Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunachal

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Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 2008

ISSN 0970-0161 print / ISSN 1754-0054 onlineDOI: 10.1080/09700160802215562 © 2008 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

RSAN0970-01611754-0054Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, Jul 2008: pp. 0–0Strategic AnalysisRevisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal

Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on ArunachalStrategic AnalysisSujit Dutta

Abstract

In recent years, China has again publicly revived its territorial claimsover India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. However, by insist-ing on these claims, China is making a settlement of the territorial issuevirtually impossible and seriously misperceiving public opinion trends inIndia. China has failed to appreciate that if Arunachal is claimed to be thesouthern part of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), India cannot acceptTibet to be within China. India’s formal position on Tibet articulated in1954 and 2003 is therefore a tentative and unilateral diplomatic offer thatcan only be sustained and the circle completed once China recognizesArunachal as part of India.

Over the past five years even as India-China economic and political tieshave witnessed remarkable progress, China has revitalized its posturingon the territorial dispute with India by publicly raising its claims over thenortheastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. This has cast a shadow on theoverall tenor of engagement between the two countries, and also onChina’s stated goal of improving ties with India, and its avowed policy ofcreating a peaceful and friendly periphery.1 The Tibetan demonstrationsfor autonomy and independence in March 2008 and China’s hard responsehave only complicated the relations.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has adopted a two-trackapproach towards India. On the one hand, seeking to promote trade andopen up the Indian market, China insisted on high-level political dialogue,confidence building, and military-to-military contacts; on the other, it haspursued persistently its expansive territorial agenda. Insisting on conces-sions, China engages itself in endless rounds of discussions, with littlemovement forward, on the approach towards the territorial question. The

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550 Strategic Analysis

Chinese maps show Arunachal as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) and call it southern Tibet. Beijing regularly denies visa to officialsand public representatives from the state on the highly incendiary groundthat the territory belongs to China and hence no visas are required. Allwritings, commentaries, and official statements claim the whole state aspart of China. Thereby China has not allowed India and the world toassume that the issue had been settled even though India enjoys full sov-ereignty and control on all parts of the province. China’s large claims pur-sued constantly and backed up by regular encroachments of PLA troops,across the border and the line of control defined in 1914, serve as impor-tant diplomatic and bargaining leverage, not only on the overall territorialissue but also on the tenor of India’s foreign policy.

However, unlike the 1990s when the issue was confined to diplomatictalks between the two sides, over the past five years the issue has resur-faced in the public statements of the Chinese officials and the strategiccommunity with greater urgency and frequency. At a time when India-Chinaeconomic ties are rapidly expanding, a dialogue to settle the territorialdispute amicably is underway, and new initiatives to enhance military-to-military understanding and confidence building are being undertaken, thepersistent raising of the Arunachal issue in different ways has had a dele-terious impact on the public opinion in India.2 The territorial disputebetween the two Asian neighbours and the world’s largest growing pow-ers is potentially highly destabilizing. This is recognized by both countriesand there has been a general understanding between the two sides since1988 to resolve peacefully the territorial issue that covers the western,central, and eastern sectors in ‘a fair and reasonable’3 manner, and thatpending a final settlement peace and tranquility would be maintained.

While the Chinese claims are not new, and the two official envoys areengaged in an intense dialogue to settle the issue, why does Beijing raisethem once again publicly? It cannot be unaware that such a public postur-ing could vitiate its bilateral relationship and that any downturn in therelationship could have spiraling consequences on the stability in theregion. Public opinion in India as a whole, and in the Arunachal state inparticular, is against any territorial surrender. India views such sweepingclaims by China as an affront on her people amidst very large concessionsIndia made unilaterally. It is an issue that could seriously harm the overalltenor of the bilateral relationship.4 Moreover, it is not clear whether Chinais pursuing the claims as a pressure point in order to influence and shape

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Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal 551

India’s foreign policy as a whole, or whether along with the simultaneousbuild-up of its military power, it is preparing for another assault on theArunachal sector before that window closes as a result of India’s growingcapabilities and other measures in the eastern sector.5 This creates anatmosphere of uncertainty and whets the security dilemma. This is particu-larly so, now that Tibet is witnessing internal trouble that is likely to makethe Chinese state feel even more insecure and turn potentially aggressive.

The revitalization in the public domain of China’s claims on ArunachalPradesh as a whole, while unofficially indicating through its interlocutorsthat India should transfer Tawang and a few other pockets to China if afinal settlement is to be reached, could have several explanations. One,though there has not yet been any agreement on the territorial issues, India-China boundary talks in the past eight years have in some ways movedahead. In 2000 the two countries, for the first time, exchanged maps indi-cating their understanding of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Cen-tral Sector. This was to have been followed by similar exchanges of mapsfor the western and the eastern sectors.6 In 2003, special representativeswere appointed by the two governments to arrive at an early settlement ofthe boundary question. There was a clear sense of urgency building up—especially on the Indian side—to show actual progress in the diplomaticdialogue that had begun in 1981 but had made little progress.7 The Chineseside too wanted to complete the settlement of all its land boundaries so thatit could focus on Taiwan, its maritime territories, and wider strategic chal-lenges. Between 1991 and 2004, it had resolved the land territorial prob-lems with Russia, the three Central Asian neighbours, and Vietnam. Theboundaries with India and Bhutan alone remained to be settled and Chinawas engaged in talks with both. The Chinese decision to step up its claimsin public and the growing incidence of the PLA encroachments can be seenas efforts to shore up its bargaining position in the run up to actual hardnegotiations. In April 2005 the two countries signed a pact of broad princi-ples to settle the territorial issue. But there was an immediate difference oninterpretation. The Indian interpretation of the principle that the interest of‘settled populations’8 would be safeguarded in any settlement9 to meanthat there would be no transfer of populated areas was contradicted offi-cially by the Chinese Foreign Minister during his meeting with the ExternalAffairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Hamburg in May 2007 as it wouldhave nullified much of China’s claims, and he pointed out that China had adifferent understanding of the issue.

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The Chinese assertiveness on Arunachal could also be explained byanother development in this period. Negotiations are deeply shaped byperceptions of power and power relations. Through the past decade, theinternational perception of India has changed, its diplomacy has expanded,and it has forged close ties with all the major powers. Its economic, mili-tary, and comprehensive power is growing and its diplomatic status haschanged. China is deeply sensitive to changing power equations and inter-national relations which have a bearing on the bilateral relations and diplo-macy. The growing status and international links of India have madeChina uneasy about the strategic developments in the region and have hadthe effect—ironically—of making it more assertive about its claims in therun up to the negotiations on an agreed framework for a territorialsettlement. Beijing would like to shape a territorial and foreign policy tradeoff while it still enjoys asymmetric power advantages translated into diplo-matic leverages.

China’s assertiveness has partially worked, emboldening it to be evenmore forceful.10 Its diplomacy made two important gains in the post-1999phase that have significant implications for Arunachal. The first was tosecure India’s agreement that the territorial issue would be settled politi-cally, and the equally important second was its ability to secure India’srecognition of the TAR—a truncated version of the Tibet region—as a partof China. China has a general inclination to settle territorial claims andsovereignty issues politically as a bargain rather than on contested historicaland legal evidence. China was able to achieve this in June 2003 when Indiaagreed to a political settlement of the territorial issue. This was the man-date given to the two special representatives on the boundary question, aspart of the Vajpayee-Wen Jiabao joint Declaration on Principles for Rela-tions and Comprehensive Cooperation.11 The approach, carried forward inthe April 2005 Manmohan Singh-Wen Jiabao joint statement, said, ‘Bothsides are convinced that an early settlement of the boundary question willadvance the basic interests of the two countries and should therefore bepursued as a strategic objective. They expressed their commitment to themechanism of Special Representatives for seeking a political settlement ofthe boundary question in the context of their long-term interests and theoverall bilateral relationship.’12 The recognition of the TAR by India waspart of a deal under which China, in turn, would formally recognizeSikkim as a part of India. Though the Indian side specifically mentionedthe TAR in the Joint Declaration, there was no specific mention on Sikkim

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by China; instead, the Chinese Premier assured Vajpayee that the correc-tion would be made in the Chinese maps. The change in the maps indicat-ing China’s new stance was referred by Wen to Manmohan Singh a fewmonths later, during the ASEAN summit meeting, but several of its mapscontinued for sometime to show Sikkim outside India.

