The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 13 | Number 3 | Article ID 4917 | Jul 01, 2016

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Retaking Japan: The Abe Administration’s Campaign toOverturn the Postwar Constitution

Muto Ichiyo

Translated by John Junkerman

Muto Ichiyo

Translator’s note: This is a translation of akeynote speech delivered by Muto Ichiyo at apeace conference held in Hiroshima Aug. 4-5,2015, marking the 70th anniversary of Japan’sdefeat in the war. The conference, attended by300 local and national activists, sought to shednew light on the war responsibility of imperialJapan and US responsibility for the atomicbombings. The text has been revised andupdated for the Asia-Pacific Journal.

The speech was made during a summer of

intense public protests over security legislationthen being debated in the Japanese Diet.Despite opinion polls that showed thelegislation to be exceedingly unpopular, thelaws were rammed through the Diet onSeptember 19, 2015. These contentious issueshave now entered a new stage, with the driveto revise Japan’s peace constitution at thecenter of the Upper House election scheduledfor July 10. Muto’s speech analyzes the issuesthat lie behind the present contest in light ofthe complex dynamics of Japan’s postwarpolitics. JJ

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The struggle over reshaping postwar Japanentered a new phase on March 2, 2016, whenPrime Minister Abe Shinzo declared at anUpper House Budget Committee hearing thathe was committed to revising the constitutionwithin his term of office, that is, by September2018. Changing the postwar regime byfundamentally revising the present pacifistconstitution has been Abe’s goal since hereturned to power in 2012, but for some timehe had avoided clearly stating his plan,knowing that the majority of voters opposeconstitutional revision.

In the three elections that have taken placeduring his administration (including the onethat returned him to power in 2012), Abe hastrumpeted “Abenomics,” ultra-lax monetaryand fiscal policies aimed at extracting theeconomy from deflation by stimulating

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consumer spending, as his main politicalprogram. However, while campaigning on itseconomic policies, since the elections the Abeadministration has pressed forward withchanges in laws, systems, and institutions toheighten Japan’s defense posture andundermine the constraints on Japan’s armedforces imposed by Japan’s constitution.

For example, after the LDP scored a victory inthe 2013 Upper House e lect ion, Abesignificantly increased defense spending andpushed through the controversial State SecretsAct in December of that year. The most blatantaction in this direction was the Cabinet’sdecision in July 2014 to reverse a long-standinginterpretation of the constitution; for decadesthe Cabinet Legislative Bureau had held thatArticle 9 of the constitution prohibited theJapanese Self-Defense Forces from exercisingthe right of collective self-defense. Reversingthis interpretation meant that Japan couldcome to the aid of an ally under attack, even ifJapan itself was not attacked. In line with thisdecision, a set of laws called the “securitylegislation” was drawn up and presented to theDiet in May 2015.

This called forth strong popular protest, whichmounted over the summer into the largestdemonstrations in Japan since the 1970s.Thousands of citizens mobilized spontaneously,joined by peace and other movement groupsfrom earlier decades. After many years ofabsence, students joined the rallies in front ofthe Diet, demonstrating in ways markedlydifferent from those of the traditional left. Eachindividual speaker delivered personalmessages, telling her or his particular reasonsfor confronting Abe and his power grab. Inplace of the standard shouted slogans of pastdemonstrations, their rhythmic, rap-influencedcall and response lent spirit and buoyancy tothe rallies.

One of the developments that spurred thedemonstrations was the testimony in the Diet

by three leading constitutional scholars in earlyJune 2015, unanimously advising that theproposed secur i t y l eg i s l a t i on wasunconstitutional. This delivered a bombshell tothe LDP, as two of the scholars were known fortheir conservative views, and one was invited tothe hearing by the LDP itself. Subsequentsurveys of constitutional scholars found anearly unanimous consensus that thelegislation was unconstitutional. Until thatpoint, the Diet deliberations had focused on thevarious individual provisions of the legislation,but their testimony shifted the focus to theunconstitutionality of the entire package oflegislation.

This added momentum to the keen sense ofcrisis already motivating the public to action,the perception that the security legislationwould change Japan into a country that wouldfight wars. This alarmed young people. Inaddition to the issue of unconstitutionality, theissue of peace—and whether there would be amilitary draft—loomed large in their eyes.

Protest against National Security Law, 30August 2015

Public anger at what came to be called Abe’s“war legislation” heightened and more andmore people joined the demonstrations at theDiet. On August 30, more than 100,000occupied the broad avenue in front of the Diet,

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overwhelming steel barricades set up by theriot police. The demonstrations became aneveryday affair, involving ever new groups ofpeople.

The Diet deliberations on the bill were a shamas Abe and his ministers refused to seriouslyanswer opposition interpellators. OnSeptember 17, the bill was forced through anUpper House committee and then passed onSeptember 19 by the full house, where theLDP-Komeito coalition government holds amajority.

