RegulatoryprocedureandparticipationintheEuropeanUnion.

StijnSmismans∗

(forthcominginFrancescaBignamiandDavidZaring(eds)(2016),TheElgarResearchHandbookonComparativeLawandRegulation,Cheltenham:Elgar.)

1. Introduction

Participationisatthecentreofdemocraticdecision-making.Inbothpoliticaltheoryandpubliclaw,

thepredominanceofrepresentativedemocracyasanormativeframeworkhasledtoafocusonthe

legislativeprocess,withthekeyactorsofpublicrulemakingbeingconceivedofaselected

representatives,ontheonehand,and‘neutralpublicofficials’,ontheother.Therealityofpublic

policy-making,however,isfarmorecomplex,involvingactorssuchasinterestgroups,civilsociety

organisations,firms,NGOs,andindividualcitizenslongbeforetheideaof‘networkedgovernance’

becameapopulartermintheliterature.Yet,ontheEuropeancontinentinparticular,publiclawyers

havepaidlittleattentiontosuchintermediaryactors.Astheirroleisnotsetoutinnational

constitutions,theyremainofftheradarofconstitutionallawyers.Atthesametime,scholarshipon

Europeanadministrativelawhasfocusedonindividualrightsvis-à-vistheadministrationratherthan

ongroupactioninthepolicyprocess(Harlow2006:120).Rareexceptionshavefocusedontheissue

ofinterestgrouplitigation,ratherthanonprocessesofinterestrepresentationorlobbyingin

rulemaking.1ThesamecanbesaidoftheliteratureoninterestgroupparticipationinEuropean

Unionpolicy-making:thereisanextensivepoliticalscienceliteratureonEUlobbying(Finke2007;

Eising2008)butlegalscholarshaveshownlittleinterestinthetopic,2exceptfortheissueoflocus

standiintheEuropeanCourtofJustice(Barnard1995;MicklitzandReich1996;DeSchutter2006).3

∗StijnSmismansisProfessorofEUlawatCardiffSchoolofLawandPoliticsandDirectorofthe

CentreforEuropeanLawandGovernance,theJeanMonnetCentreofExcellenceatCardiff

University.TheresearchleadingtotheseresultshasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanResearch

CouncilundertheEuropeanUnion'sSeventhFrameworkProgramme(FP/2007-2013)/ERCGrant

Agreementn.313642–LASI(‘Law,scienceandinterestsinEuropeanpolicy-making’).Iwouldliketo

thankDr.RachelMintoandDr.CarloPetrucciforresearchassistance.1ForanearlytreatmentofthetopicintheUnitedKingdom,see(HarlowandRawlings1992).2For‘early’exceptions,seeHarlow(1992)andVanGerven(1996).3AbroadercontextualanalysisofpublicinterestlitigationintheEUisprovidedbyCichowski(2007).

Thevirtualabsenceinlegalscholarshipofthetopicofinterestgroupparticipationinpolicy-making

canbeexplainedbytheneo-corporatisttraditionofinterestintermediationontheEuropean

continent.Whiletheinvolvementof(mainlylargesocio-occupational)interestgroupsinpolicy-

makingisinstitutionalised,particularlyviaadvisoryandbargainingstructures,itisnot

proceduralisedbygivingindividualsandgroupstherighttoparticipate,rightswhichcanbeenforced

incourtviajudicialreview.Hence,thetopicisconfinedtoindustrialrelationsstudies,ortolabour

lawstudies,inisolationfromconstitutionalandadministrativelaw.Thistraditioncontrastswiththe

Americanpluralisttraditioninwhichproceduralrights(participation,noticeandcomment,

transparency)andjudicialreviewarethoughttoensureasystemofinterestgroupcompetitionthat

playsacentralroleinasystemofchecksandbalancesanddemocraticandaccountablepublic

rulemaking.Asaresult,legalscholarshipintheUnitedStates,andadministrativelawscholarshipin

particular,4haspaidmoreattentiontointerestgroupparticipationinrulemakingthanitsEuropean

counterpart.

EveninEurope,however,thepressuresofmoderngovernanceareforcingthelegaldisciplineto

reflectmoresystematicallyonparticipationoutsideoftheparliamentaryprocess.Dissatisfaction

withrepresentativedemocracyhasledtocallsfornewgovernancearrangementsinwhich

participationisnotlimitedtotheballotbox.Ascitizenshavebecomemorevocalintheinformation

society,additionalformsofparticipationandtransparencyhavebecomekeyrequirementsof

moderngovernance.Thewideravailabilityofinformationhas,initsturn,triggeredrequestsfor

moreevidence-basedpublicdecision-making,whichrequiresfurtherreflectionontheappropriate

participatorymechanismsinpolicy-makingcharacterisedbyscientificuncertainty.Theseissuesare

particularlypertinentinthecontextofrulemakingbeyondthenationstate,asithasprovendifficult

tosimplycopytraditionalmodelsofdemocracyandinstitutionaldesign.

InthischapterIwillfocusonparticipationinEUrulemaking,whichIdefinetoincludelegislationand

delegatedlegislation.5Iwilldealwithlegislationanddelegatedlegislationtogether,andwillthus

4GoingbacktoearlyseminalworksuchasDavis(1969)andSunstein(1985).

5DelegatedlegislationintheEUhasforalongtimetakentheformoftheso-called‘comitology’

procedures.Comitologyistheprocessthroughwhichalegislativeact(mostcommonlyadoptedon

theinitiativeoftheEuropeanCommissionandbyco-decisionbytheEuropeanParliamentandthe

Council)empowerstheCommissiontoadoptfurtherregulatorymeasuresbutatthesametime

conditionsthisdelegationbyrequiringtheCommissiontointeractwitha‘comitologycommittee’,

composedofrepresentativesfromthenationaladministrations,thusallowingtheMembersStatesa

notlimitmyattentiontothelatterasonewouldtraditionallydointheUSwhentalkingabout

‘rulemaking’.Thisisforseveralreasons.Firstly,thetypeofactivityperformedviaEUdelegated

legislationdoesnoteasilyfitinto‘ourinheritedunderstandingsoflegislation,adjudicationandrule-

boundadministration’(EversonandJoerges2006:526)anditisoftendifficulttodrawaclearline

betweenEUlegislationanddelegatedlegislation(inparticularregardingthesubjectmattercovered

bytheacts).ThisrelatestothenatureofEUpolicy-making,whichismainlyregulatory,while

redistributivepoliciesremaintherealmoftheMemberStates.BothEUlegislationanddelegated

legislationthereforetendtoberathertechnicalinnature.Secondly,argumentsandpolicyinitiatives

tostrengthenparticipationintheEUhavemainlybeenmadeinrelationtolegislationratherthan

delegatedlegislation.ThisagainrelatestotheparticularnatureoftheEuropeanpolity.Despitethe

increasedroleoftheEuropeanParliament(EP)inEUlegislation,Europeanpolicy-makingstill

struggleswithalegitimacydeficit(mainlyduetothelackofaEuropeanpublicsphere),thus

increasingtheneedtoconsiderallpotentialsourcesof‘input-legitimacy’,suchasinterestgroup

participation,eveninrelationtolegislativeintervention.

ThischapterwillthusdealwithparticipationinallformsofEuropeanrulemakingleadingtobinding

rulesofageneralscope.NotwithstandingtheEU’slarge,andgrowing,numberofinstitutional

arrangementsandpolicyinstruments,lawmakinganddelegatedlawmakingspearheadedbythe

CommissionremainthemostimportantformsofgovernanceintheEU.Asaresult,giventhespace

constraints,thischapterwillfocusonparticipationinCommissiondecision-makingandwillnot

considerparticipationinotherformsofEUdecision-making(seeHofmanninthisvolume),suchas

thedecentralisednetworksofEuropeanAgencies(which,unlikeagenciesintheUS,haveamainly

knowledge-gatheringratherthanarule-makingrole)6orparticipationinsoft-lawbenchmarking

procedures,suchastheOpenMethodofCoordination.7Thechapterisalsolimitedtorulemakingat

theEUlevel,andwillnotcovertheEU’simpactonparticipationarrangementsatthenationallevel,

degreeofcontroloverthesupranationalCommission.ThesystemhasbeenrevisedbytheLisbon

Treaty,aswillbeexplainedinsection4.1.2below.6ForanoverviewoftheEuropeanagencydebate,seeRittbergerandWonka(2011)andBusuioc,

GroenleerandTrondal(2012).7 EUofficial documentshaveoften stressed thebenefits of broad civil societyparticipation in the

OpenMethodofCoordination(OMC),andsomescholarshaveheraldedtheOMCasanexampleof

participatoryexperimentalistgovernance. SeeGerstenbergandSabel (2002)andSabelandZeitlin

(2008).Othershavequestionedthebottom-upparticipatorycredentialsoftheOMCandnewmodes

ofgovernancemoregenerally.SeeSmismans(2008).

suchasviatheAarhusConvention.8Finally,Iwilldealwiththeroleofinterestgroupsaspolicy

advocatesinrulemaking,notwiththeirroleasserviceprovidersinpolicyimplementationnorwith

theself-regulatoryschemesdevelopedandadministeredbydifferentsocio-economicgroups.

Thechapterisstructuredasfollows.Insection2,IanalysehowtheEuropeanneo-corporatist

traditioninfluencedtheEEC/EU’sinitialapproachtointerestgroupparticipationinpolicy-making.

Theseformalinstitutionalarrangements,however,werequicklyparalleledbyamoreinformal

pluralistpracticeasaconsequenceofthemultipleaccesspointsthatcharacteriseEUpolicy-making

aswellasthedispersedcharacteroftheinterestgroupfieldattheEUlevel.Thispluralistpracticeis

notproceduralisedanddoesnotprovideforparticipatoryrightsandjudicialreviewasis

characteristicofpluralistinstitutionaldesignintheU.S..Insection3,IexaminehowtheEU,since

themid-1990s,hasstartedtoaddresstheissueofinterestgroupparticipationmoreexplicitly,asa

resultofbotha(perceived)needtoincreasethelegitimacyofitspolicy-makingandtheneedto

provideaninstitutionalresponsetotheincreasingpluralisationofinterestgroups.TheEU’sanswer

hasbeentoresorttotheconceptofcivilsociety,andtoprovidefor‘pluralisationwithout

proceduralisation’,whichhasfocusedmuchmoreonthelegislativeprocessratherthanon

delegatedlegislation.Inthelastsection,Ifocusonthreemajordebatesthathavecharacterisedthe

EUoverthelastdecadeandwhichhave(theoretically)thepotentialtomoveEUinterest

representationmoreinthedirectionoftheAmericanpluralistmodel:thechangesintroducedby

theLisbonTreaty(andinparticularitsnewsystemofdelegatedlegislation);thebetterregulation

debate;andtheEuropeanTransparencyInitiative.Nevertheless,Iconcludethatalthoughthe

‘traditional’neo-corporatistdesignisevermoreunderthreat,theEU’sapproachremainsoneof

‘pluralisationwithoutproceduralisation’(onewhichisgraduallybeingextendedtodelegated

legislation)andjudicialreviewinitiatedbyinterestgroupscontinuestobeviewedasafairly

marginaldeviceforensuringbalancedrepresentationinpolicy-making.

