Responsibility for the Criminal Law

Responsibility for the Criminal Law

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PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

ResponsibilityfortheCriminalLawAliceRistroph

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0006

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterarguesthatcriminallawtheoryhasbeentoonarrowlyfocusedontheresponsibilityoftheoffenderforhiscriminalacts,andseekstoshowhowotherkeyplayersinthesystemincludinglegislatures,police,prosecutors,andcourtsshareresponsibilityforthesystemofcriminallawandhowitchoosestotreatitssubjects.Thechapterisorganizedasfollows.First,itidentifiessomeofthedistinctiveinquiriesandmethodsofapoliticaltheoryofcriminallaw.Itthenturnstotheconceptofresponsibilityandoffersarevisionist,orperhapsrehabilitated,accountofcriminalresponsibility.Onthisaccount,theaccusedindividualdoesnotstandisolatedastheresponsibleagent;instead,criminalresponsibilityisalsoamatterofthepublicandcollectiveagencyexercisedthroughouttheprocessesofcriminalization,prosecution,adjudication,andpunishment.Theconcludingsectionconnectstheexaminationofresponsibilityforthecriminallawtoquestionsaboutresponsibilityforotherformsofbureaucraticviolence.

Keywords:criminallawtheory,criminalresponsibility,politicaltheory,bureaucraticviolence


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Everycrimeisacollectiveendeavour.Socialfactorsofteninfluencetheactsofindividualoffenders,butthatisnotthecollectiveaspectofcrimeemphasizedhere.Evenifwecannotidentifysocialfactorsthatledtoagivenoffender'sact,evenifwebelieveinfreewillandareconvincedthatthiscriminalhasactedonit,hiscrimeisstillacollectiveendeavour.Thisissobecausetheverycategorycrimeisdistinctivelypolitical.Politicalherereferstothepublicandcollectiveenterprisethepolityandlawisadimensionofthepoliticalratherthananalternativetoit.Perhapssinispre-legalandpre-political,butcrimestakeplaceonlyinthecontextofapoliticalcommunitythathasestablishedalegalsystem.1Asanillustration,considerthedifferencebetweenkillingandmurder.Deathisatleastconceptuallyindependentofthelaw,asarekillingandbeingkilled.2Butmurderisalegalconstruct,andtheconstructionoflawisapublic,collectiveenterprise.Indeed,theLatinwordcrimenreferrednottotheoffender'sactionbuttothepubliconetotheaccusationandjudgment.EvenoncetheEnglishwordcrimebegantobeusedtorefertotheprohibitedact,(p.108) itremainedimportanttodistinguishcrimefromsinandtoemphasize,again,thepolitical,constructedcharacterofcrime.3Themaximnullumcrimensinelegeisnotsimplyapreferenceforthenoticeaffordedbyclearlydraftedcriminalstatutes;itisareminderthatcrimeliterallydoesnotexistintheabsenceoflaw.Andlawisinevitablyacollectiveendeavour.

Atheoryofcrime,orcriminallaw,thusneedstobeattentivetothecollectiveentitythatmakescrime.Criminallawtheoryneedspoliticaltheory.Thispointhasbeenmadebefore,mostoftenwithrespecttojustificationsofpunishment,butitbearsre-emphasis.Thereisadifferencebetweentheclaimthatwrongdoersshouldbepunishedandtheclaimthatthestateshouldpunishthem;aproperlypoliticaltheorymustaddressthelatterclaim.4Butpunishmentisnottheonlydimensionofcriminallawthatinvolvesthecollectiveenterprise.Weneedaccountsoftheprocessbywhichcrimesquacrimescomeintobeingandthepoliticalconsequencesofbringingthemintobeing.Itisnotjustpunishment,butalsocriminalization,policing,andprosecutionthatneedtobesubjecttotheanalyticalandevaluativescrutinyofpoliticaltheory.

Nowherehascriminallawtheorybeenlessattentivetopoliticalcollectivities,andmorefocusedontheindividual,thaninitsdiscussionsofresponsibility.Criminalresponsibilityhasalmostalwaysbeencharacterizedasaquestionabouttheindividualoffender.5Thedominantparadigm,Ithinkitisfairtosay,iswhatArthurRipsteinhascalledtheagencyconceptionofresponsibility,anumbrellatermthatincludesvarioustheoriesconcernedwiththecircumstancesinwhichadeedorconsequenceisattributedtotheagencyofitsauthor.6Anagencyconceptionmayencompasssomeempiricalinquiriesrelatedtocausation,sothatanoffenderisresponsibleforharmsshecausesbutnotforthoseshedoesnotcause.Moreoften(butnotexclusiveofthecausalinquiries),responsibilityhasbeentheorizedasanormativeconcept:tosaysomeoneisresponsibleistomakeanormativejudgmentaboutthatperson.Whetherthenormativejudgmentisdependentonvariousempiricalclaimsisa(p.109) matterofongoingdispute.Asneuroscientistsandpsychologistspresentnewevidenceaboutthefactorsthatinfluencehumandecisionmaking,somescholarsarguethatwemustrethinkcriminalresponsibility,whileothersmaintainthatcriminalresponsibilityisamoralconceptindifferenttomedicalscience.7


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Notably,bothsidesofthisdebateassumethatthekeyquestionsforcriminalresponsibilityarequestionsabouttheindividualoffenderheracts,herbrain,herself-control,hermoralblameworthiness.Responsibilityisamatterofagency,buttheonlyagentvisibletomosttheoriesofcriminalresponsibilityisthewrongdoerherself.

Butifwekeepinviewthepoliticalcharacterofcrime,itisclearthatresponsibilityforcrimeisaquestionofcollectiveresponsibility.Membersofapoliticalentitydevelopandenforcethecriminallaw,andthoseactsofpublicagencyneedthetheorist'sscrutiny.Whenoneagentisheldresponsible,someotheragentorgroupofagentsisdoingtheholding.Andatheoryofcriminallawmustconsiderthoseexercisesofagency:thechoicestocriminalize,toprosecute,andtopunish.Inotherwords,anaccountofcriminalresponsibilitymustnotrestwithattributionsofresponsibilityforindividualcriminalacts;itmustaddresscollectiveresponsibilityforthecriminallawitself.

Thereareotherways,beyondmakingandenforcingthecriminallaw,inwhichacommunityorastatemightbesaidtobecollectivelyresponsibleforcrime.Astatethatknowinglyfosters,orevenjustpermits,criminogenicconditionsisarguablycomplicitinsubsequentoffences.8Acompleteaccountofcriminalresponsibilityshouldaddressthisformofcollectiveresponsibilityaswell.Buttheresponsibilityofgreatestinterestinthischapterisnotanalogoustocomplicity.Theclaimisnotthatthestatecausedtheoffendertoactinaparticularway.Theclaimisthatthestatedesignatedthisactasacrimeandchosetoprosecuteandpunishit.Forthesepublicacts,thereiscollectiveresponsibility.Thatresponsibilityshouldbepartandparcelofanytheoryofcriminalresponsibility.

