Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In India’s

Nuclear System, and U.S.’s and India’s

Perceptions of the 123 Agreement

Chaim BraunConsulting Professor

Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)

Stanford University

Presented at the

University of Reading

Conference on the India – United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Reading, U.K.,

September 14, 2009

U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

India agrees to:• Separate civilian from military

facilities

• Civilian sites subject to IAEA safeguards

• Support Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and continue unilateral moratorium on testing

U.S. agrees to:• Cooperate on civilian nuclear

technology development

• Assure reliable supply of nuclear fuel– Congressional approval obtained

– Nuclear Supplier Group consensus obtained

India’s Perceptions of its Nonproliferation

Status Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement

• India views itself as an effective Nuclear Weapons

State (NWS), having in place most of the requisite

attributes:

- It tested both fission and fusion weapons

- It developed strong indigenous materials protection

control and accounting system (MPC&A)

- It has a significant system of operating nuclear

power plants of Indigenous design

- It demonstrated and operates an entire closed

nuclear fuel cycle for both military, civilian uses

- It didn’t export proliferating or dual-use nuclear

technologies to suspect end-users

India’s Perceptions of its Nonproliferation Status

Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)

• India refrains from further nuclear weapons testing

despite demands from some weapons designers

• India, however, didn’t sign the Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) claiming the Treaty inherently unequal

• India refused to abide by NPT disarmament

provisions (Article VI), while claiming rights of NWS

under Article I, III, and IV

• India refuse to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT). Unclear position on Fissile Materials

Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

India’s Plans for Nuclear Electricity

Generating System

• India developed its ‘Three Phases’ nuclear energy

growth scenario:

- First phase – PHWRs – (‘HINDU’ CANDU), of

limited total capacity due to insufficient Uranium

supplies & mining capacity. PHWRs produce

Plutonium supplies to fuel Second Phase reactors

- Second Phase FBRs – 1,000 Mwe breeders, high gain

breeding, metallic Plutonium fuel. Large capacity

growth – 250,000 MWe by 2052. Large 4,000 – 6,000

MWe FBR stations, each with dedicated fuel

reprocessing & re-fabrication plant.

India’s Plans for Nuclear Electricity

Generating System (Cont.)• Third Phase – Transition of FBRs system to operate

on Pu-Th fuel cycle. Main fissile material is U-233,

bred in FBR Thorium blankets. Introduction of

Advanced converter (AHWR) to burn excess fissile

material. Long-term equilibrium operation of FBRs-

AHWRs system based on Thorium fuel cycle

• Central Role of FBRs technology, first large

demonstration plant – 500 MWe PFBR, now under

construction in Kalpakkam. Operation by 2012

• Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) viewed as

limited stop-gap measures, useful until FBRs capacity

takes off

India Near-Term Nuclear Capacity

Projections Reactor Types and Capacities Capacity (MWe) Cumulative

Capacity (MWe)17 Reactors at Six Sites in Operation; Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam,

Narora, Kakrapar, Kaiga

4,120 4,120

3 PHWRs under Constructon at: Kaiga 4 (220 MWe),

RAPP 5 & 6 (2 x 220 MWe)

660 4,780

2 LWRs under Construction at Kudankulam (2 x 1,000 MWe) 2,000 6,780

PFBR under Construction at Kalpakkam (500 MWe) 500 7,280

Total Installed Capacity by ~ 2012 7,280

Future PHWRs by 2010 - 2020 (8 x 7oo MWe) 5,600 12, 880

Future FBRs 2012 – 2020 (4 x 500 MWe) 2,000 14, 880

Future AHWR (1 x 300 MWe) 300 15,180

Total Year 2012 Capacity Plus India Technology Nuclear

Plants by 2020

15, 180

Future Imported LWRs 2012 - 2020 (6 x 1,000 MWe) 6,000 21,180

Total Installed Capacity by 2020 21,180

2.724.068.00

61.00

201.50

10.8829.46

62.90

131.36

274.56

0.00

50.00

100.00

150.00

200.00

250.00

300.00

2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052

Year

Insta

lled

Cap

acit

y (

GW

e)

PHWR (incl. AHWR and TAPS 1&2)

LWR

FBR from LWR

FBR from PHWR

Projected Nuclear Installed Capacity build up

Projected Installed Nuclear Power Capacity build-up – Reactor

Type Breakdown

Narora, UP2 (440 MWe)

IN OPERATION

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

NEW SITES

Rawatbhata Raj.

