Did the American Revolution have arevolutionary impact on American life?

Viewpoint: Yes. The American Revolution transformed American society intoa nation founded on what was regarded as radical principles that subordi-nated the function of government to natural law.

Viewpoint: No. The American Revolution was a conservative movementintended to preserve the existing social, political, and economic order.

As divided as historians are over the causes of the American Revolution(1775-1783), they are in even greater disagreement over its consequences.In one interpretive camp are those who assert that the Revolution was "themost radical and most far-reaching event in American history," while theiropponents claim that it was "culturally, politically, socially, and economically aconservative movement." This disagreement, in part, is the product of varyingviews of what constitutes a revolution. Those scholars belonging to the con-servative school of interpretation define revolutionary in terms of the moreviolent and tumultuous French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. These rev-olutions involved crowds of the poor and oppressed demanding food, theexecution of thousands of political prisoners, the destruction of the rulingclass, the overthrow of political institutions, and the emergence of a specialstyle of dress and behavior.

Measured by this standard, the American War of Independence couldhardly be called a revolution. Instead, it was a conservative movement thatsought to preserve the existing social, political, and economic order. Theplanter-merchant class who led the Revolution were not victims of either pov-erty or British oppression; neither were they intent on destroying artificial priv-ilege, promoting social mobility, or making way for the "natural aristocracy."Indeed, the new state and federal charters created during the Revolutionwere conservative documents that largely maintained the political status quothroughout the eighteenth century. Moreover, the common folk, who enjoyedwidespread political opportunities and economic and social mobility, did notresent the leadership of the powerful and therefore did not demand social orpolitical leveling. They, too, were conservatives who joined the Americancause to oppose British efforts to infringe on their rights as Englishmen. Inshort, the Revolution was a defensive movement to maintain the rights andliberties that Americans had always enjoyed.

Those historians who maintain that the American Revolution was revolu-tionary argue that there is radicalism in ideas, values, traditions, and cus-toms. They therefore measure innovation by the amount of social change thatactually took place, especially in regard to how people related to one another.For example, they point out that during the revolutionary generation Ameri-cans were transformed from monarchical, hierarchy-ridden subjects to themost liberal, democratic, egalitarian, modern, and commercial-minded peoplein the world. This dramatic metamorphosis radically changed the personaland social relationships of people, especially among women and the ordinaryfolk, by giving the former increased rights and opportunities and the lattergreater respectability (some even say dominance), dignity to their menial 257

REVOLUTIONARY EVENT

labor, and a heightened sense of class consciousness. At the same time, the Revolution alsochanged the culture of Americans and altered their understanding of "history, knowledge and truth."Finally, the Revolution, by freeing America from British trade and manufacturing restrictions,released "entrepreneurial and commercial energies that transformed the economic landscape of thecountry."

These conflicting interpretations aside, any worthwhile assessment of whether the AmericanRevolution was revolutionary must include several pertinent questions. How should one define revo-lution? Was American society democratic or undemocratic during the late colonial period? Did thePatriot leaders and their middle- and lower-class followers have different or similar goals for the Rev-olution? Were reforms that occurred during the revolutionary era the product of factors already inplace during the colonial period or were they the result of a conflict between the upper and lowerclasses provoked by the War of Independence?

Viewpoint:Yes. The American Revolutiontransformed American society intoa nation founded on what wasregarded as radical principles thatsubordinated the function ofgovernment to natural law.

In February 1761 a pivotal event in Ameri-can political history unfolded in the Bostoncourts. James Otis, the principled and energeticadvocate general, resigned his office so that hecould challenge the legality of Parliament'srecently enacted writs of assistance, which weregeneral search warrants enforced against localmerchants to stop their persistent smuggling.What remains of the speech, which lasted fivehours, was preserved through notes recorded byan astute and reliable observer of the proceed-ings, a youthful John Adams. A good portion ofOtis's argument against the "villainy" of thewrits was couched in routine language wellsteeped in the legacy of long-established Britishliberties and the cultural inheritance of commonlaw. Otis argued that general search warrants,which failed to legally identify the specific objectof the government's suspicions prior to thesearch, were in egregious violation of legal prece-dent and governmental practice. In sum, suchmethods were an insult to Crown and custom. Inparticular, the general writ perturbed that "essen-tial branch" of "English liberty" ensuring thesanctity of a man's house. "A man's house," Otisdeclaimed, "is his castle; and whilst he is quiet,he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. Thiswrit, if it should be declared legal, would totallyannihilate this privilege." In accordance with thelaw as established on British tradition, only spe-cific writs limiting a controlled search for contra-band were legitimate under common law andwere consonant with his Majesty's legitimate sov-ereign power. A general writ opposed this crucialand fixed British principle.

