GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

UNITED NATIONS CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND

REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE OF FEEDER ROADS IN EASTERN PROVINCE

Mid-Term Evaluation

DRAFT FINAL July 31, 1998

This report was prepared by Messrs. Renato Schulz (consultant, project economist, team leader) and Peter Bentall (consultant, engineer, low cost roads specialist). The views expressed in this report are the consultants’ own and not necessarily those of the Government of Zambia, UNDP,

UNCDF, ILO or any other intervening Organization.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Basic Project Data Sheet List of Acronyms SUMMARY OF MISSION FINDINGS

Summary Project Background Succinct Description of the Project Summary of Mission Findings Summary of Lessons Learned and Implications Summary Recommendations

PART A FACTUAL PROJECT RESULTS

1. Background 2. Institutional Arrangements 3. The Project 4. Project Implementation 5. Project Outputs 6. Project Status

PART B ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT DESIGN, EXECUTION AND SUSTAINABILITY

1. Quality of Project Preparation and Design 2. Efficiency of Project Execution 3. Relevance and effectiveness 4. Critical Issues 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

ANNEXES

1 Project Budget and Expenditures 2 Execution of the Operations Plan 3 Team Members and Persons Met 4 Mission Itinerary

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BASIC DATA SHEET Country: Zambia Project Number: UNDP ZAM/93/009 UNCDF ZAM/93/C02

Project Title Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Feeder Roads in Eastern Province

Project Short Title Feeder Roads Project Sector Transport and Communications (0600) Sub-Sector Land Transport (0630) Government Executing Feeder Roads Section Agency Department of Infrastructure and Support Services (DISS) Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) Implementing Agencies District Councils of Eastern Province, Roads Training School (RTS), Ministry of Works and Supply (MWS), ILO Costs and Expenditures Original Current Actual Cost Cost Expenditures1

Estimate Estimate (US$ equivalent) 6,609,400 7,204,085 2,934,965 Government of Zambia 1,042,400 1,042,400 121,600 UNDP (Budget rev.G) 932,000 1,244,832 784,359 UNCDF (Budget rev.E) 4,635,000 4,916,853 2,029,006

1 As of June 30,1998

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LIST OF ACRONYMS CMU Contract Management Unit TA Technical Advisor DC District Council DDP UNDP/UNCDF District Development Project DISS Department of Infrastructure and Support Services DoW Director of Works (Department) FRP Feeder Roads Project FRS Feeder Roads Section (of DISS) GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia ILO United Nations International Labor Organization IRS International Roads Specialist MLGH Ministry of Local Government and Housing MWS Ministry of Works and Supplies NRB National Roads Board NRE National Roads Engineer PIU Project Implementation Unit PLGO Provincial Local-Government Officer PM Project Manager PRB Provincial Roads Board PRE Provincial Roads Engineer ROADSIP Roads Sector Investment Program RTS Roads Training School UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund UNDP United Nations Development Program VIS Village Industries Services vpd (motorized) Vehicles per Day

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SUMMARY OF MISSION FINDINGS The Project under review was signed in August 1995. In its original design, it was meant to help respond to a crisis in the evacuation of a bumper crop of maize. Roadworks were to be done quickly using equipment-based technology, to resolve the crisis. This approach was thwarted by the lack of local contractors. Consequently, in May 1996 it was agreed to redesign the Project, to train contractors to do the work, and the Districts to manage the contractors contracts. It was also decided that for these smaller rehabilitation and maintenance works, labor-based construction methods would be used. It was expected that additional benefits would come of using the labor-based approach: employment creation; opportunities for women; stimulation of local economies; construction skills legacy in the communities; a sense of local ‘ownership’; and enhanced sustainability of road maintenance. The project addressed relevant immediate problems. It dealt with lack of know-how and of technical and managerial capacity at the District level, in both the private and the public sector, it addresses high rural under- and unemployment, and the need to improve a largely neglected network of district roads in poor, mostly non-maintainable condition. The Project has been highly successful, so far, in helping to alleviate these problems. Using labor-based road rehabilitation and maintenance techniques, thereby contributing to create employment, it has succeeded in training 7 private rehabilitation contractors, 15 private maintenance contractors, and 19 public officials: 14 district supervisors, 5 of whom have also been trained in preparing bills of quantities, and 5 Directors of Works have had an introduction to labor-based construction techniques. In addition, 76 km of feeder road have been rehabilitated to an excellent standard and are being maintained for a year, and another 196 km have received separate routine maintenance interventions. Considerring that not all essential inputs have been in place at any one time (national staff, the finance company, office accomodation, supporting projects), the Project has been exceptionally efficient in producing these outputs, and under normal circumstances there is no reason to believe that targets would not have been reached in full. However, some targets will not be reached. The number of maintenance contractors trained, and the target for District staff trained, will not be reached because training funds have been exhausted. A number of factors collaborated to produce this situation: firstly, the training budget was underestimated in that the capacity of Council staff, especially DoWs, was overestimated and less training than actually required was built into the Project; secondly, not enough Council DoWs and supervisors could be found to train, because many positions were unfilled and/or incumbents were not apt to be trained, and thirdly, the attrition rate fort hose trained has been much higher than expected. Similarly, it was difficult to recruit a sufficient number of trainable candidates to be maintenance contractors, and the attrition rate after training has been higher than forecast. Thus, much remains to be done to reach the Project training targets and there are no more funds to do it. While contractors trained under the Project are still at the low-end of their learning curve and should be able to increase productivity somewhat, the higher volumes of gravelling that have been necessary (90% gravelling as opposed to 40% estimated at formulation), have affected productivity and costs. In addition, other costs, particularly labor and materials, have increased faster than devaluation. Thus, the Project may run out of rehabilitation funds before the target lengths of rehabilitation works is reached.

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To reach its maintenance targets the Project is entirely dependent on government allocations for this purpose, through the NRB. Since NRB has limited maintenance to 50 km per District in 1998, the project would be short of its target by over 50%, assuming that funds for all 50 km are devoted to maintenance. In fact, the temptation exists that Districts will use the financing to rehabilitate and improve other roads, because there is no limit to costs or the type of activities that can be done on the 50 km, instead of maintaining those that have already been rehabilitated. Notwithstanding the above comments, there is no doubt that the Project has made an imprint, particularly with contractors and consultants, i.e. in the private sector, and among the Donor community. The Project is already being used as a model in the development of other Projects. For instance, ZAMPIP a project financed by the World Bank includes the training of 60 labor-based maintenance contractors following the Project’s approach. Also ROADSIP, an overall roads sector program financed by a number of donors including the World Bank, includes the establishment of 300 labor-based maintenance contractors and 72 rehabilitation contractors nation-wide. The RTS is to be the main training agency, and the Project’s approach is likely be adopted, with appropriate modifications based on the current experience. The labor-based technique has demonstrated itself useful and capable of producing high quality results, if somewhat slower than machine-based technique. However, the employment effects and the “local ownership” impact of labor-based techniques are vastly different, witness the formation of the self-help committees along the improved roads. The mission concludes that the change in Project approach was most appropriate and that the Project has already achieved a major step towards its development objective. However, while the Project was, and still is, highly relevant, and is likely to achieve much of its target for road improvement, and at least some of its objective of building-up technical capacity, we conclude that it is highly likely to be rendered unsustainable, for reasons beyond the control of the Project. Project sustainability is, in effect, totally dependent on two critical conditions: one is the proper funding of District Councils; to allow them to reorganize and hire competent professional people to run their activities. Two, is the availability of funds to continue maintenance and rehabilitation at reasonable levels of activity, commensurate to network needs. In other words, the survival of project activities beyond the life of the Project itself, is wholly dependent on the effective implementation of the government’s decentralization policy. And there are few indications that this policy is being pursued in a practical, efficient manner. No realistic steps have been taken to empower the District Councils with appropriate decision-making authority, and no permanent funding arrangements have been made to ensure their financial viability. For instance, MLGH was supposed to provide regular budget funding to the Councils, to run their general operations including the functioning of the CMU’s. This has not occurred, as Council funding is erratic. This has led to, in some cases, the loss of valuable training opportunities; for example, funds were not available for Council Supervisors to attend training on the first trial contracts, but more importantly it has prevented Councils from restructuring and attracting qualified staff. Similarly, little is being done to bring the National Roads Board, closer to the actual users of the maintenance funds, that is, the Districts. The Provincial Roads Boards, which were meant to decentralize the operation of the NRB have not been created. And no intention appears to exist to set them up in the near future. An overall lack of confidence that the District’s can manage their affairs properly and be accountable for the funds they receive, is partly to blame for this, yet confidence will not

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be established until the Councils are reorganized and funded in a way that allows them to attract qualified staff. A circularity problem exists that needs to be broken somewhere, at someone’s initial cost. Perhaps UNCDF should lead the way and arrange for the Councils to manage directly the Project funds allocated for rehabilitation. This would brake the circularity cycle and force the Councils to face their responsibilities. The means to do this are already in place, as Councils have set up special Bank accounts to channel Project funds. A successful experience in this area would assuage the NRB and the MLGH apprehensions, and ease the transition to full Council authority and responsibility for development funds. Another critical issue to the sustainability of the Project is to reduce the number of intermediaries dealing with district roads. The chain of events before any plan, Project or contract can be approved and sanctioned is too long for endorsements to come in a timely manner. Similarly, once Projects are approved and under execution, contractor certificates take a long time to be paid because the same chain of checks, approvals and sanctions has to be followed twice: once to sanction the certificate, and then for the payment to be passed back down the line. The role of some of the actors, especially that of the MLGH, should be reconsidered. The Ministry’s rather torpid disposition towards feeder roads generally and the Project in particular, would indicate that perhaps changes are needed in this area. For instance, in more than two years no visits have been paid by MLGH technical staff to Eastern Province, and as a result, useful lessons and good practices learned from implementing the Project have not been taken on by the Ministry. By the same token, the work that has been done by the Feeder Roads Section (DISS), which is useful for planning and other purposes, has not been passed down to the Districts, or the Project. Instead of taking a proactive role in the development of feeder roads, and more generally in the implementation of the government’s decentralization policy, the Ministry seems to have decided to take a rather passive, reactive posture that would need to be reviewed. Since the project has run out of training funds and the training targets have not been achieved, Project partners should decide whether training and capacity building is the Project’s paramount objective, or whether achieving physical targets is more important. If the former, we would suggest to follow the Clifton consultancy recommendations on enhanced training. The proposal, which would cost between US$200,000 and US$600,000 depending on which items are taken on, is based on the assumption that Councils in Eastern Province will not be able to continue to do rehabilitation after the Project is completed and suggests that Councils should concentrate, therefore, on maintenance only, and staff themselves accordingly. While the mission supports the Clifton proposals, it cautions that, at this time there are few signs decentralization, including funding arrangements to restructure the Councils, is becoming a reality. The Project should not try to accomplish too much before this in place, lest the effort goes later to waste. Once signs are positive, the recommendations of the Clifton report, which, as mentioned, require additional resources, should be put in place. Alternatively, the Project could continue training contractors and consultants, as it has done so successfully up to now. This alternative is widely supported by official as well as private circles, and should be seriously considered by Project authorities. This emphasis would be particularly useful if the assessment turns true, that Councils will not be able to engage in rehabilitation, but only in maintenance activities.

