Review Outline

5/24/2018 Review Outline

1/51

UPDATES IN PROPERTY REGISTRATION, MORTGAGES,

CONDOMINIUMS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS(June 2013)

(Based on Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws

(Land Titles and Deeds), 2011 ed., and Reviewer in Property Registration(Wi th Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers)

1

Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili2

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural

resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to

belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.3

Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable

agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of theinalienable public domain.

4 Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of

man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation

thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be

registered as a title.5

1 Published by Rex Book Store. See also: Law on Natural Resources, and Reviewer in Property

Registration and Related Laws (with MCQs and Suggested Answers).2 Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in

Management at the Asian Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and Research Section,Bureau of Lands, he was appointed Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and Assistant

Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He wasChairman of the 13

th Division upon his retirement from the Court. Court. Justice Agcaoili is a full-time

Professor of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and Professorial Lecturer of the UP Institute forthe Administration of Justice (UP-IAJ) and other MCLE providers. He is a duly accredited Appellate Court

Mediator (ACM). A delegate/participant in several international conferences, he wrote a paper entitledEnvironmental Protection: The Convergence of Law and Policywhich he read during the 20

thBiennial

Conference on the Law of the World held in Dublin, Ireland in October 2001. Described by Chief JusticeReynato S. Puno as isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa lupa(one of our experts on land rights),

Justice Agcaoili is the author of three books: Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (LandTitles and Deeds),with a Foreword by Chief Justgice Reynato S. Puno, Law on Natural Resources and

Environmental Law Developments, with a Foreword by Justic Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor of the

Philippine Judicial Academy, and Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Proceedings. (Tel.:922-0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail:[email protected])Justice Agcaoili is married tothe former Consuelo Guerrero Jose with whom he has three children, Mario, Cynthia and Wendy now all

residing with their families in the US.3Secretary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v. Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept.

17, 2008; Alcantara v. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865,March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v. Court of

Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21, 2002; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.4Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102.

5Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/51

2

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,6 embodies the

principle of State ownership of lands and all other natural resources as provided in

Section 2, Art. XII, to wit:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and

other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,

wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State.

With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not bealienated.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND

ANCESTRAL LANDS

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,7 petitionerschallenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous

Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful

deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural

resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous CulturalCommunities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral

lands on the basis of native title. After due deliberation on the petition, the SupremeCourt voted as follows: seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7)

others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the

necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after

redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed

upheld.

Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian theory

does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,adverting to the landmark case of Cario v. Insular Government,8 where the UnitedStates Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back astestimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of

private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before

the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in two modes: (a) by native title over both

ancestral lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and

Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

OF REGISTRATION

6Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006.

7Supra.

8212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.


3/51

3

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most

effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their

indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a personpurchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should

not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will

not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in thesystem and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarilyconclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that

land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,

recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the

validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9

The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an

official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the

owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances asthereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.

10The objective is to obviate possible

conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrenscertificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrenssystem gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be

secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the

covered land.11

PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, as expressed inLegardav.

Saleeby,12 a 1915 decision, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question

of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in

the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. The Torrens system aims to decreeland titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable,

13 and to relieve the land ofthe burden of known as well as unknown claims.

14

However, the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for fraud,15

nor permit oneto enrich himself at the expense of others,

16otherwise its acceptability is impaired.

17

9Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550.10

Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424; citing Noblejas, Land Titles

and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 32.11Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874.12

GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590, 31 Phil. 590; see also Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No.59731, Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9; National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-

68741, Jan. 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 388.13

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No. 14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996.14

SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag,supra.15

Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR

No. 125585, June 8, 2005.16Ibid.

17Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291.


4/51

4

REGISTRATION NOT A MODE

OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to

establish evidence of title over realty.18 It is a means of confirming the fact of its

existence with notice to the world at large. A certificate of title is not a source of right. Itmerely confirms or records a title already existing and vested.19 The mere possessionthereof does not make one the true owner of the property. 20

Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not

foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons

not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other

parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.21

DISTINCTION BETWEEN TITLE

AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Titlemay be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just causeof exclusive

possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, onthe other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.

22

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON

REGISTRATION

Registration in a public registry works as constructive notice to the whole world.

Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,

provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting

registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds

for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all

persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.

