RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 · RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 This Enclosure is designed to assist the respective company provide HQ SACT with all necessary documents/information required

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46

This Enclosure is designed to assist the respective company provide HQ SACT with all necessary documents/information required. For clarification, please refer to Bidding instructions in part 1 of subject solicitation.

Description of Acquisition

Part 1 Bidding Instructions

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. General 2. Classification 3. Definitions 4. Eligibility 5. Duration of the Contract 6. Exemption of Taxes 7. Amendment or Cancellations 8. Bidder Clarifications 9. Bid Closing Date 10. Bid Validity 11. Contents of Proposal 12. Proposal Submission 13. Late Bid 14. Bid Withdrawal 15. Bid Evaluation 16. Proposal Clarifications 17. Award 18. Communications and Contacts 19. NATO Secret Document Storage 20. Point of Contact ENCLOSURES: 1. SOW

2. Proposal Checklist 3. Address Label 4. Compliance Statement 5. Past Performance 6. Mandatory Price Proposal format

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RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


PART 1 BIDDING INSTRUCTIONS

1. General.

This is a Firm Fixed Price Deliverables contract in accordance HQ SACT General Terms and Conditions. Contract Award is contingent upon funding availability. 2. Classification.

This RFP is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED document.

3. Definitions

(a) The “Prospective Bidder”, shall refer to the entity that has completed and

returned the Enclosure of the transmittal letter of this RFP, and has

indicated thereon its intention without commitment, to participate in this

RFP.

(b) The term “Bidder”, shall refer to the bidding entity that has completed a

bid in response to this RFP.

(c) The term Contractor shall refer to the bidding entity to whom the contract

is awarded.

(d) The term “Contracting Officer” designates the official who executes this

RFP on behalf of HQ SACT.

(e) “Contracting Officer`s Technical Representative” or “COTR” is the official

who is appointed for the purpose of determining compliance of the

successful bid, per the technical specifications.

(f) The term “HQ SACT” shall refer to Supreme Headquarters Allied

Command Transformation.

(g) The term “ACT” shall refer to Allied Commander Transformation.

(h) The term “NATO”, shall refer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

(i) The term “days” as used in this RFP shall, unless otherwise stated, be

interpreted as meaning calendar days.

(j) The term “Habitual Residence”, means HQ SACT, Norfolk, Virginia, VA

23511.

4. Eligibility. This RFP is open to companies:

(a) Established in a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Alliance member

nation.

(b) Working in the required field of study and legally authorised to operate

the United States of America and European Union, at the time of bidding.

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


(c) Has performed the desired past performance including size, cost and

scope, as described in this RFP.

5. Duration of Contract

(a) The contract awarded shall be effective upon date of award.

6. Exemption of taxes. (a) In accordance with the agreements (Article VIII of the Paris Protocol

dated, 25 August 1952) goods and services under this contract are

exempt from taxes, duties and similar charges.

7. Amendment or Cancellation.

(a) HQ SACT reserves the right to amend or delete any one or more of the

terms, conditions or provisions of the RFP prior to the date set for bid

closing. A solicitation amendment or amendments shall announce such

action.

(b) HQ SACT reserves the right to cancel, at any time, this RFP either

partially of in its entirety. No legal liability on the part of HQ SACT shall be

considered for recovery of costs in connection to bid preparation. All efforts

undertaken by any bidder shall be done considering and accepting, that no

costs shall be recovered from HQ SACT. If this RFP is cancelled any/all

received bids shall be returned unopened, per the bidder’s request.

8. Bidder Clarifications.

(a) Prospective Bidders should seek clarification at their earliest

convenience. Any explanation regarding the meaning or interpretation of

this RFP, terms, clause, provision or specifications, shall be requested in

writing, from the Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer must receive

such requests for clarification no later than 24 August 2016.

(b) Information in response to a request for clarification to a prospective

bidder shall be furnished to all prospective bidders as a Question and

Answer amendment. All such amendments shall be incorporated into this

RFP. Oral Interpretations shall not be binding.

9. Bid closing date.

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


(a) Bids shall be received at HQ SACT, Purchasing and Contracting Office,

no later than 2 September 2016, 1500 hours, Eastern Standard Time,

Norfolk, Virginia, USA. No bids shall be accepted after this time and date.