2. TheEUbetweenEuropeanneo-corporatistinspirationandinformalpluralistpractice

2.1.TheEuropeanneo-corporatisttradition

8TheUNAahrusConventionhasbeentranslatedbytheEUintwoDirectivesandoneRegulation

dealingrespectivelywithnationalandEuropeanlevelparticipationandtransparencyin

environmentalmatters,seehttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm.

Thesystemofinterestgroupparticipationinpolicy-makinginWesternEuropeancountrieshasa

longneo-corporatisttradition.Neo-corporatismhasbeendescribedbypoliticalscientists(Schmitter

andLehmbruch1979;LehmbruchandSchmitter1982;Cawson1986;Williamson1989)asasystemof

interestintermediationinwhichalimitednumberofratherencompassingsocio-occupational

organisations(particularlytradeunionsandemployerorganisations)obtainaprivilegedrolein

policy-making.Tripartitenegotiation(betweengovernment,tradeunionsandemployer

organisations)characterisescentralgovernmentpolicies,whiletradeunionsandemployer

organisationsoftendealwithmorespecificsocio-occupationalissuesinanautonomous,self-

regulatorywayviabipartitebargaining.Themodeldependsontheexistenceofstrongtradeunions

andemployerorganisations,whicharerepresentativeoftheirsectorsandwhichareinapositionto

ensuretheacceptanceofnegotiatedcentralbargainsbytheirmembers.Itequallydependsona

relativebalanceofpowerbetweentradeunionsandemployerorganisations.Toensurethistypeof

balancedsystemofstrongorganisations,thestatetakesonanactiverole,bothsupportingthese

organisationsandcreatinganinstitutionalframeworktoinvolvethemindecision-making.Withthe

exceptionoftherighttostrike,however,thesystemisbasedonabalanceofcountervailing

bargainingpowersratherthanonasetofdetailedparticipationrightssubjecttojudicialreview.

Neo-corporatismdevelopedpost-WorldWarIIandgoeshandinhandwiththedevelopmentofthe

welfarestateandcentralpolicyinterventionfocusedonsocio-economicaswellasindustrialpolicy.

TheEuropeanneo-corporatisttraditionhasoftenbeendefinedincontrasttotheAmericanpluralist

tradition(Wagnerinthisvolume).Asearlyasthe1950s,authorssuchasTruman(1951)andDahl

(1956and1961)describedtheAmericanpolityasaprocessinwhichinterestgroupsstrugglefor

influence.Characteristicoftheirpluralistmodelisthedivisionofpowerbetweendifferentpower

centres,creatingmultiplepointsofaccessforalargenumberofinterestgroups.Thestatetendsto

beplacedinapassiverole,registeringthedemandsofgroupinterests.9ThoughtheearlyAmerican

pluralistssuchasTrumanandDahlcalledthemselves‘empiricaldemocratictheorists’(Held1996:

199),10theytendedtolegitimateorevenglorify(Hyman1978:18;Nino1996:82)thesystemof

9‘Governmentis[…]thetargetforgroupactivity,andthearbiterofgroupdemands,butitsroleis

responsive.Governmentsdonotcreateorfashioninterests…’,Cawson(1986:47).10 Their stated aimwas to highlight how classic democratic ideals and theoretical conceptions of

representative government failed to capture the way in which politics really worked (Held 1996:

199).

groupcompetitionasthebestwaytocometoademocraticequilibriuminsociety.11Theirmodelhas

alsobeencalled‘interestgroupliberalism’sincethedemocraticequilibriumissupposedtobethe

outcomeofanunregulatedprocess.Stateinterventionisminimalandindividualsareconceivedas

utilitariansatisfaction-maximisers(CohenandRogers1995:13).Contrarytoutilitariantheorists,

however,pluralistscontendthatthebestwaytomaximisesatisfactionisforindividualstoorganise

intogroupstopressuregovernmentonissuesofconcerntothem.Ifpeoplefailtoorganiseandto

participateinpoliticstheycanbeassumedtobesatisfiedwiththepolicyoutput.Itisalsoargued

thatbecauseofthemultipleaccesspointstogovernmentandthetendencyforindividualstohave

overlappingmembershipsindifferentorganisations,nogroupcanbecomedominantoverothers.

Consequently,the‘generalinterest’isbuttheautomaticoutcomeofinterestgroupcompetition.12

The normative assumptions of this model of ‘interest group liberalism’ have been seriously

challenged,mostnotablyintheworkofMancurOlson(1965),13whichmadeclearthatunregulated

group competition couldnot lead toanautomaticdemocratic equilibrium, given the inequalityof

resources of interest groups. The response, in public law, was to proceduralise processes of

representation and bargaining, to ensure that all interests would have an equal chance of being

heard and influencing outcomes.14 The history of American constitutional and administrative law,

andespeciallyofjudge-madepubliclaw,ischaracterisedbythisattempttoensureequalaccessto

policy-making by building on the principles of transparency and ‘due process’ (Shapiro 1988: 36;

Stewart1975;Sunstein1985;Craig1990:56).Bothlegislaturesandbureaucratsarerequiredtotake

intoaccountthevarietyofconcerned interests inpolicy-making ,andaresubjecttoreviewbythe

judiciary for compliance with these requirements, though with considerably more rigour for

11 It should, however, also be noted that in certain cases later ‘neo-corporatist authors’ straw

mannedthepluralistmodel,makingiteasiertocriticize(NedelmannandMeier1979:94).

12 The only value transcending the private interests of groups is an assumed ‘community of

purpose’―, a consensus about the rules of the game, i.e. everybody accepts that interest-group

competitiongeneratesthe‘generalinterest’(Lowi1969:294).13 Olson (1965) pointed to problems such as ‘free-riding’: a common interest shared by a large

aggregate of individuals will have difficulties influencing policy-making because people do not

organisewhen they think they profit from the action of others. Conversely, interests shared by a

smallgroupwillstronglyinfluencegovernmentbecauseofthegreaterincentivestoorganise.

14CohenandRogers(1995:28)thereforetalkabout‘egalitarianpluralism’.

administrative than legislative decision-making (see Sunstein 1985: 65).15 With respect to

administrativerule-making,theAdministrativeProcedureAct(APA)requiresanoticeandcomment

procedurewhichobligesanagencytogivenoticethatitiscontemplatingarule,receivecomments

from interestedoutsiders,print its final rule in theFederalRegisterandaccompany thepublished

rulewitha conciseandgeneral statementof itsbasis andpurpose (Wagner this volume). For the

adjudicative decisions of agencies, the APA provides for trial-like procedures.16 Theway in which

administrative law has intervened to ensure due process for individuals and groups is at once a

departure and a continuationof the initial pluralist ideaof interest group liberalism. On theone

hand, itrequireslegal interventiontoensure‘fair’ interestgroupcompetition. Ontheotherhand,

thefocusisoncreatingformalequalityinthelegalopportunitytoparticipate,leadingpotentiallyto

animbalancebetweenthosewithenoughresourcestousethelegalchannels(repeatedly)andthose

withoutsuchresources (Wagner thisvolume). With itsemphasison formalequality , themodel

stays loyal to its original underpinnings (and contrasts sharply with the neo-corporatist starting

point), namely that the state should not actively intervene to facilitate the organization of civil

societyortocreaterepresentativesettings,asinterestgroupcompetitionwillensuretheemergence

ofthepublicinterestinasystemofchecksandbalances.17AsBignami(2011)argues,thisdifference

between the American pluralist model and the European neo-corporatist model links to broader

political cultural differences in how the relation between the state and society is conceptualised,

withtheEuropeantraditionmoreopentowardsState interventiontoensurethepublicgood,and

theAmericanonemoreinclinedtorelyoncompetitiveprocesses.18

15Theunderlyingideaisthatinreviewinglegislativeaction,especiallywhentherelevantquestions

concernthemotivationsforsuchaction,courtsoughttogivelegislatorseverybenefitofthedoubt.16Onthepro-activeroleofthejudiciaryinformulatingevermoredemandingrequirementsforequal

accesstoprocessesofadministrativeadjudicationandrule-making,andevenlegislation,seeShapiro

(1988), Sunstein (1985) and Stewart (1975). This tendency reached its apogee in the early 1980s

when disillusionmentwith the ‘almost frantic pursuit ofmore andmore perfect pluralism’ set in

(Shapiro1988:49).17TheU.S.hasexperimentedwithmoreconsensualformsofinterestconsultation,forinstance,the

committeesestablishedpursuanttotheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct,andnegotiatedregulation,

buttheyhaveremainedatthemarginsofasystemthatismainlybasedoninterestcompetitionvia

thenoticeandcommentprocess(seeWagnerthisvolume).18Thisisalsorelatedtodifferencesinlegalculture,withtheAmericanlegalsystemrelyingmoreon

‘adversiallegalism’andtheEuropeanoneplacingmoretrustinbureaucraticdecision-making(Kagan

2007).

TheEuropeanneo-corporatistalternativetopluralismhasbeenindeclinesincethe1980sfor

multiplereasons.Duetothepluralisationofsocietyandthelabourmarket,peopleidentifywitha

widervarietyoffunctionalgroupsandnotnecessarilywithbigencompassingorganisationsof

managementandlabour.Atthesametime,governmentinterventiontodayextendstoawidearray

ofnewregulatoryareas(environment,consumer,publichealth,research&innovation,andsoon),

inwhichmanagementandlabourarenotnecessarilythebestinformedinterestgroupsorthose

withthehigheststakes.Bythesametoken,thoseareasofsocio-economicgovernancesuchas

industrialpolicyandlabourmarketprotection,and,morerecently,welfarepolicy,whichdirectly

implicateneo-corporatismhavebeenpushedbackbyneo-liberalismandglobalization,trendswhich

havealsounderminedakeycomponentofthemodel,namelytheorganisationalcapacityoflabour.

