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Religion and Politics
The Demographic Imperative
Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007
Religious Fertility vs. Religious Decline
"One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious." (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)
Hypothesis: a combination of higher religious fertility and immigration will lead to a growth in the religious population (defined in terms of belief) that exceeds the net loss of communicants through religious apostasy.
Methods
• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic minority surveys
• Cohort Component Projection Parameters: Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline or revival) by age and sex, plus current Age/Sex Structure of Religious and Secular 'Populations'
• Mortality Rates assumed as standard
Fig. 5 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
40%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
2004 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074 2084 2094 2104
Pro
po
rtio
n R
elig
iou
s
Fig. 7 Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001 Census
34
25
18
3739
22
25
32
41
4 4
19
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Muslim No religion Christian
% in
Ag
e B
an
d
0 - 15
16 - 34
35 - 64
65 and over
What About the Muslim World?• The religious cleavage between Islamists and
Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals is Paramount• Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists (or even
the wider 'religious' population) with political leverage into the future?
• Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant but modest link between Madrassa attendance and fertility in four countries
• This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 7-15 countries (depends on question)
• Aim is to determine parameters for population projections
coun
try
relig
tot fertility rate1.4048 7.1
.592294
.98574
Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.
Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000
Tanzania
Jordan
Egypt
Algeria
Bosnia
Iran
Azerbaijan
'95-97
Bangladesh
Albania 2000
Turkey
Indonesia
Pakistan
Morocco
Nigeria
Uganda
Albania '95-97
Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree
Ch
ildre
n E
ve
r B
orn
city > 100k
town < 10k
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Religious or Not, by Age Category, Muslims in Islamic Countries, 2000 WVS
0%10%20%
30%40%50%60%70%
80%90%
100%
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98
'A R
elig
iou
s P
erso
n'
Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.
Attendance at Religious Services, by Religion and Age, 2004 ESS
0%5%
10%15%20%25%
30%35%40%45%50%
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
We
ek
ly A
tte
nd
an
ce
RC
Prot
Eastern
Muslims
Source: ESS 2004
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Age, 2000 WVS, Muslims in Islamic Countries
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Education, Islamic Countries, WVS 2000, Muslims Only
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
> Prim
ary
Primar
y
>Sec
onda
ry
Secon
dary
Tec
h.
>Sec
onda
ry (u
nivpr
ep)
Secon
dary
(Univ
prep
)
Some
Univer
sity
Univer
sity
% A
gre
ein
g
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Education: +
Town Size: -
National Pride: -
GDP per Capita: -
Age: indeterminate
Married/Children: weak -
Country Ed.: +Country Fertility: -
Conclusions: Fertility
• In Muslim developing countries, unlike other developing countries, higher national religiosity is associated with lower fertility and National GDP per head has no impact on fertility
• Islamists in Muslim countries are more fertile; some evidence for sharpened fertility effect in more 'modern' contexts, i.e. cities, the educated
• But effect modest: Muslim Religious Fertility Dynamics more like USA and Europe than Israel
• The growth of the religious population through fertility is a long-term process, unlike Israel
Conclusions: Religiosity• Younger, Educated are less religious and/or Islamist,
but effect is complex and there are exceptions (18-24, university students)
• Urbanites more Islamist than rural population• Higher education levels may modestly lower Islamism,
but urbanization may raise it. Generational change will have little effect
• GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity• Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible• All told, we should expect a distinct Muslim trajectory
of modernization and development rather than secularism
• Future Research: projections of religious and Islamist populations for Muslim world, Europe, North America
• Own project: http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html
• IIASA projections project: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~terama/Relig.html