
research has identified a plethora of influences to add to our search for a solution, yet kept us still
far from having all the answers. Such multifaceted issue requires a solution with just as many
dimensions. As new factors are identified, new solutions taking into consideration these multiple
aspects must be invented. As a result, teams of interdisciplinary scholars from all fields are
working on solutions to the problems cause by terrorism, including our own International Center
for the Study of Terrorism, currently operating here at Penn State.
The question is, does psychology have a place in the mix? The posed topic for debate,
which describes the psychology of terrorism as an under-researched or a naïve attempt to
understand a complex issue, seems to believe the answer is no. This is untrue.
Perhaps the reason for a view such as this is the failure of psychology to produce what is
expected. In a time ridden with false expectations of criminal profilers and forensic science from
what criminologists have dubbed “The CSI Effect,” the call for unrealistic and ultra-efficient
results is tremendous. Particularly, the identification of a “typical terrorist” has long been
heralded as the goal for the psychology of terrorism. There is a cry for the “terrorist profile,” an
identification of the traits and behaviors expected, much like serial killers or violent rapists. In
Criminal Minds, in which the profilers bust in at just the right moment to prevent the serial killer
from doing any more harm, all it takes is entering a few predictors and a few clicks on a
computer screen to identify the risky subject. In reality, this is far from true. Even harder to
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pinpoint than the reality of the types of offenders displayed in these exaggerated television
shows, terrorists remain elusive to the discerning eye of the psychologist.
Early attempts at studying terrorism with psychology focused on psychoanalysis and a
“terrorist profile.” Despite try after try, no terrorist profile has been identified. Surprising to the
public, there has been no psychopathology evident in the average terrorists, although they tend to
see the world in a deluded, subjective light. Even suicide bombers are not exempt from this
psychologically sane rule. Not only are most terrorists not “crazy,” most terrorist groups
discourage the involvement of “crazy” individuals in their pursuits through implementing
selective standards for recruitment, so as to avoid responsibilities for unstable individuals who
may hurt their cause. Current terrorist organizations are focusing on recruiting “members who
possess a high degree of intellectualism and idealism, are highly educated, and are well trained in
a legitimate profession” (Hudson, 1999).
Across other personality traits, so much variance has been found that most researchers
identify the search for a “terrorist personality” or a “terrorist mindset” as futile (Hudson, 1999).
So many differential and contradicting varieties of terrorists have been found that it is hardly
useful to use any as a criterion for predicting terrorist activity (Sullwood, 1981). Moreover,
factors outside of personality are not good predictors of involvement of terrorism either.
Terrorists are different in gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and ideological standpoints (Hudson,
1999).
This makes the earliest stabs at the psychology of terrorism unsuccessful and, as the
prompt put it, “at worst, naïve…” The myths of the “terrorist profile” and an abnormal psyche of
a terrorist lending itself to psychoanalysis or easy dissection of traits have perpetuated the field
and the outsider’s opinion of the psychology of terrorism. We cannot change where the field has
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come from; however, we can direct where it is going. The future of psychology is not naïve.
Rather, it is ahead of the trends, particularly concerning some governmental and political entities
who continue to make decisions about counterterrorism efforts without research and objective
truths to back up their proposed claims (Hudson, 1999). Is the psychology of terrorism under-
developed? In some areas, maybe; however, there has been a recent turn of trends in the field and
more novel and exciting questions are being asked.
Instead of continuing with past unsuccessful approaches, there is a need for psychologists
to develop empirically based solutions to specific problems. Massive amounts of money are
allocated to counter-terrorism strategies each year, much of it without clear research supporting
the types of approaches they are taking (Hudson, 1999). Psychology has the potential to advise
governmental policy. However, before we can get to the right solutions, we need to take the right
first step—asking the right questions.
What are the Important Questions for Psychology?
This paper is not the first to take the standpoint that psychology needs to ask better
questions. Previous researchers have identified that we need to stop following unhelpful paths
and identify more specific, functional questions (Borum, 2004). For example, instead of asking,
“who commits acts of terrorism?” we can ask, “who disengages from committing terrorist acts
and what reasons do they give for their disengagement?” Clearly, the latter study, albeit still
complex, would have results targeted on policy implications with practical steps to be taken.
