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Appendix A

List of Acronyms

Keyword Explanation

3DES

AADC

ACH

ACS

AES

AMS

ANSI

AR

CA

CA

CC

CCD

CEM

CEN

CFS

CISSP

Tiple-DES

Automated Area Distribution Center, i.e., a USPS mail processing center

Automatic Clearing House

Address Change Service of the US Postal Service

Advanced Encryption Standard

Address matching service

American National Standards Institute

Ascending Register

Two letter abbreviation for Canada (ISO 3166)

Certification Authority

Common Criteria

Charge Coupled Device, technology used for digital photography

Common evaluation methodology

Comite Europeen de Normalisation, European Committee for Standardization

Computerized Forwarding System of the US Postal Services

Certified information system security professional

236 Electronic Postage Systems

Keyword Explanation

CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program of NIST

CO A Change of Address (of the US Postal Service)

CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture of the OMG

CPC Canada Post Corporation

CPU Central processing unit, main processor

CRC Cyclic Redundancy Code

CRL Certificate Revokation List

DES Data Encryption Standard

DMIS Digital Meter Indicia Specification of the Canada Post Corporation

DP AG Deutsche Post AG

DR Descending Register

DSA Digital Signature Algorithm

DSL Digital subscriber line

DSS Digital Signature Standard

DTR Derived Test Requirements under FIPS 140

EAL Evaluation Assurance Level (under Common Criteria)

ECDSA Elliptic Curve DSA

EDI Electronic document interchange

EEPROM Electrically Erasable PROM

EFP / EFT Environmental failure protection / testing

EJB Enterprise Java Beans

EKP Customer number provided by Deutsche Post

EMI / EMC Electromagnetic interference / compliance

EPROM Erasable PROM

EPV Elliptic curve PV

ERP Enterprise Resource Planning

ESI "Entgeltsicherung", German for revenue protection group

Appendix A: List of Acronyms 237

Keyword Explanation

EUR European currency

FIM Facing identification mark

PIPS Federal Information Processing Standard of NIST

FTP File Transfer Protocol

GPG GNU Privacy Guard

HMAC message authentication code mechanism based on a hash function

HMQV Hash enhanced MQV

HSM Hardware Security Module

IBI Information Based Indicia

IBIP IBI Program

IC Integrated Circuit

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc.

IPC International Post Corporation

IPMAR International Postage Meter Approval Requirements

ISO International Standards Organization

ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria

MAC Message authentication code, message authentication code mechanism

MD Message Digest

MLOCR Multi-line optical character recognition

MQV Menezes, Qu, Vanstone

NCSC National Customer Support Center (of the US Postal Service)

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States

NVLAP National voluntary laboratory accreditation program of NIST

ODIS Origin destination information system (of the US Postal Service)

OMG Open Management Group

PC Personal Computer

PC Piece Count Register

238 Electronic Postage Systems

Keyword

PGP

PKCS

PKD

PKI

PP

PROM

PSAG

PSD

PSD-PSN

PTM

PV

PVD

PVD-R

PVR

RA

RAID

RAM

REMPI

RFC

RIPE

ROM

RSA

RSM

RTC

SHA

SOHO

SRDI

Explanation

Pretty Good Privacy

Public Key Crypto System Standard

Public Key Directory

Public Key Infrastructure

Protection Profile (Common Criteria)

Programmable ROM

Postal Security Action Group

Postal security device

Postal Serial Number of a PSD

Postal Technology Management of the US Postal Services

Pintsov-Vanstone digital signature mechanism

Postage value download

PVD request

Postage value refund

Registration Authority

Redundant Array of Independent Disks

Random access memory

Re-engineering the mail—Postal Interface

Request for Comment

RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation

Read only memory

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman digital signature mechanism

Revenue Sensitive Module

Real time clock

Secure Hash Algorithm

Small office / home office

Security relevant data item

Appendix A: List of Acronyms 239

Keyword Explanation

SSL Secure Socket Layer

ST Security Target (Common Criteria)

STS Station-to-station protocol

TCPSEC Trusted Computer Product Security Evaluation Criteria

TLS Transport Layer Security

TPG Netherlands Post

TS Total Settings Register

UK United Kingdom

UPU Universal Postal Union

USPS United States Postal Services

UZ "Unzustellbar", German for mail item not-deliverable

XML extendible markup language

ZIP Zone Improvement Program (of the US Postal Service)

Appendix B

About the Author

As senior cryptography architect, Gerrit Bleumer lead the design and development of the global cryptographic architecture of Francotyp-Postalia Group (FP), which controls the transport and delivery of cryptographic mod­ules worldwide and supports postage meters from their initialization to removal from market. Since 2004, he has headed the department of innova­tion projects and product quality of the research and development division of FP. He has served on the advisory board of the Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security published by Springer.