Under this part of the argument, Otis didnot offer anything particularly new or revolu-tionary; his case was built on established practicesof personal liberty and restricted government.Attention was soon drawn, however, to a remark-able and decidedly radical departure from thepolitical and legal norms of the times. Otisturned his argument away from historical prece-dent and institutional usage and toward some-thing far less tangible, outside the influence ofany given society, government, or historic lin-eage. Otis focused upon the universal eternallaws of nature and the inherent rights of humanbeings, an appeal to a standard of principlebeyond the context of a specific culture ornational heritage. In this way Otis fused therights of Englishmen with something far moremetaphysical and transcendent: ethical first prin-ciples higher and weightier than cultural usage.The writs of assistance, as offensive as they wereto the customary liberties enjoyed by subjects ofthe British Crown, were even more insulting toliberties that all human beings enjoy under natu-ral law and that are infused through fundamentalnatural rights. General search warrants, a matterof locally administered constabulary policy, werenot only wrong because they were against thelaws of Britain; they were fundamentally wrongin their nature because they were perversely con-trary to that higher law preceding and legitimat-ing all forms of government. These laws owednothing to parchment or decree but were avail-able to the light of reason contained within allhuman beings and not subject to any humanpower—laws that St. Thomas Aquinas had fivecenturies earlier identified as flowing from theMind of the Creator, that Alexander Hamiltonwould later claim to be written into the innerhearts of all human beings by the hand of theDivine, and that Thomas Jefferson would soonafter identify as stemming from the "Laws ofNature and of Nature's God."

Otis asserted that "every man, merely natu-ral, was an independent sovereign, subject to nolaw but the law written on his heart and revealedto him by his Maker, in the constitution of his

258 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

nature and the inspiration of his understandingand his conscience. His right to his life, his lib-erty, no created being could rightfully contest.Nor was his right to his property less incontest-able." No government, as a product of "createdbeings," is mighty enough on its own authorityto enact, promulgate, and enforce arbitrary laws.Thus, every man is his own sovereign by natureand not by custom, convention, or status. Lifeand liberty are "inherent and inalienable" rights.No creature, no matter how wise or powerful,can produce these rights; no political communitycan presume to generate these rights; and noinstitution can reasonably claim to grant theserights. The rights that Otis spoke of, which werein his argument supported by the conventionsand historical precedent of English law and polit-ical practice, were nonetheless acquired prior tothe sovereign will of any English government orthe tender mercies of any colonial official. Otisunderstood the heart of the conflict to involvewhat Adams referred to as rights both "naturaland English." This principle, that rights are notthe product of human will or historic develop-ment but are inherent in all human beings byGod's design, is that element that makes theAmerican War for Independence (1775-1783)revolutionary, a principle reaching back to thearguments of English philosopher John Lockeand Aquinas and explicitly well established as thepoint of division from the mother country atleast fourteen years before the "shot heard'round the world."

Many students of political history areinclined to qualify the American Revolution asprimarily a war for independence and not trulyrevolutionary in the fuller sense of that concept.This argument stems from the historic fact that,as revolutions go, the American variety, whilestill a violent civil war, was not roiled by thesocial cataclysm and economic upheaval charac-teristic of more-radical events in other countries.What happened in Russia (1917) and France(1789-1799), the argument correctly asserts, didnot occur in America. There was no extensivesocial rearrangement among the classes, no eco-nomic reinvention, no workers' revolt, no redis-tribution or abolition of property, no abolitionof religion or destruction of an establishedchurch, no revolutionary "justice," no new calen-dar, no cult of personality, no reeducationcamps—in sum, no millennial aspirations.Indeed, after all the smoke cleared, institutional-ized oppression remained, most notably in thelamentable and shameful preservation of slaveryeven after several thousand African Americansbravely joined their white comrades in the mili-tary. Socially and economically, the war pro-duced independence but not revolution, or sothe argument maintains.

THEY ARE ONLYAMUSING THEMSELVES

In 1802 author WmMngton fating pt0»ad Ms m&ugms on the "tomrson" after attending a theater in New York City:

