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REPORT ON TOKWE MUKOSI FLOOD DISASTER
2014
Compiled By
Lameck Betera
DCP
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Contents CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 3
POLICY AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE ............................................. 3
1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Disaster management policy in Zimbabwe .................................................. 4
1.2 Legislation........................................................................................................................ 5
CO-ORDINATOR CO-ORDINATOR/PLANNING COMMITTEE ................................... 6
CHAPTER 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.0 Background to Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster ............................................................ 8
2.1 Progress Before Flood Disaster The Ministry of Local Government was
allocated $50, 000 for Head Count and Coordination in July 2013 and the
assignment established the following; ............................................................................. 9
CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 11
3.0 Manifestation Of Flood Disaster .................................................................................... 11
3.1 Overview of the 2013/2014 Season .............................................................. 11
3.2 Mitigation measures ................................................................................................ 13
3.3 Disaster Response ..................................................................................................... 15
3.3 Appeal For Assistance ............................................................................................. 17
3.4 Evacuation Of Communities ................................................................................ 18
3.5 Camp Coordination And Camp Management ............................................. 18
3.6 Major Operational Challenges ............................................................................ 19
CHAPTER 4 ......................................................................................................................................... 20
4.0 DISASTER IMPACT ................................................................................................................. 20
4.1 High cost of relocation ........................................................................................... 20
4.2 Untimely Population Displacement ................................................................. 20
4.3 Suitability of Relocation site of the displaced population ................. 20
4.4 Impact On Community Livelihoods ................................................................. 21
4.5 Delayed recovery from the disaster impact ............................................... 22
4.6 Delayed Valuation of property ........................................................................... 22
4.7 Compensation .............................................................................................................. 23
4.8 Exposure to health hazards ................................................................................. 24
4.9 Loss of Social Infrastructure Assets .............................................................. 24
4.10 Social and Cultural Disruption ........................................................................ 25
CHAPTER 5 ......................................................................................................................................... 26
5.0 Lessons Learnt ..................................................................................................................... 26
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5.1 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 33
5.2 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 33
CHAPTER 1
POLICY AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE
1.0 Introduction In Zimbabwe, government commitment in the management of disasters is demonstrated by the existence of the legal enabling statutes, which create the
conducive environment for disaster risk reduction initiatives. The Government of Zimbabwe committed itself in setting up institutional frameworks and
appropriate policies for Disaster Risk Reduction.
The Government of Zimbabwe through the Department of Civil Protection under
the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing has the responsibility to coordinate Disaster Risk Management initiatives in Zimbabwe.
The execution of this co-ordination mandate is realized through the National, Provincial and District Civil Protection structures with multi-sector
representation. The multi-sectoral representation is maintained at all levels. However there are marked variations in representation as some organizations remain centralized, while those that are decentralized their representation still
varies in terms of staff grades.
Central government initiates hazard reduction measures through relevant sector ministries with the local administration taking the responsibility for implementing and maintaining its effectiveness. The system uses the existing government,
private and NGO organizations whose regular activities contain elements of prevention and community development. These organizations have a level of
flexibility structurally, materially and technically which enables them to speedily adjust from their regular activities to undertaking protective, relief and rehabilitation measures in times of disasters in terms of intensity only without
drifting from their operational principles.
The National Civil Protection Coordination Committee (NCPCC) is responsible for the execution of civil protection functions. In addition to Ministries having special responsibilities according to their specialties, members of the National Civil
Protection Coordination Committees (NCPCC), Provincial Civil Protection Coordination Committees (PCPCC) and District Civil Protection Coordination Committees (DCPC) are grouped into three main functional sub-committees namely:-
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Emergency Services Sub-committee;
The main objective of this committee is to ensure effective and efficient
preparedness and response to mass casualty situations in the country though
development of requisite emergency operating procedures
Drought Relief/ Food and Water Crisis Subcommittee
The broad objective of the committee is to ensure effective and efficient preparedness and response to a food and water crisis.
Zoonotics , Epizootics & Epidemics
The broad objective of the sub-committee is to ensure effective and efficient
preparedness and response to epidemics, zoonotics and epizootics through
facilitation and co-ordination of;
Disease surveillance in humans and animals,
Education and awareness,
Prepositioning of stocks,
Dissemination of early warning/alert mechanisms,
Assessments,
Implementation of response protocols,
In line with priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), the Zimbabwe Government has committed itself to updating the legislative and policy
frameworks to create a conducive environment for disaster risk reduction. The increased vulnerability of communities to persistent and emerging risks in
Zimbabwe provides an opportunity for the UN and international/national partners to support a nationally-led platform and plan for emergency preparedness/disaster-risk reduction that builds national capacity. Building on
the recent draft legislative and policy frameworks which are still awaiting Cabinet approval, the DCP had also developed a comprehensive strategy for Disaster
Risk Management which sets the national priorities for disaster risk reduction in the country.
1.1 Disaster management policy in Zimbabwe It is national policy that every citizen of this country should assist where possible
to avert or limit the effects of disaster. Central government initiates hazard reduction measures through relevant sector ministries with the local administration taking the responsibility for implementing and maintaining its
effectiveness.
Implementation of this policy takes advantage of existing government, private UN, and NGO organizations whose regular activities contain elements of
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prevention and community development. These organizations are adapted structurally, materially and technically so that they can speedily shift from their
regular activities to undertaking protective, relief and rehabilitation measures in times of disasters in terms of intensity only without drifting from their
operational principles. Figure 1 illustrates the key players in implementing the policy.
Fig.1 The Structural Model of Zimbabwe’s Disaster Management System
1.2 Legislation The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing is charged with the coordinative role as empowered by the Civil Protection Act No. 5 of
1989. The Act provides for:-
1. The establishment of the Civil Protection Directorate whose responsibilities are:-
Establishment, promotion and directing of civil protection organizations,
civil protection provinces and civil protection areas. Appointment of planning committees in civil protection provinces and civil
protection areas. The planning committees shall draft civil protection measures to be submitted to the Director then the Minister for approval.
To assist institutions, ministries, departments, private and non-
government organizations to come up with plans for emergency
preparedness and disaster prevention. Consulting the Minister, who, in turn, shall also contact and consult the
President to declare and gazette a state of disaster.
To ensure that the data gathered though by various disciplines is not
contradictory.
Regular contacts with International Disaster Management and Disaster Relief organizations.
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Arrange to get first hand information on major incidents.
Development of public awareness programs on emergency preparedness and response.
Promoting research and training into matters relating to disaster
management.
2 Special powers designed to establish, coordinate and direct the activities of
both the public and private emergency services;
3 Guidelines for action and maximum use of resources since disaster mitigation
requires a multisectoral and interdisciplinary approach;
4 The establishment of a National Civil Protection Fund which receives
money from both Government and the public. The fund is applied to the
development and promotion of Civil Protection activities throughout the
country.
