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Regional order in South‐East AsiaMichael Leifer aa Reader in International Relations , London School of Economics and Political SciencePublished online: 15 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Michael Leifer (1974) Regional order in South‐East Asia, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal ofInternational Affairs, 64:255, 309-317, DOI: 10.1080/00358537408453136

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REGIONAL ORDER INSOUTH-EAST ASIAAN UNCERTAIN PROSPECT

MICHAEL LEEFER *

T""1 HE diversity which is the notable characteristic of the human dimensionA of South-East Asia finds full expression in its international relations.

This is a natural state of affairs, especially since the very term "South-EastAsia " has only acquired common currency since the Pacific War in the early1940s; and as such it did not signify either the re-emergence or the existenceof a sense of regional unity embodied in any pre-colonial great tradition orindeed in any common anti-colonial sentiment. "South-East Asia" is aconcept which arose out of Allied plans to dispossess Japan of its militarygains. It has now become a category of convenience extending beyond theshifting bounds of the South-East Asia Command of Admiral Lord Mount-batten; and it operates as a collective expression linking together thosecbuntries situated to the east of the Indian sub-continent, south of China andnorth of Australia.

Because of the external source of this concept—which preceded the emer-gence of new states defined by territorial boundaries originally demarcated ongrounds of colonial administrative convenience—it is little wonder that noshared central view of South-East Asia has emanated from within the region,capable of serving as a basis for regulating its inter-state relations. Insteadthe states of South-East Asia have had in common a condition of politicaldebility determined by social and cultural cleavages and by economic defi-ciency and dependency. And this condition has been expressed regionally ina common subordination to the conipetitive interests and interventions of anumber of extra-regional powers.

The Extra-Regional Powers

FROM the end of the 1960s, however, the balance of extra-regional influ-ences bearing on South-East Asia began to change. This shift has marked

a reassessment of, rather than an end to, external competitive interest; and ingreat part it came about as a consequence of the reappraisal by the UnitedStates of the strategic significance of the region. The enunciation of the

* Michael Leifer is Reader in International Relations at the London School ofEconomics and Political Science.

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Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the visit of the American President to Peking in1972, and the Vietnam Settlement in 1973 together manifested the " de-coupling" by the United States government of its long-standing regionalpriorities from its global priorities. A particular regional sector in the globalpolicy of " containment" is now seen in a different strategic perspective, andan underlying philosophical premise—the domino theory of a monolithicCommunism, with China as its vehicle for expansion in Asia—is now dis-carded. But this is not to say that American interests, as expressed orclouded by the Nixon Doctrine, are no longer engaged in South-East Asia.For example, in upholding President Nixon's " peace with honour " formulathrough the provision of material and military assistance, the global credi-bility of American policy is still linked to resisting the overthrow by force ofAmerica's clients in Indochina. However, the prospect of another projectionof American military power in the region after the manner in which it wasdeployed from the mid-1960s in Vietnam now appears most unlikely to berealized. Nor does a direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union orChina over a South-East Asian issue seem likely. Indeed there is at present amuch greater prospect of competitive regional involvement between the SovietUnion and China.

This revision of American policy was preceded and paralleled by changesof direction and emphasis in the policy of other extra-regional powers. TheBritish Government announced its plans for the withdrawal of its militarypresence from Singapore in July 1967; and although this decision was reversedby the Conservative administration which assumed office in June 1970, theBritish contribution to the Five Power Commonwealth Force instituted inNovember 1971 has been of slight military substance. The viability of thisdefence arrangement has been undermined by the withdrawal of the Australiancombat force contingent, and it is likely to be weakened still further by thereappraisal of defence expenditure now being carried out by the BritishLabour administration which came to power in March 1974.

Meanwhile, in another direction, in June 1969—a month before the initialenunciation of the Nixon Doctrine—Mr. Brezhnev launched the Soviet proposalfor "a system of collective security in Asia". This scheme lacks precisecontent but it has been widely interpreted as an attempt to fill the possiblepolitical vacuums created by American disengagement. And it has also beenseen as a move to counter the anticipated extension of Chinese influencefollowing Peking's reversion to conventional diplomatic practice after theCultural Revolution. The global character of Soviet ambitions had beenindicated earlier, in March 1968, when the first modern deployment of Russiannaval vessels in the Indian Ocean took place—a deployment which hassubsequently been sustained at an average annual level of about twenty vesselson permanent station.