4 (740 MWe)2(440 MWe)2(1400MWe)

Kudankulam, TN

2 (2000 MWe) 4 (4000 MWe)

Kaiga,Karnataka2 (440 MWe) 2 (440 MWe)

Kalpakkam, T.N.2 (440 MWe) 1 (500 MWe)

Kakrapar, Gujarat2 (440 MWe)2 (1400 MWe)

Tarapur, Maharashtra2 (320 MWe) 2 (1080 MWe)

Jaitapur, Mah.2 (2000 MWe)

• 3360 MW in operation

• 3920 MW under construction

• 8800 MW new sites

identified

Nuclear Power Plants in India - Sites

2820 MWe

4460 MWe

Role of ALWRs in India’s Nuclear Program

• Imported ALWRs will have to import their lifetime Uranium fuel requirements, due to lack of indigenous fuel supplies

• ALWRs viewed by DAE as near-term capacity-fillers until domestic FBRs program matures

• DAE concerned that imported ALWRs will:

- Create competition by foreign vendors, construction companies

-Create regional nuclear generating corporations independent of NPCIL

- Siphon-off Engineering talents from DAE reactors, R&D programs

- BREAK DAE’s NUCLEAR MONOPOLY

• Ambivalent attitude to nuclear technology imports constraining domestic nuclear development program

U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions

Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement

• U.S. global nonproliferation concerns different than

India’s domestic, regional positions

• U.S. cannot accept India’s claim for recognition as

NWS status:

- Impossible by NPT definitions

- Similar demands could be raised by Pakistan, Israel

– other NPT non-signatories

- North Korea, ultimately Iran, could demand equal

status based on developing capabilities

- New ‘Pandora’s Box’ of latent nuclear weapons

states could emerge, eventually claiming future

similar status to India

U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions Prior

to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)

- Concessions to India on terms of 123 Agreement will

complicate similar Agreements then entering review

with Korea, UAE, other Middle East countries

- India’s Nonproliferation record not so pristine :

- India clandestinely imported centrifuge enrichment

technology (not unlike Pakistan)

- India tested nuclear weapons twice:

In 1974 (prompting the creation of the NSG)

In 1998 (Prompting testing by Pakistan)

- India maintained nuclear, missile proliferation-related

contacts with Iran

- India refused to sign NPT, CTBT, FMCT(?), etc

U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear

Energy System

• India had only limited success with domestic PHWRs

program – 4,000 MWe, 6 Nuclear plant sites, all

developed in forty years

• PHWRs program afflicted by lack of Uranium fuel,

reduced generation, declining capacity factors

• Importing ALWRs will significantly increase India’s

nuclear capacity. Just three GE-Hitachi ABWRs

(1,340 MWe each) equal to total PHWRs capacity

India installed in forty years

• ALWRs are proven, commercially ready, large-scale,

fast-growth, nuclear electricity option for India

U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear

Energy System (Cont.)

• It could be to India’s benefit to give up its experimental,

proliferative PFBR, fuel cycle, in exchange for ready

ALWRs, fresh Uranium supplies to existing PHWRs

• Giving up PFBR:

- Small price to pay for large-scale benefits

- Will burnish India’s nonproliferation credentials

- Will hinder other countries demands for closed fuel

cycle, ‘sensitive’ fuel cycle facilities

- Will slow the spread of dreaded ‘Plutonium economy’

India’s Proliferation-related Perceptions

After Signing of the 123 Agreement

• India considers it got a ‘clean’ i.e. unconditional

exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

Conditions of supply:

- It can import Uranium for its operating PHWRs

- It requires foreign ALWR vendors to provide

Uranium supplies for lifetime of reactors imported

- It demand rights to import enrichment and

reprocessing (ENR) technologies, given its

equivalent NWS status, NSG exemption:

- Enrichment plants to convert fresh Uranium

supplies to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)

fuel for future ALWRS

India’s Proliferation-related Perceptions

After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)- Reprocessing plants to reprocess spent

ALWRs, PHWRs spent fuel, extract

Plutonium for its evolving FBRs program

- It demands ‘blanket approval’ rights to reprocess

U.S. origin fuel , or spent fuel from U.S. ALWRs,

as part of implementing negotiations following

signing of 123 Agreement

- It demand rights to export, under safeguards, its

PHWRs technology to developing countries,

despite proliferative characteristics of PHWR

design

• General approach of ’Lets hit the iron while its hot’

India’s Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor

Imports• India’s Singh Government paid high political price to

pass the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

(123 Agreement) in Indian Parliament

• India supported U.S. positions regarding Iran’s

nuclear program in IAEA, UN Security Council

• India cancelled its participation in Iran Pakistan

India (IPI) natural gas pipeline project

• General feeling of sacrificing legitimate regional

energy, security concerns, for global goals of U.S.

