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Repositioning theposition: RevisitingPieper's argument for aleisure ethicMary G. Parr aa Recreation, Parks and TourismManagement , Kent State University , P.O.Box 5190, Kent, OH, 44242 Phone: (330)672–0217 Fax: (330) 672–0217 E-mail:Published online: 21 Nov 2010.
To cite this article: Mary G. Parr (2009) Repositioning the position:Revisiting Pieper's argument for a leisure ethic, Leisure/Loisir, 33:1, 79-94,DOI: 10.1080/14927713.2009.9651431
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14927713.2009.9651431
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Repositioning the Position: RevisitingPieper's Argument for a Leisure Ethic
Mary G. ParrKent State University
Abstract. The purpose of this essay is to examine a spiritual justification for a leisureethic proposed by Josef Pieper. As work, for many people, becomes less meaningful, asociety organized around productive labour is becoming increasingly problematic(Bartlett, 1990; Reid & van Dreunen, 1996; Robinson, 2003). Pieper (1948/1998) pro-posed that in order to understand the value of leisure, the concept must be decoupled fromthe concept of work. Only then could leisure's true potential be realized: a reflection onwhat it means to be human. Models of leisure service provision as potential detractorsfrom, or facilitators of, this potential are discussed.
Keywords, leisure, spirituality, acedia, leisure ethic, social planning
Résumé. Le but de cet essai est d'examiner une justification spirituelle pour l'éthiquedes loisirs proposée par Josef Pieper. Pendant que le travail, pour beaucoup de person-nes, devient de moins en moins significatif, une société organisée autour du travail pro-ductif devient de plus en plus problématique (Bartlett, 1990; Reid & van Dreunen,1996; Robinson, 2003). Pieper (1948/1998) a proposé qu'afin de comprendre la valeurdes loisirs, le concept doive être découplé du concept du travail. Ce n'est seulementqu'après une réflexion extensive sur ce quoi signifie être un humain que le vrai poten-tiel du loisir peut être réalisé. Des modèles de la disposition de service de loisirs en tantque détracteurs potentiels et attracteurs facilitant ce potentiel sont discutés.
Mots-clés, loisirs, spiritualité, éthique de loisirs, planification sociale
What good is leisure? Answers to this question have been proposed anddebated throughout history, from Ancient Greece up to and includingtwenty-first-century perspectives. Recently, the "benefits approach" toleisure and leisure services management (e.g., Driver & Bruns, 1999)
Address all correspondence to: Mary G Parr, Recreation, Parks and Tourism Manage-ment, Kent State University, P.O. Box 5190, Kent, OH 44242. Telephone: (330) 672-0217;Fax: (330) 672-4106. Email: [email protected].
Leisure/Loisir, 33(1): 79-94© 2009 Ontario Research Council on Leisure
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and "repositioning" leisure services (Crompton & Kaczynksi, 2004) haveemerged as bases for potentially persuasive arguments for a leisure ethicand the value of leisure. However, these arguments are premised on thequestion "What is leisure good for?" rather than "What is the good withinleisure itself?" The "benefits approach" and "repositioning" movementsare attempts to argue for a leisure ethic based on leisure's functional mer-its or the outcomes leisure produces that are best facilitated by professionalleisure service providers. However, Josef Pieper (1948/1952) claimed,in his essay Leisure: The Basis of Culture, that in order to convincinglyargue the value of leisure, "there is only one thing to be done: to goback to the first and original source" (p. 61), i.e., the gift of creationand the essence of what it means to be human. According to Pieper,"...man [sic] attains his true form and his upright attitude 'in festivecompanionship with the Gods'" (p. 61).
