Fernandes

Regionalist Euroscepticism: Amending the Rational-Materialist Explanation

I. Abstract: Regionalist parties across Europe have been largely Euro-optimistic despite their strong territorial identity, and this Euro-optimism amongst regionalists has been generally accepted as the status quo. By reviewing the literature and conducting in-depth analyses and comparisons of the Lega Nord and Convergència i Unió, I argue that regionalist parties weigh the viability benefits of integration against fears of cultural homogenization when deciding their position on the EU. Contrary to previous research which concludes that regionalist parties will remain regionalist, my comparison argues that the underlying social-psychological conditions which facilitate regionalist Euro-optimism may be at risk.

II. Introduction:

The European Union was conceived in the aftermath of World War 2 as an antidote to the war on the European continent. The increasing prevalence of Euroscepticism, a negative opinion of the ongoing project of European integration, threatens to reignite the aggressive nationalist politics that the EU was created to prevent. Nationalist parties such as those in Germany and Hungary view the development of a European identity and institutions as antithetical to their national interests. Regionalist parties (RPs) present an alternative narrative of European integration which is compatible with nationalist territorial identity claims. Analyzing regionalists’ relationship with the European Union began with studies in the 1980s and 1990s which found that regionalist parties were the most pro-European party family (Chaney 2014, 464). Regionalist parties, such as the Catalan Convergence & Union (CiU), reconciled their regional interests with euro-optimistic positions. Through this research, I identify the importance of the EU providing avenues for regions to exercise autonomy and perceptions that the EU can coexist with local cultural differences.

However, rather than try to understand why most regionalist parties are Euro-optimists, I will focus on understanding the Euroscepticism of certain regionalist parties. The rationalist approach which is used to explain regionalist Euro-optimism ought to apply to all territorially-focused political parties including nationalist parties, but they have often failed to capture the reality of nationalist behavior. The lack of attention paid to the regionalist Euroscepticism is worrying when there is evidence of increasing “‘soft’ Euroscepticism” amongst RPs (Jolly 2015, 88). Therefore, my research question is: Under what conditions do regionalist parties become Eurosceptic? Specifically, I will be examining the 1990s to early 2000s because this time period saw the Northern League’s transition to Euroscepticism occur. I will include social-psychological approaches in my hypothesis to address identity-based concerns.

Outside of the benefits of better understanding regionalist parties, my findings will offer the chance to better understand local reactions to globalization and the role of anti-immigration stance through the lens of Ontological Security Theory and social psychology. The relationship between political elites and identity construction is not an unexplored phenomenon in political science either. Hermut (1996) and Van Haute et al. (2018) argued that the goal of nationalism was “civic-territorial persuasion” in order to “create a sense of identity.” On issues of culture and immigration, identity comes to play a key role in the decisions of a regionalist party. Regionalist party leaders will adopt Eurosceptic party platforms when the fears of immigration associated with European integration outweigh the benefits to the viability of regional independence. Europe will begin to see more regionalist Euroscepticism as RPs lose faith in a future ‘Europe of the regions’ and RPs’ fears of immigration increase. In the case of the LN, a perceived incompatibility between its regional identity and European identity tipped the balance towards Euroscepticism in 1998.

Case Selection

To test different explanations for the Euro-scepticism in regionalist parties, I have selected two cases from two European countries. The first case is the Lega Nord (LN), a eurosceptic regionalist party from northern Italy. Second is Convergència i Unió (CiU)[footnoteRef:0] which was a Catalan euro-optimistic regionalist party whose economic and political situation has similarities to Northern Italy. In this comparison, each countries’ political structure (federal versus centralized), national perspective on the EU, and European Parliamentary election rules are similar. Furthermore, Catalonia and Padania (Northern Italy) are both economically well off based on national averages (GDP per capita). However, each region exhibits differing trends of globalization, identity exclusivity, participation in transregional networks, Pre-EU legacy, and entitativity. [0: CiU dissolved and became Junts per Catalunya (Together for Cataloni) in 2017.]

III. Literature Review:

In the last few decades, scholars have worked to understand regionalist Euro-optimism. However, the neglect for understanding regionalist Euroscepticism has left theories of regionalist behavior unprepared for the challenges ahead. Analyses of regionalist parties in the 1980s and 1990s found that regionalist parties were the most pro-European party family (Chaney 2014, 464). Large N quantitative studies, based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey,[footnoteRef:1] have confirmed the initial findings that the regionalists party group is Europhile/euro-optimistic with a few outliers (Jolly 2015). With broader trends of Euroscepticism, quantitative findings indicate that euro-critical positions are increasing (Seth Jolly 2015). I look to the outliers of previous studies to understand potential developments among regionalist parties. Eurosceptic regionalist outliers such as the Northern League may, in fact, have been the canary in the coal mine for broader political trends that demonstrate the rising importance of social-psychological variables. Specifically, the Northern League demonstrated the role of increasing perceived fears of the immigrant ‘other’ on their political relationship with the EU. [1: The Chapel Hill Survey polls experts in order to calculate the measures of platform positions of European political parties each year. chesdata.eu]

Seth Jolly (2015) built on multilevel governance’s rationalist explanations by proposing his Viabilitytheory to explain regionalist Euro-optimism. The essence of the Viability theory is the argument that the EU increased the economic and political viability of smaller independent states (Jolly 2015). However, the Catalan Convergence and Union Party and the Northern League of Padania were on the political right, represented wealthy regions, exhibited xenophobia, resorted to populist rhetoric, and participated in the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party Group in the European Parliament. While each party was euro-optimistic in the early 1990s, only the Northern League became strongly eurosceptic by 1996. Through the comparative analysis of the Catalonian Convergence and Union, and Italy’s Northern League, I will test materialist hypotheses alongside explanations based on social constructivist variables and psychological theories because I suspect that expecting uniform Euro-optimism among regionalist parties is an oversimplification of the regionalist decision-making process that neglects social-psychological elements such as fear of the ‘Other’ (Elias 2008, 561-2).

Viability theory assumes that regionalist parties will all interpret integration in a rationalist way. In my research, I will look to the expressed perspectives on the EU to provide nuance to Viability theory. In the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions, regionalist parties fought for European governance that consisted of less concentrated power at the national level, more EU authority on issues best handled at the continental level, and more autonomy at the local/regional level. The costs and benefits can be calculated in many ways. Viability theory focuses on long term political benefits in a way that ignores potential economic and social fears. I propose that Viability theory be amended to recognize that psychological threats and fears can lead regionalist parties to forsake increased regional autonomy from integration.

Materialist Dimensions of Regional Viability

Seth Jolly’s work on Viability theory argued that European integration made regional autonomy/independence more economically and politically viable and therefore encouraged more regionalists to call for increased autonomy while supporting integration. Jolly continued a long tradition of explaining Euro-optimism through economic benefits.[footnoteRef:2] While I agree that regionalist parties are likely to consciously weigh the costs and benefits of integration in choosing their position on the EU, I disagree with excluding non-materialist political concerns into that equation. [2: Both Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism have touted the economic benefits of the EU as the principal force behind Euro-optimism. ]

In the purely materialist explanation, political parties pursue policies that ensure their reelection and often that translates to policies that economically benefit their constituents. The economic benefits of integration were heralded as a primary driver in each theory for European integration because preferences on the issue of integration were viewed as economic (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 4). Theorists focusing on economic rationality expect regionalist Euroscepticism to develop from a regional economy that had been disadvantaged by integration. Unfortunately, objectively determining which regions have benefited from integration is not a simple task.

Funding received directly from the EU is one such form of measuring the benefits and many regions receive funding from the Cohesion policy funds. The negative impact of EU policy on regions has been proposed as a determinant of regionalist adopting a critical Euro-optimism[footnoteRef:3] (Elias 2008, 561-2). Other regions are economically competitive enough to profit off the common market. Additionally, the benefits of integration are not distributed equally with regions because individuals who economically benefit from integration (higher-skilled workers in competitive export industries) are more likely to approve of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2001 63). Scholars studying regional economic policy making have seen regions diverge from “their respective economic cores in terms of their relative performance (Martin 2015)” in order to adjust to a“globalized, knowledge based economy” (Clifton and Usai 2018, 2). The economic benefits of integration cannot be fully separated from globalization and, therefore, EU policies that help regions compete in a global economy also provide an economic benefit. [3: Many regionalists were strongly critical of the EU constitution, but generally euro-optimistic]

Overall, purely economic factors ("class, sense of economic well-being, and orientation") have been shown to explain "less than 60% of the variation in individual attachment to the EU" (Hooghe and Marks 2001 64) on average. I suspect that regionalist voters could be basing positions on non-economic at a greater rate. However, given the mainstream understanding of Euro-optimism focuses on economic factors, my first hypothesis is:

H1: Regions that economically benefit from European integration will more often be euro-optimistic.