10. Bid Validity.

(a) Bids shall be remain valid for a period of one hundred and twenty days

(120) form the applicable closing date set forth within this RFP. HQ

SACT reserves the right to request an extension of validity. Bidder shall

be entitled to either grant or deny this extension of validity; HQ SACT

shall automatically consider a denial to extend the validity as a

withdrawal of the bid.

11. Content of Proposal.

The proposal shall consist of 5 copies the following minimum paper documents with the exception of the price proposal which is required in one copy only. Additionally electronic copies of the documents are required with the exception of the price proposal no later than 2 September 2016, 1500 hours, Eastern Standard Time, Norfolk, Virginia, USA.

(a) A table of contents for the entire proposal (See checklist provided as Enclosure # 2); (b) The bidders full name address, Point of Contacts, Telephone, Fax number and Internet site, (See Enclosure 3); (c) Compliance statement (See Enclosure # 4); (d) Provision of administrative, and technical volumes including scoring criteria, (See Annex A to Statement of work). (e) Past performance (See Enclosure #5 ) (f) Company Price proposal, including (Enclosure # 6) (g) An e-mail a single PDF electronic copy of all documentation as requested above. (Note, there is not a price proposal included) (h) Appropriate technical and financial information to determine whether proposed services, terms and conditions comply with all the requirements of this RFP.

12. Proposal Submission.

(a) Proposals shall be submitted in a single package containing two volumes,

Technical volume and Price volume, each separately sealed. The single

package shall be clearly marked with the mailing label, citing the RFP

Solicitation reference number, (See Enclosure #3). Within the single package

shall be the Technical and Price volumes, separately packaged and identified.

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


(b) An electronic copy of the technical proposal, not to include the Price volume is

required to the assigned Contracting Officer, prior to the established bid closing

date.

(c) Proposal packages may be made by mail, courier or hand carried.

(d) Proposal packages must be delivered to the HQ SACT via a verifiable method

or be handed to a member of the BUDFIN/Purchasing staff, who shall endorse

the package with a time date and delivery official shall counter sign, as to the

accuracy of the recording.

(e) Price proposals shall be in U S Dollar currency.

(f) Prices shall be on a Firm Fixed Price Basis. Price volumes shall include any

relevant discount schedule.

(g) It is the sole responsibility of the interested company to review any Q & A that

may be issued in support of this solicitation, prior to bid submission.

(h) No oral bids or oral modifications or telephonic bids shall be considered.

(i) It is the ultimate responsibility prior to submission that all proposal submissions

are reviewed to ensure they meet the technical and administrative

specifications and that offers meet the limitations and expressed conditions.

13. Late Proposals.

(a) It is solely the bidder`s responsibility that every effort is made to ensure that

the proposal reaches HQ SACT prior to the established closing date and

time. All late bids shall be returned to the offering company unopened. Only

if it can be unequivocally demonstrated that the late arrival of the bid

package was the result of NATO staff negligence (mishandling) shall the bid

be considered.

(b) A delay in a commercial courier service does not constitute a delay by NATO

or government channels.

14. Bid Withdrawal.

(a) A bidder may withdraw their bid up to the date and time specified for bid

closing. Such a withdrawal must be completed in writing or facsimile, with

attention to the HQ SACT Contracting Officer. The proposal shall be returned

unopened, at the expense of the company.

15. Bid Evaluation.

Bid Evaluation.

(a) The evaluation of bids and determination as to the responsiveness and

technical adequacy or technical compliance, of the products or services

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


requested, shall be the responsibility of HQ SACT. Such determinations

shall be consistent with the evaluation criteria specified in the RFP. HQ

SACT is not responsible for any content that is not clearly identified in any

proposal package.

(b) Proposals shall be evaluated and awarded based on best overall value to

NATO. The following factors are considerations;

Successful administrative submission of bid packages and requested

Enclosures 2-6, as listed in this RFP. (Pass/Fail).

Technical factors/pricing factors rated 50/50

Acceptance of HQ SACT General Terms and Conditions.

16. Proposal Clarifications. (a) During the entire evaluation process HQ SACT reserves the right to

discuss any bid with the order to clarify what is offered and interpretation of language within the bid, to resolve in potential areas of non-compliance.

