CHAPTER I

INDIA AND CAMBODIA 1947-69:

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical antecedents of India's Cambodia policy

reveal a vicissitudinary pattern conditioned by domestic,

regional and international factors. In the initial

years of independence, India followed a distinctly

"non-interference" approach in regard to the question of

Indo-China. However, within a decade, there was a

profound change in India's perception of and policies

towards the Indo-Chinese question, and the future of

1 Cambodia was at the centre of this question and very much

interlinked with the stakes and strategies of Vietnam,

China, the Soviet Union and the United States. The

attitudinal changes in India's Cambodia policy again came

to the fore during the sixties when China became an

important factor in the politics of the Southeast Asian

region.

1. It is interesting to note that during the last thirty nine years after independence, Cambodia had five names and five flags. From independence till 1970, when its ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown by a military coup, the country was known as the Kingdom of Cambodia. Then under General Lon Nol, it became Khmer Republic. Under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge it became the Democratic Kampuchea. And under Heny Samrin and Hun Sen, installed by the Vietnamese, it became the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea. In May

j 1989, in an effort to promote "national and political reconciliation" Hun Sen declared that it would be known as the State of Cambodia.

It is of paramount importance to consider the

underlyiny factors which shaped India's Cambodia policy

during 1947-69. The most relevant aspects of India's

foreign policy are examined here to analyse the continuity

and chanye in India's policy towards Cambodia so that the

basic premises may be identified and analysed. This

chapter also seeks to examine whether China played any

critical role in conditioning India's attitude towards the

Indo-Chinese quemstion. A brief evaluation of the

historical experience of the peoples of Indo-China is also

significant in understanding the dynamics of India's

policy postures in regard to the Cambodian question.

Indo-China: Colonial and Postcolonial Situations

Indo-China, which comprises the French colony of

Cochin-China and the French protectorates of Tonkin,

Annam, Laos and Cambodia is located on the eastern edge of

the Asian peninsular mainland jutting south of China and

eastwards of India. Cochin-China, Tonkin and Annam were

formerly part of the independent kingdom of Vietnam and

are inhabited by Vietnamese. Laos and Cambodia are

inhabited by Laotians and Khmers. Indo-China is the

2. H.R. Chakrabarthy, Vietnam Kampuchea Laos Bound & Comradeship: Panoramic Study of Indo-China from Ancient to Modern Times (New Delhi: Patriot ~ublishers,l9188), Vol.1, p.3.

strategic gateway to Thailand, Malaysia, Burma as well as

to Indonesia, the Philippines and even India. The two

great Asian countries - China and India-exercised strong

influence and made valuable contributions towards the

early development of countries in the region. India's

influence in Indo-China predated the Chinese. But its

character was predominantly cultural and c~mrnercial rather

than political.

Like other countries of Asia, Indo-China also came

under the yoke of western colonization. French control

over Indo-China started in the latter half of the

nineteenth century and continued till the outbreak of the

Second World War. When France fell in 1940, the

colonial regime in Indo-China decided to collaborate with

Japan and on 25 July 1941 Japan occupied the whole of

Indo-China. During this time, a patriotic movement grew

up in Indo-China. In Vietnam it was called the Viet Minh 4

led by Ho Chi Minh. As the war neared its end, the

3. Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China (California: Stanford University Press, 19661, p.3.

4. Viet Minh refers to Vietnam Doc Hap Dong Minh Hoi or Vietnam League of Independence. It was a Vietnamese organisation founded in 1941 among the Communist ~ietnamese in China by Ho Chi Minh, a representative of the Comintern. It was suppressed by the Chinese nationalists and renewed in 1943. It first fought the Japanese and then the French in their attempt to achieve national independence.

French conspired with the Allied powers to drive out the

Japanese. But the Japanese imprisoned the French and

declared that the colonial status of Indo-China had

ended. Thereafter, the Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, the

ruler of Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk and the King of

Laos issued declarations of independence for Vietnam,

Cambodia and Laos. But the Viet Minh refused to recognise

the Emperor's declaration. When Japan yot defeated by the

Allied powers at the end of the war, the puppet government

set up by the Japanese in Vietnam also collapsed.

On 19 August 1945, the Viet Minh took over Hanoi.

On 25 Auyust, Bao Dai abdicated in favour of the Viet Minh

regime and on 2 September 1945 a new state, Democratic

Republic of ~ietnam (DRV) was established under the

leadership of Ho Chi Minh. 6

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, it was

decided that the responsibility for disarming the Japanese

in Indo-China should rest with the Chinese in the region

above the 16th parallel and with the British in the

south. However, the Chinese showed no particular

5. D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast ~ s i a (London: Macmillan publishers, 9 p.885.

6. John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: - Its Historical Development (New Delhi: Tata Mcgraw Hill Publishiny Company, 1976), p.582.

7. Hall, n.5, p.885.

interest in the affairs of Vietnam and they helped to

consolidate the power of the Ho Chi Minh government. But

Britain signed an agreement with France, turning the area

over to French control and on 1 June 1946, a puppet

regime was set up in Cochin-China. 8

On 6 March 1946, France which had returned to

Indo-China after the war signed an agreement with

Ho Chi Minh recognising the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

as a free state with its own Government, Parliament, Army

and Finance and forming part of the Indo-Chinese

Federation within the French Union. 9

Vietnam accepted the French troops' entry into the

northern zone after the withdrawal of the Chinese forces.

This was followed by a series of unsuccessful negotiations

at Dalat in April 1946 and at Fontainebleau in July 1946

to arrive at a settlement on the political status of

Vietnam and Cochin-China. Conflict between Ho Chi Minh's

Republic and the French Empire began in 1947. In June

1949, the French signed an agreement' with Bao Dai, the

former Emperor of Annam and made him the Head of State of

8. Paul M. Sweezy et dl., Vietnam: The Endless War (New York: Monthly Review Press, l m ) , p.14.

9. Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History 1945-55 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p.40.

Vietnam which they recognised as an Associated State.

Similar agreements were signed by French with the other

two states of IIndo-China, the Kingdoms of Laos and

Cambodia. At this stage, the conflict in Indo-China began

to assume the character of being a reflection of the cold

war between the two power blocs. There were two rival

governments in Vietnam: one led by Ho Chi Minh which was

recognised by China and the Soviet Union, and the other

led by Bao Dai which was recognised by the United States

of America. As a result of the recognition of these two

rival governments by the two power blocs cold war lines

were clearly drawn in Indo-China.

In the case of Cambodia, the Japanese forces entered

there in mid 1941. But by 1945, it became increasingly

evident that Japan was losing the war and that a new

political order would ensue. Within this setting conflict

arose which shaped the course of developing Cambodian

nationalism. King Sihanouk and the Cambodian nationalist

leader, Son Ngoc Thanh were the initial protagonists.

As in the case of Vietnam, on 12 March 1945, Sihanouk

declared Cambodia's independence. lo ~ u t to counter

Sihanouk's influence, the Japanese returned Thanh to

10. John H. Esterline and Mae H. Esterline, How the Dominoes Fell: Southeast Asia in Perspective (Chicago: Hamilton Press, 1985), p 7 3 .

Phnom Penh and arranged his appointment, first as foreign

minister, and then as premier. Then negotiations with the

French over the issues of political autonomy and legal

independence began. Admiral Thierry d' Argenlieu, the

French High Commissioner to Indo-China invited Sihanouk to

Saigon to negotiate new relations with France. Sihanouk

agreed, grovided Cambodian negotiators were accepted as

delegates from an independent country and that the

neyotiations would not impinge upon the independence of

Cambodia. The resulting modus vivendi of 7 January 1946

satisfied neither condition, it recognized Cambodia as an

autonomous kingdom within the French Union but essentially

restored the pre-war relationship. 11

There were mainly two parties in Cambodia -- a

Democratic party, favouring the end of French rule and a

Liberal party which favoured prolongation of French

control and a strong monarchy. The Democratic party

elected the majority of the delegates to the Constituent

Assembly which Sihanouk set up and was supported by a

faction holding similar strong anti-French ideas, the

Khmer Issarak (Khmer for Independence).

11. For a good account of Cambodian independence movement, see V.M. Reddi, A History of Cambodian Independence Movement: 1863-i955 (~iru~ati: Sri Venkateswara University, 1970).

In the treaty of 9 November 1949, the French

recognized Cambodian sovereignty over most of its internal

affairs and obtained international recoynition for the

country as one of the "associated states" of Indo-China

within the French Union. The United States and most

non-Communist powers accorded Cambodia diplomatic

recognition in 1950. The Khmer Issarak took to a

guerrilla resistance with support from the Viet Minh,

which forced Sihanouk into an increasingly radical

position with regard to the French. Before examining the

dimensions of the Indo-China question in detail, it would

be relevant to examine India's policy postures in regard

to the nationlist struggle in the region.

India And the Nationalist Movement in Indo-China

India's interests in Southeast Asia are age-old and

they cover a wide sweep of areas. Southeast Asia's

historical contact: with India, its strategic location

between India and the Pacific and, its vast natural

resources had attracted the attention of Indians even

before the attainment of independence. However, whatever

relations India ha.d with the countries in Southeast Asia

were disrupted with the coming of the European colonial

powers.

Cambodia happens to be of great cultural interest to

India because it is culturally more close to Indians

than to Chinese and it is virtually Brahmanic culture

carried to Cambodia from the Kingdom of Kalinga.

In fact, in Cambodian language, Indians are known as

'Klany' . Even now the ruins of Anykor Wat stand as a

vivid testimony of India's strong cultural influence

in Cambodia. 12 The ~ambodian archeology, mythology,

courtship - all these were very much influenced by Indian

culture. An important point to be noted here is that

Indian influence in Cambodia was not the result of

colonization. 13

In the post war period nationalism was the binding

force between India and other countries of Asia. The

leaders of the Indian nationalist movement had projected

the Indian struggle for freedom as part of the wider

struggle for the liberation of other Asian and African

peoples from the yoke of colonialism.

When Franco-Vietnamese hostilities broke out in early

1947, Ho Chi Minh's delegate in India appealed for help in

12. For a detailed account of Indian cultural influence in Cambodia, see B.R. Chatterjee, Indian Cultural Influence Cambodia (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1964).

13. David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983)~ p.12.

their "fight to (death". 1 4 Jawaharlal Nehru turned down

the Vietnamese plea. Nor did he concede a request by

Sarat Chandra Dose, a leading member of the All India

Congress Committee (AICC) for transport and passport

facilities for t:he volunteer force organised by him in

support of the Vietnamese struggle. Nehru just wondered

how the Indian Gclvernment or other Asian countries could

be expected to declare war on France. His aryument was

that "so long as the Government of India is not at war

with another country, it cannot take action ayainst it". 15

Haviny three decades of intense fight ayainst British

imperialism inside and Western colonialsm outside, it was

only natural to expect that India would encouraye

anti-colonial struyyles in Asia and Africa. On the eve of

independence, India had called the Asian Relations

Conference in New Delhi attended by delegations from 25

Asian countries. Indo-China was represented by two

delegations - Ho Chi Minh's D'emocratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV) and the French backed regimes of Cambodia, Laos and

Cochin Chlna. While welcoming the delegates from the

Indo-Chinese states, Jawaharlal Nehru who was foreign

14. D.R. Sardesai, Indian Foreign Policy Cambodia, Laos Vietnam: 1947-1964 (Los Angeles : University of-~alifornia Press, 1968), p.11.

15. Quoted in Ton That Thien, India - and Southeast Asia 1947-60 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), p.123.

minister in the interim government declared their struggle

as "battle of freedom". In the Conference, Ma The Chau,

the DRV representative gave an up-to-date account of the

Indo-Chinese freedom struggle. He was grateful to the

- Asian peoples for their support to the struggle but added

that sympathy and mere verbal support were not enough.

Emphasislng the necessity and importance of material aid

as against the moral support which

Vietnamese struggle, the DRV representative

At the moment when the very of my country is threatened, it is good words which can save my but action. We are gathering just by curiosity of knowing each other. We have used enouqh words about Asian unity. Now let us act.[l7]

The Vietnamese delegate also wanted India to help the

Indo-Chinese nationalist movement in three ways - to

accord recognition to the DRV, to use India's influence at

the United Nations to take up the issue and to stop French

reinforcements using Indian territory. The Government of

16. India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal ~ehku's Speeches: September 1946 M& 1949 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1983), - vo1.1, p.299.

17. Asian Relations Organisation, Report of the Proceedinqs @ Documentation of the ~ i r s r Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, 19481, p.77. Also see Thien, n.15, p.123.

India took steps to limit the number of French aircraft

flying across India, 18 but, even though Nehru promised

to briny sufficient pressure to bear on France, he failed

to take measures comparable to those he took in support of

the Indonesian struggle for independence. 19

The first comprehensive statement of India's policy

on Indo-China was given by Nehru in March 1950. He said:

The policy we have pursued in reyard to Indo-China has been one of absolute non-interference. Our interference could at best be a theoretical one. I don't think that either a theoretical or any other kind of interference in the affairs of a country struggling for freedom can do any good, because the countries which have been under colonial domination invariably resent foreign interference. Their nationalism cannot tolerate it; and even if interference comes with the

18. D.R. Sardesai, "India and Southeast Asia", B.R. Nanda, ed., India's F'oreign Policy: - The Nehru Years (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 19761, p.81.

19. Nehru's attitude towards the Indonesian nationalist movement was entirely different from what he followed in Indo-China. When the Dutch attacked the Indonesian Republic on 20 July 1947, Nehru warned that no European country had any right to set its army against the people of Asia and that the spirit of new Asia would not tolerate such things. Then he organised a Conference on ~ndonesia in New Delhi in January 1949 and sent the speeches, resolutions and recommendations of the Conference to the United Nations. The negotiations that followed between the Netherlands government and Indonesian leaders led to the ultimate transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949.

best possible motlves, it is often regarded as a kind of weapon in the hands of those who are opposed to naticnalism. Besides, interference exposes them to the possible slur that their nationalism is not a free independent nationalism but one that is controlled by others. That is why we have sought deliberately not to interfere with Indo-China and we intend to continue this policy. [ 201

On 17 December 1952 Nehru explained his policy of

circumspection in Vietnam by referring to the

"extraordinarily complicated situation" as well as "larger

considerations". 2 1 Such larger considerations were the

communist character of the Viet Minh leadership, the

emergence of communist China that bordered on the

communist-led part of Vietnam and the continued presence

of French colonial. possessions in India.

The Anti-Communist. Policy of India

Nehru's response to the national movement in Indo-

China was apparently restrained by the fact that the

nationalist movement in Vietnam was dominated by the

communist leadership. In India itself, the Nehru

20. Soeech in Parliament, 17 March 1950. India, . Ministry of Information and roadc casting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953 (New elh hi: Publication Division, 1985), Vol.11, p . 2 2 6 .

21. Ramesh Thakur, Peace Keeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission (Canada: The University of Alberta Press, 19841, p.37.

government's antagonism towards communism deserves special

mention here. In a letter dated 1 October 1950, Nehru

wrote: "When we deal with c:ommunist violence ... we are

efficient enough and our actions are swift and stern". 22

On another occasion he wrote:

Whatever individual communists might say, their basic policy remains and given the chance, will be acted upon. We have, therefore, to be wary and careful.[231

It may be noted that during this time Communist

Party was banned in many states in India, and the party

workers were arrested and detained on a large scale.

The government also crushed the Telengana uprising.

Nehru openly denounced the Indian communists for their

"programme of murders, arson, looting as well as

sabotage". 24 He also warned:

we have to be completely prepared for attempts at trouble of this kind. These must be nipped in the bud and not allowed to grow.[25]

22. Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947- 64 (New elh hi: Jawaharlal. ~ e = u Memorial Fund, 1986), - G. Parthasarathy, ed., vol.11, p.214.

23. Letter dated 15 April 1952. Ibid., p.592.

24. For details see ~ndia, Ministry of Home Affairs, Communist Violence & India (New Delhi, 1949)n pp.3-7.

25. 4 October 1948- Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters Chief Ministers 1947-1964 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 19851, G. Parthasarathy, ed., Vol.1, p.213.

It is a fact that Nehru supported anti-communist measures

in other countries too. The Indian government supplied

the U Nu government in Burma with arms and equipments,

when it was threatened by the communist-led Karen revolt

within three months after Burma's independence. It also

openly condemned the communist rebellion in Malaya. 2 6

Nevertheless, India did not show any aversion to the

Indonesian nationalist struggle led by Sukarno and others.

In fact, Nehru's anti-communist policies did not distort

his understanding of the anti-colonial nature of the

Vietnamese communist leadership but only tended to

restrain his enthusiastic support.

India's Relations with China: The Benign Phase

The emergence of communist China brought about a

qualitative change in international relations and it

added to the significance of Southeast Asia from the

Indian point of view. The establishment of the People's

Republic of China (PRC) under Mao. Zedong in October

1949 made India still more circumspect towards the

Ho Chi Minh-led communist movement in Vietnam. Vietnam's

geographical proximity and ideological affinity with China

26. Sardesai, n.14, pp.16-17. Also see Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, n.25, Vol.1, pp.193-95. --

held out the possibility of the extension of Chinese

influence in the country. In fact, Vietnam h d suffered a

long one thousand year tutelage under the Chinese. Thus

China added a new dimension to India's security

perceptions. Indian fears were compounded by the repeated

Chinese assertions that countries like India, Burma, the

Philippines and Indonesia were semicolonies and their

freedom and Independence were spurious. The nationalist

leaders ln these countries were often subject to repeated

Chinese condemnations. Nehru was described as a running

dog of imperalists, a stooge of Anglo-American bloc, a

member of the political garbage group in Asia etc. 27 When

India adopted a policy of non-alignment in its foreign

relations, this was criticized by not only the United

States and the Soviet Union, but by the ~hinese also.

Mao went to the extremity of saying that neutrality was a

camouflage and a third road did not exist. 28

Although, Nehru did not anticipate any trouble with

China in the early years of his rule, some of his

colleagues in the government had serious misgivings about

China. In the context of the Chinese invasion of Tibet in

27. World Culture, 16 September 1949, quoted in R.K. Jain, China South ~ s i a n Relations ed., (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), Vol.1, pp.7-9.

28. Sardesai, n.14, p-23-

November 1950, Sardar Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister

characterized China as a "potential enemy" of India. 29

Notwithstanding this warning, Nehru took a number of steps

to befriend China such as the unilateral renunciation of

Indian rights over Tibet, the recognition of China's

sovereignty over Tibet and India's continuous support for

China's entry into the United Nations.

Nehru, thus, succeeded in winning the support of

China and the Soviet Union. India's successful mediation

in the Korean war and its appointment as the Chairman of

the Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission were clear

evidences of the improved relations with the socialist

world. The dramatic changes in the Soviet Union after the

death of Stalin in 1953 and the acceptance of the policy

of peaceful co-existence by the new Soviet leadership

further improved India's relations with the socialist

countries. The high watermark of this new trend was the

signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954, 3 0

29. Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945- 50 (Ahmedabad: Nava jivan publishing House, 1- - V0l.X, p.337.

30. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Government of India and China 1954-59 White Paper No. 1 ( ~ e w ~elhi,9959), pp. 98-101.

which incorporated the five principles of peaceful

co-existence. Nehru visualised the situation of a large

number of countries in Asia, more particularly in

Southeast Asia, remaining uncommitted to either of the

power blocs which had polarized the post war world.

The Vestiges of Colonialism

The dilatory tactics of the French on the question of

transfer of its authority on the five small colonial

pockets 31 to India had definite implications which was

another reason that prompted Nehru to adopt a restrained

attitude on the nationalist struggle in Indo-China.