As I entered the house* some time before the cur-tain rose, I had sufficient tefewe to make some observa-tions* I was much amused with the waggery and humorof the gallery, which, by the way, is kept in excellentorder by the constables who are stationed there. Thenoise in this part of the house is somewhat similar to thatwhich prevailed in Noatf s ark; for we have an Imitation ofthe whistles and yrtte of every kind of animal—This, insome measure, compensates for the want of music, (asthe gentleman of oyr orchestra are very economic oftheir favors). Somehow or another the anger of the godsseemed to be aroused ail of a sudden, and they com-menced a discharge of apples, nuts, and gingerbread,on the heads of the honest folks in the pit, who had nopossibility of retreating from this new kind of thunder*bolts, i can't say but I was a little irritated at being salutedaside of my head with a roten pippin, and was going toshake my cane at them; but was prevented by a decent-looking man behind me, who informed me it was uselessto threaten or expostulate. They are only amming them-selves a little at our expense, said he, sit down quietlyand bend your back to it. My kind neighbor was inter-rupted by a hard green apple that hit him between theshoulders—he made a wry face, but knowing it was ail injoke, bore the blow like a philosopher. I soon saw thewisdom of this determination,—a stray thunder-bolt hap-pened to light on the head of a little sharp-faced French-man, dress'd in a white coat and small cock'd hat, whosat two or three benches ahead of me, and seemed tobe an Irritable little animal: Monsieur was terribly exas-perated; he jumped upon hte seat, shook his fist at thegallery, and swore violently In bad English, This was allnuts to his merry persecutors, their attention was whollyturned on him, and he formed their target tor the rest ofthe evening.

Source:, Washington Irving, Letters of Jonathan Oidstyle, Gent.;Salmagundi: Or, The WMm* Whanm and Opinions of Launc&lofLangstaff, Esq. & Others, edited by Bruce I Granger and MarthaHmtzog (Bosfon: Jtomytw, W77).

If revolution is to be understood only interms of social and economic upheaval, thenwhat happened in eighteenth-century Americawas not a revolution. Additionally, if one adheresscrupulously to these criteria, then what hap-pened in twentieth-century Germany was revolu-tionary. For if sudden and dramatic social andeconomic transformation are the only legitimatestandards that one is allowed to consider inassessing revolutions, then the stunning and will-ful ascent of the Nazi Party in Germany in the1920s and 1930s is the real thing, while the

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 259

American assertion of the right to limitedself-government in the name of higher principlesis not. The former immediately and utterlymutated German society at every level, while thelatter merely affirmed the elusive and eternalprinciple of natural law and right as the onlylegitimate basis for political power.

If one is not so confined in defining revolu-tion, it is in this affirmation of natural law andright that one finds America to be a revolutionarysociety. Perhaps it is in the appeal to higher princi-ples over and beyond interest and utility thatmakes the American Revolution more radicalthan revolutions enmeshed in the dense matrix ofsocial structure and economic necessity. Early-nineteenth-century French writer and politicianAlexis de Tocqueville once famously remarked onthe comparative equality of conditions alreadypresent in late colonial America (slavery notwith-standing), a quality of society that owed its exis-tence to the lack of residual feudal structures andthe seeming abundance of apparently open land.While disparity in wealth was a feature of Ameri-can society both before and after the Revolution,barriers between the rich and poor were not asinsurmountable as in Europe, and wealth as awhole was far more fluid than in any society atthat time. While it cannot be denied that eco-nomic conditions and social status influencenearly every political act, noble or ignoble, revolu-tionary or otherwise, it was primarily a revolution-ary principle and not material exigency or classenmity that drove the colonists to revolt.

The issues that divided Patriots from Loyal-ists in the decades in question involved acts ofParliament that held financial consequences forthe colonists, but those results were not onerous.Writs of assistance, while obnoxious, were notburdensome on honest merchants and were anunderstandable, albeit clumsy, measure on behalfof desperate officials addressing an illegal drainon revenue. Levies and duties imposed on colo-nial merchants were often lighter than those inEngland. As nineteenth-century English histo-rian Lord Acton observed, the price of tea wascheaper in Boston than it was in Bristol; indeed,this price seemed a reasonable one to pay forbooting the French out of North America. TheBritish colonies in America were prosperous andsecure, in large part the result of the efforts ofthe British Army and Navy and of Parliament'slong-standing practice of allowing the colonistsbroad latitude in managing their own publicaffairs. From an economic and social perspective,there was no need for dramatic social and eco-nomic reformation, revolutionary or otherwise.In fact, it was against the interest of the coloniesto break from the safety of the world's wealthiestand most powerful empire. The revolutionaryprinciple of right, however, not the exigent

demands of interest, moved the colonists torebel. This event was a monumental turn in thepolitical history of the world, one that mademanifest the moral ideas of government based onthe essence of freedom rather than the require-ments of force. As Acton concluded while mus-ing over the Boston Tea Party (1773), it

was the mild beginning of the greatest Revolu-tion that had ever broken out among civilizedmen. The dispute had been reduced to its sim-plest expression, and had become a mere ques-tion of principle. The argument from theCharters, the argument from the Constitu-tion, was discarded. The case was fought outon the ground of the Law of Nature, moreproperly speaking, of Divine Right. On thatevening of 16th of December 1773, it became,for the first time, the reigning force in His-tory. By the rules of right, which had beenobeyed till then, England had the better cause.By the principle which was then inaugurated,England was in the wrong, and the futurebelonged to the colonies.