REGISTRATION OF LANDS:

GOVERNING LAW

PD No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) issued on June 11, 1978 covers bothordinary and cadastral registration proceedings, and supersedes Act No. 496 (Land

18Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA

630; Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, GR No. 161136, Nov. 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 94.19

Tiro v. Phil Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008 563 SCRA 309.20

Borromeo v. Descallar,supra.21

Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.22

Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258.


5/51

5

Registration Act) which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral

Act, governs cadastral proceedings.

Section 48(b), CA No. 141 (Public Land Act) governs the procedure for the

judicial confirmation of imperfect of incomplete titles over public lands.

JURISDICTION

Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land registration proceedings

and over all petitions filed after original registration of titles.23

The registration court

may now hear both contentious and non-contentious cases.24

But first level courts may bedelegated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases

(a) covering lots without controversy or opposition, or (b) contested lots where the value

does not exceed P100,000.00.25

Appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.

All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the

original case in which the decree of registration was entered.

26

Section 19 of BP Blg. 129confers jurisdiction on the RTC over all civil actions which involve the title to orpossession of, real property or any interest therein x x x. The Court of Appeals, or the

LRA for that matter, has nojurisdiction to cancel a certificate of title.27

REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529

IS A PROCEEDING IN REM

A land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot beacquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service

of notice.28

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

Lands of the public domain are classified into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,

(3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks. With the exception ofagricultural lands, allother natural resources shall not be alienated.

29

Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposablepublic agricultural land. Possession of inalienable public lands, no matter how long,

cannot ripen into private ownership.

23Sec. 2, PD No. 1529.

24Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 459.

25Sec. 34 BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691. See also SC Circular No. 6-93, dated November 15,

1995.26

Sec. 8, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836, Aug. 2,1995, 247 SCRA 9.27

Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.28

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 223.29

Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.


6/51

6

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of thepublic domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use

or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for town-sites and for public and quasi-public uses. (CA No.

141 or the Public Land Act).

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: CLASSIFICATION

OF BORACAY ISLAND

The case of Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

v. Yap30

illustrates the classification by Presidential fiat of Boracay Island in theMunicipality of Malay, Aklan. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the case,

President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400

hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural

land (alienable and disposable).

Under PD No. 705, or Revised Forestry Code, all unclassified lands are

considered public forest. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its

effectivity.

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.31 The followingthings are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports

and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar

character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are

intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 32

The following properties are outside the commerce of men and may not bedisposed of or registered: lands for public use or public service, forest lands, mineral,

foreshore lands, swamplands, mangrove lands, watershed, rivers and creeks,

seashore, reclaimed and public reservation.

30Supra.

31Art. 419, Civil Code.

32Art. 420, ibid.


7/51

7

Properties of public dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are

exempt from sale at public auction. But portions of the properties leased to taxable

entities are not only subject to real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction tosatisfy the tax delinquency.

33

In Laurel v.Garcia,34

the executive department attempted to sell the Roppongiproperty in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine government for use as

the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred toanother location thirteen years earlier, the Court ruled that, under Article 422 of the Civil

Code, property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared

otherwise.

Foreshore lands, or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately

covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides, belong to the State.35

They can

only be disposed of under a foreshore lease or revocable permit application filed with theLands Management Bureau.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate

Corporation,36 the Court held that foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intendedfor public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other

means. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,37 Justice Carpio gives an enlighteninghistorical background of foreshore and reclaimed lands and the development of the law

governing such lands.

InRepublic v.Court of Appeals and Morato,38the Court held that when the seamoved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore

land and passed to the realm of the public domain.

Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can submerged areas be classified as

public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that

the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, thegovernment may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open

to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for

public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposablelands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.39

Forest and mineral lands are public lands not subject to private ownership.

Subsequent release of forest lands as A and D lands does not validate the grant.40

33City of Pasig v. Republic, GR No. 185023, Aug. 24, 2011

34GR No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 17 SCRA 797.

35Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199.

36Supra.

37Supra.

38GR No. 100709, Nov. 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639.

39Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,supra.

40Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296.


8/51

8

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such

classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to

crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on

mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipapalms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forestland. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be

descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as

forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the

disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfecttitle do not apply.

