Relocation Allowance

7/28/2019 Relocation Allowance

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G.R. No. 120132. December 4, 1995.*

CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA WONG,represented by her Administrator, ATTY. REYNALDO B. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

Compromise Agreements; Judgments; Words and Phrases; Compromise, Defined; A judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement enteredinto by the parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order to terminate alitigation already instituted. A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expresslyacknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of theCode, as a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions, avo id a litigationor put an end to one already commenced. Thus, a judgment upon a compromise is a

judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by the parties in which theymake reciprocal concessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted.

Same; Same; Where it appears that nowhere in the judgment did it appear, nor can it beinferred therefrom, that the courts disposition took into account any agreement orconcessions made by the parties, the judgment is not based on a compromise agreementbut a decision rendered entirely on the merits. In the present suit, the assailed decision,far from being a judgment based on a compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decisionrendered entirely on the merits. Contrary to petitioners assertion, th e dispositive portion of the decision is very explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment.Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom that respondent courts dispositiontook into account any agreement or concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a

judgment on a compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedlyembodying the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothing but admissionsmade by the parties intended to clarify the applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact the saidadmissions are expressly laid out in Section 28(c)(8) of RA 7279 and thus could not havebeen the subject of any compromise agreement as the same are already provided in thelaw.

Squatting; Statutes; R.A. 7279; Although private individuals are not prohibited from takingpart in the relocation of squatters, there is nothing in the law either that compels them toundertake such task on a mandatory basis. Anent petitioners claim that privaterespondent must also share the responsibility of relocating petitioners, the same is alsowithout any basis. The aforecited provision is very explicit that the task of relocating the

homeless and the underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local government unitconcerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of the other governmentagencies. Although private individuals are not prohibited from taking part in the relocation,there is nothing in the law either that compels them to undertake such task on a mandatorybasis, otherwise, such obligation should have been included in the provision, eitherexpressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to further burden private respondent withtheir relocation is unwarranted.

Same; Social Justice; The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoingsimply because it is committed by the underprivileged at best it may mitigate the penaltybut it certainly will not condone the offense. Equally unpersuasive is petitioners plea forsocial justice. In previous cases, this Court has emphasized that never is it justified to preferthe poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, accor ding to the mandate of the lawIn the same vein, it has been held that the policy of social justice is not intended tocountenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best itmay mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for thepoor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascalclaiming an undeserved privilege.

Same; Same; Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider thatvery wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. In closing, we fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made in the case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals: While we sympathize with the millions of our people who are unable to afford thebasic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts of a decent home, this sympathy cannotextend to squatting, which is a criminal offense. Social justice cannot condone the violationof law nor does it consider that very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoymentof a right. This is what the petitioner wants us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjustplea because the rule of law rings louder in our ears. *Galay vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA629(1995)]

G.R. No. 120132 December 4, 1995

CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners,vs.


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COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA WONG, represented by her Administrator, ATTY. REYNALDO B. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J. :

In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of thecommunities in urban areas, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7279otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992",envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in themetropolis. Nevertheless, the courts continue to be swamped with casesarising from disputes in the proper implementation of the aforementionedlegislation, particularly on matters involving the eviction, demolition andresettlement of squatters. The present suit is among such cases.

The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 20, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.33761 entitled "Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla andVirginia Wong, represented by her Administrator, Atty. Reynaldo B.Hernandez". Petitioners claim that the assailed decision was based on anunauthorized compromise agreement to which they never consented nor hadany knowledge thereof.

Material hereto are the following antecedents:

Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented by her Administrator and Attorney-in fact, Reynaldo B. Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil CaseNo. 38-5830) against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have beenillegally occupying private respondents' 405 square meter lot located inQuezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51589 of theRegistry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Although petitioners do not claim ownership over the subject premises, theyhowever disputed private respondents' claim of ownership and alleged thatthey have been in possession of the property in question since 1972 by virtueof the tolerance and permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez.

On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38, ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from thedisputed premises. 1

Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, thedecision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto . 2

Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed apetition for review, but the petition was dismissed outright for failure to statethe material dates to show that the petition was filed on time and for not beingaccompanied by certified true copies of the disputed decision. 3

No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence, the judgment becamefinal. This prompted private respondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an

Alias Writ of Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court inits order dated March 25, 1994, 4 taking into account that the judgment hasalready become final and executory.

In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgment and their consequenteviction, petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunctionand Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court at QuezonCity, Branch 216, 5 alleging that herein private respondent must f irst complywith the mandatory requirements of Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279 regardingeviction and demolition by court order.

In its order dated April 5, 1994, 6 the lower court denied the prayer for theissuance of a restraining order as the act sought to be enjoined was pursuantto a lawful order of the court.

Thereafter, petitioners again sought recourse from the Court of Appeals viaPetition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary RestrainingOrder, claiming that the latter order was tainted with grave abuse of discretionfor being arbitrary, unjust and oppressive, and reiterating that they cannot beevicted unless there is compliance with Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279. 7

On April 28, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to thepetition and granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction, enjoining theejection of petitioners until further orders from the court. 8

On July 18, 1994, counsel for private respondent filed a Motion To Lift And/Or Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, contending among others that the Urban Poor

Affairs Office [People's Bureau] has already been notified, as mandated byRA 7279, and that more than 45 days had already lapsed since the notice


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was made in April, 1994. Thus, private respondent has substantially compliedwith the requirements of RA 7279 and therefore the enforcement of the final

judgment and ejectment of petitioners is in order. 9 Objecting to privaterespondent's motion, petitioners argued that RA 7279 requires not only the45-day notice, but also the relocation of petitioners and the grant of financialassistance to them prior to their relocation. Furthermore, petitioners maintainthat there is no extreme urgency for petitioners' eviction on account of privaterespondent's affluence. 10

The case was subsequently set for hearing and oral argument, after which,respondent court rendered the assailed decision on September 20, 1994ordering as follows:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to RA 7279, the People's Bureau is hereby orderedto relocate the herein petitioners from s ubject lot of private respondent notlater than October 30, 1994. Should the relocation of petitioners be notfinished on or before October 30, 1994, the People's Bureau shall paypetitioners a daily allowance of P145.00 for every day of delay of relocationbut in no case shall such allowance last for more than sixty (60) days.

Petitioners are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question not later than October 30, 1994, on which date the private respondent shall have the

right to take over possession thereof and, if necessary, to ask for a writ of execution for the implementation of this disposition. No pronouncement as tocosts.

SO ORDERED. 11

On October 25, 1994, a new counsel entered his appearance for petitionersand filed a motion to set aside the aforequoted decision. 12 As initiallymentioned, petitioners assert that the assailed decision was rendered basedon a compromise agreement to which they never gave their consent nor authorized their former counsel to enter into, and for which reason said former counsel has withdrawn his appearance as counsel of record.