Then, there are the biggest questions—such as, “how do we get terrorists to stop?” and,
“can we treat terrorists?” In the studying and fighting terrorism, a solution to end the lives lost
and countries suffering would be our ultimate goal. Psychology can help find a way to end the
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violence. As we mentioned above, terrorism is complex—and the end would require tremendous
economic, political, and international strides. Although psychology can contribute, other
disciplines, such as political science, or international studies, can best pinpoint some of the
political and international issues. Yet, even the most political and cross-cultural of issues have
roots at the individual level. Any large-scale revolution must start inside the inner workings of
the individual. With the right questions, psychology can correctly identify psychological
underpinnings and encourage positive steps forward.
Specifically, if we want change to happen, psychology can identify the psychological
processes needed for change. Although there are uses for all types of psychology in the study of
terrorism, this paper concentrates on the most immediate and most internal level of making a
change: the disengagement of terrorists. Although there is little merit in studying the individual
without considering the group and the larger society’s effect on the individual, disengaged
individuals go so far as to make a personal decision regardless of the group or society’s
pressures. This type of heightened rationality poses an interesting direction for research.
Groups, prone to phenomenon such as “groupthink,” a tendency towards conformity and
the rejection of opposing viewpoints, and “risky shift,” the tendency of groups under pressure to
resort to extreme means the individual would not have chosen alone, provide a ripe environment
for the absolutist thinking of terrorist organizations. If, however, psychologists can successfully
remove the individual’s psyche from that group and pinpoint the motivation behind engaging in
terrorist organization, perhaps we can reverse the effects of the group involvement and
encourage disengagement and, even more importantly, de-radicalization. The study of truly
disengaged and/or de-radicalized terrorists involves the separation of individual and group and
fascinates scientists who don’t quite understand. As Crenshaw (2000) explains, “Little is known
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about why the users of terrorism would abandon the strategy. Research has focused on the
psychological motivations for engaging in terrorism rather than motivations for renouncing
terrorism. Yet a number of protracted terrorist campaigns have ended by the deliberate decision
of participants…” Clearly, the motivations for engaging, and more importantly, disengaging
have a lot to say for the psychology of terrorism and forward motion towards practical solutions.
Why do People Engage and Disengage from Terrorism?
There are several theories, rooted in criminology, studying the etiology of violent
behavior. For example, Instinct Theory is psychoanalytic in nature. It focuses on Freud’s early
theories that suggest it is within human nature to fight. Misplaced aggression from self onto
others is the cause of violence. Drive Theory posits that violence results from the interplay of
frustration and aggression. It claims frustration absolutely produces aggression, with no other
alternatives. Social Learning Theory works like the basics of operant conditioning, within the
realm of “reinforcement” and “punishment.” It claims that since aggression can be learned,
through the experience of ones self or watching others, terrorism can also be a learned behavior.
There are also Biological Approaches, which include chemical, hormonal, neurological, and
physiological factors. It is important to consider that biological factors may play a role in
participation in terrorism; however, due to the difficult nature of achieving terrorist participation
in studies of the biology of human subjects, little specific and consistent research has been
(Hudson, 1999).
Cognitive Theory, conversely, is more interested in the internal processes and inner
workings of the terrorist’s minds rather than any outward aggression or social processes. It
suggests that people respond to and interact with their environment according to their internal
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perceptions of their external world. This means their construal can be highly subjective and
deluded. Social cognition allows that the subjective construal of one’s environment does not only
apply to the individual; it applies to the terrorist organization as a whole (Crenshaw, 1988). This
means that the beliefs of the group can encompass the internal workings of the individual.
Applying the cognitive behavioral theories to study of the psychology of terrorism has been
supported in recent years (Taylor & Horgan, 2006).
It is important to keep cultural context in mind when treating the terrorists. Terrorism,
often religious, political, or otherwise ideological in nature, cannot be separated from these
issues. Many of the complaints made by terrorists are either legitimate or seem legitimate in their
eyes, and any program attempting to change the mindset of a terrorist without addressing these
larger issues will almost certainly be unsuccessful (Horgan & Altier, 2012). In the case of social
cognition, the cultural consideration needed to be made is primarily the role of ideology.
Many scholars have highlighted the role of ideology in committing violent terrorist
attacks. As Ginges (1997) once said, “ideology is the mechanism that makes possible the
translation of discontent into specific political goals.” Bin Hassan (2012) also argues that
ideology is the real enemy, especially when it comes for the motivation to enter into terrorist
activitiy. Beck (2000) states that amongst terrorists, ideology “concentrates their thinking and
controls their actions.” Although we can’t consider ideology the be all and end all of terrorist
motivations, clearly, the cognitive theory and the internal workings of ideology are at the
forefront of the war on terror. Pluchinsky (2008) has suggested that the rehabilitation of secular
terrorists will be less difficult than religious terrorists, for whom the terrorist activity is ordered
by their higher power. Likewise, Monroe and Kreidie (1997) conclude:
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“Fundamentalists see themselves not as individuals but rather as symbols of
Islam… Islamic fundamentalism taps into a quite different political
consciousness, one in which religious identity sets and determines the range of
options open to the fundamentalist. It extends to all areas of life and respects no
separation between the private and the political… By having moral imperatives as
their goals, the fundamentalist groups perceive the world through the distorting
lens of their religious beliefs.”