The purpose of this essay is to propose a leisure ethic based on thepremise that leisure is critical to what it means to be human. FurthermoreI will argue that spirituality is an essential component of a fully humanexistence and thus the full potential of leisure is realized when the spir-itual dimension is considered. Finally, leisure is "repositioned" as anend in itself, rather than a means to achieve a desired social function. Inorder to accomplish this, it is necessary to critique the popular notion thatleisure is the opposite of work. This will allow an examination of thevalue of leisure in terms of its inherent good and its connection to theessence of what it means to be human, as proposed by Josef Pieper, atwentieth-century Thomist philosopher. Before a claim can be maderegarding the good within leisure, it must first be contrasted with anddecoupled from work as the source of its meaning and value. Further, thequestion of the delivery of leisure services in support of, or as a detrac-tor to, leisure's spirituality will be examined. Pieper (1948/1998) madehis plea for a return to a leisure ethic at a time and place when and wherethere was much work to be done; i.e., post-World War II Germany. How-ever, he argued that this was an ideal time to reconsider the very foun-dation of the social order (one previously determined by the primacy ofwork); he proposed the creation of a new "house" wherein leisure mightbe the primary determinant of human activity.
Pieper's philosophy was heavily, influenced by Thomas Aquinas(c. 1225-74), a priest in the Dominican Order considered by many to beone of the Christian Church's greatest theologians and philosophers. Hewas also a renowned teacher and is the patron saint of Roman Catholicuniversities, academies, colleges, and schools (Kennedy, 1912). Pieper
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(1962) described Aquinas' life's work as the integration of the "intellec-tual" tradition of Plato and Aristotle, with the realm of the supernaturalaccessible only by faith in the revealed word of God without subjugat-ing one tradition to the other. On the subject of leisure, Aquinas associ-ated it with the contemplative life. The contemplative life is character-ized by a certain freedom, requiring leisure and rest, because of its focuson eternal rather than temporal things as illustrated by Aquinas' cita-tion of Psalm 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God" in his Summa The-ologica (n.d./1920, II, II, 182, 1). Aquinas claimed that the active lifebinds us to the mundane "since the active life is busy about many things,while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one" (SummaTheologica, II, II, 182,1 & 4). Similar to Aquinas, Pieper's understand-ing of leisure reflects an integration of the natural world apprehendedthrough the senses and the capacity of humans to apprehend knowledgeof the divine through faith.
Pieper, considered a Catholic author and philosopher (IgnatiousInsight, n.d.), regarded spirituality from a Christian perspective, althoughlike Aquinas, he incorporated Ancient Greek philosophy into his analy-ses. Both the Ancient Greek and Christian traditions espouse a belief inan "other-worldly" realm separate from, but connected to the realm ofhuman existence. However, while the Greek tradition is polytheistic,the Christian tradition is monotheistic. While these perspectives form thebasis of this essay, it is not my purpose to argue the merits of one ver-sus the other or to discount other spiritual traditions. For the purposes ofthis essay, spirituality may be considered in general to be a belief in an"other-worldly" realm. A more detailed description of "spirit" is dis-cussed in a later section.
Characteristics and Meaning of WorkSeveral decades after Pieper's (1948/1998) plea, it appears that ourhouse is still built on a foundation of work. Joe Robinson (2003) citeddata suggesting that working hours for Americans have steadily increasedduring the 1980s and 1990s and these increases are projected to continue,even while productivity is dropping. More recently, the U.S. Bureau ofLabor Statistics shows full-time workers, aged 15 years and older, aver-age greater than 40 hours per week for each of the last four years forwhich data are available (U.S. Department of Labor, 2003-2006). Atthe same time, John Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey (2005) cited datathat claim no significant decreases in leisure time have occurred over thelast 40 years. Robinson and Godbey noted that increases in work time
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for some groups were counter-balanced by significant decreases in timespent on household chores. Even so, many Americans perceive them-selves as experiencing time scarcity (Robinson & Godbey). Pronovost(2007) analyzed data from Canadian time-use studies and found thatmore than one third of the respondents were "extremely stressed," largelydue to their work. He also found that while working hours for Canadi-ans had decreased over the past century, this trend has reversed itself withworking hours showing a consistent increase over the last 20 years(1986-2005) for which data were available.
