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American Academy of Political and Social Science

Reform of the State: An Alternative for Change in Latin AmericaAuthor(s): Carlos BlancoSource: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 606, Chronicle ofa Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America (Jul., 2006), pp. 231-243Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social

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Reform of the

State: An

Alternative for

Changein Latin

America

ByCARLOS BLANCO

Democracyis a current

strugglein several Latin American

and Caribbean countries.Although

amajority

of citizens

preferdemocratic to authoritarian rule, indicators sug

gest support for democratic institutions isprogressively

deteriorating.

From the mid-1980s onward, the

problemofgovernability

rose toprominence,

andproposals

to

reform the stateemerged.

In this context, reform refers

toprofound political

transformations thatproduce

new

institutions, newstyles

ofleadership,

and new social rela

tions whileeradicating existing

ones. Conflict and con

frontation result as structures associated with vested

interests were dismantled andreplaced by

new struc

tures that created new vested interests.Weakening

states

in Latin America are less and less able to deal with inter

nal discontent. The gap between the demandsplaced

on

the state and its ability to address them explains the need

for reform. In some countries, citizens have concluded

thatthey

neither want thedemocracy they

have nor have

thedemocracy they

want.

Keywords: governance; reform of the state; govern

ability;Latin America; democracy

Democracy

isexperiencing

a difficult moment

in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even

thougha

majorityof citizens

prefer democratic

to authoritarian rule, indicators suggesta

pro

gressive deterioration insupport for demo

cratic institutions, a conflict that has posedan

increasinglyserious

challengeto the region

since the 1980s.Although support for

democracydoes not

depend exclusivelyon economic fac

tors,it is

stronglyaffected

by them. Accordingto the Latino-barometer survey, for

example,

support for and satisfaction withdemocracy fell

Carlos Blanco is aprofessor of

Latin American studies

at BostonUniversity

as well as aprofessor of

the

Universidad Central de Venezuela. From 2001 to2005, hewas a

visitingscholar and research associate at Harvard

Universityand before

that served as ministerfor

the

reform ofthestate and also

president ofthePresidential

Commission for State Reform in Venezuela. His recentworks include La Reforma del Estado y la Comisi6n

Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado and Revoluci6n

y Desilusion: La Venezuela deHugo Chavez, the latter

published byEdiciones de La Catarata, Espana,

2002.

DOI: 10.1177/0002716206289333

ANNALS, AAPSS, 606, July 2006 231



232 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

by8 points between 1996 to 2003, dropping from 61 to 53 percent and going

from a substantial to a bare majority (Latinobarometro 2003).

Publicopinion

has thus movedaway

from consensus on the value of democ

racy. Butperhaps

the mostimportant and least expected achievement is that sup

port fordemocracy has not eroded

entirely.Given that it has weathered decades

of economic crisis, onemight consider support for

democracyto be robust.

Nonetheless it continues to fluctuate with the ups and downs of the economic

cycleand remains

quite fragile.In terms of

politicsand political parties, the Latino-barometer suggests

a

healthy dose of cynicism among citizens, whose opinions often contradict their

behavior. Forexample, the 2003 report asks

why,if 42 percent of

respondents say

they are disposed to vote for parties and 39 percent believe that the parties areeffective, nearly

90 percent say they lack confidence inpolitical parties,

a dis

crepancy that increased bymore than 13

pointsin 2002 alone (Latinobarometro

2003). These data suggesta

decliningfaith in

democracy. Indeed, theregional

panorama ofpolitical instability and authoritarian rule points to unresolved prob

lems, a lack of confidence in democraticprinciples,

andskepticism

about the

democratic process itself (UNDP 2004). This loss of confidence undermines gov

ernability, especiallyin the Andean region.

It is notenough for

agovernment

tooriginate

in democratic processes; itmustconstantly

relegitimate itselfas

representative ofthe

peopleon an

ongoing basis.

Akey

issue for the perpetuation of democratic rule is not the abilityof gov

ernmental leaders tomaintain control but the disposition of civil societyto

accepta social contract that specifies legal

and constitutional norms. The problemis not

theability

to govern but the legitimacyof government itself, an issue that can

onlybe resolved by

those who aregoverned

and not thepeople who govern them. In

a democracy, governability requires the confidence of citizens toward the state

and its leaders. Governabilityis a new facet of rule in Latin America, which

requires deepening traditional concepts of governance. It is notenough

for a gov

ernment tooriginate

in democratic processes; it mustconstantly relegitimate

itself asrepresentative ofthe

peopleon an

ongoing basis.

