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DOI: 10.1177/0486613412475183 published online 8 March 2013Review of Radical Political Economics

Fusheng Xie, An Li and Zhongjin LiCan the Socialist Market Economy in China Adhere to Socialism?

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SOEs in industrial output from twenty-seven percent in 2010 to around ten percent in 2030(World Bank 2012). This was, by no means, a new prescription. Fifteen years ago, along with thereport titled China 2020 also from the World Bank, China witnessed a full-scale privatizationof SOEs and market liberalization. However, today the resistance against privatization has

become much stronger than before. At the China 2030 press conference, Du Jianguo, an inde- pendent scholar, stood up and denounced the World Bank policy with his leaflets titled WorldBank, Go Home with Your Poison. This open protest has so far received enormous support fromthe left as well as denouncements from the right.

In what follows, we will consider the implications of the debate by focusing on three sets ofquestions. First, what is the nature of the debate, and how can we understand it in the context ofChinese reform? Second, what are the likely changes for SOEs considering the current politicaland economic situation? Third, how can we transform SOEs towards socialism so they can betterrepresent the peoples interests?

2. The Debate as Continued Class Struggle in the Political andIdeological SuperstructureWhen Chinese leaders initiated the reform towards marketization in 1978, they claimed that thegoal was to rejuvenate and improve the socialist system in China. Some important steps of thereform were developing private enterprises, attracting foreign investment, and offering privateand foreign enterprises conditions more favorable than those given to SOEs and domestic enter-

prises. In the process of dismantling the planned economyespecially in price reforms, theestablishment of capital and land markets, and SOE reformssome party members and cadresin enterprises and government started to accumulate capital through both legal and illegalmeans. The weakening of central planning made the national economy increasingly reliant on

market expansion and monetary incentives; various contradictions springing up during thereform were expected to be solved by further marketization. Under the name of reform, educa-tion, health care, housing, and the social security system, which were operated publicly as rep-resentatives of socialism before the reform, have been marketized continuously.

The objective of the reform was declared to be the creation of a socialist market economy.However, in the 1990s, the key issue changed into being the transition to a generally market-

based economy. While the path and means of this transition became a priority of theoreticaldiscussions and policy designs, the aftermath of this transitionthe resulting economic modeland its nature - was largely absent from discussions, consciously or unconsciously. In the thirtyyears since 1978, time has revealed that Chinas crossing the river by touching stones was

actually a move towards an American-style market economy. In this process, the socialist ele-ments of the Chinese economy have been reduced only to SOEs and macroeconomic control.The state-owned economy has largely been regarded as the basis for state intervention, but hasnot functioned as models for other parts of the economy to follow (Song and Sun 2010). Worse,many SOEs were privatized or simply shut down.

During the mid-1990s, massive privatization of SOEs took the form of grasping the large andletting go of the small ( zhuada fangxiao ), under which all medium- and small-scale SOEs and

part of large-scale SOEs were privatized. The beneficiaries included governmental officials, for-mer SOE managers, private capitalists connected with government, and transnational corpora-tions (Li 2011). From this process has emerged, unsurprisingly, a new capitalist class composedmainly of private proprietors and multinational capital and its related interest groups. As the sizeand wealth of this emerging capitalist class grew larger and their power grew stronger, theywould necessarily demand abandoning the socialist legacy which might impede their furtheraccumulation of wealth (Kotz 2009). Meanwhile, tens of millions of former state-owned and


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collective unit workers were laid off and impoverished. Besides the urban labor force, migrantworkers from Chinas rural belly have been the dominant source of labor supply for industrialsectors. The rising working class has organized a significant amount of petitions, protests, andstrikes against the new capitalist class (Lee 2007).