Protest against National Security Law, 15September 2015

National Security Law bill forcibly passedin Upper House, 17 September 2015

The Abe administration used this victory toadvance two major policy positions. The first isto promote the doctrine of deterrence. Arguingthat the international security environment has

drastically changed, specifically pointing toChina and the danger it poses, they argue thatit is necessary to strengthen the Japan-USalliance to counter the threat. Second, theyargue that, if the security legislation violatesthe constitution, then the constitution shouldbe changed. In the upcoming Upper Houseelection, Abe has set an explicit goal ofobtaining a two-thirds majority of seats for theLDP and its allies, which will allow them toinitiate the revision of the constitution.

So, what is at the heart of these issues? What isthe Abe administration attempting toaccomplish?

A Semi-Coup d’état in Process

The Abe administration is the first postwaradministration to call for and attempt to carryout a “change of regime.” In the 1980s, PMNakasone Yasuhiro called for “settling theaccounts of postwar politics,” which closelyresembles “breaking with the postwar regime,”the slogan of the first Abe Cabinet (2006–07).In Nakasone’s case, the slogan was mererhetoric. Abe, however, may be able to realizehis goals.

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Hasegawa Michiko, Karagokoro

What he has been carrying out is a form ofcoup d’état. The evidence for this is that he hasplaced men and women under his command insome of the most important positions inJapanese society. In the United States, whenthe president changes, the personnel inWashington change dramatically. This has beenfar less true in Japan, but Abe moved quickly toconsolidate his hold on government after hereturned to power in 2012. He placed peoplewho will follow his lead in positions such as thegovernor of the Bank of Japan (to do hisbidding with his Abenomics agenda); thedirector-general of the Cabinet LegislativeBureau (to revise the official interpretation ofthe constitution); and the chairman of NHK (toensure more favorable political coverage). Thecharacter of these appointments was typifiedby Saitama University emeritus professor

Hasegawa Michiko, who was installed on theNHK Board of Governors. Hasegawa haswritten in the journal of the ultra-right NipponKaigi organization:

Depopulation might destroy Japan. It is oftendescribed as a disorder of advanced civilizationbut, looking around the world, there issomething else involved here. It is the diseaseof feminism. Feminism is the activist movementof women who can’t abide the fact that they arewomen. Stated more concretely, raisingchildren well, protecting the family, nurturingfine children, men and women marrying whenthey reach the proper age, and as a matter ofcourse, having children after they marry.Feminism rejects all of this.

While calling for a “society where womenshine,” Abe appointed someone who thinks thisway to the NHK Board of Governors. Theappointment required Diet approval, and it wasquestioned in the Upper House budgetcommittee hearings on March 12, 2014.According to the Asahi Shimbun, “Aberesponded, ‘She is one of the country’s leadingphilosophers, studying thought and philosophyand writing such books as Karagokoro: NihonSeishin no Gyakusetsu [Chinese Heart: TheParadox of the Japanese Spirit].’” This isunbelievable. This notorious right-wing thinkeris appointed to a key position at NHK. The firstthing a coup d’état administration does is tooccupy the controlling heights, especiallyasserting control over broadcasting. This is theAbe methodology, grabbing state power inwhat amounts to a virtual coup d’état.

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Establishment of Office for the promotionof building a society where all womenshine

Then comes the security legislation. It isevident to all that the laws are unconstitutional,but the administration tries to push themthrough with a logic that has no logic. To startwith, “changing the regime” or “changing thesystem” would normally necessitate changingthe constitution. The LDP drafted a revisedconstitution in April 2012, when it was out ofpower. The Abe administration has alwayspromoted constitutional revision, and the firstAbe Cabinet made moves in this direction, in2007 revising the Fundamental Law onEducation, the “constitution” of the educationalsystem, to promote patriotic education. He alsopushed through legislation to establish theframework for the public referendums that arenecessary to ratify any changes to theconstitution.

In September 2007, Abe left power, apparentlyill, and the first Abe Cabinet ended in failure.Abe hoped to push for constitutional revisionwhen he launched his second cabinet inDecember 2012, but he realized that he lackedthe required two-thirds of the vote in the UpperHouse, and the prospects were not good forwinning a majority in a national referendum to

approve the amendments. So he first proposedchanging Article 96 of the constitution, whichrequires two-thirds vote in both houses of theDiet to initiate an amendment; he aimed tolower the threshold to one-half of each house ofthe Diet to make it easier to enact the LDP’samendments. This proposal was not only veryunpopular, but was dismissed by constitutionalscholars as a “backdoor” approach, and Abeabandoned it.

What the administration did instead, with thecollective security legislation, was to effectivelychange the constitution without going throughthe formal process of revision. While in recentdecades LDP-led governments have regularlyrevised the interpretation of the constitution toallow the dispatch of the SDF overseas (for UNpeacekeeping operations and for support of theUS-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), thislegislation represented a more fundamentalchange. Its passage constituted a “semi-coupd’état.” What would normally be possible onlyafter revision of the constitution (a successfulcoup d’état) the Abe administration carried outunder and in the name of the presentconstitution. They had to find a way to make anunconstitutional act fit the constitution.Somewhat ineffectually, LDP Vice PresidentKomura Masahiko invoked the 1959 SupremeCourt decision in the Sunagawa Incident (aruling that US bases in Japan did not violateArticle 9 of the constitution), an entirelyfarfetched rationale. The administration thenargued that it understood the geostrategicreality Japan faces, and the necessity forcollective self-defense, better than the nation’sconstitutional scholars. But in the end, theysimply used their parliamentary majorities toforce through the legislation.