To the French, these territories in India were important

for their strategic and military considerations. India

thought its criticism of French policy in Indo-China would

adversely affect the course of negotiations. Therefore,

it had to adopt a less forceful attitude on the issue of

nationalist movement in Indo-China on tactical grounds.

After protracted negotiations, France granted freedom to

these colonies in 1954.

There was a growing feeling in India that the

attitude of colonial powers had hardened and that there

31. These were Pondicherry and Karikal on the Madras coast, Mahe on the Malabar coast, Yanam on the coast of Andhra and Chandranagore in West Bengal.

was a danger of colonialism clinging to its remaining

countries in Asia. Similarly, military pacts and military

aid agreement between the Western powers and some of the

Asian countries 32 were viewed as new forms of

colonialism. There was also a feeling that the Western

powers were making vigorous efforts to retain control over

Asia and that India had to express its protest and

keep control over the new developments in Indo-China.

When John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary

of State, appealed for united action33 to meet the

communist danger in Vietnam it aroused great concern in

many countries of Asia. Prime minister Nehru who had

deliberately avoided taking sides in the Indo-Chinese

conflict was now forced to take a stand. 34 Though India's

hesitation and circumspection continued for over seven

years a qualitative change in India's Indo-China policy

was on the cards in 1954. This was the time when the

32. For example the United States - Pakistan Military Pact of 1954.

33. Dulles in a speech to the Overseas Press Club on 29 March 1954 said if the communist forces were to win control over Indo-China or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against the other free peoples of the same area. The imposition upon Southeast Asia of the political system of Russia and its Chinese Communist ally by whatever means would be a grave threat to the free community.

34. V.P. Dutt and Vishal Singh, India's Policy Attitude Towards Indo-China SEAT0 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954), p.5.

United States was giving military and economic assistance

to France to enable it to carry on its colonial war in

Indo-China with a view to checkmating the extension of

communism in the region. On the other hand, China was

committed to help, preserve and consolidate the gains

achieved by the communist leadership. The developments in

Indo-China, thus, strengthened the possibilities of a

Sino-American confrontation, at the regional as well as at

the global level.. Nehru's apprehension was that the

Sino-American conflict in Indo-China would enhance the

possibility of a t.hird world war and this prompted him to

take a sudden and renewed interest in the developments in

that part of Southeast Asia. Therefore, after a lapse of

more than a year of silence, Nehru publicly referred to

the problem of Indo-China:

Indo-China is an Asian country and a proximate area. ~espite her heavy sacrifices, the conflict finds her enmeshed in intervention, and the prospect of her freedom is jeopardized. The crisis in respect of Indo-China, therefore, moves us deeply and calls from us our best efforts to avert an extension and intensification of the conflict and to promote the trends that might lead to a settlement.[35]

35. India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, ~awaharlal ~ehru, India's Foreiqn Polic Speeches: September 1946 - April 1961 Publication ~ivision, 19837, pp.398-99; also see Parliamentary Debates, Vol.IV, No.52, 24 ~ p r i l 1954, col. 5581.

Realizing the danger of war in Indo-China, Nehru

hoped for a negotiated settlement through direct talks

between the two opposing sides to allow the Indo-Chinese

people to decide their own future. It would have been

with these considerations in mind that he had earlier

appealed for a cease-fire. Nehru recognised that:

The conflict in Indo-China is, in its origin and essential character, born of a movement of resistance to colonialism and to attempts to deal with it by the traditional methods of suppression and divide-and-rule. Foreign interventions have made the issue more complex; nevertheless, it remains basically anticolonial and nationalist in character. The recognition of this aspect as well as the reconciliation of national sentiments for freedom and independence and safeguarding them against external pressures can alone form the basis of (3 settlement and of peace. [ 36 I

On 22 February 1954, Nehru made an appeal for cease-fire

in Indo-China. 37 Following this, again on 24 April 1954,

Nehru outlined a six-point peace plan. In fact, this plan

constituted the main plank of India's Indo-China policy.

3 6 . Ibid., p.396.

3 7 . For details see ibid., p.395.

The main points Nehru highlighted were:

1. A climate of peace and conciliation

2. A cease-fire

3. Independence for the three Indo-Chinese states

4. Direct negotiations between the parties immediately

concerned

5. Non-lntervention and

6. Informing the United Nations and using its good

off ices. 38

It is significant that when an international

conference was about to start at Geneva, Nehru suggested

direct negotiations between France and its allied

governments, on the one hand, and the Viet Minh, on the

other. Nehru thought that the talks would have a greater

chance of success if the question was detached from the

cold war context and if the parties concerned were left

alone and outside intervention did not make the search

for a peaceful solution more difficult and complicated.

It was for this reason that the Indian prime minister

wanted a declaration of non-intervention in the Indo-

38. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Vol.IV, Part 11, 24 April 1954, col. 5576-83.

Chinese war by the major powers. India, on its part, did

not want the states of Indo-China to pass into the control

of the western powers or of China.

Nehru put forward the six-point peace plan for

1ndo-china at the Colombo Conference of ~pril-May

1954, before Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The

participants endorsed Nehru's plan with slight

modifications. In a broadcast from Colombo Nehru said:

Whether in Indo-China or elsewhere, peace can only come if we endeavour to establish a climate of peace. It is not by condemnation or mutual recrimination that we shall achieve this goal. We must forget past conflicts and past grievances and decide to make a new approach to each other in a spirit of tolerance and forbearance with charity towards all and malice to none.[39]

In fact, India paid no special attention to Cambodia

because the political problem in Cambodia was overshadowed

by much bigger issues in Vietnam. Whenever India spoke

about Indo-China it referred mainly to Vietnam. This was

in spite of the lack of cultural affinity between India

and Vietnam.

39. Broadcast from Colombo, 2 May 1955. India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches March 1953 - August 1957 ( ~ e w Delhi: Publication Division, :1?83), V01.111 p.252.

Geneva Conference 1954

The decision to convene a conference in Geneva was

taken in February 1954 when the Foreign Ministers of the

United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France met in

Berlin. The purpose of the proposed conference was to

discuss t.he problems relating to Korea and to work for

the conclusion of a peace settlement in Indo-China.

The conference started on 26 April 1954, and the

plenary session on Indo-China commenced on 8 May.

The participants were Great Britain, France, the Soviet

Union, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh's Government), the State

of Vietnam (headed by Emperor Bao Dai), Cambodia. ~ a o s

and the United States. India attended as an observer.

The Geneva Conference reached a final settlement with

regard to the three Indo-Chinese states on 21 July 1954.

The Conference led to the cessation of hostilities in

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. 40 The agreement comprised

three bilateral cease-fire arrangements, eight unilateral

declarations and the Final Declaration of the Conference.

40. For details see, United Kingdom, Further Documents relatinq the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference: 16 June - July E m m a Paper 9239 (London, 1953-547.

The last remained unsigned; the Americans would not

associate themselves with it and China insisted that

everyone else should sign before affixing its own

signature.

In the case of Vietnam, a provisional military

demarcation line was fixed alony the 17th parallel cutting

it into two halves. The Final Declaration made it clear

that the mllitary demarcation line was provisional and was

not to hc interpreted as constituting a political or

territorial boundary. The conference also provided that

Vietnam's political problems were to be solved on the

basis of independence, unity and territorial integrity.

General elections were provided for in July 1956 for which

consultations were to begin from July 1955. International

Control Commissions (ICC) were provided for all the three

Indo-Chinese states comprising the representatives of

Canada, Poland and India.

With regard to Cambodia, the Geneva Agreement

provided among other things, for a cease-fire (Chapter I,

Articles 1 - 3 ) , for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces

and foreign military personnel from the territory of

Cambodia (Chapter 11, Article 4) for demobilization of

Khmer Resistance Forces within 30 days after the cease-

fire order had been proclaimed (Chapter 111, Article 5)

for a ban on the introduction of fresh troops, military

personnel armaments and military bases and military

alliances not in conformity with the UN Charter

(Article 7 ) , for the release of civilian internees and

prisoners of war (Article 8) and for the setting up of an

International Control Commission (Chapter IV, Article 10

to 33)41 in Cambodia with headquarters in Phnom Penh.

At (:eneva on 20 July, the Cambodian delegates in a

unilateral declaration stated:

Cambodia, is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Cambodia to be utilized in the service of such a policy ... (It) will not join in any agreement 'with other states if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers. (It is) resolved to settle its disputes by peaceful. means. (It) will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of its terri,tory.[42]

41. Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of - the Indo-Chinese War (New Jersey: - - ~ r i n c e t G University Press, 1969), pp.572-81.

42. Ibid., p.485.

Though not officially represented at the Geneva

Conference, India played an important role in bringing

about the agreements on Indo-China. 4 3 The nomination of

India as Chairman of the International Control Commission

in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was a recognition of this

role. 4 4 At Geneva, V.K. Krishna Menon played a notable

role behind-the-scene to bring about broad areas of

agreement among the major participants. lndia showed a

keen intcrcst in the discussions on Indo-China because it

considercvl itself as an Asian power and it was Asia which

would be nost affected if the war spread. 4 5 Accordiny to

Krishna Mcnon, India did not stand on dignity, but

stood on the door step and tried to be helpful. 4 6 The

Indian representative entered into long conversations with

the official deleyates of various countries participating

in the Conference and secured from Britain and France

promises to China not to let the Americans have bases in

Laos and Cambodia. The Indian emissary also sought

assurances from China and the Democratic Republic of

4 3 . India was not formally invited due to US opposition.

44. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1954-55 (New Delhi, 1955), p.16.

45. Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (New el hi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.72.

4 6 . Michael Brecher, India - and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World - (London : Oxford University ~ress,-19m, p. 4 4 .

Vietnam that they would guarantee the independence and

neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. 47 What, in effect, it

meant was an Indian endeavour to promote peace through the

neutralization of Indo-Chinese states, as guaranteed by

the major contestants and as also based on their informal

pledges of non-intervention in the area. The informal

assurances of non-intervention as given by the

representatives of major powers were seen by many as a

clear vindication of India's influence as a non-aligned

country. India's diplomatic intervention was prompted by

its p o l i c y objectives of averting escalation of the

conflict in a region geographically close to India,

keeping communist China and the United States from major

intervention in Indo-China and minimizing their influence

in an area culturally relat.ed to India.

The Geneva settlement was discussed in the Rajya

Sabha in August 1954. Both Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon

reflected on the subject. In his speech Nehru said that

at the Geneva Conference, the resolutions passed by the

47. Sardesai, n.14, p.249.

previous Colombo Conference of Asian countries, which

was dominated by India, had attracted much attention:

That was because it was supposed, and rightly supposed, to represent the view point of a very large part of Asia, in fact, the part of Asia very intimately connected geographically and otherwise, by virtue of proximity, with the Indo-China problem ... although the Asian countries were not formally represented there, to some extent. their voice was heard, and I believe that voice had a great deal of effect on those decisions there. (a possible reference to Krishna Menon's role).[48]

Nehru also explained why India had agreed to shoulder

the responsibilities placed upon it at Geneva, which

involved sending about 150 officials, civilian and

military to Indo-China:

Ultimately, when decisions were arrived at at Geneva, India appeared in every proposal that was made and this decision to form commissions in Indo-China consisting of the three countries - Canada, Poland and India, and India to be the Chairman - was an integral part of the agreement arrived at. So, for us to say "No" or for somebody else to be chosen might upset the agreement in Geneva in regard to Indo-China. That would have been a tremendous responsibility and a far- reaching step to take. We could not do that.[49]

48. India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, Vol.vI1, 26 August 1954, col. 439-40.

49. Ibid., col. 441.

Nehru referred next to Zhou Enlai's visit to India

and Burma before going back to Geneva. He contended that

the joint statements issued by Zhou in India and Burma had

created an area of peace covering the three countries,

because in those statements the five principles of

peaceful co-existence -- non-interference, recognition of

territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression,

equality and mutual advantage and peaceful co-existence

and economic co-operation -- were enunciated. After this

Zhou went back to Geneva and the agreements on Indo-China

were reached. Nehru contended that Indo-China too had

been claimed for the area of peace as a consequence of the

Geneva Agreements. It was of the greatest importance that

areas of peace and co-existence should spread all over the

world. Interference and the fear of interference upset

co-existence and generated conflict:

And we have arrived at a stage in the world when a conflict, a small conflict, is likely to become immediately a big conflict and a big conflict is likely to become immediately a big world war.... This problem of understanding whether co- existence is possible or not is a very important one. But one thing is quite clear. If it is r,ot possible, the only alternative is world war-co- destruction.[501

50. Ibid., col. 445.

Nehru discussed parts of the Geneva Agreement on

Indo-China in detail:

The House will remember perhaps that in the decisions at Geneva in regard to the Indo-China countries - Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam - it has been specifically laid down that they should be independent, of course, and they should not have military alliances with other countries. That is to say, they should be more or less unaligned, and should more or less belong to what we call the area of peace. Now, there is some argument about the interpretation of words, but the general idea underlying the Geneva decisions in regard to Indo-China countries is quite clear. If any of the Indo-China countries aligns itself so definitely with one powerful group of nations, it becomes a threat to the other. And, therefore, instead of affirming peace, they become a cause of conflict. On the one side, it was feared that they might be a spring-board for the action of communist countries; on the other, it was feared that they might be bases for action against those countries, so that unless you could, in a sense, isolate them, in a military sense, I mean, and a sense of bases and others, from the two types of countries, YOU make them a cause of conflict. Therefore, this important principle or decision was laid down that these Indo- China countries should, as far as possible, keep out of these military alliances, and, in a sense, therefore, form part of an area of peace. How that idea develops there, of course, will depend on other circumstances.[51]

51. Ibid., col. 446.

Nehru strongly condemned the impending meeting in the

Philippines to consider the formation of a Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization as "likely to change the whole trend

towards peace that the Geneva Conference had created by

its decisions in Indo-China". 52 It was certainly the

exact opposite of the approach of the Geneva Conference if

Nehru's understanding of it was correct.

V.K. Krishna Menon spoke about the Indo-China

settlement at great length in the Rajya Sabha on the next

day on 27 August 1954. He referred modestly to "what

small part I may have had in this matter". In regard to

Cambodia, he quoted the following part of the Cambodian

agreement:

The Royal Government of Cambodia is resolved never to take part in an aggressive policy and never to permit the territory of Cambodia to be utilised in the service of such a policy.

The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if the agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.[53]

52. Ibid., col. 447.

53. Ibid.. 27 August 1954, col. 584.

32

According to Menon, this provision ruled out

membership of SEAT0 because the UN Charter permitted only

regional organizations and SEAT0 would include extra-

regional powers. Moreover, 'he International Supervisory

Commission would have to consider whether Cambodian

security was threatened and the matter would also have

to be considered by the United Nations Security Council.

In other words, Cambodia was obliged to follow a policy of

neutrality.

Thus, Nehru had a vision of areas of peace and

cooperation and disengagement from super power conflict

spreading out all over the globe, with the areas of

conflict shrinking correspondingly. Humanity had a vital

interest in the success of this endeavour because its

very survival depended upon that success. Under the

Geneva settlement, upon which India had an influence,

Indo-China had been claimed as a zone of peace in the

Nehruvian sense and India, as the chairman of the three

supervisory commissions, would have an important role in

promoting the development of the concept there. However,

Nehru was fully aware that the future of the concept

would also depend upon the circumstances prevailing in

Indo-China.

The Geneva Agreement proved to be a great success for

Indian diplomacy. From the position of a bete noire at -- the outset, India had moved to occupy a pivotal position

of a custodian, entrusted with the supervision of the

Geneva settlement over Indo-China. 5 4

The peace plan and

the acceptance of the position of chairman of the

International Control Commission (ICC) were the first

serious attempts made by India to play a role in this area

a part of which at. least historically and culturally was

its area of influence.

India. SEAT0 and Cambodia

In the wake of the Geneva settlement, the Western

powers became more active in the formation of a collective

defence treaty for the Southeast Asian region. But India,

the Chairman of the ICC, held the position that collective

security could come only by resolving world tensions and

developing a pattern of collective peace. From the very

beginning, India has been opposed to a military approach

to international problems, more particularly to the

problems concerning Asia. 55 But this approach conflicted

54. Sardesai, n.14, p.47.

55. For a detailed studv of India and SEAT0 see A. Lakshrnana Chetty, India and SEATO: -

- Madras India's Approach to Military Allianc& % Emerald Publishers, 1988).

with the United States policy in Indo-China. John Foster

Dulles believed that only a collective security

organisation could deter China from further advancing in

Indo-China. Apprehensive of communist threats, the

United States was displeased with the Geneva settlement

and employed diplomatic pressure to stall its

implementation. Once the Geneva Conference ended,

Dulles took the initiative in organising the Manila

Conference which gave birth to the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organisation ( SEATO).

India did not participate in the Manila Conference of

September 1954. Nehru pointed out two reasons for this:

first, joining in SEAT0 was not in consonance with its

declared policy of non-alignment, and secondly, its

appointment as the Chairman of the ICC would be ruled out

if it participated in the Manila Conference. 5 6

In spite of stiff opposition from India, SEAT0 was

born in Manila on 6 September 1954. It was formed with

the immediate objective of preventing the Southeast Asian

countries from becoming victims to "aggressive

communism" and containing China along the 17th parallel.

56. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Val-VII, No. 30, Part 11, 29 September 1954, col. 3677.

Its effectiveness was limited by two factors; its

commitments did not cover any of the vital areas of Asia

except Thailand and Philippines and the member states of

SEAT0 had already allied themselves with the United

States. The most significant feature of the treaty was

that out of the eight signatories, six were non-Southeast

Asian States. 5 7

Though Cambodia was not a party to the Manila

Conference, Sihanouk was very much interested in joining a

defence arrangement with the United States. He was

apprehensive of the expansion of communist influence in

Cambodia. So he made efforts to get closer to the United

States. He even proposed that if one of the countries

became the subject of unprovoked attack, other countries

would immediately come to its aid and declare war on the

aggressor. Even though the primary objective of the

United States was the preservation of an independent anti-

communist Government in Cambodia, it hesitated to agree to

the proposal of a bilateral guarantee and turned down the

Cambodian appeal. 59 Instead, the United States directed

57. The members of SEAT0 were Australia, France, Great Britian, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the United States and Thailand.

58. P.C. Pradhan, Foreign Policy of Kampuchea (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1985), p.39.

59. Ibid.

Cambodia to join SEATO, reminding it that the only

protection against communist expansion in Cambodia would

be its membership in SEATO. 6 0

India did not like the efforts of Cambodia to seek

military protection either under SEAT0 or through direct

alliance with the United States. During this period,

Indian diplomacy was directed towards dissuading the

states of Indo-China from joining such military pacts. The

United States hesitation to make a major military

commitment to Cambodia and the Anglo-French open

reluctance to assume any further responsibilities in the

Indo-Chinese region enabled India to influence the

Cambodian perceptions of foreign policy. India maintained

as we have seen that the Geneva Agreement had neutralised

the three Indo-Chinese states and that they had no right

to join a military alliance.

In India, the formation of SEAT0 was viewed with deep

suspicion and misgivings. This was the time when India

was feeling proud of itself for its positive and fruitful

role at Geneva and rejoicing at the dawn of peace in Asia.

India expressed its disgust for this military alliance

and viewed the formation of SEAT0 as a challenge to its

policy of making Southeast Asia an area of peace.

60. Wilfred G. Burchett, The Second Indo-China War (New York: International Publishers, 1970 ) , p. 40.

3 7

Nehru said that in SEAT0 he saw "neither any lessening of

tension, nor any advance towards peace, in fact, the

reverse". 6 1

. . . in Indian eyes, SEAT0 stood against almost every aspect of Indian foreign policy: it created spheres of ~nfluence, sought peace through military pacts, and engendered growth of tensions in an area close to India. Above all, it militated against Indian policy of peaceful co-existence with china and it included Pakistan, a country that sought alliances against India.[62]

Cambodia's Adoption of Neutrality under Indian Influence

India had exercised profound influence on Cambodia's

adoption of neutrality. Its interest in Cambodia had

increased after the visit of Nehru to Cambodia in November

1954. The ruler of Cambodia Sihanouk was a great admirer

of Nehru, and he hailed him as a symbol of the legitimate

aspirations of the peoples of Asia and their rights to

independence and peace. One of the results of Nehru's

visit was the recognition of the Cambodian government by

India on 31 December 1954 and the appointment of a special

mission headed by a political representative. 6 3

61. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, n.56, col. 3679

62. Sardesai, n.14, p.58.

63. Ibid., p.65.

Accordingly, B.K. Acharya was sent to Cambodia. This was

a significant development in India's relations with Indo-

China.

In March 1.955, Sihanouk visited India at the

invitation of the Nehru government. During his visit he

said :

The Cambodian people are anxious to demonstrate their determination to develop the closest tie with the Great Republic of India which is for Asia a beacon that can light our way to reach liberty and everlasting peace.[64]

Indian response was an assurance "to give such assistance

to Cambodia as lay in their power". 65 The two leaders

discussed various problems which the newly independent

countries were facing and the outcome of the decision

proved fruitful for both sides. At the conclusion of

64. India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-64 (New ~ e l h c 1966), p.281.

65. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Foreiqn Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol.1, No.3, March 1955, p.49, (hereafter cited as FAR).

their talks on 18 March 1955 they issued a joint

communique which stated:

The historical connections and close cultural affinity between India and Cambodia, which date back to a remote past, have enabled the leader of the Cambodian delegation and the Prime Minister of India to understand and appreciate each other's point of view. They also provide a guarantee for continuance of friendly relations in the future. [66]

Prince Sihanouk expressed his deep appreciation of

India's general approach to world problems and desire for

the maintenance of peace. The Prime Ministers of India

and Cambodia agreed that the best guarantee for peace in

the world and for friendship between countries was to

adhere to the principles of the recognition of each

other's sovereignty, independence and integrity, of non-

aggression, of equality and mutual respect and non-

interference in the domestic affairs of each other and of

other countries and on the promotion of conditions for

peaceful co-existence. They emphasised that every effort

should be made to preserve and strengthen the independence

of Cambodia and improve the condition of its people. 67

66. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-64, - n.64, p.280.

67. FAR (New elh hi), n.65, p.49. -

They also agreed to support the five principles of

peaceful co-existence as they were the best guarantee for

world peace. It is clear that Nehru was able to influence

Sihanouk against military pacts in the course of this

visit

Later on, inaugurating the Jawaharlal Nehru Boulevard

in Phnom Penh on 10 May 1955, Prince Sihanouk remarked:

When we refer to two-thousand-year old ties which unite us with India, it is not at all a hyperbole. In fact, it was about two thousand years ago that the first navigators, Indian merchants and brahmins brought to our ancestors their Gods, their techniques, their organisation. Briefly India was for us what Greece was to the Latin Occident. [ 68 I

This generous acknowledgements of historical debts by

Prince Sihanouk illustrate very well the antiquity of

friendly relations between India and Cambodia.

The conference of the Afro-Asian countries who met at

Bandung in April 1955 provided another opportunity for

India to influence the politics of the region. In the

68. D.P. Singhal, India - and World Civilization (Calcutta: Rupa Publishers, -2), Vol.11, pp.131-32; also see V. Suryanarayan, "India and Southeast Asia", India Quarterly (New Delhi) , Vol.XXXIV, No.3, July-September 1978, p.264.

Conference, there was discussion on the Indo-Chinese

question, and India hoped that Cambodia and Laos would

desist from forging close links with either SEAT0 or the

United States. To Sihanouk, one of the most important

problems deserving discussion at the Bandung Conference

was the danger of Chinese and Vietnamese expansionism.

India's aim at Bandung included its desire to have China

and North Vietnam make pledges of adherence to the

principle of non-intervention in the neighbouring states.

However, one of the prime objectives of the sponsors of

the Asian-African Conference was the containment of

Chinese and Viet Minh political influence at the southern

border of China and the eastern boundaries of Cambodia and

Laos and combatting of illegal and subversive communist

activities in all non-communist Asia. 6 9 In the open

sessions of the conference, cambodid, Laos and the DRV

pledged adherence to the Panchsheel, Sihanouk declared

that Cambodia was independent and neutral and had

determinedly steered its national policy towards

Panchsheel, towards the community of neutral nations --

among them India and Burma. This was a clear diplomatic

victory for Nehru over the united States. The DRV Foreign

Minister Pham Jan Dong noted that the Conference was the

69. Sardesai, n.14, p.70; also see George Mc Turnan Kahin, The Afro-Asian Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956). p.5.

very expression of the peaceful co-existence of the Asian

and African countries and the will to work together under

the auspices of peaceful co-existence. 7 0

As far as Cambodia was concerned, the Bandung

Conference was of great significance. It was here that

Prince Norodom Sihanouk came in contact with all important

leaders of Asia and Africa. It was in Bandung, in a

private rncetiny between Sihanouk, Zhou Enlai and Pham Van

Dong that the Cambodian leader got assurances from the

Communist leaders that they would respect Cambodia's

independence and territorial integrity. Thus, Sihanouk

realized the possibility of normalization of Cambodia's

relations with its communist neighbours. Prime Minister

Nehru had urged that these assurances be given to

Cambodia.

At this time, Cambodia felt it advisable to adopt a

policy of neutrality in international relations. Sihanouk

knew that Cambodia being engulfed between the two

traditional antagonists, Vietnam and hail and, and between

the two major powers, China and the United States, the

best way to avert the cold war tensions and to guarantee

70. Ibid., p .70 .

Cambodian security would be to adopt a policy of

neutrality. He himself stated this in an article in

Foreign Affairs:

Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A glance at a map of our part of the world will show that we are wedged in between two medium - sized nations of the western bloc and only thinly screened by Laos from the scrutiny of two countries of Eastern bloc, North Vietnam and the vast People's Republic of China. What choice have we but to try to maintain an equal balance between the blocs.[71]

But previously he had tried to obtain security

through a military relationship with the United States.

It was Nehru who changed his strategy.

India and Cambodia after the Geneva Conference

India had practically no diplomatic contact with

Cambodia till 1954. It had not recognised any of the

Indo-Chinese states, and in 1954, it felt that being a

non-aligned country and as the Chairman of the ICC, India

had to change that policy. To a question in the Rajya

Sabha why India had not recognised Cambodia and Laos,

71. Norodom Sihanouk, "Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity", Foreign ~ffairs (New York), Vo1.36, No.4, July 1958, p.583.

Nehru's reply was that "if we start recognising any

country, it is difficult to recognise one and not the

others". 7 2 However, India's acceptance of the

Chairmanship of the ICC opened an opportunity to make its

official entry into Cambodia and Laos.

As per the Geneva Agreement Chapter IV Articles 10

to 33,an International Control Commission (ICC) was to be

I J set up for Cambodia with its headquarters in Phnom Penh.

It began to function on 11 August 1954. 74 The ICC on

Cambodia was generally responsible for supervising

execution of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement

with these duties in particular: (1) controlling the

withdrawal of foreign forces (2) ensuring that the

frontiers of Cambodia were respected (3) controlling the

release of prisoners of war and civilian internees and

72. India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, Vol.VI1, 27 August 1954, col. 597.

73. According to the Geneva Agreements the expenditure on the ICC is to be shared by the parties to the agreement. It was decided at the Geneva Conference that the four major powers namely, USSR, China, United Kingdom and France would form a common pool and share the expense of the Commission in Indo- China with the parties concerned.

74. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 1954-55 n.44, p.17.

( 4 ) supervising at ports, airfields and the Cambodian

frontier the application of the Cambodian declaration

concerning the introduction in Cambodia of military

personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign

assistance. 7 5

A t the invitation of the Government of India, the

representatives of the Governments of Canada, Poland and

India met in New Delhi from 1 to 6 August 1 9 5 4 ~ ~ to study

the terms and provisions in the agreement relating to the

International Control Commissions and the functions and

duties arising therefrom and to initiate the necessary

principles to establish the Commissions in Vietnam and

Cambodia on the due date.

Being the Chairman of the ICC, India played a certain

amount of useful role in trying to defend and preserve

Cambodian territorial integrity and sovereignty. 7 7 AS far

as India was concerned, one of the best ways of protecting

Cambodia was to obtain from the other powers a guarantee

75. Randle, n.41, P-485

76. It was decided by the Delhi Conference in August 1954 that the three member countries on the ICC should pay the salaries and allowances of their respective national delegations including national personal working in fixed and mobile teams.

77. Interview with V.V. Paranjpae, Chairman of the ICC on Cambodia from 1967 to 1969, 20 May 1991.

that they would refrain from interference in Cambodian

affairs and to see that Cambodia did not give these powers

any pretext for intervening in Cambodia. One of the

important factors which created tension between the ICC

and the Cambodian government was the demobilization and

reintegration of the members of the Khmer Resistance

Forces ( K R F ) into national life. Regarding this in the

ICC, the Indian position was that only complete

reinteyration of this group into the national community

would lead to a stable and peaceful government. 78

Therefore, the Commission advised the Cambodian Government

not to make discrimination against them because it would

have ~eopardised the very purpose of Geneva Ayreements.

In 1955, general elections were closely observed by the

ICC teams, whose main tasks were described by the

Commission as being threefold: assuring secrecy of ballot,

maintenance of democratic freedoms and non-discrimination

against the former members of the KRF. 7 9

Another matter which the Commission had to deal with

was the United states-Cambodian military agreement of

16 May 1955. It provoked strong protests from North

78. Sardesai, n.14, p.127.

79. Great Britain, Foreign Office, International Commission for Supervision Control $ Cambodia: Fourth Interim Reports (Phnom Penh, 19551, p.5.

.Vietnam because it viewed the agreement as a great danger

for the security and peace of Indo-China. It also viewed

it as the violation of Geneva Agreements. In a communique

issued by the Royal Government on 29 May 1955 the

~ambodian Government stated:

The Agreement recently concluded with t-he USA has therefore for its object the direct grant of American military aid to Cambodia. There is no question of the granting military bases nor of a military alliance of any sort nor of the sending of American military instructors to Cambodia.[801

The Commission, with Indian support, gave a favourable

report and defended Cambodia's position and saved the

government from facing embarrassment before the critics

in the country. In 1957, the Cambodian parliament adopted

a neutrality law which was incorporated into the

Constitution.

In Cambodia, by the end of 1955, the ICC had

successfully completed its responsibility to put into

effect the military and political provisions of the

Geneva Agreement in Cambodia. The success of ICC's work

80. Great Britain, Foreign Office, International Commission - for supervision - and Control & Cambodia: Third Interim Reports (~hnom Penh, 1955), p.17.

in Cambodia was - due to the cooperation between Cambodia

and the Commission. At this point, India agreed with the

other delegates' view on the termination of the Commission

in Cambodia. But later India changed its view in favour

of Commission's continuation in Cambodia. Several factors

were responsible for the change in India's attitude:

first, India wanted to help Cambodia, second, India was

concerned with the outcome of talks between the

co-chairmen in London on the future of ICC and third,

India thought the continuance of ICC in Cambodia would

buttress Cambodian neutrality and the interests of Indian

foreign policy in the region. But Indian efforts in

this direction were tarnished due to the negative approach

of the Canadian delegate to the Commission. According to

the Canadian delegate, the Commission was not competent to

deal with cases of violation of Cambodian territory by a

country other than North Vietnam. But the main problem

Cambodia was facing at this time was border violations by

South Vietnam and Thailand , backed covertly by the

United States which was displeased with Cambodia's

neutralism adopted under Indian influence. So, after

this, the Commission's presence in Cambodia was just in

name and did not serve any useful purpose.

81. Sardesai, n.14, p.138.

Immediately after the Geneva Agreement, the Indian

attitude was clearly in favour of North Vietnam. North

Vietnam's glorious record of fightiny against the colonial

regime, its enthusiastic reiteration of principles of

peaceful co-existence and its support to India on the Goa

issue were the factors which influenced India's policy.

But in contrast with this, India's attitude towards South

Vietnam was based on suspicion, mistrust and grudge. It

was the natural consequence, to a great extent of its

policy o n Cold War, military alliances and its relations

with the [Jnited States. The American military assistance

to Pakistan and the creation of SEATO caused severe

strains in Indo-United States relations. South Vietnam's

refusal to sign the Geneva Agreements, indifference to

Panchsheel and its close co-operation with the United

States were the factors which influenced India's attitude

towards South Vietnam in the early phase.

But an opposite trend in Indian attitude could be

noticed from 1957 onwards. With regard to North

Vietnam starting from an initial position of mutual

understanding, community of views, interests, and

objectives, a situation of latent mistrust was evident.

With regard to t.he problem of elections and unification

the Indian attitude definitely changed. Indian opinion

saw the problem of vietnam no longer in terms of

nationalism versus colonialism, but in terms of freedom

versus In the case of South Vietnam, India

also changed its attitude. The change in Indian attitude

stemmed partly from its reappraisal of the situation and

partly from the efforts being made by South Vietnam to

redress the situation at home, and to improve its

relations with the non-aligned countries, particularly

with Ind~a. 83 After 1958, the border dispute with North

Vietnam's ally, China, influenced India's policy to the

two Vietnams. In October 1956, the Indian government

accorded recognition to the Republic of Vietnam. The

recognition was among several acts indicating improved

relations between New Delhi and Saigon. On 4 November

1957, the South Vietnamese President Nqo Dinh Diem

visited India. On 5 November, at a state banquet 1ndian

President Rajendra Prasad welcomed Diem as "the head of a

state, which like us, has emerged as a free nation only

82. Thien, n.15, p.137.

83. Ibid.

recently after a long spell of foreign domination". 84 He

also said:

In our approach to world problems and international relations we are animated by the desire to maintain friendly relations with other countries on the basis of the principle of co-existence or Panchsheel. When the common object LS maintenance of peace in the world and the welfare of humanity, which naturally depends on the development of backward countries, we believe neither wisdom nor expediency would dictate a different course of action.[851

In the joint communique issued at the end of his visit the

two sides decided to continue and increase the cooperation

between two countries in the pursuit of their common goal

of economic and social advancement. 8 6

Though a change could be noticed in India's attitude

towards North Vietnam, this was not revealed when North

Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh visited India from 5 to 13

February 1958. At that time Nehru received Ho as "a great

revolutionary and an almost legendary hero". The Nehru-

Ho Chi Minh statement of 13 February 1958 reaffirmed their

84. FAR (New elh hi), Vol.111, No.11, November 1957, p.220.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., pp.220-21

faith in Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful

co-existence. They also reaffirmed their belief that the

application of these principles in international relations

would help to relax international tensions and provide a

basis for peace and understanding among nations. 87

Cambodia went ahead with the establishment of

diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union and

signing of agreements on cooperation in trade and

economy with both these countries. The United States

looked upon it unfavourably and relations worsened still

further. It began giving support to rightist Khmer Serei

guerrillas opposed to Sihanouk who had started guerrilla

activities out of South Vietnam and Thailand. Cambodia's

relations with its neighbours remained cool because of the

border clashes. In 1961, Cambodia broke off diplomatic

relations with Thailand, in 1363 it ended its military aid

programme with the United States and in 1965 it broke off

dip:omatic relations with Washington.

Meanwhile, Cambodia's relations with China and North

Vietnam improved considerably. But tension continued on

its western and eastern frontiers. The situation became

87. Ibid., Vol.IV, No.2, February 1958, p.19.

very serious as a result of incursions by South Vietnamese

troops in Cambodian territory of Stung Treng in June 1958

and Thai occupation of the temple of Preah Vihar in July

1958. South Vietnam and Thailand acted with covert

American encouragement, the United States being displeased

with Cambodia's turn to non-alignment undep Indian

influence. In August 1958, Sihanouk paid an unofficial

visit to India to seek Nehru's advice in. tackling the

difficulty with Cambodia's neighbours. Nehru asked him to

find out the real motivations of the Thai and Vietnamese

governments and try to settle the matter through direct

negotiations before taking other steps. In these

circumstances, what role could India play? As a non-

aligned country India had some influence with the

superpowers in international affairs but it lacked

adequate leverage with minor pro-western states, even less

so in disputes between a non-aligned country and a member

of either bloc. Sihanouk then turned to Beijing, a much

more powerful country than India and decided to establish

diplomatic relations with it. Thus from 1958 onwards,

Cambodia started developing closer re1,ation with the PRC.

This growth of Sino-Cambodian relations in the subsequent

years was mainly at the cost of India's influence and

interests. China became a generous aid donor to Cambodia.

India could not compete with China in this area.

88. Thien, n.15, p.208.

The People's Republic of China cultivated Cambodia's

friendship during the period of Sino-Indian amity. It may

be noted that Nehru did not visit Cambodia after 1954,

despite Sihanouk's invitation extended in 1956 and 1958.

However, Sihanouk was a frequent visitor to New Delhi to

discuss various matters including relations with China.

India's Vice President S. Radhakrishnan and President

Rajendra Prasad visited Cambodia in 1957 and 1959

respectively. Both visits were marked by great

hospitality and references to ancient cultural ties

between India and Cambodia. In March 1959, even after

Cambodia's realization that it could not expect assistance

either in the f-orm of material or moral support from India

in its border disputes, the importance of general Indian

diplomatic support was acknowledged. However, when

compared with China's calculated efforts to win Cambodia's

friendship, Indian efforts were scattered.

India ' s relationship with China which was

characterized as friendly after the signing of Panchsheel

and Bandung conferences suffered a major setback in late

1958 due to China's border incursions into the northern

boundary of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin in the

89. For details see FAR (New elh hi), Vol.V, No.3, March 1.959, pp.39-41.

western sector, Barahoti in the middle sector and Lonju

in the eastern sector. 9 0 It was a manifestation of the

abandonment by China of the restraints imposed by the

Panchsheel and the Geneva Agreements. The critics in

India accused the Nehru government of believing too much

in Panchsheel. When a major Sino-Indian war broke out in

1962, Nehru realized the ineffectiveness of his China

policy and came to the realization that India was getting

out of touch with the realities of the modern world and

was living in an artificial atmosphere of its own

creation. 9 1

In the Sino-Indian war, India expected the support of

major Southeast Asian non-aligned countries like Cambodia,

Burma and Indonesia. As the war broke out, they remained

neutral with some sympathetic attitude towards India.

However, in the course of the war, when India sought

military aid from the United States and other western

countries, Sihanouk became very critical of India's

policy. After a lapse of four years, the Cambodian

90. White Paper I, n.30, pp.22-52; also see India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (New elh hi: Pub1icat;on Division, 1983), Vol.IV, pp.193-205.

91. National Herald (Lucknow), 26 October 1962.

representative at the United Nations General Assembly,

Huot Sambath said:

In regard to the fighting which took place between India and Chinese troops, it is improper to present that as a campaign of conquest launched by China against India; for if China had really intended to attack India, it would not have stopped its troops after the rout of the Indian troops, still less would it have voluntarily evacuated the contested areas when the road to New Delhi lay wide open .... China is one of the few great world powers which do not adopt a chauvinistic attitude towards other countries, but genuinely respect the principle of equality among nations large and small and base their regard for others not on considerations of wealth, material strength or size of territory and population, but solely on criteria of merit, loyalty and courage.[92]

Such a strong Cambodian support to China revealed not

only the former's solidarity with the latter but also its

willingness to uphold the image of China as a peace-loving

country. China had evidently gained ground in Cambodia

at India's expense. Naturally this gesture of Cambodia

was viewed in India as an obstacle to the development

of closer relations between India and Cambodia.

92. United Nations, General Assembly Official Records A/PV/1470, 18 November 1966, p.5.

The Cambodian press also took a distinctly anti-Indian

approach. A Cambodian newspaper Hopes of Humanity wrote - after the cease-fire:

As soon as the cease-fire was effected along the Sino-Indian boundary India began to solicit military aid from every source. It makes use of the sino-Soviet differences to ask the Soviet Union to supply it with a huge amount of aid and at the same time turns to the US for arms, ammunition and radar installations. The people of the world were shocked by all that.[931

However, at the invitation of the President of India,

Prince Sihanouk visited India during January-February

1963. In a :joint communique issued at the time of

Sihanouk's visit both the countries reaffirmed their

policy of settling differences by peaceful methods and

their faith in the principles of peaceful co-existence

between nations with different political and ideological

systems. 94 Nehru gave an account of the background of the

Sino-Indian conflict, expressed his gratitude for

Sihanouk's participation in Colombo Conference and assured

the Cambodian prince about India's determination to

follow the path of peace consistent with national honour

and dignity and territorial integrity of India. 95

93. ~uardian (London), 6 August 1963.

94. FAR (New Delhi), Vol.IX, No.1, January 1963, - p.5.

95. Ibid.

The Cambodian prince expressed his satisfaction at India's

acceptance of the Colombo proposals and added that he had

complete confidence in the ability of the Indian statesmen

to find a satisfactory solution to the distressing border

dispute by peaceful means. Both agreed to keep in touch

with each other on matters of mutual interest to both

the countries. 96

In his farewell message, Sihanouk expressed his

sadness about the events which India had had to face up to

in the course of the past months. He also explained the

reasons why Cambodia participated in the Colombo

conference:

... our decision to attend the Colombo Conference was prompted by the realization that we could not stand idly by in the face of a situation so fraught. with peril. I am personally of the opinion that our labours were not entirely fruitless, and that the proposals agreed on there have opened up promising avenues of approach to the Sino-Indian problem. For my part, I shall continue to do whatever I can to hasten the settlement of this tragic dispute involving Asia's two great powers. But such a settlement can only be reached following bilateral negotiations conducted by both parties on an equal footing and animated by a genuine desire to reach a just solution. [ 9 7 ]

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., Vol.IX, No.2, February 1963, p.51.

To strengthen India's position Lakshmi N. Menon, Minister

of State for External Affairs, attempted to wean the newly

independent countries of Southeast Asia away from China by

warning them against the Chinese threat. While reminding

the Southeast Asian countries about this, Lakshmi N. Menon

said in Thailand in 1963:

The Chinese problem is a common problem . . . . The Chinese would not be satisfied with treaties concluded by negotiations. It was only the first step in their ambition to communise Southeast Asia and the world.[98]

During the last few months of his life, Nehru seemed to

have realized that his anti-China policies would have no

bearings if India remained indifferent to the aspirations

of the Southeast Asian countries. He realised well that

India should have created better ties with them than with

China. It may be recalled here that Nehru in his last

press conference said that he had no objection to

Sihanouk's suggestion that a conference be convened to

guarantee the neutrality of Cambodia. 99 It was due to

Nehru's response that India's support to Cambodian

neutrality gained momentum, after his death, during

1964-65.

98. Strait Times (Singapore), 30 March 1963.

99. 22 May 1964, India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: March 1963-May - 1964 (New Delhi: Publication ~ivision, 1983), Vol.V, p.219.

The divergence of views between India and the

non-aligned Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia got wide

expression with the increase of the United States

intervention in Indo-China. Indian attitude and reactions

towards the developments in Vietnam were conditioned by

its relations with the PRC and its own domestic problems.

During the mid-sixties India was passing through an acute

food shortage and it had to depend heavily on the

United States to get food aid. Therefore, in these

circumstances, the Government of India's criticisms of

American intervention in Vietnam were muted. On 22

September 1964, Swaran Singh, the Minister for External

Affairs declared that the Vietnam situation was critical

and dangerous. He said:

The Government of India do not wish to make ex-cathedra pronouncements on how the situation in Vietnam should be resolved. They are of the opinion that eventually political rather than military solutions will have to be found for the problem of Vietnam.[100]

However, India succeeded in incorporating an appeal

to the powers which participated in the Geneva Conference

of 1954 and 1962 to convene urgently a new Geneva

Conference on Indo-China with a view to seeking a

satisfactory political settlement of the problem arising

100. FAR (New Delhi), Vol.X, No.9, September 1964, - p.220.

in that part of the world in the final declaration of the

Conference of non-aligned nations held at Cairo in October

1964.

Again when the United States military attacks on

Vietnam had reached serious proportions in 1965, some

senior members of the Indian National Congress warned

La1 Bahdur Shastri, the successor of Nehru, that large

scale United States intervention might enhance the

possibility of counter-intervention by the PRC. They

also reminded him that the principal Indian objective was

to prevent the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast

Asia. In reply to the debate on the motion of thanks to

the President's address in the Rajya Sabha on 9 March

1965, La1 Bahdur Shastri said:

In regard to the external affairs we have always tried that the Geneva Agreement on Indo-China should be adhered to; that there should be no breach of the Agreement and that there should be no conflict. Unfortunately, recently a new development has already arisen and the position seems to be fairly delicate. In that context we had appealed and expressed our views that two things are absolutely essential to resolve this problem. First, the hostilities which are going on at present should come to an end and the two parties should stop fighting. Secondly, there should be a Geneva type conference.[lOll

101. India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Selected S eeches of La1 Bahadur Shastri: June 1964- January N - 1 : Publication Division, 1974), p.36.

About Chinese expansionism, Shastri used much stronger

language:

TO justify its aggressive attitude China is pretending to be a guardian of Asian countries which, according to China are being bullied by India. The basic ob~ective of China, therefore is to claim for itself a position of dominance in Asia which no self- respecting nation in Asia is prepared to recognise. Larger or small, stronger or weak, every country in Asia has the fullest right to preserve its independence and sovereignty in terms of equality. The dominance of the Chinese cannot be accepted by any of them.[l02]

Therefore, India could not take a soft view of Vietnam

war and issued a statement on 8 February 1965 expressing

grave concern over the developments in South and North

Vietnam because they created the danger of a full-scale

war in Vietnam with disastrous consequences. lo3 It

further said: as an Asian country in this region, these

developments are a source of great anxiety to the

Government and people of 1ndia.lo4 It was very clear that

the situation was not improving because of interference

from many quarters. Therefore, it made an appeal for the

creation of "neccessary atmosphere" for immediate

102. Ibid., p.240.

103. FAR (New elh hi), Vol.XI, No.2, February 1965, - p.39.

104. Ibid.

convening of a Geneva-type conference for Vietnam which

required an immediate suspension of all provocative action

in South Vietnam as well as in North Vietnam by all sides

involved in the Vietnam situation. 105

Similarly, it is also clear that India's policies

towards Indo-China during 1965-69 were also influenced by

the Soviet factor. The possibility of Soviet military

assistance to Pakistan and New Delhi's own objective of

obtaining economic assistance compelled India to come

closer to the Soviet Union in the Vietnam problem.

This change could be noticed from the time of Indira

Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1966, when she

stated that India shared deep distress and concern with

the Soviet Union over the bombing of North Vietnam.

On the eve of her departure for Soviet Union on 7 July

Indira Gandhi made a broadcast Over AIR in which she

declared a seven point proposal to restore peace in

Vietnam. The proposal called for the cessation of bombing

of North Vietnam and the c0nvenin.g of the Geneva

conference followed by the cessation of hostilities, its

observance by the International Control Commission and

105. Ibid.

leading to the withdrawal of all foreign forces. 106

She said:

It is necessary to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam and to insulate that unhappy country from every foreign interference so that the people of Vietnam determine their own future free of external pressures. Looking further ahead, it might be desirable for the Geneva Conference to guarantee the integrity and independence of a neutral Vietnam and indeed of the neiyhbouring states of Laos and Cambodia as envisaged by the Geneva Agreements.[l07]

Even though her proposal received no positive

response from the parties to the conflict, it constituted

a major advance and it initiated a process of gradual

proximity of New Delhi's viewpoint with that of Hanoi.

1:ndia had come to the belief that the force of nationalism

would impel Vietnam to stand up to any external threat of

dominance, including that of the Chinese. 108

106. India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, T& - Years of challenge: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi January 1966 - Auqust '1969 - (NG Delhi: Publication Division, 1573), p. 326.

107. Ibid.

108. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1984), p.291.

Reiterating India's policy on Vietnam, again in

August 1966, Swaran Singh said:

They are our brother Asians and the people of Vietnam are suffering from one difficulty or another... naturally our sympathies go out to the people of Vietnam .... When we saw that there is grave risk of escalation of unfortunate conflict,... we could not remain silent spectators ... we have always held the view that there cannot be a military solution to this problem that this problem must be taken away from the battle field to the negotiating table and there should be a dialogue, a conference ... a Geneva type conference and the people of Vietnam may have an opportunity to decide about their future without any interference from any outside force, without any pressure from any side, direct or indirect.[l09J

The Government of North Vietnam reacted negatively to

the Indian position on Vietnam. Their attitude was that

India had long been dependent on the United States and the

countries governed by modern revisionists and that India

was their bound servant. They accused India of playing a

shameful role in the anti-Chinese chorus conducted by the

imperialists, the revisionists and the reactionaries. 110

109. Swaran Singh's Statement in the Rajya Sabha, 8 August 1966. FAR (New Delhi), Vol.XI1, No.8, - August 1966, pp.200-01.

110. A.G. Noorani, As ects of India's Foreign Policy P- (Bombay: Jaico Publishing Company, 1970), p.191.

North Vietnam's reaction was not unusual because when

President Ho Chi Minh took up the matter with India, the 'b

latter did not condemn the United States aggression but

simply expressed displeasure that the United States did

not stop the bombing to bring about lowering of tensions

and eventually to a negotiation.

While welcoming the cease-fire on the occassion - o f

the Vietnamese Tet festival, M.C. Chagla, Minister of

External Affairs, on 8 February 1967 said:

Government of India would like to appeal to the peace-loving Government and people of USA to stop the bombing of North Vietnam ... that this would shift the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table, lead to early cessation of hostilities throughout Vietnam and a peaceful resolution of this tragic conflict which is resulting in avoidable loss of many human lives -- both American and Vietnamese -- and constitutes not only a serious threat to peace but is a disturbing factor in international relations.[llll

Again in the Lok Sabha debate on foreign affairs on 5

April 1968, Indira Gandhi said:

Our effort has always been directed towards narrowing of whatever differences still exist and in overcoming whatever difficulties still exist.[ll21

111. - FAR (New Delhi), Vol.XII1, No.2, February 1967, p.15.

112. Ibid., vol.XIV, No.4, April 1968, p.91-

67

In December 1964 the representatives of Cambodia and

the United States met in New Delhi to resolve their

differences. Cambodia's complaints were mainly against

South Vietnam. The most important among them were; South

Vietnam often intruded into Cambodian territory; it had

occupied two of Cambodia's offshore islands which posed a

constant threat to its security; and it had been able to

indulge in unfriendly activities because of American

support. But in the conference, the United States took

the view that they could not be held answerable for the

activities of South Vietnam and that a direct meeting

between South Vietnam and Cambodia might probably help to

sort out things. The New Delhi talks produced no

results.

The Government of India, in April 1965 announced its

support for the convening of the Geneva conference to

study steps that should be taken to ensure the neutrality

and territorial integrity of Cambodia. The External

Affairs Minister Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha that

India had every sympathy for Cambodia's aspirations and

would play its part and render assistance in this

regard. He also expressed his firm faith that the co- - - - - - - -

113. Hindu (Madras), 22 April 1965.

114. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Vol.XLI1, No.42, 21 April 1965, col. 10373.

chairmen of 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, the UK

and USSR were in consultation with each other about the

proposal for the convening of an international

conference. 115 Swaran Singh was making a statement in

Parliament in response to a calling attention notice

tabled by 1 l . V . Kamath. He told the member that it was not

yet possible for him to give precise information about the

response from other countries expected to attend the

proposed conference. Kamath also wanted to know what the

Minister had to say about the possibility of utilising

such a conference for informal peace talks on Vietnam.

Swaran Singh merely remarked: "The Cambodians resent if a

suggestion is made that this might be used for other

purposes". 116

In June 1965, India's Deputy Minister for External

Affairs Dinesh Singh said in Phnom Penh that India fully

supported the struggle of the people against imperialism

and colonial domination and was willing to extend all

possible assistance to them. Speaking there at a dinner

hosted by Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick he said,

India was sorry to see that even after independence

imperialist powers were trying to dominat- the freed

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., col. 10374.

countries by different means and called upon the Afro-

Asian countries to close their ranks fight against

neocolonialism. 117 Again on 8 August 1966, Foreign

Minister Swaran Singh said in the Rajya Sabha:

We have always been strongly and stoutly in favour of maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia. The troubles which the Cambodian people are facing, particularly on their borders, are troubles which naturally are a matter of concern. Some proposals have been made by Cambodia towards strengthening the functioning of the International Control Commission and the matter is receiving the attention of the two Co-Chairmen, i.e., the soviet and the ~ritish, and no final decision has yet been taken.[ll8]

However, no international conference was held and the

ICC was not strengthened. This was probably because of

the negative attitude of America's ally, Britain and of

the Soviet Union.

During this period, India on its part, took some

follow up actions to have better relations with Cambodia.

When the Indian Vice-president visited Cambodia as part of

his Southeast Asian tour, Prince Sihanouk showed keen

,117. National Herald (~ucknow), 12 June 1965.

118. - FAR (New Delhi), n.109, p . 2 0 2 .

interests to remain a faithful friend of India. He said

they would always remain faithful as friends to the

people of India in heart and spirit. He wanted to

assure India of his firm faith in non-alignment. Prince

Sihanouk also said that India had recognised the frontiers

of Cambodia and thereby discouraged the annexationist

ambitions of Cambodia's neighbours. He, however wanted

India to adopt a most understanding attitude towards

Cambodia and also furnish Cambodia with normal support for

its disputes with neiqhbours. In a debate in the Lok

Sabha on 5 April 1968, Indira Gandhi said that India had

long-standlng and friendly relations with Cambodia

particularly with Prince Sihanouk. She said: "Those

relations are purposeful and are based on mutual

understanding, trust and confidence". 120

In contrast with India, China's support to Cambodia

during this period was much more pronounced. Asserting

China's support. to Cambodia, the Chinese Foreign Ministry

stated:

The Chinese Government and people have all along firmly supported the Royal Cambodian Government and the Cambodian people in their just struggle against

1.19. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 October 1966.

1.20. - FAR (New Delhi), n.112.

US imperialist aggression. The Chinese Government is closely watching the developments and hereby solemnly states that if US imperialism dares to launch a war of aggression against Cambodia, the Chinese Government and people definitely will not look on with folded arms and that the 700 million Chinese people will certainly adopt every necessary and effective measure to support the Cambodian people in their lust struggle against US imperialist aggression.[l21]

From 1965 onwards, the North Vietnamese and the

troops of the Communist National Liberation Front of South

Vietnam allegedly used the eastern provinces of Cambodia

with the connivance of Prince Sihanouk against the

American and South Vietnamese forces. Sihanouk on the

other hand accused the United States of supporting

subversive elements in Cambodia. In Cambodia's border

dispute with its neiyhbours, the Canadian and the Indian

representative held different views in the ICC. Until

1967, there was a sort of discrimination against the

Canadians and a policy of appeasing the Poles. When

V.V. Paranjpae was appointed as Chairman of the ICC, he

wanted to change the position.122 When the Vietcong

allegedly used Cambodia as a sanctuary in their fight with

121. Pekinq Review, Vol.XI, No.2, 12 January 1968, p.35.

122. Interview with Paranjpae, n.77.

South Vietnamese and the Americans, the Canadian

commissioner appealed to the ICC for investigation. The

Poles wanted to avoid investigation because they thought

the Vietcong presence in the Cambodian territory might be

exposed. But [ndia as Chairman of the ICC agreed on such

investigation. In fact, there was not very much of that

possibility. By the time the investigation request was

made by the Cambodians to the Commission, already a number

of days had gone and if any sign of Vietcong presence had

been there, they would normally have been non-existent by

the time the Commission went there. During this time,

India had to go for several such investigations. Despite

Polish resentment India went for investigation and

succeeded very surprisingly in proving the contrary to

what the Poles were afraid of - it found that there were

incursions from the American side.

The United States and South Vietnamese forces

continued to bomb the Cambodian territory, alleging that

the Vietnamese communists were using Cambodia as a spring

board for attack and that Russian and Chinese communist

arms were reaching the Vietnamese communists through

Camboeia's international ports. At this time, Prince

Sihanouk suggested that he would welcome a personal

emissary from President Johnson to discuss the problems

arising from the alleged Vietcong sanctuary in Cambodia.

Accordingly, Chester Bowles the American Ambassador to

India visited Phnom Penh in January 1968. lZ3 Chester

Bowles met the Indian Foreign Secretary Rajeshwar Dayal

and gave him a fuller version of the discussions between

him and Prince Sihanouk.

The Government of Cambodia had communicated on 9

October 1969 to the ICC that the Commission should be

dissolved with effect from 31 December 1969. lZ4 lt also

clarified that the reason for its decision was purely

financial. 12' Accordingly the ICC in Cambodia was

adjourned on 31 December 1969. 126

In sum, India's Cambodia policy during 1947-69

reveals certain perceptible trends. Immediately after

independence India followed a policy of non-interference

with regard to Indo-China. This policy of studied

aloofness continued till 1954. However, Cambodia's

relations with China could, at best, be characterised

as formal. After 1956, Chinese influence in Cambodia

was strengthening, partly at India' s expense.

123. For details see New York Times, 7 January 1968; als,~ see Times of India (New Delhi), 17 January --- 1968.

124. India, Lok Sabha, Debates, Vol.XXXII1, No.3, 19 November 1969, col. 63.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., Vol.XXXVII1, No.24, 26 March 1970, col. 261.

This was largely because India, having encouraged

Cambodia's turn to neutrality, was unable to help it out

of the resulting difficulties. When India's relations

with China began to deteriorate its relations with

Cambodia also became cool, if not unfriendly. However,

Southeast Asia was accorded an important place in the

foreign policy scheme of India in the light of the

realities of the situation revealed by the Chinese

aggression against India. The crux of the policy was

containment of Chinese threat of subversion in these

countries. Due to the variations in the degree of

intensity in Indian policy towards Indo-China, it lacked

an integrated approach. The absence of such cohesive

position derived from such factors as the incomplete

reconstruction of Indian foreign policy set into reality

by the Sino-Indian dispute, the need felt by India to

maintain a productive rapport with both Soviet Union and

the United States and the demands made on national system

by domestic and regional exigencies.

Yet another point should be noted. India on the

whole, remained loyal to the concept of an area of peace

in Indo-China advanced by Nehru in 1954. This meant,

where Cambodia was concerned, that Cambodia should remain

non-aligned and at peace with its neighbours and that its

sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected

by its neighbours and by outside powers. Unfortunately,

India could yive little more than verbal support to

Cambodia in this regard. And in 1958, India failed to

give even verbal support, owing to lack of leverage with

Thailand and South Vietnam. By the late sixties India had

clearly failed to preserve an area of peace in Cambodia.

This was because neither the Communist side nor the

Americans were willing to respect the concept as far as

Cambodia was concerned.