Political Dimensions of Regional Viability

In response to rising populism, theories of integration have begun to dedicate more attention to the public. The most successful effort on that front was made by Hooghe and Marks, who formulated a new theory known as postfunctionalism, to explain modern European Integration. Previous theories of integration, such as neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, considered elites as the central actors and ignored the public which tends to be more eurosceptic (Borzel and Risse 2009, 218). The politicization of integration triggers this shift to a form of integration that is no longer driven by elites with a consultation with the public (Jolly 2015, 124-125). In postfunctionalist integration, identity and its exclusivity/inclusivity[footnoteRef:4] either enable or more commonly impede integration (Ibid, 124-125). [4: The inclusivity/exclusivity of national (or regional) identity has been shown to be crucial in public opinion (Borzel and Risse 2009, 219). ]

The broad strokes of postfunctionalism do not perfectly fit regionalist parties because, as was shown by viability theory, regionalists have actively politicized integration by using it as a path towards autonomy before the more recent politicization that triggers the formulation of postfunctionalism. RPs have dealt with a postfunctionalist political environment far longer than other party families.[footnoteRef:5] Through their prominent role, regionalist parties have been able to frame their identity as either inclusive or exclusive. I don’t believe that it is a coincidence that Vlaam Belang and LN, two eurosceptic regionalist parties, are known for strong anti-immigrant rhetoric. Meanwhile, many RPs established EU-friendly narratives and those publics also tend to support euro-optimistic positions (ie-Scotland in BREXIT vote). Through the influence of the public's power in postfunctionalist integration, the materialist picture of viability theory is shown to be incomplete. RPs needed to actively persuade their constituents to support a future ‘Europe of the Regions’ and cultivate an inclusive identity compatible with the EU multiculturalism. [5: To continue this thought further, regionalist parties may provide insights into how parties can continue to be euro-optimistic within the context of politicized integration.]

Political competition is a dynamic environment where parties adopt various election strategies depending on the circumstances. In a postfunctionalist environment, political competition is more dependent on public opinion (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 9).[footnoteRef:6] Faced with a public that views the regional lens as legitimate, regionalists can choose to emphasize the “territorial dimension” while either neglecting economic policies, subsuming them by using the regional unit to frame economic concerns, or developing economic policies parallel to territorial issues (Elias 2018). These various strategies demonstrate that a variety of priorities can become linked with a politicized view of Europe. [6: Under postfunctionalism, the “elite has had to make room for a more Eurosceptic public” and public opinion on European integration has become “a field of strategic interaction among party elites in their contest of power” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 9).]

Politicization provides an intriguing point to bring psychological variables into a discussion of strategic concerns. While experts tend to be less prone to psychological biases and more resistant to emotional cognition, the general population and public opinion by extension are more likely to have preferences based on emotion rather than ‘rational’ self-interest. For example, Tereza Capelos has developed the concept of “reactionism” to describe a cluster of emotions which “draws on conservation values and an aversion to what is new” (Capelos and Katsanidou 2018, 1272). When party platforms must align with the political opinions of a reactionary population, the identities and perspectives of the electorate could generate Euroscepticism in the party. Postfunctionalism, as it currently stands, has yet to embrace the psychological implications of the public’s influence on European integration. By reducing the dynamics of the public to purely biographical information, postfunctionalism has ignored psychological variables that originate at the regional level which I argue account for the different outcomes seen with the Catalan CiU and the northern Italian LN. In the absence of surveys designed to capture snapshots of a population’s emotional state, I suspect that globalization may be an indirect substitute for direct emotional data. The emotions underlying backlash to globalization have been relatively similar and have resulted in similar political responses. Therefore, my hypothesis for testing a psychologically-informed postfunctionalist explanation for Euroscepticism will be:

H2. Regions experiencing more drastic globalization will be more Eurosceptic due to fear of cultural homogenization.

Identity as an Obstacles to Regional Viability

Identity has been established as critical for the process of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 2005, 295). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2004, 415) argued that “Citizens do indeed take into account the economic consequences of European integration, but conceptions of group membership appear to be more powerful.” Using group membership to anticipate behavior is complicated by the fact that individuals can have varying levels of attachment to multiple identities. This reality leads “cross-cutting identities”[footnoteRef:7] to be able to mitigate in-group bias and outgroup stereotyping (Herrmann 2004, 8-9). Most relevant for studying regionalist Euroscepticism, a region’s residents are generally individuals with both regional and national attachments and to a lesser degree attachment to Europe (Clifton and Usai 2018, 7). [7: Cross-cutting identities cut across the in-group and out-group division.]

Postfunctionalism emphasizes that politicized political conflicts “engage[d] communal identities” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2) and generated more Euroscepticism. However, Herrman demonstrated that conflicts between different identities could be reduced through the establishment of cross-cutting identities such as European identity. European identity became key for creating more inclusive identities that are less xenophobic and able to tolerate immigrants from different cultures. When a national narrative is more inclusive, national identity-attachment may become correlated with Euro-optimism (Chacha 2012, 210). On the other hand, Herrman acknowledged that a cross-cutting identity isn’t self-evident. Politicians can challenge the idea that the European identity includes their regional identity and become more exclusive. Exclusive identities would be expected to be less compatible with the multicultural vision of the EU. Brigevich’s analysis of parochial regionalists, pseudo-exclusive regionalists, and inclusive regionalists in the public appears to support this conclusion as parochial regionalists are the most exclusive and the most eurosceptic identity type (Brigevich 2018, 641). Especially important in the context of postfunctionalism, Brigevich found parochial regionalists “the most prevalent of the three identity types” (Brigevich 2018, 641).

With the influential role of exclusivity on Euroscepticism, the inclusivity/exclusivity of identity should not be regarded as an a priori fixed feature of that identity. In social psychology, conflict increases the exclusivity of the colliding groups’ identities (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 61).[footnoteRef:8] Regional identities experience conflict with their national governments according to Michael Hechter’s model of internal colonialism, which highlights subnational regional inequalities as a potential conflict (1975, 10). Hechter points to the role of conflict with EU regulations or the EU system as being a possible necessary factor for regionalist Euroscepticism. While the conflict with the national level may motivate Euro-optimism by increasing the appeal of the regional viability, it also stimulates an exclusiveness in the regional identity. The appeal of regional viability pulls regionalist parties to euro-optimistic positions while the psychological impact of the conflict could draw regionalist parties to eurosceptic positions. In my thesis,[footnoteRef:9] these opposing pulls prove to be central in understanding regionalist Euroscepticism. [8: Conflict’s psychological impacts could provide an explanation for the persistence of regional identity in the face of modernization theory which predicted that regional identity would fade away in the modern world (Seth 2015, 34). ] [9: As strategic actors, regionalist party leaders will adopt Eurosceptic party platforms when the fears of immigration associated with European integration outweigh the benefits to the viability of regional independence.]

Materialist approaches to identity inclusivity, based on the work of Karl Deutsch, suggest that intra-European trade and travel generate a broader terminal identity[footnoteRef:10] by broadening the scope of people whose well-beings are interconnected (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 62). A terminal identity that does not encompass Europe would be expected to lead to Euroscepticism. However, this materialist approach has neglected the possibility that flows of immigration may increase “intercommunal hostility” (Ibid 62). Hostility resulting from immigration seems to imply that an inclusive identity is a prerequisite to the materialist understanding of identity. Therefore, the ‘materialist’ process is dependent on inclusive social psychological foundations. In consideration of the importance of inclusivity on materialist identity and the eurosceptic psychological effects of conflict with the national level, hypothesis 3 is: [10: Terminal Identity: the largest concentric circle of identity acknowledged by someone as legitimate. Terminal identity is deeply related to governance because “governance is also an expression of community [and] Citizens care - passionately - about who exercises authority over them” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2). The issue of self-rule is necessarily based on a group’s understanding of its collective identity.]

H3: Regions with a more exclusive regional identity will have more eurosceptic regionalist party platforms.