A Nonsensical Understanding of History

In July 2013, Vice PM Aso Taro said thatconstitutional revision should be carried outquietly, without a fuss. He suggested that Japanlearn from the example of the Nazis who,

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having won an electoral victory under theWeimar Constitution, replaced it with a Naziconstitution without the German peoplenoticing. This was a misreading of history,since the Nazis, rather than amend theconstitution, instead used the Enabling Act toeffectively suspend the constitution and grantHitler emergency powers. But in any case Aso’sintention was to avoid a frontal assault on theconstitution and use the weight of accumulatedunconstitutional changes to make it easier tobreach the walls preventing revision when thetime came.

The Japanese situation is very different fromthe Nazi era. The Nazis came to power duringthe Great Depression when society had falleninto chaos; the Communist Party had grown viaintense class struggle, and in that context theNazis gained strength and took control of theReichstag. It was a time of social upheaval.Today’s Japan is entirely different. To be sure,the LDP enjoys majority support, but thesesupporters think it is the LDP of old. Theprevious DPJ administrations were soineffectual that the LDP was simply returned topower; people didn’t vote to endorse Abe’sscheme to gut the constitution. Therefore, inpublic opinion polls since the start of theadministration, the Cabinet’s basic policieshave never had majority support. An oddsituation has prevailed, where support for basicpolicies has been far below 50%, while supportfor the Cabinet has been around 50% (thoughsupport fell below this level during the Dietdeliberations on the security legislation). Thus,though the weakness of the opposition hasenabled the LDP to win successive elections,the Abe administration’s social foundation isnot at all solid, nor is it broad.

However, the Abe Cabinet has at its base asolid core of ultra-right organizations. Amajority of the LDP Diet members (and quite afew from other parties) belong to Nippon Kaigiand/or are affiliated with other right-winggroups, constituting the so-called “Yasukuni

faction.” One indication of the ideology of thesegroups is seen in the example of TamogamiToshio, the ex-Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force. Tamogami was fired in 2008after he won an essay contest by arguing thatthe Comintern caused the ManchurianIncident, that the Xi’an Incident that led to theanti-Japanese united front in China was a setupby Stalin, and other assertions that have asmuch credibility as warnings of UFO attacks.But PM Abe appeared at an “Evening in Thanksto Tamo-chan,” and delivered the followingpaean to Tamogami. “In every era there arepeople who have the courage to say, ‘This iswrong,’ and to sound the alarm for the world,sometimes risking their jobs, and sometimesrisking their lives. It is on account of suchpeople that the times move in the properdirection.” That’s the kind of ridiculoushistorical consciousness the prime ministerhas.

Abe Shinzo: "Retake Japan"

The slogans of the first Abe Cabinet were“Toward a Beautiful Japan” and “Breaking with

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the Postwar Regime.” Now the slogan is“Retake Japan.” The premise is that somethinghas been lost. What is it? It is the essence ofthe Empire of Japan. To Abe, the “postwar” hasbeen an extremely unfortunate era. The reasonis that the honor of the glorious Japaneseempire was denied and the Occupation imposedthe constitution on Japan.

It is not only Abe who thinks this way; thisthinking is fairly deeply rooted in postwarJapanese leadership long dominated by theLDP. In fact it is my contention that in thepostwar Japanese state, the continuity of theJapanese empi re was preserved , i fsurreptitiously, as a principle of the legitimacyof the state.

The Incompatibi l i ty between theConstitution and the United States

A state must be organized around certainlegitimizing principles. The state is all mighty,so it can legally kill people. It can fight wars.When it fights a war, it can take people’s lives,and those who are sent to war die. In order toundertake these things, it is necessary for thestate to have legitimizing principles. Unless thestate has fundamental, legitimizing principles,it can hardly ask the people to risk their livesfor the state. What were the legitimizingprinciples of the postwar Japanese state?

The United States has the Declaration ofIndependence as its legitimizing document.France has the Declaration of the Rights ofMan from the time of the French Revolution.Sometimes the actual functioning of the statediverges from those fundamental principles; inthese cases, the actions must be fudged or anexcuse found to justify them. The legitimizingprinciple in the prewar Japanese empire wasthe sovereignty of the emperor. Everything thatwas done by the imperial state in his majesty’sname was legitimate and justified. The invasionof Ainu homelands, the annexation of theRyukyu kingdom, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, the annexation of Korea, the

invasion of China, the Great East Asia War—allof these were justified in the name of theemperor.

