Review of Peukert's Science, Action and Fundamental Theology

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    574 Dialogue XXVI (1987)

    being causal with respect to other things), and there, it has it because it has the

    status of essence. "Essence" expresses an ineluctable ontological contribution

    which in creatures cannot be that ofesse. Such a contribution is only conceiva-

    ble becausebothessence andessein creatures presuppose the divine causality.

    (And I claim to be givingno

    'existence of its own'', apart from esse, to created

    essence, no esse essentiae .)

    I would take as expressive of the general vision I am promoting the words of

    St. Thomas in theDe ente:"Of substances, some are composite and some are

    simple, and in both there

    is

    essence; but in simple [substances there

    is

    essence] in

    a truer and more noble degree, according as, also, they have more noble being

    [esse]:

    for they are the cause of those which are composite, at least [this is true

    of] the first simple substance, which is God."

    4

    I.e., the study is of essence.

    Essenceisfound most truly of all in God (how far we are from a doctrine in which

    "God has no essence" ). We grade essence by the grade of esse the thing

    exhibits (since essence is that through which and in which a being[ens]has being

    [esse]),and we grade thatesseby the efficient causal hierarchy. The efficient

    cause has more noble esse than its effect.

    One can see why Owens focusses onesseand uses it as the scientific principle.

    It may seem a small difference to insist on, but I would, while keeping essence

    and esse in parallel view, as does St. Thomas, take essence as the scientific

    principle, while regarding the existence of creatures as the "property", in the

    Aristotelian scientific schema. I think this would result in a greater appreciation

    of the kinship between essence (or form) and existence, and so in a greater

    appreciation of the intelligibility of existence.

    I congratulate the Houston Center for its wisdom in making more readily

    available these important works of this outstanding Canadian philosopher.

    LAWRENCE

    DEWAN,o.P. College dominicain de philosophie et de theologie,

    Ottawa

    Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of

    Communicative Action

    HELMUT PEUKERT

    Translated

    by JAMES BOHMAN

    Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. Pp. xxviii, 330. $37.50

    Helmut Peukert is a member of the Department of Catholic Theology, Univer-

    sity of Miinster. His book, originally published in German in 1976, stands here as

    part of a series entitled, "Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought",

    under the general editorship of Thomas McCarthy. Previous works in the series

    include books by Theodor Adorno, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jiirgen Haber-

    mas.

    The central question with which Peukert is concerned in this book is whether

    or not theology, given the negative critiques it has received in recent decades,

    can any longer be considered an intellectually respectable academic discipline.

    At root this is a question about the intellectual respectability of theology's

    4 St. Thomas,De

    ente

    et

    essentia

    (Leonine ed., chap. 1, lines 58-63).

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    576 Dialogue XXVI

    1987)

    comm itment so as to prescind from the victims of history; but this undercuts the

    possibility of communicative action by eliminating its necessary precondition.

    Or one may choose to remain comm itted to universal solidarity, notwithstanding

    the apparent futility of such a commitment; and exactly in and through one's

    experience of taking the latter course, Peukert argues, there is disclosed an

    unlimited, mysterious, and liberating reality by virtue of which the death of

    every innocent victim ultimately is definitively overcome, such that in conse-

    quence the futility of on e's commitment is manifested as merely apparen t. The

    latter course alone preserves the presupposition that is essential to concrete

    communicative action. Peukert illustrates this second step of his argument

    through reference to developm ents in a second line of theology that culminate in

    the work of Bultmann, Rahner, and Metz.

    Precisely as an inquiry into the foundations of theology, Peukert's book

    illustrates an increasingly widespread phenomenon, namely, the emergence of

    issues that historically have been called ph ilosophical in academic disciplines

    other than explicit philosophy. Whether recognized and labelled as such or not,

    basic epistemological, metaphysical, and axiological issues are surfacing at

    every turn in the attempts of physics, psychology, sociology, historiography,

    literary criticism, etc., to make explicit their primary grounds of meaning and

    elemental criteria of justification. One ofthegreatest merits of Peukert's book is

    the clarity with which it manifests that an encounter with the full range of these

    basic philosophical issues through inquiry into the foundations of academic

    disciplines will be complete only insofar as the foundational study of any given

    discipline eventually becomes at least virtually a foundational study of all the

    disciplines, including theology. My principal criticism of the book is that the

    level on which itfinally roots the philosophical issues is not, in my judgment, the

    truly fundamental one. Peukert correctly points out that basic philosophical

    questions ultimately are matters not of theory but of practice. The practice to

    which he refers, however, is already intersubjective, linguistically constituted,

    essentially public: he gives no standing to mental practice that is individually

    subjective, often pre-linguistic, radically personal. I would argue that this Witt-

    gensteinian stance reflects an insufficient knowledge of one's own subjectivity.

    Except a t the price of operational self-contradiction, one cannot deny a certain

    methodological priority of individual cognitional and moral practice over that of

    the community; and the level of such individual practice is the fundamental level

    on which philosophical issues emerge.

    MICHAEL VERTIN

    St. M ichael s College, University ofToronto

    Order and Organism Steps to a Whiteheadean Philosophy of

    Mathematics and the Natural Sciences

    MAURICE CODE

    Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985. Pp. x, 265. $39.50,

    $14.95 paper

    Aproblem facing the philosopher of mathematics is to explainhowmathematics

    can play such an important part in our knowledge of the world. How, for

    instance, can one make a connection between the increasingly abstract notions