In 1991, he received a diploma in computer science from the University of Karlsruhe, Germany. From 1992 to 1996, he worked as research associate in several research projects in security of health care informatics funded by the Commission of the European Union. From 1997 to 1999, he worked as senior technical staff member at AT&T Labs-Research in Florham Park, NJ. In 2001 he received a Doctorate in computer science from the University of Dort­mund, Germany.

Index

Numerics 2D barcode symbology 14

64

A active attack 95 address matching services advertisement 10 alteration 190 application layer 72 ascending register 7, 37 assurance 207 asymmetric encryption mechanism 92, 94 asymmetric message authentication

mechanisms 99 atomicity 36 attack

active 95 alteration 190 bogus postal security devices collusion 187 copying 190 cryptanalysis 191 existential forgery 102 hijacking the print mechanism impersonation 188 inappropriate induction 191 manipulation 189 message replay 190 miss-application 190 obliteration 191 physical 189 print multiplexing 189

190

189

repudiation 188 selective cryptanalysis 95 selective forgery 102 side channel 189 substitution 191 subversion of key management subverted payments 188 system infiltration 188 total break 95,102 universal break 95,102

attack counterfeiting 190 attacker model 183 authenticating key 99 authorization 60

B bank payment channel 29 barcode symbology

2D 14 DataMatrix 14 PDF417 14

batch mode 31 block size 97 blocking 61 bogus postal security devices 190 business reply mail 47

carriers 35 cell 33 certified mail 45 certified mail statement 45

189

244 Electronic Postage Systems

class of mail 41 Click'n'ship 167 closed e-postage device 26 collision resistance 97 collusion 187 Common Criteria Recognition

Arrangement 219 Common Evaluation Methodology 220 common services layer 72 competitive postal operator 22 copying 190 counter 10 counterfeiting 190 courtesy reply mail 47 credit limit 31 cryptanalysis 191 cryptographic boundary 213,219 cryptographic checksum 33, 58, 88 cryptographic key 91

pair 94 private 94 public 94 secret key 93 symmetric key 93

cryptographic mechanism asymmetric encryption 92 digital signature 99 hash function 96 message authentication code 99 security parameter 91 symmetric encryption 92

cube 33 customized stamps 19 cyclic redundancy check code (CRC) 98

D data capture 43 data correction indicium 46 data integrity 98 data matrix

cell 33 cube 33 element 33

DataMatrix 14 delivery confirmation 46 delivery point barcode 86 depositing post office 10, 27, 28 descending register 7, 37

destruction stage 108 digital postage meter 13 digital postmark 2 digital signature 99, 101 digital signature mechanism 99, 101

non-repudiation 103 private key 101 public key 101 with appendix 102 with message recovery 102

distribution tier 72

E eBay 168 electronic postage 1 electronic postage system 2, 17

server infrastructure 17 electronic postmark 1 electronic presorting 23 electronic signature

see digital signature element 33 encryption mechanism

active attack 95 asymmetric 92,94 key transport channel 93 mode of operation 94 passive attack 95 secret key 93 selective cryptanalysis 95 symmetric 92 total break 95 universal break 95

encryption mechanisms public key 94

end date 43 Endicia.com 167 endorsement 10 enterprise tier 72 entropy 111 e-postage device 25

closed 26 data capture 43 local state 72 mail-handler 39 multi-carrier 29 offline 25 online 25

Index 245

open 26 postal security device 38 remote state 72 usage profiles 44

e-postage minting system 25, 28 e-postage provider 28 e-postage system

bank payment channel 29 e-postage minting system 28 e-postage provider 28 post backoffice 28 postal payment channel 29

evaluation 207 evaluation assurance levels 219 existential forgery 102 extra services 41

facing identification mark (FIM) 64, 137 FIM see facing identification mark

H hardware security module 14 hash function 96

one-way 97 hash results 97 hash values 97 hijacking the print mechanism 189 hybrid encryption 112 hybrid mail 23

I IBI-lite 139, 174 impersonation 188 imprint

5eepostage imprint 9 inappropriate induction 191 indicia 13 indicia key 38,58 inducting post office 10 initialization 59 integration testing 208 integrity check value

see message authentication code international mail 24 International Post Corporation 24 issuer 113

K key

authenticating 99 public key pair 101 signing 99 verifying 99

key life cycle pre-operational stage 107

key life-cycle destruction stage 108 operational stage 108 post-operational stage 108

key transport channel 93, 100

licensing post office 28 local state 72 lost or stolen e-postage devices 197

M MAC

see message authentication code mail- carrier 49 mail processing facility

originating 34 mailer's value-added services 39 mail-handler 39 mailing behavior monitoring 196 mailing date 7 mailing parameter entry 44 manipulation 189 message authentication 98 message authentication code 99 message authentication mechanism

asymmetric 99 existential forgery 102 selective forgery 102 total break 102 universal break 102

message digest 104 message replay attacks 190 miss-application 190 mode of operation 94 monthly invoice 30 multi-carrier e-postage device 29