Fig. 2 Operational Structure
CO-ORDINATOR CO-ORDINATOR/PLANNING
COMMITTEE
N Minister – LGPWNH National Civil Protection Coordinating
A + Committee (NCPCC)
T Civil Protection Directorate with a
I Secretariat Multisectoral Representation
O
N
A
L
P Provincial Administrator Provincial Civil Protection
R MLGPWNH Planning Committee (NCPPC)
O
V
7
D District Administrator District Civil Protection
I (DISTRICT) Planning Committee (DCPPC)
S MLGPWNH
T
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CHAPTER 2
2.0 Background to Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster
The construction of Tokwe Mukosi Dam is a strategic project for Masvingo
province after realizing that about 90% of the people in the province depend on
agricultural production. Food production in region cannot be sustained by rain
fed agriculture due to erratic rainfall hence the need to engage in irrigation
cropping.
On completion the Tokwe Mukosi dam will have full supply level capacity of 1802
600 mega litres of water whose expected 10% yield of 423 000 mega litres of
water can irrigate 25 000 hectares downstream.
In view of climate change, the project intended to provide bankable water supply for both agriculture and domestic use. According to the master plan of Tokwe
Mukosi project, displaced communities were meant to directly benefit from sugar plantation agriculture as each household would get at least 4
hectares of land under irrigation.
Major crop that is currently under irrigation in the Lowveld is sugar plantation that has sustained Hippo Valley and Triangle companies. When completed, the
dam would be Zimbabwe’s biggest inland dam with a capacity of 1 802 600 mega litres of water which can be applied to irrigate 25 000 hectares of irrigable land which the displaced communities intent to benefit. The eestimation is based
on 4 ha per family for estimated total of 6393 families who were relocated from Tokwe Mkosi basin. This hectarage can be translated to 150 000 tonnes of
cereals per season and the dam is envisaged to become the development hub of the province opening a vast and diverse investment opportunities in agriculture, downstream. Other uses that were mentioned include livestock production and
fisheries that will improve the food security situation in the low veld.
The project will also have capacity to generate 6-15 megawatts of electricity that will go a long way in complementing the much needed electricity supply.
The buffer zone is earmarked for the development of fisheries, recreation
facilities, hotels and other tourist attraction centres that will bring income to the
province and the nation at large.
The initial Activity Calendar and budgetary arrangement for the project was as
follows;
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Table 2.1. Project activities
ACTIVITY TIME FRAME AMOUNT REQ
Enumeration/Head Count 1st Sept 2012 36,040.00
Valuation 11 Sept 2012 415,502.00
Compensation for 500 families Aug to Oct 2012 2,330,770.00
Compensation for 2 500 families Nov to June 2013 11,653,850.00
Relocation of 1st 500 families Sept to Oct 2012 71,377.00
Relocation of 2nd 2 500 families (PSIP) Mar to June 2013 356,886.00
Demarcation of Buffer Zone - Physical marking
1st Sept 2012 23,550.00
Land Use Planning 1st Sept 2012 93,077.00
Identification of Irrigation Land 15 Nov 2012 14,750.00
Development of Irrigation for 500 families
PSIP 2013 1,200,000.00
Development of Irrigation for 2 500 families
PSIP 2013 6,000,000.00
Drilling of 5 boreholes 15 Sept 2012 38,900.00
Drilling of 95 Boreholes PSIP April 2013 712,500.00
Construction of first 2 primary schools 1st Sept 2012 4,183,250.00
Construction of 3 schools (2 primary & 1 secondary)
PSIP - Jan 2013 1,405,460.00
Construction of clinic 1st Oct 2012 2 500 000,00
construction of 3 dip tanks 1st Sept 2012 42,000.00
construction of 9 dip tanks PSIP 2013 126,000.00
TOTAL 31,435 992.00
2.1 Progress Before Flood Disaster
The Ministry of Local Government was allocated $50, 000 for Head Count and
Coordination in July 2013 and the assignment established the following;
That 6,393 families and their 18, 764 cattle including 8167 primary school going
and 2,295 secondary school going children would need to be relocated from the
basin. These would however, be relocated in three phases viz:
Phase 1 – relocate 1, 247 families who were deemed to be at Level 660m above
sea level and would be in danger of flooding by October 2013.
Phase II – relocate 1, 878 families who would be affected when dam was
expected to fill up by October 2014.
Phase III – relocate 3, 268 families in the Buffer Zone, who would be moved to
protect the dam by October 2015.
In the same month of July, Ministry of Public Works received $140, 000.00 for
valuation exercise and 1, 950 families were valuated in the basin.
Ministry of Lands received $40, 000.00 to plan and peg Masangula Resettlement
Scheme and produced 800 A1 plots.
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DDF and ZINWA received each $57, 500.00 and drilled 11 boreholes at Chisase
and Masangula.
The Ministry of Local Government again received $3,832 490,00 as
compensation funds and compensated 896 families under Level 1.
Ministry of Local Government then relocated 611 families and 757 cattle and 137
donkeys to Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi at a cost of $142, 754,00.
Before the disaster the process of relocation was laborious, commencing with
compensation, then driving the families to see their allocated land, allowing for 2
weeks to clear land, then finally transporting the families to their new
resettlement. The process consumed a lot of time.
By December 2013 Chisase and Masangula were full and in January the province
decided to go back to 5,020 Hactres planned plots in Chingwizi because there
was no other planned land available for resettling people affected by Tokwe
Mukosi Dam construction.
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CHAPTER 3
3.0 Manifestation Of Flood Disaster
In February 2014, Tokwe Mukorsi Dam project deteriorated into a flood disaster following the delayed compensation and relocation of communities from the
Tokwe Mukorsi basin. The initial strategic plan for the dam was premised on the recurrent droughts affecting most parts of Masvingo Province. The project
planners postulated that the dam would start filling up at a later stage when all the communities living within the Tokwe Mukorsi basin would have been trans-located to designated relocation sites.
3.1 Overview of the 2013/2014 Season Temporal distribution was good
Most rainfall was realized in January and February The season was characterised by extreme rainfall events (>50 mm in 24
hrs) No mid season dry spell October, November and December ended in the normal category
December, January and February ended in normal to above normal Tropical Cyclone Guito which was in the Mozambique Channel from 18 to
22 February briefly dried the system especially over the northeastern and eastern districts
Distribution in space was good with most parts of the country ending the
season in the normal category
The 2013 /14 season saw the Runde Catchment receiving significant rainfall far
exceeding the average rainfall of the region. For instance, a cumulative amount
of 924mm was recorded between 1st October 2013 and early February 2014
compared to the normal average of 286mm. The heavy rains were received
in the background of a seasonal forecast in which Masvingo and other extreme
southern parts of the country were expected to receive normal to below normal
rainfall as shown below.
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Fig: 3.1 DJF FORECASTED
DJF forecast went for normal rains with a bias towards above normal for meteorological regions 1 & 2 but
normal rainfall with a bias towards below normal for region 3.
Fig: 3.2 JFM FORECASTED
JFM forecast went for normal rains with a bias towards above normal for meteorological regions 1
& 2 but normal rainfall with a bias towards below normal for region 3.