Ideology cannot be considered the only contributor to terrorism. The differences between
disengagement and de-radicalization are simple yet vital to our understanding of terrorism.
Horgan and Braddock (2010) found that not all disengaged terrorists are de-radicalized;
conversely, not all de-radicalized terrorists have low rates for recidivism. Disengagement simply
means that the terrorist has ceased participation in terrorist activities. De-radicalization, on the
other hand, suggests the terrorist has foresworn terrorism has a whole. They do not have to come
hand in hand. For example, the reasons for terrorist disengagement could be for reasons outside
of ideology, such as involuntary removal of the means to terrorist activity, aging, or costs that
outweigh the benefits. Conversely, a terrorist could change his or her mind about violence as an
acceptable means to achieving the goals of the group, yet still partake out of loyalty, belonging to
the social group, or threats to his or her safety.
One strong argument for the role of ideology is the advent of “naturally occurring”
disengagement, of which ideology is often a factor (Mullins, 2010). In understanding “naturally
occurring” disengagement, it may be useful to understand first steps of motivation, involvement,
and engagement (Horgan & Altier, 2012). Recent research has pointed towards motivation and
initial involvement being closest related to eventual disengagement. The major contributor to
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disengagement is disillusionment. Put otherwise, the inability to consolidate initial assumptions
about terrorist activities with the reality of terrorist involvement can cause terrorists to forgo the
terrorist lifestyle and as a result, disengage. The ability to disengage from and lose faith in the
terrorist organization holds importance for the psychologist studying disengagement. If
disengagement can occur naturally, there is a possibility that psychologists can encourage it.
With the advent of terrorist rehabilitation programs, this could be a very real possibility in our
lifetimes.
What Does Clinical Psychology Have to Offer?
Today’s Clinical Psychologists function by a science-practitioner model, meaning that
psychologists integrate professional skills with scientific knowledge of psychology. The aim is to
understand and treat harmful or maladaptive behaviors while keeping in mind intellectual,
emotional, biological, social, cultural, socio-economic, and other types of issues. Clinical
Psychologists are involved in research, teaching, professional practice, public policy, consulting,
and more. The education of a Clinical Psychologist is arduous and extensive, and includes
research on empirically-based treatments and the application of these treatments to patients in
need of improvement.
When most clinicians set out to change a patient exhibiting behaviors affecting him or
herself or others, they reference the DSM-IV, the most recent version of the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The DSM-IV is the standard classification of mental
disorders, including descriptions and diagnostic criteria for each disorder. The DSM-IV tells the
clinician what signs, what symptoms and for how long must be present in order to make the
diagnoses, and detailed information about each facet of the disorder. The DSM-IV has five axes:
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clinical disorders, personality disorders, medical disorders, psychosocial factors, and global
functioning.
Clinical disorders are what tend to first come to mind when we think about mental
disorders. Disorders such as depression, anxiety, bipolar, or schizophrenia remain on this axis.
Personality disorders maintain differences in how the patients function long-term, with or
without the presence of an exacerbating clinical disorder. Personality disorders are long lasting
(i.e. part of ones’ personality) and persistently present in the patients’ interactions and the way
they see the world, such as in antisocial, histrionic, or borderline personality disorders. This axis
also includes developmental disorders, such as mental retardation, which are apparent early in
ones development and last for life. Medical disorders include any medical condition that may
influence or aggravate any mental conditions. Psychosocial disorders, conversely, deal with
outside influences on the patients. This includes any adverse life events, conditions, or
environments that the patients were exposed to. The global level of functioning the clinician’s
rating of patients’ general ability to function in the outside world, on a scale from 1 to 100.
Since it’s generally established that terrorists are psychologically normal, that refutes the
presence of disorders on Axis I. The existence of personality disorders, as measured by Axis II,
is more controversial. Although no “terrorist personality” has been found, there have been
several attempts at identifying personality abnormalities amongst terrorists, specifically,
antisocial personality disorders. However, no evidence has been found that terrorists are typical
“psychopaths,” although they do commit heinous violent crimes (Borum, 2004).
