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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

Manila

REP. CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ (4th Dist., Cebu), HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, ALFREDO LIGON III, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, and CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,

X__________________________X

-versus-

Case No. ______________

Certiorari and Madamus under RULE 65

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of the 13th CONGRESS, represented by REP. JOSE DE VENECIA, Speaker of the House of Representatives and the COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, represented by REP. SIMEON DATUMANONG, Committee Chairperson,

Respondents.

X__________________________X

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P E T I T I O N FOR CERTIORARI

A. PREFATORY STATEMENT

1. Ours is a Constitution tempered by the fires of its time. Borne out of a long

struggle for freedom from Martial Law, it has given us a Supreme Court of

“innovation,”1 one that, in fact, is endowed with expansive powers of, and

yes, duty to, review cases and controversies.

2. Indeed, it is a Constitution that has entrusted upon our High Court “the

duty…to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been

a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”2

3. What we then have is a system of judicial review that, as the Supreme Court

has noted in one landmark ruling not too long ago, “broadens the scope of

judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,

would have normally left to the political departments to decide.”3

1See Tañada v. Angara,G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997. 2 CONST., art. VIII, § 1. 3 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 881211, September 15, 1989; 177 SCRA 695 (1989).

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4. Under this system, as Justice Roberto Concepcion, the principal proponent of

this innovation, would put it,

The judicial power is meant to be a check against all powers of government without exception, except that judicial power must be exercised within the limits confined thereto. A matter of national defense, national interest, national welfare is not necessarily beyond the jurisdiction of judicial power.4

5. The doctrinal reaffirmation of this bedrock principle of a constitutionally

canalized duty of judicial review finds a relevant restatement in a recent

landmark ruling that casts a long shadow over this instant Petition’s path:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases of its resolution...”5

6. Today, the duty of the Court to check the abusive acts of another branch of

government – in this case, the legislature, in what, in other jurisdictions,

would constitute a political question immune to judicial intervention – is

once again being invoked.

7. In this instance, the Petitioners argue that an impeachment proceeding

against the Chief Executive, though described by the same Constitution as

primarily an act of Congress, is not without well-defined constitutional

4 III RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 645-646 (1986). 5 Francisco, et al., v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.[Hereinafter, Francisco case].

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parameters; where those charged by the Constitution with the sole power to

prosecute an impeachable public officer–in this case, Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo, President of the Philippines – transgressed the bounds set by the

same Constitution for the exercise of such power, it would be a clear

“stultification” of its constitutional responsibility, to borrow from the

language of Justice Cardozo,6 if the Supreme Court refuses to lift a finger to

resolve a constitutional controversy of supreme transcendental and national

importance. 7

6 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92 (1921). 7 The point can well be seen in the following excerpts from a debate in the 1986 Constitutional Commission deliberations :

…MR. TREÑAS. Madam President, may I just ask a few questions of the Committee for clarification. According to Section 3, subparagraph 2, after a complaint for impeachment is filed, it is referred to the proper committee of the House for investigation and report. My question now is: If after the investigation and report, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence in support of the complaint for impeachment and taking into account political considerations, especially if it is an impeachment against the president and the House is controlled by his party, and necessarily the committee also, it is dismissed, the complaint is already denied, am I right? MR. ROMULO. Yes, that is right. MR. TREÑAS. Will the person who filed the impeachment have any remedy in view of the overwhelming evidence and the fact that the committee acted in a capricious and whimsical manner? MR. ROMULO. Under this proposal, the answer must be “no” that is why I think Commissioner Davide has some amendments in mind to cure these gaps in the procedure. MR. TREÑAS. May it not be subject of a judicial review?

MR. ROMULO. As the Commissioner knows, in the definition of judicial power, one might be able to secure a review by certiorari, but that is not an expeditious remedy. So, we are open to suggestions. II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 287 (1986). [underlining supplied].

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8. Once again, the Supreme Court is cast into the eye of a storm, as

“constitutional decision-making involves policy-making and, in that sense,

politics…”8

9. But as it fulfilled its constitutionally-mandated duty in the Francisco case,9

when the High Tribunal struck the impeachment proceedings against its very

Chief Justice, Hilario Davide Jr., as unconstitutional, so should it now

squarely confront this constitutional issue of transcendental ramifications on

our national life, and slay the hydra.

B. PARTIES

10. The Petitioner, Clavel A. Martinez (4th Dist. Cebu), is one of the members of

the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress who had sought to impeach

the President of the Philippines. She is an endorser of one of the

impeachment complaints – the amended one – in question in this instant case

and is filing this Petition on the legal doctrine that legislators have standing to

maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the

Constitution in their office,10 and are allowed to sue to question the validity of

any official action which infringes their prerogatives as legislators.11

8Vicente V. Mendoza, The Protection of Liberties and Citizen’s Rights: The Role of the Philippine Supreme Court, 21 HUMAN RIGHTS L. J. 129 (1999); also excerpted in VICENTE V.V. MENDOZA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 296 (2004). 9G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003. 10 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.138298, November 29, 2000. 11 Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995. See also Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No.155001, May 5, 2003.

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11. The Petitioners below, filing the instant Petition in propria personae, are

members of the Roque and Butuyan Law Offices. They are members in good

standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, who, as officers of the court,

and as taxpayers and citizens, have a direct interest in the faithful adherence

to constitutional processes of their elected representatives in Congress12:

11.1. Herminio Harry L. Roque Jr.;

11.2. Joel Ruiz Butuyan;

11.3. Roger R. Rayel;

11.4. Alfredo Ligon III;

11.5. Gary S. Mallari;

11.6. Romel Regalado Bagares; and

11.7. Christopher F.C. Bolastig. 12. Respondent, the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress, is represented

by Rep. Jose De Venecia, the incumbent House Speaker.

12 For one, their oath as lawyers obligates them to “support the Constitution.” Also, as held in the

Francisco case:

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statue or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. GR. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003. [emphasis supplied].

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13. Respondent, The Committee on Justice, is represented by Rep. Simeon

Datumanong, the incumbent Committee chairperson.

14. The Respondents may be served with court processes at the House of

Representatives, Batasan Complex, National Government Center, Quezon

City.

C. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 15. On June 27, 2005, lawyer Oliver Lozano filed an unverified complaint for

impeachment against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines

with the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress. hereinafter

ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT].13 It was endorsed by Rep. Rodante

Marcoleta of the Alagad party-list TWO DAYS LATER, on July 29, 2005t.14

16. On June 28, 2005 Lozano filed a supplemental complaint of the same date.15

17. On June 29, 2005, Lozano submitted to the House of Representatives a

second supplemental complaint of the same date.16

13 A copy of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX A. 14 A copy of the Marcoleta Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX B. 15 A copy of the [first] supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-1. 16 A copy of second supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-2.

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18. On June 30, 2005, he filed a third supplemental complaint of the same date.17

19. On the same day, lawyer Joselito Rizaldo Lopez filed a Motion and

Manifestation for Leave to be allowed to be a Co-complainant of Atty. Oliver

Lozano Relative to his Complaint for Impeachment of the same date.18

20. On July 4, 2005, Lozano filed a fourth supplemental complaint dated July 1,

200519, and a fifth supplemental complaint20 dated July 4, 2005.

21. On the same day, Lopez filed his own impeachment complaint, also

unverified, charging Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines,

with betrayal of public trust.21 [hereinafter, LOPEZ COMPLAINT]. The

complaint, curiously similar in language and substance to the ORIGINAL

LOZANO COMPLAINT, was endorsed by Rep. Antonio Alvarez (1st Dist.

Palawan).22

22. On July 5, 2005, Lozano submitted to the House of Representatives a sixth

supplemental complaint of the same date.23

17 A copy of the third supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-3.

18 A copy of the Lopez Motion and Manifestation is attached as ANNEX C.

19 A copy of the fourth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-4.

20 A copy of the fifth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-5. 21 A copy of the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX D.

22 A copy of the Alvarez Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX D-1. 23 A copy of the sixth supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-6.

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23. On July 18, 2005, Rep. Rolex Suplico endorsed the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT.24

24. On July 19, 2005, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines filed

through lawyer Pedro M. Ferrer an Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam

dated July 18, 2005[hereinafter, ANSWER].25

25. On July 21, 2005, Lozano filed a seventh supplemental complaint of the same

date.26 It should be stressed that none of the seven supplemental complaints

was endorsed.

26. On July 25, 2005, at 8:01 a.m., House Speaker De Venecia referred to the

Secretary General of the House of Representatives the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT, the resolutions for endorsement filed by Rep. Marcoleta and

Rex Suplico, along with other documents:27

27. That same day, at around 9:30 a.m. members of the Minority bloc in the

House of Representatives, party-list representatives, and joined by concerned

private citizens filed an AMENDED COMPLAINT before the Office of the

24A copy of the Suplico Resolution of Endorsement is attached as ANNEX B-1. The Committee on Justice puts it at July 14, 2005. See infra note 36, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 at 2. 25 A copy of the ANSWER is attached as ANNEX E.

26 A copy of the seventh supplemental complaint is attached as ANNEX A-7.

27 A copy of the Speaker’s Memorandum to the Secretary General dated July 25, 2005 is attached as ANNEX F.

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Secretary General of the House of Representatives.28 Lozano himself joined as

a complainant in the AMENDED COMPLAINT, with a signed verification.

28. The same day, in a meeting of the House of Representatives in plenary the

Secretary General, upon direction of the Speaker of the House of

Representatives read on First Reading the three complaints,29 simultaneously

referring all three complaints to the Committee on Justice.

29. On July 26, 2005, the Deputy Secretary General of the House of

Representatives subsequently transmitted all three complaints – the

ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, the AMENDED COMPLAINT, and the

LOPEZ COMPLAINT – in one bundle of papers to the Committee on Justice,

which simultaneously received them at 4:20 p.m. of the same day.

30. On the same day, July 26, 2005, Lopez filed a Motion and Affidavit of

Withdrawal/Desistance.30

28 A copy of the AMENDED COMPLAINT is attached as ANNEX G. The complaint carried the heading thus: “In Re Impeachment of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President, Republic of the Philippines.” 29A copy of the Journal records containing the pertinent information is attached as ANNEX G-1 [H.R. JOURNAL, 13th CONG. 2d Sess. 17-18 (July 25, 2005)]. See also ANNEX G-2, a copy of the Order of Business of the House of Representatives in plenary, for July 25, 2005, under the section Reference of Business, through which the three complaints were simultaneously referred to the Committee on Justice. 30 A copy of the Motion and Affidavit of Withdrawal is attached as ANNEX H-4

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31. On August 1, 2005, the House of Representative sitting in plenary adopted a

new set of Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings [hereinafter,

RULES OF PROCEDURE].31

32. On August 3, 2005, Lopez filed a Rescission of Withdrawal.32

33. On August 10, 2005, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines,

filed through her lawyer a Motion to Strike of the same date.33

34. It was also the same day the Committee opened its first hearing of the

impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the

Philippines.

35. Instead of immediately determining the sufficiency of form and substance of

the three complaints, the Committee chairperson, Rep. Simeon Datumanong,

(2nd Dist. Maguindanao), allowed Rep. Edcel C. Lagman (1st Dist. Albay) to

present a list of seven “prejudicial questions”, 34 to wit:

31 A copy of the RULES OF PROCEDURE is attached as ANNEX F-1. 32A copy of the Rescission of Withdrawal is attached as ANNEX H-5. 33 A copy of the Motion to Strike is attached as ANNEX I. 34 A copy of the Lagman list of “prejudicial questions” is attached as ANNEX J.

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35.1. Was the amended complaint which was filed on 25 July 2005

properly or seasonably interposed or is it a prohibited pleading under

Article XI of the Constitution and the pertinent Rules on Impeachment of

the House of Representatives?

35.2. Considering that the amended complaint was file don 25 July 2005

when the House had not yet adopted the Rules of Procedure on

Impeachment in the 13th Congress, under what standard or rule should

the filing of the amended complaint be assessed?

35.3. Since the amended complaint radically and substantially

supplanted the original Lozano complaint, should it be considered as a

separate, independent and new complaint?

35.4. If it is considered a separate or new complaint, is it barred by the

one-year rule which provides that “no impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one

year.35

35.5. How will the amended complaint be assessed under the standard or

definition of initiating impeachment proceedings in the case of Ernesto B.

Francisco Jr., et al. v. House of Representatives, et al.,36?

35Rep. Lagman referred to CONST. Art. XI, § 3(5) here. 36G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.

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35.6. Did the amended complaint supersede the original Lozano

complaint so much so that the Lozano complaint will be subsumed under

the amended complaint and considering further that Atty. Oliver Lozano

signed the verification attached to the amended complaint thereby giving

his conformity to the amended complaint?

35.7. What is the import and effect of respondent’s filing of an early

answer on the amended complaint?

36. In that same hearing, Rep. Datumanong also raised the following issues:

36.1. Whether or not to consider the impeachment complaints one by

one as referred by the House;

36.2. Whether or not to consolidate the complaints like bills of the same

subject matter pending before a Committee of the House;

36.3. What is the effect of the Amended Complaint, which was the third

to be referred by the House to the Committee, on the first complaint of

Atty. Lozano?37

37 These issues were reflected in the Agenda sent out by the Committee the next day, along with a Notice of Meeting, see infra note 38.

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37. However, before the Committee on Justice could discuss the “prejudicial

questions” and Rep. Datumanong’s above-quoted issues, the hearing was

suspended after members of the Minority bloc in the Committee, led by Rep.

Suplico, questioned the chair’s ruling that that only regular and ex officio

members of the committee will be allowed to participate in the debates.

Thereafter, the chair moved for an executive session to resolve the

controversy.

38. On August 11, 2005 the Committee on Justice sent out notices to its members

regarding two hearings set for August 16-17, 2005, along with the Agenda for

the hearings.38 Without the prior approval of the members of the Committee

on Justice, Rep. Datumanong included in the Agenda, the above-quoted

issues and Rep. Lagman’s “prejudicial questions”.

39. On August 16, 2005, despite the objections raised by many members of the

pro-impeachment bloc, the chairperson, Rep. Datumanong proceeded with

deliberations on the “prejudicial questions”.

40. The next several hearings of the Committee on Justice was marked by

protracted debates on the propriety of deliberating over the “prejudicial

questions”, with the majority, by sheer force of number, prevailing over the

minority when it came to a vote, 54-24, on August 23, 2005.

38A copy of the Notice of Meeting is attached as ANNEX K ; a certified true copy of the Agenda is attached as ANNEX K-1

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41. In the end, the Committee on Justice whittled the “prejudicial questions”

down to two – questions that would prove prejudicial to the AMENDED

COMPLAINT: (a) Is the AMENDED COMPLAINT filed on 25 July 2005 a

separate and new complaint instead of amendatory to the Lozano complaint

filed on 25 July 2005 a separate and new complaint instead of amendatory to

the Lozano complaint filed on 27 June 2005? (b) Did the Lozano complaint

bar the Lopez complaint and the AMENDED COMPLAINT pursuant to Art.

XII § 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution?39

42. On August 30, 2005, members of the minority walked out of the hearing of

the Committee on Justice, denouncing it as a “sham proceeding” and

declaring that they will no longer participate in the deliberations.

43. This came after Rep. Datumanong moved to finally put to a vote the first

prejudicial question on whether the amended impeachment complaint is

separate and distinct from the one originally filed by Lozano against Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, over objections raised by

members of the minority that the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT was a

“sham” complaint.

44. Rep. Datumanong also denied an appeal made by Rep. Robert Ace Barbers

(2nd Dist. Surigao Del Norte) to defer the voting and allow him to speak on a

revelation made by former Social Welfare Secretary Dinky Soliman at a press

conference in Makati City that morning that the ORIGINAL LOZANO

39 See ANNEX L, infra, at 13.

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COMPLAINT was part of a plot by Malacañang to preempt a genuine

impeachment proceeding against the President.40

45. The walkout did not deter the majority in the Committee on Justice from

continuing with the proceedings and voting on the two prejudicial questions.

46. Despite the absence of member of the minority in the proceedings, the

Committee on Justice (a) voted 46-0, with one abstention, to declare the

ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT as being sufficient in form; and (b) voted

49-1, with two abstentions, to declare the same complaint insufficient in

substance.

47. By the first vote, the Committee on Justice held the AMENDED

IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT as separate and

distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and deemed these two

other complaints as barred by the ruling of the Supreme Court in the

Francisco case. By the second vote, the Committee on Justice effectively shut

down the impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

President of the Philippines.

40For an account of the walkout and the subsequent events involving the Committee on Justice, see Alecks Pabico,“Lutong Makaw” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), August 30, 2005, available at http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=343 <last visited September 20, 2005>; and Alecks Pabico, Lozano Complaint “Sufficient in Form, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), August 31, 2005, available at http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=349 <last visited September 20, 2005>.

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48. The decision – by vote of the majority – of the Committee on Justice (a) to

treat the AMENDED COMPLAINT and the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from each another; (b) to dismiss the

AMENDED COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT for supposedly being

barred by the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and eventually, (c) to

dismiss the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT for being insufficient in

substance despite being sufficient in form was carried, among other matters,

in a Committee Report subsequently transmitted to the House of

Representatives sitting in plenary.41

49. The dispositive portion of COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 reads thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the Committee on Justice finds, resolves and concludes that: 1. The “Amended Complaint” which was filed on 25 July

2006 is a new and separate complaint which is not merely amendatory to the “Lozano Complaint” which was filed on 27 June 2005;

2. The “Lozano Complaint”, having been filed and referred

to the Committee on Justice or initiated before the “Lopez Complaint”, which was filed on 04 July 2005, and the “Amended Complaint”, which was filed on 25 July 2005, barred the two subsequent complaints pursuant to the one-year bar rule provided for in Section 3(5) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution;

3. The “Lozano Complaint,” while sufficient in form, is

deficient in substance; and

4. The “Amended Complaint” and the “Lopez Complaint” are dismissed for being prohibited complaints and the “Lozano Complaint” is dismissed for not being sufficient in substance.

These dispositions confirm the Committee Report approved in principle by the requisite majority on 31 August 2005.

41 A certified true copy of the H.R. REP. No. 1012 (Sept. 5, 2005) is attached as ANNEX L.[Hereinafter, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012).

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It is further recommended that this Committee Report and its accompanying Resolution be approved in a Plenary Roll call vote pursuant to Section 3(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.42

50. On September 6, 2005, the House of Representatives by a vote of more than

two-thirds of all its Members, decided to affirm the action and report of the

Committee on Justice. The House of Representatives voted 158-51, with six

abstentions, to approve COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, dismissing all three

impeachment complaints filed before the chamber.43

51. Under the Rules adopted on October 27, 2004 by the House of

Representatives [hereinafter, HOUSE RULES] to govern its proceedings,

when a measure is adopted or lost, a member of the committee who voted

with the majority, may move for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding

day. The HOUSE RULES only allows one (1) motion for reconsideration.44

52. The opportunity to revive the impeachment proceeding against Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, came on September 19, 2005,

when the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress resumed session.

42 COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 33-34. 43 A certified true copy of the record of proceedings of the House of Representatives voting in plenary to ratify and accept COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 is attached as ANNEX M. In any case, this matter can well be considered as one of public record, and of judicial notice. See also the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) blog entry, by Alecks Pabico, A Death Foretold, for a news report of the results of the vote, available at http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=367 <last visited September 5, 2005>. It must also be said that members of the pro-impeachment bloc had vigorously objected to what they said was the questionable manner in which it was drafted. 44HOUSE RULES, Chap. IX, § 39.

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53. However, a lack of quorum barred the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration

as so described in the HOUSE RULES.45 It in effect made such filing moot

and academic.

45 This is now a matter of judicial notice. For an account of what transpired at the House of Representatives on that day, the Petitioners reproduce here in full the following newspaper article regarding the matter: Lack of House quorum foils effort to revive impeachment

Lack of quorum in the House of Representatives during yesterday’s resumption of sessions effectively barred pro-impeachment lawmakers from reviving their junked complaint against President Arroyo, effectively burying the issue six feet under. Only 104 of the 236 members of the chamber showed up yesterday, which forced Congress to adjourn the session shortly before 5 p.m. Some 50 House members are still out of the country, mostly in New York where they attended the United Nations summit. The absence of deliberations in the House plenary prevented a member of the majority, whom members of the minority were banking on, to raise a motion for reconsideration on the Sept. 6 historic ruling that voted 158-51 to junk the complaints. Under the rules, any congressman who voted in the majority (neither of the opposition nor one of six lawmakers who abstained) can raise the appeal on the next session day immediately after voting was completed, or yesterday. "Procedurally, the impeachment is dead. And Congress can do nothing about it," House Minority Leader Francis Escudero acknowledged to reporters, at the same time warning Mrs. Arroyo that the issue will continue to "haunt and hound" her wherever she goes. His colleague, Cibac party-list Rep. Joel Villanueva, son of evangelist Bro. Eddie Villanueva who also joined calls for Mrs. Arroyo’s ouster, said this has always been the majority’s tack, to win on technicalities. "It’s always been a technical knockout." Pro-impeachment Rep. Rolex Suplico of Iloilo City questioned the way in which Congress computed the quorum, saying the 50 lawmakers abroad should be excluded from the computation because they cannot be compelled to attend sessions. "The computation should be 236 minus 50, which equals 186, divided by two, then 93 comes up, then you add one. That’s 94," he stressed, citing a precedent in jurisprudence, Avelino vs Cuenco. Chances of bringing the case to the Supreme Court, according to San Juan Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, head of the impeachment legal team, are also nil, following the dismissal of two separate petitions filed by lawyers Oliver Lozano and Ernesto Francisco Jr. "We’re looking at a people’s tribunal or people’s court. Of course, we also don’t want to have a kangaroo court. That’s what we are discussing right now. It’s not extra-constitutional but I don’t think there’s something illegal about it," he said. Sorsogon City Rep. Escudero said the challenge now is for Mrs. Arroyo to

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D. NATURE OF THE CASE

54. This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the RULES

OF COURT.

55. This Petition asks of this Honorable Court to nullify the constitutionally

contemptible acts of the Committee on Justice as embodied in COMMITTEE

REPORT 1012, and their affirmation by the House of Representatives of the

13th Congress, voting in plenary, and to direct the House of Representatives to

designate her legal team to defend her on charges that she cheated her way to victory in the May 2004 polls. The opposition may only file another impeachment petition a year from now.

‘Wishful thinking’ Administration lawmakers, meantime, described as "wishful thinking" attempts by their opponents to revive the impeachment complaint, as the 158 congressmen who voted to dismiss the complaint remain "solid." "No amount of propaganda or bluffing can persuade anyone from the majority to support the complainant’s bid to reverse the House decision," Eastern Samar Rep. Marcelino Libanan said. "There is no chance the pro-impeachment group can convince anyone from the anti-impeachment congressmen to move for reconsideration. The 158 votes are still solid," he added. Davao del Sur Rep. Douglas Cagas urged their colleagues instead to focus on their legislative priorities. "The pro-impeachment group should stop living in the past and thinking of what-might-have-beens." "The nation needs to focus on urgent problems and concerns. Surely the pro-impeachment solons did not run for office just to oust the President. They should not be too obsessed with this undertaking," he said. As this developed, the fate of Ilocos Norte Rep. Imee Marcos and her status in the House minority bloc is still undecided as Escudero said their reorganization depends on the "movements" of those in the majority, who may also purge their ranks. The daughter of the late strongman is in danger of losing her membership on the powerful Commission on Appointments, the lone slot provided to the minority bloc, following her mysterious absence during the historic House plenary voting junking the impeachment complaint. See Delon Porcalla, Lack of Quorom Foils Effort to Revive Impeachment, The Philippine Star, September 20, 2005, available at http://philstar.com/philstar/News200509200403.htm <last visited September 20, 2005>.

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remand the AMENDED COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice for a

constitutional determination of its sufficiency of form and substance.

56. The Petitioners, on account of the instant suit’s urgent, novel and

transcendental nature, assert that there is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

E. TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

57. On September 7, 2005, the Petitioners received a certified true copy of

COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, of the Committee on Justice dated September 5,

2005. Subsequently, on September 8, 2005, the Petitioners received a

certified true copy of record of the questioned plenary vote.

58. Under Rule 65, § 4 of the RULES OF COURT, the Petitioners have sixty (60)

days from the date of the questioned acts or the date of receipt of the

questioned documents within which to file this Petition to question

COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 and the plenary vote made to affirm and accept

its findings and conclusions.

59. This Petition is therefore, filed on time. The corresponding docket and other

lawful fees and deposit for costs are paid simultaneously with the filing of this

Petition.

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F. SUBMISSIONS

I. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISCUSS “PREJUDICIAL AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS” AHEAD OF A DETERMINATION OF THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE THREE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE.

II. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO TREAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT THE DEFECTIVE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE THE LOPEZ COMPLAINT, IT BEING FRAUGHT WITH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITIES, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.

III.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS A PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER THE RULING IN THE FRANCISCO CASE WHEN IT IS CLEAR THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE VARIOUS APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE ONE-YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL BAR DOES NOT APPLY.

IV. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY AND THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE REFUSED TO PERFORM A POSITIVE DUTY THE CONSTITUTION DEMANDS OF THEM IN THE CONDUCT OF AN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING.

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F. DISCUSSION I. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012,46 TO DISCUSS “PREJUDICIAL AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS” AHEAD OF A DETERMINATION OF THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE THREE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE.

60. It should be stressed that neither the Constitution nor the RULES OF

PROCEDURE allows deliberations on “prejudicial questions” in an

impeachment proceeding. In fact, the rules only provide a two-stage process

of deliberation on the sufficiency of any impeachment complaint: the first

being sufficiency as to form, and the second being sufficiency as to substance.

These are the only threshold matters to be deliberated upon by the Committee

on Justice on the sufficiency of an impeachment complaint, nothing more,

nothing less.47

61. By interjecting deliberations on “prejudicial questions” prior to a

determination of form and substance, the majority in the Committee on

Justice amended the RULES OF PROCEDURE. The RULES OF PROCEDURE

was approved by the plenary; these rules cannot be amended by the sheer

action of the majority in the Committee on Justice. Consequently, the

Committee on Justice exceeded its authority and violated the Constitution, for

more than amending the RULES OF PROCEDURE, by majority vote, the

Committee on Justice amended the Constitution itself when it provided for a

46 COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 13-22. 47See RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE III § 4.

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deliberation on prejudicial questions ahead of a determination of form and

substance of the complaints.48

62. “It is a proposition too plain to be contested,” so said a path-breaking ruling

that established the historic basis of the power of judicial review, “that the

constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or that the legislature

may alter the constitution by an ordinary act…”49

63. It went on thus:

Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the

48 Under the HOUSE RULES,

Standing and special committees may adopt their own rules by a majority vote of all their members, Provided, That these are consistent with these rules and will not expand or in any way alter their jurisdictions as provided herein. See HOUSE RULES, Chap. IX, § 34.

The HOUSE RULES moreover provides that,

Any provision of these Rules, except those that are also embodied in the Constitution, may be amended by a majority vote of all the Members of the House. See HOUSE RULES, Chap. XXV, § 150.

It is clear that granting that the Committee on Justice may amend the RULES OF PROCEDURE, it may not amend such rules where to do so would go against the provisions of the Constitution setting the parameters within which it may deliberate in the case of a pending impeachment proceeding. 49Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1903), as excerpted in MENDOZA, supra note 8, at 11.

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part of the people, to limit a power in its nature illimitable…50

64. Moreover, “prejudicial questions” are plainly improper in impeachment

proceedings before the Committee on Justice that, under the RULES OF

PROCEDURE, only have jurisdiction, at that juncture, to tackle questions of

form and substance.

65. Allowing the discussion of “prejudicial questions” is a legal anomaly and can

only stem from a gross misunderstanding of criminal procedure as applied in

an impeachment proceeding.

66. In fact, any sophomore law student worth her salt knows what a prejudicial

question is all about. An eminent scholar of legal procedure, Prof. Antonio

Bautista, correctly describes the existence of “prejudicial question” as a

situation when,

The same or similar issue, factual, or legal or mixed, may be raised in a pending civil litigation and in a pending criminal prosecution. Each court which has jurisdiction over the civil case and/or the criminal action is competent to adjudicate this issue….51

67. The REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [hereinafter, RULES OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] have outlined the elements of this doctrine of

prejudicial question in this wise:

50Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1903), as excerpted in MENDOZA, supra note 8, at 11. 51Antonio R. Bautista, Precedence and Pre-Emption in Adjudication: The Doctrine of “Prejudicial Question,” 78 PHIL.L. J. 1 (2003).

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Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. –A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed..”52

68. The most cursory reading of these sections of the RULES OF COURT will

show that no such “prejudicial question” exists in the impeachment

proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.

69. The majority in the Committee on Justice has conveniently forgotten that this

is an impeachment proceeding. As such, it is sui generis. 53

70. It must be said that suspiciously, the “prejudicial questions” raised by Rep.

Lagman, along with the other arguments raised in COMMITTEE REPORT

1012 against the AMENDED COMPLAINT, all sound strikingly similar to

52RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 111, § 6 and § 7. 53See the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Reynato Puno in the Francisco case, where he says:

…I therefore respectfully submit that there is now a commixture of political and judicial components in our reengineered concept of impeachment. It is for this reason and more that impeachment proceedings are classified as sui generis. To be sure, our impeachment proceedings are indigenous, a kind of its own. They have been shaped by our distinct political experience especially in the last fifty years… See G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.

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those found in the ANSWER and the MOTION TO STRIKE filed by the

President’s lawyer, Pedro M. Ferrer. In the first place, as raised in the

deliberations of the Committee on Justice by many of the endorsers and/or

complainants, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has no legal standing yet to appear

before the Committee on Justice. The pertinent provision of the RULES OF

PROCEDURE adopted by the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress

provides thus:

Section 5. Notice to Respondent and Time to Plead. If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice that he shall answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant or complainants. No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.54

71. Indeed, both the Constitution and the RULES OF PROCEDURE prohibit the

filing of any pleading by the Respondent until after the Committee on Justice

has made a determination on the sufficiency of any impeachment complaint

with respect to form and substance.55 At this point in the impeachment

process, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has no personality to appear by counsel.

She as yet has no locus standi. Both the Answer and the Motion to Strike are

functus oficio, mere scraps of paper.

72. At any rate, a prejudicial question goes into the heart of substance. Under the

54 RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III § 5.[italics supplied] Just like the procedure in preliminary investigation in ordinary criminal cases, the Committee on Justice, which acts as the investigating prosecutor, shall determine on its own whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If it is determined to be sufficient, then the respondent must file his answer, not a motion to dismiss. 55 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III § 4 and § 5.

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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and jurisprudence, a prejudicial

question is no mere procedural matter but deals with a substantive issue

determinative of the guilt of an accused in a criminal proceeding.56 In fact, it

can well be said that a prejudicial question deals with the issue of jurisdiction,

one that, under the RULES OF PROCEDURE, is clearly a matter of substance.

As the pertinent provision of the RULES OF PROCEDURE puts it:

Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.57

73. Therefore, the House of Representatives in plenary committed a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ratified by a

vote of 158-51 the decision of the Committee on Justice, as recorded in

COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, to discuss “prejudicial and threshold questions”

56As the existence of a civil case is often held as a defense in a criminal proceeding involving the same issue, or at the very least, as something determinative of whether or not the criminal action may proceed. See the discussion in Bautista, supra note 51, at 10. The scholar of procedural law himself proposes to do away with the doctrine altogether. In his study of the doctrine, he made the following conclusion:

…The doctrine of prejudicial question serves no useful purpose. The specter of confusing rulings on the same issues is just that –a specter…[T]he doctrine has conduced to much harm and unnecessary litigation over elusive and conceptually befuddling issues of sameness, determinativeness and precedence…It would be best to do away altogether with the doctrine of prejudicial question. Let the criminal court decide the issue regardless of whether the same or similar result is contemporaneously litigated in a civil action. There is no good reason for the criminal court, which may even be the same court, to defer to the civil court. Bautista, supra note 51, at 24-25.

If that is so, this Honorable Committee will have done well to simply disregard these supposed “prejudicial and threshold” issues raised by the Respondent, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and get on with its duty to determine the sufficiency of form and substance of the three complaints now before it. 57RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III § 4(b).

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ahead of a determination of the form and substance of the three impeachment

complaints, in violation of the Constitution and the RULES OF PROCEDURE.

II. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO TREAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT THE DEFECTIVE ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WHILE THE LOPEZ COMPLAINT, IT BEING FRAUGHT WITH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITIES, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT. The ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT is stricken with a basic jurisdictional defect – it was not endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives of the 13th Congress at the time it was filed.

74. A most basic consideration must not be glossed over: at the time the

ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT was filed, it did not have the endorsement

of a member of the present House of Representatives.

75. This is a jurisdictional defect that effectively deprives the House of

Representatives of any jurisdiction over the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT.

76. Art. XI § 3(2) of the Constitution provides that:

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A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. [emphasis supplied].

77. In the case of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, the endorsement

by Rep. Marcoleta only came into the scene TWO DAYS LATER. This is

a fatal law that effectively deprives the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT of any legal personality and effect.

78. The Constitution provides that the impeachment complaint may be

filed by a citizen “upon a resolution of endorsement”58 by any member

of the House of Representatives. The endorsement must come with the

filing of the complaint, otherwise the complaint becomes stricken with

a fatal jurisdictional defect. A reasonable construction of this

constitutional requirement cannot agree with a situation where the

endorsement came after the filing of the complaint. This is a provision

evidently placed there by the framers of the Constitution as yet another

check against frivolous impeachment complaints.

58 CONST. Art. XI § 3(2).

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In sheer bad faith, the Committee on Justice, by a majority vote, insisted on the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT when its members knew the complaint was stricken with yet another jurisdictional defect: it was not properly verified.

79. The Constitution, which has established the parameters for the conduct of

impeachment proceedings, requires a verification for any impeachment

complaint to be valid, as can be seen in the following pertinent provisions of

the Charter:

…A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof…59 …In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed…60

80. The RULES OF PROCEDURE adopted by the House of Representatives of the

13th Congress unequivocally requires that an impeachment complaint be

verified:

59 CONST. art. XI, § 3 (2) [emphasis supplied]. 60 CONST. art. XI, § 3(4) [emphasis supplied].

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Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. -

Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent

referral to the Committee on Justice of:

(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or;

(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.61

81. Moreover, the RULES OF PROCEDURE specifically outlined the form of the

verification in this wise:

…The contents of the verification shall be as follows: We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state. That we are the complainants in the above-entitled complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto…62

82. In the case of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its supplements,

none of them has been properly verified at all.

61 RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE II, § 2. [emphasis supplied]. A verification, according to case law, is “intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations…” See Robern Dev't. Corp. v. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150, 159 (1999). 62 RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE IV, § 13.

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83. Instead, each of these pleadings only carried what amounts to a JURAT

usually found at the end of an affidavit, which is subscribed and sworn to

before a Notary Public.63

84. To illustrate, the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT only bears the following

statement at the end of the document:

…SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of June 2005, in Quezon City. I certify that I personally examined the affiant who understood and voluntarily executed his affidavit…64

85. Hence, it strains the credulity of ordinary citizens that despite this fatal

infirmity found in the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its

supplements, the Committee on Justice, through a majority vote, insisted that

the complaint is sufficient in form.

63 In contrast to the verification, a jurat "is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to before him… It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was properly made”…Buenaventura v. NBP Officials, G.R. No. 114829 March 1, 1995, citing Theobald v. Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208; Young v. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694; and LORENZO M. TAÑADA & FRANCISCO A. RODRIGO, MODERN LEGAL FORMS, VOL. I, 31 (6th ed., 1985). The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the jurat in this wise: It is an act in which an individual on a single occasion,

appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

64 ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, at 5. All the supplemental complaints Lozano filed also carried the jurat, and not a verification. The records of the Committee on Justice will readily bear out this fact.

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86. Yet it is not surprising that the Majority in the Committee on Justice

preferred the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT – its defects and infirmities

are an assurance that the President will not be impeached and convicted. It is

crystal clear that it cannot even pass the test of form, precisely because it has

not been properly verified.

87. Hence, COMMITTEE REPORT 1012 could say with some air of nonchalance

and without any legal basis at all, that since Lozano is a member of the

Philippine Bar, “his signature as a lawyer suffices [sic] a verification because

he was the one who prepared the complaint in his own behalf, not for his

client…”65 Certainly, a JURAT could not be considered substantial compliance

to the requirement that the complaint be verified.

88. Accordingly, it was in sheer bad faith that the Committee on Justice insisted

that it first tackle legally and constitutionally impermissible “prejudicial

questions” in order to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT.

89. This strategy concocted by the tyranny of numbers in the Committee on

Justice for the eventual rejection of the AMENDED COMPLAINT is clearly

seen in its decision to first consider purportedly “prejudicial questions” ahead

of a constitutional determination of the form and substance of the complaints.

65COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 23.

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90. Consequently, with the AMENDED COMPLAINT later dismissed, along with

the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, as a prohibited pleading, the Committee on Justice

then supposedly reviewed the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its

supplements, for a determination of substance, and thereafter dismissed it as

well.

91. Whether as a result of harried oversight or out of a desire to project some

measure of deliberative due process to the public, the Committee on Justice

actually passed upon matters of substance found in the AMENDED

COMPLAINT, and this, in the absence of any hearing at all where the

complainants were allowed to present evidence on these matters. 66

The LOPEZ COMPLAINT is fraught with even graver infirmities – flaws that render it, like the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and its supplements, constitutionally and procedurally infirm.

92. The LOPEZ COMPLAINT fares worse than the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT. Lopez labeled his complaint a “verified” one, which is farthest

from the truth, as the records of the House of Representatives, and its

Committee on Justice, will bear out. Like the ORIGINAL LOZANO

66See COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, at 29-30.

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COMPLAINT and its supplements, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT only carried a

JURAT. 67

93. In fact, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is stricken with other formal and

substantive defects. For one, some three weeks after it was filed, or on July

26, 2005, the complainant withdrew the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, citing “poor

health” as a reason.

94. Then, on August 3, 2005, the complainant filed a pleading of the same date

styled as a “Rescission of Withdrawal” with the House of Representatives,

saying that “[a]fter due consideration, and after having been advised by well

meaning friends that my participation in the proceedings is an imperative

duty as a law-abiding citizen, I have decided to rescind my withdrawal.”

95. Hence, we have a LOPEZ COMPLAINT riddled with the following infirmities

(a) the complainant did not properly verify it; (b) he subsequently withdrew it

on July 26, 2005, or a day after it was referred along with the two other

complaints to the Committee on Justice; (c) he changed his mind and on

August 3, 2005, he filed with the Committee on Justice a “Rescission of

Withdrawal.”

67 The jurat in the LOPEZ COMPLAINT states thus: “SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4 July 2005 in Quezon City. I hereby certify that I have personally examined the Complainant/Affiant who understood and voluntarily executed this Complaint/Affidavit…”at 11. For all intents and purposes, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT is a mere restatement of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT.

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96. Under the RULES OF PROCEDURE, a complaint found to be insufficient in

form shall be referred back to Secretary General, with a written explanation of

insufficiency. The Secretary General then returns it to the complainant along

with the committee’s explanation.68

97. Three reasons prevent the LOPEZ COMPLAINT from acquiring any legal

validity at all in the present impeachment proceeding.

98. In the first place, the complainant withdrew it.

99. In the second place, having withdrawn it, he cannot have the House of

Representatives re-institute it by the mere expediency of filing a “Rescission

of Withdrawal” for the reasons that (a) there is no such rescission under

either the Constitution or the RULES OF PROCEDURE, or even the 1997

REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [Hereinafter, RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE] or RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] and (b) granting that

such a rescission is allowed, the re-institution will still be of no legal effect

because the LOPEZ COMPLAINT has not been properly verified. In other

words, he cannot re-institute a complaint that cannot at all have any legal

effect because of a formal and jurisdictional infirmity.

68 The pertinent provision states thus: - “…Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant or complainants together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form…”RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE III, § 4.

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100. In the third place, while the complainant may in fact reformulate his

complaint to comply with the verification requirement, he may no longer file

the reformulated complaint within the same year because it will be barred by

the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Francisco case considering the

existence of the Amended Complaint, which alone meets formal and

substantive requirements of the Constitution of the three impeachment

complaints, as will be shown in the succeeding sections of this pleading.

Under the Constitution, the issue of verification of an impeachment complaint is jurisdictional. In the absence of a proper verification in an impeachment complaint, the Committee on Justice cannot take cognizance of it. 101. That the presence (or absence of) verification in an impeachment

complaint is a jurisdictional matter is clearly borne out in the language of the

Constitution. It speaks of a “verified”69 complaint.

102. The verification of an impeachment complaint is a formal requirement

that cannot be dispensed with. The Constitution specifically provided that an

impeachment complaint must be “verified”. Without a proper verification,

there can be no valid impeachment complaint. Without a proper verification,

the House of Representatives cannot assume jurisdiction over an

impeachment complaint. Under the Constitution, the RULES OF

6969 See CONST. art. XI, § 3 (2) and (4).

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PROCEDURE, the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and jurisprudence, the

JURAT as used in the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ

COMPLAINT cannot be considered as substantial compliance with the

verification requirement.

103. The RULES of PROCEDURE,70 in keeping with the Constitutional

mandate, simply re-stated the verification requirement. For the integrity of

the impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives to be honored,

the verification requirement must be complied with. In the absence of this

jurisdictional fact, any impeachment complaint is a mere scrap of paper.

Under the Constitution, the RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, the AMENDED COMPLAINT has already superseded the ORIGINAL LOZAN COMPLAINT and its supplements. 104. In the United States, the impeachment proceeding is likened to a grand

jury proceeding.71 In the Philippines however, the Constitution explicitly

provides that the House of Representatives has the sole power to initiate

impeachment complaints.72 Moreover, the RULES OF PROCEDURE provide

that the House of Representatives, through the Committee on Justice,

70 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE II, § 2 and RULES OF PROCEDURE, RULE IV, § 13. 71 State v. Leese, 55 NW 798; 63 Am. Jur. 2d sec. 174. 72CONST. art XI, § 3.

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determines the existence of probable cause.73 As such it acts as the Office of

the Prosecutor.

105. The procedure for the determination of an impeachment complaint’s

sufficiency of form and substance is therefore akin to that of the Preliminary

Investigation and related matters74 undertaken by the Office of the

Prosecutor.

106. The RULES OF PROCEDURE allows this:

The Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court

shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment

proceedings before the House.75

107. It is noteworthy that the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and not

those of RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is invoked in the impeachment

proceeding in a suppletory manner.

108. With this in mind, it is easy to see why the argument about the need for a

leave of court before an amendment of the impeachment complaint can be

made is patently erroneous.

73RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III § 4-§ 8. 74See RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rules 110 to 127. 75RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule VII, § 16.

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109. Anyone vaguely familiar with the conduct of preliminary investigation

before the Office of the Prosecutor knows that complainants may amend,

alter, withdraw or substitute their complaint-affidavit at will prior to filing of

the information.

110. In fact, in criminal procedure, even after the filing of the information in

court, the Prosecutor may amend it in form or in substance without leave of

court, provided that the accused has yet to be arraigned. The pertinent

provision of the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE thus provides:

…A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused…76

111. For this reason, the AMENDED COMPLAINT supersedes the ORIGINAL

LOZANO COMPLAINT and its supplements.

112. Do the changes made by the Amended Complaint prejudice the rights of

the Respondent, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? This question is improper and

premature, for the determination of sufficiency in form of the AMENDED

COMPLAINT. The question goes into the substance of the AMENDED

COMPLAINT.

76 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110 § 14.

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113. In any case, the amendments were introduced prior to the determination

of sufficiency of form and substance. Thus, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

President of the Philippines, could not claim that she was prejudiced as she

can still file her ANSWER. Moreover, the inclusion of the additional offenses

in the AMENDED COMPLAINT does not increase the penalty against her.

The AMENDED COMPLAINT is the only complaint that complies with the formal and substantive constitutional requirements for a valid impeachment complaint.

114. In the instant case, the joint verification executed by the complainants in

the AMENDED COMPLAINT states:

1. We are Complainants in this case; 2. We have read the contents of this Complaint and affirm that the allegations therein are true and correct to the best of our own personal knowledge and/or based on authentic records.

115. Notwithstanding the variance in the language used by complainants, their

joint verification clearly complies with the RULES OF PROCEDURE.

116. The joint verification executed by complainants, in fact, adheres to the

stricter requirement imposed by the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.77

77 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 7, § 4.

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Hence, it is based not only on complainants’ “knowledge and belief” but

specifically on their “personal knowledge” and/or “on authentic records”.

117. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the

allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the

imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good

faith.78

118. Rules of procedure are used to help secure and not override substantial

justice. Since rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment

of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in

“technicalities” that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice

must always be avoided.79

119. At any rate, no fault lies with the complainants in following the more

stringent requirements of the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE since the

House of the Representatives had yet to adopt its rules on impeachment at the

time their amended impeachment complaint was filed. At the very least, the

verification in the AMENDED COMPLAINT may well be taken as substantial

compliance with the RULES OF PROCEDURE.

78 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003; Torres, et al. v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 149634, 6 July 2004). 79 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146923, 30 April 2003.

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120. Clearly, the House of Representatives in plenary committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ratified by a

vote of 158-51, the decision of the Committee on Justice by majority vote, and

as recorded in COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, to treat the AMENDED

COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT, considering that the defective ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT has already been superseded by the AMENDED COMPLAINT

while the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it being fraught with procedural and

substantive infirmities, IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.

III. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RATIFIED BY A VOTE OF 158-51, THE DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE BY MAJORITY VOTE, AND AS EMBODIED IN COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, LIKE THE LOPEZ COMPLAINT, AS A PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER THE RULING IN THE FRANCISCO CASE WHEN IT IS CLEAR THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE VARIOUS APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE ONE-YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL BAR DOES NOT AT ALL APPLY.

90. Considering that the AMENDED COMPLAINT has already superseded

the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT and the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it

being of no legal effect because of procedural and substantive

infirmities, the Francisco case80 does not apply in the present

impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of

the Philippines.

80G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.

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91. As the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE applies in an impeachment

proceeding, the amendments made on the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT have a retroactive effect, such that the resulting

AMENDED COMPLAINT is deemed filed on the same date as the

superseded ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT.

92. For this reason, the LOPEZ COMPLAINT, it having been filed

subsequent to the ORIGINAL LOPEZ COMPLAINT, is barred under the

Francisco case.

93. In the alternative, assuming that the AMENDED COMPLAINT is

treated as separate from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, since

all three complaints were referred to the Committee on Justice at the

same time anyway, the bar in the Francisco case81 does not apply.

94. In the Francisco case, this Honorable Court, in interpreting Art. XI, § 5

of the Constitution, held that an impeachment proceeding is deemed

initiated upon the filing of an impeachment complaint and its referral to

the Committee on Justice. This Honorable Court thus ruled,

…Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the

81G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003.

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filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period…82

95. All three complaints concerned, though filed on different dates, were

referred by the House of Representatives in plenary to the Committee on

Justice on the same day on July 26, 2005, and were received by the same

Committee on Justice at about the same time.83

96. For this reason, Petitioners also argue that in this instant case, there

really is only one impeachment proceeding to speak of, with three

impeachment complaints directed at the same impeachable officer,

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.

97. The impeachment proceeding is too important to be allowed to

degenerate into a contest of who files first; Yet, the Committee on

Justice’s constitutionally contemptible acts have precisely that effect; it

has conflated “proceeding” with “complaint” so that the constitutionally

sacrosanct procedure to remove from public office perfidious

impeachable officials of the land becomes open season to the

unscrupulous, of whom this country unfortunately does not seem to

82 G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003. 83 See ANNEX G-2, a copy of the Order of Business of the House of Representatives in plenary, for July 25, 2005, under the section Reference of Business, through which the three complaints were simultaneously referred to the Committee on Justice.

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lack. In fact, according to former Social Welfare Secretary Dinky

Soliman, this is what happened here: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

President of the Philippines, had a direct hand in the filing of a “friendly”

impeachment complaint – the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT –

ahead of the others, to ensure that she is not impeached. A copy of her

affidavit on this matter is attached to this Petition as ANNEX N.

98. But this is how constitutional law scholar, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., sees

things:

…[W]e next look at what the Constitution prohibits. It prohibits the initiation of more than one "impeachment proceeding." It does not necessarily prohibit more than one complaint. More than one complaint would be prohibited only if the multiple complaints would require more than "one proceeding." But if they can be logically and conveniently combined into one proceeding, there would be no violation of the Constitution.

In the current controversy, the so-called "amended complaint" and the Lopez complaint, both transmitted on the same day to the Justice Committee together with the Lozano complaint, are nothing more than "bills of particulars" to accompany the Lozano complaint. They both elaborate on the one constitutional offense of "betrayal of public trust." For constitutional purposes, therefore, what is being initiated is only "one proceeding involving one complaint but with an extended bill of particulars...84

IV. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PLENARY AND THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE REFUSED TO PERFORM A POSITIVE DUTY THE CONSTITUTION DEMANDS OF THEM IN THE CONDUCT OF AN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING.

99. Under Rule 65, when any tribunal, corporation or board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law

84Fr. Joaquin Bernas, Betrayal of Public Trust, Inquirer News Service, August 21, 2005, available at http://news.inq7.net/opinion/index.php?index=2&story_id=47628&col=136 <last visited, September 7, 2005>.

48

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or

unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or

office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved

thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts

with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the

respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the

court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the

petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason

of the wrongful acts of the Respondent.

100. As discussed above, there is no preliminary stage to determine the

existence of “prejudicial questions” or issues in the impeachment

proceedings as outlined in the Constitution and the RULES OF

PROCEDURE.

101. Upon referral to it by the House of Representatives sitting in plenary,

the Committee is duty-bound to conduct hearings to determine the

sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints referred to it in

an impeachment proceeding. Indeed, there is no half-way stage between

such referral and the determination of sufficiency of form and substance.

102. In the instant petition, Petitioners are prejudiced by the unconstitutional

act committed by the House of Representatives in plenary when it

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ratified by a vote of 158-51 the constitutionally contemptible decision of

the Committee on Justice (a) to amend by a majority vote the

constitutional provisions outlining the duty of the same Committee in an

impeachment proceeding, that is, to determine the sufficiency of form

and of substance of an impeachment complaint; in this case, the

Committee on Justice added a preliminary stage by deliberating on so-

called “prejudicial questions” ahead of the constitutionally prescribed

duty of the Committee to determine the sufficiency of form and

substance of the complaint;(b) to treat the AMENDED COMPLAINT as

separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT, and

(c) to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT as being constitutive of an

impeachment proceeding barred under the Francisco case when, of the

three complaints, it was the only one that met the constitutional

requirements of sufficiency of form and substance, besides the fact that

all three complaints, in the very first place, were referred by the House of

Representatives in plenary to the Committee on Justice and therefore

constitute a single impeachment proceeding.

103. The Petitioners have a real interest in how the House of Representatives

in plenary and the Committee on Justice carried out their

constitutionally-mandated duty to determine the sufficiency in form and

in substance of the AMENDED COMPLAINT brought against Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.

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104. The Petitioners respectfully submit that the exclusive power to initiate

impeachment cases lodged by the Constitution before the House of

Representatives refers to that legally mandated ability of the House of

Representatives alone to accept, act on, investigate and decide on any

and all complaints for impeachment that comply with the requirements

set by the Constitution.

105. The Petitioners respectfully submit that the grant of that power to the

House of Representatives is not a grant of an unbounded and absolute

discretion to exercise that legally mandated ability. Such power, such

ability, is, as it has always been, coupled with the bounden duty to

exercise the same pursuant to the purposes such power has been

designed to address and within the limits set under the Constitution.

106. As such, that exclusive power carries with it or includes the positive duty

to accept, act on, investigate and decide preliminarily the merits of the

charges in any complaint or complaints that may be filed before it, much

like the judicial power which “includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies…”85

107. Indeed, the Petitioners’ right to file an impeachment complaint against

an impeachable official in one impeachment proceeding has been

85 CONS. Art. VIII, § 1(2).

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arbitrarily denied them when the Committee on Justice dismissed the

AMENDED COMPLAINT in a capricious, arbitrary, whimsical, and

unconstitutional manner and when the House of Representatives in

plenary, voting 158-51, ratified such a constitutionally contemptible act.

108. The denial of their right is a direct injury that must be immediately

redressed, if their constitutional right is to be protected and upheld.

109. In the case of the Petitioner, Rep. Martinez, the Supreme Court itself has

this to say,

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.86

110. For what the Committee on Justice did was to resort to the most absurd

of technicalities to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT but was liberal

in its acceptance of the ORIGINAL LOZANO COMPLAINT as being

sufficient in form. What resulted was a most farcical exercise worthy of

the theatre of the absurd, except that the most cruel joke was inflicted

on a public hungry for the truth about the serious allegations being

raised in the impeachment proceeding against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

President of the Philippines.

86 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.138298, November 29, 2000.

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111. What the Constitution demands is a liberal approach to the

impeachment proceeding – one that would work for the interest of

justice, truth and fairness. As Constitutional Commissioner Christian

Monsod stressed in a sponsorship speech in one of the 1986

Constitutional Commission deliberations:

…MR. MONSOD. Madam President, With respect to the section on impeachment, we would like the honorable Commissioners to note the inclusion of the Ombudsman among the officers that are subject to impeachment, and the addition of betrayal of public trust as aground for impeachment. This is derived from a resolution of Commissioner de los Reyes. In the section on the procedure for impeachment, we were benefited by the suggestions and advice of the honorable President of the Commission. The principal author of this section is Commissioner Romulo. What we seek to institute here is a more liberal interpretation of the impeachment procedures in order to avoid, for example, the deadlock which happened in the last Batasan. While incorporating the procedures arising from the bicameral nature of the future legislation, the body will note that we provided here that a majority of the Members of the House can initiate impeachment upon vote. But what is important is that any Member of the House or any citizen can file a verified complaint. We used the majority rule of the House, although in 1973 the provision was for 20 percent of the Members of the National Assembly. In that case since it was unicameral, the trying body was also the National Assembly. In the 1935 Constitution, the rule was two-thirds of the House may initiate impeachment proceedings and three-fourths of the Senate shall convict. However, in our proposal, majority of the Members of the House may initiate and two-thirds of the Senate shall convict. This is one section on which we would like to consult with the Members of this body. This is a very important provision, and we would be advised by the consultations and wisdom of this body with respect to this provision, particularly on the numbers and vote necessary to initiate, to try or to convict...87

87II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 265 (1986).

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112. Clearly, this is a matter of national interest, involving a transcendental

issue; as the people of the Republic have an unmistakable constitutional

right to demand of their representatives in public office, especially of the

President, to conduct themselves according to the democratic idea that a

public office is a public trust, so do they have an unmistakable interest in

the faithful performance by their elected representatives in Congress of

their duty to investigate an impeachable officer in an impeachment

proceeding according to well-defined constitutional parameters.

113. The Petitioners are therefore, entitled to a writ of mandamus directing

the Respondent House of Representatives to remand the AMENDED

COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice so that the Committee on

Justice, in turn, may proceed forthwith to a constitutional determination

of its sufficiency of form and substance.

G. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

114. Clearly, the House of Representatives, when it ratified by a vote of 158-

51 the constitutionally contemptible acts of the Committee on Justice as

recorded in COMMITTEE REPORT 1012, committed an

unconstitutional act – a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or

excess of jurisdiction.

115. It exercised constitutionally-granted power in a despotic manner by

reason of passion or personal hostility which is so patent and so gross as

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to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform

that act enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.88

116. Indeed, the Committee on Justice by majority vote, seconded by the

House of Representatives in plenary by a vote of 158-51, rushed to make

the unjust decision without fear of its consequences, and, having made

an unjust decision, mulishly argued to justify the decision in order to

prevail.89

117. It is the bounden duty of this Honorable Court to resolve such a conflict

where “the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases of its

resolution.”90 In the words of Dean Pacifico A. Agabin, another noted

scholar of constitutional law,

…[T]he basic understanding behind our politico-legal culture is that the function of our electorally accountable legislative branch is to make policy choices; the function of our electorally accountable executive branch is to administer policy choices; and the function of our electorally unaccountable judicial branch is merely to enforce policy choices. Proceeding from this premise, it becomes clear that it is the duty of our Supreme Court to enforce policy choices, especially if these are provided for in the fundamental law…[I]t must now follow that it is the legitimate duty of the judiciary to enforce policy which has been constitutionalized by the people. It must be granted that policies constitutionalized by the people constitute valid delegations of power to the Supreme Court, which it cannot shirk to enforce if its members are to be true to their oath to support the constitution…91

88 Alafriz v. Nable 72 Phil 28O. 89 That is, to paraphrase the words of the ancient Jewish sages commenting in the Talmud on the nature of presumptuous judgment. See THE LIVING TALMUD: THE WISDOM OF THE FATHERS AND ITS CLASSICAL COMMENTARIES 164 (Goldin, ed., & trans., 1957) 90 Francisco, et al., v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160206, November 10, 2003 91 Pacifico A. Agabin, Judicial Review of Economic Policy under the 1987 Constitution, 72 PHIL. L.J 176, 184 (1997)

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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioners respectfully

pray that this Honorable Court nullify the act of the House of Representatives in

plenary ratifying by a vote of 158-51, with six abstentions, the constitutionally

contemptible decision of the Committee on Justice by majority vote (a) to

discuss “prejudicial questions” ahead of a constitutional determination of

sufficiency of form and of substance of the three complaints, (b) to treat the

AMENDED COMPLAINT as separate and distinct from the ORIGINAL LOZANO

COMPLAINT, and (c) to hold the AMENDED COMPLAINT as a prohibited

pleading under the High Court ruling in the Francisco case.

Moreover, the Petitioners pray of this Honorable Court, after due

deliberation, to direct the House of Representatives, through the Office of the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, to remand the AMENDED

COMPLAINT to the Committee on Justice so that it may proceed with a

determination of the sufficiency of its form and substance according to the

Constitution and the various applicable rules of procedure.

Makati City for the City of Manila, September 21, 2005.

ROQUE AND BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES Unit 1904, Antel 2000 Corporate Center No. 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village Makati City

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By:

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR. PTR No. 0008545, 1.7.05, Makati City IBP No. 499912, 1.25. 00, Lifetime Roll no. 36976

JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN PTR No. 0008546 , 1.7.05, Makati City IBP No. 500459, 1.25. 00, Lifetime Roll no. 36911

ROGER R. RAYEL PTR No. 6317921, 3.25.05, Quezon City IBP No. 638438, 02159, Lifetime, Quezon City Roll No. 44106

ALFREDO C. LIGON III Roll. 47533 IBP No. 638441, 1.7.05, Makati City PTR No. 009175, 1.4.05, Makati City

GARY S. MALLARI Roll No: 48459 PTR No. 0009170, 1.7.05, Makati City IBP No. 638439, 1.14.05, Q.C. ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES PTR No.0016687, 1.7.05, Makati City` IBP No 638442, 1.14.05, SocSarGen Chapter Roll No. 49518

CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG PTR No. 01080825, 8.3.05, Makati City` IBP No 638442, 1.14.05, Samar Roll No. 50862

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COPY FURNISHED: REP. JOSE DE VENECIA SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BATASAN COMPLEX, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER QUEZON CITY REP. SIMEON DATUMANONG CHAIRPERSON COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BATASAN COMPLEX NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER QUEZON CITY