Although China's power cannot at present be projected in the same manneras that of the Soviet Union, its geo-political relationship with South-EastAsia—and in particular with Inddchina—together with its apparent psycho-

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logical weight in the region has increased the prospect of an extension of itsinfluence concurrently with the process of American disengagement. CertainlyChina has every interest in seeking to exclude or to limit the involvement ofany extra-regional powers which might be regarded as hostile or potentiallyhostile. An additional factor in the changing balance of extra-regional influ-ences has been the increasing and ubiquitous economic presence of Japan,which has aroused strong feelings of antagonism in a number of South-EastAsian countries because of the economic dependence which the Japaneseconnection has brought about. Japan, because of its acute reliance onexternal sources of raw materials and energy supply has in turn a deep interestin sustaining ready access within South-East Asia and in ensuring continuousfreedom of maritime passage through the waters of the region.

ASEAN and the Concept of Regional Order

UNTIL recently because of the sustained pattern of extra-regional involve-ment the states of South-East Asia were constrained or discouraged either

individually or in association from undertaking major regional initiatives.But the changing balance of external influences has now stimulated a greaterinterest in the management of regional order by the regional powers them-selves. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—founded inAugust 1967 as a vehicle for reconciliation after the Indonesian-MalaysianConfrontation—is one manifestation of this interest; and it reflects in parti-cular the regional outlook of Indonesia. However, the most striking initiativehas come from Malaysia, which has advocated the neutralization of South-East Asia to be guaranteed by the major powers. In November 1971 Malaysiareceived a diluted endorsement of this proposal in the shape of a declarationby the foreign ministers of the five ASEAN states, contemplating internationalrecognition of the region " as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, freefrom any form or manner of interference by outside powers ". Approval inprinciple for a version of the original Malaysian proposal has not beenmatched, however, by regional action—let alone by extra-regional response.ASEAN—which is beset with differing and also conflicting security interests—has not produced a precise definition of " neutrality ", nor a practical pro-gramme for the implementation of the declaration, which was in effect madeoutside the formal auspices of the Association. The underlying reality of thesituation is that while there has been a perceptible change in the pattern ofextra-regional involvement, there has not in fact been any substantial changein the individual or collective capacities of the constituent states of South-East Asia, capable of serving the cause of regional order.

To return to the Malaysian initiative and its significance, it can be arguedthat the neutralization proposal was a product in large part of special Malay-sian interests rather than of general regional requirements. It emerged as thepersonal response of the late Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, to theprospect of British military withdrawal and to the implications of the NixonDoctrine. It was made possible, above all, by Malaysia's new relationship

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with Indonesia—which,, following the end of Confrontation, had been trans-formed from one of bitter antagonism to one of de facto alliance. Theassurance of the political benevolence of neighbouring Indonesia, togetherwith the interposing shelter from the perils of Indochina provided by anamicable Thailand, contrasted with Malaysia's sense of apprehension aboutthe prospects of internal disorder realized in the inter-communal violence ofMay 1969. In the light of the delicate inter-communal balance of Malaysiansociety, the neutralization proposal was geared in large part to the exclusionof extra-regional forces which might exploit communal feelings, and in parti-cular local Chinese alienation, to challenge the legitimacy of a system ofgovernment which reflects a constitutionally entrenched Malay, politicaldominance. • : . : . - .- .

The principal external focus of the Malaysian neutralization proposal hasbeen the Chinese People's Republic, which it was correctly assumed wouldpossess a complementary interest in a regional arrangement excluding itssuper-power rivals—in particular the Soviet Union. For Malaysia this heldout the prospect not only of a self-denying ordinance on the part of China,but also of the establishment of formal inter-governmental ties: which woulddemonstrate to the overseas-Chinese community of Malaysia and to the in-surgent and predominantly ethnic-Chinese Malayan Communist: Party thatthe legitimacy of the government in Kuala Lumpur-was: recognized and evenapproved in Peking. Such ties were established during the visit of theMalaysian Prime Minister to Peking in May 1974, but without the cessationof propaganda support for Malaysia's insurgents transmitted by a radio stationin South China. . .