While the Revolution responded to a varietyof issues, in brief, the revolutionary principles thatmotivated the Americans involve three generalclaims: that there is a law of nature that transcendsand governs all legitimate political and legal insti-tutions; attached to this law of nature are "certaininalienable rights" of the individual that cannotbe abridged or denied by any government; andthat all legitimate government rests on some formof consent, which, when drawn to its logical con-clusion, means that the sovereign power ulti-mately rests in the people themselves whileremaining limited by the law of nature and thefact of natural rights. The colonists resolved towithdraw from their association with the Crownand to establish a new order based on thesetruths. It was not the actual burden of paying newtaxes that nettled the colonists; it was the appall-ing fact that they were being taxed without theirconsent. Britain's Parliamentary government wasrooted in the custom of "virtual representation,"linking subjects to their representatives by virtueof national affiliation. Members of Parliamentrepresented all subjects of the Crown on thegrounds that they were all common associateswithin the same polity. Representation was acci-dental; it was a function of circumstance, justifiedon common sociohistoric grounds with no appealto objective, transcultural principle, and there wasno deliberate choice made by free citizens. Thecolonists viewed representation differently. Theyagreed that representatives were advocates of theirconstituents' interests, but they argued for freeelection conducted locally and based upon a set ofcriteria distinct from mere social membership.Representatives, from the colonists' perspective,were deputies conveying popular will and operat-ing under the governing concept that they wereagents chosen by a consenting electorate. This

260 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

principle is objectively situated beyond the his-toric community and is grounded upon anabstract concept, that government is legitimateonly when the people explicitly consent to itsinstitutions, dynamics, and offices and activelyparticipate in some fashion in the selection ofthose commissioned to govern. Hence, the con-textual claim of virtual representation is sup-planted with the more radical and revolutionaryassertion that representation can only be properlyso called when it is removed from the accidents ofpassive membership and rooted in substantivedirect consent. Thus, the revolutionary clarionproclaims "No taxation without representation."What had been previously expressed by Locke anddeveloped by eighteenth-century English Whigs,the direct forerunners to the American revolution-aries, was now a principle applied by a segment ofthe British polity who radicalized the debate overrepresentation by insisting that they were not sim-ply deferential subjects of the Crown but that theywere consenting citizens of the realm. Those who"virtually" represented them in Parliament ren-dered representation unreal.

The colonists, therefore, could not consentto the admittedly modest Stamp Act (1765) levies,and it is this lack of consent that was the point ofprinciple from which the Americans drew theirobjections to Parliament's actions. The amount oftaxes and duties imposed in the 1760s and 1770swas incidental. Government by official flat—whether mild, moderate, or severe—was deemed inall cases to be intolerable; government by consentof the governed was expected. "No created beingcan rightfully contest" the natural liberties of theindividual, and no created being can govern con-trary to the liberties of its citizens.

Above all, what is truly revolutionary aboutthe American Revolution stems from its meta-physical underpinnings, namely, that sovereignpower is always subordinate to the principles ofnatural law, and that these principles are fixed tothe attendant notion that natural rights inhere inall persons by virtue of their humanity. This asser-tion was not simply a rhetorical flourish conceal-ing more mundane motivations; rather, it flowsfrom comprehension of and adherence to an eter-nal verity. Granted, no one can read the hearts ofothers, past or present, and it may be that a goodnumber of revolutionaries cynically employed thelanguage of Locke and the Whigs for their ownselfish purposes. The language was important,however; the first two paragraphs of the Declara-tion of Independence (1776) deliberately provideits most forthright and eloquent expression. Ifone removes those paragraphs, one still has a pow-erful indictment of King George III and his min-isters. From the beginning Jefferson and hisassociates saw fit to explain that all government isbased on consent, asserted by individuals who are

unqualifiedly created equal, and instituted for thesole purpose of guaranteeing the protection of theinalienable rights of free, equal, consenting indi-viduals. General search warrants, regardless of thecircumstances; taxation without valid representa-tion, regardless of the monetary percentage; andall of the many grievances enumerated in the Dec-laration are intolerable not simply because theyviolate English law and inconvenience the colo-nists, but because they are in violation of thosehigher principles of natural law and right. It wasnot "bread and peace" that was promised by theSons of Liberty, for the colonists had both inample supply, but rather their insistence upon theuniversal truth that no government holds title tothe natural rights of its charges. Nothing can bemore revolutionary than this simple fact, andmore dangerous to the minions of government byforce, however benign or despotic that forcemight be.