41

Minerals found in public or even private land belong to the State.42

In a resolution

dated December 1, 2004, the Supreme Court inLa Bugal-Blaan Association v.Ramos43

held that all mineral resources are owned by the State and their exploration, development

and utilization must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa,44 Justice Cruz said that theRegalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowelsof the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. Thus, if a person is

the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such

land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the

permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot be registered.45the Calumpang

Point Naval Reservation, can not be subject to occupation, entry or settlement. The

government, through the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), has titleand ownership over Fort Bonifacio. To segregate portions of the public domain as amilitary reservation, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect.

In Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,46 it was held that amilitary reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation

or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and

declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is

released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified bylaw or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a

military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as

a military camp or for defense.

41Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, GR No. L-27873, Nov. 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.

42Republic v. Court of Appeals and Dela Rosa, 160 SCRA 228.

43GR No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.

44GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.

45Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006.

46GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006.


9/51

9

Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered,47

and so are lakes,48

watersheds49

and mangrove swamps.50

WHO MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION

Under Section 14, PD No. 1529, the following may apply for registration:

(1) Those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription underthe provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or acquired under existing laws;

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner providedfor by law.

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), it is provided as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and

disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto may apply for the confirmation of

imperfect or incomplete title.

NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

SEC. 14(1), PD No. 1529 and SEC. 48(b), CA NO. 141

There is no substantial difference between Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec.48(b) of CA No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that (1) the land is alienable and

disposable (A and D) public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in open, continuous

exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fideclaim of ownership sinceJune 12, 1945, or prior thereto.

51 Both refer to original registration proceedings, are

against the whole world, and the decree of registration for both is conclusive and final.

47Republic v. Sioson, 9 SCRA 533.

48Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 141325, July 31, 2006; Republic v.

Court of Appeals and Del Rio, 131 SCRA 532.49

Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175.50

Sec. 4, RA No. 8550.51

Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No. 170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic,GR No. 141924, Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, GR No. 146527, Jan. 31, 2005, 450 SCRA

247..


10/51

10

REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION

UNDER SEC. 14(1), PRD IN RELATION

TO SEC. 48(B), PLA.

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for

registration of title: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land ofthe public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since

June 12, 1945 or earlier.52

Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted

and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not

clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or

occasional; exclusivewhen the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over theland and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notoriouswhen it is so

conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in theneighborhood.53

In Malabanan v. Court of Appeals,54

the Court en banc reiterated the rule in

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit55

that since Section 48(b) (in relation to

Section 14[1]) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require thatthe lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of

possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as

soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed bySection 47 of the Public Land Act.

56

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for the possession andoccupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1984. This was superseded by

RA No. 1942 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by

an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The law, however, has been

amended by PD No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, which now requires possessionsince June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

57

52Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011;

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 413 (2005).53

Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing.Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.54

GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.55

448 SCRA 442.56

Emphasis supplied.57

Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources v. Yap,GR No. 173775, Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v. Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March13, 2007; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183; Republic v. Doldol,

295 SCRA 359. See also RA No. 6940, dated March 28, 1990.


11/51

11

ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

On the basis of their capacity toacquire or hold lands of the public domain, the

following may acquire private lands:

(1) Filipino citizens;(2) Filipino corporations and association as defined in Section 2, Article XII of

the Constitution; and, by exception,

(3) Aliens but only be hereditary succession; and

(4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship can both

acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the limitation being up to amaximum of 5,000 square meters if urban land, or 3 hectares if rural land.

58

Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire

or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60%of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the

public domain. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or

holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisitionwas made by a former natural-born citizen.

59Aliens, however, may lease private lands.

60

The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine

land and not to the improvements built thereon. Land cannot sold to an alien and isallowed to recover the money spent for the purchase thereof. The provision on unjust

enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.61

CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND IS

DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF ITS

ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION

The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the

right to own it is acquired. Thus, a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a

natural-born Filipino, acquired land from a vendor who had already complied with the

requirements of registration prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the landeven if at the time of the filing of his application he was already an alien.

62He already

had a vested right to the land.

58 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000 ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA

No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179.59

Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009.60

Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461;

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.61

Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing cases.62

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapia, 235 SCRA 567.