Source: Met Office 2013/2014 Seasonal Forecast
The month of February had the highest rainfall which contributed to the above
normal rainfall for the whole country.
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The rains resulted in corresponding increase in runoff in the catchment and this
resulted in unexpected flooding incidents which resulted in the filling up of the
Tokwe Mukosi dam which was under construction.
3.2 Mitigation measures In an attempt to offload the water, the engineers made attempts to divert the
water from the dam. The diversion works managed to evacuate the flood to level
631.8m on the 26th January 2014, before the next flood reached the site on the
same date. The situation was worsened by Muzhwi dam upstream of Tokwe
Mukorsi Dam which started spilling over adding more water into Tokwe Mukorsi
Dam which was under construction.
Water levels at the Tokwe Mukorsi Dam rapidly rose to 671meters above sea level on 3rd February 2014 threatening yet to be relocated communities within
its basin. The heavy inflows into the dam, which inundated 2 600 hectares of the dam’s flood basin and saw several families’ homesteads immersed in water
before they were relocated.
During the time of the flood, about 2, 230 families required urgent evacuation
as the water level in the basin was rapidly rising due heavy incessant rains in the catchment area.
On 4th February the water level was 5 meters from overflowing thus extending the scope and extent of the emergency by threatening an estimated 40 000
people downstream of the dam.
On 5th February the water levels reached just over 672 meters exceeding the
Phase I relocation level by 12 meters. Two outlets were discharging 106 cubic meters per second against an inflow of 560 meters per second. The contractor
considered opening another new outlet to increase outflow but this would take about 4 days to complete.
On 6th February, water inflows continued to be more than the outflows and the level rose marginally by 26cm and work on the outlet continued. Some damage
on the wall (rock fall) occurred at 1200hours on 9th February 2014 and this further threatened communities downstream and the Department of Civil protection issued a press statement that was advising people to move to high
ground. Generally, people were panicking that the dam wall could breach at any time.
Table 3.1. Trends in Tokwe Mukosi water levels 26th
Jan 2014 to 14th
Feb 2014
Date
(2014
)
Storage level
in the Dam
(m)(above
mean sea
level)
Rainfall
(mm)
Daily
Water
Rise(m)
Storage
Capacity
( 106m3)
Depth of
Water (m)
Reservoir
Surface Area
(ha)
Dam Wall
Level (m)
Inflow
(m3/s)
Outflow
(m3/s)
26/01 631.80 15.80 60 676.4
27/01 637.08 5.28 21.08 110 676.4
28/01 654.28 17.20 40 38.28 380 676.4
29/01 657.80 3.52 45 41.80 570 676.8
30/01 659.60 1.80 60 43.60 700 677.2
31/01 661.90 2.30 70 45.90 850 677.2
01/02 665.25 3.35 105 49.25 1 100 677.2
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02/02 666.93 1.68 125 50.93 1 300 677.2
03/02 668.72 1.79 160 52.72 1 500 677.6
04/02 671.30 2.58 190 55.30 1 590 678.4
05/02 672.50 1.20 210 56.50 1 930 678.8 519 110
06/02 672.95 0.45 230 56.95 1 960 679.4 375 110
07/02 673.32 0.37 240 57.32 1 960 680.2 605 110
08/02 675.28 1.96 270 59.28 2 310 680.7 710 110
09/02 676.46 1.18 290 60.46 2 500 681.2 430 110
10/02 676.98 0.52 320 60.98 2 550 681.6 280 110
11/02 677.39 0.41 340 61.39 2 600 682.4 274 110
12/02 677.56 0.17 350 61.56 2 620 682.4 168 110
13/02 677.55 17.0 -0.01 350 61.55 2 620 683.2 115 110
14/02 677.50 -0.05 350 61.50 2 620 683.2 109 90
15/02 677.44 -0.06 340 61.44 2 600 683.6 77 90
16/02 677.33 13.6 -0.11 340 61.33 2 600 684.0 85 90
17/02 677.21 -0.12 330 61.21 2 600 684.0 85 90
18/02 677.12 -0.09 330 61.09 2 600 684.5 78 86
19/02 677.00 -0.12 320 61.00 2 580 684.9 75 85
20/02 676.87 -0.13 320 60.87 2 580 685.3 62 85
21/02 676.71 -0.16 300 60.71 2 570 685.8 60 83
22/02 676.53 -0.18 300 60.53 2 570 685.8 59 83
23/02 676.36 13.7 -0.17 290 60.36 2 560 686.2 55 83
24/02 676.20 13.6 -0.16 280 60.20 2 560 686.2 56 83
25/02 676.06 -0.14 280 60.06 2 560 686.6 111.3 87.3
26/02 675.96 -0.10 270 59.96 2 550 687.1 67.81 87
27/02 675.82 -0.14 270 59.82 2 550 687.4 79.72 83
28/02 675.68 -0.14 265 59.68 2 360 687.4 51.41 83
01/03 675.52 21.0 -0.16 265 59.52 2 360 687.4 65.80 83
02/03 675.40 17.4 -0.12 260 59.40 2 350 687.4 122.06 83
03/03 675.71 65.4 0.31 265 59.71 2 400 687.4 285.30 83
04/03 676.62 0.91 300 60.62 2 500 687.4 242.80 83
05/03 677.23 0.61 310 61.23 2 600 687.9 171.1 83
06/03 677.45 0.22 340 61.45 2 620 687.9 165.8 83
07/03 677.46 46.2 0.01 340 61.46 2 620 687.9 83.59 83
08/03 677.42 -0.04 340 61.42 2 620 687.9 94.7 83
09/03 677.35 -0.07 335 61.35 2 600 687.9 58.07 83
10/03 677.30 -0.05 330 61.30 2 600 687.9 61.89 83
11/03 677.20 -0.10 330 61.20 2 600 687.9 62.92 83
12/03 677.11 55.2 -0.09 320 61.11 2 550 687.9 70.35 83
13/03 677.12 11.8 0.01 320 61.12 2 550 687.9 190.60 83
14/03 677.60 1.6 0.48 360 61.60 2 620 687.9 138.77 83
15/03 677.68 0.08 360 61.68 2 620 688.4 122.45 83
16/03 677.69 0.01 360 61.69 2 620 688.4 59.56 83
17/03 677.64 -0.05 360 61.64 2 620 688.4 63.89 83
18/03 677.52 -0.12 350 61.52 2 620 688.8 52.56 83
19/03 677.39 -0.13 340 61.39 2 600 688.8 32.10 83
20/03 677.17 5.0 -0.22 325 61.17 2 580 688.8 36.87 83
21/03 677.00 12.6 -0.17 320 61.00 2 570 689.2 26.30 83
22/03 676.89 -0.11 310 60.89 2 565 690.0 35.16 83
23/03 676.74 -0.15 300 60.74 2 560 690.45 28.59 83
24/03 676.57 -0.17 300 60.57 2 560 690.45 32.98 83
25/03 676.33 -0.24 290 60.33 2 550 690.90 30.45 83
26/03 676.12 -0.21 280 60.12 2 540 690.90 22.74 83
27/03 675.88 -0.24 270 59.88 2 530 691.30 27.08 83
28/03 675.64 -0.24 260 59.64 2 450 691.30 21.00 83
29/03 675.40 -0.24 270 59.40 2 390 691.30 23.80 83
30/03 675.12 -0.28 260 59.12 2 350 691.30 19.33 83
31/03 674.89 -0.23 260 58.89 2 290 691.30 21.55 83
15
01/04 674.63 -0.26 250 58.63 2 250 691.30 20.47 83
02/04 674.34 -0.39 250 58.34 2 180 691.30 17.14 79.8
03/04 674.08 -0.26 240 58.08 2 050 691.30 18.83 79.8
04/04 673.78 -0.30 240 57.78 2 010 691.30 15.83 79.8
05/04 673.50 -0.28 240 57.50 1 980 691.30 16.30 79.8
06/04 673.18 15.2 -0.32 230 57.18 1 960 691.30 14.83 79.8
07/04 672.90 -0.28 230 56.90 1 960 691.30 18.40 79.8
08/04 672.57 -0.33 210 56.57 1 930 691.30 17.20 79.8
09/04 672.25 15.6 -0.32 200 56.32 1 920 691.30 15.82 79.8
10/04 671.93 3.8 -0.32 200 55.93 1920 691.3 14.92 79.8
11/04 671.64 9.8 -0.29 195 55.64 1750 691.3 14.50 79.8
12/04 671.32 10.8 -0.32 190 55.32 1590 691.3 18.21 79.8
13/04 671.03 -0.29 190 55.03 1590 691.3 17.80 79.8
14/04 670.71 -0.32 190 54.71 1590 691.3 18.87 79.0
Source: ZINWA
3.3 Disaster Response
Given the magnitude of the threat to extensive flooding, the Directorate of Civil Protection recommended to the Cabinet Committee on Disaster
Risk Management that a declaration of state of disaster be caused as government had limited resources to manage the disaster. On 9th
February 2014, His Excellency, the President Cde. RG Mugabe declared a State of Disaster in regard to the basin of Tokwe Mukorsi Dam, and areas
downstream as far as the Triangle area. This Declaration is in terms of Subsection (1) of section 27 of the Civil Protection Act [Chapter 10 : 06;
which provides that if at any time it appears to the President that any disaster is of such a nature and extent that extraordinary measures are
necessary to assist and protect the persons affected or likely to be
affected by the disaster in any area of the country, the President may, in such a manner as he considers fit, declare that, with effect from a date
specified by him, a state of disaster exists within an area or areas specified by him in the declaration.
The declaration of state of disaster by His Excellency the President
invoked the activation of the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Management composed of the following;
Minister for Transport and Infrastructural Development
Minister for Primary and Secondary Education
Minister for Tourism and Hospitality Industry
Minister for Environment, Water and Climate
Minister for Health and Child Care
Minister for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
Minister of State in the President’s Office
Minister for Defence
Minister for Home Affairs
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Minister for Mines and Mining Development
Minister for Energy and Power Development
Minister for Finance and Economic Development
Minister for Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development.
Minister for media Information and Broadcasting Services
Minister for Sport, Arts and Culture
Minister of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development
Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement – Co-opted member
The function of the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Management was to oversee the management of the disaster.
The Committee of Ministers was backed by the Committee of Officials, the
National Civil Protection Committee, the Masvingo Provincial Civil Protection Committee and District Civil Protection Committees of affected
districts who were tasked with coordination and management of disaster until the end of the declaration period on 9th May 2014.
Fig 3.1 Co ordination Structure
CABINET COMMITTEE
ONEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
& DISASTER MANAGEMENT
WORKING PARTY OF OFFICIALS
NATIONAL CIVIL PROTECTION COMMITTEE
PROVINCIAL CIVIL PROTECTION COMMITTEE
DISTRICT CIVIL PROTECTION COMMITTEE
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3.3 Appeal For Assistance
Following the declaration of State of Disaster, the Government made a National appeal on 12th February 2014. The Government requested for
urgent assistance in the form of food items such as mealie meal, sugar beans, minestrone soup, cooking oil, powdered milk, sugar, salt, kapenta
fish and other forms of dry relish or other dry foodstuffs, potable water, bowsers, plastic buckets, cooking utensils, soap, toilet paper, sanitary
wear, tents, plastic sheeting and blankets, roofing material such as thatch grass and zinc roofing sheets, transportation for relocating families
preferably lorries, tractors and trailers and fuel diesel preferred, candles and paraffin, matches, primus stove, basic tillage tools such as hoes,
shovels, rakes and mosquito nets
The Government also appealed for US$19,694,093.00 from the
international community to meet urgent humanitarian needs for affected communities in the Tokwe-Mukorsi Dam Basin. This was needed to
evacuate and relocate at risk communities as well as the provision of food, shelter, safe water and other basic needs. A detailed breakdown of
the estimated relief costs was as follows;
Table 3.1 Estimated relief cost
Items Estimated costs
Food and non food items 1,376,356.00
Drilling of 102 boreholes
976,000.00
Logistical Support to for search and rescue 149,090.00
Construction of 6 Primary schools 7,399,000.00
Construction of 2 secondary schools 2,348,100.00
Transport Hire 1,522,178.00
Co-ordination 40,000.00
Fuel 15,000.00
Land use planning and demarcation 210,559.00
Construction 4 clinics 4,000,000.00
Construction of dip tanks 345,000.00
Identification of irrigation land 53,000.00
Preparation of local development plan 201,950.00
Total 18,636,233.00
18
3.4 Evacuation Of Communities Following the flooding of the basin, self help rescue activities using scotch carts and other rudimentary means were employed by the affected communities before the intervention of state and non state agencies. The Air Force of
Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and Zimbabwe National Army were invited to usher in a professional search and rescue operation using helicopters
and rescue boats to remove people out of harm’s way.
Through diplomatic initiatives, the Air Force of Namibia also participated in the
exercise. A total of 450 people were air rescued. People’s belongings and livestock were also moved to safety with the assistance of tractors primarily
from DDF and Tongaat Hullet. The Department of Civil Protection facilitated in securing budgetary allocations; $35 000.00 for aircraft fuel and servicing of air craft and $300 000.00 for ZNA operations.
A fleet of lorries, cattle carriers and buses for relocation of people and their belongings was availed. During the search and rescue exercise, 6 temporary
transit camps were established on higher ground in the buffer zone where the rescued people received food, shelter and clothing while awaiting onward
movement to Chingwizi. Medical attention and sanitation provisions were also availed to maintain the welfare of the people.
All the 2 514 families who were earmarked for relocation under emergency were safely trans-located to Chingwizi holding camp.
3.5 Camp Coordination And Camp Management Owing to non-availability of planned land to resettle people a temporary transit
camp was established at Chingwizi. A strategy was put in place to minimise the
suffering of people in the temporary tent accommodation. The Provincial Civil
Protection Committee chaired by the Provincial Administrator organised itself
into operational subcommittees; Health and diseases chaired by PMD, Food and
shelter chaired by GMB, Landuse planning chaired by Ministry of Lands. These
sub-committees were replicated at Chingwizi and were chaired by the District
Administrator Mwenezi who was also tasked with day to day camp management
with support from Civil Protection Department I.O.M, UN Agencies and NGOs.
The District Administrator was resident at the camp throughout the
emergency period. He coordinated the activities of all NGOs and UN
agencies and managed all stocks and materials coming in to the camp. He
was also in charge of coordinating the provision of temporary shelter,
water supply, health and sanitation, education and other welfare
activities. Accountability procedures were put in place to ensure proper
receipting and acquittal of supplies and donations.
On arrival at camp each family was allocated a tent, 50kg mealie-meal, 2 Litres cooking oil, 1kg salt, 4kg sugar, 10kg sugar beans, 5kg Kapenta. Water
was also provide to at the camp. At first water was being drawn from Triangle until 3 boreholes were drilled and a piped water scheme was established for the transit camp.
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A clinic to offer essential health services was quickly established and was
supervised by the Provincial Medical Director . By 19 February 2014 a primary and secondary school had been established to cater for all school going children.
With the support of NGOs around 700 temporary toilets were put in place and were being decommission and replaced by new ones when full.
3.6 Major Operational Challenges
Due to fiscal constraints, Treasury was unable to disburse adequate
funding to various sectors operating in the Tokwe Mukorsi Dam project. The Department of Civil Protection was allocated only two tranches of
USD75 000.00 to manage the disaster despite its magnitude. The funding was supposed to cover the requirements of staff allowances for all
participating sectors as well as maintaining the welfare of the affected communities. The funding was not enough to service the cost of
mobilising resources for relocation.
In order to mobilise resources, Government made two appeals for assistance which aimed at the domestic and international community. The
response from the domestic appeal was positive with donations coming
from Local and International NGOs, IOM, Zimbabwe Redcross Society, individuals, civic organisations, and private and public sectors. On the
International front, response was rather lukewarm with no direct funding to Government although the United Nations family system pledged to
support the disaster management effort. However, the Japanese Government through JICA donated tents while an NGO from South Africa
- the Gift of Givers Foundation supplied some of the drugs in addition to sanitation chemicals and other materials. The Chinese Government
supported with food supplies and a cash donation of USD500.000.00. Other forms of funding was indirectly provided through cooperating
partners. The relief and rehabilitation exercise was conducted under heavy incessant rainfall. On 13 March 2014, the rains destroyed some individual household’s tents, school tents and the food storage tent was blown away exposing several food items to
flood water. Out of 20.8 tons of maize meal, 16.3 tons were destroyed by
rains. The camp required an average of 156 tons per month. Most of the food items came through donations from individuals, local and
international organisations and the private sector.
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CHAPTER 4
4.0 DISASTER IMPACT
4.1 High cost of relocation The cost of relocation of people from the Tokwe Mukosi basin increased due to
the delayed process of relocation. According to information gathered from the Provincial Administrator of Masvingo, if relocation was conducted in 2012 and
2013, the Government was going to spent about USD428 263.00. However, when the project became disastrous due to flooding, the Government appealed
for US$19,694,093.00 from the international community to meet urgent humanitarian needs for the affected communities in the Tokwe-Mukorsi Dam Basin. This was needed to evacuate and relocate at risk communities as well as
the provision of food, shelter, safe water and other basic needs. It is difficult to attach the monetary value to the cost of donations that came towards alleviating
the plight of the Tokwe Mukosi community as well-wishers donated both in cash and kind.
4.2 Untimely Population Displacement The Tokwe Mukosi Project had physical, economic and psycho-social impacts as
communities lost both their collective and individual properties un-orderly mass displacement as the project became reactive. One of the community
representatives Mr. Mangwengwe was invited to a national stakeholder seminar on Lessons Learnt from the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Construction. He narrated the whole relocation exercise up until the final permanent resettlement. “People
were moved by helicopter and by road when they suddenly found themselves surrounded by flood water..... We did not know where we were going! On arrival
at Chingwizi there was no ready shelter and people slept on the open. Shelter, food supplies, kitchen utensils were provided on the next day. There however was no water and sanitation and health facilities but these facilities were later
provided. When people were advised to move to newly pegged resettlement area, there was disharmony because of the mistrust that the promised 4
hectares of farming land and 0.5 hectares for irrigation as well as compensation were not going to be honoured.”
The dam construction displaced 6393 families within a short period of time. Failure by the project to timely relocate people from the Tokwe Mukosi basin
resulted in an unorganised movement of people that resulted in the disruption of their social fabric. The floods forced the entire villages to be relocated from their traditional homeland to neighbouring district of Mwenezi where they were
randomly resettled. Consequently, this arrangement adversely impacted on the social capital of the affected communities eg some headmen lost their status in
the new settlement model.
4.3 Suitability of Relocation site of the displaced population
Communities were moved from Masvingo and Chivi to Mwenezi district. All the districts lie in agro-ecological zones 4 and 5 which receive fairly low rainfall and
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are subjected to periodic droughts and extended dry spells. Consequently productivity in the areas is very low and the communities largely depend on
external remittances for both food and other livelihood requirements.
In terms of beneficiation from the project, there were still uncertainties on the resettlement model for the people in Chingwizi as the project did not set aside land for relocation of the project affected people. An adhoc arrangement was
made to utilise land under the Development Trust of Zimbabwe. The Trust was however not willing to offer land to absorb the affected communities in their
territory until negotiations were done at the highest level. This was one of the reasons why communities had no confidence in accepting the resettlement plan as they feared that at one time they would be asked to relocate again.
According to Agritex officials from Mwenezi District where the people were
resettled, the cropping potential of the area when compared to the pieces of land allocated to them, it is highly unlikely that an average household will be able to produce enough for own consumption on a less than 1 ha plot. As a result there
is likely to be perennial food insecurity in this area up until other means of raising area productivity are found such as introduction of irrigation.
Given that there is still an ongoing debate on the ownership of the land on which
the people were settled between the government and the Development Trust of Zimbabwe there is potential derailment of the resettlement exercise particularly the establishment of irrigation schemes for the communities. Communities were
therefore lamenting the loss of their vast pieces of land they left particularly for grazing as they have now occupied a very limited area where overgrazing was
already noticeable due to high concentration of livestock.
4.4 Impact On Community Livelihoods
Before the construction and subsequent filling up of Tokwe Mukorsi Dam, communities within the Tokwe Mukorsi basin were involved in dry land farming
that included crop production, livestock rearing (goats, donkeys, cattle, sheep and paltry) and gardening along the rivers. People generally lost their means of livelihoods-gardens, chicken rearing etc, what they used to do in their previous
habitation. It can be concluded that the floods that resulted from the delayed relocation of
communities adversely affected the rural livelihoods of the people. The floods affected their livelihood assets, such as crops and livestock, social networks and other non-agricultural livelihoods. Over 76% of households used to rely on
market gardening and vegetable sales as a source of income with 52% relying on crop sales while about 36% used to rely on savings and lending groups. The
displacement happened at a time when communities were expecting a bumper harvest as the 2013 / 2014 season had started very well. Some households lost their livestock which died on transit to Chingwizi due to road accidents and no
compensation was given to the affected livestock owners. According to some provincial reports, some livestock died on arrival due to disease outbreaks in the
receiving area.
According to the UNDP Livelihoods Recovery Assessment report for Chingwizi,
greatest losses in productive assets for the households occurred during the flooding and relocation to Chingwizi with about 48.5% of scotch carts owned by
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the households lost, followed by wheelbarrows at 14.5%, the ploughs at 14%, and cultivators at 13% and knapsack sprayers at 11%. The greatest loss in
livestock was on poultry which reduced by 79%, followed by goats which reduced by 64%, and then cattle at 42% of the numbers that farmers used to
own before the disaster. The main cause of loss was death due to diseases particularly for chicken and goats and also during transportation. There were very few animals sold.
It was also unveiled that some traders were also affected by the floods as they
lost their stocks which they source from neighbouring South Africa. The goods that were lost to floods include clothing, foodstuffs, and electrical. The value of both their private and collective property that was destroyed by the floods could
not be computed in monetary terms.
4.5 Delayed recovery from the disaster impact The Chingwizi communities are facing recovery challenges. This is evidenced by the UNDP report on “Livelihoods Recovery Assessment for Chingwizi
Resettlement in Mwenezi district, Masvingo province”, Table 4.1: Main challenges limiting livelihoods recovery for displaced households
Main challenges in recovering your lost livelihood
% households
No livelihoods challenges 2.7%
Preferred inputs (crop varieties) not available 10.9%
Damaged fields 22.3%
Cannot take out loans 3.5%
Insufficient cash / income opportunities 60.5%
Damaged livestock 9.4%
Lack of Farm animals (for ploughing) 20.3%
Do not have tools 14.5%
Poor road conditions .8%
Lost/damaged assets 8.2%
Need to build shelter 24.6%
Difficult to find employment /casual labour 16.0%
Other 29.7% Source: UNDP report on “Livelihoods Recovery Assessment for Chingwizi Resettlement in Mwenezi district, Masvingo province”,
Given the foregoing, communities will have to depend on other means of livelihoods mainly off- farm activities until the irrigation schemes are put in
place.
4.6 Delayed Valuation of property Valuation of individual belongings was conducted by the Valuations and Estates Management Department under the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works
and National Housing in preparation for the compensation of properties in cash. The remainder of the properties that were not valued in time due to lack of
financial resources were valued during a crisis situation when some of their properties were inundated by water rendering them inaccessible. As a result,
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some household properties were difficult to value due to inaccessibility of some of the homesteads which were under water. The process was fraught of
challenges that were linked to the delayed process of relocation of the Tokwe Mukosi communities.
4.7 Compensation The World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000) and the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP, 2007) recommend that no dam project should be allowed to proceed on indigenous and communal peoples` lands without
obtaining their free, prior and informed consent. Best practice dictates that compensation policies for dam projects should ensure a prompt and measureable improvement of the lives of the affected people and communities
by; Ensuring the improved livelihoods of affected people
Implementation of developmental approaches. In-kind compensation instead of cash compensation. Compensation of affected people without formal entitlement to the land.
Enhancing participatory approaches. Ensuring compliance with resettlement agreements
Table 4.2 Analysis of principles of compensation
Policy Principle Applied (Y/N)
Ensuring prompt and measurable improvement to the livelihoods of the affected people
N
Implementation of developmental approaches. N
In-kind compensation instead of cash compensation.
N
Cash Compensation Y to some
Compensation of affected people without formal entitlement to the land
N
Enhancing participatory approaches N
Prioritising the needs of the project affected people. N
Ensuring compliance with Agreements N
Under the relocation plan, each household was allocated 1 hectare for residential
purpose and would be allocated 4 hectares of arable land under irrigation. This arrangement is however a long term plan that may not have prompt and measurable benefits to the affected communities in the short run.
Basing on the analysis above, the conclusion is that the compensation to the
displaced people is far being sufficient to redress their losses. The Tokwe Mukosi project plan is to compensate the affected households in cash. This option has more disadvantages that merits. As highlighted already,
some households who got their compensation early had lavishly squandered the
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money before the commencement of the relocation program. According to an internal memo written in May 2014, a total of $3 832 490.00 was paid to 896
families as compensation before the relocation programme. On average, each family got about $4 277.00. If the cash was disbursed when communities had
been relocated normally, the households could have at least put the money to good use through reconstruction.
4.8 Exposure to health hazards An assessment conducted by OXFARM in February 2014 revealed that due to
unplanned relocation program families were evacuated from villages where they were using clean water sources (boreholes) to areas with dirty water sources
and no social services like health facilities and schools. There were no community health workers. The sudden change from using clean water to using dirty water triggered some diarrhoea outbreaks in Chingwizi.
The report further reveals that families were offloaded along the road close to
their allocated plots. Some households had to carry their belongings from the road to their plots walking approximately 4 km into the bush looking for their pegs. There was concern about pregnant women and infants were observed and
their parents were concerned about sleeping outside in the malaria prone area.
Reports indicate that health officials attended to at least 100 cases of dysentery on a daily basis. The diarrhoea outbreak was attributed to contaminated food and water, poor sanitation and overcrowding at the Chingwizi holding camp.
High prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases was reported at the Chingwizi transitory camp and this was attributed to overcrowding coupled with low health
promotion activities and lack of recreational activities. The health officials at the camp also reported challenge of teenage pregnancies because of exposure to the crowded conditions and lack of psychosocial support. Disease outbreaks were
not only limited to human beings but also to their livestock as lumpy skin disease outbreak was also experienced at Chingwizi holding camp.
According to the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR), the Chingwizi communities were deprived of their right to healthcare, food and
access to clean water. A team of psychosocial support experts was dispatched to conducting counselling services. The relocation exercise by its nature disrupted people’s livelihoods particularly their food security.
According to the UNDP Livelihoods Recovery Assessment report (2014) ,
malaria was the most commonly prevalent illness (2716 tested cases) followed by diarrhoea (1842 cases) especially among children, scorpion bites (76 cases) and then dysentery (74 cases). Except for diarrhoea (35%), all other cases have
high incidences on children less than 5 years – Scorpion bites and dysentery (55%), and malaria 54 %. The report also noted that about 61% of the
displaced households use the bush system to relieve themselves posing potential increase in diarrheal disease outbreaks.
4.9 Loss of Social Infrastructure Assets It was visible that communities were relocated to an area that had no social
infrastructure such health, education, community centres, transport and other
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essential provisions. This initially deprived the communities of their rights to access these amenities.
4.10 Social and Cultural Disruption
Traditional leaders complained that they were not given time to perform their rituals before they left the Tokwe Mukosi basin. According to the UNDP report on “Livelihoods Recovery Assessment for Chingwizi Resettlement in Mwenezi
district, Masvingo province”, it was gathered that there were already indications of hostilities between the settlers (Karanga) and the hosting community
(Shangani) mainly due to limited grazing land. This relationship was likely to impart negatively on the livelihoods and sustainable development of both communities
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CHAPTER 5
5.0 Lessons Learnt
The Directorate of Civil Protection organised for a Lessons Learnt Conference to
review how government and its stakeholders and its partners managed the
disaster. The information on Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster lessons learned was
gathered through a guided field tour, presentations by key stakeholders involved
in emergency response and those involved and had hands on in the design and
construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam as well as the participants’ group work
organized around the 4 thematic areas defined below.
The key issues that emerged from the process can be grouped around 4 main
themes – search and rescue; Camp Coordination and Camp Management;
relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures and;
regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and
related flood disaster risk mitigation and preparedness.
The rapid nature and evolution of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster demonstrated
the need to review disaster risk management in Zimbabwe especially so in the
face of changing climate.
The disaster management capacity of the civil protection organization at national, provincial and district levels emerged as an element requiring immediate focus as it was found to have some limitations. At the national level,
the Department of Civil Protection suffered from a significant scarcity of resources in comparison to the monumental caseload. Inadequate non-food
items (NFIs) such as tents, tarpaulins, water bowsers, mobile water treatment plants among others curtailed provision of comprehensive emergency response. The lean budget that the department has meant that the provincial and district
civil protection organization were inherently under-funded thus lacked the resources to mount an effective initial disaster response before external support
has been marshaled. Equally lacking was the national guidelines and policy framework to guide emergency management operations particularly where there was need for total relocation, resettlement and compensation of the people
displaced by a disaster generated by a development project. At the provincial and district levels, there was a distinct lack of capacity for
provision of relief due partly to lack of funding, inadequate emergency
resources, lack of appropriate all-terrain vehicles and inadequately trained
personnel. Although capacity was strengthened over the course of time through
on the job training in Camp Coordination and Camp Management, and
warehouse management following the disaster, the crisis had by then largely
passed.
The search and rescue operation were effective and the teams tasked
(Zimbabwe Air Force and Zimbabwe Republic Police sub-aqua), the District
Development Fund (DDF), Central Mechanical and Engineering Department
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(CMED) were diligent and dedicated and as a result no lives were lost. The
rapidness at which the flood situation evolved negated the orderly relocation of a
significant population (2,713 families, more than 18,000 livestock and household
property) that was planned and called for swift marshalling of resources over a
very short time space. The search and rescue operations thus experienced
problems of inadequate appropriate vehicles to transport people, livestock and
household properties. The operation also experienced shortages of A1 jet fuel
and containers. Operations were also hampered by lack of baseline information
such as population distribution maps and guidance on the low lying and high
lands as well as inaccessibility of some of the areas due to the torrential rainfall
that washed away roads and bridges.
Camp Coordination and Camp Management of the Chingwizi relocation camp
was preceded with commendable coordination mechanisms established by the
provincial civil protection organization and well complemented by the national
level and UN cluster coordination mechanism for civil society organizations
through United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA). Although challenges were experienced at the beginning of the
emergency operations, significant support both in cash and in kind were
mobilized to meet the humanitarian gaps. The lack of disaggregated list of
displaced people, infiltration of beneficiary registers by ineligible beneficiaries,
poor accountability, leakages of emergency supplies through pilfering and theft
and corruption among those entrusted with safe keeping of emergency supplies
were key challenges. Inadequate water supplies and sanitation and general
hygiene upkeep of the relocation camp were also key challenges given the high
population density of camp settlement.
Relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures was an
area that experiences serious challenges. As identified above, the rapid nature of
the flood disaster prevented the orderly and planned resettlement of the people
displaced by the dam project. In order to decongest the Chingwizi camp in the
face of increasing threats of disease outbreaks and to facilitate early settlement
that would allow people to retain their livelihoods, allocation of 1 hectare plots
was a method of choice. This move agitated the expectant communities causing
serious conflict that instigated forcible resettlement. The relocation exercise by
its nature disrupted people’s livelihoods particularly their food security.
Inadequate grazing areas for livestock forced some families to move their
livestock to other areas. The uncoordinated livestock movement resulted in the
spread of lumpy skin disease to the host community. Efforts were however made
to scale up livestock vaccination and dipping services which the relocated
communities did not use.
Although a significant number of organizations were physically present in
Chingwizi during the acute phase of the flood emergency, these quickly thinned
off leaving less than a handful to support early recovery.
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On the regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction
and integration of disaster risk mitigation and preparedness, there is
ample policy and regulatory frameworks to ensure dam flood safety in
Zimbabwe. There however are major gaps to ensure compliance and
enforcement of statutes particularly related to rural settlements. Settlements in
the Tokwe Mukosi basin were not regulated despite existing plans for the dam
construction. Lack of integration of disaster risk reduction on new development
and adequate consultations of all key sectors including the communities, local
government structures and the civil protection organization resulted in default
planning and budgeting for the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. This lack of broad
consultations may have contributed to failure to integrate social costs for the
dam construction and to the unplanned settlements that exposed communities
to flood risk. Furthermore, the lack of explicit policy framework and time bound
activities for relocation and compensation mechanisms including a resettlement
model for people displaced by development projects raised pertinent
administrative gaps that caused disharmony between government and displaced
communities. Government is however mobilizing resources to pay
compensation for the remaining 1,908 families and for valuating an additional
3,054 homes in the Tokwe Mukosi dam buffer zone.
3 new schools, a clinic and clinic staff housing are at various stages of
construction. Water supplies to these new facilities are however inadequate due
to the low yielding boreholes. Plans are however underway to relocate the
mobile water treatment equipment that was being used at the relocation camp
and to install a six kilometre water pipeline to service the clinic and the schools.
It is also worth noting that there is assurance from ZINWA that there is no
longer the risk of flooding of the Tokwe Mukosi dam as the a concrete facing
over the dam wall rock fill has been completed and the civil works to raise the
dam wall are nearly complete.
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Lessons Learnt
Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
Search and rescue
Coordinated search and rescue operations
No loss of life reported
Well motivated and dedicated search and rescue teams;
Verbal reports, meetings within the communities, information through local structures, police and army foot patrols, cellphone communication to the district administrators’ offices, print and electronic media played a pivotal role to inform the nation.
People self- evacuated to high
2,713 families, more than 18,000 livestock and household properties needed to be moved immediately
Shortages of A1 Jet fuel and containers
Lack of baseline information on population settlements
Rainfall damage roads and bridges
Soggy ground making road evacuation difficult
Lack of all- terrain vehicles
Control of emergency assets e.g. vehicles from outside emergency operation area;
Loss of livestock due to overloading and inappropriate transport
Relocation of people displaced by development project should take place well before development project commence
Availability of real time flood monitoring and information dissemination can facilitate search and rescue operations.
Need to devolve command and control of assets used for emergency operations to field level.
The complementarities of civil and military stakeholders in an emergency are integral to a successful response.
Development projects should integrate social costs in their budget to take into account the costs for relocation of displaced people.
Tertiary institutions such as the University of Zimbabwe and development partners to be approached to support science based real-time flood monitoring, flood mapping and technology based information dissemination;
Command and control of emergency management operational assets should be field based.
Camp Coordination and Camp Management
Provincial structures established before and during the emergency to
Lack of disaggregated list of displaced people,
Infiltration of beneficiary registers by ineligible beneficiaries,
Poor accountability, leakages of
Timely provision of disaggregated data of beneficiaries assists in focused and targeted humanitarian assistance;
Beneficiary registration should be disaggregate by age, sex, status of head of household e.g. child/OVC or female headed, elderly
30
Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
coordinate activities
Dedicated staff willing to work extended hours
Coordinated support from partners and the national levels;
Targeted resource mobilization;
Health and hygiene promotion contributed to reduced risk of disease outbreaks.
emergency supplies through pilfering and theft and corruption. Inadequate water supplies and sanitation;
General hygiene upkeep of the relocation camp;
Inadequate security and lighting for people;
Lack dumpsite and cemetery;
Inadequate familiarity of humanitarian principles among responders.
High prevalence of STIs at the Camp related to low health promotion activities and lack of recreational activities
Need for beneficiary registration to be strictly monitored to avoid infiltration
Planning for CCCM and warehouse management is important to ensure the safety and security of emergency supplies;
Procurement and pre-positioning of emergency NFIs is critical to effective disaster response;
Although water and sanitation and hygiene were compromised, health and hygiene can help reduce risk of disease outbreaks;
Inadequate shelter undermined privacy;
Awareness of humanitarian principles can facilitate effective disaster response
and disabled.
Verification of beneficiaries should be regularly conducted with the involvement of the traditional leaders and the police.
Training in CCCM and warehouse management should be mandatory for the civil protection organization staff and stakeholders;
DCP should procure and preposition NFIs;
Humanitarian principles should be customized to the Zimbabwean situation
Relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures
Families relocated before the flood disaster were adequately catered for;
Flood emergency disrupted the planned phased relocation exercise;
Lack of policy and guidelines on resettlement model and compensation mechanisms for people displaced by development projects;
The available land was under Development Trust of Zimbabwe and the present land user frustrated the program despite the land being state land
Permanent relocation did not adequately provide for livelihood recovery and
Delayed relocation of people in the basin resulted in the compromised planned resettlement;
Need for policy framework and guidelines for resettlement models and compensation mechanisms for people displaced by development projects;
Early recovery needs to be integrated with humanitarian
Relocation of people displaced by development projects to proceed project commencement;
Resettlement and compensation guidelines for people displaced by development projects should be developed;
Early recovery framework should be developed to ensure resilience of
31
Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
compromised food security;
Boreholes provided in the resettlement areas did not yield adequate water;
Planning of permanent settlement did not make provision for grazing areas;
Relocated families did not use livestock vaccination and dipping services risking the spread of livestock diseases;
An early recovery framework for the flood affected communities was not developed
Incidents of robberies reported after compensation payments
assistance;
Geological and hydrological surveys must proceed relocation and resettlement of people.
Livestock welfare needs to integral to human relocation and settlement;
Announcements of compensation payments can result in robberies;
disaster affected communities;
Availability of water and suitability of land for human activities should be considered before relocation and resettlement of displaced people.
Training on livestock emergency guidelines and standards must be conducted for civil protection organizations;
Appropriate and user friendly cash transfers need to be investigated to facilitate compensation payments.
Food assistance should continue until harvesting in April 2015.
On the regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and integration of disaster risk mitigation and preparedness
Elaborate legislative and policy framework for dam construction and safety standards exist.
International best practices relating to procedures and practices for relocating people in during dam
Inadequate compliance and enforcement of dam safety statutes;
Disaster risk reduction not adequately integrated into dam project design process.
Current river water level monitoring system does not facilitate real time relaying of river water levels to warn of possible flooding;
Relation between rainfall intensity and flooding has not been established.
There is limited capacity for flood modeling and mapping;
Need for ensuring compliance and enforcement of dam safety measures and best practices;
Civil Protection Act needs to be reviewed
Need for mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction into development planning;
The province did not anticipate a flood disaster and thus had no appropriate response plan;
Real time monitoring and
Enforcement and compliance with dam safety legislation need to be enhanced;
The Civil Protection Act, should be replaced with a proactive Act.
Disaster risk reduction should be mainstreamed into development planning;
Flood monitoring including real time
32
Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
construction;
Regular dam inspection are conducted on all dams;
Disaster management legislation and policy exist;
Best practices for dam construction and relocation of at risk population were not followed;
Funding for relocation of people in the basin was not integrated in the project budget
dissemination of early warning critical for flood risk management;
Flood mapping and modelling can assist in emergency preparedness and response;
Consultation and communication with affected communities can?
monitoring and dissemination facilities for flood early warning information and flood modelling and mapping should be prioritized;
Communities should be consulted and be well informed of the need for relocation and on preferred models of resettlement;
Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical, expertise and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness, and response to manage the flood risk within the context of climate change
33
5.1 Conclusion Although there are policies and regulatory frameworks to ensure dam flood
safety in Zimbabwe, the Tokwe Mukosi project exhibited major gaps in respect of compliance and enforcement of statutes particularly related to rural
settlements. Settlements in the Tokwe Mukosi basin were not regulated despite existing plans for the dam construction. Lack of integration of disaster risk
reduction in development planning and inadequate consultations of all key sectors including the communities, local government structures and other stakeholders resulted in poor planning and budgeting and failure to factor in
social costs associated with the construction the dam.
5.2 Recommendations Development projects should integrate social costs in their budget to take
into account the costs for timely relocation of displaced people even before the commencement of project,
There is need for mainstreaming climate change in development planning, In order to minimise social impacts, government in consultation with the
affected communities should consider conducting social impact
assessment to evaluate both intended and unintended consequences on project-affected people. The assessment must include economic, cultural,
and community implications of the project, as well as a strategy for managing and monitoring these impacts,
State should develop and enforce resettlement and compensation policies
and guidelines that ensure a prompt and measurable improvement in the lives and livelihoods of the affected people including the host
communities, State should consider both cash and in-kind compensation, Early recovery framework should be developed and budgeted as part of
the project to ensure resilience of the project affected communities, Social infrastructure should be put in place before relocation and
resettlement of displaced people, Development projects should ensure participation of all affected groups in
decision making processes. Communities should be given the platform to
contribute to plans that affect their welfare. The Department of Physical Planning should be involved in camp layout
and designs. Arrangements should be made for the management of HIV, child
protection and Gender Based Violence in camp settings.