Great revolutions vary from age to age: someare propelled by necessity, others are undertakenonly because of an idea—still others combineboth. Those revolutions that endure and resonatewith greatest power are the ones that are driven bytranscendent principles that exist prior to anymaterial or social condition or contingency. Theyspeak to human beings simply as human beings. Arevolution that is about more than material neces-sity and interest is a revolution undertaken by thefree and for the sake of freedom itself. Otis under-stood this fact during the faint, initial murmurs ofthe American Revolution. That quintessential rad-ical Thomas Paine understood the magnitude ofthis concept when speaking of America as liberty'slast true asylum. The perceptions of the actorswho were immersed in the events cannot be dis-missed—they comprehended their own struggle inenduring, transcendent terms. The social and eco-nomic ramifications remain in dispute, and per-haps that is as it should be. In that which is mostinnovative and influential, the ideas and principlesthemselves, the answer is clear: the Americanstruggle for liberty was and remains revolutionary.

-SCOTT JOHN HAMMOND,JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. The American Revolution was aconservative movement intended topreserve the existing social,political, and economic order.

Assessing the impact of the American Revo-lution (1775-1783) proves to be dangerous, foran event of that magnitude inevitably presents a

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 261

multifaceted history, whether in its origins,implementation, or outcome. Any evaluation ofthe consequences of the revolution depends notonly upon the absolute changes that occurred asa result of independence but also upon an under-standing of the colonial period under Britishrule as a comparative backdrop. Additionally,consideration may be accorded other principalrevolutions of the modern era in assessing thesignificance of the American Revolution. Eventhe application of the term revolution to describethe American matter may be questioned. Opin-ions may vary, but the American Revolution wasa conservative affair.

In their Declaration of Independence(1776), the Americans were inadvertent revolu-tionaries. Indeed, revolution, as the word enteredthe lexicon of early modern Europe, referred tothe natural sciences, specifically to the regularmovement of heavenly bodies that seeminglyrevolved in the skies. Applied metaphorically tothe concerns of mankind, revolution denotedthe irresistible movement of governments, even-tually coming to signify the restoration of gov-ernments once lost. Hence, the GloriousRevolution (1688), the event through which theterm revolution assumed its current place in thelanguage, represented the restoration of monar-chical rule as known by the English before thetyranny and Catholicism of King James II. Intheir Revolution almost a century later theAmericans sought to restore or "revolve back"their polities to the earlier purity of the Englishgovernmental system that had become cor-rupted under the Hanoverians.

Although the American Revolution appearseminently modern because it brought forth anew nation, the revolutionaries initially had notsought a break with Great Britain. As BenjaminFranklin later wrote, "I never had heard in anyConversation from any Person drunk or sober,the least Expression of a wish for a Separation,or Hint that such a Thing would be advanta-geous to America." In fact, during the eighteenthcentury an increasing Anglicization of the colo-nies occurred as Americans looked to theirmother country for appropriate norms of behav-ior—political, cultural, and otherwise. Powerfulmimetic impulses were at work, and at the timeof the Revolution, England "remained the onlycommon denominator among Americans, whoin other respects differed from each other farmore radically than they differed from GreatBritain," according to historian John M. Murrin.Even for many revolutionaries, the break withEngland was a profoundly unsettling event, withpsychologically traumatic consequences for mensuch as Landon Carter of Virginia.

The Revolution, then, hardly represented anoutpouring of nationalistic spirit. In the vote on

the resolution for independence in the Conti-nental Congress many of the delegates displayeda decided lack of enthusiasm for their enterprise.Ultimately, the decision for independence hingedon technical, legal issues about the nature of theBritish constitution and about the relationshipbetween the Crown and its subjects. The firstcouple of paragraphs of the Declaration of Inde-pendence (1776) contain Thomas Jefferson'sphilosophic musings that were designed toassuage foreign potentates and bolster the cour-age of the revolutionaries at home. Even then,the Virginian's assertion that "all men are cre-ated equal" embodied connotations of a legalnature quite different from those that the phraselater assumed. Jefferson not only borrowedtwo-thirds of the phrase "life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness" from other intellectualsbut also surely subsumed property in his unspec-ified rights in the Declaration, if indeed the rightto property was not part of pursuing happiness.

Beyond the Preamble of the Declaration ofIndependence, Jefferson revealed his profes-sional calling as a lawyer in the remainder of thedocument when, in effect, he directed a legalbrief against George III. After contending thatthe King tyrannized his subjects, Jefferson sup-ported his accusation by leveling several specificcharges against the monarch, all of whichtogether constituted the bulk of the Declara-tion and that part of the document that was socritical at the time when the Continental Con-gress hoped to appeal broadly to Americans forsupport and to unify them in their quest forindependence. In sum, Americans had beenforced to defend their British heritage, whichhad been corrupted by George III, Lord Fred-erick North, and Parliament. The colonialsfought to preserve or restore their rights andtheir liberties, as opposed to seeking that whichthey did not possess.

