respondents memorial (1) (1).doc

===============================================================MOOT COURT MEMORIAL

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Index of Authorities………………………………………………………..Pg 1

Indian Cases ……………………………Pg 1

Books ……………………………Pg

Dictionaries ……………………………Pg

Statuary Compilations ……………………………Pg

Internet Sites ……………………………Pg

2. List of abbreviations ……………………………Pg

3. The Statement of jurisdiction ……………………………Pg

4. The Statement of Facts ……………………………Pg

5. The Statement of Issues ……………………………Pg

6. The Summary of Arguments ……………………………Pg

7. The Arguments Advanced ……………………………Pg

8. The Prayer ……………………………Pg

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Indian Cases

BOOKS

o Basu’s ., The Indian Penal Code ,1980 Volume-2, 9th ed., New Delhi, Ashok Law

Agency, 2006.

o Batuklal’s., Commentary on The Indian Penal Code, 1908 Volume -2, 1st ed., New

Delhi, Orient Publishing Company, 2007.

o Batuklal’s., Commentary on The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Volume -1,

4th ed., New Delhi, Orient Publishing Company, 2007.

o Gaur, H.S., The Indian Penal Code, Allahabad, Dwivedi and Company, 2004.

o Kelkar, R.V., The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, 4th ed., Lucknow, Eastern

Book Company, 2004.

o Rantanlal and Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, 17th ed., Nagpur,

Wadhwa and Company, 2004.

o Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal code, 31st ed., Nagpur, Wadhwa and

Company, 2006.

o Sarkar’s, S.C., Commentary on The Indian Penal Code, Volume-4, Allahabad,

Dwivedi Law Agency, 2006.

o Tandon’s, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 16th ed., Allahabad, Allahabad

Law Agency, 2006.


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Dictionaries

1. Garner, Bryan A., Blacks Law Dictionary, 11th ed USA, West Publishing Co., 1999.

2. Hornby, AS. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English 6 th ed New York,

Oxford University Press, 2002.

3. Pant, Prafulla C. Legal Dictionary, 2nd ed Allahabad, Modern Law Publishing House,

2004.

4. Sethi, R.P., Supreme Court on Words and Phrases (1950-2004), New Delhi, Ashoka Law

House, 2004.

5. Simpson, J.A. and Weiner, CSC, Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed Oxford, Clarendon

Press, 2004.

6. Soanes, Catherine and Stevenson, Angus, Oxford English Dictionary of English. 2nd Ed

New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2004.

7. Webster, New International Webster’s Dictionary and The saurus of the English

Language, USA, Trident Press international, 2002.

Statuary Compilations

Indian Statutes

The Code of Criminal Procedure ,1973

The Indian Penal Code ,1860

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Internet Sites

http://www.findlaw.com

http://www.lawfinder.com

http://www.indlawinfo.org


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http://www.indlawinfo.org/

http://www.lawfinder.com/

http://www.findlaw.com/


=============================================================== http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com

http://www.lexisnexis.com

http://www.manupatra.com

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

All Allahabad

Bom Bombay

Cal Calcutta

Co. Company

CPC Civil Procedure Code

Del Delhi

ed Edition

e.g. Exemplum gratia

Guj Gujarat

HC High Court

i.e. id est (that means)

Ker Kerela

Ltd Limited

Mad Madras


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http://www.lexisnexis.com/

http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com/


===============================================================Nag Nagpur

No. Number

Ori Orissa

P. Page

Para Paragraph

Paras Paragraphs

Pat Patna

PP. Pages

Raj Rajasthan

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme court cases

UOI Union of India

V Versus

Vol Volume


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THE STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION


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THE STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. That Prasada Rao And Krishna Rao belong to the same village, and are landlords

and leaders of two opposing political parties.

2. That in the election concluded in the month of April,2009 Prasada Rao lost

elections to Krishna Rao.

3. That on the night 13-5-2009 Seerenu and four others are accused of attacking

Krishna Rao who was sleeping in the corridor of his house and killing him.

4. That then the assailants broke open a door of the house, entered the house of

Krishna Rao and looted gold, money and other valuables and in the process have

caused serious injury to the wife and children of Krishna Rao.

5. That thereafter his wife gave an FIR on the bases of which a case was registered

against Parsada Rao and Others and after conducting investigation a chargesheet

was filed against all the accused.


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THE STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Whether the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence under

section 396IPC read with sections 111 and 112 IPC?

2. Whether the accused are liable to be prosecuted for the offence of murder?


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THE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Whether the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence under



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THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE No. 1 Whether the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence under


1.1 PRESENCE OF ACCUSED NOT ESTABLISHED

Arguments on behalf of Accused No.1 Prasad Rao

It is humbly submitted that the accused Prasad Rao is not liable to be convicted for the

offence under section 396 IPC read with sections 111 and 112 IPC. The Burden of proving the

liability of the accused is upon the prosecution and the prosecution has miserably failed to

discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt. Even as per the prosecution’s case the Accused

Prasad Rao cannot be made liable for the offence under section 396 as according to the

Prosecution’s version it is alleged that the Accused Prasad Rao gave money to the other accused

to eliminate Kishan Rao nothing has been alleged in the facts as to any direction given by the

Accused Prasad Rao to commit offence under section 396 IPC.

Section 396 IPC clearly states that “If any one of five or more persons, who are

conjointly committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those

persons shall be punished with death, or 1[ imprisonment for life], or rigorous imprisonment for

a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Dacoity is defined in Section 391, Indian Penal Code as under:--

"When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the

whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons

present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so

committing, at tempting or aiding, is said to commit 'dacoity' ".


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The essential ingredients of the offence of dacoity, therefore, are that five or more

persons should be concerned in the commission of the offence and they should either commit or

attempt to commit a robbery.

Offence of robbery is defined in Section 390. Robbery is a special and aggravated form

of either theft or extortion. The chief distinguishing element in robbery is the presence of

imminent fear of violence. Section 390 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under: -

In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. Theft caused by the presence of a number

of offenders. Abettors who are present and aiding when the crime is committed are counted in

the number of persons or offenders.

In the case in hand even as per the prosecution’s version Prasad Rao was nowhere present

in the vicinity of the place where the offence was committed and nothing has been produced on

record to show that accused Prasad Rao in any manner aided in the commission of offence under

section 396 IPC. Section 396 IPC uses the term persons ‘present and aiding’, no evidence to

that effect has been led by the Prosecution to show that accused Prasad Rao was present at the

place of incident and aided in commission of offence. Even as per the prosecution version

accused Prasad Rao was never present at the place of offence.

Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Abdul Wahed Akunjee v. State of W.B.1 held that

“27. The main question for consideration regarding the pending appeals would

be whether the appellant Jagannath Roy, Manoj Singh and Abdul Hai Gayen took part in

commission of the dacoity as alleged by the prosecution witnesses and as sought to be

proved by the prosecution through its evidence both oral and documentary.

28. It is established position of law that to prove a charge under section 395 of

the IPC the prosecution must establish from cogent and convincing evidence that the

1 (2006) 3 CHN 331 at page 337


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===============================================================appellants were present at the place of occurrence where the dacoity took place and they

took active part in commission of dacoity and this point can be proved by the witnesses

who had the opportunity to see the miscreants on the spot and who could identify the

miscreants soon after the occurrence through T.I. Parade and also during trial by

pointing out the appellants as the persons who were present during commission of

dacoity and who took active part in such commission of dacoity”.

Further in Kallu Alias Ramkumar vs State Of Madhya Pradesh2 Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High

Court observed that

“This witness had identified all the five accused persons during the test

identification parade, but, the evidence of test identification parade will be accepted only

against those accused persons against whose overt act this witness had stated in the

Court. He has not stated about the specific overt act of accused Kallu and Barelal.

