Refashioning Identity

8/14/2019 Refashioning Identity

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2The(Re)Fashioningf

Moroccan ationaldentitYMICKAEL BENSADOUN

During the 1990s,he ast decade f his ife' Morocco'sKing Hasan I initi-ateda proces,of g'adt'ul liberalizationof the political sphere'One of itsimportant consequencesas he emergence f new discourses n nationalidentity. $s fr--egdpm-qf""press'io"n'exf-an'de'd'"s*eialand-t"h--n't9-g"r'sup'q"n:sr*as.ins!,"qugt'tn;drf,oi io't .of-tHt-fvtn-''"'sl3-t'9q3!i-v''1qgmglimesin opposition ta.the p;*evuir.lns""irtuti"y9-slamists, he Amazigh lnove-ment,l eminiq!groupt' ""J ffi* rightsorganizations

ll-engagedin""thisredefi itioq,*rrtrr.rqr;:;ri-i-"tlher-irnplicitlyor.explicitly'-anumb*e"r'sfthe fopudipg myrn* oi-if'*;;d At the same ime' in the faceof bothinternalandexternal;;;;;; the monarchymodifiedelements f the of-ficialdiscourr"o, ,rutionul dentitywhile eaving hemonarchy'soleas hefreeminent unifying symbolof the nationuntouched'one consequencef these evelopments asan nteresting ynamicbe-tweenthedominantdiscourseandthecounterdiscourses.Theofficialdis-coursebegan ntegratingelements f the counterdiscourseso appeasehevariousgroupsand he ralenges theyposed' n turn' thepragmatic rendsol'tl,esevarioussocialmovementswere empted o accepthe monarchy'sco-optation. n particular' he monarchyand the two main

forcesof con-testation,theAmazighmovementandthe-Islamistmovement'participatedin n ively triungt'lu"Jiulogue' The struggleover he definition of nationalldcnrity as ence etot" un mportant art of hepolitical ame' speciallynincc(ing Mutramrnad I succeededis deceasedather n |uly 1999'Allhough heyoung ing hasunwavefnglY ontinuedo defend hecen-trnlilyol'thcnlunu"ni u' a national Vmbol' ehasalso oleratedheemer-g,ettcel'tliscoursesfi* tuy eventually eakenhe historicand religiouslegil i lrrrrcy,1',t,. tttu'o"hy' n particular he ne wpassionor Morocco'stetettl tigklry isksbccorlting nacl of accusation gainstmonarchic rac-t | teel t t r |e l | t | t r l . l l r r r t t t r l l i r tgt tr t l i r t t ta lrcconci l iat ion'I ta l lowsforaprofound


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l , l / Mickt t t l l lursulor t r tc it t l tre l ' lasirr '.s ystcrrrtt c policics f repressiotrf polit icaldissidents,rro twi ths l iu td i rrghc i rc t l r t t l l tc c : l t rre t t tolit ical ystenrs not fundamen-tnlly rl i l lercrrl.2 iuceascertclirrgo the throne,Muhammad VI has n largepirrl pursuccl nclexpandedon processesnitiated by his father.For nstance,lre has ernployed he time-honored meansof makhzenianpolitics, combin-ing co-optation and repression,3o dealwith the established pposition po-litical parties, the Islamist current, and the Amazigh movement. Like hisfather, Muhammad VI has promoted a moderate Islam that recognizes henational and religious legitimacy of the king and draws its main referencesfrom the Moroccan context.4,Lthe same h1g-bg has ent4ublic'rupportro4ple;-I-rtAl]?f,clry--Amazigh gvment that is ikely-to serv.easanally",agaj.pstfu_ndamenlalism-.Theriangular political' game" has resulted in importantadaptationsin the official discourse on national identity. In the negotiationprocess over the redefinition of national identity the king plays a dual role.On the one hand, he acts as a mediator between competing groups, but onthe other hand, he seeks o redefine the nation in such away so as o remaina dominant actor of the polit ical sphere.a

This chapter explores the emergence of a variety of new definitions ofMoroccan identity since he beginning of the 1990sand analyzes heir im-pact on the official discourse,stressing he political factors underlying theseevolutions. t focuseson the main discourses f contestation, he Amazighand the Islamist, against the background of the official discourse.

The OfficialVersionAlthough the official discourse on national identity has undergone impor-tant changesover the last fifteen years, t has not altered the founding ethosof the nation. Moroccan national identity, as expoundedby the regime inthe Moroccan Constitution, s basedon threepillars.sFirst, he monarchy sthe primary national and religious symbol of Morocco. Along with Islam, itis the main unifying factor of the nation. Second,Morocco is a Muslim andArab country. Third, the territory of western Sahara,adjacent to Morocco'ssouthern border, is an inalienable part of Moroccan territory notwithstand-ing the absenceof international legitimacy. Theseprinciples have remaineda constant in the official discourse and are challengedonly by radical fringesof the Amazigh and Islamist movements.Without modifying these oun-dational pillars, he monarchy refashioned he Moroccan national identity,under national and international pressure.