Thus, the American Revolution evolved as acolonial war of liberation. Circumstances forcedAmericans to seek self-determination. The conge-ries of English colonies by definition constitutedan unstable society, subject to external interven-tion and often negative interference, largely forthe benefit of the mother country, as might beexpected in a mercantilist empire. Yet, by 1763virtually all the colonies had achieved a sufficientmaturity in their political, economic, and socialinstitutions that they might stand alone. All theyrequired was a catalyst to drive them from theirmother country, and England obliged. Follow-ing years of unavailing appeals for redress ofgrievances, the decision to seek independencewas reluctantly made in 1776. Colonials wouldhave agreed with Herbert Aptheker, the eminentMarxist historian, who later wrote, "the right of

262 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

self-determination . . . lay at the heart of this rev-olutionary effort."

Indeed, securing the right of self-determinationlooms large when assessing the Revolution, formajor changes occasioned by independence werefew. True, by the end of the eighteenth centurythe states had shed their few trappings of Euro-pean feudalism—primogeniture, entail, and qui-trents—but none of those institutions had greatlyaffected the colonial scene. Primogeniture andentail might have achieved some significance inthe socioeconomic order of Rhode Island, NewYork, and the Southern colonies, but there andelsewhere the abandonment of those protectionsfor estates went largely unnoticed. Quitrents werecollected with a modicum of success in royal Vir-ginia and proprietary Maryland, and to less advan-tage to the Crown in South Carolina. Therenunciation of quitrents little altered the course oftaxation in post-Revolutionary America.

The institutional structure of religionchanged but slightly, with the exception of thedisestablishment of the Church of England,which became the Protestant Episcopal Church.Yet, other than in Virginia and South Carolina,the establishment had rested lightly upon thecolonial populace. Georgia contained only twoAnglican churches in 1769. Moreover, the Con-gregational Church continued its establishmentin Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hamp-shire well into the nineteenth century. The Epis-copal, Presbyterian, and Methodist churchesestablished separate American identities after thewar, though the last had just barely gained a foot-hold in the colonies before the Revolution. Theindependence of the Congregationalists, Bap-tists, and Society of Friends (or Quakers) inAmerica occasioned little difference in theirchurch polities after the Revolution.

The status of minorities changed little fol-lowing the Revolution. An occasional woman—"Molly Pitcher" (Mary Ludwig Hays of New Jer-sey) or "Robert Shurtleff' (Deborah Sampson ofMassachusetts)—found indirect or devious meansto serve in the military, but such actions werehighly irregular. Many others were forced toassume a more public role in life by taking overfarms or small businesses as male members of thefamily saw action in the Continental Army, inthe state militias, or in partisan bands. Mostwomen, however, returned to their traditionaldomestic sphere as the war concluded and themen came back home. The revolutionary stateconstitution of New Jersey allowed women tovote, but that inadvertent, anomalous loopholewas closed in 1807. While the revolutionary fer-vor might have spawned the notion that womenwere entrusted with preserving and transmittingthe new nation's republican conscience, historian

Mary Beth Norton admits that the "role of therepublican mother was limited."

In fact, women's rights made little headwayin the aftermath of the Revolution. AbigailAdams had written to husband John before thewar, "By the way, in the new code of laws whichI suppose it will be necessary for you to make, Idesire you would remember the ladies and bemore generous and favorable to them than yourancestors." John responded, "Depend on it, weknow better than to repeal our masculine sys-tems." Adding to the determination of JohnAdams was the growing influence in the UnitedStates of the English jurist William Blackstone,whose popularity helped confirm male domina-tion. Many years passed before the Seneca FallsConvention (1848) declared the equality of menand women, and many more were needed tomake that contention a reality.

Ostensibly, the Revolution marked thebeginning of the end of slavery in the Northernstates. Yet, only Vermont, with a handful ofslaves, abolished the institution through organiclaw. In other states opponents of slavery struggledmightily to realize even gradual-emancipation legis-lation, and then the results were problematic.Despite Pennsylvania's famous Abolition Act(1780), slaves remained in the state until the late1840s. New Jersey's law in 1804 had little imme-diate impact. New York in 1827 finally liberatedslaves born in the eighteenth century. Revolu-tionary egalitarian philosophy dislodged bond-age slowly, and only in those areas where slaveswere few.

The institution remained firmly fastenedupon the South. Slave owners such as PatrickHenry and Jefferson occasionally released theirbondsmen, but usually only in their wills. AsHenry noted, he did not know how he could sur-vive in his lifetime without his slaves. Many ofJefferson's slaves had to be sold to satisfy hiscreditors. The bonded population in the Southrose rapidly even without the benefit of legalimmigration, spread westward as the nationexpanded, and received the cachet of the govern-ment via "popular sovereignty" and the DredScott decision (1857). Rather than set the stagefor the abolitionist crusade of the nineteenthcentury, the American revolutionaries, by theirfailure to take decisive action against slavery,brought forth the national cataclysm of the CivilWar (1861-1865).

Other marginalized groups in society foundlittle comfort in the aftermath of the Revolu-tion. The status of indentured servants remainedunaltered by the war. Free African Americans,whose small numbers increased rapidly after theRevolution, not only feared enslavement byunscrupulous whites but also saw their rightsincreasingly circumscribed by legislation. Native

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 263

Colonials erecting aLiberty Pole; engraving

by John McRae, 1820(Library of Congress,

Washington, D.C.)

Americans suffered as well. After devastating theCherokee in a military campaign in 1776-1777,white militia returned in 1780-1781 to deliver acrushing blow to the natives living in the moun-tains of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Vir-ginia. Historian James H. O'Donnell IIIconcluded, "In many ways, the Cherokee Trailof Tears had its beginnings during the period ofthe American Revolution."

From the standpoint of the colonial econ-omy the Revolution had a noticeably disruptiveimpact. The dynamic, capitalistic spirit, so evi-dent in the United States after the war, antedatedthe conflict—whether in fishing, whaling, ship-ping, and small manufacturing in New England;finance and shipping in the middle region; orcommercial agricultural operations in the South.All states, however, suffered from wartime mili-tary incursions, the loss of British markets andprotectionism, and the attempt to reorganize theeconomy at home and develop new avenues oftrade abroad. Especially hard hit was the exportsector that probably accounted for the prepon-derance of economic growth and expansion ofthe colonies and the states. As a result of theRevolution, per capita income in the UnitedStates declined drastically and might not havereached prewar levels until the beginning of thenineteenth century.

Politically, the postrevolutionary landscaperesembled that of the colonial era. According toRobert E. Brown, early Massachusetts evinced a

middle-class society in which property was eas-ily acquired and so broadly distributed thatmost adult males qualified for the franchise.Economic opportunity thus contributed topolitical democracy, a circumstance unchangedby the Revolution and even confirmed by theMassachusetts state constitution of 1780. Theliberality of the suffrage led Brown to conclude,"In many respects, the people of Massachusettshad a government more responsive to the popu-lar will than we have at the present time." Thepolitical inclusiveness and widespread supportfor the Revolution that characterized Massachu-setts, and also obtained in Virginia, in the esti-mation of Robert E. Brown and B. KatherineBrown, led them to the conclusion that theRevolution was fought to preserve a democraticsocial order.

Beyond local politics, the colonies becamestates that in turn created a national govern-ment based on the Articles of Confederation(1781). By their constitutions the states soughtto confirm the basic political precepts of thecolonies before the Revolution, including theprimacy of the lower house of the legislature,representative government, and the protectionof fundamental English rights. The Articles ofConfederation, which bore some passing resem-blance to the rejected Albany Plan (1754), pro-vided for the weakest of national unions,leaving the states mostly independent andenjoying an equality with one another in the

264 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

national legislature, circumstances not greatlydifferent from the pre-Revolutionary era.

Whether politically or otherwise, the fail-ure of the American Revolution to producemeaningful change other than independence ledto a conservatism that contrasted sharply withother modern revolutions, particularly theFrench Revolution (1789-1799). The FrenchRevolution, not the American, set the worldaflame, imbuing the word revolution with itspresent connotations and overtones. The restrictedimpact of the American Revolution, stemmingfrom its innate conservatism, proceeded from itslimited objective—self-determination, or the fulfill-ment of society, not its destruction. The Revolu-tion produced a Declaration of Independence,not a Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citi-zen (1789). Americans, in the words of early-nineteenth-century French writer and politicianAlexis de Tocqueville, were "born free." Theydid not have to battle an ancien regime with itsaristocracy, national army, and national church,such as found in France. Thus, wrote Aptheker,the American Revolution did not have the "pro-foundly transforming quality that more basicallysocial ones have," such as the anti-feudal Englishand French upheavals and the anticapitalisticrevolutions of the twentieth century.

The American Revolution resulted inchanges, of course. Principal among them wasindependence, but overall the tenor wasrestrained. Institutional life required no basicalterations. Colonials sought to retain theirEnglish legal rights, which explains the currentattachment in the United States to British tradi-tions such as trial by jury, due process, right ofpetition, and narrow definition of treason. Theproduct of circumstances and limited objectives,the American Revolution, so initially successful,failed to lead to a revolutionary tradition as inFrance. Although they became "symbols of aworld revolution, the Americans were not intruth world revolutionaries," claimed historianLouis Hartz. The American Revolution was aconservative revolution.