• India’s Government possibly needed to dress-up

benefits obtained from 123 Agreement to justify

political costs incurred

India’s Perceptions of Nuclear

Reactor Imports (Cont.)• Main benefits now claimed by India’s Government:

- Fresh Uranium supplies to operating PHWRs

- Inflated numbers of ALWRs expected to be installed

by 2020 – 60 GWe, rather than 8 GWe in pre-

Agreement estimate (2005)

- Inflated numbers of all nuclear plants to be installed:

63 Gwe by 2030, increasing to even 470 GWe by

2050 “If the Country Thinks Big and Executes its

Plans Correctly” per Prime Minister Singh, on

September 2009

- Exporting Indian PHWRs to less developed countries

to demonstrate India’s technological prowess

India’s Perceptions of Nuclear

Reactor Imports (Cont. II)

• Important role of domestic FBRs seem forgotten in

‘irrational exuberance’ over importing ALWRs

• Introduction of foreign vendors, deals with Indian

suppliers, could reduce Department of Atomic

Energy (DAE)’s monopoly over Indian nuclear

program

U.S.’s Proliferation-related Perceptions

After Signing of 123 Agreement• U.S. cannot accept India’s claim as effective NWS

• U.S. insisted on India signing comprehensive

safeguards Agreement (CSA) with IAEA, filing

Facility Attachment document for each reactor, fuel

cycle facility, to be safeguarded, & bringing signed

India-specific CSA into force

• U.S. still needs India nonproliferation assurances to

approve nuclear technology export (Part 810) licenses

• U.S. not enthusiastic about blanket reprocessing

approval. Issue now under discussion. Could

complicate pending 123 Agreement negotiation with

Korea

U.S.’s proliferation-related Perceptions

After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)• U.S. opposed to India’s requests to import ENR

technologies:

- On long-term policy basis (1978 NNPA)

- Since India did not sign NPT

- Inconsistent with NSG Conditions of Supply (India’s

exemption not completely ‘clean’)

- Contrary to requirements of 2006 Hyde Act

- Contrary to G8 Statement of May 2009

• U.S. concerned about renewed nuclear testing in India

following claims of 1998 thermonuclear test fizzle.

Singh Government tries to finesse situation, claiming

test results were sufficient, no more required now

U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to

India Following Passage of 123 Agreement• Very limited progress to date, but cautiously optimistic

• Only available, licensed sites handed to Russian, French reactor

vendor Corporations

• U.S. nuclear vendors’ sites identified only in August 2009. These

include Mithi Virdi in Gujarat State, Kovada in Andhra

Pradesh State. Licensing status of both sites yet unclear

• Limited progress on third-party liability laws in India, India

signing to 1998 Vienna Convention, updating coverage limits.

India Government promised action by 2009 year-end

• Need to resolve negotiations on blanket reprocessing approvals,

India ENR technologies import rights. Supporting India’s claim

conflicts with G8 Statement

U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to India

Following Passage of 123 Agreement (Cont.)

• Need to de-conflict with UAE’s, other Middle East

countries’, Draft & pending 123 Agreements, where a

‘Return Clause’ has been inserted. Will U.S. insist on

similar right in India’s 123 Agreement? Under what

circumstances? How to implement?

• Part 810 export licenses to U.S. vendors not yet issued

pending clarifications on open nonproliferation issues

• U.S. supported India’s applications, spent political

capital, in securing NSG exemption, passage of 123

Agreement in Congress, yet major economic benefits

promised are presently claimed by Russians, French

The Path Forward – Resolving Past Differing

Interpretations – Personal Observations

• India could now be defined as Virtual NWS within

nonproliferation regime

• Such definition allows each side to interpret it any way it

wishes. Face is saved all around

• Real test is in finding acceptable solutions to specific

issues, while each side maintains its basic positions

• On ENR technologies – India already posses

rudimentary enrichment, reprocessing technologies. If

India further develop these technologies using its own

resources, constructs, operates its plants under IAEA

safeguards – this represents best near-term option

The Path Forward – Resolving Differing

Interpretations – Personal Observations

(Cont.)• In time, as confidence builds in implementation of 123

Agreement, & in India’s nuclear program, sensitive

technology imports could be considered, as parts of large

ALWRs orders

• India might be able to construct ~ 8-12 GWe of ALWRs

by 2020, > 30 GWe by 2030

• ALWRs program will buy India time in developing FBR

reactor technology, FBR fuel cycle facilities

commercialization, using mostly its own resources,

unless FBR technology is brought under safeguards

• Future cooperative progress will be made, but at slower

pace than currently estimated

BACKUP SLIDES

India’s Breeder Program

Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In India’s Nuclear

System, and U.S.’s and India’s Perceptions of 123

Agreement - Introduction

• India and U.S. had different perceptions of India’s

nonproliferation situation & expansion mode of

nuclear electricity generation system

• These differences complicated, slowed down,

negotiations for the Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear

Cooperation (123 Agreement)

• There have occurred reversals in some of the

positions of the two sides after the passage of the

Agreement, as compared with the initial positions

• Several issues still need to be resolved before the full

value of the 123 Agreement is realized

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THREE STAGE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

Stage – I PHWRs

• 16- Operating• 4- Under construction• Several others planned• Scaling to 700 MWe• Gestation period being

reduced• POWER POTENTIAL

10,000 MWe

LWRs• 2 BWRs Operating• 2 VVERs under

construction

Stage - IIFast Breeder Reactors

• 40 MWth FBTR - Operating

Technology Objectives realised

• 500 MWe PFBR-construction commenced

• POWER POTENTIAL 540,000 MWe

Stage - IIIThorium Based Reactors

• 30 kWth KAMINI- Operating

• 300 MWe AHWR- Under Regulatory Examination

• POWER POTENTIAL Very

Large. Availability of ADS

can enable early

introduction of Thorium on a

large scale

Parameters Thermal Neutron

Reactors (PHWR)

Fast Neutron Spectrum

Reactors (PFBR)

Fuel Natural UO2 (Pu-U) O2

Clad material Zircaloy-2 20% CW 15Cr-15Ni-Mo-Ti

Coolant Heavy Water Liquid Sodium

Core outlet temp, oC 293 547

Core power density, W/cm3 100 400

Neutron energy 0.025 ev > 100 kev

Burnup 6,700 MWd/t 100,000 MWd/t

Neutron Flux, n/cm2/s 1014 4.5x1015

Life of core ~180 Days 2 Years

COMPARISON OF PHWR AND PFBR CORES

FBR PROGRAMME IN INDIA

Ø India started FBR program with construction of FBTR

Ø FBTR is a 40 MWt (13.5 MWe) loop type reactor. Design is same as that of

Rapsodie-Fortissimo except for incorporation of SG and TG (agreement

signed with CEA, France in 1969).

Ø FBTR is in operation since 1985.

Ø 500 MWe Fast Breeder Reactor Project (PFBR) through Indigenous

design and construction

Ø Government. granted financial sanction for construction in Sep 2003.

Ø Construction of PFBR has been undertaken by BHAVINI.

Ø PFBR will be commissioned by 2011.

Ø Beyond PFBR: 4 units of 500 MWe FBR (twin unit concept) similar to

PFBR with improved economy, enhanced safety, by 2020.

Ø Subsequent reactors would be 1000 MWe units with metallic fuel

Reactor Vault

Safety Vessel with Thermal Insulation Panels

35

• Fabrication Technology for MOX Fuel Established

• Experimental irradiation of PFBR MOX fuel (with U-233)

in FBTR: fuel has reached 60 GWd/t burn-up

• Fuel specifications optimized for product recovery as well as

performance

• R&D on metallic fuel for achieving shorter doubling time

PFBR type MOX pins for

experimental irradiationAnnular MOX pellet

Fuel Fabrication for PFBR

Constraints on Implementing India’s

Fast Breeder Reactors Program• Successful Completion & Startup of PFBR

• Closing Nuclear Fuel Cycle in PFBR & Follow-up FBRs

- On-site Reprocessing & Re-Fabrication

• Fuel Cycle Transition from Oxide to Metal Plutonium Fuels, Thorium-U-233 Fuels

• Funding Future FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities Construction

• Constructing ~250 GWe in Forty Five Years

- Past Record ~ 7 GWe in Forty Years

• Managing Interfaces between FBRs constructors, Operators, Fuel Cycle Providers & Regulators at each site

• Opening up New FBR Sites –One to Two Sites/Year for Forty Years

- Past Record - Seven New Power Plant Sites in Forty Years

• Training Manpower for all FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities, Construction corporations, regulators

• Industrial Fabrication Capacity dedicated to DAE Missions