The axis holding the most effect upon the psychology of terrorist action is certainly Axis
IV, Psychosocial factors. Indeed, there are precipitating psychosocial factors at play in the case
of many individuals that engage in terrorist activities. There are empirically based courses of
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treatments for clinical or personality disorders; yet, psychosocial disorders remain an
unexamined field. Larger theories on the psychology of aggression as it applies to terrorism have
been researched, with the intent of identifying the causes, and thereby, posing the most effective
means for treatment.
The idea of de-radicalization programs hold promise for the psychology of terrorism
because they address issues of Axis IV. Most de-radicalization programs treat offenders by
addressing the psychological, cultural, socio-economic, and community issues that pose
problems for formerly radicalized offenders. The most helpful strategy isn’t mere punishment,
although they shouldn’t be considered absolved of their crimes. According to Ginges (1997) in
his paper about Denial Perspective as compare to Re-integrative Perspective, we must treat
terrorists as psychologically normal to best treat the cultural aspects of terrorism. However, we
must understand that the group is important to all people, and, in the case of former terrorists, the
effect of the group is even more pronounced. Denial Perspective, which suggests punishment,
can be likened to the ideas behind the “War on Terror” and refusing negotiation with terrorists at
all costs. Re-integrative perspective, however, punishes the illegality of the acts with appropriate
sanctions while including positive social actions that take into consideration the needs of the
terrorist and of the community.
The Re-integrative perspective described by Ginges (1997) can be compared to the
rehabilitation initiatives happening today. Punitive approaches in criminology repeatedly show
the opposite of the desired effect, increasing recidivism rates instead of reducing the offender’s
propensity to reoffend (Mullins, 2010). In our “tough on crime” society, this message is not often
heard or believed. Assuredly, there is a need of separation of the offender from society and legal
sentences to be carried out; however, instead of merely releasing the offender back into society
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with a heightened change of reoffending, something must be done to reduce the chances.
Rehabilitation program goals include the re-entry of the offender into society, knowing that the
offender would be lost without social support during their rehabilitation and re-integration into
society. With true understanding of the psychology of the terrorist, re-integrative or rehabilitative
strategies hold the most validity. This paper looks towards terrorist rehabilitation programs as the
next step towards treating the terrorist.
Terrorist Rehabilitation Programs
In 2008, Time decided terrorist rehabilitation was one of the best ideas of the year
(Horgan & Altier, 2012) Functioning de-radicalization programs are present in Saudi Arabia,
Yemen Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Morocco, and many more countries around the
world. De-radicalization programs are inventive and novel approaches in the face of such a
serious issue, which is perhaps why they are so attractive. Yet, they cannot be taken at face
value. The field is still in its infancy. More work needs to be done before these programs can
accurately make claims at true de-radicalization. There are several serious problems with
terrorist de-radicalization programs and plenty areas in need of improvement. The many
programs of today are as varied as they are empirically unsound. The many different approaches
taken by the rehabilitation programs confuse the authenticity of their claimed results.
For example, The Saudi Arabia program is perhaps the most known about, bragged
about, and most controversial de-radicalization program. Some have mistakenly described the
program as a mere “art-therapy rehabilitation program,” (Mullins, 2010), but the program is far
more than just art. The program aims for re-education, rehabilitation, and reintegration. They are
taught “critical thinking skills” and question the “legitimacy” of their previous endeavors
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(Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The Saudi programs claims only 10-20% of their cases reoffend;
however there is little to prove it. Many question their ways of defining recidivism and
discovering whether or not an individual has truly re-engaged with terrorism (Horgan & Altier,
2012). Although, if true, it would be remarkably low compared to any US jail recidivism rates,
most consider the guidelines too subjective to be considered of any real worth. Getting closer to
the truth would involve transparency amongst judgments of recidivism and more.
Clinical psychology is not only about acting, it is about knowing the best actions to take.
According to the science-practitioner model, each clinical psychologist should be a clinician and
a scholar. They should research as well as they practice. These terrorist rehabilitation programs
are not exempt from that philosophy. However, so far these programs have remained stagnant.
Help up to the scrutinizing eye, these programs are based on little research or global standards.
Horgan & Braddock (2010) suggested these problems as our basis for improvement:
1. There are no explicit criteria for success associated with any initiative.
2. There is little data associated with any of these initiatives that can be reliably
corroborated independently.
3. There has been no systematic effort to study any aspect of these programs, even
individually, let alone collectively.
