Report Vietnamwar Macv

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.CQMMANl R IN CHIEF PACIFIC

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kks. my k?ilmy HistoryPrastituteREPORT ON THE WAR IN

VIETNAM(AS OF 30 JUNE 1968)

REPORT ON AIR AND NAVAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINSTNORTH VIETNAM AND PACIFIC COMMAND-WIDESUPPORT OF THE WAR

JUNE 1964-JULY 1968BY

ADMIRAL U. S. G. SHARP, USNCOMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

Section IIREPORT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAMJANUARY 1964-JUNE 1968

BYGENERAL W. C. WESTMORELAND, USA

COMMANDER, U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCECOMMAND, VIETNAM


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PREFACEThis is a report on the Vietnam War by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp,

Commander in Chief Pacific (CJNCPAC), and General William C. West-moreland, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Viet-nam (COMUSMACV). It covers events up to 30 June 1968.

Because of security considerations for military operations still underwayin Vietnam, classified information on the war has not been included. Thisdoes not detract significantly from the reports usefulness as a record of thestruggle against Communist aggression in South Vietnam.

The report is in four parts: CINCPACs account of the air and navalcampaign against North Vietnam, Pacific Command-wide efforts in supportof the war, COMUSMACVs command account of the war in South Vietnam,and a prologue that welds the other three parts together.

More comprehensive but classified reports are prepared annually byCINCPAC and COMUSMACV for official use. These reports are availableonly on a need to know basis, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.The present report will serve in the interim as an additional current referenceon the Vietnam War.

My viewpoint of the war in Vietnam is conditioned first of all by thecomprehensive nature of CINCPACs responsibilities in the entire Pacific andAsian area. As CINCPAC, I was responsible for all United States militaryoperations-naval, ground, and air-in this entire region. Therefore, whileVietnam has been the focal point of our military effort in the Pacific Com-mand, I have, by command necessity, viewed that conflict against the broaderperspective of United States national interests throughout the area.

Our operations in Vietnam have been conducted to block Communistaggression in Southeast Asia, but this aggression is only the most visible por-tion of the Communist threat to United States security interests in the Pacific.Less obvious components of the total Communist threat are manifested by theprovocative actions of North Korea, the mounting pressures of the NorthVietnamese presence in Laos and Cambodia, and the rising level of Communistinspired insurgency in Thailand and Burma. These situations have requiredcareful and continuing evaluation to insure the most efficient allocation ofavailable resources in the Pacific Command to conduct the war in Vietnamand, at the same time, the protection of vital United States interests in an area


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stretching from the Bering Sea in the north to the eastern Indian Ocean inthe south.

To meet the pervasive Communist threat, CINCPAC and his Pacific Com-mand Service component commanders and subordinate unified commandershave developed a vast and complex support structure to provide the basis forSoutheast Asia operations and continued United States operations in otherareas. This support structure is necessary for the deployment of Free Worldforces to South Vietnam and provides a readiness posture to assure an adequateand flexible response to any threat to United States vital interests.

During the period covered by this report, the war in Vietnam has beenthe major part of the total CINCPAC effort to protect vital United Statesinterests in the Pacific, and of the total national effort to protect Americaninterests throughout the world.

The success of our efforts in Vietnam and throughout the Pacific has beendependent to a large degree upon the outstanding support and cooperation ofan array of commands and agencies external to the Pacific Command. Thisreport does not detail the extent of their participation but due recognition mustbe given their significant contribution to the total effort involved.LQ --+y

U. S. G. SHARP

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COMMAND STRUCTURE

Commander in ChefPacfic

Commander in Chef Commander in Chef Commander in ChefPacfic Ar Forces

CommanderCommander US MlitaryUS Mlitary Assistance Command Commander CommanderAssistance Thaland Tawan U S ForcesCommand DefenseJont US Mlitary JapanVetnam CommandAdvsory GoupThaland

Chef,Chef, Chef,MlitaryMlitary Jont USAssistanceEqupment MlitaryAdvsory GoupDeivery Team Advsory GoupRepubic ofBurma PhlippnesChna

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CONTENTS

SECTION IPreface.................Command Structure..Prologue......Air and Naval Campaigns Against North Vietnam.

Air and Naval Actions Against North Vietnam-1965.Inception of ROLLING THUNDER Operations.ROLLING THUNDER Operations-1966.ROLLING THUNDER Operations-1967.ROLLING THUNDER Operations--January throughCurtailment of ROLLING THUNDER OperationsNaval Surface OperationsEffects of ROLLING THUNDER.

Pacific Command-Wide Efforts in Support of the War

SECTION IICOMUSMACV Report on Operations in South Vietnam

Page

111

11114162331

March 1968 4447495355

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PROLOGUEEvery war has its own distinctive features. The

War has been characterized by an invad-army that denied its own existence, by guerrilla

who lived among the people they threat-the employment of highly sophisticated

Communist weapons systems, and by care-controlled limitations on the activities of

field commanders imposed less by theies of their own forces and weapons than

considerations of international politics.For over 20 years South Vietnam has fought tofreedom against unremitting, ruthlessThe aggression has been no less real

the fact that it has been by Vietnamese againstand by techniques of subversion, in-

terror, and attack rather than overt inva-on the classic pattern. The military effort

we and our allies have mounted in assist-our Vietnamese ally has been one of con-

vation in resistance to a form of attackIn one way this war has not differed from others.

tests of battle have been met by our fightingwith unsurpassed dedication and courage,

g the finest traditions of our militaryThe Vietnam War has had the most intense press

and has been the most thoroughly docu-most centrally controlled, most computer-

and most statistically analyzed in history. Thispart to the necessity to measure the

of a war in which there were no clearlyttle lines-no front, no safe rear. Because

much has been publicized about the war, thiscontains no accounts that have not been re-

ported before, nor revelations not previously ex-pressed. Our goals, our efforts to meet them, ourachievements, and our reversals are all part of thepublic record.

The weapons in this war have ranged fromsharpened bamboo sticks through the entire spec-trum of modern conventional weapons. Throughan evolutionary growth reaching astounding pro-portions, the war has had one underlying theme-North Vietnam, supported by world Communistinterests, has maintained a fierce determination totake over the government and people of SouthVietnam, at whatever cost in lives or material. TheCommunists initially attempted to gain control bysubversive method-simple terrorism and assassi-nation. When those techniques met strong resist-ance, Hanoi applied all of its resources and all ofthe aid it could accommodate from its allies, resort-ing to overt aggression. This report will sketch theprofile of this Communist aggression and outlinewhat we have done to counter it.

The United States had no desire to become in-volved in a war in Asia. One reason we did fiatsend troops to Indochina at the end of World WarII to support the French effort to regain controlwas that we did not want to help reinstate a colo-nial authority. The indigenous anti-French resist-ance, which began in late 1946, was not just a na-tionalist movement, although it sometimes tookthat guise. The Viet Minh had been organized in1941 as a coalition of various groups-Democrats,Socialists, Communists, and other less well-definedsections of the independence movement. Its orga-nization was dominated by the Communists, ledby Ho Chi Minh who had been trained in Moscow.

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The war in Korea later proved to the world theseriousness of the threat of Asian Communism andin the early 1950s, after the Viet Minh had revealeditself as an instrument of communism, the UnitedStates, therefore, started sending more military aidto France for use against the Communist VietMinh.

GENEVA-1954Despite this aid, Frances attempt to reinstate

colonial rule in Indochina was already failingwhen the United States, Great Britain, the USSR,and France met in Geneva in 1954. They sought apolitical settlement in Korea and a truce in Indo-china. In May while the conference was in prog-ress, General Vo Nguyen Giap and his Viet Minhforces defeated the besieged French forces at DienBien Phu and with this defeat the French decidedto leave Indochina.

At Geneva, agreement was reached to partitionVietnam near the 17th Parallel with a provisionaldemarcation line cushioned by a demilitarizedzone. Neither North nor South Vietnam was to in-terfere with the internal affairs of the other. Elec-tions to reunify the two parts were to be held with-in two years of the signing.

Of great importance was the agreement banningthe introduction of new troops and weapons or theestablishment of new military bases. The man-power and materiel already in Vietnam could bereplaced but not augmented, according to thetreaty. Neighboring Laos and Cambodia werebarred from military alliances, and foreign bases ineither country were prohibited. All Viet Minh andFrench troops were to be withdrawn from bothcountries. To enforce the terms of the armistice, athree-country International Control Commissionwas created.

The United States and Vietnam did not sign theGeneva Accords, but endorsed them in principleand adhered to them in action until Communistviolations had emptied them of meaning and ren-dered the International Control Commission pow-erless.

President Eisenhower, speaking for the United

States, on 10 October 1954 offered to assist theGovernment of Vietnam in developing and main-taining a strong, viable state, capable of resistingattempted subversion or aggression through mili-tary means in the hoyx that such aid, combinedwith . . . continuing ctforts. will contribute effec-tively toward a11 independent Vietnam endowedwith a strong government. Our involvementstems from this commitment.DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN

SOUTH VIETNAMNorth Vietnam hoped that the newly formed

South Vietnamese Government would, if givenenough time, fall of its own accord. The Hanoileaders were ready to step into the resulting politi-cal void and reap a cheap victory. Such was not tobe the case, however, for in the years immediatelyfollowing the cessation of hostilities the Republicof Vietnam, beset though it was with problems,made steady if unspectacular progress.

The Geneva Accords called for national electionsin both parts of Vietnam. But in 1956 the Saigongovernment refused to hold elections in SouthVietnam on the grounds that elections in NorthVietnam under the Communists would not guar-antee the voters a free choice.

Hanoi had not anticipated this and now setabout to gain control of the South by other means.The Viet Minh had left many cadres in the Southin 1954. Under Hanois orders, they were or-ganized into a political-paramilitary organization.

In 1960 the Central Committee of the Lao DongParty, the Communist Party of North Vietnam,passed a resolution that South Vietnam was to beliberated and that North and South Vietnamwere to be unified under a progressive socialistadministration.

The Hanoi radio then announced the formationin South Vietnam of the National Front for theLiberation of South Vietnam, a front which Hanoiclaimed was made up of several political parties ofSouth Vietnamese. Subsequent Hanoi broadcastsidentified a Peoples Revolutionary Party as the

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leading party in this so-called front. It is significantthat no announcement of this came out of SouthVietnam, and no nationally-known South Viet-namese figure was ever identified with any of thepolitical parties, which were on paper only, men-tioned by the Hanoi radio.

Now the insurgent effort was infused with newcadres from the North-South Vietnamese whowent, or were taken, North after the 1954 armistice.The new organization, referred to as the VietCong, talked of land reform, a benevolent social-ism, freedom from taxes, and the evils of Amer-ican capitalistic influence. In some areas the VietCong were accepted by the people and the organi-zation established local councils. Where the peoplerejected the Viet Cong, terrorism and armed at-tack were applied.

All the while, the Viet Cong were strengthen-ing their organization, acquiring arms and experi-ence. A cold-blooded campaign of elimination oflocal and national government officials, doctors,school teachers, and public health workers wasinstituted. This campaign, and the turbulent situa-tion within the Saigon government, left the ountry weakened.

The overthrow and assassination of the coun-trys first President, Ngo Dinh Diem, in late 1963was the prelude to a series of rapidly changinggovernments. Internal ethnic and religious dif-ferences were exacerbated-often by the Commu-nists-and plagued the country during these years.One consistent factor, however, was that all lead-ers of the various governments asked for increasingmilitary assistance from the United States, for theyknew that without it their country could not sur-vive against the determined efforts of North Viet-nam to take over South Vietnam.

The Communists exploited the confusion inSouth Vietnam whenever they could. Still, the in-surgents in the South, despite their support fromthe North, were not able to gain full control ofthe country. In 1964 Hanoi decided that the in-troduction of battle-ready North Vietnamese Army

Regulars was needed to bring about the defeat ofthe South.

The troops left their North Vietnamese trainingbases for what was often a clandestine journey ofmany months along the trails through Laos andCambodia (a trail system named for their Presi-dent, Ho Chi Minh) or infiltrated the zone whichhad been demilitarized at Geneva. They oftenremained in areas across the South Vietnameseborder, where they were safe from South Viet-namese forces, until they were ready to invade.Although the Geneva Accords prohibited the pres-ence of foreign troops in Laos or Cambodia, thisclid not inhibit the Communists.

Arrivals of United States advisors requested bythe government of South Vietnam were an-nounced on the front pages of the worlds news-papers. Movement of the Communist forces wasmade secretly under cover of night and the jungle.The arrival of the Communists and their increas-illgly advanced weapons &en could not be de-tected until they were met in battle.

For this reason, facts regarding troop escalationlagged behind the estimates. We were able toestimate rates of infiltration, however, and foundcontinuing increases. Until mid-1964 the majorityof the infiltrees were ethnic South Vietnamesemembers of the Viet Minh who had regroupedto the North after the 1954 cease-fire. In late 1964the number of infiltrators began to increase greatlyas regular North Vietnamese soldiers began to beintrocluced. Ry the end of 1964 a minimum of12,000 North Vietnamese had been infiltrated, in-cluding the first North Vietnamese Army regi-ment to come as a unit. In the ensuing years largeunit infiltrations have been the rule. As of June1968 we estimate that more than 300,000 NorthVietnamese troops have entered South Vietnam.

THE COMMUNIST AID PROGRAMNorth Vietnam could not have supported sucha military effort alone. During the period 1954

through 1967, assistance to North Vietnam fromother Communist countries totaled some $2.9 bil-


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lion, most of which came from the USSR. Annualaid agreements with the USSR, Communist China,North Korea, Mongolia, Rumania, Bulgaria, andCuba have underscored Hanois heavy dependenceon this outside aid, both to maintain essential pro-duction and services and to support the war inSouth Vietnam.

Russia has equipped North Vietnam with about35 surface-to-air missile battalions and has sup-plied a sophisticated communications and radarnetwork, numerous aircraft (including IL-28jet light bombers and MIG-15, MIG-17, andMIG-21 fighter planes), and large quantities ofantiaircraft weapons. All of these weapons con-tributed to establishing the most sophisticated airdefense system ever faced by any force in combat.In addition, the USSR has supplied North Viet-nam with modern ground force equipment suchas 122- and 140-mm rockets, 120-mm mortars, and130-mm field guns.Priority attention has been given to North Viet-nams transportation system. The USSR has sup-plied not only a large portion of the vehiclesneeded to move supplies south, but also the roadconstruction equipment needed to keep existingroads serviceable and to build new military roadsin North Vietnam, Laos, and Viet Cong controlledareas of South Vietnam. In addition, the USSRhas supplied railroad equipment, barges, bridgeequipment, and petroleum for North Vietnamstransportation system.

Communist Chinas percentage of total aid hasdeclined steadily since 1965. Such aid was signifi-cant, however, and has included the rehabil-itation and development of North Vietnamsrailways, highways, and communications facilities,reconstruction and improvement of irrigation sys-tems, and construction of heavy and light indus-trial facilities. In 1966 it was reported that 40,000Chinese were being used in North Vietnam forroad and rail maintenance and other repair work.By early 1968 this figure had grown to 50,000.Some personnel were also believed to be in anti-aircraft units. Military equipment from China con-tinues to be mostly small arms, ammunition, and

light antiaircraft artillery; but some MIG-17 jetfighters have been provided.

In the early stages of the war the enemy washandicapped by weapons and ammunition short-ages and he relied often on homemade and cap-tured items. Today there is an abundance of thelatest models from the Communist conventionalweapons arsenals.SOUTH VIETNAM REQUESTS OUTSID E

ASSZSTANCESouth Vietnam has also relied on massive ex-

ternal aid, from the United States and many othercountries. In December 1961 South Vietnam sentan urgent appeal to President Kennedy for imme-diate further help. The President agreed to in-crease our military assistance. The political andmilitary situation, however, continued to deteri-orate. North Vietnam became emboldened by theeroding situation and misjudged American deter-mination. American naval ships on patrol in theGulf of Tonkin were involved in clashes withNorth Vietnamese torpedo boats on 2 and 4 Au-gust 1964, which led to approval of the JointCongressional Resolution of 7 August 1964-theTonkin Resolution-which not only approvedretaliatory attacks but also stated that:I. . . th e Congress appr oves and support s the

determ inat ion of the President, as Commander-in -Chi ef, to take all necessar y measures to repelany Lr rr ned attack against the forces of theUn ited States and to prevent fur ther aggres-sion. . . . The Un ited States regards as vital toits nati onal int erest and to world peace the mai n-tenanl e of in ternat ional peace and securi ty ofSoutheast Asia. Consonant wi th the Constit uti onand the Chart er of the Un ited Nati ons, and inaccordance wit h its obligations under t he South-east Asia Coll ective Defense Tr eaty, th e Un it edStat es is, therefore, pr epar ed, as the Pl.esidentdetermi nes, to tat e al l necessasy steps, in clud in gthe use of arm ed force, to assist any m emberor p1 otoco2 state of t he Southeast Asia CollectiveDefense Tr eaty requesti ng assistan ce in defenseof its fr eedom .UNI TED STATES COMM ITM ENT OF

FORCESDuring January and February 1965 the general

situation in South Vietnam continued to worsen,


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the military threat increased, political tensions inSaigon deepened, and morale plummeted. It be-came increasingly apparent that the existing levelsof United States aid could not prevent the collapseof South Vietnam. Even as deliberations on howbest to deal with the situation were in progresswithin our government, the Viet Cong launcheda series of attacks on American installations inSouth Vietnam. These attacks indicated that NorthVietnam was moving in for the kill. It appearedthat they would succeed, perhaps in a matter ofmonths, as things were developing. Acting on therequest of the South Vietnamese government, thedecision was made to commit as soon as possible125,000 United States troops to prevent the Com-munist takeover. At the same time President John-son indicated that additional forces would be sentas requested by the Republic of Vietnam and theCommander of the United States Military Assist-ance Command, Vietnam.

As the need increased and as North Vietnammoved in more of its own troops, requests for addi-tional United States troops followed. By Decem-ber 1965 we had about 184,000 troops in Vietnam.The year of greatest buildup was 1966, when ourstrength more than doubled. Increases have sincebeen at a slower rate but have continued.

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATYORGANIZATION REACTION

The SEATO Council and the Military Advisers,at each of their regular meetings since April 1964,condemned the Communist aggression and Hanoi-directed subversion of South Vietnam. The com-muniques following these meetings have becomeprogressively stronger in this regard. Each of themeetings was an occasion for the council to ex-press its appreciation for the contributions fromFree World nations assisting the South Vietnam-ese. The council further evinced its interest andgrowing concern, -as well as support, for SouthVietnam, a SEATO Protocol State, by encourag-ing increasing participation in its meetings by theSouth Vietnamese observer.

Each of the troop-contributing member nationsof SEATO declared publicly that its support ofSouth Vietnam was as a result of, and in accord-ance with, its obligations under the SEATO Treaty.The United Kingdom and France, though not con-tributing troops, contributed money, medical aid,technical assistance, and other forms of help.

The government of South Vietnam did notmake a formal request for assistance from the Or-ganization per se. Rather, such requests were madedirectly to each member nation individually. Sig-nificantly, all SEATO member nations, in one wayor another and in varying degrees, assisted theSouth Vietnamese in their defense against Com-munist terrorism and aggression.

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE TO SOUTHVIETNAM

In April 1964 President Johnson urged all thenations of the Free World to come to the assistanceof South Vietnam. South Vietnam itself madeformal requests to certain nations for assistance.

In response, nonmilitary assistance from 39 coun-tries other than the United States totaled $55 mil-lion from April 1964 to June 1968. Most of thosenations preferred to provide civic action and med-ical assistance rather than active military participa-tion.

Prior to April 1964 Australia was the only na-tion other than the United States to supply militaryassistance. In 1962 Australia furnished a 30-manArmy training team and in August 1964 aug-mented this team with an aviation detachment. InMay 1965 Australia agreed to send a task force toSouth Vietnam and Australian forces there nowtotal about 7,500 men.

In July 1964 New Zealand furnished a militaryengineer team and in May 1965 decided to replacethis detachment with a combat force. New Zealandforces in 1968 totaled over 500.

Other than the United States the nation SUP-plying the greatest assistance to the Republic ofVietnam is the Republic of Korea. By the end of

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1965, 20, 620orean troops were in South Vietnamand those forces now total approximately 50,000.

By the end of 1965Thailand and the Republicsof the Philippines and China also had given aidin the form of noncombatant personnel to act ineither advisory or civic action roles. In addition,Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the Federal Re-public of Germany, and many other nations werecontributing economic and technical assistance toSouth Vietnam, including many nonmilitaryadvisors and technicians.

In December 1966 a Royal Thai Governmentdecision to assist in the ground war in Vietnamreceived enthusiastic support from the Thai people.The first element of the Royal Thai Army Volun-teer Regiment arrived in Vietnam in July 1967and the main body of approximately 2,500 menfollowed in September. Later in the year Thailanddecided to send a division, with a total strength ofover 11,000 men, to replace the Royal Th,li Regi-ment. This division is scheduled to arrive in Viet-nam in two increments, the first by August 1968.The second will follow upon completion of out-fitting and training.THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAMS ARMED

FORCESThe Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam

have been fighting without respite for many years.They have carried the heaviest load of casualtiesand the greatest personal hardships. Most Viet-namese soldiers have served their country gallantly,faithf u11y, and responsibly throughout the years.With the help and training of their allies they haveacquired knowledge of modern military tacl:ics nncltechniques, which they have applied eff cctively.STRATEGY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE

WAROur basic objective in South Vietnam has been

to establish a safe environment within which thepeople of South Vietnam could form a govern-ment that was independent, stable, and freelyelected-one that would deserve and receive popu-

lar support. Such a government could not becreated in an environment dominated by Com-munist terrorism. The Viet Cong and the NorthVietnamese Army occupied large parts of thecountry and subjected large areas to armed attacksand acts of terrorism and assassination. These actswere most often directed at the representatives ofgovernment in provinces, villages, and hamletsthroughout the countryside, the government offi-cidls most closely associated with the people.

The United States military goal was to providea secure environment in which the citizens couldlive and in which all levels of legal governmentcould function without enemy exploitation, pres-sure, or violence. Our strategy to achieve this goalconsisted of three interdependent elements-theground and air campaign in South Vietnam, thenation building effort in South Vietnam, and ourair and naval offensive against North Vietnam.Through these integrated efforts we have soughtto convince the Hanoi regime that its aggressioncould not succeed and that such aggression wouldbe too costly to sustain.

To this end United States, South Vietnamese,and other Free World forces went into battle todefeat the Communists and their organizations inSouth Vietnam. When the enemy was driven outof an area, United States ancl other Free Worldforces assisted the Vietnamese people in that areawith projects such as building construction, sani-tation, and medical care. Skills in these and otherspecialties were supplied by our soldiers, sailors,airmen, and Marines in their changing roles asboth fighting men and workers in civic action.

Hut before major civic action programs couldproceed, the enemy had to be blocked in his aggres-sion. Efforts to defeat enemy aggression in SouthVietnam will be detailed in another portion of thisreport.

As almost all of his war-making material camefrom or through North Vietnam, we took the warto the enemy by a vigorous and unremitting-buthighly selective-application of our air and navalpower. Aircraft from land bases in South Vietnam

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and Thailand and from our aircraft carriers at seaapplied this power. We attacked the enemys mili-tary installations and power plants, petroleumproducts storage areas and industrial facilitieswhich supported the war effort, and the vehiclesand roads by which war material moved south-his means of provisioning the aggression. Thebombing has been the most precise in history withless damage to nontargets and noncombatants thanwas ever experienced in previous wars. Communistsupport of the war was made extremely costly interms of goods and facilities destroyed.

Our naval forces curbed the movement of menand their food and war-making material as theyattempted to infiltrate by sea or by the great riversystems of Southeast Asia. Naval gunfire assistedin coastal operations with marked effectiveness.

From a military standpoint, both air and navalprograms were inhibited by restrictions growingout of the limited nature of our conduct of thewar. The key port of Haiphong in North Vietnam,for example, through which 85 percent of NorthVietnams imports flowed, and at which ships ofmany nations called, has been a prohibited target.Our planes could not bomb it. Nor was mining ofthat harbor permitted. Materials shipped fromHaiphong were sought out later and bombed ontheir journey south, when they could be found.The primitive road and trail networks of South-east Asia and the frequently heavy tree cover madesuch moving targets and sheltered small storageareas very difficult to find, even with our sophis-ticated weapons and equipment.

Despite these difficulties, strikes on railroad lines,roads, and waterways greatly impeded the flow ofwar material. These attacks created aclditionalmanagement, distribution, and manpower prob-lems for North Vietnam.

The bombing of North Vietnam was unilaterallystopped by the United States a number of times, forvarying periods of time, in the hope that the enemywould respond by stopping his aggressive activitiesand reducing the scope and level of conflict. Inevery case the Communists used the bombing

pause to rush troops and supplies to reinforce theirarmy in South Vietnam. Such unilateral truce ef-forts, while judged politically desirable, accruedsome temporary military disadvantages to success-ful prosecution of the war.

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS-1965 TO 1968By mid-March 1965 United States forces were

exerting pressure on Communist forces in SouthVietnam and the United States logistic capabilitywas expanding. In 1966 we commenced deploy-ment of a balanced and effective combat force.Successful spoiling operations during that year pre-vented a Communist military takeover and forcedthe enemy to revert to defensive employment ofhis main force units. A capable and resourcefulenemy continued overt warfare, however. He haddeveloped a strong logistic base, much of it inneighboring Laos and Cambodia. The enemymaintained the capability to deploy substantialadditional North Vietnamese Army Regulars.

While our air operations over North Vietnamattrited but did not prevent the introduction ofexternal assistance into North Vietnam, substan-tial progress was made in destroying war support-ing industries and resources. Emphasis was directedtoward harassing, disrupting, and impeding themovement of men and material to South Vietnam.Such movement was made costly and the enemywas forced to exert a prodigious effort to continueit. He adjusted to our attacks by ingeniously hidingancl dispersing his logistics activity, however, andhis recuperative capability along the routes ofmovement was remarkable.

In 1966 we were able to take the initiative againstCommunist main force units in South Vietnam.However, the enemy was able to disengage manyunits and to seek refuge in sanctuaries in Laos,Cambodia, and North Vietnam, where our groundforces were not permitted to strike him. This per-mitted him to establish the pace of the ground warto his aclvantage. Although it would be erroneousto suggest that the enemy at this stage had revertedpurely to guerrilla actions as his primary mode of

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operations, he realized that he could not defeat andeject United States and Free World military forcesby large unit operations. He was sufficiently flexi-ble to hit at times and places of his choosing andunder circumstances that offered a good probabil-ity of success. In 1966 the enemys unit integrityhad not been destroyed, nor had his logistic capa-bilities fallen below those needed to continue thewar.

The Communists avoided major contact, usingtheir sanctuaries, fighting defensively when forcedto do so, and attempting to rebuild and reinforcefor operations at an opportune time. Tactical guer-rilla warfare was intensified without fragmentingmain force units or discarding plans for theirbuildup and use. Hanoi continued the high rateof infiltration of Regular troops to replace lossesand to augment units in the field. Enemy strategyhinged on continuing the war in the hope of out-lasting our determination.Another element of the Communists basic strat-egy was a propaganda campaign directed at in-creasing both domestic and international pressureon the United States Government to stop thebombing of North Vietnam and to settle on termsfavorable to the enemy.

By mid-1967 the combination of military opera-tions against the enemy in all areas forced him toreassess his situation in light of his deterioratingmilitary position. He was no longer capable ofmilitary victory. There were significant increasesin the strength and capabilities of Allied forcesin South Vietnam and combat operations were ex-panded accordingly. Our operations, supported byclose air support and B-52 bomber strikes, in-creasingly neutralized enemy base areas, locatedand destroyed the supplies on which the enemydepended, and drove him into sparsely populatedregions where food was scarce. The overall mili-tary trend in 1967 in enemy losses-those killed,wounded, and captured-was favorable to theallies, as was the overall trend in enemy defections.The number of persons and areas under Commu-nist control declined slowly and the number of

South Vietnamese impressed into Viet Cong serv-ice declined significantly. Consequently, the troopreplacement burden fell increasingly on the NorthVietnamese. There was evidence of manpowerproblems in North Vietnam, resulting in wideruse of women in the labor force to free men badlyneeded for military replacements. Shortages offood, material, and medical supplies were takingtheir toll. Morale and combat effectiveness dete-riorated in some of their units, especially those inisolated areas.

In 1967 the enemy did not win a major battlein South Vietnam. Many of his main force unitshad been driven to positions across the Laos andCambodia borders where they took advantage ofsanctuaries for protection and supply, in much thesame way they had operated in 1965 and 1966 whenhard pressed by our combat forces.

The Communist strategy continued to reflectan effort to draw Allied forces into remote areas,especially those areas adjacent to border sanctu-aries, leaving populated areas unprotected. Thisenabled enemy local and guerrilla forces to harass,attack, and generally impede government efforts.Through these means the Viet Cong continued toexert a significant influence over large portions ofthe population. Although enemy capabilities wereat times formidable in local areas, they were neveroverpowering. Through careful exploitation of theenemys vulnerabilities and the application of oursuperior firepower and mobility, we were able toprevent him from making any spectacular gain inSouth Vietnam in 1967.

During 1967 the air and naval campaign againstNorth Vietnam continued to be an element of ourstrategy in which we had the initiative. We con-tinued to press this advantage. There was no doubtthat our past efforts had hurt North Vietnam andthat continued support of the war in South Viet-nam was causing severe hardships. From a purelymilitary view, additional operational latitude forair and naval forces would have enabled the execu-tion of campaigns against North Vietnam whichwould have brought about a more rapid deteriora-

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tion of the enemys total war-supporting structure.If more effective curtailment of the Communistwar effort had been achieved by drains on theirresources, the result would have been a steadyreduction of insurgency and aggression in SouthVietnam.

In coordination with our military operations,the task of nation building in South Vietnam,the ultimate goal of our struggle, received its fullshare of attention. True, progress often was inter-rupted by enemy attacks or harassment, but thedemonstration of government concern and aid forevery village and hamlet in South Vietnam re-mained the aim. Efforts in this regard were notnew. The French attempted agrodes in the 1950sand the Diem regime tried a program of strategichamlets. These all failed for many reasons, notthe least of which were failure to base goals oncapabilities, to plan realistically, and to take intoaccount the interests and aspirations of the people.

Subsequent efforts at nation building were moreattuned to the needs of the people, but in 1966growth was still slow and painstaking. Althoughthe Vietnamese Armed Forces had the primarymission of supporting pacification, United Statesforces reinforced their efforts by direct support.Vietnamese Army units were redeployed and re-trained to support these programs, but providingthe motivation was difficult and progress in orient-ing those forces was slow.In 1967 a new constitution was promulgatedand the citizens of South Vietnam went to the pollsand elected a new national government. Similarly,for the first time since the early days of the Diemregime, representative government was initiatedat the village and hamlet level. There were frag-mentary but nevertheless encouraging signs thatthe National Assembly was becoming constituentoriented.

Additionally, during 1967 there was a reorgani-zation and consolidation of United States supportof the pacification program. As a result the pro-gram was buttressed with added resources, in-creased military support, and unified civil-military

staffing, thus creating a single, forcefully directed,United States pacification support effort.

Progress in the war from 1 January to 30 June1968 can best be viewed in the context of the en-emys goals for his 1967-68 winter-spring cam-paign. Sometime in mid-1967 he revised his stra-tegy in order to generate widespread internal up-risings, cause wholesale desertions from the ranksof South Vietnams Army, and lay the ground-work for a political effort, including negotiations,along with his military effort to attain victory. TheUnited States, the Communists hoped, faced witha collapsing ally, would lose the determination topursue the war.

To carry out this new strategy, even larger num-bers of North Vietnamese Regular Army troopsand a heavier volume of supplies and equipmentwere infiltrated into South Vietnam. With the ap-proach of Tet, the Vietnamese New Year season,the Communists felt that the time was ripe to goall out. They chose the first day of the Tet holidaysfor opening the offensive. Contrary to their expec-tations, the people of South Vietnam did not swingover to their side and there were few defectionsfrom the Vietnamese Army. Despite the surpriseattack in violation of the Communists own truce,the Vietnamese Army fought extremely well inthrowing back the enemy while bearing the bruntof the assault. By coming out in the open, enemytroops were more vulnerable to our superior fire-power, mobility, and flexibility. The result for theenemy was extremely high personnel losses. How-ever, the tempo of the war was intensified. Theenemy used new Soviet supplied rockets to initiateassaults on urban centers, notably Hue and Saigon,which were heretofore relatively free from attack.

During the first three months of 1968, the aircampaign against North Vietnam was hamperedby the rainy monsoon weather. As a result, mostattack sorties were conducted against supply routesand military installations in southern North Viet-nam.

On 1 April in a further attempt to get Hanoito the peace conference table, the President of the

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United States stopped bombing attacks over theprincipal populated and food-producing areas ofNorth Vietnam, except in the area north of theDemilitarized Zone where enemy actions directlythreatened United States and other Free Worldforces in South Vietnam. Militarily, this action re-sulted in further concentration of attack sorties insouthernmost North Vietnam, primarily directedat traffic on roads and trails, to try to keep rein-forcements and supplies from reaching South Viet-nam where they would be brought into battleagainst our forces. Politically, the Presidents ac-tion brought the response from the North Viet-namese that they would come to the conferencetable.

The enemy continued his countrywide attacksin an attempt to give the South Vietnamese andthe world public an impression of North Vietna-mese strength while exaggerating the human andmaterial costs of the war to the Allied side. Ourtactical aircraft and B-52 bombers continued theirsupport of ground operations in South Vietnamwith B-52 effort concentrating primarily on truckparks, storage areas, and troop concentrations. Theair effort further compounded the enemys dif-ficulties in getting supplies and equipment downthe infiltration routes.

In early May the Communists mounted furtherharassing attacks throughout South Vietnam withprimary emphasis on the Saigon area and in thenorthern part of the country. Because of theirearlier Tet losses, these attacks were not nearly as

fierce or well coordinated as the Tet offensive. Theresults, however, were essentially the same-heavylosses for the enemy, a broadening of the warinto urban areas, and a quantum jump in civiliancasualties. Still, the enemy continued to reconsti-tute and reposition his forces for further attacks.

Then in late May and early June 1968 the enemylaunched new assaults, particularly on the city ofSaigon. American military installations and Viet-namese government headquarters seemed to bethe initial objectives, although again the enemyshowed complete disregard for the lives of inno-cent South Vietnamese civilians. When these at-tacks were blunted, the enemy commenced a seriesof indiscriminate rocket attacks against the civilianpopulace of Saigon, creating widespread destruc-tion, heavy civilian casualties, and increasingnumbers of refugees. These assaults on Saigon ob-viously were designed to influence the talks thathad begun on 13 May in Paris, where Hanoishowed no disposition to modify its hardline stand.

As of 30 June our estimate is that the enemydoes not possess the means of achieving militaryvictory in South Vietnam but he does retain adangerous capability to mount serious attacks.There is no indication that he has abandoned hisgoal of a unified Communist Vietnam. Againstthe backdrop of the Paris talks, a major victorywould loom large. The enemy no doubt remem-bers how well a combined military and politicalstrategy worked for him in Geneva 14 years ago.

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AIR AND NAVAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINSTNORTH VIETNAM

By August 1964 the Viet Cong, strongly sup-ported by regular units of the North VietnameseArmy, held the military initiative in South Viet-nam, controlled much of the rural area, had seri-ously reduced the effectiveness of the SouthVietnamese governments pacification program,and appeared to be building up to a final pushagainst the largely demoralized armed forces andunstable government.

The Viet Cong were accomplishing these suc-cesses despite our ever increasing economic aid,training programs by our military advisors, andour combat support personnel serving with theArmed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

In keeping with normal military intelligencecollection -requirements, routine naval patrols hadbeen periodically operating in international watersoff the coast of North Vietnam observing junktraffic and naval activity, and collecting hydro-graphic data and intelligence concerning NorthVietnamese electronic installations which mightbecome necessary to United States forces in theevent of hostilities. One such patrol was proposedin early 1964 for reconnaissance off the NorthVietnamese coastline. The recommendation wasapproved with the patrol to start not later than31 July 1964.

In the late afternoon of 2 August, about 28 milesoff the coast of North Vietnam and on a courseaway from the coast, the radar of the destroyerMaddox detected three boats closing on the ship

at high speed. Despite evasive action, the boats bytheir maneuvers demonstrated hostile intent. TheM addox fired three warning shots and, when thatdid not deter the attackers, opened destructive firewith its five-inch guns. One boat was disabled butmanaged to launch what appeared to be two tor-pedoes, which missed by approximately 200 yards.Another boat retired to the north and lost allpower. The third boat, hit at least once, passedapproximately 1,700 yards astern of the M addoxfiring a machine gun. One of the 12.7-mm projec-tiles ricocheted into a ready service magazine. Air-craft from the carrier Ticonderoga, then in theGulf of Tonkin, joined the action, and the Maddoxbroke off pursuit of its attackers. No further con-tact was made and the carrier aircraft and theMaddox retired from the area. This was an unpro-voked attack on a ship of the United States on thehigh seas.

The next day the President warned North Viet-nam that United States ships have traditionallyoperated freely on the high seas in accordance withthe rights guaranteed by international law . . . .They will, he said, continue to do so and willtake whatever measures are appropriate for theirdefense. He further warned that The UnitedStates Government expects that . . . North Viet-nam will be under no misapprehension as to thegrave consequences which would inevitably resultfrom any further unprovoked military actionagainst United States forces.

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In accordance with a Presidential directive, theTonkin Gulf patrol was reinforced by a seconddestroyer, the C. Turner Joy, and during daylighthours by a combat air patrol from the Ticonderogaoperating off northern South Vietnam. To reducethe risk of night torpedo boat attacks, the two shipswere ordered to retire each afternoon to a nightsteaming area 24 miles square, centered about 100miles off shore.

On 3 August the Maddox and the C. Tu vne~ J oyentered the Gulf of Tonkin. On the evening of 4August 1964 the two destroyers were proceedingon an easterly course at a speed of about 20 knots.Shortly after dark, the task group commander,aboard the M addox, observed on the surface searchradar at least five contacts at about 36 miles dis-tance, which he evaluated as probable torpedoboats. The Maddox and the C. Turner Joy changedcourse and increased speed to avoid what appearedto be an attack.

About an hour later, both ships radars held con-tacts approximately 14 miles to the east. At thattime the two United States ships were approxi-mately 60 miles from the North Vietnamese coast.When it became evident from the maneuvers ofthe approaching enemy craft that they were press-ing in for an attack position, both Maddox andC. Turner Joy opened fire. At this time, the enemyboats were at a range of 6,000 yards from theMaddox when the radar tracking indicated thatthe contact had turned away and began to openrange. Torpedo noises were then heard by theM add oxs sonar and this information was im-mediately passed to the C. Tuvnev Joy, at whichtime both ships took evasive action to avoid thetorpedo. A torpedo wake was then sighted passingabeam of the C. Turner Joy, approximately 300feet to port and on the same bearing as the M addox.

One target was taken under fire by the C. Tumet/oy, numerous hits were observed, and it then dis-appeared from all radars. The commanding officerand other C. Tu vnev J oy personnel observed a thickcolumn of black smoke from this target.

Later, but during the attack, a searchlight was

observed and was seen tothe C. Turner Joy. Theately extinguished whenair patrol orbiting abovevicinity of the boat.

swing in an arc towardsearchlight was immedi-aircraft from the combatthe ships approached the

The silhouette of an attacking boat was also seenwhen the boat came between the ship and theflares dropped by an aircraft.

In addition, two aircraft at altitudes of between700 and 1,500 feet, in the vicinity of the twodestroyers at the time of the torpedo attack, sightedgun flashes on the surface of the water as well aslight antiaircraft bursts near their altitude. On onepass over the two destroyers both pilots positivelysighted a snakey high speed wake one and one-half miles ahead of the lead destroyer, the M addox.

At approximately midnight the action endedwhen radar contact was lost on the last enemy boat.Best estimates were that at least two of the enemycraft were sunk, possibly two more damaged.There was no damage to the United Statesdestroyers.

Less than half an hour after the termination ofthe second attack on the patrol, CINCPAC recom-mended that authority be granted for immediatepunitive air strikes against North Vietnam. Twohours later, a message from the Joint Chiefs ofStaff alerted us to plan strikes for first light thefollowing day.

At the same time that the strike order was issuedby the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a series of compre-hensive air and sea movements was undertaken todiscourage enemy reaction to the attack.

At the time of launch of the strike aircraft on.5 August the President announced to the publicthat the United States was making a measured re-sponse to the North Vietnamese aggression butdid not intend to start a war.

Sixty-four strike aircraft were launched fromthe aircraft carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation.They inflicted severe damage to the North Viet-namese gunboat and torpedo boat fleet, destroyingeight and damaging 21 others. Smoke from theVinh petroleum storage areas rose to 14,000 feet

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and those stores were estimated to be 90 percentdestroyed. The strikes were not without cost toour forces. Two of the aircraft from the Constella-tion were lost to antiaircraft defense at Hon Gaiand two other aircraft were hit but recovered safelv.

Immediately after the strikes on 5 August, Secre-tary of State Dean Rusk stated that the UnitedStates made its retaliatory air strikes in order toprevent a Communist miscalculation that wewould not reply in kind. President Johnson alsowarned North Vietnam and Communist Chinaagainst being tempted . . . to widen the presentaggression, and stated that there was no im-munity from reply.

The remainder of 1964 was characterized byincreased readiness throughout the Pacific Com-mand to meet any new North Vietnamese aggres-sion. Extensive plans were made for future puni-tive or retaliatory strikes to be made in responseto any renewed overt acts of aggression.

On Christmas Eve 1964 the Communists ex-ploded a large demolition charge in the BrinkBachelor Officers Quarters in downtown Saigon.A second aircraft carrier was ordered to the Gulfof Tonkin and retaliatory strikes were readiedbut not executed.

N-ORTH VIETNAMS AIR DEFENSESYSTEM-1964

Events subsequent to our air strikes on 5 August1964 in retaliation for the Gulf of Tonkin incidentsrevealed how prior training and prompt militaryand technical aid from other Communist coun:tries served to turn a rudimentary air defense sys-tem into one of imposing capabilities. On 7 Augusttwo days after our strikes, aerial photography ofPhuc Yen Airfield near Hanoi revealed the pres-

ence of MIG-15s and 17s.It was obvious fromthis rapid response that the aircraft came fromCommunist China. Hanoi evidently decided it wasprudent to prepare for a long war. North Viet-namese aggression in South Vietnam was movingahead rapidly and there was no telling when theUnited States might retaliate against the Northagain.

In early November 1964 North VietnamesePremier Pham Van Dong visited Moscow, osten-sibly to celebrate the 47th anniversary of the Bol-shevik Revolution. His primary mission, however,was to request major material and technical sup-port in building a modern air defense system.

The North Vietnamese air defense system onthe eve of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents was of loweffectiveness. The aircraft inventory consisted ofsome 30 trainers, 50 transports, and four light heli-copters, none of which had effective air defensecapabilities. The airfields were primarily orientedtowards handling light and medium transport ac-tivity. Gia Lam Airfield at Hanoi and Cat Bi Air-field at Haiphong were the only two modern air-fields capable of sustained jet operations, althoughPhuc Yen, also near Hanoi, was nearly completed.Two other airfields, Kien An at Haiphong andDong Hoi, just north of the Demilitarized Zone,had h ar d- sur face d runways capable of supportingjet aircraft. There were no missiles for defense.Conventional antiaircraft weapons (some 700 ofall types) provided the air defense capability andthere was little radar tracking capability. The radarcomplex consisted of about 20 early warning setswith very little capability for definitive tracking.Overall air defense was limited to key populationareas and military installations, and mainly re-stricted to altitudes below 20,000 feet.

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AIR AND NAVAL ACTIONS AGAINST NORTHVIETNAM-1965

At the outset of 1965 our air forces were engagedonly in limited combat operations in SoutheastAsia, but by late January of that year, there waswidespread conviction among senior United Statesand Vietnamese military commanders and civilianauthorities in Vietnam that the absence of aUnited States response to Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese attacks against our personnel andforces in South Vietnam would encourage furtheranti-United States incidents. With this in mindand with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,an operation. order-nicknamed FLAMINGDART-was developed to detail the military ac-tions for retaliatory air strikes to be executed onorder of higher authority.

One destroyer patrol, ordered into the TonkinGulf, was scheduled to begin on 7 February. How-ever, it developed that this was the date of a statevisit by Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin to Hanoiand the patrol was cancelled in order to avoid anyincident that might worsen United States-Sovietrelations. In addition to cancelling the naval patrolin the Gulf, the attack carriers Coral Sea and Harz-cock were ordered to stand down from a fullyready condition and on the morning of the sevenththe two ships turned eastward for Subic Ray, leav-ing only the aircraft carrier Ranger in the Gulf ofTonkin.

Within hours of the release of the two carriers,the North Vietnamese-controlled Viet Conglaunched a heavy mortar attack on United Statesforces and billets in the vicinity of the Pleiku Air-base. Eight Americans were killecl, 109 woundecl.This was the first of a series of Viet Cong attackswhich coincided with Premier Kosygins visit.

After this attack, our forces resumed promptlythe operational readiness posture so recently re-laxed. The aircraft carriers Covnl Sea and Hancockwere ordered to reverse course and steam towardthe Tonkin Gulf. After alerting Pacific Commandair and naval component commanders, CINCPACinformed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our forceswere ready to execute the FLAMING DART planas appropriate retaliation. The Joint Chiefs of Staffresponded promptly with Execute and the CoralSea and the Hancock launched a total of 45 planesagainst North Vietnamese army barracks and portfacilities at Dong Hoi, just north of the Demili-tarized Zone.

Simultaneously the aircraft carrier Rangerlaunched a 34-plane strike against the Vit Thu LuBarracks, 15 miles inland and five miles north ofthe Demilitarized Zone, but poor weather pre-vented these attacks from being carried out.

At Dong Hoi, ten buildings were destroyed, twoothers heavily damaged, and an undeterminednumber left burning. One A-4 Skyhawk and itspilot were lost.

Concurrent with these retaliatory actions, forceaugmentations of the Pacific Command wereundertaken to deter or counter North Vietnameseor Chinese Communist reaction. At the same time,proposals were submitted to the Joint Chiefs ofStaff to increase the military pressure againstNorth Vietnam. CINCPAC proposed that our air-craft be authorized to participate on a continuingbasis with the Vietnamese Air Force against theViet Cong within South Vietnam, that frequentdestroyer patrols be conducted in the Tonkin Gulfto place the Communists on the defensive in their

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home grounds, and that fighter escort be au-thorized for photographic re,connaissance missionsin the southern portion of North Vietnam.

With Ambassador to South Vietnam MaxwellTaylor and General Westmoreland supporting theretaliatory action and emphasizing the importanceof South Vietnamese Air Force participation, theJoint Chiefs of Staff authorized an additional strikeon 8 February with South Vietnamese Air Forceresources against the Vu Con Barracks, with theChap Le Barracks (about 15 miles north of theDemilitarized Zone) as an alternate target in caseof bad weather. The South Vietnamese Air Force,in association with our pathfinder and flak suppression forces, executed a successful strike againstthe Chap Le Barracks with 24 A-1H aircraft.

On 10 February the enemy blew up a UniteclStates enlisted mens billet at Qui Nhon, killing23 Americans and wounding 21 others. Immedi-ately after this action, CINCPAC recommendedto the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we retaliate

promptly and emphatically, and included a pro-posal that the South Vietnamese Air Force beused to strike the Vu Con Barracks. AmbassadorTaylor and General Westmoreland again were inagreement with our views.

In response to CINCPACs recommendation, theJoint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order to beprepared to conduct coordinated attacks duringdaylight hours on 11 February. The executionorder from the Joint Chiefs of Staff assignedUnited States strike forces to the Chanh Hoa Bar-racks, 35 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone.The Vu Con Barracks was to be handled by theSouth Vietnamese Air Force.

On 11 February FLAMING DART TWO waslaunched. Weather conditions forced the SouthVietnamese Air Force to attack its alternate target,the Vit Thu Lu Barracks, with resulting destruc-tion of five buildings. The United States naval air-craft strike at Chanh Hoa Barracks was successfulbut our forces suffered the loss of three aircraft.

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INCEPTION OF ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONSUntil mid-February 1965 all United States and ROLLING THUNDER STRIKES BEGIN

South Vietnamese Air Force air strikes againstNorth Vietnam had been in response to specific On 2 March 1965 the first ROLLING THUN-DER strikes were launched when United StatesCommunist violence directed against our forces.However, at CINCPACs direction, plans had been aircraft hit a supply area and the Vietnamese Airprepared to undertake a program of air strikes Force struck a port complex. Strategic Air Com-against North Vietnam, not necessarily related to mand B-52 night air strikes were included in theretaliatory action, should such operations be or- warning order for ROLLING THUNDER 5, butdered. Th e o bet trve of the air strikes was to cause SAC participation was not included in the executethe government of North Vietnam to cease its message. SAC B-52 operations were not to becomea part of ROLLING THUNDER but became asupport and direction of the insurgencies in South separate operation, ARC LIGHT.Vietnam and Laos. ROLLING THUNDER operations were initi-Before such strikes could be launched, it was ated under strict controls and specific guidance.essential for the United States and its allies to The strike day was specified, as well as the num-make preparations for possible reaction by North ber of sorties by task and by target; strikes wereVietnam and Communist China. Some prepara- dependent on Vietnamese Air Force participationtory moves were accomplished in connection with prior to or concurrent with United States strikes;the FLAMING DART air strikes to include the attacks were limited to primary targets or one ofevacuation of American dependents from South two alternates with unexpended ordnance to beVietnam and augmentation of air power in South- dumped into the South China Sea; prestrike re-east Asia. connaissance was not permitted; bomb damage

Although there were no further FLAMING assessment aircraft were to accompany strike air-DART actions, there was continued planning for craft or immediately follow the strike aircraft;additional air strikes. Higher authority, in response subsequent bomb damage assessment was to beto continued and increasing aggression by North conducted at medium altitude only and unes-Vietnam, soon authorized the use of United States corted; and no aircraft were to be recycled.forces for an air strike against the Quang Khe As the ROLLING THUNDER campaignNaval Base and recommended employment of progressed, restrictions were gradually reducedand greater latitude in air operations was author-South Vietnamese Air Force aircraft to strike the ized. Within the approved boundaries, armed re-Dong Hoi Airfield (just north of the Demili- connaissance aircraft (originally prohibited fromtarized Zone). These strikes, with a planning readi- doing so) were permitted to hit enemy vehicles onness date of 20 F ebruary, were given the nickname roads and rail lines, aircraft or vehicles on certainROLLING THUNDER. That name came to be airfields, North Vietnamese naval craft, water craftapplied to our air campaign against North Viet- firing on aircraft, radar and communications fa-nam with different strike series numbered in cilities, surface-to-air missile sites and equipment,sequence. and barges, ferries, and lighters.

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North Vietnam was divided into seven geo-graphic regions, identified as Route Packages, forROLLING THUNDER operations. They weredesigned for the purpose of assigning respon-sibility for target development, collection of in-telligence data, and target analysis. To insureeconomical and effective use of resources, opera-tional procedures were developed between our Sev-enth Air Force and Seventh Fleet that providedfor full coordination of air operations in theROLLING THUNDER program and yet allowedboth Services to operate in all areas.

As ROLLING THUNDER progressed and theoperational commanders were granted increasedflexibility in conducting operations, the subordi-nate commanders were reminded of the uniquecharacter of the campaign. For example, in anApril message to subordinate commanders, CINC-P,4C noted that in the day-to-day pressure of anoperational environment it was not easy to remem-ber that the air campaign in North Vietnam wasnot just another war with the objective of inflict-ing maximum damage to the enemy. ROLLINGTHUNDER was described as a precise applica-tion of military pressure for the specific purposeof halting aggression in South Vietnam, and thatthere was no doubt as to the damage the strikeshad accomplished. CINCPACs message empha-sized that the commanders could continue to ex-pect various types of restrictions on their opera-tions, some explicitly stated, others implied, andthat the fundamental importance of the air cam-paign, conducted as ordered, required careful com-pliance with the spirit and intent of each instruc-tion.ROLLING THUNDER STRIKES SUSPENDED

On 12May 1965 air strike and armed reconnais-sance operations within North Vietnam were sus-pended. Strike aircraft released by this move weremade available for use against the Viet Cong with-in South Vietnam. A special reconnaissance pro-gram was launched to observe the reaction of the

North Vietnamese rail and road transportationsystems.

RECOMMENDED FUTURE COURSE FORROLLING THUNDER

During the bombing pause, a comprehensive rec-ommendation on the future course of the air cam-paign was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.CINCPAC stated that in developing the futurecourse of the campaign it was necessary to weighcarefully the capabilities and limitations of UnitedStates air power when required to operate withinspecific political parameters, and to weigh the vul-nerability of North Vietnam within that frame-work. A concept was then proposed for a demon-stration of the ubiquity of our air power, charac-terized by an around-the-clock program of im-mobilization, attrition, and harassment of NorthVietnamese military targets. The specific types ofmissions proposed for this purpose were extensivedaytime armed reconnaissance on land and inlandwaterway routes south of 20 North coupled withnight blockage tactics; increased route interdictionsouth of 20 North; repeated attacks against knownmilitary facilities south of 20 North that could beeffectively attacked by a small strike force; attacksthat sought out and destroyed dispersed supplies,equipment, and military personnel; and attacks onport facilities and recognized North Vietnameseshipping.As a desirable alternative CINCPAC recom-mended that incremental attacks be authorized onthe larger targets over a period of days, to be sup-ported by bomb damage assessment. This type ofattack was to be conducted against major targetssouth of 20 North and later extended northwestto Dien Bien Phu.

Intensified psychological operations were alsosuggested as an important adjunct to ROLLINGTHUNDER. CINCPAC proposed specific meas-ures to transmit the message that the United Stateshacl no quarrel with the people of North Vietnamand that they should avoid all military installa-tions. The targets and strike zones proposed were

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initially limited to the area from the DemilitarizedZone to 20 North, but these were to be extendedto the northwest against specific targets. CINCPACalso recommended that, as the zone for strikesagainst major targets expanded to the north andwest, the armed reconnaissance and small strikezone be expanded accordingly. In this plan, it wasproposed to lift the numerical limit on armedreconnaissance sorties so that only our capability beconsidered in establishing the number of small,controlled air operations.

One purpose of this campaign was to driy.Tehometo the North Vietnamese leaders that our stayingpower was superior to their own.ROLLING THUNDER STRIKES RESUMED

During the bombing suspension initiated in May1965, information was collected to permit anevaluation of the results of ROLLING THUN-DER. On 16 May CINCPAC suggested to theJoint Chiefs of Staff that further respite for NorthVietnam would serve to make future problemsmore difficult in South Vietnam and Laos. On thisbasis CINCPAC recommended resumption ofROLLING THUNDER and received authoriza-tion from higher authority to resume operations on18 May 1965.

Within ROLLING THUNDER 15 specifiedgeographical areas were for the first time assignedfor armed reconnaissance and one strike was authorized north of 20 North against Quang SuoiBarracks.

Continuing through the end of 1965, NorthVietnamese military targets were subjected to airattack by ROLLING THUNDER operations.North Vietnamese freedom of troop and war sup-ply movement was progressively impaired a:, thenumber and importance of ROLLING THUN-DER fixed targets grew. The area and intensity ofarmed reconnaissance were expanded but at a care-fully measured and moderate pace. By years end,we had progresserl from ROLLING THUNDER16 on 25 May through ROLLING THUNDER 47,which was authorized on 24 December 1965.

EVALUATION OF ARMEDRECONNAISSANCE

It was clear by September 1965 that despite thedamage caused by air attacks in North Vietnamthere was no indication of North Vietnamese will-ingness to negotiate or terminate support of theViet Cong.

It must be noted that the principle of continualand steadily increasing pressure was basic to theconcept of ROLLING THUNDER and thus tothe achievement of our purposes through the useof air power. This principle had not been held toin the ROLLING THUNDER campaign, eitherin armed reconnaissance or in fixed target strikes.Armed reconnaissance sorties had leveled off forthe two months previous to September 1965 andstrikes on fixed targets had actually decreased.

The overall decrease in pressure was caused inpart because the authorized armed reconnaissancearea had fewer significant targets than before. Fur-ther, the reduced number of fixed targets for eachsucceeding ROLLING THUNDER period hadlessened the pressure on North Vietnam. Finally,the most important targets were in the northeastand in the large sanctuaries around Hanoi andHaiphong, where air operations were not au-thorized.

On 26 November CINCPAC recommendeddestruction of major war supporting targets inthe northeast, including those in the Hanoi andHaiphong areas, disruption of major port facilities,and subsequent increased armed reconnaissancedirected at the road, rail, and coastal lines of com-munication from China and on inland waterways.EXPANSION OF NORTH VIETNAMS AIR

DEFENSE SYSTEM-1965 In April 1965 photography revealed the firstNorth Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM)site under construction some 15 miles southeastof Hanoi. A second SAM site appeared about amonth later and by mid-July 1965 several moresites had been discovered in various stages of con-Ytruction, forming an incomplete irregular ring

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around Hanoi. Neither missiles nor missile-asso-ciated equipment was detected in any of the sites.On 24 July 1965 the first known successful SAMfiring from a North Vietnamese site occurre(l,resulting in the loss of an F-4C aircraft. Subse-quently the number of SAM sites increased rapidl)in the area north of Than11 Hoa. By the end of1965, more than 60 sites had been discovered pro-tecting the vital military-industrial complex aroundHanoi and Haiphong and the LOC south toThanh Hoa. The SAM threat forced our aircraftto operate below the minimum effective altituclesof the missile system. This required more fueland placed the aircraft within the kill envelopeof small arms, automatic weapons, and light anti-aircraft artillery. Evaluation of the effectiveness ofthe SAM system for 1965 indicated it took about13 missiles launched for each aircraft shot cloum.

As SAM defenses were increased and improved,so also was North Vietnams aircraft inventory. Inlate May 1965 eight IL-28 jet light bombers wereidentified at Phuc Yen Airfield and by mid-Junethe number of MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighter air-craft had climbed to almost 70. At Phuc Yen, thepresence of unpacked crates indicated that therewere more aircraft awaiting assembly. In lateDecember 1965 an improved supersonic fighter,the delta-winged MIG-21, arrived to bolster NorthVietnams air defenses. Combat aircraft activityduring 1965 was mainly devoted to training andonly ten fighter engagements were reported, re-sulting in a total of two United States and sixNorth Vietnamese fighter aircraft downed. TheIL-28s were not involved in combat missions.North Vietnams aircraft inventory at the end of1965 numbered about 75 MIG jet fighters and eightIL-28 jet light bombers.

The most effective elements of North Vietnamsair defense system proved to be the automaticweapons and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Anti-aircraft weapons were credited with destroyingabout 80 percent of our aircraft shot down in NorthVietnam during 1965, with the most damaging firefrom light AAA and automatic weapons. This rate

was to be expected, considering low-level attacksby fighter-bombers and flak suppression tactics.

During 1965 North Vietnam accomplished ardyid buildup of early warning and height-findingradar sites. An initial ground controlled intercept((XI) capability was established in both the north-ern and southern portions of the country and intothe Gulf of Tonkin.

On 4 April MIG aircraft possibly under GCIcontrol surprised and shot down two F-105s overThanh Hoa. The number of AAA fire controlradars increased during the year but not as fast asttie number of AAA weapons. At the end of 1965the ratio of radars to occupied AAA installationswas no more than 1 to 25.

THAI LAND BASED AI RCRAFTOPERATIONS

Thai bases were used for strike aircraft fromthe outset of the ROLLING THUNDER programand for reconnaissance missions in Laos. This ar-rangement existed with the full consent of theThai Government. The use of Thailand-based air-craft for operations in North Vietnam and Laoshelped relieve pressure on the already congested airbases in South Vietnam, introduced an added in-crement of flexibility into our air operations, andljermitted sortie levels which otherwise would havetaxed the capability of our resources.THE VIETNAMESE AI R FORCES ROLE

IN ROLLING THUNDERSouth Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) partici-

pation was a significant element in ROLLINGTHUNDER. However, heavy Viet Cong pressuretended to drain VNAF resources to meet require-ments in South Vietnam at the expense of the cam-paign in North Vietnam. Diverting carrier aircraftand increasing United States Air Force attackswithin South Vietnam relieved pressure on theVNAF, thereby permitting increased VNAF par-ticipation in ROLLING THUNDER. Subsequent-ly, the VNAF provided a minimum of three strike/

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reconnaissance missions for each of the ROLLINGTHUNDER periods.COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR ROLL-

ING THUNDER OPERATIONSThe command and control arrangement for

ROLLING THUNDER strike and armed recon-naissance operations basically consisted of CINC-PACs operational control of the strike forcesthrough the Commanders in Chief of the PacificFleet (CINCPACFLT) and Pacific Air Forces(CINCPACAF) and the Commander, UnitedStates Military Assistance Command, Vietnam(COMUSMACV). Coordination authority wasassigned to CINCPACAF with the tacit under-standing that it would be further delegated to theCommander of the 2d Air Division, located inSouth Vietnam. This authority was granted to theextent it was required to preclude mutual inter-ference of friendly forces during strike and armedreconnaissance missions. A Seventh Fleet liaisonofficer to the 2d Air Division accomplished liaisonwith the Commander of Task Force 77, who exer-cised operational command and control over theaircraft carriers on station off the Vietnam coast.The Commander of the 2d Air Division exercisedoperational control for CINCPACAF over the AirForce forces in Southeast Asia engaged in combatair operations.

This system conformed to accepted doctrine forunified control of our forces and it functionedsmoothly for this purpose. It provided an effectivemeans of exercising coordination of air operationsover North Vietnam without a combined com-mand structure. Although there were refinementswithin this system, there was no fundamentalchange.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITUREThe general purpose bomb was the weaponagainst the majority of ROLLING THUNDER

targets, The Navy used principally the SOO-poundbomb; /our Air Force relied mainly on the 750-pound bomb supplemented by the 5OO-pound

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bomb. Special targeting required limited numbersof 250-, l,OOO-,2,000-, and 3,000-pound bombs.

Throughout ROLLING THUNDER operationsthere was no case in which sorties were cancelledbecause weapons were unavailable. In some cases,however, the optimum weapons necessary forachievement of maximum damage per sortie werenot used when local shortages required substitu-tion of alternate weapons for those preferred.

Use of napalm against North Vietnam targetswas prohibited until ROLLING THUNDER 6;thereafter it was employed only against specificmilitary targets not adjacent to a population center.

LEAFLET OPERATIONSThe initial leaflet program aimed at the North

Vietnamese was approved on 9 April 1965. Theconcept was that prior to an airstrike we wouldwarn the populace, by leaflets or by radio, that cer-tain categories of targets were considered militaryobjectives and that the people should evacuate alltargets of the type described. The first leaflet mis-sion was conducted on 14 April.

In June Washington authorities granted toCINCPAC and to the American Ambassador inSaigon the authority to conduct leaflet drops aspart of the total air effort. It was intended that thetargets for ROLLING THUNDER and the leafletmissions would be complementary. Further, it wasdirected that the leaflet operations would be ex-panded to two drops of about two million leafletseach per week.

Intensified psychological operations were di-rected and on 16 July CINCPAC recommendedthat leaflet operations be conducted on the majorNorth Vietnamese population centers, to includeHanoi and Haiphong. This was approved by high-er authority with the proviso that leaflet aircraftcould not penetrate a 40-nautical mile circle aroundeither Hanoi or Haiphong. Leaflets for Hanoi andHaiphong were targeted utilizing the wind-drifttechnique.

Until the early part of September 1965 all leafletmissions were executed by F-105 aircraft. On 10


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September a C-130 was used for the first time inthe leaflet program. On this, the first night missionof the program, 9,000 packets containing toys weredropped over North Vietnam in connection withChildrens Day.

Responding to an October query from the JointChiefs of Staff, CINCPAC again proposed a relax-ation of restrictions on leaflet aircraft in the interestof more effective operations. CINCPACs propo-sal provided that the less stringent constraints ap-plicable to some of the other air operations beapplied to leaflet missions. After approval by theJoint Chiefs of Staff, the basic operation order of17 December broadened the area of operations butstill restricted aircraft from entering a 25nauticalmile radius from Hanoi, a lo-nautical mile radiusfrom Haiphong, and a distance varying from 25 to30 nautical miles from the Chinese border.

A total of 77 million leaflets and 15,000 gift kitswere distributed under the leaflet program during1965. There were indications that the material wasreaching the populace, that in some instances themorale of the people was being lowered, and thatthe North Vietnamese authorities were forced totake counterpropaganda actions. On this basis theleaflet operation was termed worthwhile.

Leaflet operations were suspended during thelatter part of December as part of the Christmasstand-down.

HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRE-1965The Viet Cong announced a Christmas truce

in South Vietnam in 1965. On our side, Secretaryof State Dean Rusk proposed that the United Statessuspend bombing operations against North Viet-nam for 24 hours and that air operations in SouthVietnam be limited to support of forces in contactwith the Viet Cong. Should this result in a realand similar restraint on the part of the enemy, wewould continue to suspend bombing in the hopethat negotiations could begin. CINCPAC con-curred in Secretary Rusks proposal, feeling thatsuch operations could be suspended without sig-nificant military advantage to the Viet Cong.

We announced that air operations would be SUS-pended over North Vietnam for a 24-hour periodover Christmas and, as circumstances would haveit, they were not resumed until the end of Jan-uary 1966. Air and ground operations in SouthVietnam were limited to defensive actions duringthe 24-hour Christmas period. Subsequently, thehJround cease-fire period was extended by six hours,and ended on 26 December.

The enemy did not observe his own announcedtruce. Casualties reported for the period 24 through26 December as a result of enemy violationswere 3 United States personnel killed and 23wounded, 54 members of the South VietnameseArmed Forces killed and 55 wounded, and 15South Vietnamese civilians killed and 19 wounded.

On 26 December CINCPAC commented to theJoint Chiefs of Staff on the difficulties faced by acommander in the presence of the enemy whena cease-fire was extended on short notice. It waspointed out that the advantage of a cease-fireaccrued to the enemy, suggested that any futurecease-fire should be planned in detail well in ad-vance, and proposed that aerial observation of keyenemy installations in North Vietnam should con-tinue even during a cease-fire.

EFFECTS DUR ING 1965Initial ROLLING THUNDER air operations

(luring 1965 were relatively light and resulted inan ordnance expenditure of only about 200 tonsof ordnance per week. As the campaign got underway and more targets were made available, up to1,600 tons of ordnance were dropped each weekwith the major portion against industrial targets.Damage within the industrial sector was quiteevenly distributed among all target systems. Forexample, an estimated 27 percent of North Viet-nams electrical capacity was destroyed by the endof 1965.

I>amage to military targets was concentratedprimarily against military barracks. However, at-tacks against other military facilities such as am-

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munition dumps and storage depots would have tience of the American public would expire beforehad more immediate impact since loss of military we could attain a just peace. Hanoi officials statedequipment required replacement from either the publicly that enormous costs and casualties wouldUSSR or Communist China. Ry the end of 1965, persuade the United States to negotiate on Northapproximately 1,500 ~vaterbornc logistic craft, 800 Vietnamese terms. In the eyes of a military com-trucks, and 650 pieces of rnilroacl rolling stock had mander, the objectives of the ROLLING THUN-been either damagetl or destroyed as a result of DER campaign had not been achieved-and tooffensive air action. achieve them required adherence to the basic con-

Indications were that enemy morale and tenacity cept and principle of applying a continual andwere supported by a strorrg conviction that the pa- steadily increasing level of pressure.

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ROLLING THUNDERAs 1966 opened, North Vietnams airspace was

free of United States combat air operations. Thesuspension which began on Christmas of 1965 inconnection with our peace overtures was continueduntil 31 January 1966 when, all peace efforts hav-ing been spurned by the enemy, limited ROLL-ING THUNDER strikes and armed reconnais-sance operations were resumed.

During the pause, enemy forces were deeply in-volved in actions preparing for the resumptionof our operations. Our side, aware of this, madephotographic reconnaissance and analyzed the in-formation obtained. The enemy preparatory ac-tivity involved reconstructing and improving hislines of communication (LOC), improving andincreasing the air defense of important areas, dis-persing the military support base, and pushing alarge number of trucks and supplies towards theinfiltration corridors leading into Laos. Some 40additional air defense positions were added in thevicinity of the northwest rail line between Hanoiand Communist China. Similarly, an increase of 26guns protecting the LOCs below Vinh was noted.

The reconnaissance photography accomplishedduring the pause in our air attacks was of greatvalue in determining enemy activity and was ofmaterial aid in planning future strikes. Analysisof the enemy effort expended to rehabilitate cer-tain LOCs indicated the value he assigned to thevarious routes.

RESUMPTION OF ROLLZNG THUNDEROPERATIONS

Resumption of ROLLING THUNDER opera-tions, which took place on 31 January, apparentlycame as no surprise to the North Vietnamese be-cause the LOC associated activity resumed nor-

OPERATIONS 1966mal night time and dispersal procedures severalclays prior to this date. News media speculationand political and other developments presagedthat the period of relative quiet was about to end.

On 12 January during the stand-down of of-fensive air operations against North Vietnam, acletailed discussion of the relationship of militaryoperations in North Vietnam to the overall strat-egy of the war in South Vietnam was submitted tothe Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this submission,CINCPAC noted that plans should be made toresume effective operations against North Viet-nam if negotiations did not bring an early cease-fire. The relationship of military operations againstNorth Vietnam to the overall strategy was dis-cussed in terms of the following undertakings: (1)to deny to the Communists in South Vietnam theeffective North Vietnamese direction and assis-tance vital to their war-making capability; (2) toassist the government of South Vietnam in pro-tecting the South Vietnamese people from Com-munist subversion and oppression, to liberate areasdominated by the Viet Cong, and to assist in theestablishment of a stable economy and the con-tinuation of an independent non-Communist gov-ernment; (3) to defeat the Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese forces and destroy their base areas inSouth Vietnam.

We statecl that it was necessary to achieve suc-cess in each of these three elements of strategythrough simultaneous application of appropriatemilitary force.

The first undertaking-to deny the Communistsin South Vietnam effective North Vietnamese di-rection ancl assistance-was advocated as the basisfor the renewed air campaign. The air campaignwas to be conducted so as to accomplish this under-

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taking most effectively. Access to external assist-ance that permitted North Vietnam to sustainmilitary operations must be denied and the re-sources already in North Vietnam and most neededto support aggression would be destroyed. Allknown military material and facilities would bedestroyed and military activities and movementswould be continuously harassed and disrupted.The foregoing would require operations quite dif-ferent from those before the cease-fire.

While recognizing limited achievements in theair campaign, CINCPACs view was that the na-ture of the war had changed since the air cam-paign began. ROLLING THUNDER had notforced Hanoi to the decision sought, and indica-tions were that Ho Chi Minh intended to continueto support the Viet Cong until he was denied thecapability to do so.

In summary, we felt that these three tasks, ef-fectively accomplished, would either bring theenemy to the conference table or cause the in-surgency to wither from lack of support. The al-ternative appeared to be a long and costly war-costly in lives and material resources.

EXPANSION OF ROLLING THUNDEROPERATIONS

ROLLING THUNDER 48 extended from 31January to the end of February 1966. Weather wasa limiting factor throughout the period. It causeda high percentage of cancellations or diversionsand greatly limited the information obtained frombomb damage assessment.

Most ROLLING THUNDER operations dur-ing this period were limited to the southern area ofNorth Vietnam and by the end of the month therewas little to report in the way of results.

y the end of February the results obtainedthrough ROLLING THUNDER, while showingthat considerable enemy military material andfacilities were destroyed or damaged, gave verylittle evidence of progress toward the objective ofthe program.

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March weather was slightly better than Feb-ruarys, with an occasional day of good visibilitythroughout the ROLLING THUNDER area.More often, however, pilots found 100 percentcloud cover or haze to 12,000 or 14,000 feet. Thiscaused a high rate of cancellations. Even so, therate of damage to fleeting targets in the ROLLINGTHUNDER area improved significantly.

In March General Westmor

Documents

Report Vietnamwar Macv