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8/9/2019 Regulation 2006
1/23
Abstract
Wall Streets House of Cards
By Ann LeeFinance Professor, Lubin Business School of Pace University
The paper draws attention to the disturbing developments in the structured productsmarket--CDOs, CLOs, MBSs, ABSs, credit derivatives etc.-- that have been responsiblefor the consistently outsized earnings of Wall Street firms but include risks that canmake the current subprime mortgage meltdown look like a minor event. It will explain inlaymans terms the highly technical and esoteric world of structured products and detailhow these financial engineering innovations create conflicts of interest and moralhazards. It concludes with proposed policy and market reforms.
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There are a number of reasons why structured products have become so prolific.
With the rise of hedge funds, more and more money have been chasing fewer and fewer
investment opportunities, thus pushing down investment returns. With potential returns
being lackluster, the appetite for investors to use more leverage to amplify returns has
increased. Banks and investment banks invent new and falsely attractive investment
opportunities through structured products that incorporate greater and greater degrees of
leverage. Structured product sellers margins are fat and buyers believe they will earn a
high rate of return (although in reality, they may be manipulated by the seller through
opaqueness). Structured products essentially provide easy money for both sellers and
buyers--until unexpected (but likely to occur) losses in the structured products
underlying assets appear. For example, an increase in home mortgage defaults can
produce sudden and large losses for investors in structured products built on home
mortgage loans.
These financial innovations have allowed banks to increase diversification in their
portfolios, resulting in regulators permitting increased leverage by banks and in banks
creating a massive fee stream for themselves. While there are clearly benefits for
spreading credit risks amongst a broad investor base, nothing comes without a price tag.
The complexity and opaqueness of these products has created two major problems that
can lead to a systemic financial crisis: 1) they create incentives for potential fraud and
conflicts of interest, and 2) they exacerbate concentration and liquidity risks for all
market participants due to their inherently high embedded leverage and tranching.
How Structured Products Breed Conflicts of Interest That Rise To Fraud
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The opaqueness of structured products is precisely the reason they are so
potentially dangerous. Structured products often include hidden or open conflicts of
interest whose potential impact may not be understood by their buyers. Because of their
opaqueness, structured products are also difficult to price, and neither buyer nor seller
may know if the price of a structured product is fair. Furthermore, the complexity of
structured products makes them an ideal tool for persons with fraudulent intent.
The secondary market provides some examples of how these products can also
abet conflicts of interest and potential fraud. The large banks own or control to a great
extent all the components of the structured products market: confirmations, valuations,
brokerage, and electronic trading. With so much control, the move to automate the
markets has been slowed significantly as banks have no desire to increase transparency
which can erode pricing power and margins.
On trading desks, banks who are the sole underwriter of a structured product may
even mis-price the tranches for their own benefit by using a theoretical, model-based
price rather than a market price because of low trading volume. There are also competing
proprietary models which may each determine a different price for the same financial
product, allowing banks easier ability to cover up fraud. An example was the case when
Bankers Trust was the only bank with an advanced derivative model at one time that
enabled employees there to mis-price their products to many customers before being sued
by P&G and Gibson Greetings.
Mark-to-market (MTM) is the price at which a trade can be executed, but without
readily available market data, banks can easily manipulate these prices. If a financial
product is overvalued and mis-priced, or if people learn that the model is wrong, it can
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experience a sudden and dramatic decline in value when the products underlying
collateral experiences a higher than expected default rate or a reduction in credit quality,
resulting in a declining rate of return for the financial product. A sudden decline in
market value for a financial product is also likely to result in a loss of the products
market liquidity. Dramatic declines in value and liquidity together can generate systemic
levels of market disruption.