The responses of the other countries of the region and of the relevantextra-regional states have been shaped by the fact that the Malaysian initiativewas governed by priorities arising from Malaysia's special circumstances.Indonesia's military-dominated government may well have resented such agrandiose proposal emanating from a state which is regarded in Indonesia asa mere country cousin; and Jakarta was responsible for modifying the originalMalaysian concept of neutralization, with its explicit provision for greatpower guarantees. At bottom the Indonesian Government's objection to theform of the Malaysian proposal arises from its conviction that Indonesia, asthe largest and most populous state within South-East Asia, has the best claimto play the leading role in instituting a new pattern of regional order. Itsconception of such an order may be described as autonomous neutralizationbased on a concert of states in the region who by their collective will andcapability will eradicate those political conditions which have-made externalintervention such a common feature of post-colonial South-East Asia. Thechosen vehicle for the fulfilment of this Indonesian ambition is ASEAN,which, according to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik,

"reflects the growing determination of the nations of this region to takecharge of their own future; and to work out problems of their development,stability and security together. It signifies the rejection by those countries

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of the assumption that the fate of South-East Asia is going to be determinedby outside powers.":

The Indonesian Government has made known its objections to the explicitprovision in Malaysia's original neutralization proposal of a guarantor rolefor China, the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the implica-tion that they might assume some undefined policing functions.

The source of these objections is not a sense of pique, but a deep-seatedapprehension; of the intentions of all major extra-regional powers, based onIndonesia's previous experience of periods of national revolution and ofouter island dissidence. Malaysia was obliged to defer to these Indonesianobjections, which Were reflected in the declaration of ASEAN foreignministers in November 1971. Meanwhile, however, the two states were able toestablish a junction of interests in their joint assertion in the same monththat the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were no longer international water-ways distinguished by the right of unimpeded passage. This was a prohibi-tion in declaratory form directed at the strategic mobility of all maritimepowers.

There has, however, been less harmony between Indonesia and Malaysiain their attitudes to the Chinese People's Republic—which for Malaysia iscentral to the neutralization proposal. For its part, Indonesia has no needof Chinese approval to domesticate a minority Chinese community whichdoes not play a role in the internal political balance of the country. Indeed,China is viewed as a source of subversion of that minority, which has aneconomic importance out of proportion to its size, and which is also chargedin official doctrine with having been a party to the abortive coup of October1965. The Indonesian Government is therefore not inclined to see China as aparticipating state involved in the management of South-East Asian regionalorder, as implied in the original neutralization proposal. More generally,Indonesia has no desire to see the crystallization of any such proposal forregional neutralization at a time when its own military capabilities and thoseof its ASEAN partners do not add up to anything which might be deployedcollectively to serve a regional policy aimed at excluding the influence ofexternal powers. For the time being it prefers the present uncertain iftolerable situation in which the less objectionable forms of Western militarypresence—incompatible with any scheme of neutralization—serve to contain,if not completely to exclude, more objectionable external presences. Mean-while Indonesia and its neighbours concentrate on the tasks of economic andsocial development in the hope of promoting political stability and an atten-dant capacity to play an autonomous role in the management of regionalorder. .

Indonesia has been joined by Singapore in its objection both to theoriginal Malaysian concept of neutralization and to the implied special rolefor China. Ever since independence Singapore has felt very vulnerable inrelation to its' Malay neighbours, because of its small size, its location and

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its conspicuously overseas-Chinese identity. The Government of Singaporeappears to think of the Malaysian neutralization scheme in terms of theworst possible case: the exclusion of the external powers permitting theemergence of a regional order under the domination of local powers eitherin the form of an Indonesian hegemony or of an Indonesian-Malaysian con-dominium. It is also feared that the overseas-Chinese identity of Singaporewould stand out provocatively, especially if stimulated by the heady impactof diplomatic ties with Peking. The realization of this, the nightmare of theworst possible case, does not seem very likely. Nevertheless, the SingaporeGovernment is concerned to encourage a kind of neutralization very differentfrom that conceived by Malaysia; one effected through the balanced multipleinvolvement of all the major extra-regional powers.

The direction of Singapore's policy for the region had been indicated evenbefore the formal pronouncement of Malaysian policy in September 1970.But while Singapore has been able to bring home and sustain an impressiverange of external economic interests in its efficiency and success, it is not ina position to act as a pioneer in the promotion of a regional order capableof providing countervailing defences of its intrinsic vulnerability. It hastherefore increasingly come to terms with Indonesia—a reconciliation basedin part on a recognition that Indonesia's strategic frontiers lie well to thenorth of the island of Singapore, which is not regarded as a major threat tosecurity in Jakarta. A working accommodation has been established betweenthe two governments despite differences over the status of the Straits ofMalacca; and that accommodation was sanctified in May 1973 by the visit toJakarta of the Singaporean Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan-yew. Apart fromshared anti-Communism and common economic interests, a major bond isthe reluctance of both States to permit the extension of Chinese politicalinfluence. Indonesia's acceptance in the short term of Western militarypresences is also a factor, although Jakarta is in principle opposed to them.However, underlying the current accommodation is a fundamental conflict oflong-term interests, arising from the fact that Singapore would feel veryvulnerable within Indonesia's preferred system of a regional order managedby local states deferring to priorities determined in Jakarta.

The Peripheral ASEAN Powers

THE more peripheral members of ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines,have also committed themselves in principle to the concept of " a Zone of

Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" rather than to the concept of neutralization.Their varying views reinforce the evidence that there is no one central viewof South-East Asia even on the part of those of its constituent states formallybound together in regional association. The circumstances of geographicallocation within the region promote exclusive viewpoints. Thus Thailand—which marches with Indochina—is acutely concerned about the nature of theresolution of the conflicts of that area, upon which will depend the character

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and extent of Vietnamese Communist influence and control.* In the light ofthe uncertain prospect which faces Thailand, and especially the possibilitythat its "security frontier" along the Mekong Valley could be violated—perhaps as a consequence of the implementation of the Laos peace settlement—it is apparent that neutralization in any of its various forms is scarcelyrelevant to the situation as seen from Bangkok. The Thai government, withits present civilian cast and its current commitment to democratic institutions,is certainly not willing to remove an American military presence stationed inthe country—despite the uncertainty of the countervailing power it affordsand the significant, if not substantive, decline in its standing complement.There has also been no indication of any willingness on the part of Thailandto repudiate the SEATO alliance, which, in its bilateral Thai-American inter-pretation of March 1962, serves as the institutional vehicle for the fulfilmentof American commitments to Thailand under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine.

Without wishing totally to transform its foreign policy, Thailand is in theprocess of reconsidering its relationship with China. In feeling their wayforward the Thais have been only too conscious of the presence on theirterritory of insurgencies which receive, at the very least, moral support fromPeking. There is, however, a clear prospect of establishing a basis for a newrelationship with China in that the government in Bangkok continues to treatthe Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia with reserve. The preven-tion of the exercise of undue influence by the Vietnamese Communistswithin Indochina may also come to be seen as a common interest linkingThailand with China. By its sponsorship of the Cambodian National UnitedFront, led ceremonially by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Chinese Govern-ment has already made its position clear; and there have long been Chineseroad-building units in north-west Laos. Chinese support for the Pathet Laomovement together with the distinct solicitude which Peking has shown for theProvisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam—and before it theNational Liberation Front—provides some indication of a desire to limit thehegemonic influence of Hanoi. In so far as Thailand is willing and able toarrange a satisfactory political accommodation with China to ward off threatsto Thai security arising out of the condition of Indochina, then its outlookis of necessity predominantly a sectoral one with not much room for anyconcept of South-East Asia as a whole. In this light the schemes for regionalorder advocated by Malaysia and more discreetly by Indonesia have a verylimited relevance and utility in Bangkok. For Thailand the crucial balanceis that which might arise in Indochina from a judicious mixture of the counter-vailing physical power of the United States and the interposing political influ-ence of China.

The Philippines has fewer problems of external security because of itscomparative maritime insulation: although there appear to be some externalinfluences—not from outside the region—involved in sustaining the Muslim

* Note also, recent expressions of Vietnamese Communist support for radical changein Thailand in Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, April 1974.