This article puts forward three arguments. First, China’s trans-Himalayanterritorial claims on Arunachal are not only based on meager evidence,but are also marginal to its core Han ethnicity and civilization or its strate-gic interests on the whole. The claims and the diplomatic posturing toattain them are not conducive to building long-term stable ties with India.China, of course, sees it quite differently. Revision of old boundariesderived from the British period would serve its anti-imperialist rhetoricregarding its 19th- and early 20th-century borders. Questioning the exist-ing border also serves as an attempt to delegitimize Tibet’s right to signtreaties and border agreements. Moreover, if it can secure Tawang, itcould also build some credibility with the Tibetans for securing a religiousoutpost at a time when the legitimacy and the nature of its rule over Tibetitself are at their lowest point since 1959. Finally, at least some withinthe PLA see the claims as a way to gain land and forest resources ofArunachal and make strategic inroads into the northeast of India thatwould bring it closer to Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal and also enableit to cut off militarily the narrow corridor that connects the rest of Indiawith the northeast if necessary. But, there is a need for a serious realitycheck here. The colonial period is long over, and India is a new entity asZhou Enlai acknowledged several times to Jawaharlal Nehru during 1957–1959. Tibet did sign treaties. Legitimacy of its rule over the Tibetans can besecured only through a genuine agreement on autonomy that safeguardsthe Tibetan identity. Tawang is far removed from this core issue. Finally,securing some additional land as a goal by what is geographically alreadyone of the largest states is an anachronism today when far greaterresources remain to be explored through trade, investments, and buildingpolitical capital with India.

Second, neither the 1954 and the 2003 unilateral diplomatic concessionsby India on Tibet nor the 2005 principles appear to have settled the prob-lem of Arunachal in a satisfactory manner. The successive Chinese leaders,it appears, have failed to appreciate that if Arunachal is claimed as part ofthe TAR, there is hardly any way India can accept Tibet as part of China.India’s formal position of Tibet as a part of China, articulated in different

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ways in 1954, 1988, and 2003, is therefore only a tentative diplomatic offerthat can only be sustained and the circle completed once China recognizesArunachal as part of India—otherwise India’s unilateral offer would haveto be withdrawn. There was a tacit understanding in the 1950s betweenJawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai on such a mutual recognition until seri-ous differences broke out, following Mao’s left-wing turn in both thedomestic and foreign policies and the consequent Tibetan revolt in 1959.

Three, there is a fundamental tension between China’s profession anddesire for a peaceful security environment and its ‘peaceful rise’ theoryflowing from its focus on modernization and globalization on the onehand, and the Communist regime’s nationalist, irredentist, and expansiveterritorial and sovereignty agenda rooted in the acquisition of imaginedimperial domains of the Qing empire on the other. Just as the growththrough globalization and general peace in which to pursue such a goal isseen as crucial for China’s modernization and rise, the pursuit of the sover-eignty and territorial agenda is seen crucial for the legitimacy of the Com-munist Party’s rule and its nationalist credentials. Restoration ofsovereignty over the so-called lost territories appears to have become theChinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) instrument for mobilizing the cadres,the growing middle class, and the elites, even though much of the histori-ography of such claims is singularly unidimensional and self-serving.While advancing its territorial claims, the PRC has often consciouslyblurred the distinction between what was no more than hegemonic influ-ence, tributary relationships, suzerainty, and actual sovereignty. Most of itsclaims are, therefore, not rooted in the exercise of the actual jurisdiction, con-tinuity of rule through the post-imperial period, ethnicity, or the popularwill in the areas claimed. It has sought to bridge this tension through aseries of agreements with the smaller states that accept China’s basic pos-ture that old boundaries and agreements must be revised because theywere imposed on Asian states by the imperial powers. In almost all suchcases China has made the so-called concessions or adjustments by reducingthe area it claimed but it, as a general rule, with the exception of the smallborder with Afghanistan and the longer border with Mongolia whereweaning them away from the Soviet Union was the primary goal, has notgiven up its claims entirely. However, with the larger and more resolutestates that have a strong nationalism of their own, and an independentconception about their territoriality such as India, Japan, Vietnam, or theformer Soviet Union, the PRC has been unrelenting in its pursuit of the

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territorial agenda. China aims to get these states agree to the logic andlegitimacy of its nationalism and the bases of its claims. From this perspec-tive, China launched military attacks when necessary, to create facts on theground and to shore up its bargaining position (Ladakh 1962, Damanski1969, Vietnam 1979). Only after both Russia and Vietnam conceded China’sclaim for at least a 50:50 settlement of the disputed area along the frontierswas an agreement achieved.

The essential tension at the heart of post-Mao China’s foreign policyhas not been overcome. The PRC has built its legitimacy on its mission tobring about national unity, to rectify historical wrongs, and to recover thelost territories in a bid to overcome national humiliation by the majorimperial powers in the 19th century and the early 20th century. However,it is unable to take a more considered view of its sweeping territorialclaims, by critically reassessing many of the myths at the core of its nation-alist historiography, and by asking whether its anti-imperial agenda wasnot in reality an agenda for restoration of the old Qing imperial territorialand political order. Having ridden the tiger of hyper nationalism and ter-ritorial revisionism for a century, the CCP is unable to dismount it.

Recent Developments in China’s Territorial Posture

In the post-1999 phase of diplomacy that has witnessed the restora-tion of normalcy in relations after the brief regression in ties followingthe Pokhran-2 nuclear tests, China has gradually become proactive inraising its claims publicly on Arunachal. But unofficially, throughinterlocutors in the strategic community, it has been more specific,with much of the claims focused on the Tawang tract.13 The Chinesestrategic community in fact had begun to activate its strategic studiesand experts on India to study, rationalize, and elaborate on its territo-rial claims in the eastern sector since 2003—the year Prime MinisterVajpayee visited China and reached an agreement under which Chinatacitly promised to recognize Sikkim as a part of India in return forIndia’s formal recognition of the TAR as a part of China.14 RecentChinese claims have therefore come from both its officials and fromsome of its principal India hands.15

The Chinese Ambassador’s statement to an Indian television channelin November 2006 emphasizing Beijing’s expansive claim on Arunachal,16

on the eve of the visit of the Chinese President Hu Jintao, has had the

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most negative impact on public opinion. It cast a shadow on Hu’s impor-tant visit, the first in 10 years by a Chinese President and General Secre-tary of the ruling Communist Party. As a diplomatic move, it remainsinexplicable in terms of lack of sensitivity and subtlety. In May 2007 theChinese Foreign Minister Yang Jieshi reiterated the Chinese claim onArunachal during his talks with the Indian External Affairs MinisterPranab Mukherjee on the sidelines of the G-8+5 meeting in Germany andsaid the ‘mere presence’ of settled populations did not affect Chineseclaims in Arunachal. It indicated that even the supposedly agreed uponprinciples are contested and that the Chinese Government would con-tinue to drive a hard bargain in pursuit of its territorial claims.

Simultaneously, there have been enhanced PLA encroachmentsacross the traditional border and the Indo-Tibet-Bhutan trijunction, con-tested by China. Members of the Parliament, representing Arunachal,have been provoked to draw public attention to the repeated encroach-ments and have indicated their frustration and concern.17 In May 2007China denied visa to a senior official from the state who was part of alarge Indian Administrative Service team, claiming blatantly that becausethe area was part of China he did not need a visa.18 The initiative to senda team to China to study its development experience had come from theIndian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has been impressed by theChinese growth story and wanted Indian administrators to comparenotes on the crucial challenges facing agriculture and rural developmentin the two countries. The unexpected Chinese action led New Delhi tocancel the team’s visit and a public backlash. The two governments hadworked on the visit for several months, and it was part of the efforts toimprove the understanding and the ties. The visa denial—though consist-ent with China’s posture since the mid-1980s—came clearly as a blow tothe Government of India (GOI) that had worked closely with the Chineseside for several months on the preparations for the visit.

The string of actions and statements from China has been a counter-current to the overall developments in India-China relations following aseries of summits in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008 and the signing of thecrucial agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for thesettlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed on April 11, 2005after two decades of protracted talks. A sense of optimism that had beencreated has suffered a blow and cynicism has crept into the media assess-ments. The actions have also appeared contrary to China’s current foreign

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policy thrust for improved and stable ties with all neighbours, includingIndia, or what it calls its ‘peaceful periphery’19 policy. Actions speak louderthan words and they indicate China’s unmitigated irredentism based onthe Qing imperial conquests of large non-Han territories in order to safe-guard the security of core Han China. The theory that the periphery mustbe occupied in order to secure the core is an essentially imperial notion thatwas internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Guomindang and Com-munist. The regime’s attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiersoften with little historical basis have had and continue to have highlydestabilizing strategic consequences.

Nature and Dynamics of Territorial Claims

It may be useful to note here that though the PRC has stepped up itsclaims on Arunachal, they essentially remain rooted in the evidence it putforward between 1959–1960. Its overall case is entirely dependent onTibet’s religious ties with the Buddhist pockets in Arunachal. The positiveevidence principally relates to the Buddhist Lamaist connection to theTawang monastery and the Tawang tract with the Drepung monastery(Gelugpa sect) in Lhasa. China has a secondary position also that claimsthat some of the pockets now with India—Khenzemane, Thagla Ridge,Bumla, Longju—in fact, lie north of the McMahon Line. The negativeevidence relates to questioning the right of Tibet to conclude a borderagreement with British India in 1914.

However, an additional dimension has become visible in its strategiccalculus since the 1990s in regard to its claims on Arunachal—the lure ofits rich land, forest, and water resources. Some PLA and other writings arecritical that China gave up the verdant captured areas in the east in 1962and instead concentrated only on the barren areas of Aksai Chin. This wasa mistake, according to them, and it needs to be rectified.20 Therefore, aresource dimension that did not exist in the Maoist period has been addednow to China’s claim on Arunachal.

The Chinese position on the eastern sector and its sweeping claims tothe extent of 90,000 km2 are not new. It goes back to September 8, 1959,when it was first officially unveiled in a letter by Premier Zhou Enlai toPrime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Thereafter it has remained the officialChinese position, articulated by the Chinese officials and analysts in thestrategic community at different times. However, it is important to point

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out here that both in his talks with Jawaharlal Nehru in January 1957 inNew Delhi and in a letter to Nehru earlier in the same year (January 23,1959), Zhou had been more circumspect and realistic and had taken amore accommodating position.

An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the questionof the so-called McMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency aswell as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again theChinese Government’s attitude. As you are aware the McMahon Linewas a product of British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region ofChina and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridi-cally, too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has neverbeen recognized by the Chinese central government. Although relateddocuments were signed by a representative of the local authorities of theTibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfiedwith this unilaterally drawn line. … On the other hand, one cannot, ofcourse fail to take cognizance of the great and encouraging changes: Indiaand Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained independencesuccessively and become states friendly with China. In view of the vari-ous complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese government, on theone hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitudetowards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act withprudence and needs time to deal with this matter.21

In his response sent on March 22, 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru not only con-tested Zhou’s interpretations about the McMahon Line and its validity butalso pointed out that:

In our previous discussions and particularly during your visit to India inJanuary 1957, we were gratified to note that you were prepared to acceptthis line as representing the frontier between China and India in thisregion and I hope we will reach an understanding on this basis.22

He drew attention to the continued publication of the Chinese maps—‘showing considerable parts of Indian and Bhutanese territory as if theywere in China is not in accordance with long established usage as well astreaties, and is a matter of great concern to us’.23

However, by September 1959 Zhou had advanced unprecedentedclaims, not raised by any Chinese or Tibetan Governments in the past,nor by the PRC during the previous 10 years. In other words, a boundarythat had been recognized by the rest of the international community, whose

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terms had not been questioned by the previous Chinese Government andwhose representative participated in the talks at Simla and signed theConvention, suddenly became live and hugely contested. In fact, theRepublican China participated in the Simla conference, as an equal partyalong with British India and Tibet, thereby recognizing its then independ-ent status. The fact that China did not finally ratify the Convention wasonly because of its objection to the nature of the delineation of the Sino-Tibetan boundary, and right up to the late 1950s, it tried to make Tibetand Britain accept its claims to certain pockets along the Sino-Tibetanborder.

Between 1959 and 1962, Mao became increasingly frustrated withIndia for not softening its position regarding the McMahon Line or agree-ing to the Chinese demand for territorial concessions, for giving refuge tothe Dalai Lama and 90,000 Tibetans, and for Nehru’s growing agreementwith both President Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Kruschev on the needfor détente and decided to use force to settle matters. However, unlike inthe western sector, the Chinese forces withdrew from the east after a briefwar. It thereafter insisted that Indian forces must not occupy those areasthat China considered to be north of the McMahon Line. Since 1962 Chinahas maintained its claims and reiterated it.

For a brief period, between 1980 and 1982, the reformist leadershipunder Deng did indicate that a territorial agreement on the basis of existingground realities could be acceptable to China. On June 21, 1980, PremierDeng Xiaoping issued a statement saying that the border problem shouldbe settled on the present LAC, in a package deal. China could recognizethe present LAC in the eastern sector and India should recognize the statusquo in the western sector.24 Premier Zhao Ziyang also indicated as muchthrough an intermediary to the Indian Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaranduring 1982–1984.25 Neither offer, however, was placed before India offi-cially during the diplomatic talks that began in 1981. At the fifth round oftalks in 1985, the Chinese position underwent a change from the statedDeng position of 1980 with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing,leading the talks with India, insisting that China had existing claims in theeastern sector and concessions would have to made by both sides in all thecontested sectors.26 This was followed by a more detailed interview to theIndian media on June 2, 1986 by Liu in which he ruled out the possibilityof a border settlement unless India makes major concessions in the easternsector. He said: ‘The eastern sector is the biggest dispute and key to an

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overall solution … It is not difficult to solve this question if India adopts areasonable and rational policy.’ Asked whether this was not a major devi-ation from the settlement proposal put forward by Zhou Enlai in 1960 – aswell as Deng Xiaoping in 1980 – Liu Shuqing claimed that the formerChinese Premier had ’never made any specific proposal ... but only ageneral idea’. He alleged that India had progressively occupied Chinese ter-ritory ‘first under colonial rule, but most of it after India’s independence.’Even after ‘the unfortunate war of 1962, which resolved the dispute tosome degree’, India is in ’occupation of the Chushul area’, for example. Hefurther said: ’we have no intention of recovering the totality of thedisputed area,’ but ’some adjustments will have to be made.’ However, ‘ifIndia finds doing this difficult, then the border question can be left asidefor the time being and we could develop relations in other fields’.27 TheChinese negotiators have stuck to this position. By 1986 and 1987, thedispute became live at Sumdorong Chu in the Tawang sector as both sidesjockeyed for position along the LAC, finally agreeing on a mutual pull-back. The crisis made the two sides re-examine their relations and led toRajiv Gandhi’s visit to China, the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 34years, and the first high-level summit since Premier Zhou Enali’s visit toDelhi in 1960.

For example, in November 2000 the Chinese embassy in New Delhiresponding to articles in the Indian media critical of China’s approachtowards the boundary question reiterated the Zhou Enlai position andsaid,

The Sino-Indian boundary issue was left-over from history. The bound-ary between our two countries has never been officially demarcated. Theunlawful McMahon Line, concocted by Britain in 1914, has never beenrecognized by successive Chinese governments. However, being the vic-tim over the Sino-Indian boundary issue, the Chinese side has all alongadvocated a peaceful solution to it through friendly talks on the princi-ples of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Pending asolution of the boundary issue, peace and tranquillity must be main-tained along the LAC in border areas.28

It must be underlined that the Chinese diplomatic moves on the terri-torial issue over the past decade have taken place in a more positiveenvironment than what India faced in the Maoist period. Deng and thereformist leaders after Rajiv Gandhi visit in December 1988 adopted several

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non-confrontational principles to deal with the problem of territorial dis-putes, without giving up basic position on sovereignty. This thinking wasfirmed up through the 1990s as China sought to secure itself against thevagaries of a US-dominated post-Cold War world order. The principalpositions that marked its new approach were as follows:

• Keep aside differences and expand cooperation on the areas ofcommon interest;

• Confidence- and trust-building measures must receive priority toavoid conflict; maintain peace along the LAC;

• The boundary issue and other disputes can be settled onlythrough a political dialogue and confidence building at the high-est level. It is, therefore, dependent on friendly relations betweenthe two countries.

• China and India must not treat each other as ‘threats’.• The boundary problem needs to be solved through mutual

understanding, mutual accommodation, and mutual adjustmentor give and take. China would not make any unilateral conces-sion on its 1959–1962 position.