Petitioners contend that the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals wasindeed based on a compromise agreement which is evident from the followingportions of the decision:

xxx xxx xxx

When the case was called for hearing on September 14, 1994, as scheduled,both parties were represented. Atty. Rogelio Directo stood up for thePeople's Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office). And the parties, including thesaid representative of the People's Bureau, agreed that petitioners herein areall qualified to avail of the protection and benefits under RA 7279 and through counsel, manifested their willingness and readiness to be relocated in accordance with said law . It was likewise agreed by all concerned thatshould petitioners be not relocated within the period of 45 days, fromSeptember 15 to October 30, 1994, the People's Bureau shall pay them anallowance of P145.00, equivalent to the minimum wage, per day of delay of relocation, until their actual transfer to the re location site to be designated for them. It is understood, however, that the daily allowance for petitioners shallbe for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, starting October 31, 1994. Inother words, should the delay of relocation of petitioners be for more thansixty (60) days, they shall only be entitled to the daily allowance of P145.00per day of delay of relocation for not more than sixty (60) days.

It was likewise agreed that on October 31, 1994, whether petitioners shallhave been relocated or not, the private respondent shall then be entitled tothe execution and implementation of this judgment, and to c ause theejectment of petitioners from subject property litigated upon. (Emphasissupplied). 13

In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals denied

petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Decision14

and reiterated that the assaileddecision dated September 20, 1994 was a decision based on the merits andnot upon a compromise agreement.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners adamantly argue that the decision of respondent court datedSeptember 20, 1994 was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement,sans their knowledge, consent and authority. Additionally, petitionersinterpose the following issues: 1) whether there can be eviction anddemolition without actual relocation; 2) can the petitioners be considered ashomeless and underprivileged?; and 3) whose duty is it to relocate them?

A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledgedas a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of theCode as "a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions,avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced". 15 Thus, a

judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise


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agreement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocalconcessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted. 16

In the present suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgment based ona compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on themerits. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the dispositive portion of thedecision is very explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment. Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom thatrespondent court's disposition took into account any agreement or concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgment on acompromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedlyembodying the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothingbut admissions made by the parties intended to clarify the applicableprovisions of RA 7279. In fact the said admissions are expressly laid out inSection 28(c) (8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of anycompromise agreement as the same are already provided in the law.

Further negating petitioners' contention are the following ratiocinations madeby respondent court in denying the Motion to Set Aside Decision, with whichwe are in complete accord:

After a careful study, We find movant's stance barren of merit. Our Decisionpromulgated on September 20, 1994 in this case was not rendered as aJudgment by Compromise. It resolved the petition on the merits, after thelawyers of the parties and the representative of the Urban Poor Affairs Officeagreed on the applicability of Rep. Act No. 7279 to petitioner's situation. As aresult of such development of the case, Our judgment granted petitionersmore than what they have came here for. All they prayed for was to hold inabeyance execution of subject final and executory Decision of the QuezonMetropolitan Trial Court, ordering their ejectment; until after the expiration of forty-five (45) days from date of notice of their ejectment to the Urban Poor

Affairs Office. But the judgment in question has recognized not onlypetitioner's right not to be ejected sans the 45-day notice to the Urban Poor

Affairs Office, but also the right to a daily allowance of P145.00 for each dayof delay or relocation, for a period of not more than sixty (60) da ys, should

there be a delay in their relocation, as mandated by law.17

Finally, in a desperate move to prolong the execution of the decision orderingtheir eviction, petitioners invoke the principle of social justice and plead thatas underprivileged and homeless citizen, their eviction and demolition of their homes cannot be effected unless there is adequate relocation. Moreover,

petitioners maintain that private respondent is also duty bound to share in thetask of relocating them.

The contentions are without merit. It is beyond dispute that the ejectment suitagainst petitioners has already been resolved with finality way back onFebruary 16, 1994 when the petitioners' appeal was dismissed outright by theCourt of Appeals and they did not interpose any further appeal therefrom. Thesubsequent proceedings merely sought to enforce the decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed premises, which petitioners however, repeatedlytried to thwart by invoking non-compliance with Section 28(c) of RA 7279.Thus, upon compliance by private respondent with the requirements of theaforesaid law, particularly on the notice to the People's Bureau (Urban Poor

Affairs Office) and the expiration of 45 days from said notice, petitioners' rightto remain in the subject lot ceased. Resultingly, petitioners' eviction must nowproceed in accordance with Section 28(c) (8), to wit:

. . . Provided, however , That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to acourt order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shallbe undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the NationalHousing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies withinforty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further , That shrelocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in theamount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty(60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local governmentunit concerned.

Anent petitioners' claim that private respondent must also share theresponsibility of relocating petitioners, the same is also without any basis. Theaforecited provision is very explicit that the task of relocating the homelessand the underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local government unitconcerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of the other government agencies. Although private individuals are not prohibited fromtaking part in the relocation, there is nothing in the law either that compels

them to undertake such task on a mandatory basis, otherwise, such obligationshould have been included in the provision, either expressly or impliedly.Thus, petitioners attempt to further burden private respondent with their relocation is unwarranted.


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Equally unpersuasive is petitioners' plea for social justice. In previous cases,this Court has emphasized that "never is it justified to prefer the poor simplybecause they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for

justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to themandate of the law." 18 In the same vein, it has been held that "the policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it iscommitted by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but itcertainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is animperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascalclaiming an undeserved privilege." 19

Further militating against petitioners' appeal for compassion is the fact thatonly recently, President Ramos himself, in the exercise of his veto power,vetoed a congress-approved measure 20 intended to extend the moratoriumon the demolition of squatter colonies throughout the country. The President'saction was intended to curtail the negative influences to general growth anddevelopment in urban areas brought about by the problem of squatting and toprevent the legitimate landowners from being unduly deprived of theimmediate use of their properties.

In closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made inthe case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals 21 :

While we sympathize with the millions of our people who are unable to affordthe basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts of a decent home, thissympathy cannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal offense. Social

justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider that verywrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. This is whatthe petitioner wants us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjust pleabecause the rule of law rings louder in our ears.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition ishereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo , p. 50, Annex D.

2 Rollo , p. 62, Annex H.

3 Rollo , p. 74, Annex J.

4 Rollo , p. 75, Annex K.

5 Rollo , p. 78, Annex L.

6 Annex M.

7 Rollo , p. 82, Annex O.

8 Rollo , p. 87, Annex P.

9 Rollo , p. 92.

10 Ibid .

11 Rollo , p. 91.

12 Rollo , p. 108.

13 Rollo , pp. 115-116.

14 Rollo , p. 26, Annex A.

15 Osmea vs. Commission on Audit, 238 SCRA 463, 471 (1994).

16 United Housing Corporation vs. Da yrit, 181 SCRA 285, 293 (1990)Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677 (1987).