Ideveloptheseclaimsfurtherinthreesections.First,Iidentifysomeofthedistinctiveinquiriesandmethodsofapoliticaltheoryofcriminallaw.Ithenturntotheconceptofresponsibilityandofferarevisionist,orperhapsrehabilitated,accountofcriminalresponsibility.Onthisaccount,theaccusedindividualdoesnotstandisolatedastheresponsibleagent;instead,criminalresponsibilityisalsoamatterofthepublicandcollectiveagencyexercisedthroughouttheprocessesofcriminalization,prosecution,adjudication,andpunishment.Inaconcludingsection,Iconnectmyexaminationofresponsibilityforthecriminallawtoquestionsaboutresponsibilityforotherformsofbureaucraticviolence.Inthecriminallaw,asinothercontexts(p.110) wherestateofficialsregularlyauthorizeandusephysicalforce,decisionsandactionsareoftenfragmentedacrosscomplexbureaucraticstructures.Tracingresponsibilityinsuchcontextsisnoteasy.Idonotsolvethepuzzlesofpoliticalresponsibilityhere,butIdoseektoshowthatthosepuzzlesshouldbepartofaninquiryintocriminalresponsibility.

1POLITICALTHEORYANDTHECRIMINALLAWWhatdoesitmeantoofferapoliticaltheoryofcriminallaw?Somepreliminarymethodologicalobservationsmaycleartheground,thoughtoofferthemistoriskfuellingpettydisciplinarysquabbles,andmaybealsoomphaloskepsis.Butgiventhatmuchcriminallawtheory,andtheoriesofcriminalresponsibilityinparticular,tendtoobscurethepoliticalcontextofthecriminallaw,themethodologicalpreliminariesmaybeworththeserisks.


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Politicaltheoryisacapaciousfieldwithuncertainboundaries.JudithShklaroncedescribedthemostobvioustaskofpoliticaltheoryastheelucidationofcommonexperience,theexpressionofwhatisinarticulatelyknowntogroupsofpeopleatanytime.9Herdescriptionimpliesanelementofcontingencyinpoliticaltheoryitisaformofknowledge,butknowledgeparticulartoplaceandtime.Tobesure,inthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtonefindsnoshortageofclaimsofuniversalandeternaltruth.Buttheenterpriseofpoliticaltheoryinvolvesacontinualre-examinationofthoseclaims.Onmanyaccounts,theorizingisanactivity,anefforttounderstandsomeobservedspectacleorphenomenon.10(MichaelOakeshottsuggestsanetymologicalconnectionbetweentheoryandtheatre:bothtermsarerelatedtotheGreektheasomethingseen,aspectacle,anoccurrence.11)Politicaltheorypresentsapuzzleinthatthespectacleofpoliticsisnotclearlydeterminedapriori.Thatis,whenwesaywhatisandisnotpolitical,wearealreadyengagedintheactivityoftheorizing.(p.111)

Whethertheapparentcontingenciesofpoliticaltheoryshouldberemediedwithessentialistclaims,orinsteadembracedasanopportunity,isitselfamatterofdisputewithinthefield.12IbelieveIcanbracketthatdisputefornow,forthereseemstobesufficientconsensusonthecontentofthepoliticalforpurposesoftheorizingcriminallawinatwenty-first-centuryliberaldemocracy.Whateverelsepoliticaltheoryisconcernedwith,itisdefinitelyconcernedwithcollectivecoexistencewithhowlargegroupsofhumanbeingsdoandshouldlivetogether.Forcenturies,thequestionofcollectivecoexistencehaspresentedquestionsaboutthecollectionofinstitutionsandofficeswecommonlyrefertoasthestate.Politicaltheoryseekstoexaminethestate,toexplainitsfunctioning,andtojustifyorcritiqueitsexercisesofpower.Thestatedoesnotexhausttheinquiriesofpoliticaltheory,butitisacentralfocus.

Thefocusonthestateisespeciallyimportantwhenweconsiderthecriminallawandtheinstitutionsofpunishment.Accordingly,asseveralscholarshaveemphasized,apoliticaltheoryofpunishmentrequiresattentiontothespecificquestionwhetherandwhypunishmentisalegitimateexerciseofstatepower.13Butthepotentialcontributionsofpoliticaltheorytocriminallawextendfarbeyondthequestionofthejustificationofpunishment.Indeed,asIhavearguedelsewhere,politicaltheorymayteachusthatinaliberalstate,punishmentsimplycan'tbefullyjustified;italwaysretainsatraceoftheruleofthestrongerthatisinconsistentwithliberalprinciplesofconsensualrule.14Beyondthequestionofjustifyingpunishment,criminallawposesotherpuzzlesforthepoliticaltheorist.Whatprocessesandstructuresgenerateandsustainthecriminallaw?Howdoesthecriminallaw,inturn,distributepoweracrossindividualsandinstitutions?15Whatarethepoliticalconsequencesofvariousprinciplesofcriminalliability,16orofvariousdistributionsofthepenalpower?Andimportantly,ifpunishmentcannotbefullyjustifiedandyetcannotorwillnotbeabandoned,whataccountcanwegiveofitsnormativestatus?(p.112)

Thesesortsofquestionsencourageustothinkofcriminallawnotasanaturalphenomenonwithfixedparameters,butasapoliticalartifact.Apoliticalcommunitymakes,sustains,alters,andappliesitsowncriminallaw.Howdoesthishappen,andwhatarethe


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consequences?Fromthisperspective,thekeynormativeissueisnot,oratleastnotonly,aquestionaboutjustifyingthecriminallaw.Weshouldstudyalsoresponsibilityforthecriminallaw.Indeed,asIdiscussinthelastsectionofthischapter,questionsofresponsibilityarelikelytoprovideabetterperspectivetoevaluatecurrentpractices,andmoreinsightsforreform,thanarequestionsofjustification.

Beforeturningdirectlytoatheoryofresponsibility,Iwanttomakeonemoremethodologicalobservation:anypoliticaltheoryofcriminallawwillbequitecomplex,muchmorecomplexthanmanyfamiliartheoriesthatfocusonlyonthejustificationofpunishment.Theorizing,again,isanefforttounderstandsomeobservedphenomenon,butinthisareathereismuchtosee,andperhapsmuchofwhatmattersgoesonbehindthescenes.Itisdauntingoverwhelming,eventothinkthattoexplainandevaluatethecriminallaw,onemustbeabletoexplainandevaluatethebehemoththatisthemodernstate.Smallwonderthatsomanytheoristshavenarrowedtheirfieldofvision,choosingtotakeboththestateandthesubstantivecriminallawforgranted,anddevotingtheirenergiestothemoralrelationshipbetweenasingleindividual'scriminalactandthatsameindividual'ssubsequenthardtreatment.Theoriesdrawnwithinthesenarrowparametershavethevirtueofsimplicity,butitisasimplicitybornofmyopia.Itwillsoonbeevidenthowgreatlyaninquiryintoresponsibilitymustcomplicatematters.

2CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY:INDIVIDUAL,COLLECTIVE,ORBOTH?Toframecriminalresponsibilityorresponsibilityforcrimeasacharacteristicoftheaccusedwrongdoer,andthewrongdoeralone,istoneglectimportantquestions.Theindividualistapproachtoresponsibilityseparatesquestionsofcriminalization,ortheappropriatescopeofthesubstantivecriminallaw,fromquestionsofcriminalresponsibility,andthusgivesinsufficientattentiontothedistinctionbetweenresponsibilityforanactandresponsibilityforacrime.17Ageneraltheoryofaction(p.113) oragencyisinvokedtoanalysethespecificactsproscribedbythecriminallaw,butthedesignationofactsascrimesisnotscrutinizedasitselfanactionforwhichpersonsorcommunitiesareresponsible.Inthisandotherways,individualisttheoriesofcriminalresponsibilityoftenfailtoattendtothepoliticaldimensionsofresponsibility.OnthealternativeaccountIdefendhere,responsibilityisamatterofhumanrelationships,ofattitudesandpractices.Onemayactalone,butoneisresponsibleinrelationtoothers.18Whenwekeepinviewboththerelational,politicaldimensionsofresponsibilityandthedistinctivelypoliticalcharacteristicsofcrime,itbecomesclearthatsomeofthemostimportantquestionsofcriminalresponsibilityarequestionsofcollectiveresponsibility.