Japan surrendered in 1945, and the empire lostits legitimacy. The Occupation began, theconstitution was created, and the postwar statewas born. So, what provided legitimacy for thepostwar state? First of all, the Constitution ofJapan. This is the foundational law of thepostwar state and the source of its legitimacyand justification. Or, it was supposed to be.However, in fact, not everything the Japanesestate did could be justified and legitimized bythe constitution. Why? Because of the presenceof the US military throughout the postwarperiod. On the very day in September 1951 thatthe San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed atthe Opera House, PM Yoshida Shigeruproceeded alone to the Presidio military baseand signed the Security Treaty. The PeaceTreaty stated that foreign military forces wouldwithdraw within 90 days, but it included anexception for the Security Treaty, and USforces would remain in Japan for an indefinitetime after its independence.

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Even more significant, Japanese armedforces—proscribed by the constitution—werecreated by order of Douglas MacArthur, thesupreme commander of the Occupation, overthe heads of the Japanese Diet. This was in1950, soon after the Korean War began, andthey were called the National Police Reserve.The reserve force was intended to fill thevacuum that was created when most of theAllied forces stationed in Japan were shifted tothe Korean Peninsula to engage in full-scalewar. At this time, the term “indirect invasion”was coined. Normally, an invasion means aforeign army landing on the shores of acountry, but i f large-scale r iots anddisturbances in Japan were considered to haveoccurred through instigation or intervention byan outside power, they would be deemed anindirect invasion; and it was the National PoliceReserve that was to deal with the “invasion.”Moreover, under the 1951 security treaty, USforces may be utilizedto put down suchdisturbances in Japan. As is clear from their

origin, the postwar Japanese armed forceswere, and have ever been, an alien entity in theJapanese state. From the start, they were a partof the US military system, and as they grew,they came to function as a part of the Americanstrategic posture. They do so to this day.

There is a commitment to interoperability inthe Japan-US defense guidelines, so since 1951the US military and the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) have shared weapons and equipment,war plans, logistics, operational manuals,terminology, and communication and othersystems. The body that exists as the Japanesemilitary has been organically incorporated intoand subordinated to the US military. In otherwords, the state power of the US has beeninternalized in the Japanese state. This meansthat the principle of United States hegemonyhas been integrated into the Japanese nationand plays a role as one of its legitimizingprinciples.

The Japanese Empire as a Third Principle

The conflict between the pacifist principles ofJapan’s constitution and the Americanhegemonic principle has long been contested,for example in the anti-base movement in the1950s. In this context, constitutional scholarssuch as Hoshino Yasusaburo pointed out thatthe constitution and the Security Treaty systemexist in Japan as parallel, contradictory legaland ruling systems. This is clear when we lookat postwar domestic developments in Japan.For example, Okinawa, which was under thecontrol of a US military government, wasseparated from Japan in 1952 when the SFPeace Treaty came into effect. The militarygovernment of Okinawa made it a US militarycolony that fit into no category of internationallaw.

An agreement was reportedly reached at thetime of the SF Peace Treaty, whereby the USrecognized Japan’s “residual” sovereignty inOkinawa. This was considered a victory forJapanese diplomacy. Some even argue that the

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emperor’s message, proposing that the USadminister Okinawa indefinitely,1 helped winthe acknowledgment of “residual” sovereignty(translated into Japanese as senzai shuken, or“latent sovereignty”).

We can see here an example of how thelegitimizing principle of the US state—thep r i n c i p l e o f h e g e m o n y , o f P a xAmericana—became incorporated as a principleof the Japanese state. Through its latentsovereignty, the Japanese state retained controlover Okinawa, while it remained in substance amilitary colony of the US. When Okinawa wasreturned to Japan in 1972, its status was one ofan internal colony of Japan, while theconcentration of US bases there ensured that itwould continue to be a US military colony.

However, in postwar Japan, there is a thirdfundamental principle. This is something thathas normally remained hidden. It is the manner

in which the Empire of Japan survived withinthe postwar Japanese state. The most importantvehicle for the survival of this legitimizingprinciple was the postwar emperor system.

The prewar and wartime emperor was not at allan ornament, but rather was the generalissimowho rode out from the palace in uniform on awhite horse. A photograph of this scene wasdisplayed on the walls of many homes. Thisman led his country in successive wars, hisarmy was responsible for the deaths of tens ofmillions of people in Asia, and millions of hisown soldiers and Japanese civilians died. Manyof those soldiers starved to death. And he lostthe war. Despite being the commander in chiefof the war, after his government surrendered tothe allies, he retained the title of emperor andcontinued to live in the Imperial Palace.

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Edwin Reischauer in 1961 by AlfredEisenstaedt

The logic of this was spelled out as early as1942 by the Japan scholar and later USambassador Edwin Reischauer, who advisedthe US government to exploit the emperor tomaintain control after defeating Japan.2 Themaintenance and exploitation of the emperorsystem was carefully prepared by the StateDepartment and implemented by theOccupation. MacArthur was adept at using theemperor. The general issued solemnstatements in the form of New Years messagesand the like, but he seldom appeared in public.This was similar to the prewar emperor.MacArthur remained ensconced in theOccupation headquarters in central Tokyo.Instead, it was the emperor who was sent outon numerous tours through Japan, exposed tothe public eye.