17 Rollo , p. 32.

18 Gelos vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 616 (1992).

19 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC 164 SCRA 671, 682-683 (1988); Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. NLRC 170SCRA 207, 210 (1989).

20 House Bill No. 13001.


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21 188 SCRA 306, 312 (1990).

G.R. No. 172724. August 23, 2010.*

PHARMACIA and UPJOHN, INC. (now PFIZER PHILIPPINES, INC.), ASHLEY MORRIS, ALEDACHU, JANE MONTILLA & FELICITO GARCIA, petitioners, vs. RICARDO P. ALBAYDA, JR.,respondent.

Appeals; The scope of the Supreme Courts review in petitions fi led under Rule 45 is limitedto errors of law or jurisdiction the Court leaves the evaluation of facts to the trial andappellate courts which are better equipped for this task; Exceptions. As a general rule, thisCourt does not entertain factual issues. The scope of our review in petitions filed under Rule45 is limited to errors of law or jurisdiction. This Court leaves the evaluation of facts to thetrial and appellate courts which are better equipped for this task. However, there areinstances in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, to wit: (1) the conclusion is afinding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made ismanifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on amisapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA goes beyond the

issues of the case, and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) saidfindings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they arebased; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioners main and replybriefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA arepremised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; Transfers; It is a management prerogative to transferor assign employees from one office or area of operation to another, provided there is nodemotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action is notmotivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, o r effected as a form of punishment or

demotion without sufficient cause. Juris pru dence recognizes the exercise of management prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,benefits, and other privileges, and the action i s not motivated by discrimination, made inbad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. To

determine the validity of the transfer of employees, the employer must show that thetransfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does itinvolve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employees transfer shall betantamount to constructive dismissal.

Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),affirming those of the LA, are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed if they are

supported by substantial evidence. The rule in our jurisdiction is that findings of fact of thNLRC, affirming those of the LA, are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed if theyare supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is an amount of relevantevidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Asexplained in Ignacio v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 365 SCRA 418 (2001): x x x Factualfindings of the NLRC affirming those o f the Labor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed to haveacquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported byevidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on thisCourt. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the processof their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the Courtto stamp its affirmation and declare its finality.

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of arbitrariness, the Court of Appeals should not lookinto the wisdom of a management prerogative. In the absence of arbitrariness, the CAshould not have lookedinto the wisdom of a management prerogative. It is the employersprerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees qualifications,aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its businessoperations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to thecompany. As a matter of fact, while the CAs observations may be acceptable to somequarters, it is nevertheless not universal so as to foreclose another view on what may be abetter business decision. While it would be profitable to keep respondent in an area wherehe has established contacts and therefore the probability of him reaching and even

surpassing his sales quota is high, on the one hand, one can also make a case that sincerespondent is one of petitioners best district managers, he is the right person to tu rnaround and improve the sales numbers in Cagayan de Oro City, an area which in the pasthad been dismally performing. After all, improving and developing a new market may evenbe more profitable than having respondent stay and serve his old market. In addition, one


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can even make a case and say that the transfer of respondent is also for his professionalgrowth. Since respondent has been already assigned in the Western Visayas area for 22years, it may mean that his market knowledge is very limited. In another territory, there willbe new and more challenges for respondent to face. In addition, one can even argue that forpurposes of future promotions, it would be better to promote a district manager who hasexperience in different markets.

Same; Same; Same; The rule is well-settled that labor laws discourage interference with anemployers judgment in the conduct of his business even as the law is solicitous of thewelfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what areclearly management prerogatives. The foregoing illustrates why it is dangerous for thisCourt and even the CA to look into the wisdom of a management prerogative. Certainly, onecan argue for or against the pros and cons of transferring respondent to another territory.Absent a definite finding that such exercise of prerogative was tainted with arbitrariness andunreasonableness, the CA should have left the same to petitioners better judgment. Therule is well settled that labor laws discourage interference wi th an employers judgment inthe conduct of his business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it mustalso protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.As long as the companys exercise of th e same is in good faith to advance its interest and

not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws orvalid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

Same; Same; Same; Salesmen; The very nature of a sales man is that it is mobile andambulant. This Court cannot agree with the findings of the CA that the transfer of respondent was unreasonable, considering he had not been remiss in his responsibilities.What the CA failed to recognize is that the very nature of a sales man is that it is mobile andambulant. On this point, it bears to stress that respondent signed two documents signifyinghis assent to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines. In respondents EmploymentApplication, he checked the box which asks, Are you willing to be relocated anywhere inthe Philippines? In addition, in respondents Contract of Employment, item (8) reads: You

agree, during the period of your employment, to be assigned to any work or workplace forsuch period as may be determined by the company and whenever the operations thereof require such assignment.

Same; Same; Same; The Court has long stated that the objection to the transfer beinggrounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the

employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.This Court has long stated that the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon thepersonal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of thetransfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer. Such being the case,respondent cannot adamantly refuse to abide by the order of transfer without exposinghimself to the risk of being dismissed. Hence, his dismissal was for just cause in accordancewith Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.

Same; Termination of Employment; Due Process; Even if no actual hearing was conductedbefore the employer dismissed the employee, the same is not fatal as only an ampleopportunity to be heard is what is required in order to satisfy the requirements of dueprocess the requirement of due process had been met since they were accorded a chanceto explain their side of the controversy. In termination proceedings of employees,procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Theemployer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts oromissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of theemployers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long asthere was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was

conducted. While no actual hearing was conducted before petitioners dismissedrespondent, the same is not fatal as o nly an ample opportunity to be heard is what isrequired in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. Accordingly, this Court isguided by Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid DevelopmentCorporation, 530 SCRA 132 (2007), (Solid), where the validity of the dismissal of twoemployees was upheld notwithstanding that no hearing was conducted, to wit: [W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute theessential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices beforethe termination of employment can be effected: (1) the fi rst apprises the employee of theparticular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs theemployee of the employers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a heari ng, onother hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and notnecessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.


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Same; Same; Equity; Words and Phrases; While an employee dismissed for cause is generallynot entitled to any f inancial assistance, equity considerations, however, provide anexception; Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural andbelonging to the sphere of morals than of law. This Court, however, is not unmindful of previous rulings, wherein separation pay has been granted to a validly dismissed employeeafter giving considerable weight to long years of employment. An employee who isdismissed for cause is generally not entitled to any financial assistance. Equityconsiderations, however, provide an exception. Equity has been defined as justice outside

law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It isgrounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, f or equityfinds no room for application where there is law.