246 Electronic Postage Systems

N non-repudiation 103

o obliteration 191 offline e-postage device 25 one-way liash function 97 online e-postage device 25 online mode 31 open e-postage devcie 26 operational stage 108 origin and destination 41 originating mail processing facility 34

passive attack 95 payment method

monthly invoice 30 post-download 30 pre-download 30

payment/volume reconciliation 196 PDF417 14 perimeter security paradigm 31 personalized stamps 19 physical attacks 189 piece count register 8, 37 point-to-point security paradigm 31 post backoffice 28 post office

depositing 28 inducting 27 licensing 28

postage amount entry 44 postage correction indicium 46 postage evidencing device see digital post­

age meter postage imprint

advertisement 10 counter 10 endorsement 10 postmark 10 towncircle 10 tracking number 10 traditional 9

postage meter digital 13

postage minting system batch mode 31

online mode 31 Postage Point 153, 175 postage rate table 42

end date 43 start date 43

postage value download 25, 61 postage value refiind 32 postal approval process 207 postal code 8

ZIP code 8 postal operator

competitive 22 private 21 universal 21,22

postal payment channel 29 postal register 7, 36, 60

ascending 7,37 descending 7,37 piece count 8, 37 total settings 8, 37

postal register reconciliation 196 postal security device 38, 53

authorization 60 blocking 61 initialization 59 postage value download 61 postal serial number 60 real-time clock 59 re-authorization 62 re-initialization 62 scrapping 63 unblocking 61 validation 60 virtual 69 watchdog timer 59 withdrawal 61

postal security producing indicia 60 postal serial number 60 postal value-added services 40 Post-download payment method 30 postmark 10

indicia 13 post-operational stage 108 pre-download payment method 30 preimage resistance 97 pre-operational stage 107 presentation tier 72 presort type 41 print multiplexing 189

Index 247

private key 94, 101 private postal operator 21 producing indicia 60 product code 41 product code entry 44 protection profile 219 PSD-PSN 60 pseudo-random bit generator 110

entropy 111 seed 110 unpredictable 112

public key 94,101 public key certificate 113

issuer 113 subject key 113

public key encryption mechanisms 94 public key pair 94,101 putting e-postage devices on hold 197 PVD <$I Italicpostage value download 25

R range of size 41 range of weight 41 rate category 41, 44

class of mail 41 extra services 41 origin and destination 41 presort type 41 range of size 41 range of weight 41 subclass of mail 41

rate table 42 readability testing 209 real-time clock 59 re-authorization 62 redate indicium 46 refusal problem 4 registered mail 45 regular use testing 208 re-initialization 62 remote state 72 repudiation 188 resource tier 72 revenue sensitive module 216 risk assessment stage 183 risk maintenance stage 184 risk management

risk maintenance stage 184

risk reduction stage 184 risk reduction stage 184 RSM

see revenue sensitive module

s scrapping 63 second preimage resistance 97 secret key 93 secret key encryption mechanisms 93 secret prefix 100 secret suffix 100 security compliance testing 208 security parameter 91 seed 110 selective cryptanalysis 95 selective forgery 102 semi-atomicity 36 server infrastructure 17 shared secret key 99 Shipstream Manager 168 side channel attacks 189 signature confirmation 46 signing key 99 site security audit 207, 208 SmartStamp 168 software architecture

application layer 72 common services layer 72 distribution tier 72 enterprise tier 72 presentation tier 72 resource tier 72

Stampit Business 168 StampItHome 168 Stampit Web 168 stamps.com 167 start date 43 statement of induction 199 subclass of mail 41 subject key 113 substitution 191 subversion of key management 189 subverted payments 188 symmetric encryption mechanism 92 symmetric key 93 system infiltration 188

248 Electronic Postage Systems

T tamper evidence 218 tamper responsive envelope 53, 54 target of evaluation 219 terminal dues 24 testing 207 total break 95,102 total settings register 8, 37 town circle 10 tracking number 10, 45 traditional postage imprint 9

u unblocking 61 universal break 95,102 universal postal operator 22 universal postal operators 21 unpredictable 112 usage data 17 usage profiles 44 USPS Postal Technology Management

(PTM) 13

V validation 60 value-added services

of the mailer 39 postal 40

verifying key 99 virtual postal registers 37 virtual postal security device 69

see also hardware security module volume analysis 196

w watchdog timer 59 WebStamp 168 withdrawal 61

z ZIP codes

Printed in the United States