Moreover, to get closer to empirically understanding disengagement and de-radicalization,
Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) developed a list of important next steps to take. These steps included
developing a method of screening out insincere participants in rehabilitation programs,
successfully altering their values and behaviors, employing strategies for supervising former
terrorists and penalizing them upon reengagement, and providing them with the necessary means
to successful re-integration into society without needing to resort to terrorist activities.
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In concurrence with this research, this paper suggests many steps forward in clinical
psychology and terrorism de-radicalization. The first is empirically based guidelines for the
parameters for success and the compilation of data for the scientific study of the programs,
especially for moving towards the discovery of what works and what doesn’t inside predictors of
recidivism. In extension of these ideas, this paper suggests empirically based practice should be
utilized instead of blindly moving forwards with attempts at attacking the ideology of terrorists.
Behavior change, not just ideology change, should be an important factor.
Empirically Based Guidelines
Terrorist recidivism rates remain controversial with uncertain measurements and recent
instances of former detainees participating in terrorist attacks against the United States (Horgan
& Altier, 2012). When you boil it down, what’s missing is an accurate predictor or the detainee’s
risk for recidivism and acts of violence—but how do we reach this seemingly unattainable goal?
As of now, there are not clear criteria for measuring the success of terrorist de-
radicalization programs. Many of the well-known de-radicalization programs fail to release to
the public their measures of “success” (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). With this advantage, they can
claim unusually high levels of success without needing proof to back up their claims. Any claims
from these de-radicalization programs should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.
Clearly, there a strong need for long-term follow up in terrorist rehabilitation program
and the development of concrete standards for determining recidivism. If these decisions remain
subjective and varied between countries, no real progress can be made and scholars can make no
decisions between what works and what doesn’t. However, with the addition of empirically
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based standards used across many countries and programs, the programs’ effectiveness will be
better judged and psychologists will have better knowledge of what works and what doesn’t.
One of the challenges is that these rehabilitation programs have different goals, and
thereby different qualifications for success. Although the blanket terms of “de-radicalization” or
“rehabilitation” programs are often used, the authentic goals of each program vary (Horgan &
Altier, 2012). There is little commonality between programs. Even the term “de-radicalization”
is problematic. De-radicalization suggests the reversal of political/religious ideologies behind
terrorism. As we have discussed, amongst the distinction between de-radicalization and
disengagement, not all programs have the larger aim of altering the terrorist’s views. According
to Horgan and Taylor (2011), programs lumped into the “de-radicalization” category have
varying objectives including rehabilitation, reform, counseling, re-integration, reconciliation,
amnesty, de-mobilization, disbandment, disengagement, dialogue, de-programming, and counter-
radicalization. Although many of these objectives suggest the ultimate throwing away of terrorist
thoughts and values, they are far from identical. Horgan and Braddock (2010) suggest the
blanket term of “risk reduction,” which they argue can apply to most programs and can translate
to many different cultures. Moreover, it allows for the inclusion of programs aimed at changing
behavior without necessarily aiming at ideology or cognitive processes.
Although de-radicalization is the heralded point of most programs, the true goal is
ultimately disengagement. Presumably, a de-radicalized person should not reengage, but since
the two don’t always go hand in hand, it is necessary to find out what works for recidivism, not
just what works for de-radicalization.
There have been some steps made towards empirically based guidelines for recidivism.
Through the repatriation of many Guantanamo detainees, the Department of Defense formed
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standards for what should be judged as recidivism. Although many former detainees initiated
contact with other known terrorist affiliates, a small percentage (about 13.5%) were known to
have re-engaged in terrorist activity with the defined parameters for recidivism (Horgan &
Taylor, 2011). Moreover, psychologists in the United Kingdom developed measures of risk for
recidivism that have so far stood up amongst careful peer reviews (Horgan & Altier, 2012).
These are steps closer towards discovering standard ideas of success, and therefore, getting
closer to a day when psychologists can systematically measure what works and what doesn’t in
predicting recidivism. Once we have empirically based guidelines, it will be simpler to establish
empirically based practice; however, as current efforts stand, empirically based practice can only
focus on what has been done and what looks promising as we move into the next era of terrorist
rehabilitation programs.
Empirically Based Practice
As previously established, empirically-based guidelines should focus on “risk reduction,”
not necessarily “de-radicalization” (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). A bigger rationalization for “risk
reduction” is that disengagement is not necessarily contingent upon de-radicalization. As
discussed by several researchers, not all radicals are terrorists; moreover, not all terrorists are
radicals in the ideological sense (Horgan & Taylor, 2009). “Risk reduction” better captures the
goal of eliminating the terrorist’s propensity towards recidivism, without the assumption that the
terrorists hold terrorist ideologies or that those terrorists must be de-radicalized in order to forgo
recidivism. There may be as many reasons for engagement and disengagement as there are
terrorists. Therefore, it may be more helpful to focus on cognitive and behavior changes rather
than just an internal change of beliefs.
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Despite research showing the distinction between de-radicalization and disengagement,
terrorist behaviors are not often enough assumed to be distinctive from the ideology. In making
this assumption without empirical evidence, psychology risks missing important factors for
encouraging the disengagement of terrorists, and de-radicalization programs risk their
effectiveness. Under the new term of “risk reduction,” empirically based treatment programs
should look at what strategies encourage disengagement as a way towards the ultimate goal of
ending terrorist acts, not just terrorist ideologies. However, with a standard set of data detailing
what types of programs hold the lowest recidivism rates, practicioners can only look at what is
and what may hold promise.
Currently, terrorist rehabilitation programs utilize everything from art-therapy to religious
teaching to victim-offender mediations, differentiated according to culture, customs, and the kind
of terrorism happening in the affected area. The treatments, although most sound intuitive, are
not all supported by any empirical findings. Clinical psychology and the analytical study of
therapies can aid the struggle for the treatment of terrorists. The psychological treatment of the
violent terrorist can only be one facet of his or her treatment; however, without the help of
clinical psychology, the successful rehabilitation of the terrorist could be much more difficult.
This section outlines several proposed treatment plans for empirically based practices.
First of all, an important question must be asked. Can de-radicalization truly exist as
pushed by rehabilitation efforts? With the current lack of empirical evidence, it’s difficult to say.
It’s difficult to operationalize behavioral changes and to find its source. Psychology cannot make
misled assumptions in its fight to move closer to a change, such as assuming ideology is the key,
or that simple efforts to change said ideology will lead to eventual disengagement. Although
ideology is important to terrorist action, as we previously discussed, it is not necessary in order
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to partake in radical violence (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). Our treatments should therefore be
experimental, critical, and multifaceted. Several ideas influenced by clinical psychology and
criminology can lead the way in our search for a solution.
The major themes of today’s rehabilitation programs have been identified by Mullins
(2010) as: “1) rehabilitation, involving efforts to dissuade Islamist radicals from their
religious/political ideological beliefs and narrative; 2) providing a legitimate lifestyle by way of
promoting family commitments and facilitating educational and vocational opportunities; 3) use
of amnesty and restorative justice, whereby lesser crimes are forgiven and extremists sometimes
meet with victims of terrorism; and 4) creation of legitimate opportunities to vent or address
grievances e.g. via group discussion,” while also as including psychological counseling as a
common factor.
Many rehabilitation programs have stressed ideology, the first identified factor. This
involves religious debates, lessons, and discussions, usually involving respected religious figures
or former terrorists (Mullins, 2010). Former efforts have largely focused on ideologies.
Addressing ideology usually involves intercession by respected religious/political leaders and/or
former terrorist leaders. Hearing the terrorist’s ideologies challenged by someone they respect
and even admire can cause the needed cognitive dissonance needed to spark a change. One
weakness of some of these programs is that although the programs require renouncement of their
former terrorist organizations in order to advance in the program, it does not follow that the
individual then has reached the conclusion that these endeavors were wrong (Horgan & Altier,
2012). Without this important cognitive reasoning, it is impossible to say whether or not terrorist
behavior will cease. Some research suggests de-radicalized terrorists spreading their stories and
messages to other high-risk or terrorist groups may be the best next step forward (Horgan &
Deitzer 21
Altier, 2012). Several countries have let this become their forefront in counterterrorism efforts
aimed at terrorist disengagement. However, since there has been no compilation of data or
meaningful analyses, it is impossible to say whether these attacks on ideology are working in
practical concerns of disengagement.
There are several programs, however, that focus more on treating the socio-economic
issues involved than the ideology of the terrorists. The rationalization behind these programs is
that by giving them the means to live a successful legitimate life, the terrorists will not have
motivation to enter back into terrorist organizations. The Saudi program is a good example of
this strategy, with the inclusion of a halfway house called the “Care Rehabilitation Center.” At
this halfway house, the former terrorists are offered education and vocational training, housing, a
stipend, and even wives upon his release and successful reintegration into society. Although this
may be an extreme example, the opposite, leaving “rehabilitated” terrorists on their own with no
forms of aid, would not be successful either. As Mullins (2010) described, certain former
terrorists feel forced back in to terrorist activities, with one former terrorist stating, “I know
militants who repented who have resumed Jihad because they were unable to work and live.”
Amnesty is a far less researched and common field for de-radicalization programs.
Although several programs offer some form of amnesty, particularly to less violent terrorists,
there are varying rules. It generally seems that most programs only offer absolution to less
serious crimes and often involves the offering of a “fresh start”—that is, a new location and life.
Restorative justice, meaning the repairing of wrongs one has caused, typically has involved
victim-offender meetings. Although these can be very painful, meetings such as these are meant
to humanize the “enemy” and give victims closure. Some reports have called these interventions
“largely unsuccessful,” but there is not enough evidence to be conclusive about the effects of
Deitzer 22
restorative justice (Mullins, 2010).
In summary, Mullins (2010) states that it is unlikely that one of these approaches are
most effective alone. A combination of these current efforts would best sway the multiple facets
involved in terrorism In addition to these past efforts, there are many ideas taken from Clinical
Psychology that have empirical support in other areas may be helpful to the treatment of
terrorists. These therapies have not yet been tried and tested in the field with terrorist
populations; however, doing so may be in the near future.
One of these promising field buds from the larger field of risk assessment. Clinical
psychologists have researched, developed, and utilized risk assessment tools for decades and,
although still far from complete, risk assessment may hold significance for predicting terrorist
recidivism. Used by mental health clinicians, forensic psychologists, criminologists, and the like,
risk assessment measures focusing specifically on violence have been developed. Particularly,
the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) has been adjusted for use with terrorist
populations. This would involve only assessing the individual, not treating. Yet, this is a vital
step in the treatment process, such as in selecting candidates for rehabilitation programs,
examining the depth of need for therapies, and predicting the risk of reoffending if released back
into a civilian population. Empirically supported methods of assessing risk would be a welcomed
addition to “risk reduction” programs.
In treating the identified risk, behavioral therapies have been suggested in order to ensure
useful results outside of changing ideology. Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) has been
suggested in lieu of focusing on changing an offender’s cognitions (Horgan & Taylor, 2011). A
child of behaviorism, this therapy focuses on the “antecedents of behavior, the behavior itself,
and its consequences” in its push to change behavior. Using this 3-factor model, ABA develops
Deitzer 23
specific and scientifically supported plans, personalized by the individual’s unique motivations,
actions, and penalties. However, terrorist ideologies often transcend the costs and rewards of
behaviors for their larger goals and beliefs systems. These belief systems involve internal,
cognitive processes. In order to best understand the range of changes needed to affect the
terrorist behavior, therapies outside the realm of pure behaviorism may be needed.
Therapies used to treat sex offenders have been suggested for terrorist populations
because of the similarities in their strong drives, wounding behaviors, and innocent victims
(Horgan & Taylor, 2011). These Sex Offender Treatment Programs (SOTP’S) include Cognitive
Behavioral Therapies (CBT) and continuous monitoring and prevention of “relapses.” This idea
of “relapse prevention” as part of a treatment program could be key in keeping terrorists away
from re-engagement and has been utilized in many programs with socio-economic support
systems, such as the Saudi’s rehabilitation program, of which one of the goals is “aftercare”
(Boucek, 2008).
Other past research has suggested “cognitive behavioral models of understanding
behavior” because of the influential effect of the organizational beliefs on the behavior of the
individual, especially as controlled by ideology (Taylor & Horgan, 2007). Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) is a process during which “The therapist and patient collaborate to identify
distorted cognitions, which are derived from maladaptive beliefs or assumptions. These
cognitions and beliefs are subjected to logical analysis and empirical hypothesis‐testing which
leads individuals to realign their thinking with reality” (Clark, 1995). CBT is one of the most
widely researched and effective types of therapy (Butler et. al., 2006). Offshoots on CBT
suggested for use with terrorists are Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and
Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP) (Horgan & Taylor, 2011).
Deitzer 24
In Beck’s paper “Prisoners of Hate” (2002), he identifies several cognitive distortions of
the terrorist projected upon an image of the “Enemy.” The first is overgeneralization, such as
terrorist opinions towards the “Enemy” of a country, fostered mostly by political leaders and the
military, applied to each of the innocent citizens of that country. The next is dichotomous
thinking, which is thinking which only holds two categories—“good” or “bad,” “righteous” or
“sinful,” “our side” or “their side.” Lastly, terrorists show signs of tunnel vision, an unwavering
goal fostered by their ideological mission, which causes them to function methodically and
robotically without considering their actions and showing great resistance to change. These
cognitive distortions can clearly cause disastrous consequences if left untreated.
An important strategy to counter these cognitive distortions is the reframing of the
“Enemy” into another human being. Challenging this “us versus them” approach can lead to the
internal recognition of these logical fallacies. Beck suggests educational sessions, group
therapies for former terrorists, and facilitating supervised meetings of victims and offenders. This
would involve “acknowledgement of the suffering, taking responsibility for violent deeds,
ventilation and processing of feelings, any challenging of negative appraisals and over-
generalized interpretations of the events” (Beck, 2002). Applying these cognitive challenges in a
therapy setting requires highly trained clinical psychologists who will work in this challenging
and experimental field. In fact, whether in CBT or other therapies, there is a strong need for
clinicians to conduct therapy sessions and a systematic evaluation of what works.
Empirically Based Education
Deitzer 25
Lastly, after the compilation of standard guidelines, data lending itself well to analysis,
and utilizing the suggested empirically based treatments, it may be the case that this is not
enough. Several sources have claimed that we shouldn’t be expected to reach today’s terrorists—
instead, counter-terrorism should focus on the generation of tomorrow (Wagner, 2006).
Pakistan’s rehabilitation program is unique in reaching out to teenaged offenders.
Younger, more susceptible minds can be more easily changed, and aiming to change the younger
generation while they can still forgo terrorist activity and make a change may be the best route.
As one boy from the Pakistani program put it, “I am going to spread and preach whatever I learn
here and tell people that what they were doing is wrong” (Raddatz, 2010). Likewise, the Chief
Minister Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has said that the promotion of education is the only way to cope
with the challenges of extremism, terrorist, poverty, illiteracy, law and order, and unemployment
(Naeem, 2012). The Ministry of Education Saudi program educates in schools about danger of
terrorism and terrorist ideologies, as well as including a media subcommittee to spread their
messages in further reaching arenas (Boucek, 2008).
It may well be that it is either too late for Clinical Psychology to intervene with older
terrorists, or that it is not worthwhile to focus efforts there when younger generations can be
influenced before they, in turn, offend. Preemptive aims at education and media influences can
work against the realities of terrorist ideologies that many children are brought up believing in,
or even fighting for. Our best bet for today in our striving for empirically based strategies for
dealing with the problem of terrorism is to use multifaceted approaches, establishing empirically
based guidelines, empirically based treatment plans, and perhaps, empirically based education as
well. Then, we may have more of a chance of affecting the strongly held beliefs in violence as an
acceptable answer to religious, political, or otherwise ideological complaints.
Deitzer 26
Conclusion
In summary, this paper has addressed the viewpoint that the psychology of terrorism is
underdeveloped or naïve attempt to address the multifaceted issue of terrorism. This paper
concedes that yes, terrorism is broad and too complex an issue to be tackled by one discipline on
its own, but psychology has much to offer. However misguided the first attempt of psychology in
studying terrorism, the psychology of terrorism has great potential. Particularly, the idea of
disengaging terrorists from their violent militant activities can be addressed by psychologists.
There is a psychological component to disengagement at the individual level, which can be best
addressed by the field of Clinical Psychology.
A part of this paper focused on asking the right questions. Accordingly, an assumption in
this paper must be addressed. Can we truly de-radicalize terrorists? Risk reduction initiatives
have so far shown promise, yet lack the empirical backgrounds and analyses to be conducted in
moving forward expected of psychology as a science. We cannot pinpoint their exact positive
effects until empirically based, standard guidelines are set for the definition of recidivism and the
judgment of risk for recidivism across cultures and programs. Research on ideology’s role in
terrorism and disengaged terrorists reporting “disillusionment” with the realities of the terrorist
organization (as compared to their initial motivations and ideas about terrorist involvement) posit
that casting aside the “terrorist ideology” is possible. If it is possible, counter-ideological
programs aimed at de-radicalization should be included in the risk reduction initiatives in the
future.
However, we cannot blatantly address ideology without considering empirically based
treatment for terrorists. Former risk reduction programs have addressed ideology, without any
Deitzer 27
standard scientific methods to determine the change of the terrorist’s internal cognitions or
whether this supposed change resulted in low rates of recidivism. Empirical guidelines would be
effectual in determining whether counter-ideology holds any real weight in the fight on terror.
An analytical review of the current strategies and their recidivism rates could determine which
tactics work. Moreover, the researched ideas of risk assessment and cognitive behavioral
therapies may hold promise for the field of de-radicalization and disengagement. In addition,
focusing on education and media reaching the younger generations may be important to
dissuading their future participation in terrorism. Many clinicians are needed to scientifically
review past methods and use empirically based guidelines and practice in the future terrorist risk-
reduction initiatives.
Deitzer 28
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