Same; Same; Same; Corporate Mergers; Even as the employee has only been in service forfour years at the time of separation since the merger of Pharmacia and Upjohn took place in1996, equity

cons iderations dictate that such employees tenure be computed from 1978, the year whenhe started working for Upjohn. In the instant case, this Court rules that an award torespondent of separation pay by way of financial assistance, equivalent to one-half (1/2)months pay for every year of service, is equitable. Although respondents actionsconstituted a valid ground to terminate his services, the same is to this Courts mind not soreprehensible as to warrant complete disregard of his long years of service. It also appearsthat the same is respondents first offense. While it may be expected that petitioners willargue that respondent has only been in their service for four years since the merger of Pharmacia and Upjohn took place in 1996, equity considerat ions dictate that respondentstenure be computed from 1978, the year when respondent started working for Upjohn.[Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. vs. Albayda, Jr., 628 SCRA 544(2010)]

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari ,1[1] u

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November 30

2005 Decision2[2] and May 5, 2006 Resolution3[3] of the Court o

Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00386.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent Ricardo P. Albayda, Jr. (respondent) was an employe

of Upjohn, Inc. (Upjohn) in 1978 and continued working there until 1996

when a merger between Pharmacia and Upjohn was created. After th

merger, respondent was designated by petitioner Pharmacia and Upjoh

(Pharmacia) as District Sales Manager assigned to District XI in th

Western Visayas area. During the period of his assignment, responden

settled in Bacolod City.

Sometime on August 9, 1999, a district meeting was held

Makati City wherein one of the topics discussed was the distric


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territorial configuration for the new marketing and sales direction for the

year 2000.

In December 1999, respondent received a Memorandum4[4]

announcing the sales force structure for the year 2000. In the said

memorandum, respondent was reassigned as District Sales Manager to

District XII in the Northern Mindanao area. One of the key areas covered

in District XII is Cagayan de Oro City.

In response to the memorandum, respondent wrote a letter5[5]

dated December 27,1999 to Felicito M. Garcia (Garcia), Pharmacias

Vice-President for Sales and Marketing, questioning his transfer from

District XI to District XII. Respondent said that he has always been

assigned to the Western Visayas area and that he felt that he could not

improve the sales of products if he was assigned to an unfamiliar

territory. Respondent concluded that his transfer might be a way for his

managers to dismiss him from employment. Respondent added that he

could not possibly accept his new assignment in Cagayan de Oro City

because he will be dislocated from his family; his wife runs a

established business in Bacolod City; his eleven- year-old daughter i

studying in Bacolod City; and his two-year-old son is under his and hi

wifes direct care.

On January 10, 2000, Garcia wrote a letter6[6] to responden

denying his request to be reassigned to the Western Visayas area. Garcia

explained that the factors used in determining assignments of manager

are to maximize business opportunities and growth and development o

personnel. Garcia stressed that other people both reprensentatives an

district sales managers have been re-located in the past and in the yea

2000 re-alignment.

On February 16, 2000, respondent wrote a letter7[7] to Aleda Ch

(Chu), Pharmacias National Sales and External Business Manager

reiterating his request to be reassigned to the Western Visayas area

Respondent alleged that during one conversation, Chu assured him tha

as long as he hits his sales target by 100%, he would not be transferred


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Respondent again speculated that the real reason behind his transfer was

that it was petitioners way of terminating his employment. Respondent

harped that his transfer would compel him to lose his free housing and

his wifes compensation of P50,000.00 from her business in Bacolod

City.

In a letter8[8] dated March 3, 2000, Chu said that she did not give

any assurance or commitment to respondent that he would not be

transferred as long as he achieved his 100% target for 1999. Chu

explained to respondent that they are moving him to Cagayan de Oro

City, because of their need of respondents expertise to build the business

there. Chu added that the district performed dismally in 1999 and,

therefore, they were confident that under respondents leadership, he can

implement new ways and develop the sales force to become better and

more productive. Moreover, since respondent has been already in

Bacolod and Iloilo for 22 years, Chu said that exposure to a different

market environment and new challenges will contribute to respondents

development as a manager. Finally, Chu stressed that the decision to

transfer respondent was purely a business decision.

Respondent replied through a letter9[9] dated March 16, 200

Respondent likened his transfer to Mindanao as a form of punishment a

he alleged that even Police Chief General Panfilo Lacson transferre

erring and non-performing police officers to Mindanao. Responden

argued that Chu failed to face and address the issues he raised regarding

the loss of his family income, the additional cost of housing and otheadditional expenses he will incur in Mindanao.

In a memorandum10[10] dated May 11, 2000, Jane B. Montil

(Montilla), Pharmacias Human Resource Manager, notified responden

that since he has been on sick leave since January 5, 2000 up to th

present, he had already consumed all his sick leave credits for the yea

2000. Montilla stated that per company policy, respondent would then b

considered on indefinite sick leave without pay. In anoth

memorandum11[11] dated May 15, 2000, Montilla informed responden

of the clinic schedule of the company appointed doctor.


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In a letter12[12] dated May 17, 2000, respondent acknowledged

his receipt of the letters from Montilla. Respondent informed Montilla

that his doctors had already declared him fit for work as of May 16, 2000.

Respondent stated that he was already ready to take on his regular

assignment as District Sales Manager in Negros Occidental or in any

district in the Western Visayas area.

In a letter13[13] dated May 17, 2000, Chu expressed her

disappointment on the way respondent viewed their reason for moving

his place of assignment. Chu was likewise disappointed with

respondents opinion that with the movement, he be given additional

remuneration, when in fact, such was never done in the past and never

the practice in the industry and in the Philippines. Chu concluded that it

appeared to her that respondent would not accept any reason for the

movement and that nothing is acceptable to him except a Western

Visayas assignment. Consequently, Chu referred the case to the Human

Resource Department for appropriate action.

Montilla met with respondent to discuss his situation. After th

meeting, Montilla sent respondent a memorandum14[14] wherein hi

request to continue his work responsibilities in Negros Occidental or in

any district in the Western Visayas area was denied as there was no

vacant position in those areas. Montilla stressed that the compan

needed respondent in Cagayan de Oro City, because of his wealth oexperience, talent and skills. Respondent, however, was also given an

option to be assigned in Metro Manila as a position in the said territory

had recently opened when Joven Rodriguez was transferred a

Government Accounts and Special Projects Manager. Montilla gav

respondent until June 2, 2000 to talk to his family and weigh the pros and

cons of his decision on whether to accept a post in Cagayan de Oro Cit

or in Manila.

In a letter15[15] dated May 31, 2000, respondent reiterated th

concerns he raised in his previous letters.


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Montilla sent respondent another memorandum16[16] dated June

6, 2000, stating that it is in the best interest of the company for

respondent to report to the Makati office to assume his new area of

assignment.

In a letter17[17] dated June 8, 2000, respondent told Montilla that

he will be airing his grievance before the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC).

In a memorandum18[18] dated June 15, 2000, Montilla stated that

contrary to the opinion of respondent, respondent is entitled to Relocation

Benefits and Allowance pursuant to the companys Benefits Manual.

Montilla directed respondent to report for work in Manila within 5

working days from receipt of the memorandum.

