ASSIGNMENT OF

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

BY GROUP V:

1. REZKI A. HANDARTA A1D208059

2. MISNAWATI NONSI A1D207053

3. SHELLY PURNAMASARI S A1D207017

4. FADRIANSYAH HANAFI AID207049

5. SRI HARTATI A1D207072

TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL FACULTY

HALUOLEO UNIVERSITY

KENDARI

2011

COHERENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF DISCOURSE

Coherence itself is a term for the complex of inferential processes that enable us to

produce discourse that others can make sense of and to interpret what others say. Coherence thus

depends on linguistic information instantiated in discourse, inferences we draw from this

information, presuppositional relations involved in linguistic cohesion, our situational knowledge

(represented in models such as frames, scripts, scenarios, and schemas), and our attitudes and

evaluations of these. The study of discourse in clinical contexts is a study of the breakdown, at

some level, of discourse coherence. Imaging studies over the last few years have made the

development of a model of discourse coherence for which the neural substrates are understood

begin to seem like an achievable goal (see e.g. Stowe et al. 2005; Ferstl et al. 2008; Mason and

Just 2007 for suggestive reviews). However, given the wide range of phenomena involved in

producing and interpreting discourse as coherent, and the potential configurations in different

disorders that could lead to impairment, isolating particular features contributing to perceived

coherence or incoherence is highly relevant in clinical settings.

REPRESENTING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

Artificial Intelligence : frames, scripts

Psychology : scenarios, schemata, mental models

FRAMES» Frames are representations of (culturally specific) knowledge and belief associated with events,

states or things. In early versions of frame theory, knowledge was assumed to be propositionally

represented and relatively static (e.g. Minsky 1975; van Dijk 2006).

Frames refer to information associated with situation specific concepts (Minsky 1975;

van Dijk 1977). For example, an event frame would include an event structure specification

familiar as predicate and participant role relationships and circumstances, and other information

such as social evaluations and logical conditions of the event and its participants. Frames are thus

a device for characterizing acquired attitudinal, encyclopedic and lexical knowledge.So, within

the script of going to the movies, we could postulate a frame for buying a ticket. This will

involve a buyer and a seller, a ticket and money (the predicate-argument relationship). It will

also include information that the ticket is likely made of paper and is required for admission to

the cinema and an expectation of cost. This can be represented in an argument structure type

format with typical default features and options included for arguments and circumstances.

Depending on the amount of detail one wants for the description, it may also include explicit

evaluations and conditions as propositions. Frames allow procedures called demons to be

attached to their slots greatly increasing the power of this knowledge representation method.

For example: frame for ‘buying a ticket to the movies’ (The superscripts are indices for the

direction of transfer in the BUY process, where the ticket goes from the seller/machine to the

movie goer and money goes from the movie goer to the seller/machine.)

SCRIPT» Scripts are representations of highly abstract generic structure potential associated with events

they delineate the inherent elements of events and their sequences (Schank and Abelson 1977).

Units of meaning consisting of sequences of events and actions that are related to

particular situations. For example a “restaurant script” is our knowledge that a restaurant is a

place where waitresses, waiters, and cooks work, where food is served to customers,and where

customers sit at tables, order food, eat, pay the bill, and depart. A person’s knowledge of this

“script” helps in understanding the following paragraph:

For example : “Tom was hungry. He went into a restaurant. At 8 p.m. he paid the bill and left”.

Although Tom was most probably shown to a table, sat down, ordered a meal, and ate it, these

facts are not mentioned in the paragraph. The reader’s knowledge of a restaurant script, i.e. the

usual sequence of events for this situation, provides this information. Script theory has been used

in studies of problem solving, reading, memory, and comprehension.

SCENARIO

» Scenarios were developed to refer to characteristic properties of situations that were not

necessarily represented in propositional form (Sandford and Garrod 1981).

Knowledge of settings and situations constitutes the interpretation behind the text. There

is overlap in what frames and scenarios describe insofar as they both refer to features of generic

situations such as participant roles. However, scenarios were originally posited to address

situational knowledge in non-propositional form, whereas frames presupposed relatively fixed

propositional knowledge (e.g. Kintsch 1974. But see also van Dijk and Kintsch 1983 where non-

propositional knowledge is not ruled out; and Kintsch 1988 where it is assumed though not

addressed because of the challenges it presented). Scenarios and frames also differ from each

other in that scenarios can be used to describe elements of ‘setting’ in the generic situation,

whereas frames characterize concepts relevant to such generic situations. Thus, a frame can be a

model that refers to concrete entities (theatre ticket), processes (buy ticket), abstractions such as

GAIN/LOSS, or emotions such as DEPRESSION/HAPPINESS, while scenarios will refer to

generic situation types such as at the restaurant, at the movies, in the classroom.

For example the scenario at the movies will include a film and possibly trailers (and increasingly

advertisements). Scenario at the movies:

• ticket booth at the entrance

• it will be dark

• it will be public

• there is seating with aisles separating the rows

• people may eat popcorn

SCHEMATA

» Schemata are similar representations but include abstract elements in different modalities such

as visual schemata for faces or houses, or discourse schemas for narrative such as those

articulated by Propp (1928), Barthes (1968) and Labov and Waletzky (1967), as well as

conventional and/or stereotypic conceptual organizations (Tannenand Wallat 1993).

Schemata serve as a reference store from which a person can retrieve relevant existing

knowledge and into which new information is assimilated. When encountering a topic in reading

or listening, the reader activates the schema for that topic and makes use of it to anticipate, infer,

and make different kinds of judgements and decisions about it.

Schemata imply a constructive process information from the discourse knowledge of the

past experience (related to the one at hand) to build a mental representation.

For example if there is different in schemas of people it will be easy to misunderstand each

other. When a person says "I like riding", referring to horse, another may think he is saying he

likes bicycle!

Like scripts and frames, schemas and scenarios facilitate contextualization and integration

processes. The variability and potential complexity of these models suggests that they are likely

to have widely distributed representations depending on their contents and the situations they

refer to. For example, in talking about the scenario ‘at the movies’, we used propositions such as

‘it will be dark’ and ‘people may eat popcorn’. This information though, might well be neurally

represented in regions associated with darkness and the sound, taste and smell of popcorn. So

what the scenario refers to may be a set of episodically encoded multi-modal experiences. We

may also know these as propositions but that is not necessary. In this respect, scenarios contrast

with frames which are assumed to refer to propositional information associated with semantic

memory. Similarly, schemas viewed as stereotypic expectations affecting interpretations of

situations may be difficult to distinguish from frames since they can be propositionally

represented. However, when the term schema is used to refer to highly

MENTAL MODEL

All mental models have a few key characteristics:

Mental models include what a person thinks is true, not necessarily what is actually true.

Mental models are similar in structure to the thing or concept they represent.

Mental models allow a person to predict the results of his actions.

Mental models are simpler than the thing or concept they represent. They include only

enough information to allow accurate predictions.

For example: if I tell you that I recently ordered a steak at a restaurant, you might assume that I

was met at the door by a host or hostess, seated, and presented with a menu. You assume these

details, and others, that I never actually mentioned because they have a mental model of how

restaurants operate. To illustrate the consequences of having a mismatched mental model, I

describe a person who goes into a buffet restaurant and waits for someone to take their order.

The person's mental model of how that restaurant operates doesn't match the actual situation, and

he would experience confusion and frustration until he modified his original model to include

buffets.