Bartlett (1990) suggested that work-engendered depression is preva-lent in highly industrialized societies, and attributed this to an increasedfocus and value placed on work and material gains at the expense ofmore "liberating and humanizing influence^]" (p. 389). More recently,Kashdan and Breen (2007) found materialism to be significantly relatedto several well-being factors. Materialistic values were associated withincreased levels of social avoidance, symptoms of depression, and globalnegative emotions; and decreased levels of positive well-being factorssuch as relatedness, competence, autonomy, gratitude, and the presenceof meaning in life. Kashdan and Breen found these relationships werefully mediated by experiential avoidance. "Experiential avoidance isthe unwillingness to be in contact with negatively evaluated thoughts,feelings, and bodily sensations and strategic attempts to alter the form,frequency, or situations that elicit these experiences..." (pp. 522-523).Thus experiential avoidance is associated with a propensity for materi-alistic values and subsequent negative well-being. Furthermore, becausehumans have finite time, energy, and psychic resources, an investmentin an "avoidance" based strategy limits the potential development of an"approach" based lifestyle, "including movement toward personallymeaningful goals" (p. 523).
Reid and van Dreunen (1996) concluded that for many workers,increased effort is undertaken for instrumental reasons (e.g., a larger pay-cheque), without psychological reward. In an industrial society wherework "is characterized as that which gives meaning and essence to humanlife" (p. 47), both the unemployed, and the employed who are workingwithout psychological reward, are at a loss. Reid and van Dreunen claimedthat leisure has a potential role to play in both the creation of a new socialsystem and the content of the new system. However, they suggested thatin this new paradigm, leisure would have to be conceptually different; seen"as an integral part of defining humanity [emphasis added] and not viewedsimply as recreation and an appendage to work..." (p. 47).
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Pieper (1948/1998) offered three paradigmatic characteristics ofwork: (a) work is activity, (b) the value of work is equated with effort,and (c) work's primary purpose is to serve a social function. Work is aspace and time in which we are actively engaged in doing something,whether it is physical activity, intellectual activity, or some combination.Activities for which we cannot demonstrate tangible outcomes, and/orin which we do not appear to be busy, are highly suspect from this per-spective. The value of any work activity is proportional to the amountof effort required to produce the desired outcomes and the value of theutilitarian outcomes associated with it. Work represents obligated timeand activity, requires effort, and is frequently associated with role con-straint and a lack of self-expression (Samdahl, 1988).
In his 1950 essay "The Social Meaning of Leisure in the ModernWorld," Pieper defined a "proletarian" as a person who is fettered tothe process of working. He proposed three reasons for proletarianism:(a) economic: a person who lacks independent financial means (property)is therefore forced to sell the only thing s/he has—the power to work,(b) social: the social, political, and cultural institutions that bind a per-son to the process of production, and (c) personal: the inner impoverish-ment of humans. That is, "man [sic] is no longer able to realize thatthere is a possible, a reasonable, sensible doing, which is not work andnot just nothing else" (p. 415). In order to overcome the state of beingfettered to the process of working, these causes must be addressed.Because Pieper included impoverishment of humankind as a cause, hesuggested that a solution to this problem must go beyond social andeconomic solutions.
the educational task.. .[is] to enable the proletarians to enter the sphere ofliberal activities, the region of activities which are neither "work" nor sim-ply play, recreation, amusement—activities which are not needed butwhich nevertheless cannot be missing in a fully-realized human life.(1950, p. 418)
Robinson (2003) also attributed the current "work to live" culture to •the inner impoverishment of humans. He claimed that American work-ers are "overdoing it" based on the misplaced notion that the quantity ofwork and degree of sacrifice (including physical health) is equated withquality of performance. Furthermore, we measure our self-worth basedon this formula. Robinson attempted to educate workers by deconstruct-ing the notion that a work-determined world is a natural state; somethingthat simply must be accepted if workers wished to keep their jobs, let
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alone advance. He also proposed changes to social policy such as manda-tory vacation time for all workers, in order to break the dominance of anAmerican work culture.