In another memorandum19[19] dated June 26, 2000, Montilstated that she had not heard from respondent since his June 8, 2000 letteand that he has not replied to their last memorandum dated June 152000. Respondent was warned that the same would be a final notice fohim to report for work in Manila within 5 working days from receipt othe memo; otherwise, his services will be terminated on the basis o

being absent without official leave (AWOL).

On July 13, 2000, Montilla sent respondent a memorandum20[20notifying him of their decision to terminate his services after h

repeatedly refused to report for work despite due notice, the pertinen

portions of which read:

As I mentioned many times in our talks, you are in a Sales position for which you had signed up. Your employment contract actually statesthat you are willing to be assigned anywhere else in the Philippines,wherever the company needs you sees you fit.

Metro Manila is the biggest and most advanced market we have in thePhilippines. It is where the success or failure of our business lies. It is,therefore, the most competitive and significant area for sales. It is themost challenging and most rewarding of all areas. Only the best fieldmanagers are given the opportunity to manage a territory in MetroManila. This is why I chose Manila over Cagayan de Oro for you inmy letter dated June 6, 2000. And because you had assured us that youwere fit to work, after being on sick leave for about five and a half months, I asked you to assume your new assignment in Metro Manila

before June 16, 2000.


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Before June 16, 2000, you wrote us a letter advising us that you cannot accept the new assignment in Manila. In response, we advised youthat the assignment in Manila is a business need and for said reasonyou were requested to report for work within five working days fromreceipt of notice. However, you failed to comply. So we issued another memo dated June 26, 2000, instructing you to report for work andadvising you that should you continue to fail to report for work, thecompany shall be constrained to terminate your employment.

In view of the foregoing, we have no alternative but toterminate your services on the basis of absence without official leave(AWOL) and insubordination pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which shall be effective on July 19,2000.21[21]

On August 14, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint22[22] with the

NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City against

Pharmacia, Chu, Montilla and Garcia for constructive dismissal. Also

included in the complaint was Ashley Morris, Pharmacias Pres ident.

Since mandatory conciliation failed between the parties, both sides were

directed to submit their position papers.

On July 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered

Decision23[23] dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of whic

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint against

respondents in the above-entitled case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.24[24]

Respondent appealed to the NLRC. In a Decision25[25] date

July 26, 2004, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, the dispositive portion o

which reads:


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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.26[26]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,27[27] which was

denied by the NLRC in a Resolution28[28] dated November 10, 2004.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari 29[29] before

the CA.

On November 30, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision ruling i

favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is herebygiven due course and the Resolution dated November 10, 2004 and theDecision dated July 26, 2004 of the NLRC Fourth Division in NLRCCase No. V-000521-2000 (RAB Case No. 06-08-10650-2000), arehereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case isREMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission, RegionalArbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, for the proper determinationof the petitioners claims.

SO ORDERED.30[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,

however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 5, 2006.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising a lone assignment o

error to wit:


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WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (CEBUCITY) CAN REVERSE OR SET ASIDE THE FACTUAL ANDLEGAL FINDINGS OF THE NLRC WHICH WAS BASED ONSUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN THERE IS NO SHOWINGOF PALPABLE ERROR OR THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACTSOF THE LABOR ARBITER IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF THENLRC. 31[31]

The petition is meritorious.

As a general rule, this Court does not entertain factual issues. The

scope of our review in petitions filed under Rule 45 is limited to errors of

law or jurisdiction.32[32] This Court leaves the evaluation of facts to the

trial and appellate courts which are better equipped for this task.

However, there are instances in which factual issues may be

resolved by this Court, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded

entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is

manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) th

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fac

are conflicting; (6) the CA goes beyond the issues of the case, and it

findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees

(7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial

court ; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation ospecific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in th

petition, as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs, are no

disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by th

evidence on record.33[33]

In the present case, this Court is prompted to evaluate the finding

of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA which are diametrically opposed.

Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it reversed the factual an

legal findings of the NLRC which affirmed the decision of the LA

Petitioners contend that it is well established that factual findings o


16/68

administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies are accorded great

respect and finality and are not to be disturbed on appeal unless patently

erroneous.

After a judicious examination of the records herein, this Court

sustains the findings of the LA and the NLRC which are more in accord

with the facts and law of the case.

On petitioners exercise of management prerogat ive

Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogative

to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to

another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,

benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by

discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or

demotion without sufficient cause.34[34]

To determine the validity of the transfer of employees, th

employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenien

or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or

diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should th

employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfe

shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal.35[35]

Both the LA and the NLRC ruled that the reassignment o

respondent was a valid exercise of petitioners management prerogative.

The LA shared petitioners posture that the transfer of responden

was a valid exercise of a legitimate management prerogative to maximiz

business opportunities, growth and development of personnel and that th

expertise of respondent was needed to build the companys busines

Cagayan de Oro City which dismally performed in 1999.36[36]


17/68

In addition, the LA explained that the reassignment of respondent

was not a demotion as he will also be assigned as a District Sales

Manager in Mindanao or in Metro Manila and that the notice of his

transfer did not indicate that his emoluments will be reduced. Moreover,

the LA mentioned that respondent was entitled to Relocation Benefitsand Allowance in accordance with petitioners Benefits Manual.

On respondents allegation that his family stands to lose income

from his wifes business, the LA ruled:

The allegation of complainant that his income will be affected because his wife who is doing business in Bacolod City and earnsP50,000.00, if true, should not be taken in consideration of his transfer.What is contemplated here is the diminution of the salary of thecomplainant but not his wife. Besides, even if complainant may accepthis new assignment in Cagayan de Oro or in Metro Manila, his wife maystill continue to do her business in Bacolod City. Anyway, Bacolod Cityand Manila is just one (1) hour travel by plane.37[37]

Lastly, the LA pointed out that in respondents contract o

employment, he agreed to be assigned to any work or workplace as may

be determined by the company whenever the operations require suc

assignment.