Other attempts to explain the pro-European stance of regionalists have pointed to the networks available for them to interact with each other such as the Committee of the Regions[footnoteRef:11] (CoR) provides a pathway for subnational units to be represented. However, critics of the CoR have argued that it has not adequately served regional interests because it cannot impede the European policy process (Christiansen 1996, 94). Although the CoR has been frequently criticized as an ineffective method of ensuring the representation of regionalists, regionalist parties have commonly allied together to form similar institutions. For example, Plaid Cymu (the Welsh nationalist party) started the bureau of unrepresented European nations. (Nagel 2004, 69). These trans-regional organizations can provide confidence in the concept of a common European political entity.[footnoteRef:12] [11: The Committee of the Regions is an institution of the EU in which subnational units are represented. ] [12: Individuals, such as regionalist party representatives in the EP or transregional organizations, “have greater political knowledge of the EU, and have high levels of subjective political competence” which leads them to “tend to be more attached to the EU (Marks and Haesly 1996; Gabel 1998)” (Hooghe and Marks 2001 65)]

The LN and CiU’s participation in transregional organizations could have influenced each regional identity’s perceived compatibility with a European identity. A regionalist party with a deep connection to other regionalists would be exposed to the regionalist norms that support regional viability arguments. To quote Hooghe and Marks, “Identity does not speak for itself in relation to most political objects, but must be politically constructed”(2009, 10-12). Exposure to viability arguments provided regionalist parties with new ways to politically construct their relationship with Europe. The diffusion of the ideas through transregional networks provides a means by which eurosceptic or euro-optimistic identity relations may be constructed and diffused. The Northern League’s populism and anti-immigration positions may have isolated it from party networks that cultivated the broad regionalist Euro-optimism. Brigevich’s research suggests that regional identity needs to be paired with European identity in order to increase support for integration (Brigevich 2018, 641). Her survey found that the pairing of supranational identity with regional identity found in pseudo-regionalists was correlated with “significantly more supportive of integration” (Ibid 641).

Participation in EU institutions ought to also play an important role in regionalists’ confidence in future increased viability. Viability theory is based on the assumption that European integration will assume a form that increases the viability of smaller states. If regionalist parties lack the experience of working with the EU, then they could also lack confidence in its efficacy. Luckily, the second-order nature of EP elections allows increased regionalist representation.[footnoteRef:13] However, not all RPs were able to gain comparable access to other EU institutions. For example, Spanish regions, such as Catalonia, were not able to receive representation on the Council of Minister (Keating 1998). Meanwhile, Italian regions have biannual consultations with the central government regarding EU policies that relate to regional issues, but they were not allowed by their national government to set up independent offices in Brussels until 1996 (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 83). The access of regions to networks of other European regionalists was restrained by state policy and LN participation in the EFA network was restricted after its suspension in 1994. Ultimately, the literature would suggest that Viability theory is dependent on regionalists being confident that a ‘Europe of the Regions’ was possible and that transregional networks, such as the Bureau of Unrepresented Nations, the CoR and EP party groups, are a vital means for establishing such confidence. [13: The term ‘second-order affair’ denotes that EP elections have “been described as a series of loosely-connected and simultaneous national elections rather than a genuine pan-European election. (Juliet Lodge (ed), Direct Elections to the European Parliament 1984).]

H4: Regionalist parties which are not embedded in transregional networks will adopt more eurosceptic positions.

Party Age: Constraints of History on Viability arguments and Identity Immaturity’s effect on Xenophobia

The history of a particular party could constrain its ability to adopt viability arguments in a number of ways. A party’s need to focus on re-election causes the demographics of a party’s voters to be a source of policy limits. As was mentioned in the section postfunciontalism, parties and their electorates exist in a mutually constituting manner. Regionalist parties’ actions can alter their voters' understanding of their regional identity (inclusivity versus exclusivity) overtime. For example, regionalist electorates could learn that the EU allows them greater autonomy, but anti-EU rhetoric could just as easily make them more exclusive. In a very practical manner, previous campaign commitments become a source of accountability. For example, the many SNP voters of today were raised on the SNP’s pro-EU position which has advocated for Scottish independence within Europe. In the BREXIT vote, 62% of Scottish voters supported remaining in the EU in contrast to the UK national vote in which 48% voted to remain.[footnoteRef:14] [14: https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results]

Sydney Van Aan Atta’s work on Galician regionalists identifies party legacies as a potential factor that could limit Euro-optimism (Van Atta 2003, 45). Pre-EU party history becomes the variable that affects the regional identity endorsed by the party. Legacies can restrict potential Euro-optimism because politicians and the electorate may have endorsed exclusive conceptions of their regional identity. Building off the initial work of Sydney Van Atta, I will posit that pre-EU legacy will cause a regionalist party to tend towards Eurosceptic positions because their regional identity was constructed in the absence of efforts to cultivate a pan-European identity. Therefore, my fifth hypothesis is:

H5 - Regionalist parties with historical legacies that predate the EU will be more Eurosceptic.

Political institutions rely on collective identities to support their political legitimacy. The widespread acceptance of a particular identity, such as the Catalan identity, allows a political party to use the identity as a lens to mobilize their electorate (Herrmann 2004). The relatively low acceptance of the European identity’s legitimacy means that citizens are unlikely to accept the legitimacy of EU policies which their state voted against (Marks et al., 1996 26; Herrmann 2004). The same legitimacy issues resulting from being a relatively new identity that plague the European identity can also affect regionalists. The case of the Northern League, in particular, highlights the importance of considering this possibility. The LN was largely responsible for the creation of Padania as a concept and Padania lacks a history of being a united political unit (Pierucci 2014). More commonly, regionalists such as the CiU will focus on the history of the region to assert its legitimacy. To capture the nature of this issue, I turn to social psychology and the concept of entitativity, the “psychological existence” of a community.

Throughout the literature, the basis of communal identities underwent little examination. Generally, communal identities were predicated on the presence of cultural homogeneity (ie - shared values, race, religion, etc) (Herrmann 2006). However, entitativity adds psychological variables (ie- the feeling of common fate, the salience of the identity, and the boundedness of community) to the discussion of collective identities. It is crucial that scholars of regionalism recognize that entitativity is a prerequisite for regionalist mobilization. The LN used economic conditions as a foundation and constructed a “‘neo-ethnicity’ for a ‘nation’ which is made up of citizens who do not necessarily have a common history, culture or language but an identity derived from similar socio-economic values and attitudes (Giordano 2001, 28).” While many scholars have written about the construction of Padania (see Giordano 2001), the psychological impact of such a new regional identity on Euro-optimism/Euroscepticism has not been explored.

By considering the entitativity of Padania, the LN’s eurosceptic shift becomes an avenue for understanding a possible connection between its anti-immigration policies and eurosceptic position. In Albertazzi and Mcdonnell’s description of the Lega Nord, they noted that LN politicians opposed economic and cultural globalization as well as the “blurring of identities” (2005, 961). In my view, entitativity could have novel theoretical implications for issues of inclusivity and exclusivity because the architects of the Padanian neo-ethnicity had a heightened fear of cultural homogenization.[footnoteRef:15] Perhaps, fears of cultural homogenization are more salient for weakly entitative identities meaning that regionalists representing newly conceived regions have an additional barrier to viability’s appeal. The possibility that Euroscepticism and anti-immigration stances may share the same psychological origins has been previously been proposed by Capelos and Katsanidou (2018, 1272). They argued that anti-immigration and anti-integration stances are resulting from a single phenomenon which Capelos titles reactionism which shares some connections with populism. However, I will make the case that Euroscepticism, while related to anti-immigration sentiment[footnoteRef:16] (Boomgaarden et al 2011), is a product party calculation in which fears of cultural homogenization are weighed against the regional viability benefits of integration. [15: A fear that caused the League to “essentialis[e] what are cultural differences, by turning them into quasi-genetic characteristics, a short-cut to exclusion that seems to work (Albertazzi and Fremeaux 2002; Gomez Reino-Cachafeiro 2002)” (Albertazzi and Mcdonnell 2005, 964). ] [16: As Boomgaarden et al (2011) found “[m]any of those who see a threat from immigrants to their national identity dislike migrants and do not see any benefits in international cooperation even in the form of EU membership.”]

In a different line of thought, the implications of a lowly entitative regional identity on party strategy could prove to be crucial. Woods (2010) notes that the Padanian identity largely depended on the existence of an ‘other’ to define itself because its historical roots were so weak. Therefore, low entitativity identities become more exclusive as a result of being forced to obsess over an ‘other’ such as immigrants and Europe. Additionally, the social-psychological approach to identity highlights that identity is “integral to a person’s self concept” which opens up theoretical connections to ontological security theory (OST) (Herrmann, Richard K., et al 2004, 41). OST proposes that groups seek to defend against threats to their sense of self-concept (Mitzen 2006). Therefore, regionalists representing lowly entitative regions could view Euroscepticism as a strategy to reduce attachment to European identity which they could view as a competitor.[footnoteRef:17] Whether through increased sensitivity to cultural homogenization or through dependence on an ‘other,’ my sixth hypothesis is: [17: Primary attachment to an identity is a scarce resource that is logically crucial to the success of the regional lens utilized by regionalist parties. Without sufficient identity attachment, the rhetoric of RPs would fall on deaf ears and they would fail to turn out votes in an election. As strategic actors, a regionalist party struggling with a weakly entitative identity would need to create a strategy to cope.]