12/51

12

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

BY PRESCRIPTION

In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,63

Section 14(2)

must be considered in relation to the rule on prescription under the Civil Code as a mode

of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. Possession and occupation of analienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do notautomatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public

domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for

public service or development of national wealth.Without such express declaration, the

property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, andthus, may not be acquired by prescription. And only when the property has become

patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public

dominion begin to run.64

Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by

Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorizedby law.

65 The period of possession preceding the classification of the property as

patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptiveperiod.66

Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a

patrimonial propertythrough possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with

just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adversepossession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith

or just title, ripens into ownership.67

Open, continuous and exclusive possession of land classified as A and D land for

at least thirty years segregates the land from the public domain and ipso jureconverts the

same to private property.

68

The conversion works to summon in operation Sec. 14(2) ofthe Property Registration Decree which authorizes the acquisition of private landsthrough ordinary prescription of ten years or extraordinary prescription of thirty years.

69

(Note: In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon,70

theCourt ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective

interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v.

Gabriel,71

which also cited the Raon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaringagain the property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's

63GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.

64

Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.65

Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 201266

Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,supra.67

Id.68

Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA

56; See Arts. 1127 and 1134, Civil Code.69

Lincoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, GR No. 167652, July 10, 2007.70

G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.71

Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012. citing Heirs of

Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 406-407.


13/51

13

name cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive

prescription. In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even

the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period ofacquisitive prescription. Only in cases filed before the courts may judicial summons be

issued and, thus, interrupt possession.72

)

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR

ACCRETION

Under Article 420, paragraph 173

and Article 502, paragraph 174

of the Civil Code,rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion.

River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the

waters ipso factobelong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course inproportion to the area lost.75However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall

have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall notexceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the

effects of the current of the water belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the

banks of rivers where it forms.76

The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, thedried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian

owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.77

In Celestial v.

Cachopero,78

it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.79

Article 457 of the Civil Code requires that the deposit be gradual and

imperceptible; that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and that theland where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.80

However, the

accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which

receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. There must be a separate action for

the registration thereof.81

72Virtucio v. Alegarbes, GR No. 187451, Aug. 29, 2012.

73Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges

constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; . . . .74

Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . .

75Art. 461, Civil Code.

76Art. 457, id.

77Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012.

78459 Phil. 903 (2003).

79See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.

80Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.

81Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524.


14/51

14

Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and is not open

to acquisition by adverse possession, unless subsequently declared as no longer needed

for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries.82

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED

FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS

A private corporation may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except

by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.83

The rule does not apply where at the time the

corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was

possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle thelatter to registration.

84

If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in possession of the

land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully apply forconfirmation of title to the land.85InDirector of Lands v.Intermediate Appellate Court

and Acme,

86it was held that a private corporation may apply for judicial confirmation of

the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-

interest first.87

PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING

Within five days from the filing of the application for registration, the court shallissue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than

45 days nor later than 90 days from date of the order.88

The public is given notice of the

initial hearing by (a) publication once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation; (b) mailing of the notice to persons named in the application for

registration and also to relevant government officials, and (c) posting of the notice on aconspicuous place on the land itself and on the bulletin board of the city or municipality

where the land is situated.89

Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to conferjurisdiction.

90However, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation

remains an indispensable requirement consistent with procedural due process.91

82Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335.83Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.84

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509.85

Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438.86

GR No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 590.87

Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,supra.88

Sec. 23, PD No. 1529.89

Id.90

Sec. 24, PD No. 1529.91

Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27

SCRA 276.


15/51

15

If amendment of the application is made to include additional area, a new

publication of the amended application must be made, but not when the amendment

consists in the exclusion of a portion form the area originally applied for.92

OPPOSITION

Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file andopposition, based on right of dominion or some other real right, to the application for

registration.93

The absence of opposition does not justify outright registration. Since the

presumption is that all lands belong to the State, the applicant has the burden of proving

his imperfect right or fee simple title to the land applied for.94

The failure of thegovernment to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right

to appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private property.95

PROOF AS TO THE

IDENTITY OF THE LAND

As required by Section 17 of PD No. 1529, the application for registration mustbe accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands

(now Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau), together with the

applicants muniments of title. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration

proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands.

InDirector of Landsv. Reyes,96 the Supreme Court declared that the submission

of the tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. But in

Director of Landsv. Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,97 the Court considered the

submission of a white print copy of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The Court

was more categorical in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court andEspartinez

98 when it stated that the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required x x xmay now be dispensed withwhere there is a survey plan the correctness of which had notbeen overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.