The NLRC affirmed in toto the findings of the LA. The NL

ruled that petitioners restructuring move was a valid exercise of it

management prerogative and authorized under the employment contrac

of respondent, to wit:

We do not see in the records any evidence to prove that therestructuring move of respondent company was done with ill motivesor with malice and bad faith purposely to constructively terminatecomplainants employment. Such misinterpretation or misguidedsupposition by complainant is belied by the f act that respondentsofficers had in several communications officially sent to complainant,expressly recognized complainants expertise and capabilities as a topsales man and manager for which reason the respondent companyneeds his services and skills to energize the low-performing areas inorder to maximize business opportunities and to afford complainant anopportunity for further growth and development. Complainant

persistently refused instead of taking this opportunity as a challengeafter all, the nature of employment of a sales man or sales manager isthat it is mobile or ambulant being always seeking for possible areas tomarket goods and services. He totally forgot the terms and conditionsin his employment contract, stated in part, thus:

x x x x


18/68

You agree, during the period of employment, to be assigned toany work or workplace for such period as may be determined by thecompany and whenever the operations thereof require suchassignment.38[38]

The rule in our jurisdiction is that findings of fact of the NLRC,

affirming those of the LA, are entitled to great weight and will not bedisturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence.39[39] Substantial

evidence is an amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.40[40] As explained in

Ignacio v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc :41[41]

x x x Factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of theLabor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed to have acquired expertise inmatters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported by

evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and areconsidered binding on this Court. As long as their decisions aredevoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of theirdeduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is leftis for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare itsfinality .42[42]

Based on the foregoing, this Court rules that the CA ha

overstepped its legal mandate by reversing the findings of fact of the LA

and the NLRC as it appears that both decisions were based on substantia

evidence. There is no proof of arbitrariness or abuse of discretion in th

process by which each body arrived at its own conclusions. Thus, the CA

should have deferred to such specialized agencies which are considered

experts in matters within their jurisdictions.

Moreover, what is objectionable with the CA decision is that i

finding that the reassignment of respondent was arbitrary an

unreasonable it had, in effect, imposed on petitioners its own opinion o

judgment on what should have been a purely business decision, to wit:


19/68

Discussing the issues jointly, a perusal of the records showsthat there was no overwhelming evidence to prove that petitioner wasterminated for a just and valid cause. Public respondent hadoverlooked the fact that the reassignment of petitioner was arbitraryand unreasonable as the same was in contrast to the purposes espoused

by private respondents. Undoubtedly, petitioner is a complete alien tothe territory and as no established contacts therein, thus, he cannot beeffective nor can he maximize profits. It cannot also contribute to his

professional growth and development considering that he had alreadymade a mark on his territory by virtue of his twenty-two (22) longyears of valuable service. Considering the quality of his performancein his territory, the private respondents cannot therefore reason out thatthey are merely exercising their management prerogative for it would

be unreasonable since petitioner has not been amiss in hisresponsibilities. Furthermore, it would undeniably cause undueinconvenience to herein petitioner who would have to relocate,disrupting his familys peaceful living, and with no additional monthlyremuneration.43[43]

In the absence of arbitrariness, the CA should not have looked into

the wisdom of a management prerogative. It is the employers

prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees

qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the

various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they

will function with maximum benefit to the company.44[44]

As a matter of fact, while the CAs observations may be acceptabl

to some quarters, it is nevertheless not universal so as to foreclosanother view on what may be a better business decision. While it would

be profitable to keep respondent in an area where he has establishe

contacts and therefore the probability of him reaching and eve

surpassing his sales quota is high, on the one hand, one can also make a

case that since respondent is one of petitioner s best district managers

is the right person to turn around and improve the sales numbers i

Cagayan de Oro City, an area which in the past had been dismall performing. After all, improving and developing a new market may eve

be more profitable than having respondent stay and serve his old marke

In addition, one can even make a case and say that the transfer o

respondent is also for his professional growth. Since respondent


20/68

has been already assigned in the Western Visayas area for 22 years, it

may mean that his market knowledge is very limited. In another

territory, there will be new and more challenges for respondent to face. In

addition, one can even argue that for purposes of future promotions, it

would be better to promote a district manager who has experience in

different markets.

The foregoing illustrates why it is dangerous for this Court and

even the CA to look into the wisdom of a management prerogative.

Certainly, one can argue for or against the pros and cons of transferring

respondent to another territory. Absent a definite finding that such

exercise of prerogative was tainted with arbitrariness andunreasonableness, the CA should have left the same to petitioners better

judgment. The rule is well settled that labor laws discourage interference

with an employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the

law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the

right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management

prerogatives. As long as the company's exercise of the same is in good

faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or

circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or vali

agreements, such exercise will be upheld.45[45]

In addition, this Court cannot agree with the findings of the CA

that the transfer of respondent was unreasonable, considering he had no been remiss in his responsibilities. What the CA failed to recognize i

that the very nature of a sales man is that it is mobile and ambulant. On

this point, it bears to stress that respondent signed two document

signifying his assent to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines. I

respondents Employment Application, 46[46] he checked the box wh

asks, Are you willing to be relocated anywhere in th

Philippines ?47[47] In addition, in respondents Contract Employment,48[48] item (8) reads:


21/68

You agree, during the period of your employment, to beassigned to any work or workplace for such period as may bedetermined by the company and whenever the operations thereof require such assignment.49[49]

Even if respondent has been performing his duties well it does notmean that petitioners hands are tied up that they can no longer reassign

respondent to another territory. And it is precisely because of

respondents good performance that petitioners want him to be

reassigned to Cagayan de Oro City so that he could improve their

business there.

In Abbott Laboratories ( Phils. ), Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 50[50] which involved a complaint filed by a medical

representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal

for allegedly terminating his employment when he refused to accept hi

reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the dru

company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with it

operational demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court therein

quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:

Therefore, Bobadilla had no valid reason to disobey the order of transfer. He had tacitly given his consent thereto when he acceded to the

petitioners policy of hiring sales staff who are willing to be assignedanywhere in the Philippines which is demanded by petitioners business.

By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical representative is expected to travel. He should anticipatereassignment according to the demands of their business . It would be apoor drug corporation which cannot even assign its representativesor detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to

areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of the employment contract .51[51]

On the existence of grounds to dismiss respondent from the

service


22/68

Because of respondents adamant refusal to be reassigned, the LA

ruled that petitioners had valid grounds to terminate his employment, to

wit:

As early as in December 27, 1999, complainant already

signified his refusal to accept his new assignment in Cagayan de Oro.Complainantwas on sick leave since January 5, 2000 up to May 11, 2000, for aboutfour (4) months and he already consumed his leave credits up to March2000. Hence, starting April 2000 he was already on indefinite leavewithout pay.

x x x x

In his letter dated May 17, 2000, addressed to respondent JaneB. Montilla, complainant informed her that his doctors have alreadydeclared him fit for work as of May 16, 2000, and he was ready toassume to his regular assignment as District Sales Manager of NegrosOccidental. This is a strong indication that complainant really does notwant to accept his new assignment either in Cagayan de Oro or inMetro Manila, which is clearly a defiance of the lawful order of hisemployer, and a ground to terminate his services pursuant to Article282 of the Labor Code.

Notwithstanding his adamant refusal to resume working to hisnew assignment in Metro Manila, complainant was still given byrespondent Montilla another chance to think it over up to June 2, 2000.By way of reply, complainant, in his letter dated May 31, 2000 to Ms.Montilla, he clearly expressed his disagreement to his transfer andwould rather seek justice elsewhere in another forum.

But still the respondent company, notwithstanding the positiontaken by complainant in his letter dated May 31, 2000 that he isrefusing his transfer gave complainant until June 16, 2000 toreconsider his position. In a letter dated June 5, 2000, respondentMontilla gave complainant a period of five (5) days from receipt

thereof to report to Manila, but still complainant did not comply. Ms.Montilla sent complainant a final notice dated June 26, 2000 for him toreport to Manila within five (5) working days from receipt of the same,with a warning that his failure to do so, the company would beconstraint to terminate his services for being absent without officialleave.

Finally, is was only on July 19, 2000, when the services of complainant was terminated by respondent company through itsHuman Resource Manager on the ground of absence without leave andinsubordination pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code.

Clearly, the complainant had abandoned his work by reason of his being on AWOL as a consequence of vigorous objection to histransfer to either Cagayan de Oro or Metro Manila. The long period of absence of complainant without official leave from April to July 19,2000 is more than sufficient ground to dismiss him. The refusal of complainant to accept his transfer of assignment is a clear willfuldisobedience of the lawful order of his employer and a ground toterminate his services under Article 282, par. (a) of the Labor Code, asamended. The series of chances given complainant to report for work,coupled by his adamant refusal to report to his new assignment, is aconclusive indication of willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his employer.52[52]

In addition, the NLRC also ruled that respondent was guilty

of insubordination, thus :

Apparently, complainant, by his unjustified acts of refusing to be transferred either to Mindanao or Manila for personal reasons,

absent any bad faith or malice on the part of respondents, has


23/68

deliberately ignored and defied lawful orders of his employer. Anemployee who refuses to be transferred, when such transfer is valid, isguilty of insubordination. x x x53[53]

Based on the foregoing, this Court rules that the findings of the LA

and the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence. The LA clearly

outlined the steps taken by petitioners and the manner by which

respondent was eventually dismissed. The NLRC, for its part, explained

why respondent was guilty of insubordination. No abuse of discretion

can, therefore, be attributed to both agencies, and the CA was certainly

outside its mandate in reversing such findings.

This Court has long stated that the objection to the transfer being

grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be

caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to

disobey an order of transfer.54[54] Such being the case, respondent

cannot adamantly refuse to abide by the order of transfer withou

exposing himself to the risk of being dismissed. Hence, his dismissal wa

for just cause in accordance with Article 282(a)55[55] of the Labor Code

The CA, however, ruled that respondent was not guilty o

insubordination, to wit:

As to the findings of insubordination, the records show that petitioner was not guilty of such offense. For insubordination to exist,the order must be reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to theemployee and in connection to his duties. Where an order or rule is notreasonable, in view of the terms of the contract of employment and thegeneral right of the parties, a refusal to obey does not constitute a justcause for the emplo yees discharge. It is undeniable that the order given by the company to petitioner to transfer to a place where he hasno connections, leaving his family behind, and with no clear additionalremuneration, can be considered unreasonable and petitionersactuation cannot be considered insubordination.56[56]

This Court cannot agree with the findings of the CA, in view of th

fact that it was an error for it to substitute its own judgment and interfere

with management prerogatives. No iota of evidence was presented tha


24/68

the reassignment of respondent was a demotion as he would still be a

District Sales Manager in Cagayan de Oro City or in Metro Manila.

Furthermore, he would be given relocation benefits in accordance with

the Benefits Manual. If respondent feels that what he was given is less

than what is given to all other district managers who were likewise

reassigned, the onus is on him to prove such fact. Furthermore, records

reveal that respondent has been harping on the fact that no additional

remuneration would be given to him with the transfer. However, again,

respondent did not present any evidence that additional remuneration

were being given to other district managers who were reassigned to

different locations, or that such was the practice in the company. This

Court, therefore, is inclined to believe the statement of Chu in her May

17, 2000 letter to respondent that additional remuneration is never givento people who are reassigned, to wit:

x x x Likewise, I am disappointed that with the movement, youexpect to be paid additional remuneration when in fact, this has never

been done in the past and never a practice within the industry and thePhilippines.57[57]

Lastly, while it is understandable that respondent does not want t

relocate his family, this Court agrees with the NLRC when it observed

that such inconvenience is considered an employment or professional

hazard which forms part of the concessions an employee is deemed to

have offered or sacrificed in the view of his acceptance of a position in

sales.

On the observance of due process

The CA ruled that respondent was denied due process in the

manner he was dismissed by petitioners, to wit:

Furthermore, the finding that petitioner was afforded due process is bereft of any legal basis. An employee must be given noticeand an ample opportunity, prior to dismissal to adequately prepare for his defense. This is an elementary rule in labor law that due process indismissal cases contemplates the twin requisites of notice and hearing.These procedural requirements have been mandatorily imposed to theemployer to accord its employees the right to be heard. Failure of theemployer to comply with such requirements renders its judgment of dismissal void and inexistent. A written notice from the employer containing the causes for the dismissal must be given. The employee isthen given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself,appraising him of his right to counsel if he desires. Lastly, a writtennotice informing the employee of the decision of the employer, citingthere reasons therefore, is given. The above procedure was notfollowed in the instant case and the series of communications and


25/68

meetings cannot take the place and is therefore not sufficient to takethe place of notice and hearing.58[58]

In termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process

consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer

must furnish the employee with two written notices before the

termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the

employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is

sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer s

decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with

as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that

an actual hearing was conducted.59[59]

While no actual hearing was conducted before petitioners

dismissed res pondent, the same is not fatal as only an ample opportunity

to be heard is what is required in order to satisfy the requirements of due

process.60[60] Accordingly, this Court is guided by Solid Development

Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Developmen

Corporation 61[61] (Solid) , where the validity of the dismissal of t

employees was upheld notwithstanding that no hearing was conducted, to

wit:

[W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of noticeand hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in thedismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that theemployer must furnish the employee with two written notices beforethe termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprisesthe employee of the particular acts or omissions for which hisdismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of theemployers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, onthe other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to

be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both apprised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them.They were also required to submit their written explanation within 12hours from receipt of the reports. Yet, neither of them complied. Hadthey found the 12-hour period too short, they should have requestedfor an extension of time. Further, notices of termination were also sentto them informing them of the basis of their dismissal. In fine,

petitioners were given due process before they were dismissed. Even if no hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process had been


26/68

met since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of thecontroversy62[62]

In the case at bar, this Court finds that petitioners had complied

with the requirements of law in effecting the dismissal of respondent.

Petitioners sent respondent a first notice in the form of a

memorandum63[63] dated June 26, 2000, warning him that the same

would serve as a final notice for him to report to work in Manila within 5

working days from receipt thereof, otherwise, his services would be

terminated on the basis of AWOL. After receiving the memorandum,

respondent could have requested for a conference with the assistance of

counsel, if he so desired. Like in Solid, had respondent found the time

too short, he should have responded to the memorandum asking for more

time. It, however, appears to this Court that respondent made no such

requests. On July 13, 2000, petitioners sent another memorandum64[64]

notifying respondent that they are terminating his services effective July

19, 2000, after he repeatedly refused to report to work despite due notice

Even if no actual hearing was conducted, this Court is of the opinion tha

petitioners had complied with the requirements of due process as all tha

the law requires is an ample opportunity to be heard.

In conclusion, it bears to stress that the CA should not hav

disturbed the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC in the absence o

arbitrariness or palpable error. The reassignment of respondent to anothe

territory was a valid exercise of petitioners management prerog ative

consequently, his dismissal was for cause and in accordance with the due

process requirement of law.

This Court, however, is not unmindful of previous rulings,65[65

wherein separation pay has been granted to a validly dismissed employe

after giving considerable weight to long years of employment.66[66]


27/68

An employee who is dismissed for cause is generally not entitled

to any financial assistance. Equity considerations, however, provide an

exception. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical

rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is

grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of

positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is

law.67[67]

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor

Relations Commission, 68[68] the Court laid down the guidelines in the

grant of separation pay to a lawfully dismissed employee, thus:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as ameasure of social justice only in those instances where the employee isvalidly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or thosereflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the validdismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involvingmoral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellowworker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissedemployee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other

name it is called, on the ground of social justice.69[69]

In the instant case, this Court rules that an award to respondent o

separation pay by way of financial assistance, equivalent to one-half (1/2

months pay for every year of service, is equitable. Althoug

respondent's actions constituted a valid ground to terminate his services

the same is to this Court's mind not so reprehensible as to warran

complete disregard of his long years of service. It also appears that the

same is respondent's first offense. While it may be expected tha

petitioners will argue that respondent has only been in their service fo

four years since the merger of Pharmacia and Upjohn took place in 1996

equity considerations dictate that respondent's tenure be computed from

1978, the year when respondent started working for Upjohn.

Ci il C d hi h id ( ) f d b ll l b l i l i d ll l b


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WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED . The November 30, 2005 Decision and May

5, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00386 are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE .

In view of the above disquisitions, petitioners are ORDERED to

pay respondent separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent

to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service.

SO ORDERED .

G.R. No. 156260. March 10, 2005.*

BABCOCK-HITACHI (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. BABCOCK-HITACHI (PHILS.), INC., MAKATIEMPLOYEES UNION (BHPIMEU), respondent.

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Any doubt or ambiguity in the contractbetween management and the union members should be resolved in favor of the latter. To begin with, any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the unionmembers should be resolved in favor of the latter. This is pursuant to Article 1702 of the

Civil Code which provides: (I)n case of doubt, all la bor legislation and all labor contractsshall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Same; Same; Contracts; Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted accordingto their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment. The above provisionstate that employees transferred from Makati City to Bauan, Batangas are entitled to amonthly relocation allowance of P1,500.00, provided their transfer is permanent or for a

period exceeding one month. Such provisions need no interpretation for they are clear.Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaningand not beyond their obvious intendment.

Same; Same; Same; The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitutethe law between the parties. In Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, we held that the termsand conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties.Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that anobligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to courtfor redress. *Babcock -Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. vs. Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc., MakatiEmployees Union (BHPIMEU), 453 SCRA 156(2005)]

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156260. March 10, 2005]

BABCOCK-HITACHI (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs . BABCOCK-HITACHI(PHILS.), INC., MAKATI EMPLOYEES UNION (BHPIMEU), respondent .

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of CivProcedure, as amended, assailing the Decision [1] dated May 14, 2002 and

R l ti [2] d t d N b 26 2002 d d b th C t f A l i CA O M 14 2002 th A ll t C t lg t d it D i i ffi i g th
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Resolutio n[2] dated November 26, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65260, entitled Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. vs. Babcock-Hitachi(Phils.), Inc., Makati Employees Union (BHPIMEU) .

The facts as borne by the records are:

Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc., petitioner , is a manufacturing corporation, with branches at Makati City and Bauan, Batangas.

Sometime in December 1997, petitioner, to improve the operating efficiency andcoordination among its various departments, formulated a plan to transfer the DesignDepartment from its Makati office to Bauan, Batangas.

With this development, petitioner, on February 24, 1999, sent separate notices toJustiniano G. Iniego, Xavier Aguila and Bonifacio B. Vergara, who occupiedEngineer 1 positions at the Design Department, of their re-assignment and transfer toBauan, Batangas effective April 1, 1999. This prompted them to claim for their relocation allowance provided by Sections 1 and 2, Article XXI of the collective

bargaining agreement (CBA) .[3]

However, petitioner refused to implement the CBA, claiming that the affected

employees are not entitled to relocation allowance under Policy Statement No. BHPI-G-044A dated October 1, 1996 [4] considering that they are residents of Bauan or itsadjacent towns .[5]

Thus, the affected union members (Justiniano Iniego, et al.), represented by Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc., Makati Employees Union, respondent , filed with the NationalConciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of relocationallowance against petitioner. In a Submission Agreement dated March 18, 1999, the

parties stipulated to submit the case for voluntary arbitration.

On July 25, 2000, after the parties submitted their pleadings and position papers, theVoluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents

concerned members their relocation allowances. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated May 30, 2001.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 2002, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming theVoluntary Arbitrators assailed Decision. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated asfollows:

After a thorough study of the case at hand , we are convinced that the affectedemployees are entitled to the relocation allowance provided for in the CollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into and signed by both the Union and

petitioner Company on July 18, 1997. We share the posture adopted by the VoluntaryArbitrator in rejecting petitioners arguments that the affected employees are notentitled to relocation allowance. Pursuant to the basic and irrefragable rule that incarrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementingrules and regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and

paramount consideration. Undoubtedly, this rule must likewise find application in theinterpretation and meaning of the CBA entered into by both the parties, for the sameis the law between the parties. x x x.

x x x x x x

In the case before this Court, petitioner Companys contention that the policystatement they issued still finds application in the present CBA is misplaced. Withthe advent of the new CBA dated July 18, 1997, the policy statement, which

previously finds application can no longer be controlling in the present situation. Hadit been the intent of the proponents of the CBA, then it could have been incorporatedin the agreement or contract, otherwise, it contravenes the very essence and purposeof the CBA. Obviously, the purpose of collective bargaining agreement is thereaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties.

Moreover, the policy statement being invoked by petitioner Company is not a part of the contract or CBA, thus, it cannot remain in full force and effect even beyond thestipulated term, especially, in the light of the present CBA. Under the circumstances,the policy statement issued by the petitioner company is a unilateral policy, which iscontrary to the provisions of the CBA. The CBA operates as the law that governs theemployer-employee relationship of herein petitioner Company and the Union.

Second. Petitioner Company contends that the rationale behind the CBA provisionon relocation allowance is clearly spelled out in the company policy on relocationallowance.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case petitioner Compa nys argument Section 1 The COMPANY shall provide a relocation allowance of ONE
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Documents

Relocation Allowance