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PART A: FACTUAL PROJECT RESULTS 1. Background Zambia has about 752,000 square kilometers and a population of roughly 8 million, which at present rates of growth will double by 2015. There are nine provinces, each of them with one urban district and several rural districts. Districts Councils (DCs) are formed by elected Counselors and headed by the Council Secretary. Agriculture and manufacturing generate most of GDP, with mining a distant third. Still, mining generates most of Zambia’s export earnings. Official development assistance is estimated to account for more than 35% of the government revenues. The Government (GRZ) is, however, determined to carry out market-orientated economic reforms, and with donor support, is addressing the economy’s fundamental problems, including improvement of the transport infrastructure, especially roads. Zambia has approximately 37,000 km of roads, of which about 3,100 km are international trunk roads (T-roads), 4,000 km are main roads (M-roads), 24,000 km are district roads (D, and RD-roads), and the rest (5,900 km) are unclassified rural roads. Only 6,500 km (18%) are paved, the rest are either gravel or earth road. The Roads Department of Ministry of Works and Services is responsible for constructing, operating and maintaining trunk and main roads (T- and M-roads) and also for about 60% of district roads (D and RD roads). However, technically, D and RD roads, and the unclassified roads are under the jurisdiction of the District Councils. The roads sub-sector lacks funding and is poorly managed. There are no fewer than seven different government agencies that deal with roads. This has generated a severe neglect, and large portions of the networks are in need of rehabilitation and maintenance. The government has taken a number of steps to change the situation. It has revived the National Roads Board (NRB) and created the Roads Fund, principally, to take care of rehabilitation and maintenance. It also intends to effectively decentralize authority for district roads to the District Councils (DCs). To achieve this goal it has established a Feeder Roads Section (FRS) at the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), which deals with District Councils. The Section is to guide and coordinate DCs’ efforts to rehabilitate and maintain their roads. However, the capacity of government is limited at all levels, central and, especially in the Districts. Districts lack technical know-how and capacity to properly handle their affairs (finances and bookkeeping). Their budgets are limited and the Central Government is reluctant to increase transfers to them. Roads are financed by the Roads Fund. The Roads Fund is conformed with fuel taxes, levies on heavy trucks, and other tariffs. The fuel tax and tariffs are adjusted regularly to ensure that income is sufficient to meet maintenance requirements. However, the Government has been borrowing heavily from the Roads Fund, which has reduced resources and limited the NRB’s ability to significantly increase the amount of roadworks carried out in the country. To a large extent, investments in roads have depended on donor assistance. Up until now assistance for feeder roads has not been substantial. Since 1987 ILO has provided assistance for feeder roads rehabilitation in Northern Province, and since 1990 in Lusaka

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Province. The Roads Training School (RTS), which is a dominion of the Roads Department, Ministry of Works and Supplies, has also been the recipient of ILO assistance. Recently, the World Bank extended a large IDA grant to Zambia to implement a Roads Sector Investment Program (ROADSIP). This program has yet to get underway. 2. Institutional Arrangements The National Roads Board (NRB) has been put in charge of development and maintenance of roads nationwide. It finances these activities with the Roads Fund, which it manages. The Roads Fund is the major source of funding for roads in Zambia and it disburses directly to contractors for work done in any jurisdiction. A Financial Committee reviews requests, and approves payments for works carried out. NRB, was intended to have Provincial Roads Boards (PRBs). The PRBs, which were expected to be headed by the Provincial Secretaries and composed primarily of private sector members, were to coordinate road development efforts in the Districts, ensure that the Provincial Roads Plan was balanced and consistent, and, upon the advise of the Feeder Roads Section of the MLGH, serve as a conduit for Districts to apply for funds from the NRB. The Feeder Roads Section (FRS), which is nested in the new Department of Infrastructure and Support Services (DISS) of the MLGH, was created with the financial support and technical assistance of the World Bank. Its principal responsibilities are to: a) set-up a system and procedures at the central and provincial levels for planning,

coordinating and implementing District feeder roads projects b) prepare and firm-up policies, strategies and plans of action for District feeder roads

rehabilitation and maintenance c) carry out a national feeder roads inventory and periodic condition surveys d) develop training programs for small contractors for maintenance and rehabilitation e) coordinate donor agency financing for feeder roads. The FRS is also expected to advise the NRB and the PRBs on feeder roads plans for rehabilitation and maintenance in the Districts 3. The Project The government’s reform policy has decentralization as a central theme of reforms. Under decentralization, the District Councils (DCs) would take on increased responsibilities including exercising their statutory responsibility for specific categories of roads. However, DCs are handicapped because they have neither the financial resources nor the technical expertise to carry out their expected duties. In 1993, UNCDF and UNDP identified Eastern Province as an area of concentration for assistance to Districts. Two mutually reinforcing projects have been put in place in the Province. A District Development Project which supports local capacity building and minor infrastructure developments, and the Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Feeder Roads Project (FRP). The rural road system in Eastern Province suffered serious damage due to lack of maintenance. As a result, the pace of agricultural development slowed. To improve this situation, the FRP is providing extensive technical assistance to develop the

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capacity of the eight Districts in the Province, to plan, contract and supervise the execution of road rehabilitation and subsequent maintenance. To help the Councils carry out the task of improving their rural roads network, the Project is training small local contractors, who would carry out, under contracts with the Councils, rural road rehabilitation and routine maintenance using simple, labor-based work methods, and consultants, who would help to prepare tender documents to hire the contractors. The immediate objectives of the Project are to: • establish a capacity in the Districts to plan, design, contract and monitor road

rehabilitation and maintenance works using labor-based methods and locally available materials, leaving the execution of the works to local private contractors;

• develop a capacity among local contractors to rehabilitate and maintain feeder roads, through the use of labor-based technology;

• improve access to and within the Districts included the Project, as determined by economic and social activities in their areas of influence;

• create direct employment in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the selected roads in the Districts, and the conditions for sustainable longer-term employment in agriculture and other sectors.

The Project is focused primarily on building-up the capacity of the Districts and the private contractors, to rehabilitate and maintain rural feeder roads using labor-based techniques. In addition to training planning and supervisory staff in the Districts, and establishing functioning Contract Management Units (CMUs) in them, including effective monitoring and reporting systems, the Project is expected to produce the following outputs: a) 9 trained labor-based rehabilitation contractors, and 25 labor-based maintenance

contractors; b) 25 trained rehabilitation site supervisors, and 25 trained maintenance site

supervisors to work with the rehabilitation and maintenance contractors; c) using project capital funds, which would be repaid by the contractors, procure plant

and handtools to equip the contractors; d) 580 km of rehabilitated feeder roads; e) 700 km of feeder roads under maintenance; f) 900,000 worker-days of direct employment. All eight districts in the Province would receive technical assistance and training, but only five (Chadiza, Chipata, Katete, Lundazi, and Petauke) would receive capital assistance to carry out rehabilitation works. The MLGH through its Feeder Roads Section in the DISS is the central government agency executing the Project. The Provincial Administration through the Provincial Local Government Officer (PLGO) and other units such as the Provincial Planning Unit (PPU) and the Provincial Road Engineer (PRE), provides technical support to the Districts. The District Councils select the roads to be rehabilitated or maintained (following criteria yet to be defined under the Project), call for tenders, award and sign the contracts, and supervise their execution.

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Government (GRZ) finances the local cost of housing counterpart staff, and the costs of running and maintaining vehicles provided to the Districts. Also, GRZ directly or through the NRB, finances the costs of routine maintenance activities. UNDP finances the two National Road Engineers (NREs), the technical assistance provided through ILO (that is, the Technical Advisor (TA), and other ILO technical support), the training of District, contractor and consultants’ staff, provided under contract by the Roads Training School (RTS), and project drivers and office services. UNCDF finances the road rehabilitation contracts and the capital for the initial procurement of construction equipment and handtools, both tailored to labor-based construction technology. The initial capital outlay is recovered, however, from the contractors who receive the equipment and handtools, over the period of the Project. The funds recovered are reinvested in additional rehabilitation contracts. To recover the capital costs, a specialized financial agency was hired, which would in addition, provide the contractors technical assistance on accounting and financial management, and on equipment maintenance and repair. The services of the investment company would be paid for by interest charged to the contractors on the US$ equivalent of the cost of the equipment (the cost of the equipment is treated as an interest-bearing longer-term loan made to contractors, to purchase the equipment and handtools). ILO is providing the technical assistance under a cooperation agreement with UNDP and GRZ and is assisting in the technical monitoring of the Project. 4. Project Implementation The Project Agreement between UNCDF/UNDP and GRZ was signed in August 1995. In its original design, roadworks were to be done using equipment-based technology. It was expected that this would achieve rapid results and make a quick impact on the condition of local, district roads. This approach was limited, however, by the lack of local contractors. Consequently, in May 1996 it was agreed to redesign the Project, to train contractors to do the work, the Districts to manage the contracts, and consultants to prepare the tender documents. It was also decided that for these smaller rehabilitation and maintenance works, labor-based construction methods would be used. Similar experiences to promote labor- based contractors on similar projects in Africa gave base to believe this would be an effective strategy, and use of either technology would have required the training of small-scale local contractors. In addition, it was expected that other benefits would come of using the labor-based approach: employment creation; opportunities for women; stimulation of local economies; construction skills legacy in the communities; a sense of local ‘ownership’; and enhanced sustainability of road maintenance. But, to administer and manage a contractor-based program, emphasis needed to be placed on building-up the capacity of the District Councils responsible for the roads. Specifically, technical personnel needed to be trained, and their operations reorganized to work on contract management instead of the traditional force account operations. At the time of the Reformulation in June/July 1996 some activities were already in progress: • training of maintenance contractors by the Roads Training School (RTS) • arrival of the International Roads Specialist (IRS) • recruitment of the Project Manager (PM)

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• advertisements for recruiting the two National Road Engineers (NREs) • preparations for the initial selection of rehabilitation contractors • discussions on the selection of a finance company • procurement of equipment some of which was immediately available in Harare • agreements between the Government and both RTS and ILO were in place. An Addendum to the Project Agreement, to reflect the redesigned Project, was signed on 21st October 1996. Several activities, however, like equipment procurement and engaging the finance company were stalled until the Agreement was signed. In the event, the project manager took up his post in August 1996 and two NREs were selected and appointed. However, subsequently, neither would take up the position, and it was not until December 1996 that the first NRE arrived in Chipata. Following further recruitment the second NRE was appointed in March 1997. The initial proposal to locate offices and a workshop for both the FRP and the DDP in a large FAO compound on the outskirts of Chipata was rejected as inconvenient to effectively coordinate with the PLGO. In August offices were made available at the civic complex, on a temporary basis. Both Projects were established in the same offices, since both are under the same project manager and have common reporting and coordination needs.. There was no provision in GRZ, UNDP or UNCDF budgets for support staff: secretaries and drivers, and they could not be appointed immediately. Following a budget revision they were engaged in February 1997. It was recommended in the Addendum that, in addition to the identified project staff, the FRS of the MLGH would post technical staff to the Project on 6 months secondments. This would have provided extra support, while at the same time trained FRS staff in what was a new activity for them. An initial activity of the Project was to furnish its office. The best offer was from a company in Harare, Zimbabwe. The consignment arrived only in October 1996, extensively damaged due to inadequate transport. This led to lengthy responsibility claims and consequent delays in establishing the project office. Before the reformulation the first set of hand tools for the maintenance works was procured. These tools were used in the training of maintenance contractors, which was in progress at the time of the reformulation. At the start of the first trial contracts for the maintenance contractors, in October 1996, the tools were distributed to 20 maintenance contractors and the capital costs were recovered from their payment certificates. Total cost recovery was not achieved, however, until the end of the second trial contracts in late 1997. Procurement of the rehabilitation contractors equipment waited the signing of the Addendum, three months after the reformulation proposal. Although a Government executed Project, UNCDF took on the procurement of the vibrating rollers using international competitive bidding (ICB). Other equipment, e.g. trailers, water bowsers and deadweight rollers were procured under local competitive bidding rules. For reasons of backup support, and the need for an available tractor two tractors were to be provided to each contractor. The Addendum also recommended that each contractor receive two vibrating rollers. In the event, the decision was made to provide them with one of each type (vibrating and static or deadweight roller). This reduced the overall capital cost of

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the equipment set. All the equipment arrived in Chipata in May/June 1997, in time for the start of the first trial rehabilitation contracts. As the Project progressed it was decided to add some other small items of equipment to the contractor’s stock (e.g. a manual stone crusher and culvert molds) and to substitute a manual concrete mixer for the powered type originally proposed. In the absence of the finance leasing company the Project had to produce a temporary Hire Agreement, so that the tools and plant could be handed over to the contractors. This Agreement is still in force. The arrangement lacked some of the key components intended to support and train the contractors, which were an essential reason for seeking the involvement of the finance company. One of the main parties to the technical assistance support of the Project was the Roads Training School, which enjoyed a long collaboration with the ILO in labor-based road building. The RTS was contracted by the MLGH to provide the training in the Project. The original Project Document had no component for training contractors in labor-based techniques, it was written for an equipment-based approach. However, by the time the RTS training was established the emphasis had already changed. RTS became active before the Project was reformulated and thus, some changes to their contract were necessary later. The details of the required maintenance and rehabilitation training programs were more clearly defined by a consultant, A. Beusch,. The main changes included: • to train three persons from each rehabilitation contractor instead of one, • to include two trial contract periods instead of one, • to included supervisors from all Districts, not just those where investments were

to be done, • to train more maintenance contractor, to eventually achieve the target number, • to add mentorship for both maintenance and rehabilitation contractors. Contractor selection fort the rehabilitation training was done in July 1996. Provision had been made for the training to be carried out on a site in Chipata, using either hired equipment or equipment from the RTS itself. This option was not taken up, mainly for logistic reasons. Mission discussions with contractors revealed that training in Lusaka was preferred. The training started in December 1996. A full description and time scale of all the initial Project start-up activities was included in the Inception Report, February 1997. It also related the key issues that affected project progress at that point. The report included a revised workplan. In particular, revised cost estimates for rehabilitation and maintenance work were produced based on actual site conditions. One significant change was the need for more gravelling than the 40% included in the Addendum calculations, which increased costs, reduced productivity rates, and lowered potential Project output. In view of staffing and other constraints, it became clear that additional technical support was required if the program was to be kept on course. Because no provision had been made in the Project Document for someone to prepare the tender documents, the decision was made to engage an external consultant. Largely based on their labor-based construction experience in Kenya and Uganda, Norconsult was selected to assist in the preparations of the first trial rehabilitation contracts. Subsequently their support has been continued, to train and mentor consultants and District staff, and to further assist in the preparation of contract documents.

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In the Addendum it was suggested that once the contractors became spread in the five participating Districts, project staff would need to be redeployed to reduce the travel and physical exertion required to supervise activities. This has not happened and the proposal is further constrained by the absence, due to illness, of one of the NRE’s. Some of the support and mentorship currently being carried out by project staff and Norconsult, was intended to be done by the finance company. Especially assistance with the equipment loan, and the establishment of financially viable contracting enterprises. Since at the time of the reformulation, finance companies had already been identified and technical proposals obtained, it had been expected that an appropriate firm would be engaged forthwith. This would have allowed the company to participate in selecting contractors, and then train them. However in late 1996, UNCDF decided to review the invitation documents and become involved in the hiring. However, no feedback was received by the Project and the decision was then made to engage an ILO consultant to assist in the selection. The consultancy took place in March/April 1997. Since the procurement was done following national competitive rules, the Zambian Tender Board became involved, and eventually it selected a company that was not the highest ranked by the ILO consultant,. The contract, in accordance with proper procedure, was then submitted to the Legal Affairs Department for scrutiny. Finally, the company, Village Industry Service (VIS), was engaged by MLGH only in July 1998. By this time the second trial rehabilitation contracts had been substantially completed, and 12-month follow-up contracts were ready to be signed. As a consequence of the absence of the company’s support, equipment maintenance by the contractors has been generally poor. All but one contractor employed a mechanic, but the report of an independent consultant engaged under the Project in May 1998 (Mr. E.Sabelli), highlighted what he describes as a ‘pitiful state’ of much of the equipment. His report lists every piece of equipment in detail and is not repeated here. Following the initial emphasis on the training of contractors and consultants, the Project is now focusing its attention on the Councils. It was one of the objectives of the Project to establish District Councils capacity to take over project activities, and continue with maintenance and rehabilitation of feeder roads using labor-based techniques, once the Project was completed. As a result of the severe scarcity of human, material and financial resources in the Districts this component was expected to be difficult. Another ILO consultant (Mr. J.Clifton) produced in June 1998 a comprehensive report on District staff capacities. Following interviews with, and a detailed assessment of every key member of the staff in the Councils, the consultant recommended a comprehensive training program. The recommendations and implications are discussed in Part B. One further consultancy, undertaken in line with the recommendations of the Addendum, was the carrying out of a socio-economic baseline survey. This was done by the Participatory Assessment Group (C.N. Mwikisa – August 1997). The survey quantified some key indicators against which the Project may be measured, such as traffic counts. Not surprisingly, traffic counts show large non-motorized flows and only marginal motorized traffic (everywhere volumes are less than 20vpd, and generally less than 10vpd were counted). One of the objectives of the study was to introduce the Districts to the data collection methodology, so that regular data collection is carried out as part of their planning activities. For the purposes of their advisory and monitoring oversight, and with a view to achieving the basic project objectives of capacity building in both the public and private sectors, the project team has taken on a number of initiatives. Since both the FRP and the DDP are closely linked and under one manager, several activities are common to both Projects, they include:

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• establishment and regular quarterly meetings of a National Consultative

Committee, • regular internal Management meetings, • regular meetings with the Directors of Works, • technical and management workshops and seminars for contractors, and • promote the participation of Council staff in the regular meetings of the Labor-

Based Contractors Association. These activities are documented in minutes, resolutions, technical handouts, progress and monitoring reports. The Project Agreement established the funding arrangements for the Project. The GRZ was to finance the maintenance works from the Roads Fund, through the National Roads Board NRB. The stated intention was that Provincial Roads Boards were to be established to facilitate the timely payment of contractors, on which the sustainability of the labor-based technology depends. In the event, NRB funding is still centralized, which entails processing payment certificates via a circuitous maze of checks and sanctions, which goes through the Councils, the FRS in MLGH, and the NRB in Lusaka. To speed up payments the Project has agreed to manage the NRB funds. Rehabilitation works, funded by UNCDF, were expected to be managed by the Districts, assisted by project staff. The intention was to make use of the financial management capacity that was being created in the Districts under parallel assistance, notably British Aid and UNCDF’S District Development Project. However, British aid was suspended, and the DDP was delayed. Thus, the Project has had to assume full management of the funds. Neither funding management arrangement: for maintenance or for rehabilitation, is sustainable in the long-term, as it stands at present. MLGH was to fund the activities of the District Contract Management Units. In the event, the flow of funds has been inconsistent. This has been the subject of continuing discussion at the various management and monitoring committees. At best, Councils receive intermittent subventions from the MLGH, and in several cases payment of salaries is several months in arrears. At the time the Project started no feeder roads standards were available. Through the services of Norconsult, project-specific standards were developed. The Addendum suggested a 5 meter overall formation width, based on the recommendation of an EU study. The Project adopted two standard cross-sections, a 4.5m and 5.4m overall formation width. In light of the low traffic counts, the first is clearly the most adequate. However, no standard has yet been developed or been adopted by the MLGH, which has tendered the 1998 rehabilitation and maintenance program with different standards than these. Although the Addendum suggested considering the ICE, UK, Minor Works Conditions of Contract (which consist of only 11 clauses and are meant for contracts in the range of US$1 million), the Project, on the recommendation of Norconsult, adopted the World Bank Conditions of Contract for Smaller Works (which are meant for contracts in the US$10 million range). No agreement exists yet on which documents to use. The NRB is independently developing a set of Contract Conditions, and the MLGH has used a different, non-standard Contract Document to tender the 1998 rehabilitation and maintenance work program.

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To aid the preparation and supervision of contracts, the Project produced a comprehensive series of forms which result in a fully detailed, task-by-task bill of quantities. The forms are more detailed than seen on other similar Projects and are extremely useful for contractors and supervisory staff to estimate, measure and cost, all the activities that contribute to the labor-based construction of a road. However, no dissemination of this useful tool has been made by the MLGH. In addition to quarterly reports, the Project has produced many other reports that analyze and record progress, they include: • report on the performance of the first trail contracts by each contractor, including

and assessment of each contractor, • detailed analysis of actual worker day inputs for each contractor and comparisons

to the estimates, • completed-project fact-sheets • detailed project status reports • employment figures by gender • status of equipment loan repayments by contractors. The rehabilitation and maintenance cost estimates were calculated in detail in the Project Addendum. Based on a number of assumptions, principally an expected rehabilitation gravelling of 40%, target outputs of 2km per month were estimated. Equipment needs were based on these figures. An analysis of the rehabilitation activities shows that gravelling of around 90% has been necessary, this has had a major effect on output and costs. With their given sets of equipment, contractors have been reaching outputs only in the range of 1.5 km per month. In addition, labor and materials costs have increased. The result is that rehabilitation works are averaging US$10,000 per km compared to the US$7,000 estimated in the Addendum. Similarly, an analysis of maintenance works shows that in many cases the tasks carried out are not strictly in the routine maintenance category, particularly on recently equipment-graded roads, where significant new drainage structures have been needed. Outputs have consequently been somewhat lower than expected. One of the most encouraging Project developments has been the spontaneous formation of the Labor-Based Contractors Association, which includes both the maintenance and rehabilitation contractors. This organization was born out of contractor discussions during the training in Lusaka. The Association is run by an Executive Committee and holds regular meetings to discuss issues of common interest. Project staff attend the meetings, which are a positive contribution to general capacity building amongst the contractors. The Association has an office in Chipata, which the Project is equipping on a reimbursable basis. Another development of the Project is the inclusion of consultants (some from well-established companies, others individual consultants) in the training program. Consultants have been trained in the engineering assessment and preparation of tender documents for labor-based rehabilitation contracts. This training was added to the Norconsult contract and commenced in May 1998, and is in line with the objective of building up capacity in the private sector. In light of the uncertainties and constraints surrounding the future activities of the District Councils, this inclusion was a sound decision, the implications of which, for the future direction of the Project, are discussed in Part B.

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Overall, Project implementation is in line with the approach and program set out in the Project Addendum. In the light of constraints and circumstances, mostly outside the Projects immediate control, pragmatic decisions have been taken to try to sustain progress. These have included changes in emphasis and budget revisions. 5. Project Outputs Capacity Building 10 rehabilitation contractors were selected for training at the Roads Training School. Training included formal classroom training at RTS, and two supervised, on-the-job training, trial contracts. 8 contractors passed the formal training, and 6 successfully completed their first trial contract. The 2 that failed to complete the first trial contract were merged into one company. Therefore, the Project has now 7 trained labor-based rehabilitation contractors. The contractors are currently completing their second trial contract and some have started to receive follow-up contracts from the Project 21 maintenance contractors were trained at the RTS. As with the rehabilitation contractors, training included formal classes and two trial contracts. 18 contractors passed the classroom training and 15 of them completed the two trial contracts successfully. Some are currently working on their first full contract. 14 District Supervisors were trained in the principles of labor-based construction. All of them have received on-the-job training in supervision of rehabilitation and maintenance works from project staff. In addition, 5 of them have received some formal and on-the-job training, from project staff, in field assessment and surveying. The 2 national roads engineers employed by the Project, the project manager and the Provincial Director of Works attended an introductory course on labor-based construction at IHE, in Delft. 5 District Directors of Works attended a two-week seminar on Contract Management in Harare. Physical Output 76 km of feeder roads were rehabilitated under the first and second trial contracts, and another 150 km are currently being rehabilitated under subsequent contracts. 196 km of roads received routine maintenance interventions under the maintenance trial contracts. In total, then 272 km of road have received routine maintenance works (the 76 km rehabilitated, as rehabilitation contracts include routine maintenance for a year after completion, and the 196 km on which trial maintenance contracts were carried out). However, no regular routine maintenance is done on the roads rehabilitated or maintained under the Project, or on the rest of the Districts’ network, because (i) there is, as yet, no maintenance program, and (ii) Districts can only contract maintenance when funds become available to them, which has not happened regularly. Employment Generation Up to the end of the first quarter of 1998, 124,398 work-days of direct employment had been generated by the road rehabilitation contracts, of which 16% were performed by

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women. 30,664 workdays had been generated in road maintenance works, of which 14% were carried out by women. 6. Project Status The quality of work being produced by the maintenance contractors was noted at the time of the reformulation of the Project. Mission observations confirmed that good quality is still the general norm. Of course, some contractors perform better than others do, and some need continuous regular supervision (Council supervisors visit 3 times a week). Some problems have resulted from the maintenance contractors having to undertake tasks which are not strictly routine maintenance and are therefore outside their training experience (further enhanced maintenance training is suggested in Part B). As a result of the training and trial contracts, performance of the rehabilitation contractors is also good. On all the roads inspected the work is of good technical standard, as good as any on similar Projects elsewhere. This is a reflection of the good quality training, and the close initial supervision during the trial contracts. The only comment (already noted by the Project) is that the longitudinal profile of the rehabilitated roads tends to be uneven on stretches. More attention needs to be paid to the surface in the final compaction stage. The number of rehabilitation contractors has been reduced to 7, as two of the contractors trained are being merged into one company. This has to do with one of them having poor organization and finances, rather than with the technical quality of the work (which highlights the effect of not having had the finance company’s support in the early stages of contractor training). In the process of reaching its present status, and generating the outputs described above, the Project has spent the equivalent of US$2.9 million of a budgeted US$7.2 million (UNDP Budget revision H, UNCDF Budget revision F). These expenditures have been financed as follows: Original Current Actual Cost Cost Expenditures2

Estimate Estimate (US$ equivalent) Government of Zambia 1,042,400 1,042,400 121,600 UNDP (Budget rev. H) 932,000 1,244,832 784,359 UNCDF (Budget rev. F) 4,635,000 4,916,853 2,029,006 TOTALS 6,609,400 7,204,085 2,934,965 It should be noted that it is commendable that the government has been able to contribute US$120,000 to the execution of this Project in times of stringent budgetary constraints. Not many Projects in Zambia are receiving such attention and allocations. A full account of government as well as Donor expenditures is in Annex 1. Pretty much as expected, in the sense that major training outlays were to occur in 1996 and 1997, all training funds (except some minor allocations for fellowships, in-service training and study tours) have been spent, and not all the training that was supposed to be done, has been completed. In particular, Directors of Works and other personnel at the

2 As of June 30,1998

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District Councils have not been either trained, or fully coached (see Staff Capacity Assessment, and Future Training Needs Report, J. Clifton, June 1998). A number of factors collaborated to produce this situation: firstly, the training budget was underestimated in that the capacity of Council staff, especially DoWs, was overestimated and less training than actually required was built into the Project; secondly, not enough Council DoWs and supervisors could be found to train, because many positions were unfilled and/or incumbents were not apt to be trained3; and thirdly, that the attrition rate fort hose trained was much higher than expected. Thus, much remains to be done to reach the Project training target for District Councils. The Council Supervisors course, for instance, was not particularly satisfactory, in that only 4 trainees became available (in lieu of 10 proposed). These were the best participants in the maintenance classroom program, but they could not join the practical, trial contract phase because of Council lack of funds to pay their subsistence allowances. It is notable that of 39 staff from the Districts who have had training under the Project, only 22 remain in their posts. Many have left for the private sector, and others have been reassigned; this is a serious constraint to capacity building. Moreover, there seems to be little chance that vacant positions will be filled, because Councils have a long salary arrears, and because a major retrenchment of staff is underway overall. Until the restructuring exercise (initially on a 3-year pilot basis) is completed, chances of finding sustainable candidates for training are slim. At the moment, there are not sufficient suitable candidates to train; a situation that prompted the decision to invite local consultants to join the training program (mostly at their expense), which proved to be a sound decision. (In the context of the issue of training, see also the section on “Critical Issues,” below). Similarly, because of the increases in costs (see Project Implementation, above) it is not likely that all the road lengths expected to be rehabilitated under the Project will be done. Maintenance, on the other hand, was supposed to be financed by the government, but given current financial constraints, it is difficult to expect that the full lengths forecast to have been put under regular routine maintenance will be achieved. In fact, to date, no regular maintenance program has been put in place, only specific interventions have been carried out on certain roads under the trial contracts. But no regular, year-after-year maintenance activities are programmed. The NRB has stated its intention to tender 3 to 5 year maintenance contracts. This would overcome part of the problem, and eliminate the need to plan for work that needs to be continuous, on an annual basis. However, developments may be a long time in coming. District Councils have stressed their confidence in being able to mobilize self-help maintenance from local communities, once the roads have been improved. This would help Councils overcome partly the funding problem. But self-help also requires some training for selected community personnel, lest some untrained maintenance does more harm than good. For instance, someone who was initiated on the rehabilitation works could demonstrate to the communities how the necessary routine work should be done. But Councils would need to provide permanent advisory support. It has seldom been the case that self-help arrangements have been sustained, yet the proposal should be pursued. A self-help maintenance committee has been formed in the area of the first trial contract road, on the Tamanda Loop, in Chipata District. Still, continuity of funding and the commitment of the Council’s Works Departments are the best insurance for a sustainable system. 3 This, in turn, lead to the inclusion of consultants in the training instead of Council staff.

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PART B ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT DESIGN, EXECUTION AND SUSTAINABILITY 1. Quality of Project Preparation and Design The development objective for the revised Project speaks of an integrated strategy for rural infrastructure development, relying on locally available private sector resources and the training of District Councils. It thus gives importance first to the training of the private sector, and then to capacity building in the Districts. The immediate project objectives, on the other hand, detail first, capacity building in the Districts and then on private sector contractors. While the Addendum to the Project Agreement might have been clearer in stating objectives, it is evident that it placed prominent significance on training both the private and public sector. The issue is one of emphasis, which has become important, as partners may have to decide where to place the emphasis in the second half-term of the Project. The clear intention was for District Councils to cease using direct labor (force account) and move towards managing the provision of services for them. For this, the Works Departments had to be re-designed into Contract Management Units (CMUs) with a staff structure oriented to effectively managing rather than directing works. The approach was sound, although it appears that the concept of the CMU has not been fully understood. The Addendum might have been more specific, although project outputs do cover the point in detail (Addendum para. 4.3.1). Together with these less measurable objectives, very specific goals were defined in the Addendum, e.g. the number of contractors to be trained; lengths of roads to be rehabilitated and maintained, and employment to be created. This pattern of Project delineation unfortunately leads staff and other parties to place the emphasis, at least initially, on the quantified objectives as a judge of Project achievements. To complicate matters, under Project Description (section 5 of the Addendum) it is the length of rehabilitated roads which receives first mention, capacity building is placed third. Surely, no priority was suggested, but there is uncertainty as to the main objective. If Project design had been more definitive it would now be easier to opt for alternatives. Yet, in designing the Project, it could not have been foreseen that questions of emphasis and priorities would become important to Project partners in deciding how to proceed in the second half-term of the Project. However, partners will have to decide whether to place more emphasis in reaching physical goals or training goals, and if the latter should be chosen, whether to reach private sector training targets or public sector training goals first. The three main players in the Project: the Technical Assistance team, the Roads Training School, and the finance company, were designed as a coordinated arrangement. It was seriously affected by the unexpected difficulties in recruiting the National Roads Engineers in the TA team, and the two-year delay in appointing the finance company. Given what was known at the time of reformulation these circumstances could not have been foreseen and project design could not have made allowance for it. Yet, the Project has been affected by the delays. There were advantages in contracting the RTS: it had a long-standing association with labor-based techniques through ILO, and, in addition, the training capacity would remain in-country and not dependent on external technical assistance. While the RTS training included contractors as well as District supervisors, critically, the Director of Works were

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not included (a point made in the Clifton report). The DoWs had been identified as qualified engineers with some years of experience. The assumption was that specific training was not necessary and that interaction with the project team would be sufficient for them to assimilate the necessary contract management skills. However, the assumption was not borne out by facts, and DoW training is conspicuously missing at a time when all Project training funds have been exhausted. In the circumstances where not all the essential components of the Project were in place at the outset (e.g. national staff, the finance company, office accommodation, supporting Projects), the inevitable outcome was that project staff assumed an executive rather than solely advisory role. This applies in particular to the management of funds, which was to be done by the Districts using their newly acquired skills provided in parallel training. The design of this component recognized that other inputs to capacity building in the District Councils, were critical (e.g. British ODA, VNG’s the Dutch Association of Municipalities, and UNCDF’s District Development Project). Since these parallel training efforts were not completed and in the case of DDP was late, Districts could not cope and the Project had to take over the task of managing funds. Once established these executive arrangements are difficult to displace, and as a result Project staff-time meant for advising and mentoring the Districts, has not been available as expected. Also, Project design could have been more definitive in stating that much of the day-to-day support to Council supervisors would have to come from the DoW’s themselves. This would have been particularly the case if they had been as qualified and experienced as they were assumed to be. As it turned out, because of their qualifications and experience and the pressures of other duties, DoWs have not been fully mentoring their own staff. Further training, and the restructuring of Councils should help to resolve this problem. One point of concern is the role of the FRS of DISS in the MLGH. MLGH is the executing agency for the Project, and FRS was supposed to have an important input, play a leading role, extract useful lessons, and gain valuable experience from the implementation of the Project. Instead, a misconception seems to have occurred and somehow labor-based works have been understood by FRS as an experimental, pilot exercise, a separate activity divorced from their mainstream of responsibilities. It is regrettable that the coordination arrangements have failed to materialize, and that in the first two years of the Project no one from the FRS has managed to find time to visit the Project. The impression given is that, contrary to expectations; the Project and the FRS are working independently. Another area where coordinated implementation of the Project has not been in line with the Addendum is that of District Council funding. MLGH was supposed to provide regular budget funding to the Councils, to run their general operations including the functioning of the CMU’s. This has not occurred, as Council funding is erratic. This has led to, in some cases, the loss of valuable training opportunities. For example, funds were not available for Council Supervisors to attend training on the first trial contracts. Similarly, funding of maintenance activities by the NRB is cumbersome. The NRB does not transfer funds to the Districts to pay contractors’ under contracts that Councils have signed, instead it pays contractors directly. This has led to unsustainable arrangements being made by the Project to manage NRB funds and pay contractors. More care should have been exercised in Project design to assess the financial capacity of the government and the Councils, and perhaps different funding arrangements should have been devised. As it stands, until the GRZ decentralization policy has resulted in

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the restructuring and consistent funding of Districts, the problem is not likely to be resolved. As a result, the key question of continuing maintenance of the roads after rehabilitation, and thus of Project sustainability, remains open. Funding for maintenance is the responsibility of the NRB, which has limited each District to contract works on 50 km of road the present year. This arrangement is likely to encourage Councils to opt for the rehabilitation of other roads, rather than the maintenance of the newly rehabilitated lengths. For this reason, the Project has extended the maintenance period in the rehabilitation contracts to 12 months. However, this is an unsustainable arrangement. More care should have been taken in Project design to research and resolve through the Project, the “after Project” maintenance issue. Notwithstanding the above comments, the Project’s success and the lessons learnt from it, attest to the validity of its design. The Project is already being used as a model in the development of other Projects. For instance, the ZAMPIP Project financed by the World Bank includes the training of 60 labor-based maintenance contractors, following the Project’s approach. Also ROADSIP, which is an overall roads sector program financed by a number of donors including the World Bank, now includes the establishment of 300 labor-based maintenance contractors and 72 rehabilitation contractors nation-wide. The RTS is to be the main training agency, and the Project’s approach is likely be adopted, with appropriate modifications based on the current experience. From this point of view the Project has already achieved a major step towards its development objective. 2. Efficiency of Project Execution The Project Workplan has been followed with minor exceptions. This was done to ensure Project fluidity and efficient execution. The workplan was revised in the Inception Report, to reflect circumstances at the time, and further annual updates will be required. The plan of operations was set out in 7 Activity Blocks, which were assigned a time scale for completion within the 5 years Project period. Each one of them is reported on in Annex 2. Considering that not all Project components have been in place at any one time, execution has been exceptionally efficient in producing its expected outputs. An example is provided by the timely procurement of plant and handtools that were necessary for the training. It is not often in CDF Projects, that procurement is timely. In this case it was achieved by the use of flexible approaches and a proactive interaction between CDF staff in the field, project personnel, the government and suppliers. Their approach should be used as a “better practices” model. Moreover, if one takes into account that contractors are still at the initial stages of their learning curve and are reaching outputs of 1.5 km of rehabilitation works per month, then one can conclude that the Project as a whole, is more likely than not to reach its output target of rehabilitated road lengths in time (that is, by the Project Closing Date of 2001). Contractor productivity should gradually increase to around 2.0 km per month and at that rate targets would, no doubt, be reached as forecast in the Project Document. Two factors conspire against this forecast; one is the relatively higher volumes of gravelling that have been necessary, this reduces productivity. The other is costs, increased gravelling is more expensive, and in addition, labor and other materials costs have been increasing faster than devaluation, thus the project may run out of rehabilitation funds before the target is reached.

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To reach its maintenance targets the Project is entirely dependent on government allocations for this purpose, through the NRB. Since NRB has limited maintenance to 50 km per District in 1998, the project would be short of its target by over 50%, assuming that funds for all 50 km are devoted to maintenance. In fact, the temptation exists that Districts will use the financing to rehabilitate and improve other roads, instead of maintaining those that have already been rehabilitated, because there is no limit to costs or activities that can be done on the 50 km. Some Project targets will, obviously, not be reached because funds have already been exhausted. District staff training is one. The number of maintenance contractors trained is another. As explained, a number of reasons conspired to produce this situation, and the Project partners will have to decide whether to add resources to the Project, or remanage existing ones, if they agree that reaching training goals is more important than reaching physical outputs. This does not detract, however, from the fact that the Project has been very efficient in training contractors, consultants, and some District staff. Finally the mission notes the fluidity and ease of relations between the Donors and other UN agencies involved in this Project, and their host country counterparts. Similarly, the cooperation between UN agencies, UNDP/CDF and ILO/ASIST in particular, has been quite remarkable. The backstopping support received by the Project from ASIST has been particularly effective. There is no doubt that this has significantly contributed to the efficiency of Project implementation and augurs well for the second half-term of the Project. 3. Relevance and Effectiveness The Project was, at the time it was reformulated, and is still now, highly appropriate to the Zambian environment. It addresses relevant immediate problems applicable to Zambia generally, and Eastern Province in particular. It deals with lack of know-how and of technical and managerial capacity at the District level in both the private and the public sector, it addresses high rural under- and unemployment, and the need to improve a largely neglected network of district roads in poor, mostly non-maintainable condition. The Project has so far, been highly successful in helping to alleviate these problems. Using labor-based road rehabilitation and maintenance techniques, thereby contributing to create employment, it has succeeded in training 7 private rehabilitation contractors, 15 private maintenance contractors, and 19 public officials: 14 district supervisors, 5 of whom have also been trained in preparing bills of quantities, and 5 Directors of Works have had an introduction to labor-based construction techniques. In addition, 76 km of feeder road have been rehabilitated to an excellent standard and are being maintained for a year, and another 196 km have received separate routine maintenance interventions. As to broader development objectives, the Project Document was mute. Nonetheless, the emergency transport circumstances which triggered the Project in the first place, namely local difficulties in evacuating a bumper maize crop in 1995-96, which were to be resolved by the quick improvement of feeder roads through the Project, were overcome without the Project’s intervention. When the Project could have helped, it was unable to, because of lack of contractors to improve the roads. By the time the Project was redesigned the emergency was over. The Project’s broader development objective then changed, to building-up technical capacity in the Districts, and this the redefined approach of the Project is much better suited to achieve than the initial capital-intensive, machine-based approach. There is no doubt that the Project has made an imprint, particularly with contractors and consultants, i.e. in the private sector, and among the Donor community. The Project is

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being closely followed by them, and its experience is being translated into the design of other Projects. The use of labor-based techniques has demonstrated itself useful and capable of producing high quality results, if somewhat slower than machine-based techniques. However, the employment effects and the “local ownership” impact of labor-based techniques are vastly different, witness the formation of the self-help committees along the improved roads. The mission concludes that the change in Project approach was most appropriate. During this first half-term of the Project, the burden of carrying out the Project work, particularly the preparation of contract documents, much of the supervision, as well as ensuring timely payment to contractors, has fallen on the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). Despite the insufficient and late government contributions, the PIU has been able to keep the contractors, especially the maintenance contractors who are being paid by the NRB, motivated and in business. However, this situation is not sustainable in the longer term. In the future, and particularly after the Project is completed, these functions will have to be carried out by the Districts. Yet, with their current insufficient resources and poor staffing, they will not be able to support the continuation of maintenance and rehabilitation work at the rhythm required to maintain the contractors in business. Project sustainability is, in effect, totally dependent on two critical conditions: one is the proper funding of District Councils; to allow them to reorganize themselves and hire competent professional people to run their activities. Two, is the availability of funds to continue maintenance and rehabilitation at a reasonable level of activity, commensurate to network needs. In other words, the survival of project activities beyond the life of the Project itself, and consequently the enduring of the benefits they are generating, is wholly dependent on the effective implementation of the government’s decentralization policy. And yet, there are few indications that this policy is being pursued in a practical, efficient manner. No realistic steps have been taken to empower the District Councils with appropriate decision-making authority, and no permanent funding arrangements have been made to ensure their financial viability. Among the immediate steps that would need to be taken is the payment of salary arrears in the Councils, the funding of severance payments to reduce their establishment, and their restructuring to allow them to substitute current staff by qualified professional people paid accordingly. Thus, while the Project has been making significant efforts to train and prepare contractors and consultants to efficiently carry out road rehabilitation and maintenance works, there is no evidence that similar efforts are being made at the Central and Provincial level, to ensure that the enterprise will be carried out efficiently by the Councils beyond the life of the Project. For instance, little is being done to bring the National Roads Board, closer to the actual users of the maintenance funds, that is, the Districts. The Provincial Roads Boards, which were meant to decentralize the operation of the NRB have not been created. And no intention appears to exist to set them up in the near future. Thus, the NRB remains as distant from the Districts as it ever was. An overall lack of confidence that the District’s can manage their affairs properly and be accountable for the funds they receive, is partly to blame for this, yet confidence will not be established until the Councils are reorganized and funded in a way that allows them to attract qualified staff. A circularity problem exists that needs to be broken somewhere, at someone’s initial cost. Perhaps UNCDF should lead the way and arrange for the Councils to manage directly the Project funds allocated for rehabilitation. This would brake the circularity cycle and force the Councils to face their responsibilities. The means to do this are already in place, as Councils have set up special Bank accounts to channel Project funds. A successful experience in this area would in turn assuage the NRB’s and the MLGH’s

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apprehensions, and ease the transition to full Council authority and responsibility for development funds. Although theoretically, the Roads Fund is well endowed by the proceeds of the fuel levy, its administrator, the NRB, has had funding constraints, caused by the Ministry of Finance’ retention of fuel taxes, that have made it difficult to channel more resources, in a timely manner to roads in the rural Districts. In all fairness, some of the constraint is in the delay with which the Districts and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing come up with appropriate plans for the NRB to fund. But this is more likely to be the product of inefficiency than inability. Plans for road rehabilitation and maintenance have to be submitted by the Districts to the MLGH for scrutiny and approval before they are assembled by the Ministry into a nationwide Plan, which is then referred to the NRB. This process is protracted and subject to political pressures which naturally delay it. Once at the NRB plans are again scrutinized for reasonableness, and are, naturally, again, subject to political and other non-technical pressures that delay their approval. Thus, Plans have been late and their implementation slow. The long chain of checks and controls should be shortened and the number of actors involved in approvals reduced. In addition, by strictly exercising its prerogative to process payments nationwide at its Headquarters in Lusaka, NRB is actually preventing small-scale contractors, especially those farther away, from being paid in time. Payment procedures, in turn, are cumbersome and circuitous. Certificates have to be sanctioned by the Districts and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing before they reach the NRB where they are again scrutinized. Paychecks, once issued, are routed through the MLGH and the Districts, to the contractors. Again, this long chain of intermediaries should be shortened and the number of actors reduced. Payment delays have significant ripple effects. Small-scale contractors generally, but labor-based contractors particularly, are vulnerable to late payments as labor, their principal input, cannot go unpaid for months. If not paid, laborers cease to work and production halts. Small-scale, labor-based contractors do not have the financial strength to keep their workforce, and are, thus, compelled to default on contracts. Furnishing a steady stream of rehabilitation and maintenance work, and timely payments, are vital to the survival of the Project’s enterprise. The effort to improve contractor and official local capacity to manage and maintain roads cannot be sustained without them. Thus, while the Project was, and still is, highly relevant, and is likely to achieve its goals of building-up technical capacity and of improving some roads, we conclude that it is highly likely to be rendered unsustainable by the slow implementation of the government’s decentralization policy. This policy involves, among other things, the funding of Districts to ensure that they have the resources to restructure themselves and attract qualified staff paid accordingly, and have the funds to properly exercise their statutory responsibilities including rehabilitation and maintenance of their road networks. Both are necessary to ensure the sustainability of the Project. 4. Critical Issues As it stands, the Project has yet to train a sufficient number of maintenance contractors, and most District Council personnel that were to subsequently staff the Contract Management Units (CMUs). However, except for some fellowships and in-service training funds, the training budget has all been consumed. Therefore, unless the training budget is replenished with either fresh funds, or by remanaging existing resources, the

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Project will not be able to carry out further training of either maintenance contractors or District Council officers. At the same time, future Project activities are intimately tied to (i) progress in implementing the decentralization policy and (ii) the MLGH’s concomitant progress in building up District Councils (that is, reorganizing, and properly funding and staffing them). Yet, if restructuring of the Councils is not to occur in the immediate future, and there are few, if any, indications that this will occur, it would be premature for the Project to engage in the active training of District staff. This is because people that may not remain in the Councils’ might be trained, while those that would be employed might not. It is fortuitous therefore, that the Project has run out of training funds at this juncture. Yet, if Donors and the government should agree that training and capacity building is the Project’s paramount objective, and were to make available funds to complete the task as planned, we would suggest to follow the Clifton consultancy recommendations on enhanced training4. The proposal, which would cost between US$200,000 and US$600,000 depending on which items are taken on, is based on the assumption that Councils in Eastern Province will not be able to continue to do rehabilitation after the Project is completed. The report suggests that Councils should concentrate, therefore, on maintenance only, and staff themselves accordingly. To manage maintenance contracts, the consultant concluded, the following activities should be done: (i) Directors of Works in all 8 Districts should be intensively trained (earlier assumptions that DoWs had adequate knowledge and experience were not borne out by the consultant’s assessment), (ii) awareness of District Secretaries about roads and their development and care should be increased by providing them a network management course and study tours, (iii) the 14 District supervisors already trained should have a refresher course, (iv) workshops on surveying, computer applications, reporting, road inventories and condition surveys, and on contract management procedures should be provided to CMU technical staff, and secretarial support staff should receive training on office techniques, filing, computer applications, etc.. In addition, the consultant suggests that (v) another technical assistance team member should be recruited for a period of 18 months, to liaise with the Districts, provide them mentorship, and manage (vi) a program of internships for District personnel at the Project Implementation Unit. Moreover, the mission has been made aware of a strong desire in the Districts for assistance in training communities in basic maintenance activities and their organization. There is a strong grass-roots movement in the Province to organize self-help road maintenance, which the Districts would naturally want to capitalize on, especially given their limited funding and poor prospects of improvements in this area. Self-help in maintaining, even simple rural roads, cannot be left to be done without some organization and technical input, lest it creates more bad than good. Thus, some minimal community training would be advisable. This is not included in the consultant’s estimates. An alternative to training District officers at this time, is for the Project to continue training contractors and consultants, as it has done so successfully up to now. This alternative is widely supported by official as well as private circles, and should be seriously considered by Project authorities. Since the target number of maintenance contractors has not been reached yet, 15 instead of 25 maintenance contractors have been trained so far, the Project should perhaps focus on reaching this target before embarking on training District personnel. This emphasis would be particularly useful if the

4 John Clifton, An Enhanced Training Program for Key District Staff to man the Contract Management Units, Feedeer Roads Project, June 1998.

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assessment turns true, that Councils will not be able to engage in rehabilitation but only in maintenance activities. A Project objective that has not yet been achieved, is that of establishing a capacity to plan and design rehabilitation and maintenance programs in the Districts. This has been partly because the PIU is ill equipped to provide training in this area directly, and because of the late start of the DDP which was to provide the main input to build up this capacity. Project designers tried to capitalize on the obvious synergy between the two Projects but could not foresee that one might become out of phase with the other leaving an important gap. As a result, Districts are still using a list of priority roads drawn up in 1993, adapting it to current circumstances. Adaptation has proved difficult though, and political and other pressures have rendered the 1993 list obsolete with the consequence that some questionable choices are being made on roads to rehabilitate and maintain. This, in turn, translates into debatable Plans which get changed and redrawn by political pressures applied on the different sanctioning agencies, notably the MLGH and the NRB. Responsibility for the DDP has recently been moved in the MLGH from DISS to the Department of Local Government, and this augurs better prospects for a speedier implementation of the different components of that Project and thus an increased support for planning at District level. Another critical issue to the sustainability of the Project is to reduce the number of intermediaries dealing with district roads. The chain of events before any plan, Project or contract can be approved and sanctioned is too long for endorsements to come in a timely manner. Similarly, once Projects are approved and under execution, contractor certificates take a long time to be paid because the same chain of checks, approvals and sanctions has to be followed twice: once to sanction the certificate, and then for the payment to be passed back down the line. The role of some of the actors, especially that of the MLGH, should be reconsidered. The Ministry’s rather torpid disposition towards feeder roads generally and the Project in particular, would indicate that perhaps changes are needed in this area. For instance, in more than two years it has not developed highly needed design standards for feeder roads. Since no visits have been paid by MLGH technical staff to Eastern Province, useful lessons and good practices learned from implementing the Project have not been taken on by the Ministry. By the same token, the work that has been done by the Feeder Roads Section (DISS), which is useful for planning and other purposes, has not been passed down to the Districts, or the Project5. Instead of taking a proactive role in the development of feeder roads, and more generally in the implementation of the government’s decentralization policy, the Ministry seems to have decided to take a rather passive, reactive posture that would need to be reviewed. 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5 A nationwide (vehicle observation) inventory of road conditions has been undertaken resulting in a full listing and mapping of the roads in all Districts. Contract Documents were produced and contracts were tendered by DISS, for the current year’s program of 50km lengths in each Districts. The DISS also produced a Project Implementation Manual, including road standards, which at present is awaiting World Bank comments. Although it is difficult to reconcile Contract Conditions containing 54 clauses as were developed by the Project, with the 5 clauses in the DISS documents, attempt should be made at coordinating. The DISS also specifies 4 meter gravelled width for their contracts while the Project has been using either 4.5 meter and 5.7 meter standards. Agin coordination is necessary.

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From the foregoing analysis there emerges the conclusion that Project constraints do not come from components within the control of project staff:

• human capacity at District level is difficult to find; the Councils are overstaffed, they exhibit poor working environments, staff vacancies cannot be filled and their ability to recruit appropriate staff is severely limited by their salary arrears,

• financial resources are scarce, funding remains centralized, and there are no local

revenue sources; in addition, there is little financial management experience and a generalized lack of confidence in the councils prevents experience from being built up,

• retrenchment is necessary but its implications are far reaching, if only financially, • components from other parallel Projects have not complemented the Project’s

efforts, • the government’s decentralization policy is not yet at implementation stage – a pilot

is to start in January 1999 and the program has a 3-year lag before it can be fully implemented.

• restructuring of District Councils has not yet been worked out; the intention is for

leaner, better qualified staffing of Councils, but this will be a long time in coming, • Central, MLGH support for the Project, for example in providing practical

management direction, has been lacking and there is an attitude of passiveness towards the Project that should be looked into.

The question of human capacity in the Districts was addressed in the Clifton Report and specific recommendations for an enhanced training program were put forward. This would involve the hiring of further TA input for 18 months, and costs would have to be financed somehow as the Project itself has run out of training and capacity-creation funds. The mission supports the Clifton proposals in principle, but cautions that, at this time there are few, if any, signs that decentralization, including funding arrangements and restructuring, are becoming a reality. The two UNDP/UNCDF projects (FRP and DDP) should adopt the role of leading support towards these objectives without trying to accomplish too much before other necessary components are in place. Once signs are positive, the recommendations of the Clifton report, which, as mentioned, require additional resources, should be put in place. Meanwhile, the Project should assist in continuing the current on-the-job capacity building which should involve identifying potential staff for the restructured organization from amongst existing personnel and as far as possible train them for the new role of managing the provision of technical services by contractors to the Councils. zamreprt.doc 05/16/05 10:10 AM

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ANNEX 1

PROJECT BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES

(US$ equivalent)

Budget6 Expenditures7 Balance UNDP UNCDF UNDP UNCDF UNDP UNCDF

Mission costs 30,000 190,630 0 107,951 30,000 82,679Intnl.Professionals 479,908 0 290,549 0 189,359 0Natnl. Professionals 140,068 0 31,924 0 108,144 0Support Personnel 40,899 0 9,419 0 31,480 0Training 373,705 0 313,705 0 60,000 0Equipment 88,110 89,082 85,607 71,070 2,503 18,012Vehicles 0 249,805 0 196,652 0 53,153O & M Vehicles 0 193,302 0 77,238 0 116,064Rehabilitation Roads 0 3,160,000 0 655,969 0 2,504,031Rehabilitation Eqpmt. 0 842,860 0 762,860 0 80,000Support Costs 81,781 143,306 26,508 143,206 55,273 100Miscellaneous 10,361 42,000 6,361 15,360 4,000 26,640Contingencies 0 5,873 0 0 0 5,873 TOTAL 1,244,832 4,916,853 764,073 2,030,306 480,759 2,886,552

Government Expenditures (Kwacha)

Items of Expenditure 1996 1997 1998 (to June 30)

Housing for Natnl.Road Engrs. 4,700,000 1,560,000Allowances for DC staff 1,720,000 2,728,000 10,499,000CMU Expdtrs. (fuel,oil, etc.) 2,501,213 1,249,146Portion of mntce. contcts. paid by GRZ 55,867,517 31,830,139Portion of mntce. contcts. paid by NRB 0 67,853,313Miscellaneous 2,260,366 271,171TOTAL EXPENDITURES 1,720,000 68,059,093 113,262,769Exchange rate 1,264 1,354 1,620US$ equivalent 1,400 50,300 69,900

6 UNDP Budget Rev.H, UNCDF Budget Rev. F 7 As of June 30, 1998

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ANNEX 2

EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS PLAN

The plan of operations was set out in 7 Activity Blocks as follows: Block A- Preparation Activities These 11 activities were, optimistically, set for completion by October 1996, which turned out to be before the Project was redesigned and the Addendum was agreed and signed. The key constraints to achieving the target date were that: • RTS Agreement required amendment and courses modified with consultant input

in September 1996, • National Road Engineers failed to take up their appointments, • rehabilitation contractors selection, in collaboration with RTS, proved more time

consuming than forecast, • equipment procurement and appointment of the leasing company could not

proceed before the Addendum was signed, • Project accommodation was not settled quickly. Activities were seriously disrupted and delayed (not an uncommon experience on the start-up to Projects) for reasons outside the control of project personnel in place. The decision to transfer activity A.9 model training site, to Lusaka was sensible in the circumstances. Block B-Maintenance Contracts While other activities were delayed the maintenance contractor training activities were on time, having been started under the original Agreement. The first trial contracts started in October 1996 – which was on target, and the second trials were then introduced, which started in February 1997 corresponding with the time allotted to Activity B4 (annual maintenance contracts). As a result of the trials the original 21 contractors were reduced to 13 (about 50% of the Project target). This is a greater attrition rate than expected and with no budget for an additional training, this situation is likely to remain. A more extended mentorship period, as recommended by the “capacity” consultant, would also require additional funding, and is not likely to occur unless additional funds are provided. This question was already raised in the Inception Report and even if not fundable under this Project, the activity should be included in future RTS training programs. Similar attrition rates amongst Council Supervisors have seriously reduced the ability of the Districts to undertake the supervision (which would have been a bigger problem if the full complement of maintenance contractors had remained). Government budget contributions were used for the second trial contracts (60 Million Kwacha) and the question of the availability and consistency of funding for the annual program was already being discussed. Funding through NRB is only available centrally for payments of contractors’ certificates, unfortunately not as pre-agreed budget disbursements, as was the case with MLGH contributions. Delays in initiating an annual program resulted (Activity B4). One concession the Project contractors received from NRB (whose procedures for payments to small-scale labor-based contractors are not reasonable) was the transfer of

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lump sum amounts to the Project, to cover all contractors’ certificates for a period of time. This is not sustainable in the longer term. But, so far, there seems no likelihood of NRB disbursing directly to District Councils, to pay for the contracts they sign. Activity B5 is ongoing. Activity B6 to encourage and assist maintenance contractors to develop (through greater mobility) has no designated time frame but it needs consideration at this stage, if any capital commitment is to be repaid during the Project period. Block C Training Phase I Model site training commenced in December 1996 only 2 months behind the original schedule (C1.) with completion in March 1997 (C7). Preparations for the first trial and the arrival of the equipment coincided in May/June 1997 (C5 and C6) but Activities (C4 and C9) involving the finance leasing company was not possible in view of its delayed appointment. This was a serious constraint to one vital component of contractor development and it should not be allowed to occur on similar future Projects – as a Pilot Project normal rules can usually be waived. The socio-economic study (C2) was carried out in July 1997. Block D- Training Phase II For the trial contracts the contractors had to re-locate from Lusaka to Eastern Province (D2), this occurred in June 1996 (4 months behind original schedule). Activity D4 (arrangements with leasing company) was replaced by a Hiring Agreement. Financial capacity had not been established in the Districts and payments to contractors were made (and still are) through the Project account (D1). The option to institute second trial contracts was taken up (D6, D7 and D8). It is noted in Quarterly Report 4, that due to the persistent lack of contributions from MLGH the involvement of District Council Supervisors in the execution of the first trial contracts at Tamanda loop was ineffective (D2 and D3). At that stage the supervisors presence was critical in the efforts to establish the District CMU’s (D5). The first trial contracts took 4.5 months to complete (November 1997) as against 3 months estimated in the Addendum. The estimates for the 7-second trial contracts showed around 20% cost increase (D8). Block E – Training Phase III This phase became the 7 second-trial contract starting in December 1997 (E2 – over scheduled May 1997), with increased lengths to an average of 7km per contractor over a 6 month period to May 1998. RTS continued to have involvement (1 Training Officer 3-4 weeks at sites). These contracts were located in the 5 Project Districts. Discussions were continuing concerning the establishment and shape of the CMU’s (E1) and the decision was made to include the training of local consultants for contract document preparation in view of the lack of sufficient technical capacity at the District Level (such tasks require at least a Diploma Holder). An ongoing on-the-job training program for District Supervisors was drawn up (Quarterly Report 5) for the first half of 1998. The preparation of an annual contracts program (E4) was started by the project team, with DC Supervisors, 4 UNZA students, and local consultant trainees, for

35

commencement in July 1998. The selection of roads to include was still based on the original list produced by the Councils; and for maintenance, NRB decided to allow 50km (irrespective of cost) for each District. FRS identified these roads and prepared contract documents without the full involvement of the Districts (E5). Under the DDP a District Planning Officer is now in each District and a more rational system of road priority selection should now be possible. The issue has been extensively discussed (e.g. DoW Meeting 23/24 March 1998). The task of moving contractors towards a competitive bidding situation (E7) will be re-scheduled until after the first round of annual contracts since the input of VIS will be needed to assist contractors to build up the necessary costing data. Block F-Final Phase This will now commence in around June 1999 until the completion of the Project (June 2001). Block G- Reporting, Monitoring, Review, and Evaluation. The establishment of the NCC and its regular quarterly meetings (G1) provides the necessary (high level) forum at which critical Project (FRP and DDP) issues are discussed. Even with the influential range of representation there, the inability to have concerns translated into positive action is, an obvious frustration. Since it is stated strongly in many quarters that the activities of these Projects are being monitored closely by Government Departments and Donors with a view to replicating them on a countrywide basis, it is difficult to understand why many of the NCC concerns evoke little response. The situation raises serious questions about Project sustainability once the team withdraws (G7). Reporting (G2 and G3) is in place, but not yet running in a smoothly coordinated manner to allow, for example, quarterly report to evolve more naturally out of a compilation of the monthly reports. A graphical representation of progress against target can replace several paragraphs of descriptive text. Key issues for action are the most important element of these reports, with potential future problems/constraints being also identified. No Tripartite Review meeting (G5) has been held and the first is scheduled for September 1998. The contract documents that have been produced by the Project are particularly user-friendly (apart from the fact that they are based on the World Bank Conditions for small contracts, which are appropriate for a different scale of small Project than labor-based maintenance). They are an excellent guide for contractors, especially at their early stage of development. However, they are unlike contracts they will face in the ultimate real-life situation where, for example, Bills of Quantity items will be fewer and more inclusive. The whole question of appropriate tender documentation appears confused with a variety of different documents currently active. This is an area needing further close coordination between all parties concerned. Otherwise the performance of the contractors is in line with expectations and experience elsewhere: • site organization is generally good/very good • labor conditions, working environment, task assignment are satisfactory

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• women ‘s participation (at around 20%) should gradually be improved • no negative environmental effects were observed - quite the contrary, for

example, in the restoration of quarry sites. • contractors are taking valuable initiatives in working practices (e.g. watering

gravel at the quarry sites for easier compaction on the road) • equipment management and maintenance is a cause for concern that should be

reviewed • contractors are generally keen to listen to and accept advice and guidance • quality standards are good.

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ANNEX 3

TEAM MEMBERS AND PERSONS MET

The mid-term evaluation mission team was composed of Messrs. Renato Schulz (consultant, project economist, team-leader) and Peter Bentall (consultant, engineer, low-cost roads specialist). During the course of its review the team met the following persons: Mr. Katongo Permanent Secretary MLGH Mr. L. Mwiinga Director DISS, MLGH Mr. R. Stephens Team Leader, Feeder Roads Support Prog., MLGH Mr. U. Martz Project Eng., Feeder Roads Support Prog., MLGH Mr. N. Gananada Executive Scretary, National Roads Board Mr. M. Stevens Management Support Unit, National Roads Board Mr. R.M. Bwembya Provincial Local Government Officer, Eastern Province Mr. K.A. Nyirenda Provincial Community Dev. Officer, Easteren Province Mr. J.S. Kambaila Town Clerk, Chipata Municipal Council Mr. W.S. Khatanga Director Eng. Services, Chipata Municipal Council Mr. M.W. Kawyingi Director Socio-Economic Plng., Chipata Mun. Council Mr. A.G. Masenga Council Secretary, Petauke District Council Mr. R. Ndholovu Director of Works, Petauke District council Mr. R.C.J. Kabunda District Planning Officer, Petauke District Council Mr. R. Mwila Council Secretary, Katete District Council Mr. M. Wkonga Director of Works, Katete District Council Mr. L. Banda District Planning Officer, Katete District Council Mr. S.G. Mutinta Director of Works, Chadiza District Council Mr. M. Singute Dpty. Council Secretary, Lundazi District Council Mr. C.P. Mushota Principal, Roads Training School Mr. C. Mulonga Roads Training School Mr. L. Zulu President, Zambia Consultants Association Mr. H. Mulambya Sounther Tulip Consulting Mr. N. Sindikila Rankine Consulting Mr. L. Zulu Barrow Bini Consulting Mr. E.H. Muwamba Project Manager, Village Industries Services Mr. A.M. Phiri Regional Manger, Village Industries Services Mr. J. Ndemi Engineer, Norconsult Mr. R. Themwu Manager, Justed Development Co. Ltd. Mr. M. Themwu Supervisor, Justed Development Co. Ltd. Mr. M. Danu Supervisor, Justed Development Co. Ltd. Mr. N. Kabwe Manager, Camber Construction M. A. Chilinda Supervisor, Camber Construction Mr. E. Mvula Supervisor, Camber Construction Mr. G. Phiri Director, Ezbert Construction Mr. A. Bawda Manager, Ezbert Construction Mr. D. Phiri Supervisor, Ezbert Construction Mr. E.M. Kamoto Manager, WheelTrax Contractor Mr. A. Sakala Manger, WheelTrax Contractor Mr. J. Sakal Manager, Kawaye Chataya Contractor Mr. I. Manda Supervisor, Kawaye Chataya Contractor Mr. D. Zulu Manager, Mtomba Construction

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Mr. A. Mwanza Manager, Rapid Construction Mr. J.T. Banda Manager, Jugeoro Contractors Mr. K. Mwula Manager, Kanuza Enterprises Mr. C. Phiri Manager, BCP Enterprises Mr. J. Phiri Manager, Jomaph Enterprises Mr. P. Elias Manager, Elimoc Contractors Mr. A. Banda Manager, Khama Lidyetsa Contractor Mr. G. Mangesana Manager, Mangesana Contractor Mr, T. Ziba Manager, Panganani Contractor Mr. A. Sakwyia Project Manager, Feeder Roads Project Mr. F. Blokhuis Techncial Advisor, Feeder Roads Project Mr. S. Tembo National Roads Engineer, Feeder Roads Project Mr. R. Lupenga Implementation Advisor, District Development Project Mr. J.C. Charlier Program Officer, UNDP/UNCDF

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ANNEX 4

MISSION ITINERARY

JULY 5 Sunday Mr. Schulz arrives in Lusaka 6 Monday Mr. Bentall arrives in Lusaka Team reviewed files and background in UNDP Office 7 Tuesday Team worked at UNDP Office in Lusaka 8 Wednesday Team traveled to Chipata 9 Thursday Team reviewed Project in the field 18 Saturday Team returned to Lusaka 20 Monday Team conducted interviews in Lusaka, wrote Draft Report 25 Saturday Mr. Bentall leaves Lusaka 30 Thursday Wrap-up meetings, Draft Report was distributed to actors and officials, comments were received 31 Friday Team leader incorporated comments into a Draft Final Report which was left with UNDP/UNCDF Lusaka staff. Mr. Schulz returned to New York AUG 03 Monday Team leader submitted Draft Final to UNCDF HQ in NY and debriefed UNCDF HQ staff on mission zamrept.doc 05/16/05 10:10 AM