MacArthur made strenuous efforts to ensurethat the emperor, far from being prosecuted oreven forced to testify in the Tokyo war crimestrial, retained the throne. He promoted aconstitution that removed the governingauthority of the emperor, while preserving hisstatus (in Article 1) as “the symbol of the stateand of the unity of the people.” This was donerapidly so the draft would be ready before theFar Eastern Commission (which would have theauthority to decide policies for the occupationof Japan) could be set up and issue a directiveto prosecute the emperor . The draftconstitution was comparatively democratic,with content that would not raise objectionsamong the public in either the Soviet Union orthe US. That constitution was adopted, so thepostwar emperor system is often referred to asan American-made system.

International Military Tribunal for the FarEast, 1946

Thus Emperor Hirohito, who had the highestresponsibility for the war, was left unpunishedand did not abdicate. The consequence of thiswas that it limited the punishment of those whoacted under his orders and in his name. Theentire responsibility for the war was shifted toGeneral Tojo Hideki and the other Class-A warcriminals, seven of whom were executed eventhough the emperor was their supremecommander. The emperor became a “symbol ofpeace,” credited not with waging the disastrousfifteen year war but with the surrender. Theresult was that, following the execution of theClass-A war criminals, with Hirohito remainingon the throne, the Japanese state could do nomore to punish war responsibility.

Restoring the Honor of the Class-A WarCriminals

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Kimura Tokutaro

In this fashion, a vessel was created to preserveand nurture the idea that the wartime actionsof the empire were not wrong, and even thatthey were right. After the Occupation ended,the legitimizing principle of the prewar empirewas clearly retained within the Japanesegovernment. On May 1, 1952, immediatelyafter Japan regained its independence on April28, Attorney General Kimura Tokutaro issued anotice that stated that war criminals who hadbeen put to death were not “executed” butinstead had suffered “death during legal duty”(hōmushi).3 This is a term that was never usedbefore or since. It was an official measure thatrestored honor by declaring that all of the warcriminals who were put to death had not diedas punishment for committing crimes. At thesame time, the cause of death in the familyregisters of these individuals was changed from

“execution” to “death during legal duty,” andthe payment of war pension benefits wasresumed. The San Francisco Peace Treatyincludes a clause that states that Japan acceptsthe judgments of the war crimes trials. Butimmediately after the treaty came into effect,the honor of the Class-A war criminals wasrestored. Doing this in such short orderindicates the existence of a strong state will.There is more. In 1952 and 1953, the Dietvoted three times to approve the release ofimprisoned war criminals. A few members ofthe Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and theLabor-Farmer Party were opposed, but themeasures passed with nearly unanimoussupport, including from the Japan SocialistParty. A petition in support of releasing allimprisoned war criminals gathered 40 millionsignatures. During the Diet debate, onesupporter of the release described all convictedwar criminals as victims of the war.4 Thegrounds for demanding the release of warcriminals was that the Tokyo trial representedvictor’s justice, which is what the right wingstill asserts today.

It is certainly true that the Tokyo trial wasvictor’s justice and lacking in fairness, but ifthat was the case, then Japan should haveconducted proper trials of its own. In the warthey initiated, the leaders of the Japaneseempire committed crimes, not only againstpeople in foreign countries but against theirown people. Contemporaries should have said,“We’ll try them on our own.” If there weremany flawed convictions among the B- and C-Class war criminals, then their own countryshould have held new trials and brought theseto light. But the thinking during the Dietdeliberations was that all of the war criminalswere victims of the war, to be told, “Sorry foryour hardship, welcome back.”

Thus postwar Japan created a sphere ofimmunity from responsibility. In this sphere,the thinking that the Empire of Japan had beenright was kept alive within the postwar

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Japanese state, and this thinking was then putinto action. The best evidence of this is in theMinistry of Education’s textbook authorizationprocess. The ministry (now the Ministry ofEducation, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology, MEXT) has followed a policy ofconcealing, to the extent possible, the warcrimes and horrifying actions committed byimperial Japan. As typified by the order toreword “invasion” as “advance,” the will of thestate is transmitted to the schools. When thiswas exposed internationally, it developed into adiplomatic issue, the “Japanese textbookproblem.”

In the field of foreign affairs, the Japanesegovernment has always taken the position thatthe annexation of Korea was legitimate. TheTokyo trial had narrowed the timeframe forJapanese war crimes to after 1931, so the 1910annexation was outside its scope. There was arisk involved in addressing the issue during thetrial. The US and Japan had reached anunderstanding in 1905, the secret Taft-KatsuraAgreement,5 that after the Russo-Japanese Warended, the US would recognize Japanesecontrol over Korea, while Japan wouldrecognize American control of the Philippines.This is one important reason why the trial didnot address the annexation of Korea.

In this fashion, the principle of imperialcontinuity, which the new constitutionostensibly disavowed by making the emperor a“symbol,” was retained and implemented by thepostwar state wherever possible. This indeedwas a third principle of the postwar state,which could not be spoken about openly. Butbecause it was a legitimizing principle of thestate, every action the Empire of Japan hadtaken, from the seizure of Ainu lands andRyukyu, through the invasion of China and thePacific War could be treated as legitimate.