PROOF OF CLASSIFICATION

OF LAND AS A AND D

The following may be considered sufficient to establish the classification of land

as alienable and disposable land for purposes of original registration:

1. Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development that the land has been

92Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.

93Sec. 27 PD No. 1529.

94Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227.

95Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.

96GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.

97GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586.

98GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98.


16/51

16

released as alienable and disposable land.

2. Land Classification Map showing that the land lies within the alienableand disposable portion of the public domain.

3. Executive proclamation withdrawing from a reservation a specific areaand declaring the same open for entry, sale or other mode of disposition.

4. Legislative act or executive proclamation reserving a portion of the public

domain for public or quasi-public use, which amounts to a transfer of ownership to the

grantee.

5. The report of a land inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the subject land

was found inside an agricultural zone and is suitable for rice cultivation is binding on

the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of theGovernment to classify public lands. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or

status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

99

6. A certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an

application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification

project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the

application.100

7. The Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director that Lot 249 had

been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925 ,as annotated on the subdivision plan, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal

requirement.101

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,102 the Court held that the applicant shall

submit a (a) CENRO or PENRO certification that the land is A and D, and (b) copy of

the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true by the

legal custodian thereof.

But in DENR Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, it was clarified that

the issuance of the certification and the certified copy of the approved LC Map to provethat the area applied for is indeed classified as A and D is within the competence andjurisdiction of the CENRO where the area is below 0.50 has., or the PENRO where it is

99Republic v. De Porkan, GR No. L-66866, June 18, 1987, it is not enough for the Provincial Environmentand Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer(CENRO) to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove

th 151 SCRA 88.100

Llanes v. Republic, GR No. 177947, Nov. 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, citing Republic v. Candy Maker,

Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272.101

Republic v. Serrano, GR No. 183063, Feb. 24, 2010.102

GR No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 613 SCRA 537. See also Republic v. Bantigue, GR No. 162322, March14, 2012; Republic v. Dela Paz, GR No. 171631, Nov. 5, 2010; Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines

Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.


17/51

17

more than 0.50 has.

In Llanes v. Republic,103

the Court allowed consideration of a CENROCertification though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent

unfairness. In Victoria v. Republic,104

the subject property was covered by a cadastral

survey of Taguig conducted by the government. The Court held: Such surveys arecarried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the landscovered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey

that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a public forest.

This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.

That there are building structures, residential houses and even government

buildings existing and standing on the area does not prove that the land is no longer

considered and classified as forest land.105

EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, thereckoning point of possession is June 12, 1945.

106 It is only necessary that the land is

already classified as A and D land at the time of the filing of the application for

registration.107

Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide

claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.108

Acts of a possessory character by

virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient.109

Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without

substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute exclusive and

notorious possession under claim of ownership

110

TAX DECLARATIONS AND

TAX RECEIPTS

Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof of ownership but

have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of actual possession or

supported by other effective proof.111

Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting itevery once in a while do not constitutes acts of possession.

112Tax declarations are not

103G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.

104GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.105

Chang v. Republic, GR No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011.106

Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188..107

Malabananv. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.108

Sec. 14(1), PD No. 1529; Sec. 48(b), CA No. 141, as amended; Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec.

4, 2008; Republicv. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183109

Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No. L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32.110

Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734; Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177. 111

Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id.112

Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214.


18/51

18

evidence of the right of possession unless supported by the other effective proof. But

they constitute proof that the holder has claim of the title over the property.113

Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax

purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession in the

concept of owner.

114

Hence, payment in one a lump sum to cover all past taxes isirregular and affects the validity of the applicants claim of ownership.115

But merefailure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that there was

abandonment of the property.116

SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER

VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

Spanish titles are no longer admissible as proof of ownership. The so-called

Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136is inexistent.117

In a case, TCT No. 451423-A was tracedback to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate Estate of the late Don

Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,was already declared null and void,and from which no rights could therefore be derived.118

JUDGMENT; DECREE OF REGISTRATION

Within 15 days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing theLand Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration and certificate of

title.119

There is no period within which to issue the decree.120

While the judgment becomes final 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment

(as to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from receipt of the decision by

the Solicitor General who represents the government in all registration proceedings),

121

the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case until after the expiration of one

year from the issuance of the decree of registration;122

hence, the case may still be

reopened and the decision set aside when granted.123

Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and

the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. A Torrens title issued on the basis of

113Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820; Masagana v. Argamora, 109 SCRA 53; Director

of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.114

Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.115

Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140.

116Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.117

PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; QuezonProvince v. Marte, GR No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of

Appeals, 265 SCRA 733; Director of Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329.118

De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011.119

Sec. 30, PD No. 1529)120

Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012.121

Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.122

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.123

Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348.


19/51

19

a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the

Property Registration Decree which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the

decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of saiddecree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of

title.124

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of landalready decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second

decree for the same land would be null and void.125

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,126

the Court held that a judicialdeclaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from

subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he

thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48127

of Commonwealth Act No. 141,

as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable.128

WRIT OF POSSESSION

The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration

case but also against any one adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to

the issuance of the decree.129

The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land

after the issuance of the decree and who was not a party in the case. He can only beproceeded against in a separate action for ejectment or reivindicatory action.

130The writ

is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession131

and may be issued by a special order of the court. Mandamus is a proper remedy tocompel the issuance of a writ of possession.

132

124Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases.125

Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada

v. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 333, 343-344, citingMetropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558, November 17,

1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.126

G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No.

L-47847, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.127

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or

claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their

claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately precedingthe filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These

shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant andshall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).128

Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011129

Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491.130

Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.131

Gawaran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 154; Lucero v. Leot, 25 SCRA 687.132

Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011.


20/51

20

JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS

Section 1, 14 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that actionsaffecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be

commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area

where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title

to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, hence, exclusive original

jurisdiction over such action pertains to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the

property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in which instancethe MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction.

Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the

complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby

sought.133

Actions for cancellation of title and reversion belong to the class of cases that"involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where theassessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the

RTC.134

When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year,one may avail himself of accion publicianato determine the better right of possession, or

possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion

reivindicatoriais an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery ofpossession. While an accion reivindicatoriais not barred by a judgment in an ejectment

case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana.135

REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO

FRAUDULENT OR IRREGULAR

REGISTRATION

The aggrieved party has a number of remedies to question the validity of the

decision. These include the remedies of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 37 of the

Rules of Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or appeal to the Court of Appeals orSupreme Court pursuant to Section 33, PD No. 1529.

Under the property Registration Decree, the remedies consequent to fraudulent or

irregular registration are: review of decree under Section 32; reconveyance under Secs.53 and 96; damages under Sec. 32; claim against the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95;

reversion under Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title; quieting of title; annulment

133Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico

Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.134

Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012; Santos v. CA, 214 SCRA162.135

Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases.


21/51

21

of judgment under Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and

other special laws.

Petition for review of decree. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,

136

the Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili,Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), stressed thatcourts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an

application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of

the decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored

solely on actual fraud.

It has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of

the courts decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final

decree of registration for, as noted inRivera v.Moran,137 there can be no possible reasonfor requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging

his claim of fraud.

The rule on the incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after oneyear from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to titles acquired

through homestead or free patents.138 It has been held that the date of issuance of the

patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases.

Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens becomes indefeasible and

incontrovertible one year from the issuance of the final decree and is generally conclusive

evidence of the ownership.139

The rule on the inconvertibility and indefeasibility of aTorrens title after one year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to

title acquired through homestead or free patents.140

Only extrinsic or collateral, asdistinguished form intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.

To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the

petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) he must show actual fraud in the

procurement of the decree of registration; (c) the petition must be filed within one (1)year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and (d) the

property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.141

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigationwhich is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,

attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fullyand fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party

136GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.

137GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836.

138Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.

139Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992)

140Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.

141Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.


22/51

22

in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,

which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just

determination of the case.

Relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists

in the following acts:

(a)Deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact theyare;

(b)Applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been alloted to him in the partition;

(c) Intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector toinclude in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream;

(d)Willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims;

(e)Deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice;(f) Inducing a claimant not to oppose the application for registration;

(g)Misrepresentation by the applicant about the identity of the lot to the trueowner causing the latter to withdraw his opposition.142

(h)Failure of the applicant to disclose in her application for registration the vitalfacts that her husbands previous application for a revocable permit and to

purchase the lands in question from the Bureau of Lands had been rejected,because the lands were already reserved as a site for school purposes;

(i) Deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly inherited by the applicantfrom her parents, which misled the Bureau of Lands into not filling the

opposition and thus effectively depriving the Republic of its day in court.143

In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of

the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting

his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of thecourt.