Thus, evidence with respect to accused persons other than Gabbar alias

Goverdhan and Chhotu alias Dayaram (Kallu alias Ramkumar, Barelal and Sukhram)

appears to be shaky. The mere statement of P.W. 6 Anant Sharma about the presence of

accused Kallu and Barelal, in the absence of any evidence of overt act, and further in the

absence of evidence of other witnesses referred above, cannot be made the basis for

conviction…………….

However, the accused-appellants Kallu alias Ramkumar, Barelal and Sukhram

are entitled to benefit of doubt, as their presence during the incident and their overt act

has not been proved so as to warrant their conviction.”

Hence the above stated judgments clearly lays down that it is for the prosecution to

establish the presence of accused at the place where offence was committed and his actual

participation in the commission of offence. Even as per the prosecution’s version Prasad Rao

was not present at the time when alleged offence under section 396 IPC was being committed

2 1992 CriLJ 2380=========================== ==========================

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===============================================================and nothing has been stated in evidence as to any part played by him in the commission of

offence. Further it is submitted that Accused Prasad Rao had been falsely implicated on account

of alleged political rivalry with kishan Rao. No connection between Accused Prasad Rao and

Sreenu has been remotely established by the prosecution.

Therefore, it is submitted that prosecution has failed to establish the presence of accused

Prasad Rao in commission of offence beyond reasonable doubt on the other hand accused Prasad

Rao has successfully established from the evidence on record that he is not liable for the offence

charged much less he has successfully created doubt in the mind of the court regarding his

involvement in the alleged offence. Hence Accused Prasad Rao should be acquitted on this sole

ground.

Arguments on behalf of Accused Sreenu and others

It is humbly submitted that the accused Sreenu and others are not liable for the offence

under section 396 IPC in as much as their presence has not been established at the place of

occurrence by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

It is settled law that when the dacoity was committed during the night in a house, unless it

is established on basis of reliable evidence that there was some source of light in which the

witnesses could have identified the culprits, any claim of identification of the culprits by the

witnesses should not be accepted, especially, when in the first information report as well as in the

statements recorded during the investigation, no source of light was disclosed. It cannot be

disputed that in cases relating to dacoity, the identification by the witnesses is the main evidence,

as such the prosecution has to satisfy, that the witnesses were in a position to identify the

culprits, during the commission of the dacoity. Any such claim that the witnesses identified the

culprits during the commission of the crime, has to be examined by the court with reference to

the circumstances of a particular case. The court has to be satisfied that there was not only ample

opportunity for the witnesses to identify the culprits but they had identified them with the help of

some light either in the house or outside.


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===============================================================The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar, 3observed as under

“19. In the present case, we find from the evidence of the witnesses examined by

the prosecution as already noticed that the witnesses are related and their relations were

strained with the appellants on account of the litigation. The incident happened at 11

o'clock in the night. The witnesses have stated that they have seen the incident and

recognised the appellants either in the torchlight or in the lantern light which was

burning at their house. It has come in evidence of the witnesses as well as the

investigating officer that neither the torch nor the lantern was seized by the investigating

officer during the course of investigation, nor were they produced before the court. In the

circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the appellants have been identified in the

torchlight or in the lantern light.”

In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P., 4 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that

“7. ……..The dacoits were strangers to the eyewitnesses. Then the question

arose whether there was sufficient opportunity for these witnesses to recognise the

accused. It is noted that none of their features (sic was) even suggestively mentioned in

the FIR not even in the case-diary as noted by the High Court. It is also to be noted that

none of the eyewitnesses said that they recognised the dacoits while they were inside the

house and on the other hand it becomes highly doubtful whether they could not have

identified the strangers in the moonlight. Taking all these aspects into consideration the

trial court was not prepared to accept the evidence regarding the identification parade of

the persons. We think this is a reasonable view in the matter. Therefore, the participation

of the appellants in the actual dacoity becomes doubtful.”

3 (2008) 16 SCC 99 at page 105

4 1994 Supp (1) SCC 62 at page 64


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===============================================================In State of U.P. v. Hardeo,5 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

“3. We have carefully gone through the records. Admittedly, the occurrence was

during the dark midnight. The witnesses claimed to have identified the culprits standing

at distance of 150 feet with the help of light emanating from the straw-fire in the khandar

of Rajendra which was at a distance of 40 steps (80 feet) towards the north-west of the

door of the scene house. The High Court on appreciation of the evidence was not inclined

to accept the evidence of the witnesses claiming to have identified the culprits with the

help of that light and also the torches carried by the assailants. In our opinion, the High

Court was right in rejecting that evidence.”

Hence the prosecution has failed to establish the identity of the accused in as much as

nothing has been stated as to whether there was sufficient light to identify the accused while they

were committing offence of dacoity, whether the accused were stranger to the victims or were

known to them. It is submitted that it is highly improbable that if the accused were known

Kishan Rao or his family, the accused would have committed such offence without covering

their faces. Hence the evidence to the effect that Krishna Rao’s wife and children identified all

the accused cannot be relied upon in as much as it is not possible to identify the strangers whom

the Krishna Rao’s wife had seen once and that too in moonlight in the middle of night at the time

when they were actually asleep. Further the children being minor their evidence cannot be relied

upon and moreover it is highly improbable the minor children could have identified the accused

by seeing only once and that too in minimum possible light at the middle of night. Moreover no

independent witness has deposed regarding their presence at the place of offence and nothing has

been produced on record to corroborate the above said fact. Hence the accused Sreenu and

others are liable to be acquitted on the sole ground that they have successfully created doubt in

the mind of the court as to there presence at the place of offence.

5 1993 Supp (1) SCC 473 at page 474=========================== ==========================


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===============================================================1.2 MERE RECOVERY OF PROPERTY DOESNOT MAKE ACCUSED LIABLE FOR

ALLEGED OFFENCE.

It is submitted that the evidence on record as to the recovery of looted property from

Accused Sreenu doesnot proves the case of Prosecution and no presumption regarding

commission of the alleged offence could be raised.

In State of Rajasthan v. Talevar,6 the court observed as under

“18. Thus, the law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that where the

only evidence against the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the

circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been committed at

the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the person in possession of the

stolen property had committed the murder. It also depends on the nature of the

property so recovered, whether it was likely to pass readily from hand to hand.

Suspicion should not take the place of proof.

19. In the instant case, accused Kuniya was arrested on 24-12-1996 and a silver

glass and one thousand rupees were alleged to have been recovered on the basis of his

disclosure statement on 29-12-1996. Again, on disclosure statement dated 2-1-1997, a

scooter alleged to have been used in the dacoity, was recovered. Similarly, another

accused Talevar was arrested on 19-1-1997 and on the basis of his disclosure statement

on 26-1-1997, two thousand rupees, a silver key ring and a key of an Ambassador car

alleged to have been used in the crime were recovered. Thus, it is evident that recovery

on the basis of disclosure statements of either of the respondent-accused persons was not

in close proximity of time from the date of incident. More so, recovery is either of cash,

small things or vehicles which can be passed from one person to another without any

difficulty. In such a fact situation, we reach the inescapable conclusion that no

presumption can be drawn against the said two respondent-accused under Section 114

Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. No adverse inference can be drawn on the basis of

recoveries made on their disclosure statements to connect them with the commission of

the crime.

6 (2011) 11 SCC 666 at page 671


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===============================================================……. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of

the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his

innocence.”

In Sheonath v. State of U.P.,7 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under

“4. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that in the circumstances of

the case the High Court should not have convicted the appellant under Section 396 IPC,

but only under Section 411 IPC Section 114 of the Evidence Act and illustration (a) read

as follows:

“114. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to

have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human

conduct and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case.

Illustrations.

The Court may presume —

(a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods after the theft, is either the

thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for

his possession.”

This Section was considered by this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan

[ AIR (1956) SC 54] . This Court, after considering some High Court cases, observed:

“In our judgment no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should

be drawn from a certain circumstance. Where, however, the only evidence against an

accused person is the recovery of stolen property and although the circumstances may

indicate that the theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is

not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was

the murderer. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof…..”

….. The recovery took place five days after the dacoity. It is not impossible that

during that period the property might have passed from the dacoits to a receiver. Under

these circumstances, we are of opinion that it would not be safe to convict Bhurgiri of

7 (1969) 3 SCC 116 at page 118=========================== ==========================


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===============================================================dacoity on the evidence of this recovery alone. It would be more proper to convict him as

a guilty receiver.

Then the question arises whether he should be convicted under Section 411 or

412 IPC. So far as Section 411 is concerned, he is clearly guilty under that section. The

presumption under Section 114 applies, and we can safely presume that he is a guilty

receiver of stolen property particularly when we find that the property was kept in the

Bara, and not at his own house. He must have had reason to believe that it was stolen

when he received the property and that is why he left in the Bara. But we feel that it

would not be proper to convict him under Section 412 because that section requires that

the receiver should know or have reason to believe that the property had been transferred

by the commission of dacoity. The prosecution, in our opinion, has to show something

more than the mere possession of stolen goods for a conviction under Section 412. If the

prosecution is only able to show mere possession, the proper section to use is 411.”

Similarly in Narayan Singh v. State of M.P.8, it was held that

“8. However, the recoveries are duly effected and the Sub-Inspector as well as the

witnesses spoke about the same. Merely because certain stolen articles were recovered

from the accused they cannot be held to be dacoits by invoking the presumption unless

there is a recent possession.”.

In State of U.P. v. Hardeo9, it was held that

“4. So far as the recovery of the articles said to have been concerned with the

case, as held by the High Court there is no satisfactory evidence to connect the first

respondent so as to incriminate him with the offence under Section 412 IPC. In our

considered opinion, the judgment of the High Court does not warrant any interference.”

8 1994 Supp (1) SCC 62 at page 65

9 1993 Supp (1) SCC 473 at page 475=========================== ==========================


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===============================================================Hence, it is submitted that it is an established law that mere discovery recovery of

property doesnot raise presumption that offence under section 396 IPC has been committed by

accused Sreenu much less other accused. The looted property included gold, money and other

valuables which are movable property and could be easily transferred from one person to

another, and hence possibility of movable property having been passed on to Sreenu from

someone else cannot be ruled out. Further except for the statement made by wife of Krishna Rao

no independent evidence has been led by the Prosecution. Nothing has been produced on record

to corroborate the above said fact. Moreover no evidence as to identity of money could be led

and as far as other movable properties are concerned identical gold ornaments or identical

movables are available in bulk and easily available in market. Hence the Prosecution has failed

to establish any role played by any Accused in commission of above said alleged offence. On the

other hand Accused have created sufficient doubt in the mind of the Court. Accused Sreenu

could be prosecuted maximum under section 411 IPC for the recovery.

1.3 ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED UPON THE UNCORROBORATED

TESTIMONY OF KRISHNA RAO’S WIFE AND TWO MINOR CHILDREN.

It is submitted that Accused cannot be convicted solely on the testimony of Krishna

Rao’s wife and children. The evidence given by the witnesses is contradictory to the version

given by the Prosecution as even according to the facts alleged by the Prosecution Prasad Rao

was not present at the place where offence took place. Registering FIR against Prasad Rao who

was not even remotely connected with the crime clearly shows that it was only due to the alleged

political rivalry and suspicion created on the basis of alleged rivalry that he has been falsely

implicated in this case.

In Nallabothu Venkaiah v. State of A.P.10 Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

“13. … The test, in such circumstances, as correctly adopted by the trial court, is

that if the witnesses are interested, the same must be scrutinised with due care and

caution in the light of the medical evidence and other surrounding circumstances.

10 [(2002) 7 SCC 117 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1615] (SCC p. 125, para 13)=========================== ==========================


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===============================================================Animosity is a double-edged sword and it can cut both sides. It can be a ground for false

implication. It can also be a ground for assault.”

In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha11 the court held that

“15. … if the relatives or interested witnesses are examined, the court has a duty

to analyse the evidence with deeper scrutiny and then come to a conclusion as to whether

it has a ring of truth or there is reason for holding that the evidence was biased.”

Hence , it is settled law that in cases of animosity and relationship the testimony of the witnesses

should be examined with caution and must be corroborated in material particulars. However

nothing has been produced on record to corroborate the evidence of witnesses.

Further the evidence given by child cannot be relied upon as it is an established law that a

child witness can be easily tutored. In the case in hand since accused Prasad Rao was nowhere

present at the place where offence was committed and the children could not be expected to

have known any kind of animosity between the accused and their family, hence this clearly

establishes that children were tutored to depose in particular manner after the commission of

alleged offence.

In State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit12Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that

“9. The law is well settled that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated

carefully as a child may be swayed by what others tell him and is an easy prey to

tutoring. Wisdom requires that evidence of a child witness must find adequate

corroboration before it is relied on. (See Panchhi v. State of U.P. [(1998) 7 SCC 177 :

1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] )

10. The High Court was of the view that considering her age at the time of

occurrence PW 3 might have been sleeping. This cannot be said to be impossible.

11 [(2003) 12 SCC 606 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 526] (SCC p. 613, para 15)

12 2000) 3 SCC 70 at page 73=========================== ==========================


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===============================================================11. PW 3 also has deposed that accused Ashok was known to her family and used

to visit their house but accused Chaman Lal was not known to this witness. She identified

both the accused in the Court. At the time of the occurrence there was no electricity,

therefore, it is difficult to accept that she being 9½ years old could have identified

accused Chaman Lal during the occurrence…….”

In Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar,13 it was held that

“3. ……It is well-settled that a child witness is prone to tutoring and hence the

court should look for corroboration particularly when the evidence betrays traces of

tutoring. We, therefore, think that appellant 1 was entitled to benefit of doubt.”

Similarly in K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of A.P.,14 it was held that

“9. …. The evidence of a child witness has to be subjected to closest scrutiny and

can be accepted only if the court comes to the conclusion that the child understands the

question put to him and he is capable of giving rational answers (see Section 118 of the

Evidence Act). A child witness, by reason of his tender age, is a pliable witness. He can

be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or inducement. Therefore, the court must be

satisfied that the attendant circumstances do not show that the child was acting under the

influence of someone or was under a threat or coercion. Evidence of a child witness can

be relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to evaluate the evidence, comes

to the conclusion that the child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. It is

safe and prudent to look for corroboration for the evidence of a child witness from the

other evidence on record, because while giving evidence a child may give scope to his

imagination and exaggerate his version or may develop cold feet and not tell the truth or

may repeat what he has been asked to say not knowing the consequences of his

deposition in the court. Careful evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the

13 1995 Supp (4) SCC 416 at page 41714 (2012) 8 SCC 73 at page 78


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===============================================================background and context of other evidence on record is a must before the court decides to

rely upon it.”

Thus from the above stated judgments it is clearly established that the evidence given by the

deceased’s family members cannot be relied upon. More so when no evidence other than oral

testimony of the witness has been given.

1.4 TALLING OF FRINGERPRINTS ON THE WEAPON AND SCENE OF ACCUSED

DOESNOT MAKE ACCUSED LIABLE

It is submitted that tallying of finger prints doesnot support the case of Prosecution in as

much as nothing has been stated on facts that fingerprints are of any of the accused mentioned in

the FIR.

1.5 EVIDENCE OF PW-6 DOESNOT SUPPORT THE CASE OF PROSECUTION

Alagupandi v. State of T.N., (2012) 10 SCC 451 at page 462

29. Existence of a motive for committing a crime is not an absolute requirement of law but it is

always a relevant factor, which will be taken into consideration by the courts as it will render

assistance to the courts while analysing the prosecution evidence and determining the guilt of the

accused.

1.6 OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 396 NOT COMMITED


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THE PRAYER


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===============================================================In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly

prayed before this Hon`ble Court that the Accused deserves to be acquitted of the charges

framed against him, in the interest of justice.

Respectfully Submitted

Sd/-

Counsel for the Respondent


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Documents

respondents memorial (1) (1).doc