H6 - Regions with low entitativity will be more Eurosceptic.

IV. Research Methodology:

To answer the question of “Under what conditions do regionalist parties become Eurosceptic?”, I synthesized six hypotheses designed to test the underlying decision process of regionalist political parties. In order to focus on party dynamics, I chose to focus on party platforms rather than the general public. Furthermore, seeing a lack of attention to social psychological awareness in Viability and postfunctionalist theory, four out of six of my hypotheses incorporated social-psychological arguments.[footnoteRef:18] Fully understanding social-psychological identity under multilevel governance is a difficult task, but examining various hypotheses with the social-psychological interpretation in mind allows me to generate some speculations on the specific issue of regionalist Euroscepticism. [18: Considering the different approach to identity found in social psychology is also key.definition of identity shifts the discussion of identity away from group membership categorization towards a discussion of how a group becomes “integral to a person’s self concept” (Herrmann, Richard K., et al 2004, 41) and the complex external relations of a person’s self-concept.]

Key Definitions

To understand the decision making of regionalist parties, it would be beneficial to first define regionalism. Regionalism, as a guiding political ideology, refers to a belief in self-determination of political units that position themselves in defense of the peripheral region/nation against the center. These beliefs lead regionalist parties to advocate for greater autonomy over their affairs that can manifest as secessionism at the extreme or autonomy reform. Essentially, this cleavage manifests itself as the regionalist commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, which the Treaty of Maastricht embedded into European governance. The principle of subsidiarity, in the political context, suggests that the level of governance that is most efficiently able to resolve an issue should be granted authority over the issue. In practice, this principle argues that policy decision-making and discretion of funds be given to regional authorities while macroeconomic policies and security responsibility be held at the European level.

Second, with globalization playing an important role in hypothesis two, a concise definition is needed. I will utilize the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s definition of globalization because it is the definition underlying their index which I am using to quantify globalization. According to KOF’s definition, globalisation is “the process of creating networks of connections among actors at intra- or multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods” while also “erod[ing] national boundaries, integrat[ing] national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produc[ing] complex relations of mutual interdependence” (Gygli et al. 2019). This definition encompasses political, cultural and economic shifts allowing me to fully capture globalization’s effects. Economy-centric definitions focus on imports, exports, and foreign direct investment while neglecting cultural elements that could be influential.

Lastly, my usage of entitativity refers to the “psychological existence” of the identity. For example, most national identities are strongly entitative. If surveyed, populations in Italy would not dispute the existence of ‘Italy.’ When dealing with sub-national regions, entitativity can be more challenging because regional identity is rarely reinforced by an accompanying legal identity or other important factors. Previous research on regionalist parties has assumed constant strong entitativity in their models of party behavior. Entitativity is not a fixed variable for a specific identity. While national identities are often strongly entitative, the breakup of nations through civil wars demonstrates that even the entitativity of national identities, which is rarely questioned, is fluid.

Overview of Relevant Variables

As described in the introduction, I will be comparing Convergencia i Unio, a euro-optimistic Catalan regionalist party, and the Lega Nord, the northern Italian eurosceptic regionalist party. In this comparison, Spain and Italy’s Political structure (federal versus centralized), national perspective on the EU, and European Parliamentary election rules are similar enough that their impact on regionalist positions on the EU should be minimal. Additionally, Catalonia and Padania (Northern Italy) have higher GDP per capita than their national averages which further reduces possible explanations for the LN’s Euroscepticism. The independent variables which will be considered are the trends of globalization, identity exclusivity, participation in transregional networks, Pre-EU legacy, and entitativity.

Dependent Variable

The variable which my hypotheses seek to explain is each party’s position on the EU. In my comparisons, positions on the EU are measured on the scale of euro-optimistic to eurosceptic. Specifically, I will rely on the Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) which was first conducted in 1999 to measure Euroscepticism after 1999.[footnoteRef:19] The EU position in CHES is set on a scale from 1-7 with 1 being strongly opposed and 7 being strongly in favor of European integration. Before 1999, I will follow the example of Raj S. Chari, Suvi Iltanen and Sylvia Kritzinger in Examining and Explaining the Northern League’s ‘U-Turn’ from Europe. Chari et al. used the first eurosceptic public speech by LN leadership in 1998 to mark the LN’s shift to Euroscepticism (2004, 429). Therefore, before 1998, the platform of the LN was considered to be euro-optimistic. [19: Full scale breakdown: 1 = Strongly opposed 2 = Opposed 3 = Somewhat opposed 4 = Neutral 5 = Somewhat in favor 6 = In favor 7 = Strongly in favor]

Independent Variables by Hypothesis

H1: Regions that economically benefit from European integration will more often be euro-optimistic.

The Lega Nord poses an interesting ontological challenge for comparisons with other regions because its territorial claims do not match the EU’s Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics (“nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques” or NUTS). The NUTS system of statistics is broken down into two levels with NUTS 1 regions being a collection of several NUTS 2 regions. However, with the LN’s support largely concentrated in the socially and economically homogeneous northeastern area of northern Italy in the 1990s and early 2000s, I will be using Lombardy as an exemplary example of LN’s base to provide a similar unit of measurement to Catalonia (Giordano 2001, 33-34).[footnoteRef:20] Lombardy should be able to function as a proxy for all of Padania due to its close connections with LN leadership, and consistent LN electoral support. Umberto Bossi, the leader of the LN until 2012, started his political career by founding the Lombard league which joined together with other regional leagues to form the Northern League. Additionally, Lombardy, known for its capital Milan, has been a stronghold for the LN since the party was founded. Lastly, both Catalonia and Lombardy are full units at the NUTS level 2 categorization which allows me to properly compare the two regions using EU regional statistics. [20: Although the LN claims to represent Padania, its support is hardly entrenched in the 11 supposedly Padanian regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont, Liguria, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol, Aosta Valley, Tuscany, Marche, and Umbri). However, its support is mainly based in the “north-east of Northern Italy, from Udine and Pordenone to the provinces of Belluno, Vicenza and Treviso to the provinces of Brescia, Bergamo, Sondrio, Como and Varese in Lombardy, and finally to the province of Cuneo in Piedmont” (Giordano 2001, 33-34). ]

H2. Regions experiencing more drastic globalization will be more Eurosceptic due to fear of cultural homogenization.

Catalonia and Lombardy have both economically benefited from European integration and globalization. However, the specific experience with globalization will act as an intriguing point of comparison for the regions. Catalonia matches the expectation that competitive regions in a global economy focus on the benefits of flows of capital to their regions. On the other hand, Lombardy and LN have emphasized immigration as a negative consequence of globalization even during their Euro-optimistic years in the 1990s (Hepburn 2009). It is possible that increased Euroscepticism could have resulted from more drastic globalization.Therefore, I will compare the different globalization levels and rates of globalization in Spain and Italy in order to test H2.

H3: Regions with a more exclusive regional identity will have more eurosceptic regionalist party platforms.

As was discussed in the review of the literature, the identity inclusivity of Catalonian and Padanian identity could be a key variable to understand their different positions on the EU. The literature provides multiple routes for measuring identity inclusivity. For example, some regions have surveys that have evaluated respondent identity inclusivity by asking if they would consider individuals to be a particular nationality based on fabricated biographic information (Bond 2006, 616). However, survey data on the exclusivity/inclusivity of identity among regional populations has offered conflicting results in the literature. For example, the presence of exclusive regional identities is expected to relate to a less pro-EU population. However, “the nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia show a high proportion of exclusivist ‘regional level’ identities” in the 1990s (Pallares 1997, 152). This counterintuitive result indicates that there are almost certainly important nuances being lost in the inclusive-exclusive spectrum. Therefore, H3 might be most useful addressed using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey’s measures of party positions on multiculturalism and immigration policy from 2006-2014 which should allow me to roughly compare the inclusivity of the two regional identities.[footnoteRef:21] [21: Although this data represents the party rather than the identity more broadly, there is evidence that party framing has a strong influence on the public’s beliefs. For example, an important element to consider when studying the identity of regionalists is labels that they utilize to describe themselves because “there is an element of differentiation between the electorates of NSWPs, which define themselves as "nationalist" or as "regionalists"(Pallares 1997, 152). This finding is incredibly interesting because it demonstrates the influence of self-framing by parties and the weight of the nationalist title in constituents’ minds.