In Cruzv.Navarro,144 it was held that the intentional omission by the respondent

to properly inform the court a quo that there were persons (the petitioners) in actual

possession and cultivation of the parcels in question, with the result that the court as well

as the Land Registration Authority were denied of their authority to require the sending

142Libudan v. Palma Gil, GR No. L-21164, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17.

143Republic v. Lozada, GR No. L-43852, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 502.

144GR No. L-27644, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109.


23/51

23

of specific individual notices of the pendency of the application in accordance with

Sections 23 and 24 of the Property Registration Decree, constitutes actual fraud.

Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No. 1529)An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightfullandowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another,

to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.145

An action for reconveyance is an action in personamavailable to a person whose

property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It isfiled as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land

registration court. A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title

immediately upon the institution of the action in court.146

As held inMedizabel v. Apao,147

the essence of an action for reconveyance is that

the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of theproperty, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered inanother person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The mere

issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the

possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in

the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may haveacquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.

148

Reconveyance does not aim to reopen proceedings but only to transfer orreconvey the land from registered owner to the rightful owner.

149 Reconveyance is

available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a

constructivetrust between the parties.

150

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur:

(a)the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership ordominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(b)the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procuredthrough fraud or other illegal means;

(c)the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and145

Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011.146

Muoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing cases.147

G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608. See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No.161030, Sept. 14, 2011148

Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003), citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354Phil. 556, 561-562 (1998).149

Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008; Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July28, 2008; Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356.150

Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13, 1994.


24/51

24

(d)the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final andincontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud,151ornot later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.152

A petition for review and action for reconveyance are no longer available if theproperty has already been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to

recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must

prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.153

There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the

aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered

owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser forvalue.154

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE MAY

BE BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION

(1) Action based on fraud - four years(2) Action based on implied trust- ten years(3) Action based on a void contractimprescriptible(4) Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possessionimprescriptibleAn action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in

ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, or the instrument

affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds theland and operates constructive notice to the world. Repudiation of said trust is not a

condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.155

The 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based onfraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession

of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does not apply to an action to

nullify a contract which is void ab initio.Article 1410 of the Civil Code categorically

151Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, which held that: An action for

reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which

requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. 152

New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citingWalstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut, GR No. 147379,

Feb. 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206.153

Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262

(2005).154

Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R.

No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.155

Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641, 653

(2004).


25/51

25

states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not

prescribe.156

But prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the

disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or

his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.

157

LACHES MAY BAR RECOVERY

Where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that

equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rightsof third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable

powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.158 This is thebasic principle of laches which may bar recovery for ones neglect or inaction.

Cancellation of titleFraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment

of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which

must be proved.159

Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)This action may be filed against applicant or person responsible for the fraud

where reconveyance is no longer possible as when the land has been transferred to aninnocent purchaser for value.

160

Action for compensation from the Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No.1529)

The requisites for recovery are: (a) a person sustains loss or damage, or is

deprived by any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of the bringing of land under theTorrens system; (c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the

certificate of entry in the registration book; (d) without negligence on his part, and (e) is

barred from bringing an action for recovery of the land.161

Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)

156Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011.

157Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.

158Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277.

159Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011

160Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9)

161 Sec. 95, PD No. 1529.


26/51

26

The action is instituted by the government, through the Solicitor General, in all

cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the Constitution162

or were

fraudulently obtained.163

Annulment of Judgment. (Rule 47, Rules of Court)A petition for annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders of

Regional Trial Court for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. are no

longer available must be based on (a) extrinsic fraud, (b) lack of jurisdiction164

and (c)

lack of due process.165

A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud

must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

166

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of

jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of theclaim.

167

Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsicfraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.

168

Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment

sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment

may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed orimplemented.

169

In Yujuicov. Republic,170

the Court ruled that the action of the government forreversion on the ground that the land was part of the Manila Bay was improperly filed

with the RTC as the action should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governing annulment of judgments of RTCs.