TheactiontheoryapproachtocriminalresponsibilityisexemplifiedbyMichaelMoore'sinfluentialwork.19Onthisaccount,criminalresponsibilityrequiresanact,andanactisunderstoodasawilledbodilymovement.Ofcourse,Moore'saccountisfarmorecomplex,butthenuancesofhisclaimsarenotessentialtomyargumenthere.Itisworthemphasizing,asMoorehimselfdoes,thathisclaimedrelationshipbetweenactionandcriminalresponsibilitymustbeunderstoodinthecontextofbroaderphilosophicalcommitmentstomoralrealismandaretributivetheoryofpunishment.20Moorearguesthatresponsibilityisanobjectivefactaboutaperson,notsimplyanattitudethataperson


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orpersonsmighttaketowardsomeoneelse.21Andhehasalsodefendedpunishmentastheimpositionofretributivedesertonadeservingoffender.22Thesecommitmentstomoralrealismandretributionproduceanaccountinwhichonedimensionofresponsibilityisthecommissionofanact.Itisanindividualistaccount,oranaccountofpersonalresponsibility,inthattherelevantconsiderationsareconsiderationsaboutthespecificindividual.Todecidewhetheranindividualisresponsible,wemustaskwhethershehasacted,andwhetherheractionsaretheresultofpracticalreasoning.23

OthercriminallawtheoristsrejectMoore'sspecificaccountofthelinkbetweenactionandresponsibility.Variousscholarshaveconnectedcriminalresponsibility(p.114) totheindividual'sabilitytocontrolaspecifiedstateofaffairs,24totheindividual'scharacter,25ortosomecombinationofcapacitiesandcharacter.26Onanyoftheseaccounts,criminalresponsibilityisaquestiontobeaskedabouttheindividualaccusedaboutwhattheindividualhasdone.Wemightputtheinquiryintermsofagencyratherthanaction,andsaythattoberesponsibleistobeanautonomousagent.27Asmentionedabove,ArthurRipsteinhasdescribedtheseapproachesundertheumbrellaphrasetheagencyconceptionofresponsibility.

Notice:thesequestionsofagencyandactioncouldberaisedwithrespecttoanyhumanaction,whateveritslegalstatus.WecouldapplyactiontheorytoanalysemyresponsibilityfortheoutfitsIselect,forthewaysIentertainormistreatmyfriends,orforthearticlesIwrite.Butcriminallawtheoryisconcernedwiththenarrowerclassofactionsthatareproscribedbythelaw,aclassofactionsusuallythoughttocarrygreatersocialsignificancethanmysartorialchoicesor(even)myintellectuallabours.Ifwearetofocusonresponsibilityforcrimeratherthanresponsibilityforactstowhichthelawisindifferent,thenwemustpayattentiontothedesignationofactionsascrimes.28Suchdesignationisitselfanactionnotoftheindividualwrongdoer,ofcourse,butofthepoliticalorlegalinstitutionsthatgenerateandenforcethecriminallaw.

Myclaimisthatweshouldthinkofcriminalresponsibilityasnecessarilyinvolvingagentsotherthantheindividualaccused.Thisisnottodenythatcharacteristicsoftheindividualaccusedareimportanttoassessingresponsibility,butthesecharacteristicsarenotalonesufficienttoexplainresponsibility.Theactrequirement,thecontrolrequirement,orsomeothervariationmaybeanimportantlimitationontheascriptionofcriminalresponsibility.Butwhenwespeakofresponsibility,weshouldbeclearthatitisalwaysascribed,andsomeoneisdoingtheascribing.

Thislastemphasisontheascriptionofresponsibilityisatoddswiththemoralrealistclaimthatresponsibilityjustexists,independentofanyperson'sdecisionto(p.115) holdanotherresponsible.Asithappens,Ihavemydoubtsaboutmoralrealism.Butnoticethatevenonthemoralrealistaccount,someoneotherthantheindividualaccusedbearsadegreeofresponsibilityforcrime,insofarassomeonebearsresponsibilityforthecriminallaw.Theindividualwrongdoermayberesponsibleforthewrongfulactthatisacrime,butsomeotheragentisresponsibleforthefactthatitisacrime.

Manyscholarswouldprobablyagreethatthecommunityorthegovernmentbearssome


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responsibilityforthecreationandenforcementofthecriminallaw,butwouldsuggestthatthisparticularkindofresponsibilityissimplynotthemeaningofthephrasecriminalresponsibility.29Thisintellectualbifurcationisbothconceptuallymisleadingandpoliticallycostly.Itisconceptuallymisleadingbecauseevenwhenwefocusontheindividualwrongdoerandhiscapacities,choices,orcharacter,wecanaffixthelabelcriminallyresponsibletohimonlyifcertainpoliticalandlegalconstructionsareinplace.Whenweleavethoseconstructionsoutofanaccountofcriminalresponsibility,weengenderawayofthinkingandtalkingaboutthecriminallawthatallowsthoseconstructionstogounscrutinized.Inakindofsimplisticretributivism,theoffender'sindividualresponsibilitybecomesviewedasasufficientconditionforpunishment;putcolloquially,punishmentisamannerofholdingtheoffenderresponsible.30Thepoliticalcostofthiswayofthinkingishigh.(Imeanthatthecosttotheoverallpolityishigh;topublicofficials,incontrast,therhetoricofindividualresponsibilitymayproveausefulwaytoavoidaccountability.)Inseveralnations,especiallytheUnitedStates,increasinglyseverepunishmentsandclimbingratesofincarcerationhavebeenjustifiedasnecessaryeffortstoholdoffendersresponsible,andthereislittleifanyefforttoaddresstheenormoussocialcostsofmassincarceration.

Todeveloptheargumentforamorecomprehensiveapproach,itmayhelptoexaminetheconceptofresponsibilitydirectly,settingasideforthemomentthebaggageofresponsibilityclaimsmadeinthespecificcontextofcriminallaw.Responsibilityappearstomean,literally,answerabilitytheabilitytorespond.Anumberofscholarshavetakentheconceptofcapacity(orobligation)toanswerasadeparturepointfortheorizingresponsibility.31Thisapproachusuallyleadstoanemphasisonthe(p.116) relationalnatureofresponsibility,forifwethinkofansweringwethinkofoneagentansweringtoanother.Butanswerabilitywithinrelationshipsisonlythebeginningofaconceptofresponsibility.Weusethelanguageofresponsibilitytoexpressnormativejudgmentsabouthumanrelationshipsandtheactionshumanstakewithinthoserelationships.Inthosenormativejudgments,weuseanumberofdifferentverbs:wemightsaythatAdambearsresponsibility,thatBettytakesresponsibility,orthatCharlieshouldbeheldresponsible.Bearingandtakingresponsibility,aswellasholdingoneselforsomeoneelseresponsible,arehumanpractices,andatheoryofresponsibilityshouldfocusonthispracticaldimensionofit.Simplyput,responsibilityisamatterofhumanrelationshipsandpracticeswithinthoserelationships.

Apractical,relationalconceptionofresponsibilitymightbeginwiththeindividual,butitwillnotendthere.Responsibilityisinthefirstinstancesomethingtakenratherthansomethingassigned.32Withthisclaim,ChristineKorsgaarddistinguishesaKantiantheoryofmoralresponsibilityfromtheviewthatresponsibilityisprimarilyamatterofpraisingorblamingothers.OneneednotadoptaspecificallyKantianmoraltheorytoshareKorsgaard'sviewthatresponsibilityiscloselyassociatedwithindividualautonomy,andthatonemustfirstberesponsibleinordertomakejudgmentsofothersresponsibility.ButthoughKorsgaardbeginswithtakingresponsibility,shemovesquicklytoholdingoneanotherresponsible:holdingoneanotherresponsibleisthedistinctiveelementintherelationofadulthumanbeings.Toholdsomeoneresponsibleistoregard


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herasapersonthatistosay,asafreeandequalperson,capableofactingbothrationallyandmorally.33Onthisaccount,responsibilityisconnectedtoreciprocity;toholdanotherresponsible(after,ofcourse,takingresponsibilityoneself)istoenterintoarelationshipofreciprocalrespect.34Abandoningthestateofnatureandsorelinquishingforceandguile,youarereadytoshare,totrust,andgenerallyspeakingtoriskyourhappinessorsuccessonthehopethatshewillturnouttobehuman.35

Itisclearthattoholdsomeoneresponsibleinthisthresholdsenseneednotentailblame,criticism,oranyothernegativeevaluation.Korsgaard'sworkmaythusofferausefuldeparturepointforatheoryofresponsibilitydisentangledfromretributiveimpulses.(ThatisnottosaythatKorsgaard'saccountofresponsibilityisinconsistentwithretributivism,butonlythatitdoesnotequateajudgmentofresponsibilitywithanassessmentofretributivedesert.)Still,though,weneedtobesomewhatmorespecificaboutwhatitistoholdoneresponsible.Weshouldallwanttobeheldresponsible,insofaraswewanttoberegardedasautonomoushumans.Itmaybetruethatinaverygeneralsense,weholdothersresponsiblewheneverweviewthem(p.117) asrationalagentsandenterintoreciprocalrelationshipswiththem.Butthereisanarrowersenseinwhichweholdsomeoneresponsibleforaparticularactorcharacteristic.Thissenseofholdingresponsiblewilloften,thoughnotalways,involveblamingorcriticizing.Thissenseofholdingresponsibleseemstheonemostrelevanttocriminallawtheory.

Eveninthenarrowcontextofblaming,Korsgaard'saccountofferskeyinsightsthatcriminallawtheoristshavetoooftenoverlooked.36Korsgaarddistinguishesbetweenwhatshecallsthetheoreticalandpracticalconceptionsofresponsibility.Underthetheoreticalconception,responsibilityisacharacteristicofpersonsakin,perhaps,tothemoralrealistviewIdescribedearlier:apersonjustisorisnotresponsible,independentofthejudgmentsherfellowcitizensmaymakeofher.37Underthepracticalconception,holdingoneanotherresponsibleissomethingthatwedo,themoreorlessdeliberateadoptionofanattitude.38Underthisconception,itmaybeperfectlyreasonableformetoholdsomeoneresponsibleforanattitudeoranaction,whileatthesametimeacknowledgingthatitisjustasreasonableforsomeoneelsenottoholdthesamepersonresponsiblefortheverysameattitudeoraction.39Holdinganotherresponsibleissomethingwedointhecontextofparticularrelationships,andthosewithotherrelationshipsmaymakedifferentresponsibilityjudgments.Furthermore,andofgreatimportanceforapoliticaltheoryofresponsibility,ifdecidingwhethertoholdsomeoneresponsibleissomethingthatwedo,itissomethingthatwemayinturnbeheldresponsiblefor.40Thisclaimhasclearimplicationsforatheoryofcriminalresponsibility:thosewhoholdoffendersresponsiblearethemselvesresponsibleforthatdecision.

Noticethatonthisaccount,holdingsomeoneresponsibledoesn'titselfdictateanyparticularactiontowardthatperson.IfmyneighbourpromisestowatermyhouseplantswhileIamaway,ImayholdhimresponsibleifheforgetsandtheplantsaredeadwhenIreturn.ButwhetherIthenrelyonmyneighbouragainthenexttimeItravel,ormakealternativearrangementsforplantcare,orpoisonmyneighbour'sshrubsinretaliation,isstillafurtherquestion.Thisinsightalsohasimportant(p.118) consequencesforthe


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criminallaw:holdingacriminalresponsibleneednotentailholdinghimincustody,orevennecessarilyimposinganypunishmentatall.41

AlsoinspiredbyKant,ArthurRipsteindevelopsanaccountofresponsibilitythatsimilarlyemphasizestherelationshipsinwhichresponsibilitypracticestakeplace.Rejectingtheagencyconceptionofresponsibilityasatwo-termrelationbetweenagentandoutcome,Ripsteinadvocatesanalternativereciprocityconceptioninwhichresponsibilityisunderstoodasarelationshipbetweenpersonswithrespecttoconsequencesofamorallyrelevantkind.42OnRipstein'saccount,agencyandresponsibilityareseparateissues.Evenwhenapersonhasactedasanagent,itmaybeinappropriatetoholdthatpersonresponsible,dependingontheparticularrelationalcontext.43

WiththeseinsightsfromKorsgaardandRipsteinthatresponsibilityinvolvesmultiplepersons,thatagencyandresponsibilityaredistinctconcepts,thatholdingsomeoneresponsibleisitselfanactionforwhichoneisresponsible,andthatholdingsomeoneresponsibledoesn'tyettellushowtoacttowardthatpersonwemightreturnourattentiontothecriminallaw.Clearly,thepersonalresponsibilityoftheaccusedisnottheonlyrelevantresponsibilityinquiry.Wemustalsoevaluatethosewhoholdtheaccusedresponsible.Thosewhoimposejudgmentandpunishmentareresponsiblefortheiractions,butmorebroadly,thosewhocriminalizeandthosewhodemandcriminalizationandenforcementbearresponsibilityforthosedecisionsanddemands.Thusvariouspublicofficials,andmembersofthegeneralcommunity,mayberightlyheldresponsibleforthecriminaljusticesystem.Tosayallthesepersonsmaybeheldresponsibleisnot,ofcourse,tosaythattheyshouldbeblamedorcondemnedagain,holdingresponsibleisnotequivalenttoanegativeappraisal.Butholdingacommunityanditsofficialsresponsibleforitscriminallawdoesentailacarefulscrutinyofthevariousdecisionsthatgointothecriminallaw,anditimpliesthattheofficialsorcommunityareanswerablefortheconsequences,goodandbad,ofthecriminaljusticesystem.44(p.119)

Ofcourse,publicofficialsandapoliticalcommunitymaybearresponsibilityformanypoliticalacts,notonlythosepertainingtocriminaljustice.And,asanumberofscholarshaveemphasized,publicresponsibilityfortheseactsmayhaveimplicationsfortheindividualresponsibilityofagivendefendant.Inarecentaccountofcriminalresponsibilityasanswerability,AntonyDuffarguesthattoberesponsible,theaccusedmustbeanswerabletohisfellowcitizens,whichrequiresthatthefellowcitizenshavestandingtodemandananswerfromtheaccused.45Ifanindividualhasbeensystematicallyexcludedfromfullparticipationinthepolity,thepolityarguablylacksstandingtocallhimtoaccountforhisviolationofthelaws.46DuffdistinguishesthisargumentfromtheRottenSocialBackgrounddefenceonceadvancedbyRichardDelgadoandothers,whichwouldexcuseadefendantforcriminalconductproducedbyseveresocialinjustice.47Duff'sstandingclaimisstillmoreradical;itproposesthatserious,systemicinjusticemayactuallyserveasamoralbartotrial.48Onthisaccount,thedefendantisnotresponsibletothepolity(thoughhemayberesponsibletoothers,includingthedirectvictimofhiscrime)becausethepolityhasfailedinitsobligations.Ideally,thepolitywoulditselftakeresponsibilityforitsownfailures.[W]emustourselvesbecollectivelyreadytobecalled


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toaccount,andindeedshowthatweholdourselvestoaccount,fortheinjusticessuchdefendantshavesufferedatourcollectiveandtypicallypassivehands.49

VictorTadroshasdevelopedasimilarargument,beginningwiththepremisesthatpovertyiscriminogenicandthatthestatehasaresponsibilitytoreducecriminogenicsocialconditions.50Thesetwoconditionsaresufficienttoestablishthatthestate[is]complicitinthecrimesofthepoorandthusthepoorhaveamoralclaimforthestatetorefrainfromholdingthemresponsiblefortheircrimes,eveniftheyareinfactresponsibleforthem.51(NotethatforTadros,beingresponsibleandbeingheldresponsiblearedistinct.Hisargumentalsoseemstopresumethatawrongdoershouldbeheldresponsibleonlyonce.52)Finally,AlanNorriehasofferedabroadcritiqueoftheindividualistunderstandingofcriminalresponsibility,arguingthat(p.120) itisbasedonafalseseparationofpersonalagencyandsocialconditions.53If,asNorrieargues,theindividualisalways-alreadysocial,thencriminalresponsibilityisalwaysalreadysocialaswell.54Notonlypovertybutothersocialconditionshelpconstitutetheindividualandhisactions,andanaccountofcriminalresponsibilitymustacknowledgethat.

Invariousways,Duff,Tadros,andNorrieeachincludequestionsofcollectiveresponsibilityintheassessmentofcriminalresponsibility.Noticethatthecollectiveresponsibilityunderexaminationontheseaccountsinvolvesthecommunity'sactionspriortotheinstantoffence,anditoftenconcernsactionslargelyindependentofthecriminalprocess.Forexample,collectiveresponsibilitymayinvolveresponsibilityforgrosslyunequaldistributionsofwealth,orfordenialofeducationalopportunity,orforsystemicracism.Ihavelittledoubtthattheseactionsorconditionsareonesforwhichapolitymightrightlybeheldresponsible.ButIwanttoemphasizethateveniftheaccusedhasbeentreatedfairlyinmattersofeconomic,educational,andracialjustice,thecommunity'sdecisionstopunish(anddecisionstocriminalize)willthemselvesstillincurresponsibility.Duffaskswhetheracommunityhassuitablycleancollectivehandssuchthatitmaylegitimatelybringanaccusedtocourtanddemandthatheanswerforhiscrimes.55Iwanttosuggestthatthecriminalprocessmayitselfdirtyoratleastsmudgethecommunity'shandsandwhetherornotitdirtiesthem,thecriminalprocessinevitablyentailscollectiveactionandcollectiveresponsibility.

Todevelopthispoint,itishelpfultoconsiderarecentdiscussionofthemoralburdensofpunishment.AlonHarelarguesthatastateshouldnotaskprivatecitizenstoimposepunishmentshamingpenalties,forexamplebecausetodosoimposesimpermissiblemoralburdensontheindividualschargedwithpunishing.56Harelassumes,forpurposesofhisargument,thatthestatewillcontinuetodeterminewhoistobepunishedandhowmuch.Healsoassumesthattheprivatecitizensarecooperative,willingpunisherswhocanbetrustedtoimposepunishmentontherightpeopleintherightamounts.57Evenundertheseconditions,theprivateindividualsruntheriskthattheymaybeaskedtoimposesanctionsthatthey,asindividuals,believetobeinappropriateHarelcallsthisrisktheconscience-based(p.121) moralburden.58Further,theprivatepunisherfollowingpublicinstructionsmayinflictapunishmentthatisinfactinappropriate;thedefendantmayturnouttobeinnocent,ortodeservemuchmorepunishmentthanshe


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receives.Thislatterburden,theriskofimposingerroneouspunishment,Harelcallsthemoralresponsibilityburden.59

Butisitonlyerroneouspunishmentthatgeneratesmoralresponsibility?Anddoprivatecitizensavoidmoralresponsibilityiftheyavoiddirectinvolvementinpunishing,delegatingthattasktopublicofficials?Withrespecttothesecondquestion,Hareldistinguishesbetweencollectiveandindividualresponsibility.Themoralburdenargumentdoesnotclaimthatindividualsarenotresponsibleinanywayforthejustnessofthestate-inflictedsanctionsinademocraticpolity,butmerelythattheyarenotindividuallyresponsible.60Collectiveresponsibility,accordingtoHarel,isaspecialmitigatedtypeofresponsibility.61Hareldoesnotexplainthesenseinwhichcollectiveresponsibilityismitigated;Iconsiderthisissueintheconcludingsectionofthischapter.Fornow,notethatthiscollectiveresponsibilityseemstoexistevenifthepunishmentsimposedarefairandlegitimate.Thosewhopunish,includingthecitizensofademocraticpolitywhoseinvolvementisquiteindirect,areresponsibleforwhattheydo.Theyareresponsibleforwronglyimposedsanctions,buttheyareresponsibleforrightlyimposedsanctions,too.

Putdifferently,responsibilityandjustificationarenotquitethesameissue.Inthefirstplace,onemaybebothresponsibleforanactandjustifiedintakingit.Somecommentatorshaverecognizedthispointwithrespecttoindividualdefendantsandjustificationdefences:thedefendantwhohasavalidjustificationdefenceisnonetheless(maybe,allthemore)aresponsibleagent,eventhoughheisnotsubjecttopunishment.62Additionally,justificationdoesnotnecessarilyrelievearesponsibleagentofallprospectiveobligations.Indeed,insomecasesjustificationisconditionedonfulfillmentofprospectiveobligations,aswhencourtsrecognizeanecessitydefenceforprisonescape,butonlyforthoseescapeeswhopromptlyreporttoauthoritiesafterescapingadangerousinstitution.63

SomereadersmaycomplainnotthatIhavedistinguishedbetweenresponsibilityandjustification,butthatIhaveconfusedtheissues.ManyofthepoliticalissuesthatIportrayasbearingoncollectiveresponsibilityforthecriminallawsuchasquestionsofcriminalizationorsentenceseverityaremoretypicallycharacterizedasissuesrelatedtothejustificationofpunishment.Nodoubttheconceptsand(p.122) questionscouldbeshuffledinmyriadways,buttherearegoodreasonstothinkofthenormativestatusofthecriminallawintermsofresponsibilityratherthanjustification.Iexaminethosereasonsinthenextsection.

3JUSTIFICATION,RESPONSIBILITY,ANDBUREAUCRATICVIOLENCEIncarcerationisatypeofbureaucraticviolence.64Itinvolvestheuseofforceagainstpersons,andthisuseofforcetakesplaceinacomplexinstitutionalcontext.Thereareotherformsofbureaucraticviolence,includingmilitaryforce,policeforce,statetorture,andcivildetention.Philosophicalscrutinyofsuchactionshasalmostuniversallyfocusedonquestionsofjustification:whatarethecircumstancesinwhichtheuseofforceisjustified?Havingansweredthatquestion,thetheoristviewshisworkascomplete;hecanonlyhopethosewhocontroltheuseofforcewilladheretotheguidelineshehaspronounced.


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Butjustifyingforceisnottheonlyrelevantquestion,anditmaynotevenbethemostimportantone.Itispossible,asIhavesuggested,thatpunishment(atleastinitsphysicallyinjuriousorcustodialforms)cannotbesatisfactorilyjustifiedinaliberaldemocracy.Itispossiblethatpunishmentalwaysindicatesafailureofconsensualself-governmentandaresorttorulebyviolence.Indeed,thoughcriminallawtheoristsalmostinvariablyfindsomeprincipletojustifypunishment(disagreeing,ofcourse,onwhatthatjustificationis),inthepoliticaltheoryliteratureondirtyhands,punishmentissometimescitedasanillustrationoftheclaimthatpoliticalruleinevitablyentailscorruptorimmoralacts.65Ihavedirtyhands.Rightuptotheelbows.I'veplungedtheminfilthandblood,saysSartre'sColonelHoederer.Doyouthinkyoucangoverninnocently?66Andperhapsitisfoolishtothinkonecanpunishinnocently.67(p.123)

Evenforthoseforthemanywhowouldrejectthisscepticalaccountandinsistthatpunishmentcanbemorallyjustified,responsibilityforthecriminallawisanindependentquestioninneedofattention.Weacknowledgethatthecriminaljusticesystemsometimesgoesawryitsometimesconvictsandpunishestheinnocent,orproducesinhumaneconditionsofconfinement,orneedlesslypainfulexecutions.Whenthingsgoawry,weneedawaytoassessresponsibility.Andifthestate,oritsagents,orthepeopleitrepresents,bearresponsibilitywhenthingsgowrong,theyarealsoresponsiblewhenthingsgoright.Ofcourse,theconsequencesofpublicresponsibilitymayvarydependingonwhetherwethinkaparticularpunishmentwasjustified.Aswehaveseen,ajudgmentofresponsibilityisnotamandateonwhattodonext.Itmay,however,leadustoconcludethatsomethingmustbedone.

Sometimes,theancientprincipleofhabeascorpusisdescribedintermsthatevokethisconcernwithresponsibilityforstateviolence.Intheoryifnotalwaysinpractice,habeasreliefisavailabletoanyonephysicallyheldbythestate,whetherhisdetentionislabelledcriminalorcivil.Apetitionforawritofhabeascorpusisademandthatthestatebecalledtoanswerforitsongoingviolence;itisawaytocallthejailertoaccount.68Ofcourse,modernhabeaslawisriddledwithlimitationsonjudicialauthority,anditdoesnotpresentlyfunctionasasourceofthesortofresponsibilityassessmentIamurginghere.Butintheprinciplesthatunderliehabeascorpus,onecanseeonedimensionofresponsibilityforstateviolence.

Responsibilityhasbothbackward-lookingandforward-lookingdimensions.Bothaspectsareimportantquestionstoaskofthecriminaljusticesystem,andofotherusesofstateforce.Whenwelookback,wearetryingtofigureouttheoriginsofanactofviolence.Admittedly,thiscanbemuchmoredifficultinthepoliticalrealmthanitiswithanindividualdefendant.Thestateisacomplexandmysteriousentity.Itisnotalwayseasytoidentifywhichactionsoreventsareproperlyattributedtoit,ortoknowwhetherattributionsofresponsibilitytothestateshouldimplicateorexoneratetheflesh-and-bloodhumanswhoactasstateofficials.Somebodyhastopullthetrigger,toinjectthecondemned,toclosethehandcuffs,tolockthecelldoor.Somebodyhastowritethelegalmemos,too.Sinceacomplexbureaucracyauthorizesandorderstheseactions,itisnotalwaysclearhowtoallocateresponsibilityamongthevariousmembersofthatbureaucracy.


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Andinthecaseofaliberaldemocracy,citizensareinvolvedtoo;theymaybedemandingthatthesecelldoorsbelocked,oratleastallowingthisviolencetobedoneintheirname.Collectiveresponsibilityissurelyadifferentkindofresponsibilitythansoleindividualresponsibility,butitisresponsibilitynonetheless.One(p.124) dangerofbureaucraticviolenceisthatthebureaucraticcomplexitywillrenderresponsibilityinvisibleorobsolete.Nosingleactorseemsindividuallyresponsible,andso(itmaybeargued)nooneisresponsible.ThesedangersshadowHarel'saccountofresponsibilityforpunishment.Harelclaimsthatapublicofficialwhopunishesonbehalfofthestateajudge,prisonguard,orexecutionerisoftenentitledorobligedtoexecutefaithfullythestate'ssentencingdecisions.69Thisobligationrelievestheofficialofthemoralresponsibilityforpunishmentthataprivatecitizenwouldbearwereshetoinflictpunishment.Butaswehaveseen,Harelalsoarguesthatstate-inflictedpunishmentinvolvesatmostamitigatedresponsibilityofdemocraticcitizens.Responsibilitydoesnotliewithstateofficials(noteventhejudgeorexecutioner),anditdoesnotlie(fully)withprivatecitizens.Thedanger,again,isthatresponsibilitywilllienowhere,thatthestructureofthebureaucracywillenableviolencetobedonewithnoonetoanswerforit.70

Andansweringforstateviolenceisarequirementofalegitimatepoliticalentity.Thisbringsus,finally,totheforward-lookingdimensionofresponsibility,andthereasonthatweshouldspeakofresponsibilityratherthanmerelyofjustification.Aclaimofjustificationtendstocloseaconversation,whereasaclaimofresponsibilityonlyraisesnewquestions.Imagineapolitythatdidnotmerelyholdothersresponsibleforcrime,butthattookresponsibilityforcrime.Thispolitymightscrutinizetheaccusationsitmakesandtheactsitcriminalizes.Evenifthepolityweresatisfiedthattheboundsofitssubstantivecriminallawwereproperlydrawn,itwouldthenexaminetheextenttowhichsocialandpoliticalconditionswithinitscontrolcontributedtothecommissionof(properlydefined)crimes.Andevenifthepolityweresatisfiedthatithaddefinedthecriminallawfairlyandsecuredajustsocialorder,itwouldalsohavetoconsiderthepoliticalandsocialconsequencesofitsresponsestocriminalacts.Ifitspenalpoliciescausedsignificantharmtoindividualsandcommunities,aresponsiblepolitywouldnotdismisssuchharmsascollateralconsequencestojustifiedviolence.Itwouldseektoaddressthoseharms,tomitigatethem,perhapstocompensateforthem.Suchscrutinyandremedialactionwouldbedifficult,butthatiswhatitmeanstotakeresponsibility.

Notes:(1)Forsinindeedwasintheworldbeforethelawwasgiven,butsinisnotcountedwherethereisnolaw.Romans5:13(EnglishStandardVersion).

(2)Isayatleastconceptuallyindependent,becauseaslegalregulationreachesmoreareasofhumanconduct,legaldefinitionsofdeathbecomeincreasinglyimportantandmaysupplantextra-legalunderstandings.

(3)THobbes,Leviathan(RichardTucked;Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),201.