Another conflict of interest lies in bank loans. Bank loans are an important and
significant component of the credit markets and provide financing for both individuals
and business enterprises. However, today banks can offload these credit risks by selling
loans to structured products or by buying credit default swaps (CDS) which act like
insurance contracts against defaulting credit products. As a result, their concerns about
the long-term credit worthiness of the loans they underwrite are limited. Instead, the
banks become more interested in the fees they can make from origination because if they
dont ultimately keep the loans in their portfolio, they have no other reason for
underwriting. Since banks are no longer responsible for the risk of the loans they
underwrite, the rapid disintermediation of credit risk between lender and creditor often
results in weakened underwriting practices such as looser covenants and insufficient due
diligence. Such self-interested and short horizon decisions can create the seeds for
systemic market risk.
A concrete example of such lending practices is sub-prime lending to individuals.
Sub-prime mortgage structured products, which provide financing for sub-prime
mortgages to individuals, have exploded over the past few years according to SEC
filings, increasing from $48 billion in 2000 to $464.9 billion in 2005. Sub-prime loans
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are, by definition, risky, and as their volume radically increases, there is potential for
significant increases in the risks borne by financial market participants.
Subprime lenders such as Fremont used the capital extended by the large banks
such as UBS or JP Morgan to underwrite. Once the subprime mortgages were
underwritten, the loans were packaged into structured products and sold to investors by
the large banks. The money collected from selling the structured products was then used
to repay the loans originally extended by the large banks. The large banks made huge
profits from putting the structured products deals together. While these structured
products were marketed to investors as relatively safe investments because they used
historical subprime default rates from good economic cycles to make predictions about
future default rates, the underwriting standards for the underlying subprime loans became
progressively worse. All kinds of new mortgage loans whose default rates could not be
accurately reflected or predicted by historical data such as Alt A loans which didnt
require proof of income or wealth were being underwritten and thrown into structured
products.
Greentree Financial provides an example of what can happen when sub-prime
lending increases rapidly. Greentrees primary business was financing manufactured
housing, a sub-prime market. After Greentrees acquisition by Conseco, the market for
manufactured housing loans suffered great losses, eventually resulting in Consecos
bankruptcy. Greentrees lending decisions were based upon a need for volume, to create
more loans that could result in gain-on-sale accounting for Conseco, as opposed to a
concern for the credit worthiness of the loans. When the manufactured housing loan
market subsequently suffered great losses, Greentrees gain-on-sale accounting was
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exposed as fictional, and both Greentree and investors in financial products created by
Greentree suffered large losses. The sub-prime loan market has similar incentives for
lenders to the manufactured loan market that brought down Greentree, but the sub-prime
lending market is much larger than the manufactured housing loan market ever was.
Such sheer volume involved in just this segment of the structured products market alone
could result in the potential for institutional failure leading to financial contagion.
Besides lax underwriting of the collateral that go into structured products, active
mis-pricing can also occur in deal terms of the structured products themselves. Since
these products are not standardized like other derivative products such as foreign
exchange contracts, structured products underwriters can discreetly create opaque
products. According to a senior manager at Tricadia, an institutional investor, UBS
allegedly marketed a deal called Buchanan, by intentionally mis-pricing it as a typical
credit-linked note, a type of standard structured product, as opposed to a customized
one. Unless investors read and understood the fine print regarding the definition of how
loss amounts were unusually allocated on page 7 of the memorandum, he believed that
the deal was potentially sold under false assumptions and misleading representations and
thus may have been mispriced by some investors.
Clearly, institutional investors have the fiduciary responsibility to read the
documents carefully, but when deals come at a rate on average of 2-3 a day, rarely do
portfolio managers ever spend the time to read through 200-page prospectuses before
investing in these deals. If enough institutional investors shirk their responsibilities,
there could be many more ticking time bombs in the pipeline as their risk management
could be based on false assumptions when these deals rapidly default and lose value
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without sufficient capital or liquidity to cushion these blows. These portfolio managers
are, in a sense, playing Russian roulette thinking there is only one bullet in the barrel as
opposed to five and praying that they made the correct bet.
Another concrete example of active mis-pricing of structured products occurred in
the portfolios of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Since both of these entities are exempt
from the 34 Act and therefore were not required to disclose their financials in offering
documentation, the management at these entities misapplied accounting rules for years to
the public in order to meet stock incentives. The limited disclosure required of these
entities made it difficult for analysts and investors to decipher their true financial state,
especially because of the sheer size of their portfolios which ran in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Small mistakes in hedging such large sums of money could have
enormous implications.
Another major related conflict of interest lies in the codependency between
dealers and structured products managers. It is an incestuous machine that feeds upon
itself, as structured product managers must buy deals from dealers, and the dealers can
only do deals if structured products managers buy from them. The structured products
must be warehoused at the dealer until the structured product vehicle has been filled with
collateral by the designated structured products manager. The collateral can be almost
anything, and increasingly has become synthetic in nature, meaning it doesnt reference a
real asset but rather a contract created by a bank, such as a credit default swap (CDS) or
even other structured products which could be managed by the same manager, creating
circular logic.
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The latter situation is called CDO squared because it is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO), which is one form of a structured product, with other CDO- issued
securities as collateral, but since each CDO-issued security can reference other CDO-
issued security as collateral, the number of CDOs embedded within one CDO-issued
security can be several layers deep. Due to the potential for significant overlap in these
CDOs, a CDO manager or investor may each think he has achieved diversification in the
underlying collateral when in fact, the opposite may be true. For example, multiple
CDOs may have GM loans as underlying collateral. A CDO squared may purchase
different CDOs thinking that it will achieve a diverse underlying portfolio when in fact,
the concentration risk for GM loans may be exponentially compounded. When it is
virtually impossible for an investor to figure out where the money is coming from, the
uncollectible debts underlying the structured products make these investments become
essentially worthless even though the banks who sold them have made a killing from
their sale.
The other circular logic occurs when one division of the bank sells a specific
credit derivative swap (CDS), a type of derivative that acts as insurance against the
reference credit instrument, and a different division of the bank buys it. For example, the
brokerage division of a bank could sell CDS on a CDO while the banks asset
management division that owns CDOs in its portfolio may buy that same CDS because
they manage separate profit and loss responsibilities and respect informational barriers,
meaning that the divisions are not supposed to communicate with each other to avoid
insider trading. In this case, the bank will have created insurance for itself, an absurd
situation, but it theoretically can happen.
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How Leverage In These Markets Can Create A Systemic Crisis
The high embedded leverage of structured products compounds the problem of
opaqueness. Leverage is a way to use borrowed money to amplify potential gains at the
risk of amplified losses, thus magnifying the credit risk for buyers of structured products.
A good example of financial leverage is an investment in an index mutual fund. If you
invest a dollar without leverage, and the fund declines by 10%, you then lose ten cents.
However, if you invest a dollar in the same mutual fund with 10 times leverage, and the
fund declines by 10%, then you lose the entire dollar. In the case of structured products,
many include leverage of 10 times or more, and 100 times is common. As a direct result,
the magnitude of an unexpected or poorly understood potential loss of structured products
can have far greater impacts to the financial system and the economy.
In a way, CDO squared structured products enable banks to create money
practically out of nothing because they are so synthetic in nature that the ultimate
underlying collateral is unknown. Each tranche incorporates leverage and each investor
is permitted leverage, sometimes as high as a hundred times, against CDO collateral to
buy more CDO tranches. Even small market movements or inaccurate estimates of
defaults can amplify losses quickly and trigger liquidity crises that could result in a
cascading avalanche that overwhelms our financial system.
Leverage by itself is not dangerous, but combined with conflicts of interest, it
becomes lethal. For instance, some banks pressure CDO managers to buy CDOs that the
bank couldnt sell from prior issuances or structure a CDO to provide insurance on the
banks own portfolio, thus increasing systemic risks because bad credits become more
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concentrated and leveraged while remaining hidden and marketed to unsuspecting CDO
investors.
This elite circle of buyers and sellers of structured products collateral is small
relative to other financial markets, perhaps a few hundred worldwide, although the dollar
amounts exceed those of the equity markets. As a result, if either party decides to exit the
market, the foundation for these arrangements, amounting to trillions of dollars, can
quickly unravel given the small community, destroying the house of cards. Up until
recently, the risk of one player leaving the party has been largely ignored because the
deals were far too lucrative, and defaulting collateral has not been an issue in a benign
economic environment. However, should investors shun these products or dealers get
nervous with the market outlook, the warehousing mechanism could halt at any time,
causing panic and a domino effect in trading that could lead to enormous losses for
banks, potentially evaporating their entire capital base in a very short time frame, leaving
little time for a solution to be implemented.
Moreover, from a liquidity and concentration perspective, structured products also
create systemic risks that are unlike other financial products due to their complexity and
leverage characteristics. While the institutions that traffic in these instruments tend to be
large financial firms such as commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies,
and hedge funds, it is not safe to assume that they have the systems sophisticated enough
to understand and manage all the risks associated with these products.
In fact, risk management of these products has lagged far behind the innovation of
these products. Although most of the major banks now have credit risk management
tools that are more robust than ever before which monitor credit risk at a federated level
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and explicitly manage/hedge credit risk and stress test for liquidity and dealer exits, the
growth in these markets and instruments has still outpaced the developments in risk
management, documentation, back office facilities, models, and risk management
safeguards. The quality of pricing data, data integrity, their dissemination, and the ability
to perform what if analysis all have lagged the growth of these products and strategies,
increasing systemic risk. Any risk management official at a bank will readily admit that
no perfect hedge exists for structured products. Risk management for tranched credit
portfolios in particular, is by far more difficult from a theoretical and practical
perspective than risk management for other products, and to this day, no general market
consensus has been established on how those risks should be measured. It is therefore
likely that these market participants did not transfer the risk they were supposed to
transfer or thought they transferred.
What To Do
The public has a right to be worried about these developments and demand
regulation in this unregulated market because if one or more of these large institutions
fail due to these products, the financial damage could be extensive not only to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but could have a ripple effect throughout our
economy similar to the aftermath of the S&L crisis or even the 1929 stock market crash.
Even Gerry Corrigan, the former New York Federal Reserve President and Vice
Chairman of Goldman Sachs, has called structured products financial instruments of
mass destruction.
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As everyone knows, the stock market crash of 1929, loose credit markets, and
flawed trade policy contributed to the Great Depression, an example of financial markets
failing to self-regulate, resulting in widespread economic consequences for every sector
of society. Today, excessive leverage and speculative trades in the structured products
market threaten to repeat history. The financial institutions collective desire to reap
enormous short-term profits conflict with societys collective need to maintain stable,
fair, and functioning global financial markets.
The New York Fed has begun to consider these issues by (a) pushing banks to
expedite trade confirmation and document and reduce mountain-like backlogs, (b) saying
it wants to measure individual and aggregate counterparty risk exposures, (c) trying to
estimate the domino effect to the financial system of a few counterparty failures, and (d)
attempting to coordinate such tracking/measurement efforts with foreign regulators,
namely the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK.
Through the Report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II
published in July 2005, private sector participants led by Gerald Corrigan, Vice Chairman
at Goldman Sachs and former New York Fed President, also acknowledged problems
with these new class of financial products and proposed solutions for addressing some of
the shortfalls. At the time the report was issued, tens or hundreds of thousands of credit
derivative transactions remained unsettled for weeks given that these transactions were
processed by hand. When the Fed and the media learned of this operational failure,
broker/dealers began hiring more operational employees to process the trades.
But these efforts fall woefully short of what is needed. The 200-page
Counterparty report acknowledged outstanding issues that needed fixing such as faster
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transaction processing, but focused on operational risk, not financial and credit risk.
Concern over operational risk is understandable since operational failure in the settlement
process for equity trades in the late 1960s became serious enough to produce systemic
risk. However, the counterparty report did not address all the problems, especially the
ones highlighted in this article.
In reality, meltdowns are much more likely to occur when banks and broker
dealers suffer tremendous losses, to the tune of billions of dollars, due to market
corrections after years of mis-pricing, as opposed to the timing of back office settlements.
Measuring domino effects/risks to the financial system from structured products,
for instance, often demands accurate and timely information different from what is
currently provided to the Fed. Currently, banks and broker dealers issue call reports
only on a monthly basis. Such information could not possibly help the Fed respond
rapidly to any crisis given that the risk profiles of banks and brokerage firms change by
the hour.
Our current regulatory system is ill-equipped to address the issues and concerns
posed by these new financial engineering innovations. It is too fragmented, and most
regulators do not have the appropriate skill set to understand and sniff out potential
problems generated by these instruments. While all financial institutions are linked
together through investment and trading in the same structured products, different
regulators oversee the different counterparties so that no one has complete authority over
this area. Banks, insurance companies, and investment banks all have different
regulators, but does it make sense for an insurance company and a bank that are
counterparties in the same structured products transaction to have different regulators?
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After Glass-Steagall was dismantled, these businesses now significantly overlap, making
our current regulatory structure particularly unwieldy, outdated, and ill-prepared to
address the problems these new financial innovations present.
Self-regulation by trade associations have also proven inefficient in setting
standards and ineffective in bringing more transparency to these markets. The
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an important trade association
that has offices worldwide, has difficulty persuading its members to accept a standardized
format for settlement after years of a product being traded. Standardized loan-only CDS
documentation, for example, took several years to develop with many prior trades done
on varying legal documentation. With multiple legal agreements being used for the same
product, the potential for loopholes, confusion, and disputes also increases, thus further
increasing the loss of investor confidence in the markets.
Regulation entails costs and benefits; the trick is finding the right balance so that
costs of unintended consequences such as stifling innovation do not overwhelm the
benefits. The role of a good democratic policy should be to protect basic human rights
and property. But presently, the government arguably is failing to adequately protect its
citizens by allowing financial institutions to undertake and engage in undue risk and
permit breeding grounds for fraudulent practices that could subvert our entire financial
marketplace. Although regulators have acknowledged the problems and risks posed by
structured products, not enough has been done to date and no comprehensive solution has
been proposed. Any solution must increase transparency for sellers, buyers and
regulators and impose limits to ensure that market participants do not assume more risk.
At the very least, the government should do the following:
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1. IMPOSE LIMITS ON LEVERAGE AND COUNTERPARTY RISK AND
IMPROVE DATA TRANSPARENCY AND REGULATORY FILINGS. Naturally, in
order to research the appropriate amount of leverage allowed in the financial system, the
Fed needs transparency into the leverage extended by banks and broker-dealers. When
the Fed announced in March 2006 that it will no longer report M3, the measure of money
supply that would include all such leverage, it essentially chose to ignore the high
existing levels of leverage. Measuring only M1 and M2 means the Fed is only counting
paper money, checking accounts, and savings accounts less than $100,000. All the
money outside of these parameters is not counted, which means the Fed is assuming that
at least half or more of the money supply outstanding does not exist or matter and is
operating monetary policy based on that belief.
At the very minimum, the Fed should restore reporting M3. But in order to
measure leverage in a meaningful way, it must also have visibility into where the risks
lie. As such, the Fed should also require all financial institutions to report, on a real time
basis, risk reports including leverage, rather than the monthly call reports that are
presently used but are of limited utility. The Fed should also require companies to report
their true value at risk (VAR), their solutions to it, their top 25 counterparty exposure, the
kind of products to which they have exposure, and transaction documentation for all
material transactions. Only with up-to-the minute information can the government
develop a rapid response system that could minimize damage if a systemic market failure
should occur.
2. REGULATORY AGENCY CONSOLIDATION. Enforcement is another
issue. Once limits have been determined and agreed upon, they must fall under the
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could be required to make a premium contribution to the bank insurance deposit fund.
Only by holding them responsible will our country have the best hope of aligning the
interests of banks and the public and prevent such speculative activities from growing out
of control.
4. INCORPORATE THESE STANDARDS INTO BASEL III. Work has already
begun on Basel III, following the second Basel Accord which represented
recommendations by bank representatives and central bankers from 13 countries to revise
international standards for measuring banks capital adequacy. Basel II was designed to
address the weaknesses in Basel I, and Basel III will further refine the definition of bank
capital, quantify further classes of risk, and improve sensitivity of risk measures. Now is
an ideal opportunity to enlist international support and coordination in developing
banking and brokerage standards so that regulatory arbitrage can be minimized. Foreign
regulators have just as much incentive to limit economic destruction of systemic risk. If
they know that the standards will be uniform in the international banking community,
they will find it more palatable to comply. If all countries agree to the same laws and
cooperate, no financial firm will have an incentive to move their business, and there will
be no race to the bottom by various countries.
Critics will likely claim that such regulation will only drive the structured
products business as well as all other OTC derivatives business to other jurisdictions
where regulatory burdens are not so heavy. They will claim the current U.S.
competitiveness in financial markets will be eroded while not reducing systemic risks.
They have used similar arguments as reasons to repeal Sarbanes-Oxley, because many
IPOs have moved offshore.
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Such arguments seem specious when a companys decision where to launch an
IPO involve other factors besides regulatory burdens. Offshore offerings may be at least
driven by increased capital availability in emerging markets and would happen even if
Sarbanes-Oxley was never implemented. More likely, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
rather than Sarbanes-Oxley is the reason why foreign companies have chosen to list on
other exchanges. These companies feared the political risk of dealing with capricious
U.S. lawmakers, not increased transparency.
Opponents of regulation of this market cite that there is lack of empirical evidence
of wrongdoing. They will also point out that there have now been several credit events
which while operationally intensive, did prove the sustainability of the market.
In most hypotheses, counter examples often exist, but that doesn't necessarily
negate the overall theory. Arguably, most things in life are difficult or impossible to
prove, but the evidence could be so consistent with the hypothesis that it would suggest a
causal relationship where a strong correlation exists. For instance, there was no direct
evidence that Salomon Brothers cornered the bond market, but the behavior was strongly
consistent in support of that conclusion. No one can directly point to greenhouse gases
as the cause for global warming, but enough evidence has convinced the majority of
scientists that it is conclusive. In the case of structured products, no banker will ever
admit that he or she was stuffing bad loans into these financial vehicles. Even with
complete data and all the time in the world, it would be a difficult study from which to
extract empirical data and still probably no one would do it. However, it is well
understood that underwriters always have inventory that they cannot sell. It is widely
accepted that there are clear financial incentives for these underwriters to place them with
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less sophisticated managers. The widespread subprime mortgage meltdown suggests
that the conflicts of interest are indeed pervasive.
Another anti-regulatory argument is that more regulation would disrupt markets
because of the increased legal liability exposure for investors, both real and perceived.
Traders in money losing transactions may simply not honor their trades if they believed
that the transactions would be deemed illegal under a new regulatory regime. With any
change in rules, disruption is expected to happen, but that alone is a poor reason not to
correct abuses. One solution could be to smooth the transition period by announcing a
future date that new rules would be effective which gives plenty of lead time for market
participants to adjust their strategies and positions without causing panic in the
marketplace. Perhaps the unintended effect may even result in stronger volume growth
and wider participation, since the global markets will be assured that our government is
not ignoring market developments and innovations.
Some business leaders have promoted the notion of principles-based rather than
rules-based governance as the best way to protect the integrity and competitiveness of
our markets. They argue essentially that it is better to avoid enacting laws and simply
trust corporate management to exert moral leadership. The Delphi credit event in which
the market was able to avoid a bond squeeze by agreeing to some principles that worked
well suggests a case of professionalism over regulation. However, this idea is convenient
for management, but may not be realistic in the long run. It is possible that not one but
multiple major defaults could happen simultaneously in the future in which orderly
professionalism may not succeed when much more capital is at stake. The Delphi
example in reality may be simply a close call because it happened during a benign
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economic environment and should be seen as a warning shot to regulators that a more
rigorous system should be put in place in the event several major defaults happen during
a weak economic backdrop. Without the requisite public constraints, corporate economic
corrupt activity, both legal and illegal misappropriation of wealth and income, can make
it difficult for our markets to survive the fallout.
Instead, a hybrid approach of principles and rules-based governance should be
adopted. Principles-based governance is needed so that participants cant evade the law,
and rules-based governance should be implemented simultaneously so that participants
have guidance for the principles. While the FSA uses more of a principles-based
approach, the British system differs from the U.S. in that it is harder to litigate there, and
it is easier for them to change laws since they dont have a system of checks and balances
similar to ours. An analogous situation would be taxes. Principles-based governance
would say that everyone who can afford to pay taxes should pay at least 20% in income
taxes. However, rules-based governance is required so that taxpayers would understand
what constituted income and understand how to interpret the law when uncertainties
arise. Principles-based governance works well only if everyone can agree on the
prohibited outcome so that methods are irrelevant. In some ways, existing laws such as
the 33 Act are short principles-based legislation, yet they are difficult, cumbersome, and
confusing to apply.
Defenders of the present system also complacently believe that no systemic risks
will result from any major market disruption in this area. Monetarists, popularized by
Milton Friedman, contend that something akin to the Great Depression can be avoided
simply by pumping more money into the system to avoid a liquidity crunch. Fed
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Chairman Ben Bernanke has stated that the Fed under his watch will have the keys to
the printing press, and we are not afraid to use them. The quote was used in the context
of his argument that monetarism will respond to zero interest rate conditions. However,
injecting money into the system does not necessarily create more capital for financial
institutions in crisis. Evidence from the Japanese stock market crash that doomed Japan
to a decade of recession despite monetary stimulus of zero interest rates may suggest that
aggressive monetary stimulus will not be enough. Worse, if the rest of the world knows
that the U.S. will simply print more money rather than correct abuses and structural
problems, confidence in the U.S. dollar and thus in the U.S. government will disappear,
causing even further economic damage. Not worth a continental referred to the
worthlessness of U.S. currency during the American Revolution because of government
overprinting; we do not need a 21st century repeat of that 18th century fiasco.
Since this is a complex problem, no solution will be free from criticism. In fact,
previous proposals such as those from CFTC Chairman Brooksley Born who advocated
increased regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were rejected and maligned
by financial circles and their Capital Hill supporters. Even the collapse of Long Term
Capital did not redeem her progressive calls for action, because the political power was
too beholden to private financial institutions unwilling to surrender their pecuniary
interest for safer, more stable markets.
Bottom line, self-regulation has not worked well. In a paper titled, Cautious
Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Self Regulation and Market Structure During the
First 70 Years of the Securities Exchange Commission, Joel Seligman, considered the
nations foremost expert on securities law, comments that self-regulation prompted the
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most serious failure in securities industry, a collapse of industry regulatory controls so
complete, it permitted, in the agencys retrospective view, the most prolonged and
severe crisis in the securities industry in forty years.
Our financial markets will always attract the foolish and the greedyeven the
fraudulent-- and no amount of regulation can completely eliminate fraud and reckless
behavior. But if we want to ensure financial market integrity and stability, then we
should consider the ethical obligations to move beyond a system of self-regulation.
While possibly no perfect solution exists, society should still seek to remedy what are
clear abuses to the system. Through public education and by taking steps to safeguard a
dynamic financial market through improved market transparency and balanced
regulation, we can prevent these problems from reaching systemic levels.