In effect, the post-Mao Chinese leaderships would not make anyconcession on its stated territorial position, but at the same time it wouldwork to reduce tensions. This positive phase could change if China growsfrustrated with the inability to get its way against India and the risingopposition from Tibetans both within and outside, including the exilecommunity in India.

Assessing Claims

The Chinese claim rests on two specific arguments. One, Tibet had inthe past exercised influence and collected taxes in parts of Arunachal,including Tawang, where there is an important monastery. Two, the 1914Simla Agreement that delineates a boundary along the Himalayan water-shed dividing Arunachal from Tibet is not valid because Tibet had noauthority to sign it, and the conference was a British attempt to separateTibet from China. These claims have been further elaborated in Chineseofficial statements.

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Thus, China’s principal arguments regarding its claim on Arunachal aspresented in Zhou’s letter of September 1959 and subsequently repeatedand elaborated at the Officials Talks in 1960 may be summarized as follows:

• Tibet had no right to sign any international agreement, andhence the 1914 Simla Agreement between British India and Tibetsettling the boundary in the eastern sector (as well as northBurma) is not legal. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement clearlymentions that Tibet does not have such a right.

• The March 1914 bilateral Agreement settling the Indo-Tibetanborder in the east was secretive and not shown to the Chinese forapproval.

• While China had participated in the Simla Talks and its Plenipo-tentiary Ivan Chen had even signed the July 1914 Convention, ithad not been ratified by the central government in Beijing.

• The traditional boundary lies along the foothills of the Himala-yas and not at the Himalayan watershed as claimed by India andas indicated in the McMahon Line.

• Tawang is an area of religious significance to Tibet, which col-lected taxes there until 1951.

• Tibet was unhappy about the Agreement and had objected to the1914 Agreement in 1947.

The following segment examines the Chinese claims on the basis of theevidence as presented by both India and China at the official talks in 1960and in subsequent writings.

Jurisdiction

The Indian side pointed out during the 1960 official talks that theTibetan ties were religious and monastic in Tawang—as it had with othermonasteries in the trans-Himalayan region—and cannot therefore be con-sidered as the basis for any sovereignty claims. Such claims as have beenadvanced by China since 1959—and not by the Tibetans or the ChineseCentral Government before that date—are tantamount to the Vatican for-warding sovereignty claims on the basis of its ecclesiastic ties with theCatholic churches all over the world. Moreover, the ties Tibetans had with

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the Monbas, living in the trans-Himalayan villages, emerged only in the17th century, were restricted to a few small pockets, and they do not under-mine the jurisdiction of the tribal groups that inhabited the area or that ofother Indian kingdoms such as the Ahom rulers of Assam. Why would theshort phase of any perceived Tibetan influence or contact be more legiti-mate than the local Satraja, Ahom and later British Indian, and Indian juris-diction on a continuous basis for a much longer historical phase? Moreimportantly, what is the basis of China’s claim when Tibet itself signed andsanctified the current boundary and Republican, Guomindang China, andthe CCP did not make such a claim at any point until September 1959?

The tribal areas formed part of the borderlands of Indian kingdoms inthe east and were kept in peace by a judicious use of conciliation and useof force by the Ahom rulers. The British after 1826 continued this systemand placed the areas under the jurisdiction either of the political Agents orof the Deputy Commissioner of the adjoining districts. The introduction ofthe Inner Line in 1873 was a device to prevent traders from the rest of thecountry entering the areas for exploitation of resources in the tribal areas29

and also prevent the tribals from carrying out raids in the lower plains.

The Chinese have claimed that Tibet was collecting taxes from Tawangmonastery until 1951 when full-fledged Indian administration wasextended into the area. However, there is no record of the Tibetan tax col-lection or administration in the entire Monba area. There are, instead,records of Tawang monastery collecting religious dues from the villages inthe Tawang30 and Sherchokpa areas, and the monastery sent part of itsannuity to Drepung monastery in Lhasa to which it was affiliated. Therewere also some private Tibetan estates owned by the monastery in thearea. However, ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Monastery cannot beequated with political jurisdiction of Tibet and no such jurisdiction hasbeen shown by China. The Chinese evidence regarding its claims, pre-sented during the 1960 talks, pertain exclusively to three small pockets ofthe Buddhist influence close to the traditional border—Monyul, Layul,and Lower Zayul. The overall evidence presented related mostly toTawang, where there the monastery had close ties with the Monbas of thearea who are Buddhists.

Though China has not been able to produce records of the Chinese orTibetan administration or jurisdiction over most of Arunachal yet it claims90,000 km2 of the area south of the Himalayan watershed up to the foothills.

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Whatever evidence it has adduced covered four pockets: the Tawangvalley, the Mechuka valley, the Brahmaputra/Tsangpo-Siang loop, andparts of the Lohit valley or the Walong circle. Specifically, the pockets areKhenzemane in the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction, Tawang tract (both inTawang district), Longju in Subansiri district, and Rima in the Walongsector. In 1962 the PLA invaded all these areas. Even earlier in 1959 it hadsent forces into Longju, leading to armed clashes, and the PLA entered bothLongju and Taksing in 1962. China has not provided much evidence of theTibetan or the Chinese administration but maintains both these areas arenorth of the McMahon Line. It also claims that Thagla ridge, Teygala at theIndia-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction, and Bumla are north of the McMahon Linewithout indicating where the line should lie and on what basis.

Demography and Ethnicity

While there are Buddhist pockets among the Monbas, the people arenot Tibetans. An examination of the ethnography of Arunachal Pradesh,called the Northeast Frontier Agency until the early 1970s, reveals thatthere are distinct tribes that straddled each of the river valleys in thissprawling, largely forested hilly region. The religion and language ofthese tribes have been influenced by Tibet and the people of the Assamvalley and adjoining areas—as is true of any border region—but each tribehas its indigenous culture. The tribesmen in the north—Monbas, Akas,Daflas, Miris, Abors, and Mishimis—were all ethnically different from theTibetans. China cannot, therefore, claim the area on the basis of ethnicityor religion.

Also, none of the tribes and peoples of Arunachal have ever soughtmerger with China; instead, they have increasingly and actively partici-pated in the democratic process in India.

The International Legitimacy of the Simla Agreement

According to India, the traditional boundary on the eastern sector hadbeen formalized by the 1914 Simla Agreement between Tibet and India.China formally participated in the talks in Simla and the Chinese Plenipo-tentiary signed the Agreement, though the Agreement was not finally rat-ified by Beijing. The Simla Agreement and the Convention of July 3, 1914were not kept secret as the Chinese have claimed since 1959, but were

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published in the very first edition of Aitchison Collection of Treatiesissued (1929) after they were signed. The issue that Olaf Caroe, ForeignSecretary to the Government of India, had the relevant volume inAitchison’s Treaties of 1929 recalled and re-published in 1938 with a 1929date line and a different account of events is not relevant because that doesnot have a bearing on the facts regarding the Simla Conference and theMcMahon Line. Also, Sir Charles Bell’s book Tibet, Past and Present pub-lished in 1924 after approval by the India Office showed the McMahonLine clearly on the map. Bell was the political officer in Sikkim and actedas the advisor to the Indian Foreign Secretary, Henry McMahon, the Brit-ish plenipotentiary at the Simla Convention and whose name was given tothe Indo-Tibetan boundary agreed at the Convention. It is relevant tomention here that all documents recording Chinese objections to the SimlaConvention concerned themselves only with the line partitioning Tibetinto an Outer Tibet, which was to be entirely autonomous, and InnerTibet, to be administered by China. The McMahon Line was not even oncecited among the objections. Bell says that China did not ratify the Conventiononly for one reason … ‘the frontier to be established between China andTibet’.31

Similarly, the assertion of the PRC that Tibet was a part of China andtherefore had no right to enter into treaties is an assertion withoutgrounds of evidence. Tibet had through its history signed a number oftreaties that were recognized as valid instruments by the parties con-cerned, including the Chinese Central Government:

• The Treaty of 783 was signed between Tibet and Tang China.• The peace Treaty of 822 between Tibet and Tang China was the

culmination 200 years of Sino-Tibetan conflict. The Chinese wereforced to treat the Tibetans as equals with a separate state withits own inviolable territory.32

• The treaties of 1684 and 1842, which Tibet had signed withLadakh and Kashmir, respectively, and in which Tibet’s tradi-tional boundaries in the west were confirmed and her trade rela-tions with Kashmir regulated, can be cited as a good example.