Thatbeingsaid,moredecentralised,multi-level,andslimmed-downversionsofneo-corporatism

continuetooperateinseveralEuropeancountries,19oftenallowingformoreegalitarianpolicy-

outcomeslesspronetochangesintheeconomicgrowthcycle.20Whiletradeunionshavenowhere

neartheorganisationalcapacitytheyhadinthepast,theneo-corporatistlegacycontinuestoshape

inimportantwaysstate-societyrelationsandinstitutionalapproachestointerestintermediation.

2.2. The impact of the neo-corporatist tradition on the EU: institutionalisation without

proceduralisation

Movingfromthenational leveltotheEU,theEuropeanneo-corporatist legacyhasalso influenced

thewayinwhichinterestgroupparticipationisorganisedwithinEUpolicy-making.Atthecreationof

the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 it was considered indispensable to involve the

socialpartnersinthenewsupranationalorganisation,giventheircentralroleatthenationallevelin

19Updatesontheneo-corporatistmodelcanbefoundbothintheliteratureoncomparative

industrialrelations(e.g.Crouch(1993)andEuropeanFoundationforLivingandWorkingConditions

(2013))andinthevarietiesofcapitalismliterature,inwhichtherelationshipbetweeninterest

groupsandthestateconstitutesoneofseveraldimensionsofpoliticaleconomythattogetherresult

indifferentmodelsofcapitalismormodelsofwelfarestates,e.g.Esping-Andersen(1990)and

EbbinghausandManow(2001).20Whiletheeconomiccrisisthatstartedin2008hasacceleratedthetrendtowardsdecentralisation

ofindustrialrelations,thosecountrieswiththemostdevelopedindustrialrelationssystemshave

beenabletocushiontheireconomiesbetterfromthenegativeimpactsofthecrisis(Hyman2010;

Glassner,KeuneandMarginson2011).

thisarea.Consequently,theHighAuthority,thepredecessoroftheEuropeanCommission,included

persons close to or emanating from the trade unionmovement (European Trade Union Institute

1990:44).Inaddition,toassisttheHighAuthority,aseparateConsultativeCommitteewascreated,

composedofrepresentativesofproducers,workers,consumersandtraders.21

AsimilarapproachwassubsequentlyfollowedfortheEuropeanEconomicCommunityatitscreation

in1957. All foundingMemberStates,exceptGermany,22hadeconomicandsocial councilsat the

national level and favoured the creation of such a council at the European level. The European

Economic and Social Committee (EESC), composed of representatives from national socio-

occupational organisations (trade unions, employer organisations and professional associations),

wassetupwithanadvisoryfunctionsimilartothatoftheEuropeanParliamentaryAssembly. The

creation of the EESC should be placed within the context of the sector-by-sector approach to

European integration (Lodge and Herman 1980: 267). The ‘Monnetmethod’ (Featherstone 1994:

155;Wallace1996:42)wasbasedon the involvementofkeyeconomicelites, includingorganised

labour,ineachoftheparticularsectorstargetedforintegrationonthetheorythattheywouldbuild

transnationalcoalitions insupportofEuropeanpolicies(Wallace1993:300). ThefirstCommission

(and the High Authority in the ECSC) did not bring proposals to the Council without having first

obtainedtheagreementofinterestgroupsattheEuropeanlevel(McLaughlin1985:164),anditwas

inparticularhroughtheEESCthattheseinterestgroupswererepresented.23Ithasevenbeenargued

thattheagreementreachedamongthesocio-economicinterestsintheEESCcarriedgreaterweight

than the opinion of the Assembly, since, during the initial period, it was composed of leading

personalitiesfromwell-establishedsocio-economicorganisations,whereastheAssemblywasstilla

non-directlyelectedbody(Corbey1996:346).

21OnthecreationandthefirstyearsofthisCommittee,seeMechi(2000).22Germany’sreluctancewasduetoitsexperiencewithcorporatistinstitutionsunderFascism.For

purposesof thediscussion inthischapter,however, it is importanttokeep inmindthedifference

between‘authoritariancorporatism’(throughwhichauthoritarianregimeswerelinkedtoeconomic

elites, while at the same time fake trade unions were used to control labor) and ‘societal’ and

‘liberal’corporatism,whichdevelopedlater(hence‘neo-corporatism’)and inwhichtradeunions

andemployerorganisationsoperatedas freeorganisationsandwereguaranteedautonomy from

thestate(Schmitter1979).

23OntheattitudeofthefirstCommissionpresident,WalterHallstein,seeLodgeandHerman(1980:

269).

However,astheEEC,andthenEU,engagedinincreasinglymorepolicyareas,theEESClostmuchof

itsappeal(Smismans2000).Firstofall,beingcomposedofrepresentativesfromnationalsocio-

occupationalorganisations,itcouldnotprovideaforumfortraditionaltripartitecorporatist

bargainingbetweenkeyrepresentativesofbroad,encompassingorganisationscapableof

committingtheirorganisations.Moreover,astheEUbecameinvolvedinmoreregulatoryfields,the

socio-economicfocusoftheEESCpreventeditfromrepresentingthediversityofinterestsand

expertiseimplicatedbytheexpandingagenda.Henceinterestgroupsincreasinglylobbieddirectly

theEuropeanCommission,CouncilandEuropeanParliament(inthecaseofthelatter,asitspowers

begantoincrease)andestablishedofficesinBrusselswhichcouldserveasabasefortheselobbying

efforts.Manypoliticalscientistshavethereforedescribedthesystemofinterestintermediationin

theEUaspluralist.Thispluralistsystemisdefinedbytwoprincipalcharacteristics:(1)itinvolvesa

diverseandlargesetofinterestgroups(Europeanandnationalassociations,aswellasindividual

firmsandconsultancies)ratherthanalimitednumberofencompassingandrepresentative

associations;(2)thepolicy-makingprocesscontainsmanypointsofaccess,boththroughthe

multipleinstitutionalplayersattheEuropeanlevelandthroughthenationalpoliticsoftheMember

States(StreeckandSchmitter1991;Schmidt1997).

Notwithstandingthesedevelopments,itisimportanttoappreciatethecontinuinginfluenceofthe

neo-corporatistunderpinningsoftheEU’ssystemofinterestintermediation.First,inthefieldof

Europeansocialpolicy,sincethemid1980stheEUhasdevelopedtheEuropeansocialdialogue

procedure,whichcopiestheneo-corporatistmodelofsomeofitsMemberStates.TheEuropean

CommissionisobligedtoconsulttheEurope-widefederationsofnationaltradeunionsandemployer

organisationsonallofitslegislativeproposalsinthearea;thesefederationscandecidetotakeon

theissuethemselvesthroughbipartitenegotiation(collectiveagreements),sidesteppingthe

CommissionandtheotherEUinstitutions,andtheircollectiveagreementscanbegivenlegal,

bindingforce.Althoughthescopeofthesocialdialogueislimitedtothefieldofsocialpolicy,andits

resultshavebeenmodest,24itfollowsatraditional,neo-corporatistdesign.

Second,andmoreimportantforthisanalysis,whilefromtheperspectiveofpoliticalsciencethe

pluralistlabelmaybettercaptureinformallobbyingpracticesintheEU,thecharacterizationisless

aptfromalegalperspectivefocusedoninstitutionaldesignanditsimpactoninterestgroup

participation.Asdiscussedearlier,intheU.S,theproceduralguaranteesofadministrativelawhave

beenshapedbythepluralistideathatfreeinterestgroupcompetitionplaysacentralroleinthe

24ForanoverviewoftheEuropeansocialdialogue,andtheEU’sroleinindustrialrelationsmore

broadly,seeSmismans(2012).

definitionofthepublicgoodandinthecontrolofgovernmentpowerinasystemofchecksand

balances.Transparency,accesstodocuments,andnotice-and-commentprocedureallowall

stakeholders(oratleastthosewithenoughresourcestoorganiseeffectively)toparticipateinrule-

making,withaccesstojudicialreviewasanoversightmechanism.Thissystemofpluralist

proceduralisationisforeigntotheEU.Instead,theinstitutionalisationofinterestgroupparticipation

intheEUdisplaysmoreneo-corporatistfeatures.

Akeyelementofthisneo-corporatistdesignistheinstitutionofadvisorycommittees.Advisory

committeeshaveexistedsincethecreationoftheEECandhavemultipliedovertime.Theyare

generallyspecifictoapolicyfieldorpolicyproblemandcanprovidetheEUinstitutions,andthe

EuropeanCommissioninparticular,withfarmorein-depthexpertiseandrepresentativepositions

thanthe‘generalist’EESC.Theseadvisorycommitteesorexpertgroups25canbecomposedof

‘independent’scientificexperts,ofrepresentativesfromnationaladministrations,ofinterestgroups,

oracombinationofthethree.26TheEuropeanRegisterofExpertGroupstodaylists832expert

groups,27503ofwhichincluderepresentativesofinterestgroups,and142ofwhichareexclusively

composedofsuchgroups.Advisorycommitteescanbesetupformally,i.e.byaCommission

decision,butmoreoftentheyarecreatedinformallybyaCommissionunit.Somecommitteeshave

aroleinthedraftingoflegislationand/ordelegatedlegislation,whileotherareinvolvedinpolicy

implementation.Somearepermanent,whileothersare‘adhoc’createdforasinglepolicyinitiative.

Exceptforsomecaseswherethecreationofsuchacommitteeisrequiredbylegislation,the

establishmentaswellasthecompositionofsuchcommitteesisatthediscretionoftheCommission.

Toconstituteacommittee,theCommissionDirectorateGeneral(DG)intherelevantpolicyareamay

usea‘public’callforexpertsonitswebsitebutmayalsosimplyrelyonitsexistinginformalnetworks

oraskMemberStatestoproposeexperts.Equally,itisentirelywithinthediscretionofthe

CommissionDGwhetheritwilltakeintoaccounttheopinionofsuchacommittee.

Foralongtime,thesecommitteeshavefunctionedcompletelyoutsideofpublicview.Therewasno

transparencyontheexactnumberofcommitteesortheircomposition.Today,theCommission’s

onlineRegisterofExpertGroupsaimsatprovidinganoverviewofalladvisorycommittees,aswellas

25TheCommissiontraditionallycalledthem‘advisorycommittees’,buthasmorerecentlyshiftedto

theterm‘expertgroups’.Inthisdiscussion,Iusethetwotermsinterchangeably.26Foranoverviewofthetypesofexpertcommitteesandtheirfunctioning,seeLarssonandMurk

(2007:94)..27Pleasesee,http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm,lastaccessedon16/08/14.

theircomposition.28However,theCommissiondoesnotpublishgeneralcallstofillpositionson

advisorycommitteesanddoesnotinvitecommentontheproposals.Neitherareopinionsofexpert

groupssystematicallypublished.Thissystemofinterestintermediation,therefore,operatesvery

differentlyfromtheproceduralisedAmericansystemandappearstobeinspiredmorebythe

Europeanneo-corporatisttradition.WhileEUadministrationhasamplediscretionarypowers,itis,

atleastintheory,tobeguidedbytheobjectiveofinvolvingthekey(preferablyrepresentative)

actorsinthefield.Theseactorsarebroughttogetherinacommitteeandareexpectedtodiscussor

negotiateinordertoproduceacommonposition.Whilethecriteriaforselectingcommittee

membersarerarelymadeexplicit,advisorycommitteesaregenerallyconstitutedwiththeambition

ofgeneratingarepresentative‘Europeanview’,andtothatendoftenincluderepresentativesfrom

allMemberStates(eitherfromnationaladministrationsorinterestgroups)orfromEurope-wide

associations(whichtendtobeconfederationsofnationalinterestgroups).Inmanycases,the

CommissionhasalsoprivilegedsuchEuropeanorganisationswheninformallysoundingoutthe

publicandgatheringinformationonpolicyinitiatives.Moreover,ithascreatedseveralfunding

programmesandbudgetlinestosupportthecreationanddevelopmentofEurope-wideassociations

(MahoneyandBeckstrand2011),inparticularthoserepresentingnon-profit,‘weaker’(e.g.trade

unions)or‘publicinterest’(e.g.environmental,consumer,socialinclusion…)sectors.Thisactive

supportforcivilsocietyorganisationsevenextendstofinancialassistanceforsuchorganisationsat

thenationallevelincountrieswhereintermediateorganisationsarepoorlyestablished,particularly

inCentralandEasternEuropeaftercommunism,onthetheorythatweaknationalorganisations

underminetherepresentativenessofconfederalassociationsattheEuropeanlevel(Pérez-Solórzano

BorragánandSmismans2012).

Takentogether,theEU’ssystemofinterestintermediationcanbeconceptualizedas‘neo-

corporatistininspirationcombinedwithinformalpluralistpractice’.Theuseofadvisorycommittees

thataimatsomelevelofrepresentativenessanddeliberateornegotiatecommonpositions,aswell

asactivefinancialsupportforthedevelopmentofcivilsocietyorganisationsbearwitnesstotheneo-

corporatistlegacy.Atthesametime,EUinstitutionshavenotclosedtheirdoorstoinformal

lobbying,whichis‘pluralist’bothintermsofthediversityoftheinterestgroupsinvolvedandthe

numberofaccesspoints.Althoughthissystemisinstitutionalised,itdoesnotfollowthe

proceduralised,pluralisttemplateofU.S.law:itisnottransparent,itlacksparticipationrights,and

itlimitsjudicialreviewoftheprocessofrule-making.Withrespecttolegislativeaction,whetherand

28TherearenodataavailableonwhethertheRegisterisinrealityexhaustive,giventheinformalityofsomeoftheadvisorycommittees.However,publicationoftheexistenceofacommitteehasbecomethenormtheCommissionintendstofollow.Informationonthecompositionrelatestotheorganizationsrepresentedratherthantotheindividualscomposingthecommittee.

howtouseadvisorycommitteesliesentirelywithinthediscretionoftheCommissionandother

institutionalactors.Withrespecttodelegatedlegislation,thereisthepossibilityofobtainingjudicial

reviewoftheprocessinthosecasesinwhichthelegislationdelegatingregulatorypowerrequires

theCommissiontoconsultanadvisorycommittee(orinteractwithaso-called‘comitology

committee’composedofrepresentativesfromnationaladministrations).IftheCommissionfailsto

engageinconsultation,itcanbetakentocourt,butthistypeofexplicitconsultationrequirementis

theexceptionratherthantheruleand,inanyevent,neithertheadvisorycommitteenorany

interestgroup(representedornotonthecommittee)wouldhavetherighttocontestafinallegal

actbecauseofafailuretotakeintoaccounttheiropinion.

Itisbeyondthescopeofthisanalysistodrawanycomparativeconclusionsonwhetherthis

Europeansystemof‘neo-corporatistinspirationwithinformalpluralistpractice’wouldscorebetter

orworseintermsof‘fairness’thantheAmericanproceduralisedpluralistmodel.Insomeofthe

morerecentliterature,thissystemhasbeensaidtogeneratepolicy-learning(KnoepfelandKissling-

Näf1998),orevenconstituteaformofdeliberativedemocracy(Habermas1996;Elster1998;

BohmanandRehg1997;Dryzek2000)atleasttotheextentthat‘interests’arenotsetinstoneand

thepositionsofcommitteemembersareconstitutedthroughdeliberation.Thelink,however,

betweentherealityofcommitteegovernanceandtheoriesofdeliberativedemocracyisproblematic

sincethecurrentprocessisopaqueanddoesnotappeartobelinkedtodeliberationinthewider

publicsphere.Whilethislackoftransparencymaynothavebeenobjectionableintraditionalneo-

corporatism,sinceofficialsfrombroadlyrepresentativesocialpartnerorganisationsultimatelyhad

todefendtheoutcomesofcommitteebargainingtotheirmemberships,thedifficultyofestablishing

suchorganisationstoday,especiallyattheEuropeanlevel,makesitmoresuspect.Thus,even

thoughadvisorycommitteeshavethepotentialtoprovideaforumfordeliberationamong

representativeorganizationsandeventhoughtheCommissionhasmadeanefforttobolsterthe

organizationalcapacityofcertaindiffuseinterests,thereisalsoevidenceofcasesinwhichadvisory

committeesdonotoffera‘fair’representationofinterests.

Oneindicationofthisrepresentationalimbalancecanbefoundintheresultsofaninquiryledby

ALTER-EU(AllianceforLobbyingTransparencyandEthicsRegulationintheEU),29anassociationof

about200civilsocietyorganisations,tradeunions,academicsandpublicaffairsfirms.ALTER-EU

arguesthatroughly100ofthe832orsoexpertgroupsinexistencetodayaredominatedbylarge

corporations,especiallyinkeypolicyareassuchastheInternalMarket,Agriculture,andEnterprise

29Pleasesee,www.alter-eu.org,lastaccessedon16/01/14:

andIndustry.30Oneoftheculpritsofthisoutcomeistheabsenceofclearruleson‘conflictof

interests’,whichenablesindividualsworkinginorforprivatecompaniestoregularlyregisteras

individualindependentexpertsratherthanasrepresentativesofaninterestgroupwhentheyserve

onexpertcommittees.Insum,itisunlikelythatthesystemof(neo-corporatist)EUexpert

committeescanfullycompensatefortheimbalancesoffreeinterestcompetitionin(pluralist)EU

lobbying.WhethertheAmericanproceduralisedsystem,withformal,equalparticipationrightsand

extensivejudicialreview,butsignificantinformalinequalities,wouldscoreanybetterintermsof

fairnessisanotherquestion(Wagnerinthisvolume).

3. ReconcilingEuropeantraditionwithfurtherpluralisation?‘Pluralisationwithout

proceduralisation’

3.1. Transparency:‘pluralisationwithoutproceduralisation’(thepluralistway)

Despitetheproliferationofbothinformallobbyingandadvisorycommittees,theEUdidnotadopta

horizontalapproachtointerestgroupregulationuntiltheearly1990s.Thesystemremainedopaque

andadhoc,withnocoordinatedpracticesinthedifferentDirectoratesGeneraloftheCommission.

WiththeMaastrichtTreaty,however,whichextendedtheEU’scompetencesconsiderablyandwas

expectedtogenerateacommensurateproliferationofEUinterestgroupactivity,theCommission

waspromptedtodevelopamorecomprehensivepolicyonhowitwouldinteractwiththepublic.It

didsoin1992,intworelatedcommunicationsadoptedonthesameday.31Thefirstcommunication

promisedthattheCommissionwouldimproveitseffortstomakepolicyproposalspubliclyavailable

inanexplicitattempttoinvitecontributionsfrominterestgroups.Thesecondcommunication

addressedmoredirectlytheissueofinterestgroupparticipation.TheCommissionannouncedthat

itwouldcreateaSingleDirectoryoftheinterestgroupswithcontactswiththeCommission,which

wouldsupplementtheexisting,uncoordinatedsystemofseparatelistsineachDirectorateGeneral

(DG)andwouldstreamlinetheprocessofinteractingwithinterestgroups.Italsointendedtotackle

problematiclobbyingpracticesbyinvitinginterestgroupstosignavoluntarycodeofconduct.

Thenormativeinspirationoftheapproachputforwardinthe1992communicationswaspluralist.

TheCommissionexplicitlypraisedtheaddedvalueofinterestgroupactivityasprovidingthe

30ALTER-EU,Statementonthenewframeworkonexperts,10January2010.31Commission,“AnopenandstructureddialoguebetweentheCommissionandspecialinterests

groups”[1993]OJC63/02,andCommission,“Increasedtransparencyintheworkofthe

Commission”,[1993]OJC63/03.

administrationwithvaluableexpertise.Theobjectivewasnottoshapedirectlytherelationship

betweenadministrationandinterestgroupsbuttoimprovethetransparencyoftheCommission’s

work,soastofacilitatetheparticipationofinterestgroups.AslongastheCommissionprovided

moreinformationonitsproposals,freeinterestgroupcompetitionwouldguaranteethatitwould

obtainthenecessarypolicyinformation.‘Inexchange’forimprovedcontactswiththeCommission,

interestgroupsweresimplyaskedtoabstainfromunfairlobbyingpractices.Andeventhisminimal

attempttoregulateinterestgroupactivitywasentirelyvoluntary,and,infact,onlyaminorityof

interestgroupssignedcodesofconduct.

Tosummarize,theCommission’sinitiativeatthestartofthe1990ssoughttofacilitatebroader

involvementininformallobbyingbymakinganumberofchangestoinstitutionalpracticethatwould

sitontopoftheexisting(unchanged)systemofadvisorycommittees.Itdidsothrough

‘pluralisationwithoutproceduralisation’:thetwocommunicationsweresoftlawdocuments,which

impliedthatthepromisetomaketheCommission’sworkmoretransparentdidnotcarryanyrights

toparticipationortojudicialreview.

3.2. Civilsociety:‘pluralisationwithoutproceduralisation’(theneo-corporatistway)

Bytheendofthe1990s-early2000s,theparadigmattheheartoftheCommission’sapproachto

interestgroupsshifteddramatically,atleastinthediscourseemployedintheCommission’sofficial

publications.Atthetime,theCommissionwasrespondingtoatleasttwodevelopmentsinthe

broaderpoliticalenvironment.First,despitetheincreasedroleoftheEuropeanParliamentin

Europeandecision-making,andtheeffortsintheAmsterdamTreatytoaddresstheEU’s‘democratic

deficit’,theEUwascontinuingtostrugglewithalegitimacydeficit.Second,theprotestsofthe‘no

global’movementhadbroughtincreasedpublicattentiontotheroleofNGOsininternational

governance.ItwasinthiscontextthattheCommission’sapproachtointerestgroupsbegantobe

framedbytheconceptofcivilsociety.

TheCommission’sparadigm-shiftfirstcametolightintheareaofsocialpolicy.Onissuessuchas

anti-discrimination,genderpolicyandsocialinclusion,thetraditionalsocialpartnershadbeenside-

linedbyanumberofnewerinterestorganizationswithamoredirectstakeinthepolicyissues.The

Commissionrecognizedthisrealitybypromoting,alongsidethesocialdialoguewiththesocial

partnersdescribedearlier,a‘civildialogue’withthesecivilsocietyorganisations.Thecivildialogue

didnotprovidetheinvolvedorganisationswithpowerscomparabletothoseofthesocialpartnersin

thesocialdialogue;instead,ittooktheformofregularforumswithsuchassociations(representing

boththenationalandEuropeanlevels)andevenmoreregularmeetingswithrepresentativesfrom

theEurope-wideassociations.Similarinitiativesweretakeninareassuchastheenvironment,public

healthand(followingthenoglobalprotests)trade.Hence,inseveralareas,extraattentionwaspaid

toincluding‘weaker’and‘generalinterest’groupsinthepolicy-makingprocess(asopposedto

better-resourcedbusinessandprivateinterestgroups).

ThesesectoraldevelopmentswerefollowedbytheCommission’sgeneralstatementon‘civilsociety’

initsWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance(2001).Incontrastwiththeconceptsof‘interest

groups’and‘lobbygroups’,whichofteninvokesuspicion,theCommission’suseoftheterm‘civil

society’signalledthedemocraticpotentialofbottom-upparticipatoryprocesses.Accordingtothe

WhitePaper,civilsocietyorganisationsincludednotonly‘NGOsbutalsotradeunionsand

employers’organisations,professionalassociations,charities,grass-rootsorganisations,

organisationsthatinvolvecitizensandlocalandmunicipallifewithaparticularcontributionfrom

churchesandreligiouscommunities’.32Althoughthisdefinitionwasnotcomprehensive,itdidimply

thatcivilsocietyorganisationsweremorerepresentativethanotherinterestgroups.TheWhite

Paper,therefore,setoutatwo-trackmodelofconsultation:ontheonehand,asetofcommon

standardsandprinciplesfortheconsultationofall‘interestedparties’,andontheotherhand,the

developmentof‘moreextensivepartnershiparrangements’withmorerepresentativecivilsociety

organisations.

Byendorsingaspecialrelationshipwithmorerepresentativecivilsocietyorganisations,theWhite

Papersuggestedapluralisationoftheneo-corporatistmethod.ToquotedirectlyfromtheWhite

Paper:

OntheCommission’spart,thiswillentailacommitmentforadditionalconsultationscomparedto

theminimumstandards.Inreturn,thearrangementswillpromptcivilsocietyorganisationsto

tightenuptheirinternalstructures,furnishguaranteesofopennessandrepresentativity,andprove

theircapacitytorelayinformationorleaddebatesintheMemberStates....Withbetter

involvementcomesgreaterresponsibility.Civilsocietymustitselffollowtheprinciplesofgood

governance,whichincludeaccountabilityandopenness.

Justassocialpartnershadbeengrantedprivilegedaccessbecauseoftheirrepresentativenature,

newcivilsocietyorganisationsinpluralisedcontemporarysociety,suchasenvironmentalor

32CommunicationfromtheCommissionof25July2001"Europeangovernance-Awhitepaper",

COM(2001)428final-OfficialJournalC287of12.10.2001.

consumergroups,weretobenefitfromcloserinvolvementaslongastheywerenon-profit

associationsrepresentativeofbroaderinterests.

Itisclear,however,fromareviewoftherecenthistory,thattheCommissionhasfailed

implementingthisstatedcommitmenttoaspecialrelationshipwithcivilsocietyorganisations.The

keyinstrumentwastobeapublicdatabaseofEuropeancivilsocietyorganisations(CONECCS).The

databasewastoprovideCommissionofficialswithaclearlistof‘morerepresentativeorganisations’,

whileforcivilsocietyorganisationsitwasto‘actasacatalysttoimprovetheirinternalorganisation.’

CONECCS,however,hasfailedtofulfiltheseambitions.Thecriteriatobeeligibleforthedatabase

werenotdemanding:listedorganisationshadtobenon-profitassociationswiththemissionof

representingtheirmembers,beorganisedattheEuropeanlevel,i.e.withmemberorganisationsin

atleasttwoEUcountries,beactiveandhaveexpertiseinoneormoreoftheCommission’spolicy

areas,andhavesomedegreeofformalorinstitutionalexistence.Theserequirementsfellfarshort

ofthehardrepresentativenessrequirementsthatarestillusedinmanyEuropeancountries,in

particularintheindustrialrelationsfield,suchasaminimumnumberofmembersandformal

conditionsonhowtheorganizationistoguaranteetheauthorityandaccountabilityofindividuals

designatedtospeakfortheorganization.Evenmoreimportant,theCommissionfailedtodevelop

‘extensivepartnershiparrangements’thatwouldincentivizeorganizationstoregisterwiththe

databaseandmeettheadmittedlyminimalcriteriarequiredforregistration.Viceversa,Commission

officialshadlittlereasontopaymoreattentiontoCONECCSorganisationssinceregistrationdidnot

providemuchofaguaranteeoftheirrepresentativequality.Insum,despitethestrongrhetoricin

bothEUofficialdocumentsandtheacademicdebate,thecivilsocietyconceptseemstohavehad

relativelylittleinfluenceontheactualconsultationpracticesoftheCommission.33

ThefirstofthetwoconsultationtracksproposedintheWhitePaper—consultationofall‘interested’

parties--hashadamoresignificantimpact.In2002,theCommissionadoptedacommunication

spellingoutinmoredetailtheproceduretobefollowed,calledtheGeneralPrinciplesandMinimum

StandardsforConsultationofInterestedParties.ThePrinciplesinclude:wideparticipation

throughoutthepolicychain,inparticularregardingmajorpolicyinitiatives;effectiveness,which

impliesconsultingasearlyaspossiblebutalsoinamannerproportionatetotheimpactofthe

proposal;coherenceasbetweenCommissiondepartmentsinhowtheyconductconsultations;

33Asdescribedearlier,therewaschange,butmainlythroughtheincreaseduseofforumsfor

Europeancivilsocietyorganisationsatthesectorallevel,notinthecross-cuttingfashionadvocated

intheWhitePaper.

openness;andaccountability.TheStandardsrequirethattheCommissionprovideclearinformation

onthecontentoftheconsultationandtheproceduretobefollowed,thatitannouncethe

consultationontheinternetviathesingleaccesspointYourVoice,thatitallowatleasttwelve

weeksforinterestgroupstosubmittheiropinion,andthatitacknowledgereceiptofopinionsas

wellasprovides‘adequatefeedback’.Sincetheearly2000s,theCommissionhasconducted

numerousconsultationsalongtheselines.

ThesePrinciplesandStandardssuggestaproceduralisationofCommissionconsultationpractices

butinactualfacttheproceduralisationthathasoccurredhasbeenquitelimitedand‘soft.’A

numberoffactorshavecontributedtothisresult.First,therequirementsaresetdowninanon-

bindingCommissionCommunicationandarephrasedsoastoleavetheCommissionwith

considerablediscretion.Asaresult,theycannotbereliedonincourt,exceptasaninterpretative

toolintheapplicationofother,bindingproceduralprovisions(inthosefewcasewheresuch

provisionsareavailable),andcangenerallyonlybeusedtochallengeadministrativepracticeviathe

softermechanismoftheEuropeanOmbudsman.Second,thescopeofthePrinciplesandStandards

issoambiguouslyframedastoavoidtyingthehandsoftheCommissioninmostcases,withthe

resultthatthedecisiontogoaheadwithaconsultationisgenerallyentirelywithinthediscretionof

theCommission.Third,theCommunicationdoesnotextendtoalloftheCommission’sconsultation

mechanisms.TheCommissionstatesthatitwill‘focusonapplyingthegeneralprinciplesand

minimumstandardstothoseinitiativesthatwillbesubjecttoanextendedimpactassessment’and

toGreenandWhitePapers.Explicitlyexcludedarethesocialdialogue,delegatedlegislation,34and

moregenerallyallconsultationmechanismssetoutintheTreatiesorinotherCommunity

legislation.Mostinstitutionalisedconsultationmechanismsthusfalloutsideoftheapplicationof

thesegeneralprinciplesandstandards.Insum,thePrinciplesandStandardsapplymainlyatthe

34Thetextreferstoexcluding‘comitology’,whichisthetypicalEUlevelformofdelegatedlegislation

(seebelow).

initialstageofnewpolicyinitiatives,generallyinthecontextofanonlineconsultation,35and

sometimescombinedwiththedraftingofanimpactassessment.36

BasedonthisanalysisofthePrinciplesandStandards,twoespeciallysignificantgapsinthe

regulationofinterestrepresentationemerge.First,theCommunicationisfocusedontheinitial

stagesofpolicymakingandparticipationindelegatedlegislationremains,forthemostpart,ablack

box.Second,thesystemofadvisorycommitteesdescribedearlierinthischapterhasbeenlargely

untouched.TheCommunicationstatesthat‘whereaformalorstructuredconsultationbodyexists,

theCommissionshouldtakestepstoensureitscompositionproperlyreflectsthesectorit

represents’(p.20,emphasisadded).TheCommunication,however,failstoprovideinstruments

andcriteriaforensuringtherepresentativecompositionofexistingconsultationbodiesandtothe

extentthatbalanceisnotachieveditinstructstheCommissionto‘considerhowtoensurethatall

interestsarebeingtakenintoaccount(e.g.throughotherformsofconsultation)’.Hereweseethe

principalstrategyemployedinthe2002Communication:itseekstoimproveinterestgroup

participationbycreatinganadditionalformofconsultation(i.e.openortargetedonline

consultation),notbyreformingthemultiple,existingmechanismofinterestgroupconsultation.

4. TowardsmoreproceduralisationandAmerican-stylepluralism?

Overthepastdecade,therehavebeenthreemajordevelopmentsthathavethepotentialtomove

theEUtowardsasystemofinterestgroupintermediationclosertotheAmericanpluralistmodel:

thechangesintroducedbytheLisbonTreaty,thebetterregulationdebate,andtheTransparency

Initiative.ThefollowingsectioncarefullyanalyzeseachoftheserecentadditionstotheEU’s

institutionalframeworkandconcludesthat,onbalance,theEuropeansystemofinterest

representationremainsoneofpluralisationwithout(hard)proceduralisation.

4.1. TheLisbonTreaty

35OntheCommission’sTransparencywebsite,theCommunicationislinkedto‘YourVoicein

Europe’,thewebsiteforCommissiononlineconsultations,butnottotheRegisterofExpertGroups,

ortheComitologyRegister.Seehttp://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index_en.htm(lastaccessedon:

15/11/12).36Thereadershouldnote,however,thatonlineconsultationsandimpactassessmentsarenot

alwaysconductedintandemorforthesamepolicyinitiatives(seebelow).

4.1.1.Article11TFEU:constitutionalisingparticipatorydemocracy?

Attheconstitutionallevel,therehasbeenoneparticularlyvisiblechangewithramificationsfor

interestgroupparticipation.TheLisbonTreaty,whichenteredintoforcein2009,amendedthe

TreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU)toincludethetitle‘ProvisionsonDemocraticPrinciples’.Afterfirst

establishinginArticle10TEUthattheUnionisbasedontheprincipleofrepresentativedemocracy,

Article11TEUlistsvarioustypesofotherparticipatoryprocedures.Initsoriginalversion(inthe

failedConstitutionalTreaty)Article11TEUwasentitled‘participatorydemocracy’.Thistermand

conceptweredeletedfromthefinalversion,butthesubstanceofthearticlehasremainedthesame,

andreadsasfollows:

1.Theinstitutionsshall,byappropriatemeans,givecitizensandrepresentativeassociations

theopportunitytomakeknownandpubliclyexchangetheirviewsinallareasofUnion

action.

2.Theinstitutionsshallmaintainanopen,transparentandregulardialoguewith

representativeassociationsandcivilsociety.

3.TheEuropeanCommissionshallcarryoutbroadconsultationswithpartiesconcernedin

ordertoensurethattheUnion’sactionsarecoherentandtransparent.

4.NotlessthanonemillioncitizenswhoarenationalsofasignificantnumberofMember

StatesmaytaketheinitiativeofinvitingtheEuropeanCommission,withintheframeworkof

itspowers,tosubmitanyappropriateproposalonmatterswherecitizensconsiderthata

legalactoftheUnionisrequiredforthepurposeofimplementingtheTreaties…

Article11TEUwastheproductofanefforttoconstitutionallyrecognizetheimportanceof

participatoryproceduresotherthanelectoralparticipation,somethingwhichtheCommissionin

particularhadstressedeversincethepublicationoftheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance.

Duringthedraftingprocess,thescopeofparticipatoryprocedureswasbroadenedtoincludenot

only‘civilsociety’orinterestgroups,butalsoa‘citizens’initiative,’sinceitwasarguedthatthe

debatehadbeentoonarrowlyfocusedandthatthedemocraticprocessshouldalso,orevenabove

all,ensurethatcitizenscouldparticipatedirectlyinpolicy-making.37Theintroductionofthe

‘citizens’initiative’procedure(para.4),whichallowsaminimumofonemillioncitizenstoinvitethe

37Fordetailsonthedebateamongthegovernmentsandelectedrepresentativesduringthedrafting

process,seeSmismans(2004).

EuropeanCommissiontotakeactionisthereforethemostinnovativepartofArticle11TEU,

althoughitseffectislikelytobelimited(asillustratedbyitspracticeuntilnow).38Thefirstthree

paragraphs,bycontrast,seemmainlytoconfirmexistinginstitutionalpracticesofstate-society

relations.Theformulationisvagueandtheintentbehindtheuseofthedifferentconceptsof

‘representativeassociations’,‘civilsociety’and‘partiesconcerned’isunclear.TheArticleneither

introducesnewproceduresforinterestgroupparticipationnorintroducesparticipatoryrights

enforceableincourt.ItishighlyunlikelythattheEuropeanCourtofJusticecouldeversanctionthe

InstitutionsfornotrespectingArticle11TEU,exceptfortherareandfairlyimplausiblescenarioin

whichtheInstitutionsdonotprovideforanyformofparticipationatall.Nevertheless,Article11

TEUmayserveasinstrumentforthesoftproceduralisationofinterestintermediation.Inthe

future,theCourt,andespeciallytheInstitutionsthemselves,mayrelyonArticle11TEUtogether

withother(mainlysoft)proceduralrequirementstounderscoretheimportanceofparticipationfor

thepolicy-makingprocessandmaytherebycontributetoacultureinwhichthefailuretoestablish

andfollowparticipatoryproceduresisperceivedbypoliticiansandofficialsasbreachinginstitutional

expectations.Inthisrespect,thereferenceinparagraph2toallinstitutionsisparticularly

important,sinceuntilnowonlytheCommissionhasconsistentlypaidattentiontoparticipatory

procedures.

4.1.2.Participationinthenewsystemofdelegatedlegislationandcomitology

Whilenotasclearyrelatedtothetopicofinterestgroupparticipation,anotherimportantreform

introducedbytheLisbonTreatydeservesourattention,namelythenewsystemofdelegated

legislation.TheEuropeansystemofdelegatedlegislationhastraditionallyfunctionedviaso-called

‘comitology’,wherebythelegislator(theEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilontheinitiativeof

theCommission)delegatestotheCommissionthetaskofadoptingfurtherregulatorymeasures.

TheCommission,however,isrequiredtodosoininteractionwitha‘comitologycommittee’,

composedofrepresentativesofalltheMemberStates,generallydrawnfromthenational

38Theexperiencewithcitizens’initiativestodatesuggeststhatitisdifficultforthesignaturesof

sucharelativelylownumberofcitizens(onemillion)toforcesubstantialchangestoaregulatory

frameworkthathasbeencarefullycraftedbythedemocraticallyrepresentativeinstitutionsofthe

EuropeanParliament(throughdirectelectionofthemembersofparliament)andtheCouncil

(throughtheMemberStates),generallyafterbroadconsultationwithstakeholdersandexperts.See

Smismans(forthcoming).

authoritiesdealingwiththeparticularpolicyareaatissue.Thissystemisdesignedtoallowthe

MemberStatestoretainsomedegreeofcontroloverpolicy-makingevenafterpowersare

delegatedtothesupranationalEuropeanCommission.Althoughtheintricaciesofcomitologyare

beyondthescopeofthischapter,forpurposesoftheanalysishereitisimportanttonotethat

neitherthepoliticalnortheacademicdebatehaspaidmuchattentiontotheissueofinterestgroup

participationincomitology.Thatisnottosaythatthereisnosuchparticipation.Advisoryorexpert

groups(asdescribedabove)arenotonlyactiveinlegislativeproceduresbutalsoincomitology

procedures,oftenoperatingalongsidecomitologycommittees,andtheissuesraisedindelegated

legislationaresometimesthetargetoflobbyingbeforetheCommissionandevendirectlybefore

comitologycommittees.AtleasttoanAmericanaudience,itmaycomeasasurprisethatintheEU

interestgroupparticipationhasbeenextensivelydebatedinthecontextoflegislativeaction,butnot

delegatedlegislationandthecomitologyprocedure.

ThedebateoncomitologythatemergedduringthedraftingoftheLisbonTreatyaffordedapolitical

opportunitytoconsidertheroleofparticipatoryproceduresindelegatedlegislation.This

opportunity,however,wasmissedand,asintheprevioustwodecades,thefocuswasontheplace

oftheEuropeanParliamentindelegatedlegislation.FromtheperspectiveoftheParliament,

delegatedlegislationisproblematicbecause,unliketheMemberStateswhichcanexertsome

controlviacomitologycommittees,theParliamenthastraditionallyhadnoroleindelegated

legislation.Althoughreformsmadeinthe1990sopenedthedoortosomeparliamentary

involvement,39theyfellshortofexpectations,especiallyinviewoftheParliament’senhanced

powersoverlegislation.ThesolutionintheLisbonTreatywastointroduceadistinctionbetween

‘legislativeacts’,‘delegatedacts’and‘implementingacts’.Whilethematerialscopeofthesetypesof

actsispoorlydefined,40andhasbeenstronglycriticisedintheliterature(Schutze2011),41the

39CouncilDecision1999/468layingdowntheproceduresfortheexerciseofimplementingpowers

conferredontheCommission,OJ1999L184/23;andCouncilDecision2006/512amendingDecision

1999/468,OJ2006L200/11.40This,togetherwiththefactthatthecategoriesofRegulation,DirectiveandDecisioncontinueto

exist,meansthattheobjectiveofaclearerhierarchyofnormscanhardlybeconsideredtohave

beenrealised.Therearenowpotentiallyninetypesofinstrumentsthatcanbeadoptedunderthe

TEU:LegislativeRegulations,DirectivesandDecisions;DelegatedRegulations,Directivesand

Decisions;andpotentiallyImplementingRegulations,DirectivesandDecisions.

normativeaspirationbehindthetextwastocreateahierarchyofnormsthatwouldcorrespondwith

theappropriatelevelofparliamentaryinvolvement.Themostimportantnormsaretobesetdown

inlegislativeactsadoptedbythelegislator(theParliamentandtheCounciloninitiativeofthe

Commission),actsofgeneralapplication‘supplementingoramendingcertainnon-essential

elementsofalegislativeact’(Article190TFEU)aretobeadoptedindelegatedacts,bythe

CommissionunderthecontroloftheParliamentandtheCouncil,andexecutiveimplementingacts

areprimarilytheresponsibilityoftheCommission.Delegatedactsaretobecontrolledequallyby

theParliamentandtheCouncil:eithertheParliamentorCouncilmayrevokethedelegation;orthey

mayobjecttoadelegatedactwithinaperiodsetoutbythelegislativeact.42Implementingacts

continuetobeadoptedthroughasystemofcomitology,leavingcontroloftheCommissioninthe

handsoftheMemberStates,withvirtuallynoinvolvementoftheParliament.

InthesechangeswroughtbytheLisbonTreaty,theParliamentwasthewinner,sinceitobtained

considerablymorecontrolpoweroverdelegatedacts,whiletheMemberStatessawtheirpowers

diminishedsomewhatsincecomitologycommitteeswereeliminatedfordelegatedacts.Yetthe

provisionondelegatedactswasalsoamissedopportunity.Atthetimeofthedraftingofthisnew

hierarchyofnorms,Iarguedthatthenewdistinctionmayopenthewayforthereconsiderationof

theroleofproceduralisationofparticipatoryprocesses(Smismans2005).Sincetheexperienceof

otherdemocraciessuggeststhatlegislativevetoesareaverybluntinstrumentofcontrolthatare

rarelyused(Schutze2011:664),Iarguedthatparticipatoryproceduresofferedanadditional

mechanismforholdingtheadministrationaccountable.Interestgroupparticipation,however,

neverenteredintothedebateduringthedraftingoftheLisbonTreaty(oritsforerunner,the

ConstitutionalTreaty).ForboththeMemberStatesandmanyMembersofParliament,thearcane

topicofcomitologyappeareddifficultenoughtounderstand,evenwithoutincludingthetopicof

interestgroupparticipation.

TheadoptionoftheLisbonTreatydidnotendthedebatesoverdelegatedactsandimplementing

acts.In2011,theParliamentandCounciladoptedanewlegislativeframeworkforcomitologyin

implementingactsand,somewhatsurprisingly,thislegislativeframeworkactuallyreducedthe

Parliament’spowers,asitnolongerhasarightofscrutinyovertheresultingimplementingacts

41AsHofmann(2009:499)putsit:‘TheopaquenessofEUlawhasbeendeliberatelytakentoanew

levelinordertomakeanabstracttheoreticalpointoftypologytopresstheEUintoastate-like

federalmodel’.42Itisuptothedelegatinglegislationtochoosebetweenthesetwocontrolmechanisms.

(ChristiansenandDobbels2012).43Atthesametime,theMemberStatesfoughtbacktoregain

poweroverdelegatedacts.WhileArticle190TFEUdoesnotprovideforcomitologyinthecaseof

delegatedactsandtheCommissionhasrefusedtocreatecomitologycommitteeswithformal

powers,theMemberStateshaveobtainedapoliticalcommitmentfromtheCommissiontoconsult

withMemberStaterepresentatives(ChristiansenandDobbels2012:17).Thishasbeensetdownin

anon-binding‘CommonUnderstanding’signedbytheCommission,Council,andParliament:when

draftingdelegatedacts,theCommissionagreestoconductconsultationswiththeCouncilandthe

Parliament,andtosendbothinstitutionsalltherelevantpreparatorydocuments,whileatthesame

timeretainingdiscretionoverhowtoorganisesuchconsultations.44

ToconcludethisdiscussionoftheLisbonTreaty,theoutcomefromtheperspectiveofparticipatory

procedurewasdisappointingoverall.Insteadofatransparentsystemofcontroloverdelegatedacts

based,ontheonehand,onthelegislativevetoand,ontheotherhand,theproceduralised

participationofinterestgroups,theendresultwasasystemofprotractedMemberStatecontrol

behindthescenes.Althoughinterestgroupscertainlyexerciseinfluencethroughlobbying,this

remainslargelyunregulatedandoutsideofthepubliceye.Thelattercanequallybesaidofthenew

systemofcomitologyunderthenewComitologyRegulationof2011,whichappliestoimplementing

acts,andhasleftthe(non)regulationofinterestgroupparticipationintheseprocedurescompletely

untouched.Insum,despitetheintensedebatesspanningoveradecade,theroleofinterestgroup

participationintheEU’ssystemofdelegatedlegislationremainsinsideablackbox;aswewillseein

thenextsection,thedebateonbetterregulationmightjustprovidesomeopportunitytoopenthe

blackbox.

4.2. Thebetterregulationdebate

Thebetterregulationdebatebeganwiththe2000LisbonStrategytomaketheEUthe‘most

competitiveknowledge-basedeconomyintheworld.’Likeelsewhere,‘betterregulation’hasmeant

43EuropeanUnion(2011)‘Regulation(EU)No182/2011oftheEuropeanParliamentandofthe

Councilof16February2011layingdowntherulesandgeneralprinciplesconcerningmechanismsfor

controlbyMemberStatesoftheCommission’sexerciseofimplementingpowers’,OfficialJournalof

theEuropeanUnion,L55/12,Brussels,28.2.2011.

44CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,CommonUnderstanding–DelegatedActs,8753/11,11April2011.

toagreatextent‘lessregulation’,asthefocushasbeenonreducingtheregulatoryburdenonthe

market.IntheEU,however,withitsconstantsearchforgreaterlegitimacy,betterregulationalso

becamerelatedtoargumentsaboutparticipationinpolicy-making.Thiswasparticularlythecase

aroundthetimeoftheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance(2001).Two‘participationtopics’in

particularenteredthebetterregulationdebate,namelytheimportanceofconsultationduring

impactassessments(IA)andtheneedtoreflectonalternativeregulatoryinstrumentsviaco-

regulationandself-regulation.45Ifocushereontheformer.

Since2003,IAshavebeenroutinelyissuedbytheCommission.TheCommissiondraftsIAsforall

majorpolicyproposals,i.e.mainlylegislativeproposalsbutalsopolicyprogrammesandkey

communications.TheEU’simpactassessmentsystemischaracterisedbyabroad‘integrated

approach’,whichincludesanassessmentofeconomic,socialandenvironmentalimpacts.Torealise

suchanintegratedapproach,theinvolvementofallrelevantstakeholdersisessential.The2009

CommissionGuidelinesonIAsidentifythreeessentialvariantsofsoundevidenceforIAs,namely

‘internalexpertise’(i.e.availableinCommissionDirectoratesGeneralotherthantheonedraftingthe

IA),‘externalexpertise’(i.e.drawnfromexpertcommittees,Europeanagencies,andindependent

experts),and‘consultationwithinterestedparties’.

Intheory,IAcouldserveasavehiclefortheproceduralisationofinterestrepresentation,similarto

notice-and-commentrulemakingintheUnitedStates.Insuchasystem,iftheCommissionin

conductinganIAfailedtoconsultthepublicorconsultedbutentirelydiscardedtheopinions

expressedbythepublic,thefinaloutcomecouldbechallengedincourt.However,theEuropean

systemallows,atbest,foronlyaverysoftformofproceduralisation.Tobeginwith,theprocedural

rulesforIAsaresetoutinGuidelines,i.e.asoftlawinstrumentnotdirectlyjusticiableincourt.

AlthoughtheEuropeanCourtofJusticehasrecognisedthattheCommissionmaycreatelegitimate

expectationsenforceableincourtbypromisingadministrativebehaviourthroughsuchsoftlaw

documents,itisunlikelythatCourtwouldfindthattheGuidelinesonIAsgiverisetoalegitimate

expectationofstakeholderparticipationsincetheyaffordtheCommissionwithconsiderableleeway.

AccordingtotheGuidelines,IAsarebasedontheprincipleof‘proportionateanalysis’,whichalso

extendstohowparticipationisorganised:itisfortheCommissiontodecidehowtoorganise

participation‘proportionateto’theimportanceandscopeofaninitiative.Mostimportantly,the

Guidelinesdonotsetoutanyspecificprocedureforstakeholderinvolvement―whetherthrough

advisorycommittees,onlineconsultations,orinformalcontacts.TheydostatethattheCommission

45EuropeanParliament,CouncilandCommission,InterinstitutionalAgreementonBetterLaw-

MakingOJ2003/C,321/01.

shouldrespectthe2002PrinciplesandStandardsofConsultationbut,asanalysedabove,these

PrinciplesandStandardsarenotoriouslyflexible.Therefore,eventhoughitiscorrectthatthe

informationincludedinIAsmayinformtheCourt’sapplicationofsubstantivereviewprinciplessuch

assubsidiarityandproportionality(Alemanno2011)itisunlikelythattheveryvaguestandardsfor

consultationsonIAswillgiverisetoanewgroundofreviewbasedontheviolationofaprocedural

requirement.

Eventhoughtheroleforcourtsislimited,asofterformofproceduralisationofIAsmayemergein

thefuture.AllIAsarescreenedbytheEuropeanImpactAssessmentBoard(IAB),whichisabody

composedofseniorofficialswithintheEuropeanCommission.IftheIABconsidersthatanIAdoes

notrespecttheIAGuidelines,theIAwillbesentbackforreadjustmenttotheDirectorateGeneral

whichdraftedit.ItisthetaskoftheIABtostrikethefinebalancebetweenleavingtheDGs

flexibility,inlinewiththeprincipleofproportionateanalysis,andestablishingacommonpractice

withminimumstandardsapplicabletoallIAs.Thisisequallythecaseforissuesofparticipation

withintheIAprocedure.Todate,theIABhasmainlyinsistedthatwhentheCommissiondecidesto

holdaconsultation,theresponsibleDGshouldmakemoreofanefforttoensurethatstakeholder

viewsarerepresentedthroughouttheentireIA,inparticularonallthepolicyoptionsproposedin

theIA.46Intheory,however,theIABcouldbecomemoredemandingwithparticipation

requirements.Forinstance,someDGspublishallindividualopinionsofstakeholderswiththeIA,

whileothersonlyprovideasynthesisoftheopinions.SomeDGs,whensendinganIAtotheother

Institutionsattachalltheopinions,othersattachanoverview,andyetothersalsopublishthe

opinionsortheoverviewonline.TheIABcoulddevelopacommonapproachonthisandother

elementsoftheconsultationprocedure.ItcouldgoevenfurtherandrequireDGstoreflectand

reportontherepresentativenessoftheirconsultationprocedures,inlinewiththesoftguidelines

providedinthe2002PrinciplesandStandardsofCommunication.Itisunlikely,however,thatthe

IABwilltakethisstep,sinceparticipationhasneverbeenakeypriorityfortheBoard,andithas

becomeespeciallylesssoinrecentyearsasthebetterregulationagendahasbecomefocusedmore

oncompetitivenessandlessonimprovinglegitimacythroughparticipation(Radaelli2007:194).

OneareacurrentlyinfluxistheroleofIAsindelegatedlegislationandcomitology.Asexplained

earlierandincontrastwiththeU.S.,IAshavetraditionallybeenusedformajorpolicyinitiatives,i.e.

legislation,andnotforclassicadministrativerules(seeWeinerandRiberointhisvolume).In2009,

forthefirsttime,theCommissionrecognizedthatIAscouldalsobeusedfordelegatedlegislation

46Thisconclusionisbasedonananalysisof20IAs(indifferentpolicyfields)aswellastheannualIAB

reportsaspartoftheLASIproject.Seeabovefootnote1.

andcomitology.47Aswasarguedaboveindiscussingthetreatmentofdelegatedlegislationinthe

LisbonTreaty,thisrepresentsapositivedevelopmentwiththepotentialtoshedlightonthe

currentlyopaquesystemofinterestgroupparticipationattheimplementingphaseofthepolicy-

makingprocess.Thereality,however,isstillquitelimited.ThenumberofIAsindelegated

legislationandcomitologyisstillverylow.48Moreover,itremainstobeseenwhattypeof

consultations,ifany,willbeheldinthecontextofsuchIAs:sinceboththecontentandprocedureof

IAsaretobe“proportionate”tothenatureoftheproposal,whichinthecaseofdelegatedactsand

implementingactscanbeexpectedtobelesssignificant,andsinceIAsfordelegatedand

implementingactsaretoavoidre-consideringissuesthatwerealreadyassessedinthecontextof

thelegislativeact,anyconsultationthatisheldmightverywellbequitecursory(Alemannoand

Meuwese2013;Mendes2013).

BeforeleavingthesubjectofIAs,itbearsaskingifandhowthislayerofproceduredepartsfromthe

patternsofinterestrepresentationestablishedbytheotherparticipationproceduresand

institutionsdiscussedearlierinthischapter.Althoughtheexperienceinthisfieldisstillquitenew,

severalpreliminaryconclusionscanbedrawnfromresearchconductedinthecontextoftheLASI

project.49WeassessedallIAsadoptedbetween2003and2013(830intotal)onthebasisofthe

informationonparticipationprovidedbytheIAreports(whichalwaysincludeasectionwith

informationontheactorsconsulted).Despitethediscursiveinsistenceontheimportanceofbroad

stakeholderparticipation,IAsdonotappeartohaveledtoageneralpluralisationoftheconsultation

procedure.AlthoughIAshaveincreasinglycometousegeneralonlineconsultations,theyremainthe

exceptionratherthantherule,andrepresentonly25%ofallIAs.Inadditiontoanyonline

consultationprocedure,theDirectorateGeneralresponsibleforpreparinganIAwillinvolve,on

average,10.3actors,whichcanincludeCommissionDGs,Europeanexpertcommitteesoragencies,

interestgroups,andconsultancies.AlthoughitisnecessarytoinvestigatefurtherhowIAsmayor

maynothavechangedestablishedpatternsofparticipationthroughadvisorycommitteesorvia

informallobbying,ourdatasupporttheconclusionthatIAshavenotsignificantlyexpandedthe

numberortypesofactorsconsultedbytheCommissionandconsequentlyhavenotproduceda

generalpluralisationofinterestgroupparticipationinrulemaking.

472009Guidelines,supraat_.48Intheperiod2009-2013,3IAswereadoptedfordelegatedacts,and21forimplementingacts.49LASIisanERCfundedresearchprojectdealingwith‘Law,scienceandinterestsinEuropeanpolicy-

making’.(seefootnote1).IwouldliketothankmycolleagueDrEmanuelaBozziniforthestatistical

analysis.Foramoredetailedtreatmentoftheargument,seeBozziniandSmismans(forthcoming).

4.3. Thetransparencydebate

In2006theEuropeanCommissionlaunchedtheEuropeanTransparencyInitiative(ETI).50,Themain

objectiveoftheETIwasnottoshapeinterestgroupparticipationbuttomakeitmoretransparent.

Inadditiontoprovidinganonline listofbeneficiariesofEUfunding,51thekey innovationhasbeen

theintroductionofa‘TransparencyRegister’―anonlineregisteroflobbyistsapplicabletoboththe

European Commission and the European Parliament which replaces the CONECCS database

discussedearlier.52UnlikeCONECCS,whichonlylistedEuropeancivilsocietyorganisationsaspartof

the effort to incentivize more representative organisations, the Transparency Register aims to

include all types of lobbying actors, whether NGOs, think-tanks, academic institutions, in-house

lobbyists or consultancies. Compared to CONECCS, it also recordsmore information on lobbying

actors, in particular regarding their financial resources. At the same time, the organizations that

registerarerequiredtosignacodeofconductongoodlobbyingpractices.

Atfirstsight,theTransparencyInitiativeisinspiredbythepluralisttradition,butacloserlookreveals

itmaybeusedinawayclosertotheneo-corporatisttraditiondiscussedearlier.Ontheonehand,

the Register promotes free competition among interest groups to influence policy-making by

ensuring that the process is transparent and that the actors followminimum standards of ethical

lobbying behaviour. Although the Register is not obligatory, estimates suggest that about three

quartersofEU-level lobbyingactorsarenowregistered, thankstoasystemofpersuasion,naming

and shaming, and carrots rather than sticks, such as an early-alert email system for new

consultations. 53 On the other hand, it does not create any new procedural rights to influence

50COM(2006)194final.51Seehttp://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm,lastaccesson20/08/14.

52CommunicationFollow-uptotheGreenPaper“EuropeanTransparencyInitiative”COM(2007)127

final; Communication European Transparency Initiative: A framework for relations with interest

representatives (Register and Code of Conduct) COM(2008)323 final; Agreement between the

EuropeanParliamentandtheEuropeanCommissionontheestablishmentofatransparencyregister

for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy

implementation,[2011]OJL191/29.

53TheseareestimatesasitisdifficulttoidentifytheexactnumberofactorsinvolvedinEUlobbying.

SeeGreenwoodandDreger(2013).

government decision making, as found in the pluralist American system of notice-and-comment

rulemaking.Moreover,asaresultoftheTransparencyRegister,theCommissionandtheEuropean

Parliamentnowhaveattheirdisposalconsiderablymoreinformationonlobbyingactors,whichcan

be used to determinewhether organizations and groups are representative and can help achieve

balanced interestrepresentationonadvisorycommittees.54 TheRegisterwouldthusfunctionasa

toolwithinaneo-corporatistsetting.

5. Conclusion

InterestgroupparticipationintheEuropeanUnionhasevolvedconsiderablysincethecreationof

theEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1957.AsthepowersoftheEUincreased,interestgroups

shiftedtheirattentiontotheEuropeanlevel,formedEuropean‘umbrellaorganisations’,andoften

setupofficesinBrussels.Atthesametime,broadersocietalforcesproducednewsocial

movements,aproliferationoffunctionalcategories,andconsiderablepluralisationofinterest

groups.Inresponse,theEUhasopeneditspolicy-makingprocesstoavarietyofinterestgroups.

Themultipleaccesspointsforinterestgroupinfluence—throughtheCommission,theEuropean

Parliament,andnationalrepresentativesintheCouncil―hasalsoledmanyobserverstodescribethe

EUasapluralistsystemofinterestintermediation.Atthesametime,theEU’sinstitutionshave

beenshapedbytheneo-corporatistlegacythatcharacterisesmanyofitsMemberStates.Thusthe

systemofinterestintermediationtraditionallycontainedtwoparallelstrands:ontheonehand,

extensive,informallobbyingand,ontheotherhand,formaladvisorycommitteesaswayforthe

publicadministration(principallytheCommission)toensure,atleastintheory,balancedinterest

representationinpolicy-making.

Fromacomparativeperspective,especiallyforthosefamiliarwiththeAmericanneo-pluralistmodel

ofinterestrepresentation,therearetwostrikingelementsoftheEuropeansystem.First,legally

bindingparticipationrightsandproceduresthatcanbeenforcedincourtarelargelyabsent.

Althoughthereareminorexceptionstothisrule,55mostparticipatoryprocessesareentirelyinformal

oraresetdowninsoftlawdocumentswhichprovidevirtuallynoscopeforjudicialreview.Second,

54Foramoredetailedanalysisofthisargument,seeSmismans(2014).55Theprimaryonesareintheareaofstateaidpolicy,seeMendes(2011),andinthosecaseswhere

legislationrequirestheconsultationofanadvisorycommitteeandtheCommissionentirelyfailsto

consultthecommittee(anextremelyremotescenario).

totheextentthatthepoliticaldebatehasconsideredinterestgroupparticipation,thefocushas

beenonparticipationinlegislativedecision-making,notdelegatedlegislation(orrulemakingin

Americanlegalterminology).ThiscanbeexplainedbytheEU’s(perceived)lackoflegitimacy:in

the1990sand2000srepeatedattemptsatEUinstitutionalreformhavesoughttoaddressthe

concernthatEUdecision-makingisremovedfromtheconcernsofitscitizensandimproving

participationbeforetheCommission,whenitdraftslegislation,representsonesucheffortat

democraticinnovation.Itmustbesaid,however,thatthesilenceonparticipationanddelegated

legislationremainsremarkable.

OverthelasttwodecadestheEUhasattemptedtoformalisesomewhatitsrelationswithinterest

groups.Aboveall,thesystemhasbecomemoretransparentwiththeRegisterofExpertGroupson

advisorycommitteesandtheTransparencyRegisteronlobbyingorganizations.Sincetheendofthe

1990s,andparticularlysincetheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance,theEUalsohasattempted

tomakeitssystemofinterestintermediationmore‘representative’or‘balanced’.However,instead

ofreformingtheexistingsystem,inparticularadvisorycommittees,theCommissionhasmainly

insertedtheadditionalstepofabroad-basedonlineconsultationatthestartofthe(legislative)

policy-makingprocess—pluralisingthesystembyaddinganotherparticipationlayer.

Althoughmorerecenteffortsatreform,suchasthebetterregulationdebateandtheTransparency

Initiative,haveclearlybeeninspiredbyAmericanregulatorylawandpractice,theEuropeansystem

ofinterestgroupparticipationcontinuestobeshapedbyitsneo-corporatistlegacyandisbest

conceptualizedas‘institutionalisedbutnotproceduralised’.ThereisnosignthatEuropeanpolitical

andadministrativeeliteshaveanyintentionofpursuingsuchastronglyproceduralisedroute,at

leastintheforeseeablefuture.NeitherwouldIarguethatsuchroutewouldbepreferable.The

Europeaninstitutionaltraditiontendstorelyontheadministrationtoensurethatpolicy-makingis

informedbyabalancedrepresentationofinterests,whiletheAmericanoneplacesmoretrustin

market-stylefreecompetitionbetweeninterestgroupstoachievefairrepresentation.Evidenceon

bothsidesoftheAtlanticshowsthatpolicy-makingisbiasedinfavourofcorporateandbusiness

interestsandagainstbroadersocietalinterests.Thejuryisstilloutonwhethereitherofthetwo

systemsis‘moreeffective’or‘fairer’,andanyjudgmentwillinevitablyreflect,atleastinpart,

normativeattitudestowardsthestateandinterestgroupsmorebroadlyspeaking.Forthemoment,

despitethediscourseinAmericanlawofformalequalityandproceduralrights,ontheEuropeanside

oftheAtlantictheperceptionisthatforallofitsimperfections,asystemthatrelieslessoncourts

andmoreonadministrativeandpoliticalactorstoremedyimbalancesinrepresentationisfairer

overall.

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