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(4)Justbecausetheoffendermightdeservepunishment,itdoesnotfollowwithoutanappropriatetheoryofstatepowerthatthestateshouldassessthedegreeofdeservedpunishmentanduseitspowertoimposeitontheoffender.Thequickassumptionthatthestateisentitledtopunishoffenderswhodeserveitisoneoftheunfortunatebanalitiesofcriminallawinourtime.GFletcher,TheGrammarofCriminalLaw:American,ComparativeandInternational,Volume1:Foundations(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),153.

(5)[W]hyismodernlegaltheoryapparentlysopreoccupiedwithindividualresponsibility?Theindividualismofmoderncriminallawtheoryisoneofitsmostremarkeduponfeatures,andanincreasingamountofspaceisgivenovertotheanalysisandspecificationoftheconditionsofindividualliability.LFarmer,CriminalLaw,Tradition,andLegalOrder:CrimeandtheGeniusofScotsLaw1747tothePresent(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),141.Foracritiqueoftheindividualistapproachtocriminalresponsibility,seeANorrie,Punishment,Responsibility,andJusticeARelationalCritique(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).

(6)ARipstein,JusticeandResponsibility(2004)17CanadianJournalofLaw&Jurisprudence361,3612.

(7)StephenMorse,whotakestheviewthatneuroscientificresearchislargelyirrelevanttothecriminallaw,describessomeofthemajorpointsofcontentioninarecentarticle.SJMorse,ThoroughlyModern:SirJamesFitzjamesStephenonCriminalResponsibility(2008)5OhioStateJournalofCriminalLaw505.

(8)Eg,VTadros,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility(2009)43JournalofValueInquiry391,4045.

(9)JShklar,Legalism:Law,Morals,andPoliticalTrials(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1986),28.

(10)Thetraditionalmeaningoftheory,etymologicallytiedtoseeing(theoria),hasmodeledtheactivityofthetheoristonthesolitaryactofgraspinganobjectwithinafieldofvision.SKWhite,Pluralism,Platitudes,andParadoxes:FiftyYearsofWesternPoliticalThought(2002)30PoliticalTheory472,477.

(11)MOakeshott,WhatIsPoliticalTheory?,inWhatIsHistory?AndOtherEssays(Exeter:ImprintAcademic,2004),391,393.

(12)CompareOakeshott([Thepoliticaltheorists]onlyhopeofachievingabetterunderstandingofwhathehasidentifiedaspoliticsliesinbeingabletoresistthetemptationtoquestionthelimitshehasimposeduponhimself.)withWendyBrown:[P]oliticaltheoryisafiction,constitutedbyinventeddistinctionsandarangeofrivalriesandconceits,allofwhicharemutableandpuncturableandvaryacrosstimeandplaceToidentifypoliticaltheoryscontrivednature,however,doesnotreduceordevaluetheenterprise;rather,ithelpssetthestageforconsideringthepossibilitiesandchallengesit


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facesinaparticulartimeandplace.WBrown,AttheEdge(2002)30PoliticalTheory556,557.

(13)NLacey,StatePunishment:PoliticalPrinciplesandCommunityValues(London:Routledge,1988);GBinder,PunishmentTheory:MoralorPolitical?(2002)5BuffaloCriminalLawReview321;JMurphy,DoesKantHaveaTheoryofPunishment?(1987)87ColumbiaLawReview509,51011.

(14)ARistroph,RespectandResistanceinPunishmentTheory(2009)97CaliforniaLawReview601,61922.

(15)Onthisquestion,seeMThorburn,Justifications,Powers,andAuthority(2008)117YaleLawJournal1070.

(16)Onthisquestion,seeVFNourse,ReconceptualizingCriminalLawDefenses(2003)151UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview1691.

(17)Asdiscussedbelow,manyscholarswhoaddresscriminalresponsibilityalsoaddresstheappropriatescopeofthecriminallaw.Thechargehere(alsodiscussedingreaterdetailbelow)isthattheytreattheissueofcriminalizationasindependentoftheissueofcriminalresponsibility,wheninfacttheseissuesareintertwined.

(18)Onsometheoreticalaccounts,evenaction,properlyunderstood,isdependentonotherpeople.[A]ctionisneverpossibleinisolation;tobeisolatedistobedeprivedofthecapacitytoact.HArendt,TheHumanCondition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1958),188.ButArendtsnormativetheoryofactionissodifferentfromtheaccountsofactionincriminallawtheorythatIthinkitfairtosaythatsheisaddressingadifferentconceptaltogether.

(19)MSMoore,ActandCrime:ThePhilosophyofActionandItsImplicationsforCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993);MSMoore,LawandPsychiatry:RethinkingtheRelationship(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).

(20)MSMoore,MoreonActandCrime(1994)149UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview1749,1753.

(21)Ibid;seealsoMSMoore,MoralRealityRevisited(1992)90MichiganLawReview2424.

(22)MSMoore,TheMoralWorthofRetribution,inFSchoeman(ed),Responsibility,Character,andtheEmotions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987).

(23)MSMoore,LawandPsychiatry,512.

(24)DHusak,ThePhilosophyofCriminalLaw(Rowman&Littlefield,1987);DHusak,DoesCriminalLiabilityRequireAnAct?,inhisThePhilosophyofCriminalLaw:SelectedEssays(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2010)7782.Analternativewayofframing


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acontrol-basedunderstandingofcriminalresponsibilityistoaskwhethertheindividualhadboththecapacityforcontrolandafairopportunitytoexerciseit.HLAHart,PunishmentandResponsibility(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1968),152.

(25)NLacey,StatePunishment.

(26)VTadros,CriminalResponsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).

(27)Ingeneral,thoughobviouslynotinallcases,Iamresponsibleformyactionsandyouareresponsibleforyours.Andthatisbecausemyactionscanbeattributedtomeasanagentandyourstoyou.VTadros,TheScopeandGroundsofResponsibility(2008)11NewCriminalLawReview91.

(28)Tadrosdoesdistinguishbetweenkillingandmurder,andbetweentakingandtheft.Butonhisaccount,thedistinctivewrongfulnessofthosekillingswecallmurder(andthosetakingswecallthefts)appearstodictate,ratherthanfollowfrom,criminalizationchoices.VTadros,CriminalResponsibility,2.ThepoliticalresponsibilityofthosewhomakeandenforcethecriminallawisnotafocusofTadrossaccountinCriminalResponsibility.However,Tadrosdoestakeupquestionsofpolitical,collectiveresponsibilityforcrimeinasubsequentarticle,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility,discussedinmoredetailbelow.

(29)Moore(eg)isattentivetoquestionsabouttheappropriatescopeofthesubstantivecriminallaw,butheseparatesthosequestionsfromtheissueofcriminalresponsibility.SeeegPlacingBlame(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997),3645(ontheconceptofcriminalresponsibility)and758(onthescopeofthecriminallaw).

(30)EgStephenMorse,ImmaturityandResponsibility(1997)88JournalofCriminalLaw&Criminology15,50.

(31)RADuff,AnsweringforCrime:ResponsibilityandLiabilityintheCriminalLaw(Oxford:HartPublishing,2007);CMKorsgaard,CreatingtheKingdomofEnds(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),188;JRPennock,DemocraticPoliticalTheory(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979),267;GWatson,AgencyandAnswerability(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2004);MStone,TheSignificanceofDoingandSuffering,inGPostema(ed),PhilosophyandtheLawofTorts(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),159.

(32)Korsgaard,ibid189.

(33)Ibid.

(34)ThoughKorsgaardalsoemphasizesthatrespectingandholdingresponsiblearenotidentical.Respectforsomeoneshumanityisnotalwaysbestexpressedbyholdinghimresponsibleforeachandeveryaction.Itmaybebettertoadmitthateventhebestofuscanjustslip.Ibid211.


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(35)Ibid189.

(36)Thereareimportantexceptions.Notably,somerecentworkincriminallawtheoryhasemphasizedthepracticaldimensionofresponsibilitythefactthatitisamatterofhumanpractices.RADuff,WhoIsResponsible,forWhat,toWhom(2005)2OhioStateJournalofCriminalLaw441;VTadros,TheScopeandGroundsofResponsibility(2008)NewCriminalLawReview19334192.

(37)CMKorsgaard,CreatingtheKingdomofEnds,197.

(38)Ibid.Blamingactuallyinvolvesbothconceptionsofresponsibility;itrequiresustomakeamoralassessmentofsomeonesaction,onthebasisofatheoreticalexplanationofwhatshedid.Ibid205.

(39)Ibid199.KorsgaardcitesBernardWilliamssdiscussionofGauguininMoralLuck(BWilliams,MoralLuck(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979))andsuggeststhatitmightbereasonableforGauguinsDanishwifetoholdhimresponsiblefordesertingher,andyetnotreasonableforotherstoholdhimresponsibleforthisaction.Forothersuggestionsthatthereasonablenessofholdingresponsibledependsonparticularrelationships,seethediscussionsofRipsteinsreciprocityconceptionofresponsibilityandTadrosonpovertybelow.

(40)Korsgaard,ibid199.

(41)Thispointhasbeenrecognizedbyscholarswhoseeresponsibilityasanecessarybutnotsufficientconditionforpunishment.EgLacey,StatePunishment,69.Alongsimilarlines,ThomasScanlonarguesthatevenifweprivatelyholdanactorresponsible,itisafurtherquestionwhetherweshouldexpressthatjudgmenttohimortoothers.TMScanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),269,276.

(42)Ripstein,JusticeandResponsibility(2004)17CanadianJournalofLaw&Jurisprudence361,366;seealsoRADuff,WhoIsResponsible,forWhat,toWhom?(2005)2OhioStateJournalofCriminalLaw441,442.

(43)Ripstein,ibid363,365.Inthisarticle,Ripsteinisconcernedprimarilywithprivatelawandnotwithcriminalresponsibility.Heoffersasanexampleanindividualwhoas,underconditionsoffullagency,madeaterriblechoicesuchasdefault[ing]onaloanworthmorethanhisassets.Itmaybeappropriatenottoholdthispersonresponsibleforreasonsintrinsictotheconceptofresponsibility.Ibid3835.

(44)Astheyareanswerableforitsfailuresandomissions:fordecisionsnottocriminalizecertainharmfulacts,ornottoenforceparticularlaws,ornottoprotectcertainvictims.Recognizingresponsibilityforthecriminallawneednotimplyanaffirmativedutytopunish,sincearecognitionofresponsibilitydoesnotyettelluswhattodo.Butinemphasizingthatacommunitybearsresponsibilityforitscriminallaw,Idonotmeantoobscurethefactthatitalsowillbearresponsibilityifitfailstorespondtoharmand


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violenceamongitsmembers.

(45)Duff,AnsweringforCrime,53,1913;seealsoRADuff,Punishment,Communication,andCommunity(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),1858.

(46)Duff,AnsweringforCrime,191.

(47)RDelgado,RottenSocialBackground:ShouldtheLawRecognizeaDefenseofSevereEnvironmentalDeprivation?(1985)3Law&Inequality9.

(48)Duff,AnsweringforCrime,192.

(49)Ibid193.

(50)VTadros,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility(2009)43JournalofValueInquiry391,391.

(51)Ibid393.

(52)Tadrosmakesthisclaimtoexplainwhythestate,ifcomplicitincrime,shouldnotholdthecriminalresponsible.[I]nholdinganotherresponsibleforwhathehasdonethroughadefectivepracticeofresponsibility,theaccusermightblockpracticesofresponsibilitythatareclosertotheideal.Ibid403.

(53)Norrie,Punishment,Responsibility,andJustice.Norrieattributesthedominantapproachtocriminalresponsibility,withitsemphasisonindividualagencyandrelativeinattentiontosocialconditionsorcollectiveresponsibility,toKantiantheory.ButasindicatedbythediscussionsofKorsgaardandRipsteinabove,Kantianismdoesnotprecludearelational,contextualizedapproachtoresponsibility.

(54)Norrie,TheLimitsofJustice:FindingFaultintheCriminalLaw(1996)59ModernLawReview540,551.

(55)Ibid192.Asnotedabove,Tadrosexpressesasimilarinquiryinthelanguageofcomplicity.VTadros,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility(2009)43JournalofValueInquiry391,4045.

(56)AHarel,WhyOnlytheStateMayInflictCriminalSanctions:TheArgumentfromMoralBurdens(2007)28CardozoLawReview2629.

(57)Ibid2638.

(58)Ibid.

(59)Ibid263940.

(60)Ibid2643.


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(61)Ibid.

(62)EgKyronHuigens,TheContinuityofJustificationDefenses(2009)2009UniversityofIllinoisLawReview627,6934;Thorburn,Justification,Powers,andAuthority(2008)117YaleLawJournal1070.

(63)EgPeoplevLovercamp(1974)43CalApp3d823.

(64)Tobeclear,evenordinaryincarceration,intheabsenceofphysicalattacksbyprisonofficialsorfellowprisoners,isviolentinthesensethatitinvolvestheuseofsuperiorphysicalforceagainstanembodied,andthusvulnerable,humanbeing.Aprivateindividualwhoconfinedcaptivesincageswouldalmostcertainlybeclassifiedasaviolentoffender.Nevertheless,someobserversresistthelanguageofviolenceinthecontextofofficial,state-sanctioned,andthusarguablylegitimateusesofforce.Ibeginwithnoassumptionsaboutthelegitimacyofpunishment(orthenecessaryillegitimacyofviolence),andfindthetermviolencetobethebestdescriptionoftheuseofphysicalforceagainsthumanbodies.

(65)MWalzer,PoliticalAction:TheProblemofDirtyHands(1973)2Philosophy&PublicAffairs160.

(66)JPSartre,DirtyHands,inNoExitandThreeOtherPlays(NewYork:VintageInternational,1989),218.

(67)ARistroph,GamesPunishersPlay,inPRobinson,SGarvey,andKFerzan(eds),CriminalLawConversations(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009);ARistroph,RespectandResistanceinPunishmentTheory(2009)97CaliforniaLawReview601.Ihavearguedelsewherethatpunishmentisatbestincompletelyorimperfectlylegitimate.Ibid.Thisclaimisnotequivalenttopenalabolitionism.Instead,itisaclaimthatcrimeoftenpresentsaliberaldemocraticstatewithatragicdilemma.Toleavecrimesunpunishedmayproduceintolerableconsequences,buttoimposepunishmentwillviolatevariousliberalprinciples.

(68)BoumedienevBush(2008)128SCt2229,2247.

(69)AHarel,WhyOnlytheStateMayInflictCriminalSanctions:TheCaseAgainstPrivatelyInflictedSanctions(2008)14LegalTheory113,130.

(70)ThisdangerwasthethemeofmuchofHannahArendtswork.SeeegHAArendt,ResponsibilityandJudgment(JKohned,NewYork:SchockenBooks,2003);HAArendt,EichmanninJerusalem:AReportontheBanalityofEvil(NewYork:VikingPress,1963).


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