Reflections on the Humanitarian Response to Cyclone Pam

ACMC Civil Society Roundtable

24 June 2015

Outline

• Disaster Risk in the Pacific

• Community-based DRR

• Civil Society Response

• National Coordination

• International Response

• Recommendations

Disaster Risk in the Pacific

• One of the most vulnerable regions in the world: high exposure to disasters + low capacity to manage risk.

• Particularly exposed to tropical cyclones, which are likely to become more intense, bring with them heavier rains and cause more extensive flooding.

• PICs face a disproportionate share of disaster-related economic loss. Of the 20 countries with the highest average annual disaster losses relative to GDP in the world, eight are in the Pacific.

• Average annual disaster loss = 80% of social expenditure in Vanuatu, 59% in Tonga and 43% in Fiji.

• A 1-in-100 year disaster event could cost 143% of annual GDP in Niue, 63% in Tonga, 52% in Micronesia and 50% in Vanuatu.

Community preparedness:Pre-disaster

CDC members with a Cyclone Tracking Map - 2014

Pre-Disaster:

• Established and functioning Community Disaster Committees (CDCs)

• Disaster simulations

• Identifying safe houses and traditional practices

Pastor Silas Nilwo displays some of the taro that survived Cyclone Pam. He planted it after CARE ran a session on food preservation and disaster resilient crops.

Community preparedness: during disaster

During disaster

• Established and functioning CDCs

• Identified safe houses, organised evacuation, cut down trees close to buildings, stored water in jerry cans.

• Strengthened houses, stored food/water, identified safe houses

Martha Yahwo, Assistant CDC Coordinator, points out where the CDC helped people cross the river to safety during Cyclone Pam.

‘Even though Cyclone Pam was much stronger than previous cyclones, this time there were no deaths and no serious injuries … [without the trainings] people would have stayed in houses that fell down, plenty of trees would have fallen on houses if we hadn’t cut them, people would have been scattered and running everywhere instead of inside safe houses.’

Community preparedness: after disaster

“Sometimes people see me as just a girl…but now, they listen to me”: CDC member Sabrina Yaviong shows off her new kitchen garden, planted after the cylcone.

CDCs:

• Assess data, collated and deliver to DM authorities

• Monitor and support community recovery efforts

• Promote women’s leadership

Community preparedness:Communities not supported to prepare for disasters

• “A few people did things to prepare, like strengthening their houses and putting nails in the roof, but most of the things were written off when the cyclone came. We didn’t prepare for the size of the cyclone.”

• No functioning CDCCCs• Majority of houses not built to

withstand disasters: 81% of houses damaged

• Majority of households building back same as before

Civil Society Response

Legal and regulatory framework for disaster management

National structures for humanitarian coordination

Vanuatu Humanitarian Team • Recognised in the Cyclone Support Plan &

NDMO SOPs, and MOU between NDMO and VHT

• Regarded as model for humanitarian coordination in the Pacific

Clusters• Government leadership, VHT-member co-

leads• Roles and responsibilities described in

National Cyclone Support Plan and NDMOs SOPs

• Not the PHT clusters

But never tested in a large-scale disaster• Structural issues• Awareness regarding national structures

International response: Too Many Cooks?

• 100+ new NGOs, many new, limited understanding of existing structures/processes

• Significant coordination challenge:

• “The problem is that many NGOs came and just … went straight to the field, and we’d receive reports of some people receiving tarps, and others not. … You need to know who’s in your own backyard, so you don’t waste time and money on areas where people are already working.”

• “Coordination got progressively more difficult the further you got from day zero. At the start, … it was just existing actors, with their existing relationships. Once surge capacity came in, complications increased exponentially.”