• Tibet had also signed a treaty with Nepal in 1792 and 1856. TheTibet-Nepal treaty of 1856 was in operation for a full centuryuntil replaced by the Nepal-China Treaty of 1956. Article III of

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the 1956 Nepal-China Treaty states, ‘All treaties and documentswhich existed in the past between China and Nepal includingthose between the Tibet Region of China and Nepal are herebyabrogated.’33 The treaty therefore tacitly recognizes that Tibetand Nepal had signed a treaty that was valid until then and rec-ognized by both sides. In fact, both the Qing and the Guomin-dang Governments in China recognized the 1856 treaty.

• The Lhasa Convention of 1904 between Tibet and Britain con-cluded after the Younghusband expedition and reiterating theprovisions of 1890 and 1893 agreements signed by Britain withChina on Tibet.

• The 1908 Trade regulations signed by Britain, Tibet, and Chinaconfirming the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, indicatingthat the provisions could not be implemented without Tibet’sconsent.

• The Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of Urga on January 11, 1913 recogniz-ing each other as independent states.

• The February 1914 Simla Agreement between British Indiaand Tibet settling the boundary between India and Tibet fromthe Bhutan frontier in the west to Diphu or Talok pass (in theIndia-Tibet-Burma trijunction) and upto the Isu Razi Pass in theeast in Burma.

• The Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of July 3, 1914 signedbetween Tibet and Britain.

Most problems relating to the 1914 Agreement flow from the fact thatTibet’s international status is controversial and contested. The Tibetansargue that they were historically fully independent, except for brief periodsof foreign rule by the Mongols and Manchus but never by a Han Chinesedynasty. Moreover, Tibet, like Mongolia and the Han Chinese, had thrownoff the Manchu yoke in 1911. Both Mongolia and Tibet declared independ-ence, and in 1945 Guomindang China and the Soviet Union had, through anagreement, officially recognized Outer Mongolia’s independent status.Tibet could not secure such a recognition because of the British policytowards China. The problem for Tibet in securing international recognitionfor its sovereignty after 1912 essentially flowed from the fact that Britain hadrecognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in order to ensure that that it

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remained outside Tsarist Russian influence. It did not amount tosovereignty—which neither the Qing from the 19th century onwards andnor the newly created Republic of China had exercised. However, Tibet wasseen to be within China’s area of influence and a special role in its securitywhile having full domestic and even foreign policy autonomy. Tibet,despite its own administration, currency, taxation, language, and religioustradition that influenced China, Mongolia, and Manchuria, was not recog-nized as a fully independent state by other countries until 1950. Yet,between 1912 and 1950 Tibet was fully independent. While in terms of civili-zation and ethnicity, Tibet has always been separate from China and formost of its history had full internal and external sovereignty, it came underManchu imperial influence in the 18th and 19th centuries as did Han China.Yet even in this period, Tibet was never a province of the Qing empire,unlike Taiwan and Xinjiang, which were declared as provinces in late 19thcentury.

The argument that the British India occupied the territory constitut-ing today’s Arunachal, when Tibet and China were weak, is similarlyflawed. All empires and kingdoms expanded and contracted, as theirpower rose and declined. The British expansion is no more or no lesslegitimate or illegitimate than the Chinese, the Manchu, and the Tibetancolonizations and imperial expansions, on the basis of which China hasadvanced all of its territorial claims. Even under the Qing imperial tute-lage, it had treaty-making rights that were recognized by the Qing impe-rial rulers of China. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the RepublicanChina participated in the Simla conference as one of the three sides alongwith Tibet and the British India—a clear indication of its recognition ofthe existing realities. The PRC’s non-recognition of the Simla Agreementdoes not render the agreement invalid or illegitimate. It is just a currentstatement of China’s changed politico-strategic posture. It has also beenargued that under the terms of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement Tibetdid not have the right to sign agreements on its status without the con-sent of Qing China. However, the terms of the agreement had clearlybecome inoperable as a result of the collapse of the Qing state and theemergence of three separate and independent entities—Republic ofChina, Mongolia and Tibet.

The Guomindang and the Communist Party did not accept Tibet asfully independent and kept alive China’s claim of sovereignty in place ofsuzerainty—which was the actual nature of the relationship even at the

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peak of the Qing imperial control. The PLA’s occupation and the 1951Agreement snuffed out Tibet’s de facto independence, and genuine auton-omy was promised. But the 1951 occupation and the subsequent Chineseexercise of sovereignty did not nullify Tibet’s past status and its treaty-making powers, as India and the Tibetan Government in exile havepointed out.

The Question of Tawang

The PRC maintains that Tibet continued to be in possession of theTawang monastery until 1951 and that it was also collecting taxes in thearea. Former Ambassador to India, Zhou Gang insists that ‘during mytenure as Chinese ambassador to India, I made it clear on many occa-sions to the Indian public — Tawang belongs to China, it is the birthplaceof the sixth Dalai Lama and the Dalai Lama is “China’s Dalai Lama”,who cannot be “India’s Dalai Lama”… I think if the Indian side canmake substantial adjustment in the East sector according to the princi-ples of mutual understanding, mutual accommodation and mutualadjustment, the Chinese side will make its adjustment in the Westernsector accordingly’.34 The evidence, however, shows that it was theDrepung monastery in Lhasa, and not the Tibetan Government, that con-cerned itself with the Tawang monastery. No Chinese official ever vis-ited Tawang until the 1962 invasion. Tawang, part of the former Kamengdistrict, is now a district in its own right. Different groups of Monpa trib-als inhabit the Tawang area in the north, the Dirang valley in the centralarea, and the Kalaktang valley in the south. All the three groups belongto the Gelukpa sect of Buddhists. Historical records show that Monpaswere never the citizens of Tibet, nor was the area ever administered byTibet, although the adjoining area in the north, under the Tsona districtof Tibet, was ruled by the Dzongpon Tibetans. Moreover, Tibetan reli-gious connections with Tawang was of recent origin whereas the localIndian influence and jurisdictions, including that in the British period,have a long history. Moreover, the status of Tawang was clearly settledat the 1914 Simla Convention that Tibet had signed and was never con-tested by China till 1959.

As T.S. Murty, who participated in the 1960 talks with the PRC delega-tion, says, ‘The Chinese did not provide any evidence to show thatTawang monastery was in the “possession” of the Tibetan government

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and not merely affiliated for some purposes to a Tibetan monastery’.35

Even the Prime Minister of Tibet had recognized in 1914 that the onlyTibetan interests were private estates and monastic contributions.36 In factmajor Tibetan monasteries had religious ties with a string of monasteriesin the trans-Himalayan region and they have not led to sovereigntyclaims.

It may also be noted that when the border between Bhutan and theTawang tract was surveyed and finalized by a joint Bhutan-Indian com-mission between 1936 and 1938, there was no protest either from Tibet orfrom China, nor was any protest when the Northeast Frontier Agency wasmentioned as part of India and a Union Territory under the Constitutionin 1950.

Geography and Watershed

The watershed principle had found explicit mention in agreements con-cluded by the Qing (China) dynasty with Russia in 1864 (Central Asia), withFrance in 1895 (Vietnam), and with British India in 1890 (Sikkim). Moreover,in its border agreements with Burma and Nepal in 1960 and 1961, this prin-ciple is clearly recognized. In both the cases, the boundary was acknowl-edged to run along the watershed formed by the same continuing mountainsystem.37 The Chinese agreements with Burma/Myanmar, Nepal, andPakistan (occupied Ladakh) all follow the watershed principle along theHimalayas and are consistent with the topographical flow of the agreedboundary in Sikkim and the McMahon Line in Arunachal. The Chineseargument that in Arunachal alone this flow is broken, and the traditionalboundary runs along the foothills, is inexplicable except for reasons of terri-torial expansion and politico-diplomatic goals specific to India.

While India has argued that the traditional boundary in the easternsector lies along the Himalayan watershed as in the other sectors, theChinese side has claimed that it lies along the southern foothills of theHimalayas in Arunachal. This is curious because the southern boundaryof Tibet lies along the watershed of the Himalayas in the Central Sectorwith India and with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan; the same continuingwatershed of the Himalayas forms the boundary between Burma andChina. The McMahon Line drawn follows the watershed principle fromthe Arunachal sector to the northern Myanmar. However, only in theArunachal sector does the alignment claimed by China suddenly drops

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down to the southern foothill of the Himalayas, but on the east and thewest of this sector, it lies along the main watershed range of the area. TheChinese are yet to give any credible explanation as to why in this sectoralone their claim departs from the Himalayan watershed and why what isvalid in the case of the other Himalayan neighbours, and especiallyBurma/Myanmar, is not valid for India. The argument that the claim-lineof China, along the Himalayan foothills, is akin to the borderline of Indiawith Bhutan and Nepal is ingenuous because all the three are trans-Hima-layan states with borders with Tibet, and it is the principle of dividing theTibetan border from India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar that is at issue.