The Gift of LeisureWhen work is viewed as activity that requires effort, leisure is oftenseen as the opposite of work and akin to laziness, or inactivity. Work'sopposite, in leisure, is apparent in leisure's contemporary associationwith relaxing activities (Parr & Lashua, 2004). Pieper (1948/1998)breaks up this false dichotomy by refuting the assumption that leisure isthe opposite of work (as activity). The original German title of Leisure:The Basis of Culture is "Mufie undKult." Mufie refers to idleness, but notin the sense of the opposite of activity. Mufie is defined as free time andinner peace to do something that corresponds to one's own interests,while freizeit (literally, free time) is time in which someone need notwork, has no particular obligations; freely available time for hobbies orrelaxation. According to Dr. Geoffrey Koby, a professor of GermanTranslation, "The difference lies in the inner peace or calm that mufieincludes—it implies mental freedom, not just externally 'free' time"(personal communication, 2/8/06). Pieper argued that the contemporaryconcept of leisure bears little resemblance to the leisure of AncientGreece, but it is also likely that translating "kulf as culture, and "mufie"as leisure, may have led to some misconceptions of Pieper's meaning.The German word "Jailf is associated with divine worship and forms ofthe word may be translated as "to cultivate," or "to culture" (Weiss,1998). Thus leisure is the basis for cultivation of the spirit.
According to Pieper (1948/1998), in contrast to work as effort,leisure occurs in the space and time within which we are open to expe-rience and knowledge that comes to us effortlessly. Insight into ourhumanness and our connection to the world is given or revealed whenour minds and hearts are quiet. It comes to us as a whole, as inspiration,rather than through the effort of analysis. According to Pieper, leisure"includes within itself a celebratory, approving, lingering gaze of theinner eye on the reality of creation" [emphasis added] (1948/1998, p. 33).In Christian teachings, all that humans have, that we can lay claim to, isa gift from God that stems from the original gift of life. The nature of agift is such that it is freely given and unearned by the recipient, thus agift is unrelated to effort. Humans do not ask to be born, thus the gift oflife is unearned. Nor do humans ask to be born into a particular context,yet all exist for a reason and have potential. This is not to say that human
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agency is nonexistent, that humans have no effect on producing desiredoutcomes. Clearly, humans do have the power to make choices and oftenthe choices of some have profound impacts on the lives of others. Oftenit is difficult to judge the potential value of an individual's existence, e.g.,a person in a persistent, vegetative state, against the backdrop of a work-determined world.
According to the Ancient Greeks, the use of the mind was a uniquegift given to humans by the gods and excellence was achieved whencreatures used the capabilities conferred by the gods (Hunnicutt, 1990).Based on Hunnicutt's analysis of Plato's use of the words leisure and play,Plato used work, leisure, and play to depict a hierarchy of virtuousaction. Inactivity or laziness has a negative value and lies at the lowestlevel. Work has positive value in that it is required to produce life'snecessities and it allows for the freedom of leisure. However, workshould be pursued to the extent that it facilitates leisure—the opportu-nity to engage in free activities. To continue to work to amass wealthbeyond what was necessary "was voluntary slavery to incessant neces-sity and loss of the blessing of leisure; it was work without end" (Hun-nicut, p. 214). The freedom of leisure for the Ancient Greeks was theopportunity to engage in activities done purely for their own sake—theartes liberalis. According to Hunnicutt, "The hallmarks of the authen-tic liberal arts were spontaneity, lightness, and joy, all results of the freeacceptance and free sharing of virtue as a gift" (p. 216). Play was the mostvirtuous activity of all and was used to describe engagement in philos-ophy. For Plato, play (i.e., doing philosophy, or playing with ideas) is themost virtuous of activities not only because of its intrinsic value, butbecause it is the fulfillment of excellence using the mind—the God'[s]unique gift to humans.
Aquinas agreed that engagement of a species in "that operation thatis most proper to it," gives proof of its existence (n.d./1920, SummaTheologica, II, II, 179,1). Furthermore, humans' capacity to understandand act according to reason is what separates humans from other species.Because humans have an intellect, Aquinas divided the life of humansinto the active life (work-a-day activities or servile arts) and the contem-plative life (use of the intellect to contemplate truth and the good, or theliberal arts, embodied in God) (Summa Theologica, II, II, 179, 1). ForAquinas, the contemplative life was more excellent than the active lifefor a variety of reasons, but most significantly because it requires use ofthe intellect, it requires very few "things" to support it; it requires leisure,and it is according to Divine things rather than human things (Summa
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Theologica, II, II, 182, 1). Pieper (1950) also described a "rank-differ-ence" between the servile arts and the liberal arts. The servile arts areactivities that produce something useful, whereas engagement in theliberal arts serves no immediate purpose. Yet, in order to live a truly"human" life, engagement in the liberal arts is quite necessary. For theScholastics of the Middle Ages, leisure was associated with humans'capacity to be spiritual; "to accept his [sic] place in the universe that con-tains both matter and 'higher values,' those that transform his [sic] dailylife and his [sic] human suffering" (Bartlett, 1990, p. 392). They aremore valuable because these activities allow full expression of what itmeans to be human; a transcendence of life beyond the work-a-dayworld.
Spirit and the Essence of HumanityAccording to Kierkegaard (1849/1954), "man [sic] is spirit" and thespirit is the "self." "Man [sic] is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite,of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity..." (p. 146). Thetwo "selves," represented by infinite, eternal, and freedom on the one sideand finite, temporal, and necessity on the other do not exist independ-ently, but co-exist in a relationship or synthesis. This is akin to Aquinas'(n.d./1920) description of the mix of the active life and the contempla-tive life. While the contemplative life (or domain) is superior to theactive life for reasons cited above, there are times when a person is jus-tifiably called away from contemplative activities for some "necessityof the present life." In Summa Theological Aquinas cautions againstforgoing the contemplative life altogether while attending to life's neces-sities, thus "depriv[ing] ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden over-whelm us" (II, II, 182,1 ad 3).
For Kierkegaard, the source of the relationship of the two selves isalso at issue. He posited two possibilities: the relation between the twoselves constituted itself, or the relation was constituted by another. In theformer case, to deny or suppress the existence of one or the other "selfis to lead a life that is not fully a self. Kierkegaard referred to this as"despair at not willing to be oneself." In the latter case, a third term, orrelationship, is created in the relation of the synthesis to the "Powerwhich constituted the whole relation" (p. 147), thus creating a human self.In Pieper's (1948/1998) words, spirit is the "ability to comprehend theworld" (p. 87), where the world refers to the sum total of existing things,including God(s). The "world" is contrasted with the "environment;"the place where humans live out their daily existence. Since humans
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are not pure spirit, they must exist in, and have the unique ability tocomprehend, both worlds. Thus the essence of being human is to exer-cise the capacity to seek the truth, the "whole good," the world of theGod(s).
In addition, leisure is "the disposition of receptive understanding, ofcontemplative beholding, and immersion—in the real" (Pieper, 1948/1998, p. 31). In order to cultivate the spirit, we must have leisure; thatwhich is not of the world of work, but co-exists and allows a transcen-dence of the environment. It is in these moments that we not only cansee beyond the functional, but we also serve a larger purpose in being atone with self and our connection to the larger world.
[T]o be human is: to know things beyond the "roof of the stars, to gobeyond the trusted enclosures of the normal, customary day-to-day real-ity of the whole of existing things, to go beyond the "environment" to the"world" in which that environment is enclosed. (Pieper, p. 94)
FestivalPieper (1963/1965) characterized celebration of the festival as the ulti-mate use of the freedom in leisure. Leisure is rooted in festival, or cel-ebration because in this context, "all three conceptual elements cometogether: the relaxation, the effortlessness, the ascendancy of'being atleisure'...over mere 'function'" (Pieper, 1948/1998, p. 50). Pieperbelieved that leisure finds its "innermost possibility and justification" indivine worship and claimed "there is no worship without the gods.. .a fes-tival that does not get its life from worship, even though the connectionin human consciousness be ever so small, is not to be found" (p. 51). Inhis book In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity (1963/1965),Pieper attempted to uncover the essence of festive celebration, its nec-essary qualities and contexts. In order to be festive, a celebration mustoccur as an exception, outside the realm of.the work-a-day life. Thisapplies equally to those immersed in a work culture and to the idle richwho had nothing but time on their hands; both would have difficultyfinding "exceptional" time and space. But Pieper cautioned that to trulyunderstand the essence of "festive," it must be considered in broaderterms than simply the opposite of everyday work or a break from work.The opposite of servile work, or the artes serviles is not inactivity or non-work, but the artes liberalis (free activity that is meaningful in itselfand serves no other purpose). Thus for an occasion to be festive "meansto do something which is in no way tied to other goals, which has beenremoved from all 'so that' and 'in order to'" (1963/1965, p. 7).
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So to be truly festive, an activity must be done for its own sake.The value lies within the activity itself, not in the outcomes it produces.This concept is not new in leisure studies, but is often under-empha-sized. It is frequently described as a defining characteristic of an activ-ity experienced as leisure, an activity done for its own sake. The freedomin leisure is that it is no longer bound to the criteria of work as the sourceof its value (effort, activity, social function). Research into the "why" ofhuman behaviour is very helpful for both researchers and practitioners.Understanding why people do what they do can assist in theory devel-opment and in facilitating needs satisfaction. But what is a researcher orservice provider to do when a respondent answers "just because?"Furthermore, where does one locate such an activity against the backdropof a world of work? How does one justify an activity that serves noother purpose than itself? Why is it so important, from Pieper's per-spective, to remove leisure from work as its source of meaning?
To find the answers, Pieper (1963/1965) suggested that an examina-tion of what is involved in the fulfillment of human life (i.e., the accept-ance of, and gratitude for, the gift of life) is necessary.
The traditional name for the utmost perfection to which man [sic] mayattain, the fulfillment of his [sic] being, is visio beatifica, the "seeingthat confers bliss." This is to say that the highest intensification of life, theabsolutely perfect activity, the final stilling of all volition, and the partak-ing of the utmost fullness that life can offer, takes place as a kind of see-ing; more precisely, that all this is achieved in seeing awareness of thedivine ground of the universe, (pp. 11-12)
This view predates the Christian tradition and can be found in Plato'sSymposium Diotima: "This is that life above all others which man [sic]should live, in the contemplation of divine beauty; this makes man [sic]immortal" (quoted in Pieper, 1963/1965, p. 12). According to Pieper, thedegree to which a person can "see" the "world," is also the same degreeto which that person engages in an act meaningful in itself. This "see-ing" requires a degree of contemplation, wherein the mind is not occu-pied by distracting thoughts, nor does the mind become distracted byengaging in intellectual analysis of the experience.
Acedia as a Barrier to LeisurePieper (1948/1998) discussed the concept of acedia as a barrier to the"receptive understanding" of leisure. In fact, Pieper (1948/1952) claimedthat acedia is contrary to leisure because it disrupts the human capacityto be at one with self. Acedia is the
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despair of not willing to be oneself which makes man [sic] unable to live withhimself. He is driven out of his own house—into the hurly-burly of work-
. and-nothing-else, into the fine-spun exhausting game of sophistical phrase-mongering, into incessant "entertainment" by empty stimulants—in short,into a no man's land which may be quite comfortably furnished, but whichhas no place for the serenity of intrinsically meaningful activity, for contem-plation, and certainly not for festivity. (Pieper, 1963/1965, p. 21)
Acedia was considered the most egregious of the eight types of evilthoughts (the others are gluttony, impurity, avarice, sadness, anger, vain-glory, and pride) in the monastic tradition of the Middle Ages (Bam-berger, 1970). It is important to note that these thoughts are a natural con-dition and cannot be avoided, however, these thoughts stir up passionsthat when acted upon, become sins, particularly in the case of acedia(Evagrius Ponticus, n.d./1970, DeSeille, 2002). Much has been writtenabout acedia, but its origins can be traced to the writings of Evagrius ofPonticus, a monk who lived in the latter half of the fourth century.