Final judgments of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies are not

susceptible to petitions for annulment under Rule 47.171

PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that in no case shall such (petition forreview) be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired

the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.

162Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292.163

Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007.164

Rule 47. Rules of Court.165

Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013.166

Section 3, id.; Galicia v. Manliquez, GR No. 155785, April 13, 2007.167

Alcazar v. Arante, GR No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012.168

RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 7; Bulawan v. Aquende, GR No. 182819, June 22, 2011.169

Bulawan v. Aquende,supra.170

GR No. 168861, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws.171

Fraginal v. Paraal, GR No. 150207, Feb. 23, 2007, 516 SCVRA 530.


27/51

27

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without

notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair

price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another personsclaim.172

A person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has torely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are

annotated on the title, for registration is the operative act that binds the property.173 But a

purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard

and still claim that he acted in good faith.174

The rule of caveat emptorrequires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed titleof the vendor and one whobuys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and

losses consequent to such failure.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that, as regards immovable property,

ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded the salein the Registry of Property.

InCruzv. Bancom Finance Corporation, the adverse claim and the notice of lispendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979,

respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by

respondent only on March 14, 1980. The Court stated that the prior registration of a lien

created a preference. Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will notdiminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lispendensand the adverse claim.

The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time ispreferred in right) is followed in land registration.

175Thus, it has been held in a case that

Mahinays notice of lis pendens having been registered ahead of Sorensen's real estate

mortgage, the notice of lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate mortgage. The

claim of Sorensen that the owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverseannotation at the time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the

nature of involuntary registration, the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the

original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind

third parties. It affects the whole world even if the owner's copy does not contain thesame annotation.

176

The phrase innocent purchaser for value in Section 32 of the Property

172Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264.

173Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710.

174Yared v. Tiongco,supra.

175Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358, 365 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685

(1942).176

Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-903

(1995).


28/51

28

Registration Decree includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for

value.177But unlike private individuals, banks are expected to exercise greater care and

prudence in their dealings, including those involving registered lands. A bankinginstitution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage

contract.178

In St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,179

the Court, heldthat where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings

and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the

subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the

mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith.

In Mahinay v. Gako,180 the Court ruled that when a mortgagee relies upon what

appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the basis of the

title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title wasdefective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the

land mortgaged must be respected and protected.

181

In Blanco v. Esquierdo,182 it was held that the right or lien of an innocent

mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if

the mortgagor obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case, upon a complaint filed by

the legal heirs of Maximiano, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-6582for having been secured through fraud, and also the cancellation of DBPs mortgage. The

only question is whether the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The Court answered

in the affirmative. The bank was not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title was in thename of Fructuosa at the time of the mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely on

what appeared in the certificate and was under no obligation to look beyond the

certificate and investigate. The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action fordamages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action may

be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.

RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,

the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken

possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

177Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals,supra.

178PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011.

179GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577.

180Supra.

181Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands

v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494 (1960).182

GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.


29/51

29

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person

who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the

person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens

system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) then,

the first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the

oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered underthe Torrens system.

183Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine

ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the

buyer; specifically, to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of

Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith.184

As against the registered owners and theholder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.

185

InRemalantev. Tibe,186

the Court ruled that the civil law provision on double saleis not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found

to be fraudulent.

Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v. Valerio,187

where the same parcel of landwas purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one

deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply

where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the othervendee should prevail.188The rule that where two certificates purport to include the same

land, the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting

the process of registration.

189

On the other hand, while the execution of a publicinstrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, it only gives

rise to a prima faciepresumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the

vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.190

Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not

have nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is

authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transferlegally. In a number of cases, an action for reconveyance has been treated as an action to

quiet title.191

183Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544.

184Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011

185Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.

186GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.

187GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.

188Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 350.

189Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988, 295 SCRA 556.

190Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.

191Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases cited therein.


30/51

30

PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL

OWNERSHIP

InDewara v. Lamela,192the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and

Eduardo during their marriage, before the enactment of the Family Code. The issue is

whether the property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugalproperty of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject to levyand execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal

case for serious physical injuries. Held:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,

unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.193

Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this

presumption.194

The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial

approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.195

23

Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in

which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an

essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, it does not necessarilyfollow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,

obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations maybe charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were

contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the

conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the

wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is

bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the

fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the

responsibilit

Documents

Review Outline