• Mercy Corps example:

• “Following several days examining the situation and context, our analysis indicated our immediate role was not required … it is evident that the Vanuatu government is in control of the situation and taking full advantage of international support, in particular the UN, bi-lateral donors, militaries and a number of well-established NGOs”

International tools and services for humanitarian response

International tools & services for humanitarian response

UNDAC• Got things going• Only one team available from the

Pacific; mostly from other parts of the world, little experience of Pacific/Vanuatu

• Minimal knowledge of existing coordination structures

• No prior agreement between UNDAC/VHT/NDMO

Humanitarian Action Plan• Formally govt-approved, but generally described as OCHA led:• “It’s an automatic thing. It’s the

second phase of the Flash Appeal. It was presented as a process that had to be, ‘now it’s time to do the HAP’. It wasn’t debated.”

• Limited understanding amongst existing actors of HAP, incl fact that govt could not be included in HAP:• “The disability desk had developed a

project … we had to tell them you can’t have govt agencies in there, and then we called around NGOs saying ‘someone needs to put these guys under them’.”

• National NGOs had to be approved by Geneva, not feasible

• Time-consuming

International response: military assets

• Huge military response: land, air & sea assets from six countries (Aust, French, NZ, Sols, Tonga & Fiji)

• Critical logistics support when no alternative available

• Query whether assets were the right ones? limited by weather conditions

• Coordination and communications with NGOs during response

• Appropriate prioritisation of incoming goods?

• Need for better civmil preparedness planning

International Response: cultural issues“When international staff came in, taking

dominant standpoints and speaking over the

top of senior government

authorities, it didn’t go down well.”

“I never spoke in a meeting when the cluster lead was

present. If I wanted to say something,

I’d write a note and pass it to the

[ministry representative] so that he could say

it”.“It’s a positive thing

to have organisations that

work for the ministry, and speak

for the ministry”.

“I’ve never felt so disrespected in my

life.”

“If she’d respected the authorities, they

would have respected her back. People are used to just coming in and

doing whatever they want”.

International Response: cultural issues

“I never felt comfortable talking in

a cluster meeting, because it was all

experts”

“The UN doesn’t like to be second.”

“There’s hardly a Ni-Van

representative there.

The culture was completely foreign

– early morning starts, loud, militarised,

everyone there with their wanker jackets

and badges, high pressure,

completely different from the way

anyone operates here, it would have been a very difficult thing for a Ni-Van to walk into that

room”

“I will never forget walking into the EOC for the first time … I walked into a room that was overflowing with white faces,

the only Pacific person in the room was the Fijian SPC rep, the tension in the room was tangible and everything about it just

felt wrong. The NDMO Ni-Van staff were all sitting in the office across the corridor. There was no way I wanted

to sit in that room.’”

Summing Up

• First stage of response saw significant achievements:• Emergency food rations distributed in all affected areas• >21,000 received safe drinking water• >26,000 people benefited from repair of water supply systems• 67,500 received tarpaulins• >55,000 people received tool kits to rebuild their homes• Temporary learning spaces provided so that children could return to school

• But issues related to the inter-operability of national/international actors• Lots of rhetoric about the need to localise the humanitarian response and

better orient international systems to support national governments. • National systems were in place, but we struggled to step back and not have

things done our way.• Why?

• Humanitarian imperative• International humanitarian systems not designed to fit within national structures• The scale of the response did overwhelm national absorptive capacities (why weren’t

national structures better prepared?)

Recommendations

Supporting national governments Improving the international responsePromote understanding amongst national actors of the international tools and services available to assist with disaster response.

IASC & PHT: review international and regional humanitarian rules, templates, checklists, guidelines and terms of reference and remove default assumption that international systems will be used, with the UN in the lead.

Support national governments to strengthen and promote understanding of their national disaster laws and policies in order to ensure better facilitation of international humanitarian assistance.

Support national governments to promote understanding amongst international responders of their disaster response laws, policies, systems and structures.

Step up efforts to support national governments to manage international humanitarian assistance.

Get much better at understanding contexts, respecting cultural mores and utilising in-country experience and local knowledge.