-ALAN WATSON, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHCAROLINA AT WILMINGTON

References

John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, SelectedWritings of Lord Acton, volume 1, Essays inthe History of Liberty, edited by J. RufusFears (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985).

John Adams, Works of John Adams: Second Presi-dent of the United States, volume 2 (Boston:Little, Brown, 1850).

Adams and Abigail Adams, Familiar Letters ofJohn Adams and His Wife Abigail Adams,During the Revolution, edited by CharlesFrancis Adams (New York: Hurd & Hough-ton, 1875).

Herbert Aptheker, The American Revolution,1763-1783; A History of the American People:An Interpretation (New York: InternationalPublishers, 1960).

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York:Viking, 1963).

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of theAmerican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1967).

Thomas C. Barrow, "The American Revolutionas a Colonial War for Independence," Wil-liam &Mary Quarterly, third series 25 (July1968): 452-464.

Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Poli-tics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1953).

Robert E. Brown, Middle-Class Democracy andthe Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955).

Brown, and B. Katherine Brown, Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy? (East Lan-sing: Michigan State University Press,1964).

Richard Buel, "Democracy and the American Rev-olution: A Frame of Reference," William &Mary Quarterly, 21 (April 1964): 165-190.

Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: TheAmerican Revolution and Political Society inNew Tork, 1760-1790 (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1981).

Douglas R. Egerton, "Black IndependenceStruggles and the Tale of Two Revolutions:A Review Essay," Journal of Southern His-tory, 64 (February 1998): 95-116.

John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro in NorthCarolina, 1790-1860 (Chapel Hill: Univer-sity of North Carolina Press, 1943).

Jack P. Greene, Landon Carter: An Inquiry intothe Personal Values and Social Imperatives ofthe Eighteenth-Century Virginia Gentry (Char-lottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965).

Greene, "Search for Identity: An Interpretationof the Meaning of Selected Patterns ofSocial Response in Eighteenth-CenturyAmerica," Journal of Social History, 3(Spring 1970): 189-220.

Louis Hartz, "American Political Thought andthe American Revolution," American Politi-cal Science Review, 46 (June 1953): 321-342.

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 265

Merrill Jensen, "Democracy and the AmericanRevolution," Huntin0ton Quarterly, 20(August 1957): 321-341.

Cecelia Kenyon, "Republicanism and Radicalismin the American Revolution: An Old Fash-ioned Interpretation," William & MaryQuarterly, third series 19 (1962): 153-182.

Jackson T. Main, "Government by the People:The American Revolution and the Democ-ratization of the Legislatures," William &Mary Quarterly, third series 23 (July 1966):391-407.

Main, "The Results of the American RevolutionReconsidered," Historian, 31 (August1969): 539-554.

Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic,1763-89, revised edition (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1977).

John M. Murrin, "The Legal Transformation:The Bench and Bar in Eighteenth-CenturyMassachusetts," in Colonial America: Essaysin Politics and Social Development, third edi-tion, edited by Stanley N. Katz and Murrin(Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 415-449.

William H. Nelson, "The Revolutionary Charac-ter of the American Revolution," AmericanHistorical Review, 70 (July 1965): 998-1014.

Robert Nisbet, "The Social Impact of the Revo-lution," Wilson Quarterly (Autumn 1976):93-107.

Mary Beth Norton, "The Evolution of WhiteWomen's Experience in Early America,"American Historical Review, 89 (June 1984):593-619.

Norton, Liberty's Daughters: The RevolutionaryExperience of American Women, 1750-1800(Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

James H. O'Donnell III, The Cherokees of NorthCarolina in the American Revolution(Raleigh: North Carolina State UniversityGraphics, 1976).

James Otis, "Against Writs of Assistance," asrecounted by Adams, Constitution Society<http://www.constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm>.

Thomas Paine, The Thomas Paine Reader, editedby Michael Foot and Isaac Kramnick (Har-mondsworth, U.K. & New York: Penguin,1987).

Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: TheOrigin of the American Tradition of PoliticalLiberty (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953).

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and DelbaWinthrop (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 2000).

Thomas G. West, Vindicating the Founders: Race,Sex, Class, and Justice in the Origins of Amer-ica (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,1997).

Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization ofMind in the American Revolution," in TheMoral Foundations of the American Republic,edited by Robert H. Horwitz (Charlottes-ville: University of Virginia Press, 1977).

Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution(New York: Knopf, 1992).

Wood, "The Significance of the American Revo-lution," Journal of the Early Republic, 8(Spring 1988): 1-20.

Alfred F. Young, "How Radical Was the Ameri-can Revolution?" in Beyond the AmericanRevolution: Explorations in the History ofAmerican Radicalism, edited by Young(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press,1993).

266 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION