1
38 Trade Insight Vol.5, No.2, 2009 book review book review D epression economics is back and is more relevant than ever to ensure that the gains in prosperi- ty achieved in the past several de- cades do not evaporate in a few months. Countering Robert Lucas’s claim at an American Economic As- sociation presidential lecture in 2003 that the “central problem of depres- sion-prevention has been solved for all practical purposes", Paul Krug- man, the 2008 Nobel Laureate in eco- nomics, argues that the problem is far from being solved. In The Return of Depression Eco- nomics and the Crisis of 2008, the Prin- ceton University professor contends that economists and policy makers ignored warnings about bubbling sectors and believed in “a set of fool- ish ideas” and “crank doctrine” like supply-side economics that only ap- pealed to editors and wealthy men who succumbed to the flawed ideol- ogy. Rightly invoking John Maynard Keynes’s ideas and relating them to the crises since the 1930s, Krugman shows that depression economics, which is “the study of situations where there is free lunch because there are unemployed resources that could be put to work", is still rele- vant and we are far from fully fath- oming business cycles. In 10 chapters covering the ideo- logical battle, the crises in Japan, East Asia and Latin America, the bubbles created by Alan Greenspan while at the helm of the United States (US) Federal Reserve, the shadow (parallel) banking system and the present crisis, Krugman offers a com- pelling case for the relevance of Key- nesian economics and the need to stimulate aggregate demand and re- store market confidence, by all pos- sible means (even short-term nation- alization of banks and more govern- ment spending than tax cuts), when the economy is in a deep financial slump and a liquidity trap. He lu- cidly explains the persistent slump Return of depression economics in the Japanese economy—which he says is a classic case of liquidity trap and bears a striking resemblance to the present economic crisis—and the waves of currency crises, from the tequila crisis in 1994 to the East Asian crisis in 1997. Perhaps the most important point is Krugman’s emphasis on the fact that warnings about bubbles were missed (or ignored) and it is entirely possible to have an economic crisis, triggered by a crisis of confidence, even in a stable market economy. Even the most promising economies were vulnerable to self-fulfilling pan- ics. Krugman argues that the policy response to big crises was not enough in the crisis affected countries. He argues that Japan failed to act quick- ly and decisively in restoring market confidence and recapitalizing the banking system. While the crisis was brewing since 1990, it was only in 1998 that Japan’s legislature passed a US$500 billion bank rescue plan. Similarly, Mexico failed to devalue its currency enough to avoid fertile playing field for speculators and en- gaged in irresponsible politics that further disturbed investor’s confi- dence. He believes that the current fiscal rescue package in the US (around 1 percent of gross domestic product) is short of the expenditure required to stimulate demand in a recession of this severity and magni- tude—a point contested by conser- vative economists and policy mak- ers. He also comes down heavily on investors like George Soros, the In- ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Treasury for fuelling cri- ses and advocating counterproduc- tive policies during distressed times. Krugman argues that to get out of a slump, it is necessary to heat up an economy, even by excessive govern- ment spending, i.e., it is okay to have moderate inflation. Krugman’s crit- ics disagree, arguing that exclusive- ly focusing on “Keynesian compact” would leave the economy vulnera- ble to disturbances in aggregate sup- ply caused by expectations of infla- tion. However, this should be of a secondary concern at a time when the credit market is frozen, produc- ers are closing factories, consumers are not spending, and there are un- used resources that could be proper- ly put to work. There are talks about a second stimulus package in the US (Krug- man wants it to be 4 percent of gross domestic product). Along with other countries, China, Japan, India, and the European Union are spending billions of dollars to stimulate their economies. And, the IMF is armed with US$500 billion to stimulate de- veloping economies. The world has listened to Krugman’s call for resort- ing to the good “old Keynesian fis- cal stimulus”. The tide is on Krug- man’s side. Only time will tell how strong the tide will be in pulling the global economy out of the recession. The author is based in Washington, D.C., and has recently been appointed as Jun- ior Fellow for Trade, Equity and Devel- opment Programme at Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace. Title: The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 Author: Paul Krugman Publisher: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009 ISBN: 978-0-393-07101-6 (hardcover) Chandan Sapkota

Review of Return of Depression Economics_Trade Insight_Vol5No2_SAWTEE

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

A review of The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008

Citation preview

Page 1: Review of Return of Depression Economics_Trade Insight_Vol5No2_SAWTEE

38 • Trade Insight • Vol.5, No.2, 2009

book reviewbook review

Depression economics is backand is more relevant than ever

to ensure that the gains in prosperi-ty achieved in the past several de-cades do not evaporate in a fewmonths. Countering Robert Lucas’sclaim at an American Economic As-sociation presidential lecture in 2003that the “central problem of depres-sion-prevention has been solved forall practical purposes", Paul Krug-man, the 2008 Nobel Laureate in eco-nomics, argues that the problem isfar from being solved.

In The Return of Depression Eco-nomics and the Crisis of 2008, the Prin-ceton University professor contendsthat economists and policy makersignored warnings about bubblingsectors and believed in “a set of fool-ish ideas” and “crank doctrine” likesupply-side economics that only ap-pealed to editors and wealthy menwho succumbed to the flawed ideol-ogy. Rightly invoking John MaynardKeynes’s ideas and relating them tothe crises since the 1930s, Krugmanshows that depression economics,which is “the study of situationswhere there is free lunch becausethere are unemployed resources thatcould be put to work", is still rele-vant and we are far from fully fath-oming business cycles.

In 10 chapters covering the ideo-logical battle, the crises in Japan,East Asia and Latin America, thebubbles created by Alan Greenspanwhile at the helm of the United States(US) Federal Reserve, the shadow(parallel) banking system and thepresent crisis, Krugman offers a com-pelling case for the relevance of Key-nesian economics and the need tostimulate aggregate demand and re-store market confidence, by all pos-sible means (even short-term nation-alization of banks and more govern-ment spending than tax cuts), whenthe economy is in a deep financialslump and a liquidity trap. He lu-cidly explains the persistent slump

Return of depression economics

in the Japanese economy—which hesays is a classic case of liquidity trapand bears a striking resemblance tothe present economic crisis—and thewaves of currency crises, from thetequila crisis in 1994 to the EastAsian crisis in 1997.

Perhaps the most important pointis Krugman’s emphasis on the factthat warnings about bubbles weremissed (or ignored) and it is entirelypossible to have an economic crisis,triggered by a crisis of confidence,even in a stable market economy.Even the most promising economieswere vulnerable to self-fulfilling pan-ics. Krugman argues that the policyresponse to big crises was not enoughin the crisis affected countries. Heargues that Japan failed to act quick-ly and decisively in restoring marketconfidence and recapitalizing thebanking system. While the crisis wasbrewing since 1990, it was only in1998 that Japan’s legislature passeda US$500 billion bank rescue plan.Similarly, Mexico failed to devalueits currency enough to avoid fertileplaying field for speculators and en-gaged in irresponsible politics thatfurther disturbed investor’s confi-dence. He believes that the current

fiscal rescue package in the US(around 1 percent of gross domesticproduct) is short of the expenditurerequired to stimulate demand in arecession of this severity and magni-tude—a point contested by conser-vative economists and policy mak-ers. He also comes down heavily oninvestors like George Soros, the In-ternational Monetary Fund (IMF)and the US Treasury for fuelling cri-ses and advocating counterproduc-tive policies during distressed times.

Krugman argues that to get out ofa slump, it is necessary to heat up aneconomy, even by excessive govern-ment spending, i.e., it is okay to havemoderate inflation. Krugman’s crit-ics disagree, arguing that exclusive-ly focusing on “Keynesian compact”would leave the economy vulnera-ble to disturbances in aggregate sup-ply caused by expectations of infla-tion. However, this should be of asecondary concern at a time whenthe credit market is frozen, produc-ers are closing factories, consumersare not spending, and there are un-used resources that could be proper-ly put to work.

There are talks about a secondstimulus package in the US (Krug-man wants it to be 4 percent of grossdomestic product). Along with othercountries, China, Japan, India, andthe European Union are spendingbillions of dollars to stimulate theireconomies. And, the IMF is armedwith US$500 billion to stimulate de-veloping economies. The world haslistened to Krugman’s call for resort-ing to the good “old Keynesian fis-cal stimulus”. The tide is on Krug-man’s side. Only time will tell howstrong the tide will be in pulling theglobal economy out of the recession.

The author is based in Washington, D.C.,and has recently been appointed as Jun-ior Fellow for Trade, Equity and Devel-opment Programme at Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace.

Title: The Return of DepressionEconomics and the Crisis of 2008

Author: Paul Krugman

Publisher: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009

ISBN: 978-0-393-07101-6 (hardcover)

Chandan Sapkota