Th e publicationof French ournalistGillesPerrirtrlt lsrool


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16 / Mickael Bensadounplary coexistenceamong peoples of different faiths, with the authorities and"s.ocietyei4g.espegi4lly olerant and prot-ective oward jlits Jewsjl'J\{oroccanJewiSh.ntellectuals, artists, and politicianrll particip.ated in,the dissemina-[!on of this idea, publishing a seriegofbooks..and.articlespr,arsing-Muslim-J9ry1sh ptepte under a benign and paternal mpnarchy.l2Hasan II liked to claim that for geographic and historic reasons,Mo-rocco'svocation was to build bridges between civilizations, in particular,between Islam and the West.l3Responding to Samuel Huntington's 'tlashof civilizations" thesis,la he Moroccan official discourse called for dialoguebetween civilizations. The golden age of Muslim Spain was repeatedly re-ferred to as an ideal model to be followed, with specialemphasisplaced onthe mutual enrichment in Andalusia betweenTewishand Muslim intellec-tuals.Through the use of festivalsand other cultural manifestations,lsMo-rocco trumpeted the Andalusian golden age n order to show the world thattoday'sMorocco remained a land of toleranceand could serveas a bridgebetween ivilizations.

At the policy level, this vocation found its expression n the support-ing role played by Morocco in the promotion of the peaceprocess betweenIsraelisand Palestinians. he active participation of Morocco in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was another demonstration of the country'sability to foster understanding and cooperation between he three mono-theistic religions.

The overarching theme of the official discourse, then, is that Moroccois a Mediterranean country linked to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa'historically, geographically, and culturally.l6 Its history is rich in reciprocalinteractions with foreign civilizations and cultures. Thus Moroccan identity,drawing on this rich heritage, is defined as pluralist in nature, culturally,ethnically, and even religiously, and not monolithic. Such a discourse fitsin nicely with the postmodern celebration of plural and hybrid identities.Whereas modernity praised the unitary national state,postmodernity val-ues multiculturalism. Hence Morocco's modified official discourseon na-tional identity seems o prove the Moroccan monarchy's ability to adapt tothe cultural requirements of the globalization era.17ndeed, the legitimacyof the monarchy, drawing on its status asheir to Morocco's ong tradition ofsharifian ule, is not principally basedon Arab nationalism,enablinga flex-ible management of the country's various social and cultural forces. Con-trary to the old establishednationalist parties, he monarchy is not com-mitted to the building of a monolithic national identity and to its politicalexpression, centralizedacobinstate.As a monarchy, hc Mor


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18 / Mickael ensadounber origin recognized throughout the Arab world, considered the-Alnazigb.-movement a product of American and Zionist imperialism that-threatened.theunity of the Arab nation.2On the 1990s, he Amazigh movement fash-ioned ts dentity mainly in opposition o Arab nationalist deologies n boththeir conservativeand leftist expressionswhile refraining from becomingan antimonarchical force.

As far as the monarchy is concerned, the Amazigh movement does notdirectly threaten t, so ong as ts religious and political supremacy emainsunchallenged,and so long as the movement does not display nationalist/separatist mbitions. Hasan I's response o the ris e of the Amazigh move-ment fit the makhzenian mold, constituting a balanced mix of repression,fragmentation, and co-optation. Qrl Aqgust 20'1994' he delivered.on.iln:p-oftanl speegh hat provided sffieiaL recognition to the Moroccan Berhgr

.. i,.r- djalecls (there are hree mgin-pnes n"Morocco), characterizing them aspat!-;:1""'" of the country's auth-entrcnational identity-?l Moreover, the king pledgedto introduce the teaching of Berber dialects in Morocco's schools. Royalpronouncements almost always carry decisiveweight in Morocco. This onewas no exception, eading to a flourishing of the movement. A plethoraof Amazigh cultural organizations sprung up, and a number of Amazighpublications were founded. True to makhzenian form, the king's speechalsomarked the initiation of a co-optation policy of the Amazigh movement. Amoderate, pragmatic trend led by the movement's leading intellectual au-thority, Mohamed Chafik, agreed to work with the monarchy' whereas aradical trend led by former militants of the far Left, some of whom are fromthe northern Rif region, refused the regime'sovertures. For the movement'spragmatists, common interestswith the monarchy took precedence.On theone hand, the monarchy needed he Amazigh movement to weaken ts mainopposition, he Islamists, nd to support ts measures f incremental iberal-ization. On the other hand, the Amazigh movement was understood by thepragmatistsas being incapableof refashioning Moroccan national identitywithout the monarchy's suPPort.

lyom-the !-gginning-of the 1990s, he Amazigh movement has stresqedthe .gorrqlpligrr between the demo"cratization pre,cessand-the recogr+ition,pf Berber cultural-{ghts.2z According to this view, the Amazigh languageand culture are marginalized becauseMorocco is not yet a democracy.{.mqqigh lqtellectuals qse the Spa4ish monarchy as an example f91lhe de-siredmanagementof linguistic pluralism. Because t is a democracy,spainhas granted official recognition to minority languages ince 1978. ror tlreAmazigh movement, he Moroccan monarchycannot clairn o be a tlctttoc

The Re)Fashioningf MoroccanNational dentity / 19racy as ong as t does not give full recognition to the 'Amazighness" of thenation. Conversely, n this view the monarchy needs the Amazigh move-ment, one of the leading democratic forces of the country, to create a civicnation of freecitizens n order to rebuffthe Islamist challenge.

lslamism, the S tate, and the WestAlthough the monarchy claimed that Morocco was immune from funda-mentalism, n fact, rom the beginning of the 1990s, t becameobvious hatIslamism constituted he main opposition force n the country. This becameeven more apparent as the deca dewore on, ironically as a consequenceofthe kingt adroit orchestration of a policy of alternance,which incorpo-rated Morocco's raditional opposition parties, mainly from the Left, intoa power-sharing arrangement.23Although the Islamist movement is deeplyfragmented, its different trends make use of what it views as Morocco'sidentity crisis in order to enlist support. For them, Westernization consti-tutes the main threat to the Muslim identity of Morocco.24Globalizationis equivalent with Westernization, and, therefore, the monarchy's strategicchoice to participate in globalization processesshould be fought. They an-swer to the official discourse stressing Morocco's vocation as a bridge be-tween civilizations with a counterdiscourse stressing he inevitable clash ofideasbetween Islam and the West.zsFor the Islamists, Morocco can not andshould not try to prove that Islam is compatible with Wester n values, or, touse Huntington's terminology, Morocco, unlike Turkey, should not becomea country "torn' between East and West.

The l99l Gulf War provided Moroccan Islamist groups with an opportu-nity to demonstrate their political weight. The massive demonstration or-ganized in Rabat on February 3, 1991,26o express solidarity with the Iraqipeople served asa coming-out party, of sor ts, for these groups. The invasionof Iraq was depicted by the Islamists as a new crusade against an Arab an dMuslim country. Moroccan secularpan-Arabists and Islamistswere unitedin their condemnation of the war, the Wes t, and the Zionist enemy. Thebroad popular affinitywith this view made the monarchy's pro-Western dis-course and foreign policy appear disconnected rom public opinion. Civilsocierly'.spposition to the Gulf War seemed o suggest hat Morocco wascullurally and socially an integral part of the Muslim and Arab world. Mo-ro(:cilnsoc:iety ad not reacteddifferently from other Arab societies espiteMoror't-o'.syrrrbolic roop deployment n support of SaudiArabia (and,byi npl cu orr, rc Wcsl rrr et lcoali t ion against raq.


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' l l rc r orrrr l ly lsrrtc l l t 'c l rr i t ll i lc alsoconlri l)ut ed o the strengthening farr l i Wc$lnn lee l i rrg ,stt Morocco. l 'Algcriaatrcl slamic undamentalismi i l r . , t r orr l i rrp ' ,o t l reo l l i t t r l l iscorrrse,hc pri rrrary igr-r i f icantnemy'bth-t ' r , ; " l l l reMorot rn r i r l io rr i r lt lc rrt i ty ,i rr s lamist ndpan-Arabistntellec-Irr,rlr,,lr e rrt lt 'o l lrl isl i irrtWe'st s Morocctt'.snd Islam's ival'bther."Priorf r l lrr' rrrlrl i t ;rl iorr l I rrrrt irrgton'.slashof Civilizations,Mehdi el-Manjrarrscrf c lt 'r 'ru r'ivi l izalionit lw^r" (guerre ivilisationnel/e)o describe he( rrl l W;rr'. / /l lris sccular-l,eftntellectual et he tone or the Moroccancri-l i(luf ol 'l lrc West,which has only increased ince he eventsof Septemberll, 2(X)1.,ikc Moroccan Islamists,El-Manjra considered he war as a newe usade notivated not only by economic interestsbut also by cultural andrcl gious motivations:

There should be no doubt in one'smind that the Arabs are but the firstguinea pigs for an experiment designed o perpetuate he military,political and economic domination of the Westernworld aswell as hehegemony of its fudeo-Christian values. . . The deployment of forceswas compounded with psychological warfare of unprecedentedmag-nitude, along with a most revealing hysterical campaign by the mediaof the West-even Goering would appear like a shaky novice if hesaw he new mastersof the art of communication and information atwork. . . . The Gulf War should not be viewedasa regional conflict norreduced to a simple confrontation between the fudeo-Christian Westand the Islamic world. It is a North-South war, a conflict arising romthe |udeo-Christian civilization's inherent will to exert hegemony overall other civilizations,whether Arab, Asian or African, that is all otherforms of civilization which are different from the Western one.28Since he end of the Cold War , this type of discoursehas becomedomi-

nant in both Islamist and pan-Arab leftist circles.For them, Morocco, as aMuslim country, should define ts identity by opposition to the imperialistWest and Zionism. Islamists and secularpan-Arab intellectualsdefendedsimilar views regarding he subsequent aunching of the Israeli-Palestinianpeace process.Their common anti-Western and anti-Zionist feelings edintellectualssuch as Abd al-|abri and the veteran pan-Arabist oppositionleader Muhammad Faqih al-Basri to propose the establishmentof a na-tional union composed of secularpan-Arabists and of Islamists o opposethe "new crusade."2e y implication, their opposition was directed not onlyagainst he West but also he official policies of their own country.

The reiectionof Western ulture s oneof the main elements f Islamist

The Re)FashioningfMoroccanNational dentity / 21ideology in Morocco and the Muslim world as a whole. The West is per-ceived as a historical colonial power that continues to dispossessMoroccoand the Muslim umma from its identity; part of the Islamists'agenda s tore-Islamize Moroccan society.

SheikhAbdessalamYassine,he intellectual leaderof Moroccan Islamism,often comparescorrupt westernized elites to the good soldiers of God, pre-senting Moroccan society asdivided by an internal 'tlash of civilizations":At the head of the Islamist caravan advancing with assuranceon theroad towards power and autarchy,you will find no Westernized fel-low-travelers given over to the enemy both intellectually and cultur-ally. You will find no friendships or allianceswith the enemy.Neitherwill you find anyoneof neat appearance nd "position of responsibil-ityi' who is in fact a dreary spy and whose life is spent in a successionof apparatchiks'conferences and parties where information about thepotential of the country is hawked about in exchangeof hard cur-rency. You will find no clients of Hilton hotels, dance halls and otherdens of vice or habitu6s of seminars airing views akin to those of Free-masons,Zionism, capitalism or intelligence agencies. ou will findonly soldiers of God mobilized to serve he material and economiccauseof the community and considering this as an act of worshiprewarded by God.3oFor the Islamists, Morocco has achieved political independencewithoutcultural independence. Moreover, it is undergoing an identity crisis thatleads to underdevelopment.3l The decolonization process remains to becompleted since the 'bccidentalizing" Moroccan elites are culturally west-ern and attempting to import a foreign model to a Muslim country. Theroot of the society'sproblem is cultural alienation; the solution is to returnto Muslim fundamentals, hat is to say he implementation of the shari'a.

This ideology attracts a large proportion of young Moroccans educated inArabic. In a survey conducted at the end ofthe 1980s, ut offour hundredstudents polled, 75 percentbelieved he adoption ofthe Shari'a as he lawof the land to be the only solution to Morocco's problems.32Islamists propose a model of development that is supposed o suit thelocal culture, but in fact, like the Salafistsofthe Istiqlal party, they generallyoppose the version of traditional Moroccan Islam promoted by brother-ltoclszawiyaf). Moroccan Islamistsdefend a cultural model opposed ollre Wcstcrn elites' way of life. They adwocate he aeeele,ratiqn f Msr-o.c_eolstlt 'r 'adcs ld policit 'sof linguistic Arabization and the marginalizationof


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94 / Mlthueltlettc.rrlr,lrTbe Reopenlng f the Iteet(=lne nttrequencef tltc. rroliticaliberalization asbeen he growingdis-cunclonu thepress f someof the darkerchaptersn th e country's ecentlristory, ncluding he televisedestimonies f torture experiencedy for-mer politicalprisoners. or human ightsactivists uchasDrissBenzekri,who spentsixteen ears n prison for his revolutionary deas, democraticMoroccocannotemerge efore t dealswith the darkest earsof Hasan I'sreign, esanndes eplomb(yearsof lead), rom 1965 o 1975.41 hetherornot Morocco s n the process f a kind of therapeutic atharsishat will laythe ground or a real econciliation etweenhe monarchy nd he Moroc-canpeopleor, o the contrary,will delegitimizehe monarchicalnstitutionremainso be seen.n anycase,he ormationof a newcollectivememory,or memories,snow underway.Traumaticevents uch as he repression f the March 1965Casablancariots, the kidnappingand murder of exiled opposition eaderMehdi BenBarka hat same ear,and he failedmilitary coupsof l97I-72 arenow pub-licly debatedn the media and n testimonies. heForum |usticeet V6rit6,createdn 1998o shed ight on the repressive oliciesof Hasan I andpro-vide ndemnities or the victimsof torture and prison,hasbecome ncreas-ingly activeunder he eadership f Benzekri. orexample, n Iune26,2000,the forum participated n the InternationalDay in Supportof Victims ofTorture,presenting ewpublications fr orture n Morocco.a2 n October7, 2000, t organized pilgrimage or five thousandhuman rightsactivistsand ournalists o the notorious ormer prisonof Thzmamart,wheremanypoliticaldetainees ad beenheld. n the winter of 2000,AhmedMerzoukipublishedan important testimonyon Tazmamart,a3hich became best-seller n Moroccoand France.