The point about India expanding its administration into NEFA in 1951is unclear and not very relevant. In January 26, 1950 India had alreadydeclared NEFA a part of India in its Constitution without protest from anycountry, including Tibet and China. Moreover, it was in 1951 that Chinahad militarily occupied Tibet and imposed the 17-point agreement on theTibetans. If that act of expanding Chinese sovereignty forcibly overanother nation that had been since the collapse of the Qing empire in 1911been independent is legitimate according to China, why should the intro-duction of normal administration of the new, independent, democraticIndia in an entirely peaceful manner on an area that had been a part ofvarious Indian kingdoms and states for many centuries, and whose terri-torial status till that point was not under dispute, illegitimate? The newawakening to Tawang and the consequent territorial claims, when nonehad been made by China earlier till 1959, and when the people of thearea—all equal citizens of democratic India—have never sought any alle-giance with China has created problems in both bilateral relations and increating a sense of insecurity in Arunachal that has been repeatedlyexpressed by its elected representatives. As for China taking up the role ofpreserving the religious sentiments of the Tibetans, it is a bit ironical sincethe most revered religious leader of Tibet the Dalai Lama and his over250,000 followers remain in exile in India since 1959, and the Chinese gov-ernment has repeatedly persecuted Tibetan lamas and controlled the mon-asteries in order to ensure that they do not oppose Chinese rule.Moreover, as has been pointed out earlier, it was Tibet that signed the 1914Simla Agreement delineating the boundary in NEFA that left Tawang onthe Indian side, and though upset with the British for having failed to getChinese acquiescence to the Tibet–China boundary and the Simla Convention,Tibet briefly raised it in the late 1940s; it soon accepted that the issue had

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been settled. The Dalai Lama has again reiterated this position in a state-ment on June 4 this year. Similarly, the argument that Tibet was collectingtaxes till 1951 in Tawang is somewhat misplaced as indicated earlier.Moreover, the birth of the 6th Dalai Lama in Tawang cannot be the basisfor any sovereignty claim. As Samdhong Rimpoche, Prime Minister of theTibetan government in exile, has pointed out, if he had been born in any ofthe Southeast Asian Buddhist states would China have claimed it as well?

“We have continued the legitimate government of the Dalai Lama,which is now 367 years old. That government has agreed to McMahon lineand Tawang and other issues were agreed on basis of the watershed princi-ples. The watershed principle said that whatever water comes to this sidebelongs to India. It was very clear demarcation. … Why should there be anytension on the Tawang issue between India and China? India should standup and say that you (China) have no business to talk about it. Tawangbelongs to India. Why is this issue lingering on? If Chinese say that becausethe sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang, it belongs to Tibet then if oneDalai Lama was born in Mongolia can I say Mongolia is a part of Tibet?”38

Selective Interpretation of Treaty Arrangements

The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had clearly stated to the Indian PrimeMinister Nehru during their talks in Delhi in 1957 that while China did notrecognize the Simla Agreement and the McMahon Line, it would adhere to itin practice with both India and Burma/Myanmar, because it had become areality and had been bequeathed to the two states by history. This was theChinese position untill Zhou’s sudden volte-face, in his September 1959 let-ter to Nehru, which claims 90,000 km2 in the northeast, including the wholeof North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (later renamed Arunachal). Yet Chinamade no issue of accepting the same McMahon Line as a defined borderwith Burma in 1960. This selective and dual standard of China with inher-ently hostile in intent in its territorial diplomacy towards its two neighbour-ing states seriously undermines any principled basis for its claims. The effectwas to vitiate the environment for negotiations with India during 1959–1962.

India’s Response

India’s overall response has been to maintain the general line ofengagement, not a return to the era of confrontation. At the same time,

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India wants to protect its sovereignty and territoriality from being under-mined. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal soon after hisreturn from his January 2008 visit to China and announced a major eco-nomic package to improve the infrastructure development there. This wasfollowed by the visit of Defence Minister to Tawang in March. The formerArmy Chief Gen. J.J. Singh has been appointed the Governor of the state,to ensure that the developmental and security situation remains in thefocus of the centre.

India’s negotiating leverages on Arunachal, however, have beenweakened by its unilateral concession of recognizing the Chinese sover-eignty over Tibet in 1954 without securing the Chinese reciprocal recognitionof the NEFA boundary. While the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951 hadbecome a reality and had not been challenged by the international com-munity, there was no basis for a unilateral recognition of Tibet’s occupa-tion when it had such a huge strategic consequence for the country. PrimeMinister Nehru’s assumption and expectation in recognizing the Chinesesovereignty over Tibet was that China in turn would be cooperative,would be less paranoid, and would recognize the boundaries of India, asclaimed by New Delhi. That assumption, based on Nehru’s conversationswith Zhou, proved totally misplaced. Moreover, because China had notquestioned the validity of the McMahon Line until then, it was alsoassumed by the GOI that the boundary in the eastern sector was settled.Zhou Enlai’s 1959 letter to Jawaharlal Nehru in which China raised sweep-ing claims on both Ladakh and NEFA shattered all such assumptions. Itunderlined that in diplomacy with China—whose statecraft historicallyhas been steeped in realpolitik—unilateral concessions have no place andhaving done so was a big mistake, and that assumptions cannot be madeunless clearly stipulated.

The 1954 agreement was valid for eight years and was not renewed byIndia in 1962 because of the growing Chinese restrictions on Indian accessto the trade marts in Tibet that were protected under the agreement.Therefore, the Indian recognition of Tibet, as part of China, legally lapsedin 1962 and has not since been renewed in any agreement. However, polit-ically India did not formally change its position on Tibet. It gave refuge toDalai Lama and his 90,000 Tibetan followers in 1959 and later allowed theTibetans to set up a government in exile. For the next two decades, thediplomatic relations remained frozen though China continued to enhanceits military control, infrastructural development, and repression on the

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Tibetan opposition. New Delhi remained rooted in its basic position on theChinese sovereignty. A new chapter began in 1988 during Prime MinisterRajiv Gandhi’s path-breaking visit to China. In the joint statement, Indiaaffirmed that the ‘Tibet region is an autonomous part of China’. This toowas a unilateral statement without any relationship to the settling of theArunachal boundary, though it mentioned formally the autonomous sta-tus of Tibet. The 1988 position was given up in 2003 when India recog-nized the TAR as part of China as a further gesture of goodwill. It was notrealized that the TAR included Arunachal in the Chinese maps, nor wasany reciprocity sought. Such unilateral concessions and postures havecompromised India’s negotiating edge.

The possibility of India adopting a more flexible and nuanced postureexists since none of these statements are treaty-based commitments. In thecontext of any hardening of posture by China, the Indian side could adoptseveral options. It could stop mentioning Tibet in all joint statements, inthe absence of China’s recognition of Arunachal as a part of India. The twosides can then issue more specific issue-based statements on trade, invest-ments, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and other areas of coopera-tion at the summits. India could also ask China to stop showing Arunachalas its part in its maps; in the event of non-compliance India can indicate adifferent colour wash for Tibet in her official maps. If China steps up itscoercive diplomacy Beijing could be told that unless discontinued Indiawould be forced to change its 1954 position recognizing Tibet as an auton-omous part of China. To his Chinese counterpart the Indian Special Repre-sentative could convey that the traditional border delineated in the SimlaAgreement should be demarcated as the final boundary, and India couldconsider specific measures to enable the Tibetan religious pilgrims to visitTawang as China does with Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash and Mansaro-var. India could also tell China that religion-based arguments for claimingTawang would only complicate the issues because India could then stakeher claims on Kailash and Mansarovar on similar grounds. The SpecialRepresentative could take up each of these with his Chinese counterpart,while avoiding a public controversy. By insisting on the principle of reci-procity, India could have a more balanced position on the issue thatwould make China review some of its positions. Finally, in the context ofthe growing Chinese claims on Tawang and other Arunachal areas, Indiacannot assume that the PLA would not initiate a controlled, limited, andswift action to take over some of these areas, after the Olympics. India’s

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rapid deployment forces, mountain divisions, and air power must remainalert to any attempt at undermining the letter and spirit of the 1996 and2005 CBM agreements.