]

H4: Regionalist parties which are not embedded in transregional networks will adopt more eurosceptic positions.

To operationalize H4, I will focus on the CiU and LN participation in party groups in the European Parliament (EP). EP party groups are the core voting blocs of the institutions and thus become important networks for transmitting ideas. For example, the European Free Alliance (EFA) consisted of many regionalists from around Europe. However, regionalist parties also participated in other party groups at times such as the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party Group (ELDR). As a variable, transregional networks will be examined by creating a time-line of EP party group membership and then comparing membership against the RPs’ position on the EU.

H5 - Regionalist parties with historical legacies that predate the EU will be more Eurosceptic

Independent Control Variables.

Historic party legacies can be defined in a few ways. For my purposes, I will create a timeline for the CiU and LN that notes the start of their regional independence movement, the founding date of the party, and the date of their national entry to the EU. The start of each regional independence movement will focus on modern politically organized iterations of the movement. For example, Spain was historically broken up into different kingdoms, but the Catalan independence movement will be considered as beginning with the formation of the first Catalan political party in 1922. Due to the original regionalist party being separate from the selected cases, the founding date of the CiU and LN will also be considered in relation to the national government’s EU entry date.

H6 - Regions with low entitativity will be more Eurosceptic.

As mentioned before, entitativity is the psychological existence of identity. I will be using the questions on Eurobarometer surveys from 1991, 1996, and 2000 which ask about identity attachment to different territorial levels to test H6. Given the psychological nature of entitativity, it can be difficult to objectively measure it. However, I believe that identity attachment could be an excellent approximation of entitativity. Higher levels of attachment to Catalonia or Padania should be correlated with increased entitativity. Respondents in the surveys who considered the regional level to be their primary territorial identity or ‘citizenship’ should also feel that the region is psychologically real or entitative. Each Eurobarometer survey frames its question about identity attachment differently so the data is heterogeneous between each year. Therefore, the comparison of data from Italy and Spain to identify changes in identity attachment that would support H6.

Independent Control Variables

Given the literature’s history of marking off the Northern league as an outlier amongst regionalist parties, this section must demonstrate the significant similarities between CiU and LN to give legitimacy to any conclusions drawn from their comparison. At a basic level, both the CiU and LN are conservative-leaning political parties formed through the regionalist party alliances.[footnoteRef:22] CiU was created through an alliance between the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). Meanwhile, the Northern League was formed out of a federation of six Italian leagues.[footnoteRef:23] With those facts in mind, the conservative positions and multi-party origins of the LN no longer appear as unique. [22: According to the Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES), the CiU scored 5.875 on the GALTAN (Green-Alternative-Libertarian and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) scale while the LN scored 6.1667 in 1999. The CHES measures the GALTAN position of political parties on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being the most liberitarian/postmaterialist, 5 being the center, and 10 being the most traditional/authoritarian.] [23: The six leagues came together to create the Northern League were Liga Veneta, Lega Lombarda, Piemont Autonomista, Uniun Ligure, Lega Emiliano-Romagnola and Alleanza Toscana.]

Additionally, given that the political opportunity structure of the state has been theorized to influence regionalist parties’ opinions on the European Union, a comparison between regionalist parties is best conducted between parties operating in states with comparable levels of centralization. Centralized states naturally repress regionalist tendencies through the concentration of political power. In line with Viability theory, regions seek greater autonomy through the EU so a centralized state could push regionalists to become euro-optimistic.[footnoteRef:24] Both Spain and Italy fall on the Federal end of the spectrum with their regions being allocated more political powers. While Spain is usually defined as a semi-federal state, the level of centralization experienced by regions with special autonomy such as Catalonia in Spain is similar to regions in a fully federal state such Italy.[footnoteRef:25] [24: However, the opposite impact was also observed in the UK during the 1970s. Regionalist parties in the UK viewed London as oppressing them and therefore feared the EU in the 1970s as another form of concentrating power outside of their region (Massetti, and Emanuele 2010, 74). ] [25: Including CiU rules out the possibility of considering Euroscepticism amongst regionalists as simply a product of a federal political structure. Additionally, to quantify this characteristic for more in-depth research, the Regional Authority Index (RAI) can provide figures for a specific calculation of the level of decentralization in each state (Jolly 2015, 64). However, the RAI lacks data specific to the Lombardy region of Italy, which I use to represent the Padanian region because of its central political role.]

A state’s European Parliament (EP) election policies can strongly influence a regionalist party experience with the European Union.[footnoteRef:26] Potentially, parties that are structurally excluded from the EP may come to hold different levels of Euroscepticism when compared to RPs represented in the EP (either by diffusion or through a practice theory approach). Neither Spain nor Italy had policies that restricted access and interaction in the EP. In this way, the influence of participation in specific networks of actors, such as the EFA, is not obscured by one case being completely excluded from the system in which those networks operate. [26: For example, European elections structure in France tend to exclude regionalist parties because a party needs 5% of France’s total vote.]

Importantly, economic strength among regions tends to vary fairly significantly. In selecting Catalonia and Italy, I have chosen to minimize variation by selecting regions that were relatively economically strong because EU cohesion policy funding is directed to regions with a GDP per capita below 70% of the average GDP per capita in the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 85). Avoiding such regions in my study eliminates the validity of the hypothesis that regional Euro-optimism is simply a product of regions seeking economic funding from the EU.

Given the dynamics proposed by viability theory, each region’s political influence could theoretically impact party positions. A region with a high degree of influence within their state could foreseeably be dissuaded from adopting a Euro-optimistic position due to an expectation of reduced autonomy (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 90).[footnoteRef:27] However, it is clear that regionalists who envision a ‘Europe of the Regions’ do not expect a reduction of autonomy. Rather, EU institutions provide a pathway for greater authority at the regional level through the principle of subsidiarity.[footnoteRef:28] Regardless, both Catalonia and Padania would be considered relatively powerful among regions. In my survey of the literature, quantifying the power of each region has been rarely delved into except in mentions of the strength of the German regions[footnoteRef:29]. Although comparing the GDP per capita and population may shed some light on a region’s power, a populous region would hardly be influential without cohesive voting habits. With cohesive voting, a region could affect whether a state ratified a treaty on European integration. [27: As Hooghe and Marks discuss, “Weak regions have little to lose if policy making is shifted to the European level, but powerful regions object if it is their authority that is reallocated” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 90).] [28: In a vein of thought similar to Neofunctionalism, regionalists consider the adoption of a subsidiarity-based distribution of power, where policymaking is conducted at the supranational or regional level depending on the economic outcomes, as being the more efficient policy. ] [29: Christiansen discussed how the German Lānder leveraged its vote to push the regional considerations onto the agenda by endangering such a treaty (Christiansen 1996, 94). ]

A contributing factor to my selection of the CiU and LN was the fact that both have some history of calling on populist themes and strategies (Lazer 1977, Heinisch 2018). Despite many regionalist populisms occurring throughout Europe, the regionalist literature tends to explain away the LN’s Euroscepticism by classifying it as a populist-regionalist party. The opposition between an idealized ‘moral people’ against the ‘corrupt elite’ is the foundation of populism and it overlays easily with the regionalist battle against the national elites for their region’s ‘people.’ Considering the presence of populist rhetoric among both parties, my hypotheses offer alternative explanations for understanding how populist rhetoric could affect each party’s position on the EU in different ways.

V. Case Analysis

In my approach to understanding the conditions which facilitate regionalist eurosceptics, I consider the decisions of each party as the result of weighing the benefits outlined in viability theory against fears of cultural homogenization. On the surface, this may seem to be a pure rationalist approach to party behavior. However, I propose that social psychology has the potential to explain the foundations for that decision. Fears of cultural homogenization and immigration are not based on purely objective consequences and belief that the EU will make regional independence more viable is hard to objectively evaluate without making a series of assumptions that are psychological at their core.

Although populism has been the popular explanation for regionalist Euroscepticism, Catalan Convergence and Union has used populist discourse. In my proposed framework of weighing cultural fears against viability benefits, the historical legacies and embeddedness in networks of regionalist parties could become important for ensuring that their identities were not threatened by integration. Populist regionalists mobilize the people versus the elite fracture to differentiate themselves against an ‘other’ whether that be the center of the state or the EU. The regionalist Euroscepticism results from the expectation that continued integration would result in cultural homogenization rather than independence.

To identify the potential causes of Euroscepticism among regionalist parties, this current analysis will compare the CiU and LN across the variables of relative regional wealth, globalization, identity inclusivity, pre-EU history, party networks & entitativity.

H1: Regions that economically benefit from European integration will more often be euro-optimistic.

The economic impacts of integration have been shown to influence citizens’ opinions on the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 415). Drawing on prominent conflicts between regionalist parties and their national government over taxation, the wealth of each case region (measured by GDP per capita) will be compared with the national average. One of the key arguments used by regionalists is that their region is economically strong enough to be independent. Additionally, the larger economic impacts of integration are difficult for citizens to perceive objectively, but internal national wealth disparities are more salient for the average citizen. The relative success of the region logically influences the public opinion on the status quo which has often been pro-integration and Euro-optimistic.

Both the LN and CiU have made economic cases for their positions on the European Union. Considering the relative economic success of Catalonia, and Lombardy when compared to the EU average GDP per capita, access to the common market has been of greater salience in party rhetoric than funds from the Cohesion policy.[footnoteRef:30] Before their Eurosceptic turn in 1998, Lega Nord voted in favor of the TEU[footnoteRef:31] and saw European Integration “as a way to give more power to the regions” (Quaglia 2010, 67). [30: Regions that receive funding from the Cohesion policy would also be expected to be euro-optimistic regardless of GDP per capita relative to the national average.] [31: Bossi emphasized the manner in which the TEU contained the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ (Quaglia 2010, 67). However, when Italy actually qualified to join the EMU, Bossi “admitted that the joining of the EMU had made the secession of Padania from the rest of Italy more difficult” (Quaglia 2010, 68). ]

As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the relative difference between Catalonian GDP per capita and the average for Spain is similar to the difference between Lombardy and the Italian average. Both Catalonia and Lombardy are net-contributors to the national budget. Each region had roughly $3,000 more in GDP per capita than the national average, but only the LN adopted a Eurosceptic platform. It does not appear that relative economic wealth is the main determinant of Eurosceptic party positions. Additionally, CiU and LN were considered center-right parties during the 1990s. Therefore, party ideology would not appear to justify differing interpretations of a similar experience of wealth.

Figure 1[footnoteRef:32] Figure 2[footnoteRef:33] [32: Figure 1 Data Sources: “Lombardy GDP per Capita, 1995-2016.” Knoema, knoema.com/atlas/Italy/Lombardy/GDP-per-capita. “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects.” International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1980&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=136&s=NGDP_RPCH,NGDP,NGDPPC,PCPIPCH,LUR,GGXWDG_NGDP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=38&pr.y=5.] [33: Figure 2 Data Source: “GDP per Inhabitant.” Idescat. Statistical Yearbook of Catalonia. GDP per Inhabitant. 2000, www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=356&lang=en&t=2000. ]

H2. Regions experiencing more drastic globalization will be more Eurosceptic due to fear of cultural homogenization

Hypothesis 2 proposes the benefits outlined in Viability theory could fail to encourage regionalist parties to adopt euro-optimistic positions when drastic globalization occurs by igniting fears of cultural homogenization in the public. Postfunctionalism Euro-optimism, in particular, is vulnerable to salient fears of cultural homogenization because multiculturalism is the foundation of European identity. If drastic globalization undermines multiculturalism, European integration could also be called into question and Euro-optimism would decline.

Figure 3[footnoteRef:34] [34: Figure 3 data source: Gygli, Savina, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm (2019): The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisited, Review of International Organizations, 14(3), 543-574 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09344-2.]

Figure 3, above, uses the KOF globalization index[footnoteRef:35] measure the overall globalization that Spain and Italy underwent. When looking at Figure 3, it is apparent that both Italy and Spain experienced an increase in globalization during the 1990s. Based on H2, I would have expected that Italy had experienced a steeper rate of globalization. Instead, Spain underwent a faster rate of globalization during the 1990s and ended at a similar globalization level despite having a lower level in 1990. In Figure 4, the range of 1990-2000 contains years which saw the largest annual rates of globalization for both Spain and Italy. Compared to other decades, the 1990s stand out for both Italy and Spain in terms of rate of globalization and cumulative globalization (see figure 5). If the rate of globalization were to be the cause of the LN’s Eurosceptic shift, then the CiU would have been even more Eurosceptic than the Northern League by 2000. [35: The KOF Globalization index only collects data about the state-level. Therefore, I have needed to assume that the sub-state regions are globalizing at a similar rate. Luckily, the selected regions are relatively economically successful so they have likely globalized at a similar or faster rate than the national average.]

Looking closely at 1998 when LN leadership gave their first eurosceptic speech making the LN’s eurosceptic turn, annual globalization in Italy spiked (Figure 4) and Italy’s globalization level was 2.75 points higher than Spain’s level.[footnoteRef:36] If the absolute level of globalization is more important than the rate of globalization, H2 could still be valid when looking at 1998. However, Spain did eventually surpass Italy’s level of globalization in 2000 without CiU experiencing a eurosceptic turn. Further research could explore other measures of globalization that are disaggregated to the regional level to test this hypothesis. Based on the current data, globalization alone does not appear to be the explanatory variable of the LN’s eurosceptic turn. [36: 79.76 (Italy) versus 77.01 (Spain)]

Figure 4[footnoteRef:37] Figure 5[footnoteRef:38] [37: Same as figure 3] [38: Same as figure 3]

H3: Regions with a more exclusive regional identity will have more eurosceptic regionalist party platforms

Hypothesis 3 is firmly based on social psychological arguments and the literature which has repeatedly found that identity is a key determinant for Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 2005, 295). Furthermore, Brigevich (2018, 641) demonstrated that exclusive regional identities are correlated with Euroscepticism within the public based Eurobarometer data. Given the difficulty of comparing exclusivity levels across regions using the Eurobarometer,[footnoteRef:39] I will compare the immigration policies and multiculturalism of the LN and CiU using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data as well as referring to secondary-source descriptions of Catalonia and Padania’s identity-exclusivity prior to 1999. Using the CHES data on party positions on immigration policy and multiculturalism from 2006, 2010, and 2014, I believe that I can capture an approximation of the exclusivity of Catalonian and Padanian identity. Then, that approximation will be tested against descriptions of Catalan and Padanian identity from secondary literature. [39: The eurobarometer may collect fairly large samples from each European country, but the number of respondents in specific regions is often too small and inconsistently measured to get a proper estimate.]

Figure 6 and Figure 7 display scatterplots of regionalist parties (RPs) in the CHES data where the x-axis of each scatter plot represents each party platform on the Euroscepticism-Euro-optimism spectrum (1 = most eurosceptic and 7 = most euro-optimistic), while each figure’s y-axis indicates each party’s position on policy proxy for exclusivity versus inclusivity. Looking at immigration policy among RPs (0 = most pro-immigrant and 10 = most anti-immigrant), the trend line does show a slight tendency for pro-immigrant parties to be more Euro-optimistic. CiU’s values demonstrate a relatively tight cluster in a position that I would characterize as Euro-optimistic and in the middle ground on immigration policy with a slight leaning towards anti-immigrant policies. Meanwhile, the LN’s values fall in a looser cluster in a position that is clearly very anti-immigrant and very eurosceptic. Based solely on immigration policy, Padanian identity appears to be more exclusive than Catalonia. However, Catalonia and many other regionalists do not appear to be paragons of inclusivity. Catalonia clearly falls in the grey area between an exclusive and inclusive regionalist party.

Figure 6[footnoteRef:40] [40: Data for figure 6: Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. “2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.” Version2015.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.]

The CHES evaluated multiculturalism on a scale from 0-10 with 10 being pro-assimilation and 0 being pro-multi culturalism. Comparing the CiU and LN’s clusters in Figure 7 yields similar results to Figure 6. However, the CiU’s cluster shifts towards a more exclusive stance when looking at multiculturalism and the LN’s cluster demonstrates even more variability. Exclusivity, defined as a pro-assimilation stance, would not appear to be explanatory of the divergent positions on the EU exhibited by the CiU and LN.

Figure 7[footnoteRef:41] [41: Same as figure 6]

In consideration that H3 would be supported more strongly by the CHES immigration policy variable rather than the position on multiculturalism, I will turn to Eve Hepburn’s overview of regionalist positions on immigration provides a detailed analysis of the impact of regional identity on immigration positions (Hepburn 2009, 5-7). Hepburn’s work is the only scholarly piece available that compares the CiU and LN’s identities concerning their immigration policies. According to Hepburn, the CiU primarily framed Catalan identity as civic while also emphasizing the ability of immigrants to become culturally (primarily defined in linguistic terms) Catalan[footnoteRef:42] (Hepburn 2009, 5-7). Additionally, the CiU primarily viewed immigrants as beneficial to the Catalan economy and, therefore, beneficial to the goal of independence. I suspect that greater exclusivity demonstrated by the CiU leaning towards pro-assimilation is related to the tendency of Catalonia to emphasize the linguistic assimilation and preservation of the Catalan language. Hepburn suggested that the civic framing of Catalan identity is part of a broader Catalan national building project with independence as the goal. Unlike the CiU, the LN actively cultivated the association between immigration and crime while promoting an ethnic view of Padanian identity (Hepburn 2009, 8). This anti-immigrant perspective was cultivated as part of the LN’s criticism of Italy’s national immigration policy which the LN saw as a threat to cultural homogeneity in Padania as well as small businesses interests. The centrality of northern Italy’s small business economy to Padania’s ability to differentiate itself from the rest of Italy could explain the LN harsh rhetoric on immigration. Unlike the economic argument for immigration from CiU, the Northern League argued that immigration was a threat to Padania’s economy and eventual independence. A common argument was that that independence necessitated a reduction in immigration so that “foreigners could not steal local jobs” (Hepburn 2009, 16). [42: As a part of its immigration policy, “Immigrants are offered free Catalan language immersion courses” (Hepburn 2009, 12).]

Hepburn’s account of regionalist immigration policy demonstrates a clear connection between identity and immigration. Although Hepburn uses the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ instead of inclusivity versus exclusivity, there is a clear connection. Civic identities offer a specific form of inclusivity that is compatible with culturally assimilation policies. Meanwhile, ethnically-defined identities do not even allow that sort of contingent inclusivity. Based on the CHES data and Hepburn’s account, it is safe to say that H3 appears to be supported. Civic, more inclusive, definitions correspond with Euro-optimistic regionalist platforms and goals. Meanwhile, the anti-immigrant ethnic-based definition utilized by the LN matches its Eurosceptic position. However, it must be noted that the anti-immigrant sentiment in the LN predates its Eurosceptic shift so H3 appears to explain the LN’s eventual Euroscepticism, but not the reason that the shift did not occur until 1998.

H4: Regionalist parties which are not embedded in transregional networks will adopt more eurosceptic positions.

Based on the discussion of European Parliamentary party groups, I anticipated that the membership in the European Free Alliance, the primary regionalist party group, would be the key dividing line between eurosceptic and euro-optimistic RPs. However, as the timelines below show (Figures 8.1 and 8.2), LN officials first joined the EFA under the banner of the Lega Lombarda, one the Italian leagues that joined together to form the LN later in 1989. However, the LN was suspended by the EFA in 1994 due to its participation in a governing coalition with Alleanza Nazionale, a fascist-nationalist party whose authoritarian policies were antithetical to the EFA’s principle of subsidiarity (Giordano 2001, 30)[footnoteRef:43]. The LN officially joined the European Liberal Democrat and Reformer Party (ELDR) after its suspension in 1994. Considering that the LN’s eurosceptic shift occurred in 1998, the separation of the LN from the EFA could have been a factor. However, comparing the LN with the CiU shows that EFA membership was unlikely to be causally important. [43: The Alleanza Nazionale was considered neo-fascist and “favoured a strong central Italian State and no regional autonomy” (Giordano 2001, 30).]

Figure 8.1[footnoteRef:44] [44: European Free Alliance (EFA): https://www.electio2014.eu/european-free-alliance/European Liberal Democrats and Reform Party (ELDR): https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Liberal-Democrat-and-Reform-Party]

Figure 8.2[footnoteRef:45] [45: Same as Figure 8.1]

The Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC), one of the parties in the alliance that comprises the CiU, was an observer member of the EFA in 1981. When Spain joined the European Union in 1986, the EFA actively encouraged both parties inside the CiU to become full members. However, the CDC relinquished its observer status and left to join the ELDR in the 1987 European Parliamentary election while the Democratic Union of Catalonia joined the European People’s Party Group (EPP). Despite the EFA’s efforts, CiU did not join the EFA until the 2000s.

The party networks outlined in the timeline is surprising given the expectations following from H4. If H4 was accurate, then a regionalist party with other RPs in its network would be euro-optimistic Additionally, isolation from other RPs would be expected to limit a party’s confidence in a future ‘Europe of the Regions’ and, thereby, nullify the euro-optimistic pull of increased independence viability. Instead, the timeline shows that the LN, the eurosceptic case, was a member of the EFA from 1989-1994 and the CDC was an observer member in the EFA from 1981-1987. If not participating in the EFA was causally related to the LN’s eurosceptic turn, then the CiU would be expected to be more eurosceptic. The CiU was never even a full member of the EFA until the early 2000s. Furthermore, only one of the parties that comprise the CiU was an observer member. With that in mind, it is safe to say that party network connections to the EFA are not an important determinant of Euroscepticism in regionalists.

Additionally, considering party networks outside of the EFA further undermines H4 because the LN and the CDC were both members of the ELDR from 1994-1999. If party networks were able to effectively facilitate norm diffusion between RPs, then the CiU and LN would be expected to have the same position in the EU.[footnoteRef:46] However, both CDC and LN were members of the ELDR at the time that the LN’s eurosceptic turn occurred. If the ELDR network diffused eurosceptic norms, then the CDC, a more senior member of the ELDR than the LN, should have also become eurosceptic. Therefore, the LN’s participation in the ELDR is unlikely to be the explanatory variable for its eurosceptic shift. [46: This norm diffusion was expected to occur through the negotiations within a party group as it collectively came to policy decisions in the European Parliament. There was some anecdotal evidence from the Scottish National Party to support this idea because it is commonly thought that MEP Winnie Ewing became a stronger proponent of Euro-optimistic ideas after her time in the European Parliament (Lynch 1994, 62-3).]

Inverting the argument of H4 may offer grounds for further exploration. Specifically, the LN’s participation in a governing coalition with a neo-fascist party is a potential avenue to consider in future research more deeply. The LN had already adopted anti-immigration positions at this time, but the larger shift against the EU occurred around this period. The norms within the governing coalition may have influenced the trajectory of the LN’s perspective towards the EU. Given the party’s eventual shift towards Italian nationalism, the LN’s electorate and ideology were likely more compatible with the coalitions’ Eurosceptic frames. Borrowing from the strategic approach to political parties, the Euroscepticism in the party could also have been a result of the LN needing to justify policies adopted at the national level and their traditional anti-Rome rhetoric needed to be replaced by anti-EU frames.

H5 - Regionalist parties with historical legacies that predate the EU will be more Eurosceptic

Pre-EU legacies in political parties can influence modern party positions through demographics, pre-EU commitments, and the crystallization of identity frames. Through those means, pre-EU legacies could be a barrier to euro-optimistic positions. Of the ways that a pre-EU legacy could lead to Euroscepticism, the crystallization of identity frames is the only means which could be impacted by a regionalist party’s ties to its independence movement’s legacy.[footnoteRef:47] Looking at the history of the Padanian and Catalan independence movements depicted in Figure 9.2, the first calls for Catalan independence from a political party occurred 67 years before the first calls for Padanian independence. With the Catalan independence movement beginning in 1922 and Spain not joining the EU until 1986, the frames of Catalan identity had ample time to develop outside of the EU. Meanwhile, the Padanian independence movement (see Figure 9.1) did not begin until the founding of the Northern League in 1989, a full 31 years after Italy joined the European Economic Community.[footnoteRef:48] Expanding the consideration of Padanian independence to the Lombardy independence movement does place its starting date in 1982, but even that is 24 years after Italy’s entry to EEC. [47: For my purposes, I am using the founding of the first official political party advocating for independence as the starting point of the modern independence movement. The rationale for selecting the first independence seeking party for a region is that independence and viability of independence has been the predominant motivation for regionalist Euro-optimism according to Seth Jolly. Seeking independence in a Europe without the EU could plausibly affect the framing of regional identity in a way that limited the regional identity’s compatibility with Euro-optimism. ] [48: Ambitions for a European identity began in the early phases of the EU even when it was a mostly economic arrangement so I am assuming that the EEC and later phases of the EU had similar effects on ]

Figure 9.1

Figure 9.2

Demographics (voter-loyalty) and pre-EU commitments would only result from the political party’s previous electoral strategies. Therefore, solely examining the history of the CiU and LN rather than Catalan and Padanian independence is another possible manner to test if pre-EU legacy could impede the euro-optimistic pull of Viability theory. However, this alternative way of testing H5 yields the opposite results that we would expect. The LN and its precursors (ie- Lega Lombard) are younger than the CDC and UDC. Furthermore, the LN and its precursors were founded after Italy had already joined the EU. Whereas, the UDC and CDC, who formed the CiU in 1978, were founded in 1931 and 1974 respectively. Even the younger CDC was formed before Spain’s EU entry.

H6 - Regions with low entitativity will be more Eurosceptic

Drawing on the literature around the social-psychological challenges of constructing a European identity, I decided to apply the concept of entitativity to regional identities (Herrmann 2004). Following ontological security theory which supposes that security of self-conception, I argue that a low entitative regional identity leads regionalist parties to adopt eurosceptic positions to eliminate the appeal of European identity.[footnoteRef:49] In this view, attachment to a particular identity is a scarce resource that is necessary for the survival of identity-based parties such as regionalist parties. An RP’s need to maintain identity attachment is so fundamental that the party is willing to sacrifice the European integration’s benefits to regional autonomy. Therefore, the Eurobarometer data on attachment to territorial identities in Spain and Italy will be compared to test if this theoretical argument matches the changing level of attachment before and after the LN’s eurosceptic turn in 1998. [49: The social psychological approach to regional identity opens up the discussion to these parallels with ontological security theory. As Richard Herrmann (2004, 41) argued, the social psychology discussion of identity focuses on how a group becomes “integral to a person’s self concept” rather than identity as a means of categorizing group membership.]

To begin testing the applicability of H6, a baseline of identity attachments in Spain and Italy is needed. Using the Eurobarometer 36, the higher degree of attachment to NUTS II regions (ie- Catalonia and Lombardy) stands out significantly in 1991 (see Figure 10). In contrast, the identity attachment in Italy (see Figure 11) is primarily concentrated NUTS I and NUTS II. This data from the EB36 was created by researchers by first having people write in their primary territorial attachment and then the researchers translating the responses to the NUTS system. Considering that fact, I suspect the NUTS I classifications in Italy likely encompass Padania.[footnoteRef:50] In Italy, examples of NUTS I regions are Northeast and Northwest Italy. With the possibility that attachment to one of the other NUTS I regions confounds the survey’s representation of attachment to Padania, the actual attachment to Padania in northern Italy could be lower than the NUTS I category as a whole. [50: NUTS I regions in Italy are the Northwest, Northeast, Center, South, and Island. ]

Only 2% of Italian respondents listed Italy as their primary territorial attachment while 48% and 45% selected NUTS I and NUTS II regions respectively. Even in Spain which is notoriously regional, more respondents (6.2%) identified their country as their primary attachment. Based on question 63 from EB36, Italian regional identities had more attachment than the national identity, but regional identities should be less entitative due to the split between NUTS I and NUTS II. Considering that the LN had just formed in 1989, such a split of attachment was easily expected because RPs in northern Italy, such as the Lombard League, represented the NUTS II level identities to the public before 1989. However, given the assumptions of H6, the split still allows us to infer a lower entitativity for Padania than the entitativity of the Catalan identity.

Figure 10[footnoteRef:51] [51: Eurobarometer 36 (Oct-Nov 1991)Regional Identity, and Perceptions of the Third World]

Figure 11[footnoteRef:52] [52: Q63 and Q64 from Eurobarometer 36 (Oct-Nov 1991)Regional Identity, and Perceptions of the Third World]

Furthermore, additional analysis of primary attachment strength reveals that Italian respondents had weaker attachment for their primary choice than Spanish respondents. Of the Italian respondents who selected NUTS I as their primary attachment, 51.1% felt that they were ‘very attached’ to the identity (see Figure 13). On the other hand, 73.9% of Spanish respondents, who selected the NUTS II as their primary attachment, considered themselves ‘very attached’ (see Figure 12). Overall, Italian respondents were less likely to be ‘very attached’ to their primary identity than Spanish respondents. It could have been this less committed environment that enabled the LN to construct a Padanian identity. In summary, Italian regional identities had fewer people very attached to those identities than Spanish regional identities.

Figure 12[footnoteRef:53] [53: Q63 and Q64 from Eurobarometer 36 (Oct-Nov 1991)Regional Identity, and Perceptions of the Third World]

Figure 13[footnoteRef:54] [54: Q63 and Q64 from Eurobarometer 36 (Oct-Nov 1991)Regional Identity, and Perceptions of the Third World]

EB36 indicates that regional identities in Italy were less entitative than Spanish regional identities due to a split between NUTS I and NUTS II identities as well as fewer respondents being ‘very attached’ to those identities in Italy. The use of different questions in later Eurobarometer surveys makes charting a trend of regional attachment more difficult. However, using Spain as a reference and assuming relative continuity Spanish identity attachment provides a point from which to examine Italian identity attachment for any shifts that could explain its eurosceptic turn in 1998.

In 1996, Eurobarometer 44.2bis (EB44.2bis) asked respondents about their first choice for ‘citizenship feeling.’ Shifting the wording of the question from identity to citizenship is likely responsible for many more respondents saying their country. In the 1991 question, only 2% of Italian respondents and 6.2% of Spanish respondents said that their primary attachment was to their country. Respondents to the question about ‘citizenship feeling’ in 1996, on the other hand, choose their country more than 50% of the time in both Spain and Italy. Suspecting that many respondents put more weight on ‘citizenship’ than ‘feeling’ and took the question to mean legal citizenship, I would like to draw attention to the other columns of figure 14. 30% of Italian respondents selected the EU as their first choice for ‘citizenship feeling’ while only 10% of Spanish respondents did the same.

Considering that 1% of Italian respondents in 1991 considered Europe as the location of their primary identity attachment and even fewer Spanish respondents did the same, there is a possibility that the entitativity of European identity increased from 1991-1996. If that was the case, then the LN may have come to view European identity as a threat to Padanian identity. In fact, Figure 14 shows that almost twice as many Italian respondents choose the EU when compared to those that selected regions.[footnoteRef:55] The number of Spanish respondents selecting their region for this question was almost four times as many as those who picked the EU. Based on those numbers, the H6’s argument is a possible explanation for the LN eurosceptic turn which occurred 2 years after EB44.2bis. [55: Unlike EB36, EB44.2bis did not use the NUTS system to classify responses.]

Figure 14[footnoteRef:56] [56: Q17 from Eurobarometer 44.2bis (Jan-Mar 1996) Policies and Practices in Building Europe and the European Union]

VI. Conclusions Based on Case Comparison

To explain the timing of the Lega Nord’s Euroscepticism, we must return to the propositions of Viability theory which proposes that regionalist parties are euro-optimistic as a party family because European integration increases the viability of regional independence. Lega Nord clearly held this view of European integration prior to its eurosceptic turn. The potential benefits of integration to independence did change when the LN became eurosceptic. Therefore, the LN must have decided that the negatives associated with integration outweigh the viability benefits. After testing six hypotheses by comparing the LN with Catalonia’s Convergence and Union, I believe that the combination of two possible negative effects could explain the LN’s eurosceptic turn.

First, H3 showed that the exclusivity of Padania’s identity could have driven the party to be eurosceptic. While the LN and CiU both adopted pro-assimilation positions, the CiU emphasized linguistic assimilation and saw immigration as a positive addition to its economy, unlike the LN who saw immigration as a threat. Those combined differences led to the CiU to have a more immigrant-friendly platform than the LN. An important element of European integration is increased migration between European countries and LN certainly saw migration as a negative consequence. However, H3 can not be a complete explanation because the LN was strongly anti-immigrant before its eurosceptic turn.

Secondly, the results of H6 demonstrated that the entitativity of Padania appeared to decrease while the entitativity of the EU seemed to increase in 1996. If the LN felt threatened by Italians’ increased attachment to the EU,[footnoteRef:57] continued European integration could be viewed as a threat to the party’s future. Furthermore, being euro-optimistic is inherently permissive of European identity so eurosceptic rhetoric can be used to undermine Europe’s entitativity. Lacking the ontological security that comes from a strongly entitative identity, the LN adopted policies to secure the Padanian self-conception, by reducing support for a European identity. Additionally, conflict is a means of strengthening identity attachments by rallying against an Other as mentioned previously. [57: Drawing from ontological security theory’s expectation that actors seek to affirm their self-conception, I feel that it is logical for a regionalist who is dependent on a declining entitative identity to take action to maintain their support.]

Ultimately, it is incorrect to consider the Northern League as an outlier because it is following the same strategy as other regionalist parties. European integration’s benefits to the viability of regional independence did cause the Northern League to be euro-optimistic in the early 1990s. However, by 1998, the League’s exclusive and poorly entitative identity led the party to consider European integration’s effects to outweigh the viability benefits. Therefore, populism, by itself, does not necessarily endanger regionalist Euro-optimism.

VII. Future Research

In the future, H2 should be reconsidered by taking H3’s results into account. Globalization could explain the timing of the LN’s eurosceptic turn. Although Spain underwent more globalization in the 1990s, Italy and the LN, in particular, may have had a lower tolerance for globalization due to its exclusive identity. While globalization by itself may n