This new interest n recenthistory indicates he lossof the makhzen'smonopoly n the writing of nationalhistory and he definitionof Moroccanidentity.aa he narrativepresentedn thedaily mouthpiece f thepalace,eMatin du Sahara,s now challenged y independentmediaand historians."Thestruggle or Morocco's ast"4ssback,with the potentialof laying hegroundwork for a nation of citizensdefending heir right to know,write,and remember heir own history after a ong periodof amnesia.BenjaminStorabelieves hat this processwill be fruitful only if the victims' aim is totell their history, o inform their citizensand not to seek evenge, hich canlead o internalconflicts.a6 oreover,he state's illingness o acknowledgepast aultsand repair h em s a positive ign or democratizationnd he

The Re)Fashioningf MoroccanNational dentity / 25reconciliationof the citizenswith their political nstitutions.Thecreation,by the royal dahir ("edict") of |anuary 7, 2004,of the InstanceEquitd etReconciliation, state ommission resided verby Benzekriand n chargeof the dentificationand ndemnificationof victimsof humanrightsabusesfrom 1956 o 1999,was especially oteworthy,particularly becausehereis no parallel or sucha body anywhere n North Africa and the MiddleEast.aTn a speechn Agadirannouncing reationof the commission,KingMuhammad I proclaimedhat'bur goal s that all the Moroccansecon-cilewith themselvesnd with their history, hat they ree heir energies ndthat heyparticipaten the edificationof democraticandmodernsocietyi'asHe alsostressedhe fact that this processwould reinforce he democraticcultureof the nation.

This search or historical truth and quest or reconciliationand repa-ration may or may not lead o the emergence f a civic Moroccannationidentifyingwith its political nstitutions.But n the meantime,t encouragesMoroccancitizens o public involvement.The success f the 'taravansoftruth' (lescaravanese a vdritd)organized y theForumfusticeand v6rit6demonstrateshe public'sappetite or information and civic involvement.Sincehe irst pilgrimage o Tazmamart,he orum hasorganized our morecaravanso di fferent places hat becamedes lieux de mdmoire"ae f thedarkyearsof state epression: alaaMGouna, Agdz,Figuig,and milchil inthe Atlasmountains.|udging rom the numberof recentnewspaper rticles ealingwith differ-entpoliticalevents f an ndependentMorocco, he nterestn the country'spostindependenceistory hasonly continued o increase. he ndependentweeklies e ournal and TelQuel re he primary producersof "journalistichistoryi'but the officialLeMatin du saharahasalsoprovideda publicspacefor publicationsdealingwith recenthistory, ncluding the history of theRif' whichwasconsideredaboounderHasan I.50n particular, t providesincreasing overage f the major publicationsof Berber ntellectuals, n n-dicationof thenewly ound importanceof the Amazighmovement.

The AmazighNarrativeAlmost from the outsetof MohammedVI's reign, he Amazighmovementhas propagated powerfulalternativenarrativeof Moroccannationalhis-tory. In addition to its engagement ith contemporaryand modern his-tory, this narrativealsoconcerns tselfwith the country's onguedur6e norcler o proveMorocco'.sontinued Amazighness"hroughouthistory.


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-f r t hl i r ht t rl l l rn\ i l l t , tnl( r re rrrr lr . t ly irrgrrr 'posr 'l l l r is npplo ir t ' l t s lo l t 'p ir ir l rc pol i t ica le l i tes 'i t t i t t ,r l i r r 'srwittr l l re let lrets tt t t l , ry l t ' l i r r i t iort ,l rc wholenation. ndeed,l lrc Arrrrr ig l l u ,r l l l ive i tssutneril t i t t l t t :rc s tt t t l t t tost omplelg-gqlg lu:errr ' l rc lweerrl r t 'Moror ' t rr r ir l iorttr t t l l tc lcr l l cr r lcrt t i ty . hen hestate,rcptcsclrl(.(l y llrt' lrrrA/r::r' ,,1rr,,li l( 's, isc:rirttirtittcsl. l , i l i l ls the Imazighen,l lr t ,wlro lcnrl l ion s wourrt lcd nc l runri l ia led. ' lh is o irr t s madeycryel-e-4rin lhc AnrazighManifestool'March l, 2000,sr hiclr stresseqlhat !! p -per-ber rewriting of Morocco'shistory and the reparationof his[oriq inig-s_!i-q.esagainst Berbersserve he whole nation.s2

For Amazigh movement ntellectuals,Morocco is an ancient nation pre-dating the appearance f Islam and the Moroccan sultanate.s3s an ethnic,Berber-basedentity, Morocco existed ong before a modern nation-statesystem emerged to provide political expression to collective identities. TheAmazigh narrative contradicts many aspectsof the modernist theories ofnationalism,sawhich consider he nation asa modern creation ntrinsicallylinked w ith the emergence of the state.For Rachid Raha, a Rifian intellec-tual and editor of the monthly le Monde Amazigh, "the history of Moroccofrom the High Atlas rupestrian engravingsof the Neolithic period untiltoday is a continuous history and a fundamentally Amazigh one."ss

"Consensual"Amazigh intellectuals such as Mohamed Chafik, HasanAourid, and Halima Ghazi even suggest here is a continuity between theBerber kings of Roman times and the monarchs of the modern era. ForHasan Aourid, Juba I is "a great Moroccan King of great finesseand knowl-edge."s6 his implies that the two main pillars of the Moroccan nation areits Berber identity and the monarchy. In an article published in both leMatin du Sahara and Le Monde Amazigh, Halima Gh1zi, a historian andmember of the Administrati ve Committee of the Institut Royal de a CultureAmazighe (IRCAM; see below), further developed this thesis. Morocco asa political entity, she states,has existed since antiquity. There is continuitybetween the Berber aguellids (Berber kings) and the modern monarchs ofMorocco. In opposition to the official historiography, whic h st resses hatonly Islam and the monarchy could unif' the different tribes coexisting inthe Moroccan territory, she claims that the two founding elements of theMorocco nation are he Amazigh identity and the monarchy, which gave henation its concrete political expression.5T hafik, the Amazigh movement'ssenior authority and a'tonsensual intellectual"par excellence, hares hishistorical analysiswhen he compares he opposition to foreign dominationby SultansMoulay Ismail (1672-1727),HasanI 1873-94),and MuhammadV (1927-61,who ruled as king of newly independentMorocco from 1956),

The Re)Fashioningf MoroccanNational dentity / 27to the opposition of Amazigh leaders Masinissa, fugurtha, and |uba I toinvaders more than two thousand years ago.s8

As the above treatment of Moroccan history indicates, fhe mains[reamMoroccan A-mazigh.movement.isp-r.o.rmonaf,chynd extends its support toMuhammad VI.. The Amazigh- centered,narrative. prevides the monarchywith a historic and national legitimacy. independent,from its religious le-.gitimacy. Together with the monarchy, the Imazighen are presented as themain opponents to foreign invasions in Morocco's history. Although theyaccepted he influence of foreign civilizations, such as fudaism, Christian-ity, and Islam, they always produced a national version of these cultures tosurvive.seEven the building of a modern Muslim state has not destroyed theBerber identity.

At the same ime, the Amazigh narrative stresses he modern period andprovides its own interpretation of the distinction made by French colonialistsociology between the ble-dal:rnaklxzen, hat is, territory under the sultan'sauthority, and the hkd".Al.*jha,he "land of dissidence"controlled mainly byBerber ribes.60 or Chafik, the siba s not a form of dissidence ut rather ofself-defense against the makhzen, which reproduces undemocratic behav-iors mported from Easternpolitical culture.6lAmazigh historiansquestionthe official narrative when it claims that the bled-al-makhzen was an effec-tive Muslim state. For historian Mohammed Mounib. the bled al-makhzenwas controlled by oppressivecaids (governors), whereas the Berber territo-ries were autonomous lands governed by traditionall y democratic Berberinstitutions.6z The Amazigh Manifesto claims that the anti=B,erber policy


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28 / Mickacl lJensadounArrrazigh Manifesto insists on the existenceof a strong ethnic Moroccanidentity prior to the imposition of the French protectorate nl9l2, whereasthe nationalist narrative claims that a distinct Berber collective identity,is merely a creation of "the divide and rule policy" of the.Erench-colonial.po.w.er.ndeed, the Moroccan nationalist ntovement, nfluenced by Salaf-ism and Arab nationalism, represented he Berbersaspotential alliesof thecolonialists becauseof the "French Berber policyi' One o-f hg ep-i-g-gl_g!q9gls,.ip 1-[e-.historyof Moroccan nationalism, according to the prgvaill$_yt"g*,w4q he May 16,1930, Berber dahirl'an unsuccessfulFrench.atternp-l"aunedat p-roviding uridical autonomy to some Berber ribes.6s

Not surprisingly, Amazigh historians and activistshave sought to rewritethis crucial episode,particularly in order to contest he accusationof theBerbers' alliance with France.66Hence they reverse he nationalist narrativeof the struggle or independence, lai ming that theBerber mountains werethe real patriotic centers of resistance o French rule, whereas he urban(Arab) elites imited their commitment to political treatises. hey highlightthe poetry of the time, which attests o the strong patriotic feelings of theBerber tribes, notwithstanding the establishment's efforts to erase t fromMoroccot collective memory.67

To be sure, he mainstream Berber critical narrative of modern historydraws a clear distinction between the legitimate monarchy and the falsifieddominant narrative of the nationalist movement. !h_991-emy l-olher--ofrhe.,Amryrgf; rnov-ement !s pot !he, p_onarsh,y,.but i{rabn'lslamisnr'1 an ideol-ogy imported from the Near East and therefore deemed incompatible withthe national identity of Morocco, the Islamic West.68For Hasan Aourid,the modern state dominated by the Istiqlal party's ideology was built in op-position to the Amazigh identity. The state'sArabization policy is a denialof the Amazigh language and culture,6eand the Istiqal's political elite usedimported ideologies o build an Arab national identity that marginalizedthe natural defenders of the nation, the Berbers. 9n !q-pgf lhe p-re"-v-igusFrench colonization, thg lmgigl-r..gnandthqMoro.cean.nalion-as,affhslg areq"tr"iing ft;- u n"* kind of cqlouizal-ion,an.Arah.colonizatiqq.-o.-{3asLe{.n

_g;i$n. Moderate Amazigh intellectuals have constructed the movement'sidentity in opposition to both the establishment Istiqlal and the newer Is-lamist parties,all of which areconsidered o be "amazighophobici' n focus-ing on manifestations of Arabo-Islam, the Amazigh movement generallyrefrains from analyzing he complex relationshipsbetweenthe monarchyand the Berbers since ndependence.For instance, he Amazigh Manifestodoesnot mention the role of Prince Hasan n the repressionof the Rif re-

The Re)Fashioningf MoroccanNational dentity / 29bellion in 1958-59 or the 1971and 1972 attemptsat coups dtat by largelyBerber elements n the military.to Ualnq_treamAmazigh-intelle-etrr_als,.d,p_n_pl.antagonize !,he''m9p-4ry!.rg.w-hich."th-9y""e-an-cider..?-.p-s!entia!lly, espp-.ciallyafter Mohlmmg{ -VJJook-asenes_of.symb-_o_ll-.-mp,.qggf_e-1sati-sfi1inga{_gfthe lqo.Jeme.n_t$emands"On October 17, 2001,Muhammad VI, dressed n traditional Berberclothes,recognized he central placeof 'Amazighness" in Morocco's nationalidentity in a speech delivered in Ajdir (Khenifra), in the Middle Atlas, an-nouncing the creation of the IRCAM. Putting an end to the Arab hegemonicdiscourse,Muhammad VI described Moroccan national identity aspluralistin nature and declared that the "historic roots" of Morocco are Berber.7lReactionswere varied. Q-o1nemazigh q-lilitants, such.as he former Com-munist Ahmed Adgfr!rqi,7-? aw-the.-monarchylsmoye..asan attempt to co-gpt 4nd Wea-ke! hg.Amazigh.movement in o,rdentp.preyent he emergenceof a militanl-?.ntiregtme A.-mazlghmoyementnas had happened in Algeria'sKabylian region. However, the predominant thinking among the MoroccanAmazigh activists was that the foundation of the IRCAM, a follow-up deci-sion to teach Tamazight n some primary schools,and the emergenceof anew discourse on national identity were positive developments. In contrast,Moroccan Arab nationalist intellectuals and Islamist leaderscriticized theofficial recognition of the Amazigh identity because t endangeredthe Arabidentity of Morocco.

How is one to understand Muhammad VI's actions? Essentially,he haschosen a path familiar to Moroccan rulers, playrng the role of arbiter be-tween competing social forces, in this case, he 'Arabo-Islamists" and theAmazigh in their contest over the definition of Moroccan national identity.Ilor instance, he issueof the transcription of the Berber languagegener-ated an intense debate regarding which script to employ in the teaching of'lhmazight: Latin, Arabic, or Tifinagh (a modified version of ancient Berberwriting). Most Islamists vociferously advocatedthe Arabic script, whereasa majority of Amazigh militants and intellectuals preferred the use of Latinlettersfor both ideological and practical reasons.Royal intervention eventu-rrlly esulted n a controversialcompromise, he adoption of Tifinagh.

Ikrr ideologicaland cultural reasons, he Amazigh movement is deeplyopposed o the Islamistmovement.This view was sharpenedby the May 16,2(X)3, uiciclebombing attacks n Casablanca y jihadists that killed thirty-llrrcc irrnocerrt people. Amazigh activists and intellectuals, such as thelerrrirrislMcryarrr )emnati and the radicalMohammed Boudhan, eactedhy cxporrnding tn cxplicitly seculardiscourse n opposition o Islamism

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1 ?a i r l f i * rel l le;1Ert*rt;;refid ltr dornlndlrl pllcc of Islam in the political system.others blamedlhe irugrollnlkrr o['oriental ideologies o Morocco for the country'ssuffer-lrrgr. ltrr' lloudhan, Morocco-s "irrational attachment to the'a.rab p6t" isit great soulge of s!lgnat!9,-n.73.4.r-r'authentic" Amazigh Mo"ro_eco*onfu.other hand, weuld.b,ecomedemoc-raticand-trence..dev-elop.ainstream, lessradical Amazigh intellectuals such as Ahmed Boukous,T4Hasan Aourid,75and Ahmed Assid also defend a certain level of secularization,or at leastanenlightened Islam that they say s compatible with democracy.Althoughthey generally avoid employing a radicar anti-Arab and anti-Islamist dis-course' fhey also claim that North African identi.ty. s no.t-oriental"aadrrotanti-Western but rather Amazigh and Mediterranean. For those who speakin more explicit political terms, federalism is sometimespresentedas anappropriate formula. In a related vein, Iraqi Kurds are pointed to asamodelof a determined ethnic minority operating n a hostile milieu.76

ConclusionMoroccan national identity is in the midst of a processof contestation andreconstruction. The redefinition of national identity is the result of continu_ous negotiations between the elites of new movements and the king whoseeks o remain a unif ing syrnbol and actor.77 he monarchy acceptsandsometimeseven encourages he emergenceof new discourses, uch as heAmazigh discourse and the moderate Islamist discourse, as ong as hey donot question the pillars of Moroccan identity, including the religious legiti-macy of the monarchy. Although radical streams of both movements con-test the foundational pillars of Moroccan identity, the liberalizing monarchyhopes t can ame thesemovementsby integrating hem into theofficial po-litical game.The Islamist fustice and Development party seems o accept herules of the game by distancing itself from a wahabbi-type fundamentalistIslam, which the authorities characterize asan imported ideology opposingthe values of Moroccan Islam. The mainstream Amazigh movemeni, for itspart' propagatesa discourse hat stands n total opposition to the Istiqlalparty's and Islamists' deology without antagonizing the monarchy. whereasthe Islamists seem o abandon the nation to look East, he Amazigh move-ment aims at becoming the last defender of the Moroccan nation threatenedby transnational ideologies. This view has even been applied to Morocco'slong-running struggle to incorporate the western sahaia into the kingdom.According to Mohamed chafik, the western Saharacan only be Moroccanbecausets population is Amazigh in origin and adheres o Morocc.rr rsr.r',

The Re)FashioningfMoroccanationaldentity / 31which was tself born in the sahara during the golden ageof Morocco, creat-ing a Western Islamic culture distinct from Eastern Islam.TsI&r"-o.c.'*g! .9r*:grLf,,k,-r*rds:s--o-ing-en."r*fsr.nsl-p*pJilie.._al.e_nd,infe-llep-t"1largtruggl-e,pv--o. pg.Ea.stgrqrprien"-tedidgologies.which mainrein rhrr ..Tcro-rr e65rF-r!v-u*yr,llE.'e'afJgrq:Qn9tr*tedJd*0togies,-whieh""maintainlhal-ll-IsLan!sthgeel11!i'e'-r1-'"(I:lqrllkuwqql-h.aaB,r.he-.$e,.c,cty*idgn-+ityn-dmare.rialcrisis;W.estern:"orjented.ideologies",ruhrch"defend,thefs;bfi".fr*fri"iafi,U_.eraldemoe,racy;"and.,an--Ar.nazigh,ideology"which"stipurarec,th,.aJ-theH?xrg90p9-"wirhmpdp"rnitx..ep.4,slsb*li,?,#lp,n*is..tq.-ef.rsnsrhs**fts.;,jp.9t114.Pq.b,gt-rppts"hesethnic, ulturar,eligious,nd a""i"jil"ilii"""g", *ilrcontinueo nfluencehenature f heMoroccanolitical ystem.i. por-sible positive scenariocould be the emergenceof a consociationardemoc-r.aqy'e ounded on power sharing a*onglslumists, liberal democrats, and'Amazighists" in which the monarchy would become a benign moderatingand unifying actor.

Notesl' The Amazigh movement is a predominantly urban-basedmovement that defendsthe cultural rights of the.Berbers, the indigenous peopre of Morocco. It emproys theterms Amazigh' (plural "Imazighen') for Berber, iamazight" for the Berber ranguage,and "Tamazghd' for the Berber homeland. See Bruce Maddy_Weitzman, ,.ContestedIdentities:Berbers, Berberisrn and the State n North Africaj, Journal of North AfricanStudies6, no. 3 (Autumn 2001):23_47.2. Myriam et Frid6ric Vairel catusse,"Ni tout i fait le mme ni tout d fait un aure:M6tamorphoseset continuitd du rigime maro caini Maghreb-MachreklT|(Spring 2003):73-92.

3. Makhzen (lit. "treasury" or "strongbox') is the traditionar term for Morocco,s ul-ing monarchichal-military-bureaucratic apparatus.For a crassic nalysisof the Moroc_can political system,see ohn warerbury, The commander of the riitrr\rt (New york:( olumbia University press,1970).4. Karim Mezran, "Negotiating National ldentity in North Afric al, nternational Ne_gotiation 6, no. 2 (2001): 475' For the dominant discourse,see, or exampre,Muhammad othman Benjelloun,Itrojet National et dentiti au Maroc (Casablanca: ddil 2002).Also seeTerhi t.h,i.r"rr,"llcyo'd the Moroccan state-The TransnationalNation-Building of the Amazigh cul_f rrnlM

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Refashioning Identity