To repeat, it is my view that the postwarJapanese state is formed from these threelegit imizing principles—the postwar

constitution, American hegemony, and thecontinuity of imperial Japan. The three havecontinued to exist in a relationship of mutualincompatibility. The first and second arevisible, while the existence of the third isusually denied or downplayed. None in fact wasable to assert itself at the expense of theothers. As a result, none of these threeprinciples has been able to attain the status ofthe fundamental principle.

Sunagawa Incident, 1955

There is a need to consider the merits of theJapanese constitution, but what has made theprinciple of pacifism embodied in Article 9function as an effective principle of the stateand society is the strength of the movement

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from below. The state itself has not been ableto properly use the principle of pacifism as aprinciple. The decision of the Tokyo DistrictCourt in the case of the Sunagawa Incident wasthat the Security Treaty violated Article 9 andwas unconstitutional. At that moment, theJapanese state recognized the pacifist principleas the foundational principle of the state.However, immediately afterward, SupremeCourt Justice Tanaka Kotaro (the presidingjustice for the Sunagawa case) met with USAmbassador Douglas MacArthur II and thenissued a baffling ruling declaring that theSecurity Treaty fell into the category of a“ p o l i t i c a l a c t , ” a n d t h e r e f o r e i t sconstitutionality could not be judged throughthe process of “judicial determination.” Withthat, the Japanese state transformed thepacifist principle into a pseudo-principle.

Then, did American hegemony attain full statusas a principle? No, it didn’t, because of thestrong force of such movements as the anti-Security Treaty struggles of 1960 and 1970.The US hegemonic principle is “freedom,”which equated to anti-Communism. Japan didnot become an anti-communist state the wayGermany did immediately after the war; duringthe early postwar administration of KonradAdenauer, for example, the slogan “better deadthan red” gained currency. Thus, none of thethree principles gained ascendancy, and theJapanese state saw to it that they coexistedreasonably well, using them each when it wasappropriate. As a result, all three lost theirqualification as fundamental principles.

It was the LDP that took best advantage of thissituation, and was able to remain in power fordecades. Standing in opposition to this was theso-called progressive forces. The largest ofthese, the JSP, had as its political base 4.5million organized workers of the Sohyo laborfederation. In addition were the JCP and apolitical bloc of progressive intellectuals. Theseformed the opposit ion to the LDP-ledgovernment. This postwar progressive force

embraced the constitution’s pacifist principleas a principle, and forced the state to respectconstitutional pacifism as a fundamentalprinciple the state should adhere to. However,there was a major weakness. This force sawpeace entirely from the perspective of domesticJapan. In their perception war was somethingthat would attack peaceful Japan from theoutside, and it was enough to avoid that. Withthis mode of thinking, all that mattered waspeace within Japan, and the movement tendedtoward the conservative goal of maintainingpeace, i.e., the status quo.

The Beheiren and Zenkyoto Movements

In the second half of the 1960s, a newmovement emerged as distinct from thetraditional left. Beheiren (the official Englishtitle is Japan “Peace for Vietnam” Committee;the literal translation is Citizen’s Coalition forPeace in Vietnam), Zenkyoto (All-Campus JointStruggle Committee), and later, the women’sliberation movement came on the scene. Mostvisible were the intense street demonstrationswhere New Left sects clashed with the riotpolice and the Zenkyoto campus struggles thatoccupied and shut down universities.Meanwhile the struggles in Sanrizuka andMinamata spread their strong impactnationwide as local movements againstenvironmental pollution and development, andBeheiren’s activities to help deserters from theUS military gained attention. There was aneruption of every form of resistance, and theycreated an unexpectedly large and dynamicsphere of political activism.

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The political movements of that era overturnedwhat was considered common sense by earlierJapanese movements. Earlier movements wereaimed at protecting something—protectingpeace, which over time came to mean thestatus quo. In the context of rapid economicgrowth, the “peace” that representedresistance in 1960 shifted to the maintenanceof the status quo. In contrast, the movements ofthe late 1960s pointed to the status quo itselfas the problem: It came to be understood thatJapan was already complicit in the Americanwar in Vietnam, and that relationship had to bechanged then and now. That was an essentialcharacteristic of the new movement. And in themidst of it, the concept of fundamentalprinciples of state and society was refined andenriched. I think we can see in this newmovement process the crystallization of theconcept of the right to live in peace (heiwa-tekiseizon ken), integrating three elements in theconstitution, namely, the pacifist statement inthe preamble, renunciation of war and armedforces in Article 9, and the people’s right to lifeand the pursuit of happiness in Article 13.

I think we also need to take a look at changesin the underlying structure that sustained theworkings of the postwar state. This is whatamounts to the national territory-centeredmode of capital accumulation of postwarJapanese capitalism. This economic structureunderlay the LDP’s ability to rule more or lesssecurely by manipulating the three otherwise

incompatible legitimizing principles. Thestructure combined large-scale landdevelopment, siting industrial estates along thecoastlines; the systemization of largeenterprises and their small- and medium-sizedsubcontractors; the system of food control(price support for rice farmers); and pork-barrel politics using the national coffers, all ofwhich were instrumental to achieving rapideconomic growth. As long as this functionedwell, politics sorted itself out. There was littleneed to politically mobilize citizens. Theeconomy was the stand-in for politics.

This began to crumble in the late 1980s, asneoliberalism and globalization underminedthis foundation. The economic cycle that wascontained within Japan broke down, which inturn eroded the LDP’s polit ical base.Meanwhile, privatization, especially of thenational railways, began to rapidly underminethe base of public sector labor unions, and in1989, the Sohyo confederation was absorbed bythe corporate-oriented Rengo federation. Thisleft the JSP without its main organizationalsupport, and it fell into decline.

1995 was, in numerous ways, the beginning ofthe present era.

That year saw the advent of the MurayamaTomiichi Cabinet. The LDP, JSP, and the NewParty Sakigake formed a strange-bedfellowscoalition, with the LDP giving the premiershipto JSP Chairman Murayama in order to cobbletogether a majority in the Diet, with theinclusion of the smaller Sakigake. It was amoment when two conflicting currents crossedpaths. One was the emergence of wartimecompensation claims, including those of“military comfort women,” which resulted in asuccession of court cases. Within Japan, therewas a growing tendency to acknowledge theseclaims, and a movement emerged calling fornew inquiries into wartime victimization.

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Murayama Cabinet

It was also around this time that rightwingforces seeking to justify imperial Japan began asimultaneous offensive on a number of fronts.Nippon Kaigi formed as a broad coalition of allthe ultra-right forces. The Society for HistoryTextbook Reform was launched, textbooksreflecting their nationalistic historical stancewere produced, and an effort was begun tohave the texts adopted by Japanese schools.This finally brought the third legitimizingprinciple—imperial continuity—to the fore, andwith that principle at the core a full-fledgedmove was launched to revise the constitutionand replace the postwar state with a statebased on the principles they adhere to. Tenyears later, Abe Shinzo, deeply identified withthese rightist campaigns, formed his firstcabinet. This rightist force does not actuallyhave a strong base in the wider society. Butduring these years, the counter force on theleft has grown weaker, both organizationallyand philosophically. The impact of the collapseof socialism has been great, and no new visionfor transforming society has been gainedmomentum. In that context, the right has takenadvantage of the opportunity to fan the flamesof xenophobia. Bookstores are flooded withanti-Chinese and anti-Korean books, ephemeralas they may be. This should not be takenlightly.

Abe’s Policies Could Destroy Japan-China

Relations

One concern is that, as long as the Abeadministration stands on the principle that theJapanese empire was legitimate, that couldundermine the premise of Japan’s relationswith China. As long as Abe embraces the ideathat the Nanking massacre never happened, orthat comfort women were simply prostitutes,that the Chinese war of resistance againstJapan was a Comintern conspiracy—even if hesugarcoats these beliefs in his publicdeclarations—he cannot build a stablerelationship with China or South Korea.Politically, PM Abe will not say these thingsopenly, but it is clear from his statements fromthe time the LDP was still out of power, that histrue beliefs differ very little from those ofTamogami.

The foundations of the Japanese relationshipwith China were set in clear terms in the jointcommunique that established diplomaticrelations in 1972. There it was stated thatJapan, “keenly conscious of the responsibilityfor the serious damage that Japan caused in thepast to the Chinese people through war, deeplyreproaches itself.” If this statement isoverturned, friendly relations with Chinabecome impossible.

Japanese officials say that they welcome top-level talks and the door is always open, butsince PM Abe affirms Japan’s imperial past,meeting with him would mean giving China’sstamp of approval to those views, and China isnot about to do that.

Even more to the point, Abe has developed andseeks to implement something like a globaldoctrine that makes relations with Chinaimpossible. Abe often says in his speeches, “Icreate my strategy by looking at a globe.” Whatkind of strategy? He proposes to organize an“arc of liberty and prosperity,” running fromEurope through the Middle East, to India,Southeast Asia, and Japan, an alliance ofcountries with shared values led by Japan,

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advancing economic development andguaranteeing mutual security. This is clearly aChina containment policy. It is virtuallyimpossible to build friendly relations withChina on that foundation.

John Kerry and Chuck Hagel at theChidorigafuchi National Cemetery, 3October 2013

When it comes to relations with the US, there’sno way the US will accept the stance that theGreat East Asia War was legitimate. As a result,US-Japan relations were very tense for a while.In October 2013, when Secretary of State JohnKerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagelarrived in Japan for negotiations on the US-Japan defense guidelines, their first stop was tomake an offering at the ChidorigafuchiNational Cemetery, (which houses a memorialto unidentified war dead and is considered aneutral war memorial compared to thepoliticized Yasukuni Shrine). It was a forcefulexpression of displeasure. Shortly afterward,PM Abe made a visit to Yasukuni. The USe m b a s s y i s s u e d a s t a t e m e n t o f“disappointment” over his decision to do so.Abe’s stance creates cracks in the Japan-USrelationship.

Abe visiting Yasukuni Shrine, 26 December2013

The US and China have created a dynamicrelationship, which I have called “compositehegemony.” The US has no intention of fightinga war with China or building a wall ofcontainment. It aims to maintain a balancedrelationship, mixing confrontation andcooperation, while implicitly acknowledgingthat the two countries will exercise control overAsia and the Pacific. Pivoting its globalstrategic thrust toward Asia, while facing thepressure of cuts to its military budget, the USseeks to shift some of the burden onto analliance of Japan, Australia, and South Korea,creating what amounts to a standingmultinational force. It aims to exploit Japan tothis end. It expects Japan to provide funds, andto make the SDF a force that the US militarycan more easily utilize.

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The third Armitage-Nye report (2012) containsa series of recommendations, such as restartingJapan’s nuclear reactors and increasing themarine-corps capabilities of the Ground Self-Defense Force. It supports removingrestrictions on collective self defense, but itdoes not back revising the constitution. To theUS, revising the constitution in what amountsto an open embrace of imperial continuity is ared flag. Except for this, the Abe administrationaccepted the recommendations across theboard, and started to implement them. Abesees th is as the way to mainta in therelationship with the US.

The desire to build the country on the thirdfundamental principle of imperial continuity,and the subordination of Japan to the US areinterlinked in a peculiar way. Abe wants toreturn Japan to its prewar imperial status andreturn to the ranks of the world powers, with astrong mil i tary in place. But, for theforeseeable future, Japan cannot go against theUS, in particular it cannot become a nuclearpower. So, what can it do? It can curry favorwith the US and fulfill the role of subcontractorto the US military. The more Abe follows theYasukuni course, however, the more the US canraise the price of supporting his government.

The Future Outlook

The fight to change this dynamic is, therefore,a struggle in the realm of fundamentalprinciples: To reconstitute the principle of

pacifism forged in the postwar Japanesemovement, to build connections to a universalworld, and thus to free ourselves from theprinciples of American domination and imperialcontinuity. This would amount to transcendingthe postwar regime from our side, based on theprinciple of the right to unarmed, peacefulexistence.

Our principle is one that can form the basis forpolicies and the goals of a movement. I thinkwe should set a long-term goal of de-hegemonizing the Pacific. In place of the “wemay have spats but we’re the ones in control”composite hegemony of the US and China, weshould aim for non-hegemony. But we have toend our integration into the present structureof hegemony, and to take a stance that sidesneither with American nor Chinese hegemony,and refuses to recognize their compositehegemony. Keys to th is goal are thedemilitarization of Okinawa and the signing ofa peace treaty between the US and theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea. Thiskind of thinking must inform our fight againstAbe. We will not side with American or Chinesehegemony. As a true deterrent force, we willbring about peace and reform by forging linksamong people. In this way, we’ll put an end tothe theory of deterrence, which can only lead toan ever-expanding and nuclear arms race.

For this reason, the struggle with the Abeadministration over fundamental principles isone that opens new prospects for the future.

Muto Ichiyo, born 1931, is a writer on political and social affairs, and an activist engaged inthe anti-war movement and other social movements since the 1950s. He was active in theanti-Vietnam war Beheiren movement (1965-74), inaugurated the English-language magazineAMPO in 1969, founded the Pacific-Asia Resource Center in 1973, and played a leading role inorganizing the People’s Plan 21 program (1989-2002). He founded the People’s Plan StudyGroup (PPSG) in Tokyo in 1998 and serves on its board of directors. He is the author of manybooks, the most recent of which is Sengo Rejiimu to Kenpō Heiwashugi (The Postwar Regimeand Constitutional Pacifism), which was published in March 2016.

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John Junkerman is an American documentary filmmaker based in Tokyo. His film Japan’sPeace Constitution was completed in 2005 and is available in North America from IcarusFilms. His most recent film, Okinawa: The Afterburn (2015) won the Mainichi Film Award forbest documentary and was named #1 in the Kinema Jumpo Best Ten list. It will be availablefrom First Run Features soon.

Notes1 In 1949, Emperor Hirohito sent a message through an aide to William Sebald, politicaladvisor to SCAP, in which he stated his views that 1) the US military occupation of theRyukyu Islands should continue; 2) there should be a long-term lease, with Japan retainingsovereignty; and 3) the procedures should be established by an agreement between the twocountries.2 See George R. Packard, Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan (2010).3 A similar term, “death during public duty” (kōmushi), was used in a set of questionssubmitted in the Diet to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in 2005. Asked whether the honorof Class-A war criminals had been restored, Koizumi ducked the question by responding, “Themeanings of ‘honor’ and ‘restore’ are not necessarily clear, which makes it difficult to respondto this question.”4 Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi (Reform Party) at an Upper House session on June 9, 1952.5 In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Prime Minister Katsura Taro and Secretary of WarWilliam Taft reached this understanding to recognize each other’s spheres of control. Taftlater became president.