In the ultimate analysis, however, it is not by winning the argumentthat India and China would be able to reach a final boundary settlement,set behind them a bitter history of misperception and conflict whose scarsare still alive, and look forward to a much more positive and promisingfuture relationship. It is citizenship and established constitutional, politi-cal, and ethnic allegiance and identity that would have to be given fullconsideration in settling the issue of disputed territories. No matter howvaluable land is to either side, the citizens are all the more important, andthey cannot be treated as transferable commodities. This principle is inline with the modern democratic notion of popular sovereignty that peo-ple cannot be forced to give up their citizenship and nationality rightsbecause of the agreements imposed from above by the states, based ontheir strategic calculations, or to assuage the so-called historical claims.The principle has wide ramifications and includes the land that belongs tothe people. It is important to point out here that the relevance of villageboundaries, where the population of the village is settled as subjects of astate, came up during the 1960 India-China official level border talks. ‘Itwas well known that every Indian village not only included the inhabitedportion and cultivated fields but also the pasture grounds and forestswhich were the preserve of the village.’39 As an example it pointed out tothe Chinese side that ‘When the village Kurkutti was assessed for revenue,the waste land, the grazing fields and the forests in Barahoti and otherareas right up to the border had also been taken into consideration’.40

Though the non-transfer of population, as a principle, was adopted byIndia as a basic position, the final formulation agreed to in 2005 gave roomfor different interpretations. In fact, many of the principles to settle theterritorial dispute, signed in 2005 after many years of negotiations, areunfortunately too omnibus and broad—leaving considerable scope for mis-interpretation. They have, as a result, not helped clinch the issues in a clearand indisputable manner. The Chinese Foreign Minister, by contradictingIndia’s understanding, has underlined that broad principles, good as rheto-ric and image building, do not help resolve specific issues and neither arethey meant to as far as China is concerned. In the 51 years between thesigning of the Panchasheel and the Agreement on the principles of settle-ment in 2005, Indian diplomacy ought to have grasped this reality.

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Finally, the agreement to seek a ‘political settlement’ of the boundaryissue adopted after 2003 needs to be interpreted in terms of an overall set-tlement and not in terms of an agreement in each of the specific sectors. Asfar as Arunachal is concerned, the historical and geographical principlesare already in place. In fact because the two countries had already agreedon a ‘fair and reasonable’ settlement as the basic framework for a compro-mise, what was gained by using the word ‘political’ that conveys anunprincipled deal?

Conclusion

China’s use of force and military occupation of large tracts of territoryin Ladakh and the invasion of NEFA in 1959–1962 destroyed the India-China relations for nearly three decades. The relations began to berepaired after the reformists came to power in China in 1978 and began toimprove after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in 1988. It reopenedhighest level political dialogue and visits after a gap of 28 years. It hasbeen difficult to change China’s image as a land-hungry, an aggrandizing,and an untrustworthy neighbour that prevailed in the country after 1962.The success of China’s reforms and globalization, its repeated statementsof good neighbourly and peaceful intentions, and steady improvement inbilateral ties with India have begun to change that negative public percep-tion. New constituencies that are emerging are interested in economic tieswith China. Beijing, in the interest of long-term stable relations with India,needs to nurture this image with care. Giving up its misplaced claims onArunachal would advance such a goal significantly.

Beijing’s continuing claims on Arunachal is unprecedented when com-pared to the settlements it has reached with its 12 other land neighbours.In none of the other cases, China seriously pursued such large populatedareas. While it kept circulating old maps that made sweeping claims basedon old imperial conquests, it did not pursue them during the negotiationsand finally settled for a more limited territorial adjustments, whereby onlyvery small populations were affected. By persisting with such large claimsofficially against India, it sends a message that it looks at India with preju-dice and a sense of rivalry and is not serious about building stable ties.

Over 50 years have passed since the PRC began to craft its new sover-eignty and territorial shape, a process more ambitious than that of the lateQing and the Nationalist Governments that preceded it. It is a process that

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still remains incomplete, along the continental stretch with India and in themaritime areas that stretch into Taiwan, Senkaku, the Korean waters, andthe Spratlys. How China is going to solve its pending territorial disputewith India will be a test case for China’s peaceful rise theory. It will not beeasy for China to give up its claims, no matter how weak are the bases of itsclaims. But it needs to find a way to do so in its own larger foreign policyand security interest. However, by making claims in public and by diplo-matically and militarily pursuing them a retraction is being made difficultat a time when the leadership is not powerful enough to withstand politi-cally the attacks of surrender that the hard-line nationalists within the PLAand the Communist Party could raise. Therefore, the PLA’s support wouldbe needed for a change in posture. The Indian military can, to an extent,help by engaging the PLA and ensuring that it understands India’s aspira-tions, security needs and, its own political constraints over the territorialissues. India’s engagement strategy must also make China understand thata peaceful and reasonable settlement of the Arunachal issue, based on thetraditional and historically derived border, is crucial to the aspiration ofChina to remain on its much articulated peaceful pathway.

Notes1 For example, the Chinese President Hu Jintao on 16th January this year told visit-

ing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he would like to see relationsclimb much higher than that envisaged by the joint declaration signed by the twocountries a day earlier. Hu said he was enthusiastic about the engagement acrossthe Himalayas going far beyond the routine diplomatic and official levels. See thereport from Beijing, ‘Hu Jintao for closer India-China ties’, Times of India (NewDelhi), January 17, 2008.

2 A series of reports and editorials have been published in leading Indian newspa-pers indicating the public mood. See for example the report, ‘Difficulties in Sino-Indian ties come to fore’, Times of India, May 27, 2007, and ‘China is the greateststrategic challenge’, Times of India, June 4, 2008.

3 The joint statement signed between Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Li Peng onDecember 23, 1988 states that the two leaders “agreed to develop their relationsactively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable climate and condi-tions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question while seekinga mutually acceptable solution to this question.” The phrase ‘fair and reasonable’has since been the standard formulation for the approach towards a boundary set-tlement and emphasizes a just solution to the problem based on the merits of thecase. The Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperationsigned between the Prime Minister A B Vajpayee and Wen Jianbao on June 23,2003 similarly calls for a “a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution

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through consultations on an equal footing.” The formulation was repeated in thejoint statement and the agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principlesfor the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed by Prime MinisterManmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in Beijing on 11th April 2005, Beijing. The Chi-nese general approach towards a territorial settlement is ‘mutual understandingand mutual accommodation’ – a realpolitik and bargaining based compromise,that has marked most of its border agreements.

4 There were significant domestic protests against the boundary agreements signedby Kyrgyzstan (2002) and Vietnam (2000) under which territory that had beenunder their jurisdiction had to be surrendered to China.

5 Since the return of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from his China visit in Januarythis year, the Indian Government has taken a series of measures to secureArunachal. This included the PM’s visit to Arunachal and the announcement of a10,000-crore package for development of roads, railways, and other infrastructure;the defence minister’s separate visits to Sikkim and Tawang; the appointment offormer Army Chief J.J. Singh as the new governor of the state; and the plan to builda series of helipads that would improve its connectivity of this hill state.

6 In January 2001 Prime Minister Vajpayee, and the visiting former Prime Minister,and the then Chairman of the National People’s Congress of China, Li Peng,expressed satisfaction during their talks in New Delhi on the process of clarifica-tion of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) including the exchange of maps, and itwas agreed that the ‘process should be completed as soon as possible’. See ‘India,China agree on LAC clarification’, The Tribune, Chandigarh, January 16, 2001.

7 India and China have agreed to speed up the process of resolving their long-standing border dispute. ‘I had very good discussions with Chinese Premier WenJiabao’, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told reporters travelling with him froman East Asia summit in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur. ‘We feel the negotia-tions should be expedited…We are dealing with difficult issues. Without settingany deadline, I do think it is possible to move forward at a faster pace…’, he said,on Thursday (People’s Daily Online, December 16, 2005).

8 Article VII of the agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principlesfor the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed on April 11, 2005in Beijing says: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguarddue interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”

9 See the ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and theGovernment of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters andGuiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’signed in New Delhi on April 11, 2005. Article VII states, ‘In reaching a boundarysettlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populationsin the border areas’.

