The George Washington University

Reevaluating U.S.-NATO Nuclear Security Policy

Walter James

Professor Murray Snyder

IAFF 3180W – Nuclear Security Policy

December 13, 2016

Abstract

This paper addresses the partially-outdated security apparatus of U.S. nuclear policy.

Specifically, it addresses the use and upkeep of “Forward-deployed” U.S. nuclear weapons in

European NATO states – the inordinate costs, the security risks to the facilities and weapons

themselves, and the outdated deployment mechanism of these weapons in the face of attack or

political disintegration. The analysis then turns to the potential solution of relying on the other

pillars of the Nuclear Triad, specifically the use of nuclear submarines and submarine launched

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as the primary means of maintaining nuclear security for the U.S. and

its allies as well as keeping its alliances and deterrence mechanisms intact.

Introduction

Along with conventional military support and political unity, one of the pillars of

NATO’s practical strength lies in its network of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities spread across its

European member nations’ territory. The organization, formed in the face of a growing threat

from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, utilized a policy of nuclear deterrence capability

through the presence of these weapons at a close proximity to the Soviet Union. In addition, it

signaled the United States’ dedication to aiding other NATO allies in the event of any form of

attack from Soviet forces. This network of nuclear weapons in Europe was a vital aspect to

military strategy in countering potential Soviet threats, which dictated in part the political

strength and unity of NATO. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the threat of state-

sponsored nuclear attack has largely diminished (especially involving Europe), leaving NATO

left to contend only with the prospects of Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs that are

still, at best, in their fledgling stages of production and lacking effective methods of deployment.

Despite the dynamic nature of the nuclear field, the United States has made little adjustment to

the policies of use and placement of its nuclear arsenal since the fall of communism. This is in

part due to the continued and powerful message it sends to maintain nuclear launch sites in

NATO allied nations; one of continued dedication to all threats to western ideology and

governance. However, the lack of a common enemy, the inefficacy of the current U.S. nuclear

technology abroad, and the rise of dissimilar interests among NATO allies have caused a rift in

the overall unity of NATO and its defensive nuclear order. Thus, the U.S. policy of “Nuclear

Sharing” has lost strategic value. The strategic and tactical effectiveness of maintaining a secure

network of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in NATO countries has greatly diminished, and

the political justification for continued nuclear reinforcement left hollow.

Is there a way for the United States to accomplish the same type of dedication to NATO’s

security, while simultaneously maintaining a more readily-deployable and reliable nuclear

arsenal controlled by the US? This paper will explore this question and the plausibility of a

solution that consists of pulling back the U.S. forward-deployed nuclear arsenal in European

NATO nations and establishing a “nuclear dome” over allied nations using only two of the three

current branches of the nuclear triad: advanced Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). This nuclear dome policy would accomplish

the same tactical deterrence capabilities, as well as reinforcing U.S. commitment to the defense

and political backing of allied states. The future of global use of nuclear weapons is unclear;

therefore, the policies to be used by Western powers must be adjusted to meet the parameters of

a constantly changing nuclear game.

Background – Reduction Falls Short of Elimination in the Forward Deployed Arsenal

The emplacement of a forward deployed nuclear stockpile in Europe was born out of a

logical long-term security strategy in the face of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. During the years

of the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950s, the strenuous debates among the military

community on how to formulate its nuclear policy featured various suggestions on how to

demonstrate the West’s superior nuclear firepower against a potential invasion of Europe by

Soviet forces. The military sought a strategy that, as defined in the National Security Council

Paper NSC 162/2 on Basic National Security Policy, would “meet the Soviet threat” while also

avoid “seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermine our fundamental values and

institutions”. 1 Eventually, the administration settled upon idea of “Massive Retaliation”; a stance

of constant assurance that any aggression by the Soviet Union would be met with a nuclear

attack – either via small nuclear bombs used tactically against military targets or via more

powerful, strategic weapons to be used on economic centers and Soviet industrial production.2

1 Freedman, Lawrence. “Chapter 6: Massive Retaliation”. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Third ed. New York: St. Martin's, 2003. Print. Pg. 77. 2 Ibid, 79.

As the Cold War progressed into the 1960’s and the agitation between East and West

failed to abide, President John F. Kennedy augmented the Eisenhower administration’s policy of

“Massive Retaliation”. Understanding that a surprise nuclear attack preceding a conventional

invasion would be the probable form of large-scale Soviet aggression, the Kennedy

administration introduced the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD). MAD ramped

up NATO’s deterrence mechanism, establishing that a first strike on NATO assets would be met

with an overwhelming nuclear response from the United States and its allies upon multiple

targets within the Soviet Union. The U.S. military saw this as the safest way to deter any form of

militaristic Soviet threat, especially a nuclear one. In a report presented to the National Security

Council in February of 1955 titled the “Killian Report”, the effectiveness of MAD was

summarized as its ability to dissolve the factor of surprise first-strike capability: “The ability to

achieve surprise will not affect the outcome because each country will have the residual

offensive power to break through the defenses of the other country and destroy it regardless of

whether the other country strikes first.”3 The logic in this decision was the reality that nuclear

weapons were both more powerful and less expensive than sustaining large numbers of

conventional ground forces in Europe to deter the Soviet Union’s massive land army. In order to

demonstrate the reality of this posture, NATO would require an ever-prepared stockpile of

nuclear arms deployed across its member states.

Following the implementation of MAD, the U.S. collaborated with NATO nations to

deploy over 7,300 warheads to various positions on the European continent by 1971. The U.S.

placed nuclear warheads in Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Turkey, the Netherlands, Greece,

and Belgium.4 Prompted by the SALT negotiations in 1972 and a series of Pentagon reviews

directed by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the number began to decline in 1975 and

continued to do so through the progression of the late Cold War era. Nuclear technology

advancements now allowed for lighter warheads and more powerful blast yields. This slow yet

constant reduction in quantity of U.S. warheads in Europe (balanced out by increasing potency of

the weapons) matched the reduction of the U.S. stockpile controlled by the Pacific Command.

3 Science Advisory Panel. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume

XIX.” U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian, 14 Feb. 1955. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 4 Kristensen, Hans. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War

Planning (2005). Web. 06 Sept. 2016. Pg. 24.

As the inevitability of the Soviet Union’s impending ruin became more and more

apparent, NATO security forces thought it suitable to reevaluate the necessities of its nuclear

armament resources in Europe. To NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the remaining

1,400 nuclear bombs no longer offered substantial use without the former targets in Eastern

Europe to which they were purposed. Representatives of NATO states met in Rome in October

of 1991 to construct an updated security apparatus to govern NATO policies in a new paradigm.5

Surprisingly, the assembly yielded little adjustment to current policy, simply framing the

justification for the forward deployed nuclear weapons in a different perspective: “…the

fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent

coercion and any kind of war ... by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the

nature of the allies’ response to military aggression.”6 Deterrence through a mix of nuclear and

conventional force was to remain the core of NATO’s strategic defense policy, despite the lack

of a nuclear opponent. Therefore, it was considered appropriate that the forward-deployed U.S.

weapons in certain NATO states were to remain static.

Despite a constant critique of this conclusion, it was not deemed necessary to rid the

European continent of a U.S. nuclear arsenal, if only for political reinforcement. Even following

the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and through the various international nuclear agreements

including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties which reduced the number of deployment

systems of nuclear states, the U.S. continues to maintain an arsenal of 160-200 nuclear weapons

in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. The continued upkeep of these

weapons presents several problems and redundancies for U.S. Nuclear Policy.7

Concept – The Nuclear Dome

Today, new important issues have come to the forefront of modern nuclear policy. These

issues range from the current negative implications of Nuclear Sharing (namely its tendency to

aggravate nuclear rivals like Russia), security concerns of U.S. nuclear sites in European host-

5 Ibid, 32-33. 6 Sauer, Tom, and Bob Van Der Zwaan. "US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit:

Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible." International Relations 26.1 (2012): 1-100. SAGE Journals. Web. 16 Oct. 2016.

7 Kristensen, Hans, and Robert Norris. "US Nuclear Forces, 2008." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64.1 (2008): n.

pag. Web. 13 Oct. 2016.

countries, and the matter of basic efficacy and deployment practices of the weapons in the event

of their use. The range of issues raises doubts concerning the justifications of the U.S. nuclear

sharing policy in Europe.

The frustratingly perpetual argument for the continued placement and upkeep of these

gravity bombs deployed to NATO states is two-fold: the physical reassurance of U.S.

commitment to protecting NATO allies, and their ability to demonstrate to any potential

aggressor the on-going deterrence policy of NATO with proactive assertion. Concerning the

former, forward deployment ideally ensures a host country of the United States’ ability to use

retaliatory nuclear force on their behalf. The Turkish Ambassador to Canada Omer Ersun

exhibited this relationship when he declared “NATO without the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed

in Turkey would mean nothing to the Turks.”8 In essence, this is the only objective of the

Nuclear Sharing program that currently meets its own expectations, although there is skepticism

of its impact as a foundational bond between the U.S. and Europe relative to other seemingly

more relevant bonds “including economic, financial, historical, and social connections.”9 The

latter, however, begins to lack credibility when it is understood that the mere placement of

nuclear weapons in Europe doesn’t guarantee the efficacy of their deployment. As Major General

Robertus Remkes (USAF, Ret.) would acknowledge, the current hardware and deployment

systems of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe are both outdated and ineffective in a potential conflict:

NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe today – U.S. B-61 nuclear bombs to be delivered by U.S. and Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) – is a relic from the Cold War and disconnected from the security requirements of the twenty-first century. These weapons were once foreseen to threaten targets in Eastern Europe – West of the Soviet Union. For today’s and tomorrow’s potential political and military challenges to NATO, they hardly seem suited.10

These “relic” B-61-3 and B-61-4 bombs highlight the outdated defensive nuclear

mechanism of forward deployed U.S. nuclear weapon systems. While the five Nuclear Sharing

host states do indeed have dual capable planes to deliver these gravity bombs, specifically the

American F-15Es and F-16s, and the British Tornado GR4, the planes have a limited range that

8 Kibaroglu, Mustafa. "Isn't It Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?" 14.4 (2005): 443-57. Belfer Center for

Science and International Affairs. Web. 14 Oct. 2016. 9 Sauer, Van Der Zwaan, Pg. 26. 10 Kamp, Karl-Heinz, Dr, and Robertus Remkes, C.n. "Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements." Nuclear

Threat Initiative (n.d.): 76-95. Pg 81

leave Asia and the Middle East outside its immediate round-trip reach without re-fueling.11 This

would mean that either mid-air or landed re-fueling would be necessary – both operations that

waste valuable time in the event of an emergency which could severely undermine the efficiency

and even likelihood of a successful retaliatory nuclear strike in the face of a first strike. General

James Cartwright, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that this system provided

no tactical advantage that other pillars of the nuclear triad did not already accomplish.12

The second major issue with the current forward deployed weapons is the maintenance

costs at the facilities in which the bombs are contained. The host state provides the land and

resources for infrastructure of the bases while the U.S. Air Force is tasked with repair, custody,

and improvements to the weapons stored underground in reinforced bunkers at undisclosed

locations. The U.S. spends approximately $200 million annually per nuclear base in the 5

Nuclear Sharing states. Despite the redundancy of the program and pushback from the Senate

Committee on Energy and Water Development Appropriations, the Obama administration

initiated the Life Extension Program (LEP) in 2013 for the B61 arsenal in Europe, extending the

life of the program for at least another 20 years. The Pentagon predicted that the LEP for the B61

arsenal in Europe would cost a total of $10 billion.13 Considering how much of U.S. financial

resources are already dedicated to the upkeep of a general nuclear program as a security

endeavor, including the constantly deployed nuclear submarine fleet and upkeep of ICBM

facilities within U.S. territory, this a financial redundancy that could surely be eliminated.

In addition to unnecessary costs of maintaining the nuclear facilities in host states, the

U.S. must also face the reality that despite the security protocols to protect these sites from

seizure or theft, their very existence poses a threat to the current nuclear order. There will always

be those who seek to commandeer already-existing nuclear weapons, especially non-state actors

like terrorist groups. While this scenario is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out of the question. Major

General Remkes argues that various examples of terror attacks from before the September 11th

attacks “underscore that we are facing adversaries that are clever, committed, and not deterred by

failure. Moreover, they have a track record of planning and conducting high profile attacks with

11 Sauer, Van Der Zwaan, Pg. 15. 12 “Nuclear Posture Review Transcript”. Council on Foreign Relations. 08 April 2010. Web. 19 Oct. 2016. 13 Dodge, Michaela. "U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Critical for Transatlantic Security." The Heritage

Foundation. N.p., Dec. 2015. Web. 20 Oct. 2016.

a high prospective payoff. Although many plots have been foiled before their execution, the most

common methods to combating terror have been largely reactive and not proactive…”14 Gaps

and mistakes in security protocols of and between nuclear facilities have already been an issue.

For example, in 2008, four ICBM components were shipped to Taiwan accidentally without

authorization, leading to extreme vulnerability in the discretion of the U.S. nuclear program.15

Problems seem particularly prone in transportation of nuclear materials, which is commonly

recognized as the point of greatest vulnerability to capture of nuclear weapons by foreign groups.

A security review of U.S. and European nuclear operations concluded that most sites in Europe

“require additional resources to meet [DoD] standards”, and that there were “inconsistencies in

personnel facilities and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation.”16 It also

found that several areas at various bases in Europe were in need of significant repair or

renovation, including “support buildings, fencing, lighting and security systems”. While these

grievances are addressed at a grimly slow pace given the implications of severe risk to security

of nuclear weapons, one can consider the ease in which this problem could be resolved if these

facilities were to be dissolved entirely.

The final argument for pulling back the U.S. forward deployed nuclear arsenal in

European Nuclear Sharing states is the policy and political issues that the program spawns.

NATO bureaucrats often argue, along with the points already addressed above, that the forward

deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal helps to deter not only potential aggression from foreign entities

but also the proliferation of nuclear weapons themselves. This is often framed in a Cold War

context (which should immediately nullify is legitimacy). Many studying this dilemma have

viewed this argument with considerable criticism, finding no substantial evidence that the

forward deployed arsenal accomplishes any form of proliferation among host nations. Tom Sauer

writes that “in hindsight, this claim seems doubtful. For instance, the U. S. nuclear umbrella did

not prevent France from acquiring nuclear weapons.”17 Another example often cited is

Germany’s pledge to refrain from nuclear proliferation in return for hosting U.S. weapons.

14 Robertus Remkes, C.n. "The Security of NATO Nuclear Weapons.." Nuclear Threat Initiative (n.d.): Pg. 70-71. 15 McDermid, Charles. "U.S. Accidentally Sent Ballistic Missile Parts to Taiwan." The New York Times. N.p., 25

Mar. 2008. Web. 16 Oct. 2016. 16 Kristensen, Hans. Most Nuclear Weapon Sites in Europe Do Not Meet US Security Requirements. USAF Report,

(FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 19, 2009): 63. 17 Sauer, Van Der Zwaan, Pg. 8.

However, Germany claimed its renunciation for nuclear refinement, construction, and possession

under the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in the reunification process

beginning in the 1990s.18 Its government and public have been strongly anti-nuclear ever since;

the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany would undoubtedly have no effect on this

stance. Politically, the maintained U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe has done little to assuage other

nuclear states; in fact, it has only served to aggravate Russia, which in 2015 directly demanded

the removal of the U.S. forward deployed arsenal due to its violation of the Nuclear Proliferation

Treaty.19 Hans Kristensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council highlights the need to

remove this source of agitation:

At a time when NATO and the United States seek a new partnership with Russia and are concerned over the security of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, the interests of the alliance are not served by keeping hundreds of nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. The presence of these weapons is a continuous irritant to normalizations and an unnecessary and counterproductive factor in Russian military planning.20

Indeed, from the political and policy perspective of the arrangement, the United States seems to

be violating previously-agreed-upon nuclear treaties and thus aggravating nuclear competitors,

all the while claiming that its efforts are achieving the opposite effect.

Alternative Solution: The Nuclear Dome

Due to these problems, the sensible response is an overhaul of strategic placement and

stance of U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States Air Force should remove the 150-200 nuclear

gravity bombs stored in NATO allied European states and rely solely on the two remaining

pillars of the nuclear triad – SLBMs and ICBMs. These deployment options are more efficient

than heavy bombers deploying gravity bombs and, provided their facilities are held in direct U.S.

nuclear control, more secure than long-range bomber weapons deployed in foreign states. The

ballistic missile arsenals rely primarily on strategic nuclear power, compared to the smaller,

18 Maier, Charles S. Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

UP, 1999. Print. 19 Halpin, Tony. "Russia Calls on U.S. to Remove Its Nuclear Weapons from Europe." Bloomberg. N.p., 24 Mar.

2015. Web. 17 Sept. 2016. 20 Kristensen, Hans. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War

Planning (2005): n. pag. Web. 06 Sept. 2016.

tactical power of the B-61 gravity bomb arsenal in Europe. Should the U.S. seek to use tactical

nuclear weapons over its larger strategic warheads, it could simply replace the warheads on

ICBMs or SLBMs to meet that purpose. The removal of the forward deployed arsenal also

reinforces the public U.S. policy of nuclear non-proliferation; even if the weapons stored in

Europe are controlled by the U.S. military, their very existence there is what has been perceived

as a move away from non-proliferation.21 Thus, with these arsenals alone, the United States can

establish a nuclear dome over any nation within its political alliance network. This is currently

the policy maintained for South Korea22 and Japan23, since there are no forward-deployed US

nuclear weapons in these states. This policy can be easily applied to NATO states as well.

Therefore, so long as the new deterrence policy was publicly announced, the same political

promise to European NATO states’ security could be upheld. The dedication to Europe’s security

via the publicly-announced nuclear dome policy would establish what is often called a “hand-

tying” commitment, which places considerable repercussions on U.S. credibility for going

against its implied policies.24 In order to comprehend the superior effectiveness of the remaining

pillars of the nuclear triad, it is vital to analyze their characteristics which give them the

advantage over the forward-deployed nuclear gravity bomb arsenal in Europe.

The U.S. ICBM arsenal has changed in size and number throughout the post-Cold War

era. Today, the arsenal consists of 450 LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles in various bases in

Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming (the Minuteman I and II missile systems were retired in

1970). These missiles have Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)

technology, allowing for up to three nuclear warheads in each missile with a yield of each ICBM

warhead ranging from 300 to 500 kilotons (Kt). When trying to meet the parameters of the

START II treaty, the MIRV technology was temporarily replaced with a single warhead per

missile, but after START II failed to enter force, MIRV technology was replaced on the

Minuteman III missile. The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) and New START, the

21 Halpin, Tony. "Russia Calls on U.S. to Remove Its Nuclear Weapons from Europe." Bloomberg. N.p., 24 Mar. 2015. Web. 17 Sept. 2016. 22 Kristensen, Hans. "The US Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea." The Nuclear Information Project. N.p., 2006.

Web. 30 Oct. 2016. 23 Kristensen, Hans. "Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella". Nautilus Institute. Archived from the original on

2008-04-22. Web. 24 Oct. 2016. 24 James D Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” page 68–90.

current nuclear treaties adhered to by the United States, do not prohibit MIRV technology.25

These missiles provide a number of advantages to the heavy bomber program. First, unlike the

heavy bomber deployment method, they can reach almost anywhere on the planet from the

launch sites in the Northwestern United States, with an operational range of 8,100 miles

(13,000km). They fly at a top speed of Mach 23 (over 17,000 miles per hour), almost physically

impossible to intercept without Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology. Due to their range and

speed, the can easily compensate for the lack of a deployed nuclear arsenal in Europe to protect

NATO allies. Second, the ICBM silo facilities are highly secure, run entirely by the U.S. Air

Force. ICBM facilities are essentially military barracks with the capability of launching nuclear

missiles.26 Third and perhaps most importantly, the ICBM arsenal is maintained at a 99%

readiness levels – a reliability of deployment that dwarfs that of the heavy bomber program,

which requires valuable time spent mounting the weapon onto an aircraft and launching the craft

from an airbase only after an alert has been raised.

The SLBM program features several similar advantages, if only slightly different in detail

and deployment method. First deployed in 1990, the U.S. uses submarine-launched missiles as

the third pillar of the Nuclear Triad. The submarine fleet is comprised of 14 Ohio-class

submarines, with 24 UGM-133 Trident II (a.k.a. Trident D5) missiles mounted on each vessel.

Each Trident D5 missile contains between 3 and 12 MIRV warheads. The Trident D5 has a top

speed of just over 18,000 miles per hour with a range of over 7400 miles – slightly less than that

of the Minuteman III ICBM, but can be launched from a submarine deployed in any ocean. Like

the ICBM arsenal, the Trident D5 is more readily deployable and with a greater operational

range. Additionally, U.S. nuclear submarines are profoundly secure vessels – when deployed,

they are submerged in the deep ocean. While destruction of a vessel is plausible, seizure of their

missiles is virtually impossible. The nuclear submarine fleet is in a constant rotation of

deployment, guaranteeing readily-deployed nuclear missiles on the available ships at any given

time.

25“Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.” Web. 2 Nov. 2016. 26 Pappalardo, Joe. "Meet the Airmen Who Watch Over America's Nukes—And Await the Unthinkable." Popular

Mechanics. N.p., 23 Mar. 2011. Web. 1 Nov. 2016.

Unlike the heavy bomber deployment method for gravity bombs, ICBM and SLBM

deployment methods are tested on a regular basis.27 The Minuteman III was tested as recently as

February 26, 2016 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.28 Between 1989 and 2015,

Lockheed Martin has successfully tested 157 consecutive launches of the Trident D5 missile.29 In the event of any situation that the President should find a nuclear option suitable, the ICBM

and SLBM arsenals wield the ability to achieve contact on any target on the planet. Even if the

ICBM arsenal were to be neutralized in a first strike by another nuclear opponent, the submarine

fleet would still maintain retaliatory capability. Thus, introducing a Nuclear Dome policy of

deterrence maintains the same capabilities of protecting NATO allies as does the forward

deployed arsenal, with the same political promises implied in the placement of the forward

deployed arsenal still valid.

Closing comments

While the tactical nuclear arsenal is designed for different purposes than that of the

ICBM and SLBM arsenals, which mostly rely on strategic nuclear power, its distinction is

irrelevant if the program itself suffers virtually every disadvantage to ballistic missile

technology. As this paper has acknowledged, ICBMs and SLBMs enjoy a number of advantages

over the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal in NATO states. They are more reliable through

constant testing, have greater deployment capability, and pose significantly less risk to the

security of the weapons themselves than the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear arsenal in nuclear

sharing states. The security concerns of major states are in a state of constant transition. Today,

the U.S. faces new threats that demand adaptation from its outdated Cold-War policies of nuclear

security. As such, the U.S. would be advancing its nuclear policies and increasing the efficiency

of its defense budget by removing this forward-deployed arsenal in favor of relying on its ICBM

and SLBM arsenals to maintain its dedication to NATO’s security through a nuclear dome. In

order to maximize the effectiveness of the ICBM and SLBM arsenals, the US can diversify the

types of nuclear warheads mounted on these missiles (i.e. using tactical nuclear warheads in

27 Burns, Robert. "U.S. Continues to Test Cold War-era Minuteman Missiles." Portland Press Herald (2016): n. pag. Web. 13 Oct. 2016. 28 Alexander, David. "U.S. Test-fires ICBMs to Stress Its Power to Russia, North Korea." Reuters. N.p., 26 Feb. 2016. Web. 29 Oct. 2016. 29 "U.S. Navy's Trident II D5 Missile Achieves New Test Flight Reliability Record". Lockheed Martin (Press release). 10 November 2015. Web. 22 Oct. 2016.

addition to the currently-used strategic warheads) to meet any type of threat. Relying on the

policy of a nuclear dome, the U.S. will continue to protect its interest abroad while maintaining

its status as the apex of the nuclear order.

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