The problemof

governabilityhas grown acute in the current era because so

many factors affectingit lie outside of the traditional relation between leaders



REFORM OF THE STATE 233

and citizens. Globalization means that agrowing array of

productive, mercantile,

financial, technological, social, and cultural circuits cross national boundariesfreely,

creating a new transnational reality that constrains the behavior of individual countries and their

politicalleaders. As

producers, consumers, and social actors, citizens

now lie at the center of ahuge

web of global influences. The forms inwhichthey

articulate their material, symbolic,and

spiritual needs, and the way these needs are

satisfied, areincreasingly determined by transnational factors.

In other words, democraticgovernability

ischallenged

becausepeople

are in

evergreater

measure citizens of the world, eventhough

most of their demands

must still be satisfied within the framework ofthe nation state. As citizens ofthe

world, inhabitants ofdeveloping

nationsincreasingly express demands originat

ing in the political cultures and consumer tastes of advanced postindustrial soci

eties, articulatingwants that go well

beyondthe satisfaction of basic needs.

Global economicintegration has created a new kind of citizen who is

capable,at once, of

demandingan end to

poverty while insistingon environmental pro

tection and gender equity, desiresusually

associated with advanced states of

development.National governments

are also constrained increasingly byinternational insti

tutions. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, especially, organizationssuch as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, along

with the

U.S. Treasury, have obliged authorities to adopt fiscal and monetary policies that

reflect the viewpoint of the"Washington Consensus"; at least they

must adhere

to these policiesif

they wish to receive economic assistance.During the 1990s,

severe institutionaladjustments

wereimposed

on economiesthroughout

the

region without considering how they might affect governability.As a result,

nation-states and citizens werechallenged by

new conflictsreflecting demands,

needs, andpossibilities originated

in the international arena.

From the mid-1980s onward, the problem ofgovernability

arose to prominence

throughoutLatin America and the Caribbean?not the classic problem of

beingthreatened

byauthoritarianism but a new threat from the dissatisfactions

of citizens and theinability

ofpolitical

institutions and leaders to address their

complaints.In this sense, governability

in thetwenty-first century is not a

problem that is exogenous to the prevailing social, economic, and

political order;

rather, it isendogenous

to theglobal

market economy and threatens its continu

ity from within.

StructuralAdjustment

Thepopulist

economic model of Import Substitution Industrialization was

neverimplemented

in amannercompatible

with sustainable growth,nor were its

policieswell suited to

achieving long-termmacroeconomic

equilibrium, yieldinga crisis of

governabilitythat became

increasingly apparent during the 1980s. At

the end of that decade and at thebeginning

ofthe 1990s, it became clear that exit




from the crisis would require structural changes wellbeyond those in the economic

realm. Thecollapse of the socialist world not

only recognizedthe huge

cost that

humanityhad endured because of social

experimentationin the twentieth

centurybut

representedthe end of a

system that had heretofore offered an alternative to

those seeking greater justice and equalityin

society. The socialist catastrophewent well beyond the

sufferingof those who had lived under its repressive

regimes.It also

signaled the end of amodel for social and economicdevelopment

in the third world.

The end of the cold war was more than an armistice to avoid anArmageddon;

it

also involved theimplosion of a social system. Although capitalist society and the

market hadevidendy triumphed,

itquickly became clear that the entry of former

socialist countries into the global economy was not going to be easy. New difficulties arose to

delaythe integration of the global market, a task that was

initiallyassumed to be easy given peaceful

conditionsfollowing

the end of the cold war.

Instead, the transition tocapitalism brought disruptions throughout

the globe,even

in those nations where democracy and market relations had long prevailed.The resurgence of nationalism, fundamentalism, mass

migration, guerillawar

fare, terrorism, and new forms of transnational crime such as narcotics traffick

ing and state-centered mafias, producedlocalized wars that were insoluble using

traditional mechanisms. Moreover, this instability occurredduring

a time when

the ranks of the poor were increasing throughout the world, not diminishing asthe apostles of the market had predicted.

Rather thanrapid

economicdevelop

ment, conflicts and contradictions emergedas the constituent elements of

global

societyat the millennium.

Beneath these deficiencies and sufferings laymore formidable scientific, tech

nological,and cultural challenges. The existence of these challenges

does not

gainsay the need to restructure markets; they simplydemonstrate that when

humanbeings

ceasebeing

the point of reference for reform, they inevitablybecome its victims. In this sense, what is

requiredfor

developmentin the new

century is an ethic that places human beings front and center and makes themthe organizing principle

for the formulation andimplementation

of all social, eco

nomic, andpolitical policies.

The market system that ispresently spreading throughout

the world has both

strengths and weaknesses, even whencarefully

tailored to local circumstances.

Theproblems

areespecially

acute in countrieslacking

the cultural aspirations and

motivations associated with interaction in acompetitive

arena.Although

itmay be

impossibleto build a modern society without the market, it is also

impossibleto

construct amodern society with the market alone. The gap between what the mar

ket can do and what it cannot do alone signals the need to reform the state.

EconomicChange

in Latin America and the Caribbean

The westernhemisphere

entered aperiod

of turbulence in the 1980s.

Originatingin the foreign debt crisis, the economic disorder eventually spread

to




all countries in the regionin immediate or successive waves. The international

community initiallyviewed the crisis as a manifestation of

misguidedeconomic

policies imposed by bloated states on withered civil societies that had been

asphyxiated by government regulationand were

incapable of generating favor

able market conditions. Given the excessive debt runup by many nations, the

natural tendencywas to see the crisis in financial terms, leading

to anemphasis

on economic reform and the structuraladjustments imposed by

the International

MonetaryFund. But in the end, this

partialand incomplete conceptualization

of

the crisiscompromised

democraticgovernability.

As structural economic reforms

wereimplemented,

the need to attend to rising social conflict and civil unrest

becameincreasingly apparent, and social policies emerged

as the order of the

day, offering remedial assistance to certain classes to avoid the intensification of

social conflict.

By the late 1990s, the social problems arising fromreadjustment

hadacquired

greater visibilityand

legitimacyin the international arena, and more resources

were devoted to their solution. The prevailing approachto social

policy, however,

was characterized bytwo

important weaknesses. First, it conceived of socialpol

icy narrowlyas a

"tranquilizer"to

pacify civil society whileapplying

correctives in

the economic realm. Second, it viewed social reform asancillary

to economic

reform and, in sodoing, limited its effectiveness as a

politicalshock absorber. As

societies were pushed to restructure their economic and financial infrastructures,

policy makers assumed that adequate social compensation would ensure a tran

sition that was notoverly

traumatic so that a newequilibrium of economic well

being could ultimately prevail.This sentiment was embodied in the saying,

commonly repeated byinternational officials at the time, "The best social

policyis a

goodeconomic

policy."

Unfortunately,economic benefits did not flow from the

policiesat the same

pace as social demands. To address this imbalance and improve execution in the

public sphere, leaders beganto

emphasize institutional transformations to

improve theefficacy

andefficiency

of state services. Thus, the state moved to the

center of thepolicy

reforms but was still subordinate to the need for institutional

reforms in the economic realm. Policies wereadopted

topromote privatization,

secure the independenceof central banks, further the

developmentof

regulatory

institutions, transform the customssystem,

and dismantle economic controls.

Thesechanges

were intended to transform the economic role of the state and

generatenew institutions to

promote the competence and culture of the market.

The deficiencies of this narrowconceptualization

werequickly

revealedby

its

inability

to achieve sustainable democratic

governance

and human

development.Privileging

the economic realm overpressing social questions led to conditions of

ungovernability.The imposition of structural adjustment weakened

democracy

by makingit synonymous with harsh

policiesthat were divorced from the

feelingsand needs of citizens, thus

provokingauthoritarian

nostalgia among both citizens

and leaders. Thepublic grew disenchanted with

political parties and the veryinstitutions of

democracy, which seemedincapable

ofguaranteeing work,

income, and decent conditions of life for all. In the face of this disenchantment,




leaders looked for new ways toimpose unpopular

economicpolicies that they

believed to beobligatory, given pressures from international organizations and

thehegemonic ideology

oftheWashington

Consensus.

The authoritarianstyle

with which many economicadjustment

measures were

imposedled inevitably

to violations of human rights.In some cases, the violations

were chronic and systematicin character, though usually

of low intensity, whereas

in others they acquiredmassive and scandalous proportions.

In the end, as the

period of economicadjustment

wasprolonged and as

poverty, social conflict, and

disorder continued to rise, the vision of economicchange

as the basis for social

transformation collapsed.

The Deterioration of the State

Proposalsto reform the state

implicitly recognize that forces wellbeyond

the

market arefomenting change throughout

theglobe, producing

newprofiles

for

societies, nations, and states. As a result, reform does not refer tosimple

techni

cal or administrative adjustmentsbut to

profound politicaltransformations that

producenew institutions, new

styles of leadership, and new social relations while

eradicating what existed before. Such reform inevitably brings conflict and confrontation as certain structures associated with vested interests are dismantled

andreplaced by

new structures that create new vested interests.

Reform is necessary because the integrity of the nation-state isbeing eroded

on several fronts. The economic crisis hasbrought

about agrowing incapacity

to carry out the redistributive functions associated with thepopulist govern

ments that formerly prevailedin Latin America. The incapacity of the state is

also evident in the deterioration ofpublic

infrastructure and the decline of ser

vices, notably schoolingand sanitation. The resulting decline in

public health

and education represents a reduction in human capital that is rarely taken intoaccount on the national level. The deterioration of state services has brought

a

marked decline in the qualityof life for most

people, putting the state in aweak

positionto arbitrate solutions, especially

when requiredto assume new and

difficult tasks.

The ongoingcrisis in

publicservices has stimulated a loss of confidence in the

stateby important segments of the

population. Manycitizens have lost confi

dence in the leaders and institutions of the democratic state, exacerbatingthe

problemsof governability

that to somedegree prevail throughout

Latin America.

Whatever one believes about the proper role of the state in a market society, no

one proposes abandoningits basic social functions. For this reason, a clear dete

rioration inpublic

services offers a severechallenge

to the legitimacyof the state

itself. When the state can nolonger carry out its social functions, the door is

openedto the erosion of other functions that rely

on its social performance.A

falling qualityof life has led to the belief that the

political system has neither the

interest nor the abilityto confront the manifold challenges posed by globalization.




Democratic values have suffered as a result, and the view isspreading

that

the constitutions and laws that establish socialrights and guarantees

are of little

practical value.The

spread of this pessimistic sentimentdeepens

the distrust of citizens

toward the state and its institutions, underminingthe

abilityof state actors to lead

andreducing

the range of functions with which theyare entrusted. Public dis

satisfaction isamplified by frequent examples

of corruption that are not ade

quately punishedand ongoing scandals that follow in their wake. The result is

a further decline inpublic

esteem toward the state and its officials, which is

reflected in the growing antagonism between citizens and leaders.

While this crisis of confidence isunfolding

underneath the nation-state,

another is blossoming above it. Processes of economic and financial globalizationnow allocate to

supranationalentities attributes and authorities

formerlyassoci

ated with the nation-state. Fiscal and economic decisions that wereformerly

con

sidered the sovereign right of state actors have been transferred to multinational

institutions and toforeign

markets that, for all intents and purposes, exercise de

facto control overkey

elements of macroeconomic decisionmaking. Despite the

ups and downs oftheglobal economy, there is a

diversityof new forms of transna

tional association, and nosingle country is in a

positionto resist this

integrationist dynamic.As a result, nation-states have

attemptedto

forgeeco

nomic and political connections at the highest levels, through repeated summits

between heads of state and government within the region, thehemisphere,

and

the globe, including theforging

of special links between Spain and its former

colonies.

Meaningfulsocial

change

. . .

presupposes

powerfulresistance

from those who expect

to lose status and power under the

newarrangements.

The inevitable conclusion is that states in Latin America, as elsewhere in the

world, areweakening

in atangible way and are less and less able to deal with

internal discontent. The gap between the social demands placedon the state and

itsability

to address them explainsthe need for reform. There is little doubt at

this point that the crisis has moved beyondits social and economic dimension

into the realm of the political.Even

thougha

majority of citizens continue to

express support fordemocracy

asopposed

todictatorship,

it is nonetheless



238 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY

true thatspecific democratic institutions such as the

legislature,the courts, the

presidency, parties, unions, and civil associations find themselves subjectto seri

ous doubt and increased public questioning. In some countries, citizens haveconcluded that

they neither want thedemocracy they

have nor have thedemocracy

theywant.

When state actors areincapable

ofdeveloping policies

topromote change

in

desired directions, the ultimate result is a loss of faith in the political system and

itsprevailing institutions?hence the crisis of democratic governability. Although

strong adjustments have been adopted throughout the regionto

reorganizenational economies, and whereas these may have been

indispensableto restoring

macroeconomic health, the samepolicies have reduced the quality of life for

many people. The fact that some social advances have been achieved through

readjustmentdoes not

gainsay the fact thatlarge segments ofthe population

have

beenimpoverished.

This decline inliving standards opens the way to neoauthor

itarian formulations.1 For those segments of society that have borne the brunt of

economicreadjustment,

authoritarianism has come to beperceived

as desirable,

or at the very least acceptable.The reform of the state thus emerges as a necessary response to these exigen

cies. In the wake of the growing crisis of democraticlegitimacy,

there is apro

found need to redefine and transform the state apparatus throughoutLatin

America (COPRE 1988,17-74). Needed reforms include democratizing the state

and society, increasing the efficiency and efficacy of public services, and recon

figuringthe

relationshipbetween the

publicand private

sectors. Such reforms

offer a democratic alternative to authoritarianism, which may appear inevitable

given the ongoing deterioration of the state and thedeepening

of citizen distrust

toward democracy and its values.

A New

Conception

of

ChangeIn sum, the economic crisis in Latin America has led to a

growingcrisis of

democratic legitimacy,which has

obligedcountries to reconsider the nature and

meaning of the structural adjustment. Different countries havebegun

toexperi

ment with differentapproaches,

which has led to three basic innovations inpol

icy formulation. First, plansfor economic, social, and

political restructuringare

increasingly integrated,so that institutional

changesin

multipledomains are

implementedin a coordinated fashion. Second, leaders have

placeda new

emphasis

on the

sustainability

of reforms, such that economicpolicies

are seen to

dependon a broader set of reforms that serve as

catalysts for greater politicaland

institutional change. Finally,it is

increasingly recognized that, in the long run,

economicdevelopment requires

notonly

economicchanges

but broader trans

formations of culture, social organization, legal institutions, and public policies.In short, sustained economic

development requires the wholesale institutional

transformation ofthe social andpolitical system.




Transformations of thismagnitude

involve changesat all levels of state and

society andultimately

alter preexisting relations of power. Some sectors emerge

from the readjustment better off, whereas others do not. Meaningful social

change thus presupposes powerfulresistance from those who expect to lose sta

tus and power under the newarrangements. The fundamental choices faced by

adeveloping society always

involve a redistribution ofpower?the birth or death

of an institution, the privatizationor socialization of a

productive enterprise, the

incorporationor elimination of some administrative

procedure, thedelegation

or

concentration of power. Whatever choices are madeinevitably enhance the posi

tion of some social actors whileundermining

that of others.

Achievingreform thus

dependson a

political process that isindependent of its

explicit content, be it economic, administrative, technical, or whatever. The political character of the process of social change highlights

the fact that for a reform

to occur, adynamic redistribution of social power is necessary

on both a hori

zontalplane (center to

periphery) and on the vertical dimension (national to sub

national). Reforms are thuspolitical

in a double sense. First, every economic,

political, social, or culturalchange requires

a redistribution of power, for without

such a redistribution the reform would be blocked, delayed,or distorted

byresis

tance from those affected. Second, given thatchange requires

an alteration of

power relations, reformers must formulate apolitical strategy to achieve it.

Reforming the State

Thepossibility

ofreforming

the state was first broached in Venezuela, where

thepresident?in December

1984?appointeda Commission for the Reform of

the State. Over the course of a decade, this commissionopened

aspace for citi

zens to consider potential political, administrative, institutional, and cultural

reforms. The central idea was that economic reforms were not theonly changes

needed. Indeed, the mostimportant reforms were

political and institutional in

nature. Reformers viewed broader institutionalchange

asindispensable

for mak

ing economicdevelopment politically viable and

socially sustainable.

To attack theproblem

ofgovernability directly,

it isultimately necessary to for

mulate apolitical program for the redistribution of

political power. Given this

comprehensiveview of reform, three fundamental

changesare

required: reform

ing the state in the strict senseby transforming

its institutional structure and

organization, reforming relations between the state and civil society byrestruc

turing

the means

by

which citizens and leaders interact, and

reforming politicalparticipation by transforming

the mechanisms under which citizens influence

state actions toguarantee real

popular influence.

Which of thesechanges

ispursued

and inwhat orderdepends

on the countryunder consideration and its

respective lineupof social and political forces. In

some countries, reform may emerge from a conflictivepolitical struggle

rather

than a structured designor

plan, owingto the absence of suitable mechanisms for




citizenpolitical participation. In other countries, reforms may be initiated by the

state in consultation with civil society, particularly bychief executives and in some

cases by legislatures. By the end of the 1980s, awareness of the need for statereform

prompteda

majority of Latin America's executives to formulate plans for

reform and to offer them aspart of broader programs for governance (Grindle

2000, 1-36).

During the 1990s, the reform ofthe state became anobligatory component

in

proposals for leadership and wasexpressed

inmany countriesby the creation of

new institutions todesign and organize administrative reforms. In the course of

successive summits between heads of state and government, the theme of demo

craticgovernability and the reforms necessary to achieve it became a constant.

These reform efforts not only produced new relations between citizens and the

state but also conferred upon citizens new social and political rights.The coming

togetherof movements

yieldeda broader process of democratization, providing

a new model for social and economic transformation known as Sustainable

HumanDevelopment.

Reforming Market Society

At thebeginning of the 1990s, a debate

ragedbetween two

politicalorienta

tions in Latin America: neoliberal and statist. This debate washighly ideological

and in many ways skirted core issues. In the end, consensus was reached on the

need to restructure market economies, at leastamong

mainstreamparticipants

in

the debate. The remaining questioniswhat are the most efficient and democra

tic means for constructinga market economy. Experience

in Latin America sug

gests that under current conditions ofglobalism,

traditional alliances between

elite privateinterests and state actors often stifle entrepreneurial culture and

leave insufficient space for the development of market relations characterized bythe free play

ofsupply

and demand.

Persistentinequalities

in the region have meant that economicrestructuring

often does not translate immediately and spontaneouslyinto a

competitivemar

ket among equals.On the contrary, opening markets has

frequentlyserved to

concentrate wealth, exclude citizens from economic resources, and perpetuate

existing inequalities.Under such circumstances, the end result is counter to rosy

economic forecasts. Rather than promoting economicgrowth

anddemocracy,

an

institutionally incomplete openingto the market paves the way for the reemer

gence of authoritarianism as a populist tool to overcome the forces of exclusion

emanatingfrom the operation of an

increasingly "savage" market economy.

The proper construction of markets throughoutLatin America is thus a task

the state cannot avoid. The creation of ahealthy, well-functioning market involves

extraeconomic tasks, and for this reason state action is unavoidable. The state

must secure the rule of law,which is fundamental inguaranteeing private prop

erty, respecting contracts, andresolving

conflictspeacefully;

the state must




create alegal and regulatory apparatus

to secure the efficientfunctioning

of markets;

and the state must build institutions and create incentives for the training of labor and

for the promotion of technological progress, building a stock of human capital. Thecreation of the markets is a task the state must assume, not

exclusively but nonethe

less decisively,to

promotean efficient, democratic, and productive society.

Moving toward Governability

Achievingstable democratic government is

necessarilya

question highon the

Latin Americanpolitical agenda.

The issue has surfaced in different ways in differ

ent settings but has nonetheless been addressed consistently in governmental,

political, academic, and intellectual circles throughout the region. Thegoal

of stable

governance has remained elusive, however, owingto a lack of

conceptual development. The

predominant tendency has been to address issues linked to democratic

governabilityas isolated themes, attacking

themthrough

discrete administrative

structures without recognizing their underlying conceptual unity. Simply put,we

lack a coherenttheory

toguide

the formation ofgood

social policy.This lack means that

although governments participate widelyin discussions

of democratic

governability, they

have

generally

failed to

develop strategicdesigns that enable them to tackle the problem

in asystematic and coherent way.

Thoughthe current

politicalenvironment is favorable to an

open discussion of a

myriad of questions related to democraticgovernability,

thepractical and con

ceptual technology for its realization does not yet exist. In macro-social terms, we

appear to be in aperiod

ofexploration, investigating the reach of certain ques

tions andconsidering

the possibilities for certain concrete outcomes. Democratic

governabilityhas become a

keyissue because of worries

by international institu

tions, national governments, and civil society about social andpolitical stability,

yielding

new intellectual

leadership

on the

subject.

It is no

exaggeration

to state

that intellectual leadersthroughout

the regionnow view democratic

governabil

ityas a central concern, with crucial

problemsand obstacles that must be

addressed if economicdevelopment

is to be sustained.

Conceptual advances have been slow because systematicresources for

research are not made available by governments, except for certain academic

centers. Practical advances have been even slower to emerge owingto the diver

sity ofconceptual approaches

and national circumstances, and nocountry has yet

made much progress. On the contrary, spreading poverty andinequality

has

tended to frustrateprogress. Improving

thequality

of life anderadicating misery

constitute essentials tests for governments throughoutthe region. Progress

is also

difficult because state institutions often derive from dictatorial, authoritarian,

and colonial pasts, yielding legal, political,and cultural traditions hostile to the

promotion of change.As a result, the very institutions that should themselves be

dedicated to reform are often most in need of reform themselves, making social

changeall the more

complex.



242 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY

Leadership throughoutthe region is

undergoinga transition between older,

populistvisions of society and a newer, more modern vision associated with

reforms ofthe state,society,

and markets. Elements ofthe new vision are evident

in the region, but many leaders remaintrapped

in traditional rhetoric andpolit

ical practiceseven when

they recognize the need tochange.

The reform of the

state is thus theprincipal challenge

to democraticgovernability, recognizing that

old authoritarian, populistmechanisms cannot secure a transition to a more

democratic, efficient, and affluent society. The transformation of the state is

required before broader changecan occur; yet it is not

possibleto tackle the

reform of the state without a broader transformation of societymore

generally.This broader societal transformation is the fundamental issue for Latin America

as itmoves into thetwenty-first century, yielding

a clearagenda

forchange:

1. Reforms must be enacted to modernizeparties

andpersonalize

electoralsystems.

2. Politicalsystems

must be decentralized, developingsubnational

organizationsto

bringcitizens into closer contact with the state and thus

permitting greater efficiencyin the

provisionof

publicservices and

greater public accountability.3. Public administration must be reformed

by creating systemsof merit and

simplifying

publicadministrative

procedures.4. The judiciarymust be modernized with the goal of clearly and definitively establishing

the rule of law.

5. The process offormulating

andenacting public policies

must be reformed todevelop

greater coherence between these two functions and to stimulate greater efficiency in

execution.

6. New mechanisms of citizenparticipation

must bedeveloped

to enable the social mobi

lization ofthepublic

and its effective interventions inpublic

decisions.

7. Thepresidencies

must be reformed toprovide

moreagile, responsive,

and efficient

leadershipof

publicadministration.

8. The armed forces must be modernized toguarantee

astrong

commitment todemocracy

and betterpreparation

for new missions.

Together,these

eightelements constitute fundamentals

requiredfor the effective

reform of the state throughout the region. In some countries, their execution

might require ancillary legaland political changes,

such as constitutional amend

ments to weaken the power of entrenched interests, modernization of the exec

utive branch to overcome alegacy

of authoritarianism, and modernization of the

armed forces to inculcate democratic values and arespect for civilian rule rather

than arepressive militaristic orientation.

Rising dissatisfaction with democracy, the trauma of widespread impoverish

ment, and the deficient performanceof many economies has brought about a cri

sis of democraticgovernability throughout

Latin America. In this context, the

institutional reform of the state emerges as a proposal for integrated societal

transformation, one that offers a newpath for social and economic

developmentin a

globalizingworld.

Note

1. MarinaOttaway (2003, 1-6) labeled it as semiauthoritarian regimes.




References

COPRE?Comision Presidencial

para

la Reforma del Estado. 1988.

Proyecto

de

Reforma Integral

del

Estado. Vol. 1. Caracas, Venezuela: COPRE.

Grindle, Merilee. 2000. Audacious reforms, institutional invention anddemocracy

in Latin America.

Baltimore:John Hopkins University

Press.

Latinobarometro. 2003. Presentacion de Prensa de Informe Resumen la Democracia y la Economia.

http://www.latinobarometro.org/ano2003/presentacion_de_prensa_percent20lb_2003.pd.

Ottaway,Marina. 2003. Democracy challenged:

The riseof semi-authoritarianism.

Washington,DC:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP). 2004.

Democracyin Latin America.

Projectin

Democracyin Latin America. New York: UNDP.

Documents

Reform of the State - An Alternative for Change in Latin America (2006) - Demo