However, so far direct and violent capital-labor conflict has not been the dominant form ofclass struggle in China. First, the proletarianization of rural migrant workers is yet to be complete, because despite working in cities, the reproduction of their labor power still highly relieson the countryside where they own use rights of land and other productive resources (Pun et al.2009). Second, although a rising tide of strikes has been conspicuous recently, most of them have

been sporadic, localized, and focusing on immediate economic demands such as higher wagesand better working conditions, hoping to draw attention and help from the government. Theselabor protests have shown that Chinas new working class is still largely a class-in-itself, not aclass-for-itself.

Instead, class struggle in the ideological sphere has been very significant. As Marx writes,theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses (Marx 1978: 1843). Inthe top-down reform led by the Communist Party, society was successfully inculcated with thereform ideology which soon became hegemonic in discourse. Moreover, because the economicstructure is the basis of politics and ideology, the changes in ownership structure and class struc-ture that have accompanied the rise of capitalist private enterprises have been inevitably reflectedin theoretical, ideological, and policy levels. The capitalist class has also taken advantage ofideological tools, like higher education and new media, to advance their interests.

First, as the national economy has been geared to the American style, economics education inChina has also been Americanized. Many economists trained in neoliberal economics in theUnited States have been invited to China and granted the power to reform economics education intop academic institutions. The popularization of neoliberal economics has worked along with the

marginalization of Marxist economics, and a generation of young scholars with blind faith in neolib-eralism has also been brought up (Cohn 2011). For them, the inefficiency of SOEs has become atenet of faith, which indirectly negates the socialist elements in the market economy. In this process,socialism has been theoretically weakened and further reduced to abstract concepts such as equal-ity or fairness, whilst capitalist features of the reform have been significantly strengthened.

Second, before 1978 socialism in China was generally equivalent to a combination of publicownership, a planned economy, and distribution according to work. As reform proceeds, a

planned economy and distribution according to work have been replaced with a market economyand distribution according to factor (mainly capital) contribution; and the dominant position of

public ownership has been replaced with the controlling power of state ownership. As a result,

SOEs have become the last resort for socialist elements of the market economy. This is whydenouncing or defending SOEs has become the focal point of theoretical and ideological debatesin China since 2004.

Third, Chinese rightist elites are already experienced in transforming a topic into a public con-sensus via the media under their control. In this way, they have pressured the government to re-design policies in their favor. For instance, during the 2000s and 2010s, the rightist elites started aseries of debates like the debate on SOE management buy-outs in 2004, on Chinese economicseducation in 2005, on the orientation of Chinese reform in 2006, on democratic socialism in 2007,on universal values and the 08 Charter in 2008. Although topics differed, these debates allrevolved around whether China should persevere with or give up socialism. Moreover, each washalted by party and state officials out of fear of challenging the legitimacy of the economic systemtoo much; each was ended by the authority as a compromise to balance the left and the right.However, the way of compromise, in fact, always leaves the door open for further ideologicalmanipulations by rightist elites who oppose socialism and embrace privatization.


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As Michael Burawoy argues, when struggle takes place on the terrain of ideology, the con-sequences of struggle must be understood through an examination of the actual relations behindideology.Where interests are taken as given, ideology becomes a resource that people manipu-late to advance their interests or a cement that contains conflict or minimizes strain (1979).

Also as Marx suggests, through ideological forms people become conscious of the conflict between the productive forces and the superstructure, and fight it out (Marx 1978: 1859). At present, the debates on SOEs reveal the continuation of privatization and ongoing class strugglein China. Rightist intellectuals, policy advisors, and government officials, as well as the media,initiated these debates in order to influence the next leadership of the central governmentand policy making in general. Their ultimate goal is to eliminate public ownership, legitimizemanagers embezzlement of public wealth by privatizing SOEs, allow transnational capitals tocontrol the Chinese economy, and thus eliminate all remaining socialist elements.

3. The Foreseeable Future of the SOEsThe serial debates have greatly influenced government policies on SOE reform. For example, inMarch 2010 the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of theState Council required 78 central SOEs to quit the real estate sector if real estate was not theirmajor business. Two hundred and twenty-seven enterprises were affected and state-owned assetsinvolved totaled 99.1 billion yuan ($15.2 billion). In The Proposals of the State Council on

Encouraging and Leading Private Investment to Develop Healthily (May 2010), it was suggestedthat the government should enlarge the scope and scale of private investment; encourage and guide

private investment in basic industries, infrastructure, and financial sectors; and allow privately-owned real estate corporations to build affordable housing, public rental housing, and other policy-

based housing. The proposals were largely accepted in Premier Wens government work report in

March 2012 and thus became the target of future reform ( Peoples Daily , March 16, 2012).It is undeniable that, under current conditions, socialism with Chinese characteristics tends to

develop into capitalism. As the Chinese market economy develops, economic interests have beenincreasingly diversified, and thus the ideological discourses are also changing. There will befurther theoretical and policy-related debates over whether or not China should adhere to social-ism. Rightist elites will undoubtedly wage new wars against SOEs and propose furthering priva-tization. How, then, will the position and function of the state-owned economy change in theforeseeable future?

We argue that, in the relatively longer term, as long as the CPC remains the ruling party,socialist legacies and rhetoric will not become extinct, and some socialist elements will still be

functioning, such as giant SOEs, the state-owned banking system, public ownership of land inthe Constitution, and the implementation of national economic plans. In general, without radical policy changes, the proportion of the economy under state ownership, in spite of some fluctua-tions, will remain relatively stable over time.

First, the CPC continually insists on maintaining the dominant role of the state-owned econ-omy in the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the necessity of which has already beenrealized among the top leaders. Jinping Xi, the Chinese vice president, pointed out that SOEswere strong forces for building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, the major pillarsfor building socialism with Chinese characteristics, an important basis on which the CPC canretain leadership, and an important area where the CPCs basic theories can be implemented and

put into practice (Xi 2009). In the Fourth Session of the 11th National Peoples Congress in 2011,Bangguo Wu, chairperson of the Standing Committee, stated firmly that China would not adopta system of multiple parties holding office in rotation or adopt pluralization of the guidingdogma. He ruled out the possibility of separating powers among the executive, legislature, and


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judiciary or adopting a bicameral or federal system, and also clearly declared that further priva-tization was not under consideration (Wu 2011). Serial reports published in Guangming Daily recently emphasized the importance of SOEs in consolidating and developing public ownership,

promoting advantages of the socialist system, strengthening economic and defense power,

increasing national coherence, curbing income inequality, maintaining social fairness and jus-tice, promoting general prosperity, consolidating the states political power, and increasing socialharmony. 1

Second, it is unreasonable and also difficult to further privatize the current state-owned econ-omy. Most of the SOEs either have already gone through an initial public offering (IPO) or arehuge in scale. Their major businesses involve capital- and/or technology-intensive industries.Eighty percent of the central SOEs quality assets are concentrated in listed companies and are ofhigh market value. The property-rights exchanges of the unlisted ones must be conducted througha designated special market by public auction. In practice, Chinese private investors so far cannotafford to buy out or operate these SOEs. Also, since the debate over SOE management buy-outsin 2004, the whole society has been cautious about the complex manipulations through whichmanagers of SOEs turned public assets into private ones, thus the state-owned assets cannot begrabbed as easily as before.

Third, public attention, social pressures, and rising economic nationalism have made further privatization more difficult. First of all, the Chinese state-sector working class has accumulatedclass experiences in the pre-reform era and has developed a substantial degree of socialist con-sciousness. Once they realized that their class interests were invaded by the new capitalist classand its supporting government officials, they strongly opposed further privatization of SOEs (Li2011). For instance, in July 2009, the proposal for privatizing Jilin Tonghua Iron and Steel Grouptriggered massive and violent self-organized worker protests, in which seven blast furnacesstopped working and one high-ranking manager was beaten to death. This event forced the Jilin

provincial government to stop its initial plan of privatizing the enterprise. Similarly, the privatiza-tion of Henan Linzhou Iron and Steel Group was halted due to massive worker protests, in whichPuyang SASACs vice director was placed under house arrest by workers for 90 hours. Both casesimply that in order to avoid further capital-labor conflicts and maintain social stability, the govern-ment will be more cautious on SOEs further reform. In addition, many nationalists argue forSOEs because SOEs are the major force against foreign capital. One study has shown that amongtwenty-seven major industries, wherever SOEs do not take a large share, foreign capital occupiesthe dominant position (Gao 2010). Thus if the SOEs retreat, it is likely that transnational monop-oly capital will come to dominate Chinese domestic resources and markets.

Finally, it is fallacious to exaggerate the monopoly of the state-owned economy, a central

argument made by the right elites. First, monopoly is an inevitable outcome of the increasingdegree of socialization of production. As a market phenomenon, monopoly is not necessarilyrelated with forms of ownership. Due to technical and resource advantages, economy of scale,and policy reasons, both SOEs and private enterprises would develop into monopoly. Additionally,under globalization SOEs mainly compete with large transnational corporations; therefore the

problem of the SOEs is not being too large, but instead being too small to compete. Also, finan-cial statements have shown that SOEs perform well in many aspects, so it is ungrounded toimplement privatization by accusing them of low efficiency (C. Zhang and Y. Zhang 2011).Thus, the current problems in Chinas SOEs are not associated with bad performance at all, butsomething else. In this regard, privatization, rather than being the first solution, will only makethem worse (Chang 2007).

1Guangming Daily is a newspaper led and managed by the Central Committee of the Chinese CommunistParty. Intellectuals are its major targeted audience.


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4. Proposals for the SOEs towards Socialism

Although state ownership is not equivalent to socialism, we believe that it has the potential to rep-resent true ownership by the people. At present, workers in SOEs not only enjoy greater bargaining

power, but also earn higher compensation. National statistics have shown that average wages forworkers in SOEs are significantly higher than those of private enterprises in general. (See appendix1.) Also, when breaking down the economy into nineteen major sectors with different value-addedand skills involved, the advantage of SOEs in terms of compensation is still evident. (See appendix2.) Thus state ownership appears to be more beneficial for workers in terms of distribution relations,and thus shall be preserved in the course of reform. However, the problems of the current SOEs, weargue, mainly lie in the lack of participatory democracy, which do not appear fundamentally differ-ent from those in the private sector (e.g., both adopt some features of Fordism).

It is first worth noting that this problem hindering SOEs from representing true ownership bythe people is actually a direct consequence of neoliberalization, especially managerial reformstarting from the 1980s. Carrying the policy prescription from the World Bank, Chinas SOEshad to bear high interest rates, lay off their workers, give up their welfare responsibilities, andmost importantly establish hierarchical labor-management relations in the workplace. WhenSOEs have to behave under the logic of capital under market competition, they refrain from theworkers participation which used to be the core of the Angang Constitution during Maos era. 2

Notwithstanding, defending SOEs at present will still contribute to protecting workers, moti-vating labor movements, and safeguarding the remaining socialist elements in China. Historicallyspeaking, to nationalize and turn a private economy into a state-owned economy appears to be oneof the most efficient ways by which a public economy can be established. If the percentage of theChinese economy under state ownership were to be lower than 15 percent, then it would beextremely difficult to restore socialism in China, even for a leader who believed in socialism.

It should equally be noted that state ownership is not equivalent to public ownership; onlyunder certain conditions can the former be turned into the latter. These conditions include atleast: (1) regarding the relations of production, the means of production should belong to thesociety and people should hold equal positions in ownership. In the concrete labor process, thereshould be no antagonism such as that between capital and labor. (2) Regarding the relations ofdistribution, within enterprises, every laborer, including enterprise managers, should get paidonly according to their work; within the whole society, the profits and gains from differentialrents resulting from the monopolistic position SOEs occupy should be used to benefit all of the

people. (3) Regarding management and planning, the state, in charge of the national economy,should manage state-owned assets effectively according to the will of the society. It should make

them represent the peoples shared interests, which should be prominent when balancing amongdifferent types and sizes of enterprises, and between central and regional plans. Within individualenterprises, laborers and other stakeholders should be able to participate in the management ofthe enterprises effectively and democratically.

Under socialism, it is necessary to reform and perfect the management system of the state-owned economy according to the requirements of public ownership: the revenues of SOEs must

be submitted to the state, the salaries of SOE leaders must be adjusted, the trend of pursuing self-interests in the SOE reform must be forbidden, and, in particular, economic democracy withinSOEs must be established. Only by following these steps can SOEs be turned into units truelyrepresenting laborers rights and interests. These steps also reflect the requirements and

2The Angang Constitution consists of the leaders involvement in labor and the workers involvement inmanagement. It also reforms unreasonable rules and regulations, which the general public, the leaders, andthe technicians all take part in. It was initiated in the Anshan Iron and Steel Factory in Liaoning Provinceand soon advocated by Mao in 1960 nationwide.


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advantages of the socialist system. It is worth emphasizing here that this is not simply a battle onan ideological question. In a practical process tangled with the issue of whether or not to give upthe basic socialist elements of the economic system, confrontations between economic powers arevery real. Theoretical studies and propaganda are important; nevertheless, ideological rhetoric

will be useless if the socialist campaign has no real power. With the deepening of the worldwidecapitalist crisis and the awakening of the Chinese working class and their rising level of organiza-tion, the changes in Chinese socioeconomic structures may light the way to a socialist future.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Per Capita Annual Compensation of Urban Employees in Different Units (2008-2010)

Year 2008 2009 2010

State-owned (yuan) 31,005 35,053 39,471Collectively-owned (yuan) 18,338 20,958 24,430

Privately-owned (yuan) 17,071 18,199 20,759Notes: Data for other types of non-privately-owned units are not reported here.Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b.

Appendix 2. Average Wage of Employed Persons in Urban Units by Sector in Detail (2010) (units: yuan)

State-ownedunits

Urban collective-owned units

Urbanprivate units

National Total 38,359 24,010 20,759Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and

Fishery16,522 18,156 16,370

Mining 44,904 23,791 20,981Manufacturing 36,386 20,841 20,090Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas,

and Water47,724 33,851 18,834

Construction 31,777 20,210 22,228Traffic, Transport, Storage, and Post 40,097 19,882 21,989Information Transmission, Computer Services,

and Software46,402 37,576 31,226

Wholesale and Retail Trades 35,814 16,816 19,928Hotels and Catering Services 23,864 18,808 17,531Financial Intermediation 66,014 44,154 30,513Real Estate 33,967 24,617 23,228Leasing and Business Services 33,680 20,981 23,879Scientific Research, Technical Service, and

Geologic Prospecting53,235 37,538 28,886

Management of Water Conservancy,Environment

25,478 18,551 19,607

Services to Households and Other Services 32,417 20,818 18,350Education 39,166 31,486 21,862Health, Social Security, and Social Welfare 41,112 32,645 21,571Culture, Sports, and Entertainment 42,367 24,796 20,012Public Management and Social Organization 38,387 26,957 8,900

Note: Data for other types of non-private-owned units are not reported here.Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2011, Tables 4-15, 4-17.


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AcknowledgmentsWe are grateful to three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biographies

Fusheng Xie , PhD, is an associate professor at the School of Economics, Renmin University of China,Beijing, China.

An Li and Zhongjin Li are PhD students at the Department of Economics, University of MassachusettsAmherst.

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Review of Radical Political Economics-2013