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rebellion in the south of the country. The Philippines retains a close militaryassociation with the United States both through SEATO and through thebilateral security pact of 1951, while President Marcos is committed to theview that an American military presence is still required in South-East Asia.Manila has made a commitment to the " Peace Zone " proposal, and informalbut high-level contacts have been established with Peking as the preliminaryto an anticipated establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future, inspite of a conflict of claims with China over the Spratly Islands in the SouthChina Sea. Meanwhile of late there has been serious friction with Malaysiaover the alleged involvement of elements from the East Malaysian state ofSabah in the Muslim rebellion in the southern Philippines. And a commoninterest with Indonesia in establishing the maritime territorial bounds of thearchipelago states has not yet been sufficient to encourage Manila to share theregional vision of its neighbour. Although through ASEAN the PhilippineGovernment shares in a common awareness of regional changes, its immediateinternal concerns do not dispose it towards collective action for regional order.

The other states of South-East Asia also share a sense of uncertaintywhich overshadows any sense of regional purpose. Burma has now becomeless monastic in its international outlook; but while it is willing to engagein closer relationships with neighbouring states, it is not yet committed toinstitutionalized regional association. The Burmese Government gauges itspriorities in terms of its bilateral connections, which have of late been im-proved both in relation to Thailand and to China—following the rupture ofrelations during the Cultural Revolution. It should be noted, however, thata recent revival of Chinese support for the Burmese Communist Party hascaused great concern in Rangoon.

Within Indochina, the continuing bitter and unresolved conflict makesregionalism an unreal prospect. North and South Vietnam, both with externalmaterial support, continue to be locked in an antagonism that only forcemajeure seems likely to eradicate; while the violated and stricken state ofCambodia remains beset by civil war which is also sustained by externalbacking. Only in Laos—where a political settlement took elemental shape inApril 1974—is there some prospect of stabilization based upon a localneutralization arising from the accommodation of internal and external forces.Throughout Indochina, much will depend upon the capacities and ambitionsof the Vietnamese Communists and on the corresponding scale of Sino-Sovietcompetition for access and influence.

Among the major extra-regional powers, China has the greatest incentiveto support the creation of some kind of neutral zone; and it has alreadyindicated its support in principle for the idea. Japan, with an increasedappetite for access to raw materials, markets arid investment opportunities,also has every reason to encourage the maintenance of stable political condi-tions by the best available means. But although it has moderated, extra-regional competition has not disappeared, and several foci of conflict betweenextra-regional and regional states remain in existence—for instance, in the

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cases of the Straits of Malacca and of the Spratly Islands. Neither the UnitedStates nor the Soviet Union (seeking to promote its concept of collectivesecurity) has given any indication of support for the Malaysian proposal inany of its various forms. In sum, what emerges from an analysis of thepolitical outlooks of the different South-East Asian states and those of theinterested extra-regional powers is a diversity of views which puts in questionthe utility of treating the region as a discrete zone susceptible to collectivemanagement.

An Uncertain Future

BUT although the prospect of the deliberate promotion of a regional orderis unlikely to be realised, this sceptical assessment does not seek to deny

that an era of international relationships in Asia is now passing. What willtake its place remains undefined. Much will depend on the manner in whichseveral different levels of political activity interlock. In the past, the processof decolonization involved political competition between alternative elites inthe various territories, leading to the engagement of external patrons and insome circumstances to intra-regional conflict. In the future, the scale ofexternal intervention should decline, in so far as American experience inVietnam is salutary for other powers; while Sino-Soviet competition maytake place at a relatively lower level of involvement. However, it will bedifficult to preserve even any de facto stand-off by the extra-regional powers inthe absence of a collective will and capability on the part of the regionalstates to support such a self-denying ordinance; and the attainment of such acapability will be jeopardized if internal political changes or intra-regionalfriction undermine any tacit understandings on the part of the outside powers.In other words, any order which rests solely or primarily on extra-regionalaccord cannot exclude the prospect of a reversion to some form of competitiveintervention should changes in regional circumstances alter the basis of anysuch understanding. In the case of South-East Asia, collective will andcapability remain conspicuous by their absence. And the regional founda-tions of regional order have yet to be laid.

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