The Praktikos of Evagrius Ponticus (n.d./1970) was written inresponse to repeated requests for guidance regarding the problems andconcerns of the monastic life. The task of the monk was to attain a stateof apatheia through contemplation. Apatheia is described as a purity ofthe soul, a state of perfection wherein one could commune with God. Thepurpose of the demons (evil thoughts and sinful actions) was to impedeone's progress, to keep one from achieving that divine communion.Throughout the ages, acedia was described in a variety of ways andrecommended treatments were also varied and at times conflicting(Crislip, 2005). In the early period beginning in the fourth century, ace-dia was a vice, or undesirable "trait of character" that impeded themonastic's ability to achieve apatheia or communion with God. In thelate medieval period, it was reckoned that all Christians could and didexperience acedia, as the belief that "all offices, duties, and aims—notjust those of the contemplative—were understood as being 'in the serv-ice of God'" (Daly, 2007, p. 46). Daly further argued that the recogni-tion of acedia in the secular corresponded to the development of beliefin the fulfillment of an "inner-worldly" asceticism; the belief that humanscan and should discern and apply their human capacities to life on Earth.Evagrius encouraged introspection, a careful attention to one's thoughts,their intensity, their frequency, and the context in which they seem toarise. It is natural to experience these thoughts, but to fight them openlythrough discursive thought is also to give in to them because that isequally distracting (Laird, 2005). Thus, to give in to day-to-day distractions
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is to deny our human essence, our capability of experiencing both theearthly environment and the spiritual world.
While most of us do not aspire to live the austere lifestyle of depri-vation sought after by the monks, it is not a far stretch to imagine con-temporary situations where we feel just as the monks did; distractedfrom our purpose, bored, weary, and isolated. These feelings create asense of restlessness, which in turn leads to work for work's sake.According to the noon-day-devil, our lives would be so much easier,enjoyable, and successful if we gave up the quest for a spiritual connec-tion; the "ability to comprehend the world." Bartlett (1990) claimed thata society that values work and its outcomes (primarily material comfortand financial security) as the highest virtue is left culturally bankrupt,because it leaves no room for alternative values such as the value ofleisure. Leisure, conceived by the Scholastics, is associated with thecapacity of humans to cultivate spirituality and acknowledge their placein the universe "that contains both matter and 'higher values,' those that,transform his [sic] daily life and his [sic] human suffering" (Bartlett,p. 392). "Leisure is not the attitude of mind of those who actively inter-vene, but of those who are open to everything:... of those who leave thereins loose and who are free and easy themselves..." (Pieper, 1948/1952,p. 41).
Justification for a Leisure Ethic ,
Pieper (1948/1998) argued that leisure cannot be justified by equatingit with a break from work, even if we can document its recuperativebenefits. If contemporary leisure's value lies in its compensatory func-tion (i.e., its instrumental capacities), it simply reinforces and justifiesa work-dominated culture, rather than stands in opposition to it. In apopular children's nursery rhyme, Humpty Dumpty falls off a wall andcan't be put back together despite the best efforts of the king's horses andmen. In the context of utilitarian arguments, leisure can put HumptyDumpty back together again, but only in the context of the "environ-ment;" the day-to-day experiences that keep us functioning as produc-tive members of society. In this scenario, Humpty's shape, colour, socialrelations, etc., are a function of their usefulness to society. They are"real" but they are not the "truth" because they are rooted in the envi-ronment. Plato cautioned against accepting a facsimile as the "truth"(Hunnicutt, 1990) because it reduces the infinite to the finite. It reduceshuman's capabilities to the here and now, ignoring human's capacity tocomprehend both the spiritual and the mundane.
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Traditional leisure services based on a social planning model arepredicated on producing beneficial outcomes, implying an instrumentalfunction (means to an end). The "benefits approach" and "repositioning"of leisure services are examples of this approach. Recreation and leisureprograms and services are designed to provide a counterpoint to thestress of the work-a-day world, the contexts in which we find ourselvesthat drag us down and keep us from functioning productively. Leisure andleisure services, in this context, are valued only to the extent that partic-ipation requires effort and can be tied to some useful outcome, not theleast of which is recuperation from, and restoration for, work. In thissense, the "repositioning" of leisure services reflects jockeying withother social institutions and/or agencies for a coveted "position" as a rec-ognized and valued, effective and efficient, instrumental strategy foralleviating social ills.
However, solely arguing the position based on instrumental out-comes, leisure services may facilitate and might in fact lead us furtherinto a state of acedia. It is much easier to fill up our lives with additionalactivities, especially if they are touted as good for our mental and phys-ical wellbeing, or to disengage entirely from meaningful engagements,than to accept the challenge of being at one with ourselves and ourworld that leisure, as defined by Pieper, requires. In this sense, leisureservices address the economic and social causes of proletarianism, butdo little to address the inner impoverishment of humans.
Leisure's value, as characterized by a contemplative beholdingof the whole of experience, lies in its ability to celebrate humanity, i.e.,the identification, development, and affirmation of our human capac-ities. Leisure's value lies precisely in that it is an essential ingredientin living a fully human life, a life that utilizes the unique capabilityto comprehend the Divine. When we stop to analyze our experiencethrough rational thought, when we start consciously weighing theadvantages and disadvantages, beneficial or detrimental outcomes,etc. then it ceases to be leisure because we are judging its valueaccording to activity, effort, and outcome. This (over)analysis is pre-cisely what Evagrius warned against in his discussion of acedia.Engaging in continuous, discursive thought and deeds keeps us busy,but it interferes with simply "being." It is what it is, no more, no less.When we are no longer bound by this need to rationalize our behav-iours and thoughts, then we are at leisure. When we are in the moment,then we feel most alive—and it is good. It is the nature of humans toseek '"the whole good'—goodness so very good that there is nothing
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in it which is not good, and nothing outside of it that could be good"(Pieper, 1958/1998, p. 40).
From Pieper's perspective, arguing the value of leisure based onthe value of the functional outcomes it produces will never be success-ful because it ignores, and thus reinforces, the fundamental problem—a disconnection between human endeavours and the totality of the worldin which we exist, including, and most importantly, the spiritual realm.Leisure (i.e., "the disposition of receptive understanding, of contempla-tive beholding, and immersion—in the real" Pieper, 1948/1998, p. 31)is the basis of culture in that it occurs in a special place, time, and atti-tude to engage in cultivation of the spirit. In this way, humans can cometo know themselves and their world, to be closer to what God calls themto be. In leisure, people are free to examine what God calls them to bewithout being fettered to the process of working. The identification,development, and use of "god given" talents are, in effect, giving thanksto God for these gifts.
Acts that affirm our distinct human nature, (i.e., the capacity tocomprehend, through the use of the mind, both the environment and theworld) could be considered, in and of themselves, divine worship. Wor-ship of a creator is considered the ultimate expression of harmony in theworld; giving glory and praise to God for the gift of life. Inactivity, orexcessive activity that is firmly rooted in the environment, are an affrontto God because they reject the essence of what it means to be human.Pieper's argument for a leisure ethic is rooted firmly in its potential fora celebration of the spirit. The "first and original source" is both theessence and the origination of humanity, the gift of life, given by theGod(s). Leisure is reconceptualized in a time and space where humancapacities can be discovered without the burden of demonstrating theirvalue in the world of work, a time and space where humans can affirmthe gift of life. Leisure's value lies precisely in that it serves no other pur-pose than to reconnect with, to be at one with, the totality of humanexistence.
Pieper often began his essays with a caveat that what was to followwould certainly not provide a clear-cut solution to whatever issue orproblem he was to address. Rather, he wished to open the discussion,using the discipline of philosophy, to broader interpretations and thuspotential solutions. To define a problem as economic, social, or politi-cal, engenders economic, social, or political solutions. Similarly, thisessay does not provide a clear-cut solution or strategy for demonstrat-ing the value of leisure (e.g., a formula for calculating economic impact).
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However, examining the potential of leisure independent from the crite-ria of work allows for the development of strategies that address theinner impoverishment of humans against the backdrop of the "world"rather than the "environment." It offers an opportunity to "reposition"leisure, and its facilitation through leisure services, by reconsidering thevery "position" toward which we are aiming. Thus the educational taskbefore us is to argue the benefits of leisure for its own sake, rather thanits instrumental benefit in service to a work-determined environment.
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