10 It has worked because the Indian side has persistently from Nehru to Vajpayee toManmohan Singh have come to believe—despite little evidence—that such con-cessions would lead to China finally accepting the established territorial order in

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Arunachal and that it is important to settle the territorial issue at an early date sothat the two countries can stabilize their relations and focus on wider bilateral,regional, and international issues.

11 See the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Betweenthe Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, June 23, 2003. It says, ‘The twosides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the politicalperspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement’.

12 See Article 11 of the Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic ofChina signed on April 11, 2005. This is also emphasized in the agreement on Guid-ing Principles signed between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao.Article 2 states, ‘The two sides should, in accordance with the Five Principles ofPeaceful Coexistence, seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution tothe boundary question through consultations on an equal footing, proceeding fromthe political perspective of overall bilateral relations’.

13 Several articles have appeared on the issue in Chinese journals. Also see the ChinaTibet Information Centre article, ‘Internal dissension invites outside bullying’,February 2004, at http://www.tibet.cn/english/zt/history/..\history/200402004525162711.htm (Accessed May 5, 2004).

14 India had recognized ‘the Tibet region’ as a part of China in the India-ChinaAgreement in 1954 and the Tibet region as an ‘autonomous part of China’ in thejoint statement signed in December 1988 during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’spath-breaking visit. The new formulation agreed to in 2003 became more specificby mentioning the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) instead of the phrase Tibetregion. The Chinese side clearly saw different nuances in the two phrases and wasmore comfortable with the latter formulation.

15 For example, Sun Shihai, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific stud-ies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a leading Indian specialist, says,‘India entered into Tawang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama, in 1951. ForTibetan Buddhism Tawang is important’. Similarly, Ma Jiali, a senior India special-ist with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) underthe Ministry of State Security, Beijing, says, ‘Tawang is central to the resolution ofthe Sino-Indian border issue’. He told PTI in an interview that if India ‘returns’Tawang, ‘a sacred place for Tibetan Buddhists’, the Chinese side would be ‘mag-nanimous’ in settling the border in the Western and Middle sectors of the disputedboundary. He said, ‘If the border issue is not dealt well, the Chinese central gov-ernment could face problems from local Tibetan people, who consider Tawang aspart of Tibet…The Chinese government cannot afford to ignore popular feelings.Some Tibetans could use this issue to foment trouble in Tibet if Tawang is notreturned to China.’ Ma asserted that no Chinese Government or leader can acceptthe McMahon Line drawn by ‘British imperialists’. See ‘Return Tawang to China toresolve boundary dispute’: Chinese Scholar, PTI from Beijing, March 7, 2007.

16 Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi claimed in an interview to the TV channel CNN-IBN in New Delhi on November 13, 2006 that ‘In our position, the whole of the

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state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of theplaces in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.’

17 ‘Congress MP alleges incursions by Chinese troops’, PTI, November 21, 2007. TheMP, Nabam Rebia, from Arunachal Pradesh told the Rajya Sabha (Upper Houseof the Indian Parliament) that a lot of incursions by Chinese troops had takenplace in both Arunachal and Sikkim. He said the Chinese army had demolished aBuddha statue in Tawang district on October 30, 2007.

18 The denial of Chinese visa to Gonesh Koyu, an IAS officer of the Arunachal Pradeshcadre who was a part of a 107-strong delegation of IAS officers who planned totravel to China. ‘We hold that the boundary issue between China and India shouldbe settled fairly and reasonably at an early date through friendly consultations’,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, responded to a question at theofficial press briefing in Beijing on May 29, 2007. Before the boundary settlement,differences should not be brought into the front, affecting exchanges between thetwo nations, Jiang told PTI when asked to comment on Beijing’s refusal to grantvisa to an Indian IAS official from Arunachal Pradesh. See ‘China asks India not tobring differences to the fore’, The Tribune, Chandigarh, May 30, 2007.

19 In the early 1980s as China opened up to the outside world it also sought to lowersecurity risks through a regional policy, known as ‘zhoubian zhengce’ (peripherypolicy) or ‘mulin zhengce’ (good neighboring policy), to cope with the manychallenges that had emerged in its relations with the neighbouring states as aresult of Maoist policies since the late 1950s. Following the end of the Cold War,the post-Tiananmen crisis in ties with the West, and the disintegration of theSoviet Union, the need to improve relations with countries on China’s peripherygrew as it sought to establish a secure and friendly ring of states around it.Beijing’s periphery policy has two security goals: one, to prevent alliances of itsneighbours with the dominant world power, the United States, that could con-strain its foreign policy maneuverability and pose potential security challenges;and two, for that very reason, to settle border disputes with its neighbours‘through consultations and negotiations’ – as mentioned in Communist PartyGeneral Secretay Jiang Zemin’s report to the 15th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party (Beijing Xinhua, October 16, 1997). The first policy goalhas involved China in developing strategic relationships and finding commongrounds with Asian countries in resisting pressures on market penetration andhuman rights issues from Western powers. The second goal has led China sincethe early 1990s to search for secure boundaries and peaceful settlements of itsmany land and maritime territorial disputes. The policy continued to be givenhigh priority at the 16th and 17th Communist Party Congress in 2002 and 2007.For a good account of the evolution of the policy see Suisheng Zhao, ‘The Makingof China’s Periphery Policy,’ in Suisheng Zhao (ed.) Chinese Foreign Policy, M.E.Sharpe: Armonk, 2004, pp. 256–275.

20 See Nan Li, ‘From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism:The Chinese Military Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-MaoEra’, Peace Works, n. 39, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.: 2001.

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Nan Li bases his analysis on writings and interviews with a number of PLA offic-ers. While arguing that ‘several factors may encourage China to take such a defen-sive stance, including India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; difficult logistics tosustain an offensive operation on high, remote, and geographically harsh plateaus;and the general perception of the disputed territories as barren mountain rangesthat have little economic value. An exception to this perception is the land under Indiancontrol called Arunachal, which China also claims as its territory (emphasis added)’,p. 42. He, however, adds that ‘… the Chinese claim may be used more as leverage innegotiating with India over territories that are under Chinese control, but alsoclaimed by India, than as an agenda item to be acted upon. Chinese security ana-lysts at least privately acknowledge that it may be immensely difficult for China torecapture this land in the near future’, p. 42. However, seven years have passedsince the study was completed and the PLA may well have a different assessmentof relative strength and therefore its capacity to engage in coercive diplomacy.

21 Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged, and agreements signed between theGovernments of India and China, 1954–1959, White Paper, Vol. 1 (1960), Ministryof External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 53.

22 Ibid. p. 56.23 Ibid. p. 57.24 Deng Xiaoping, Xinhua report from Beijing, June 21, 1980.25 Interview with A.P. Venkateswaran, February 23, 1999.26 ‘Chinese Introduce New Element of Controversy’, The Hindu, November 11, 1985.27 See Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shu Qing’s interview to the Indian media in Beijing,

in the Indian Express, June 3, 1986, p. 1.28 See article by Lu Bing, Press Attache with the Chinese Embassy, This Bond Can

Get Stronger, The Pioneer, New Delhi, November 10, 2000, p. 9.29 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873.30 There were 11 villages in all in the Tawang area—8 in the western Tawang and

3 in the eastern—in 1951 when Tibet was occupied by China.31 Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1924, p. 156.32 See Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A history of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-

Tibetan Relations, Westview, Boulder, CO, 1996, p. 73 for the text of the Treaty.33 See text of Nepal-China Agreement to Maintain Friendly Relations on Trade and

Intercourse, Kathmandu, September 20, 1956, in Ramakant, Nepal-China andIndia, Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1976, p. 272.

34 Zhou Gang, also a Senior Adviser to China Institute for International StrategicStudies, Beijing spoke to PTI in Beijing, See PTI report ‘Chinese Envoy calls forTawang’s return’, October 31, 2007, in Samachar.com, October 31, 2007.

35 T.S. Murty, Paths of Peace: Studies on the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, ABC PublishingHouse, New Delhi, 1983, p. 174.

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36 Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic ofChina on the Boundary Question, 1961, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,p. 280.

37 Ibid. p. 283.38 See Samdhong Rimpoche’s interview to Rediff.com ‘If India wants, it can sacrifice

Tibet issue’, March 19, 2008.39 Report of the officials of the Governments of India and the PRC on the Boundary

Question, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, December 1960, p. 188.40 Ibid. p. 197.

Sujit Dutta is Senior Fellow at IDSA, where he heads the China andEast Asia programme.

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Documents

Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunachal