Resilience of Coal Transport on the Three Rivers Waterway System Ryan S. Engel, LCDR, USCG TJ Clement, MAJ, USA Naval Postgraduate School OA4202 Network Flows and Graphs Course Project November Background - Pittsburgh PITTSBURGH 2 nd Largest Inland Port in the U.S. 20 th Largest Port in the U.S. Produces 25% of U.S.s steel $9 Billion of goods annually 200 River Terminals 2 Commodities through Pittsburgh 50% of the U.S. electricity comes from Coal Steel Production Requires Coal Coke Power Plants use Coal Lignite 13.6 Million TONS of Coal Annually 3 Multi-Modal Coal Transport Transport Mode:National Cost: ** Barge$.005 / ton-mile Rail$.05 / ton-mile Truck$.10 / ton-mile ** To be visited later 4 Cargo Capacity Comparison Source: Port of Pittsburgh website 5 Study Area 6 Pittsburgh Allegheny River Monongahela River Ohio River Braddock Lock & Dam Emsworth Lock & Dam Lock & Dam 2 Demand Supply 7 Supplies and Demands Terminals:Tons of Coal / weekSupply/Demand Gulf Materials (Mon)14.0K Demand Neville Island (Ohio)10.7K Demand Rivers: Allegheny:In: 30.0KDemand Out:0.62KSupply Net29.4KDemand MonongahelaIn:101.5KDemand Out:137.4KSupply Net:36.90KSupply Ohio:In:112.9KDemand Out:123.6KSupply Net:10.7Supply * Assumption:1 Commodity 8 Study Area Pittsburgh Allegheny River Monongahela River Ohio River Braddock Lock & Dam Emsworth Lock & Dam Lock & Dam 2 Demand = Supply = Lock and Damn = 9 Normal Operation Coal primarily moves by barge (least expensive) Movement is constrained by capacities River segments Locks and dams Terminal crane and lift operations System flow is driven by supply and demand Objective of System: Minimize overall transit cost Meet demand for coal 10 What Can Go Wrong Blockage on river segment Loss of function at Lock or dam Contingencies Move Coal by rail Subject to Offloading capacities at terminals Increased distances and costs Objective: To minimize overall cost 11 How to Model Min cost flow problem: Use a mixed integer linear program Quantify Costs:** Barge = distance x 1 Rail = distance x 2.5 Truck= infeasible Quantify Capacities** Terminal offload =1 million tons a year Railroad offload =4.25 million tons / year Waterway =f(distance, bridge delay, shipment size) Objective: To minimize overall cost given attacks on system ** To be revisited 12 Original Network Diagram 13 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE MONT JS TURR GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON AZCN BLM2 BLM1 Network Model River Route Railroad Route River Node Land Node (6.2, 4536) (12.1, 4536) (35, 81.7) (47.8, 81.7) (5,81.7) (47.8, 81.7) (35, 81.7) (46.3, 81.7) (5,81.7) (7, 4536) (1, 4536) (0, 336) (1, 4536) (0, 336) (0, 1134) (1, 4536) (0, 19.2) (1, 4536) ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE MONT JS TURR GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON AZCN BLM2 BLM1 Normal Operations River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Cost 452 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE MONT JS TURR GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON AZCN BLM2 BLM1 #1 Worst 1-Arc Attack River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Cost 1026 ALLE JS River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Cost 1022 #2 Worst 1-Arc Attack ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT AZCN MONT GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON BLM2 BLM1 Comparing 1-Arc Attacks PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE JS AZCN River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Cost 1026 MONT GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON BLM2 BLM1 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT GTS1 MRIE NISI #1 Worst 2-Arc Attack PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE JS AZCN River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Arc Defense Cost 1026 MONT GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON BLM2 BLM1 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT GTS1 MRIE NISI #2 Worst 2-Arc Attack PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE JS AZCN River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Arc Defense Cost 1934 MONT GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON BLM2 BLM1 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT GTS1 MRIE NISI #1 Worst 3-Arc Attack PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE JS AZCN River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Arc Defense Cost 1263 MONT GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON BLM2 BLM1 ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT GTS1 MRIE NISI #2 Worst 3-Arc Attack ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE MONT JS TURR GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON AZCN BLM2 BLM1 River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Arc Defense Cost 25,838 #1 Worst 4-Arc Attack ELM1 ELM2 ELA1 ELA2 OHIO OHT NISI GTS1 MRIE PTPT LD22 LD21 ALLT ALLE MONT JS TURR GTC BCBT BLA2 BLA1 MON AZCN BLM2 BLM1 River Route RR Route River Node Land Node Arc Attack Arc Defense Cost 2337 #2 Worst 4-Arc Attack Cost vs. Number Attacks ,837 25 Cost vs. Simultaneous Attacks 25,837 26 Cost vs. Simultaneous Attacks Things to be Revisited Assumptions: Use of net flow for the locks and dams - Coal in and out is not distinguishable Option: Use a multi-commodity for each river Timeline = 1 Week Other timelines may have varying delays in the arc. Attacks would need to be recalculated Costs: Railway 2.5 times more expensive in our model. 28 Summary Notable Results: 1 Attack on the waterway doubles the cost 4 Attacks on system has enormous economic impact Coast Guard defends most critical 4 arcs: The system is resilient Future Study: Validate assumptions Implement multi-commodity flow Broaden study area 29