17. Award.

HQ SACT intends to award a firm fixed price contract to the Contractor that represents the best overall value to NATO. HQ SACT will collect information from references provided by the Offeror in regard to its past performance. The Offeror must provide the information requested for performance risk evaluation, or affirmatively state that it possesses no directly related or similar past performance. Firms lacking relevant past performance shall receive an “unknown” evaluation for performance risk. HQ SACT reserves the right to negotiate minor deviations to the listed

General Terms and Conditions to this RFP. 18. Communications.

(a) All communication related to this RFP, between a prospective bidder and

HQ SACT shall be only be through the nominated HQ SACT Contracting

Officer. Designated contracting staff shall assist the HQ SACT

Contracting Officer in the administrative process. There shall be no

contact with other HQ SACT personnel in regards to this RFP. Such

adherence shall ensure Fair and Open Competition with equal

consideration and competitive footing leverage to all interested parties.

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19. Point of Contact is; Tonya Bonilla, Contracting Officer 757-747-3575 [email protected] Or Catherine Giglio, R&D Contracting Officer 757-747-3856 [email protected]

All correspondence shall be forward to;

HQ SACT, BUDFIN BRANCH Purchasing & Contracting, Contracting Officer RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 ATTN. Tonya Bonilla [email protected] 7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100,

Norfolk, VA, U.S.A.

mailto:[email protected]



RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


Enclosure 2

PROPOSAL CONTENT / CHECKLIST

Table of Contents Bidder`s name, address, POC, Contact numbers, email address. Compliance Statement. Past performance (including References). List of Key personnel. Technical Proposal. Price Proposal. Mailing label.

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46

This Enclosure is designed to assist the respective company provide HQ SACT with all necessary documents/information required. For clarification, please refer to Bidding instructions in part 1 of subject solicitation. Page 11

Enclosure 3 (The label below is to be completed by the bidder and affixed to the exterior envelope; parcel or package mailed or deliver to ACT)

SEALED BID TO RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 (To be opened by Contract Awards Committee (CAC Only)

Sender: ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ HQ SACT RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 Attn: Tonya Bonilla 7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100, Norfolk, VA 23551-2490 U.S.A

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46

Bidder’s proposal must be based on full compliance with the terms, conditions and requirements of the IFIB and all future clarifications and/or amendments. The bidder may offer variations in specific implementation and operational details provided that the functional and performance requirements are fully satisfied. In case of conflict between the compliance statement and the detailed evidence or explanation furnished, the detailed evidence/comments shall take precedence/priority for the actual determination of compliance. Minor or non substantial deviations may be accepted. Substantial changes shall be considered non responsive. Page 12

Enclosure 4 COMPLIANCE STATEMENT TO SEALED BID RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 It is hereby stated that our company has read and understands all documentation issued as part of RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46. Our company proposal submitted in response to the referenced solicitation is fully compliant with the provisions of RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46, and the intended contract with the following exception(s); such exemptions are considered non substantial to the HQ SACT solicitation provisions issued.

Clause Description of Minor Deviation. ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------

(If applicable, add another page)

Company: __________________ Signature: ________________________ Name & Title: ________________ Date: _________________________ Company Bid Reference: ______________________________________________

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46


Enclosure 5

PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FORM

PAST PERFORMANCE DATA

Contracting Agency:

____________________________________________________________________________

(b) Contract No:

____________________________________________________________________________

(c) Type of Contract (Firm Fixed Price, IDIQ, Requirements):

____________________________________________________________________________

(d) Title of Contract:

____________________________________________________________________________

(e) Description of Work Performance and Relevance to Current Acquisition (Type of

facility, capacity, estimated patronage, summary of staff used):

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

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____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

(f) Contract Dollar Amount:

____________________________________________________________________________

(g) Period of Performance:

____________________________________________________________________________

(h) Name, Address, Fax and Telephone No. of Reference:

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

(i) Indicate Whether Reference Acted as Prime or Sub-contractor:

____________________________________________________________________________

(j) Comments regarding compliance with contract terms and conditions:

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

(k) Complete Contact Information for client:

____________________________________________________________________________

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____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

(l) Permission to contact client for reference: Yes/ No ________________________________ _____________________________________________ Name/Signature of Authorized Company Official

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RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 Developing a Proof of Concept Digital Game for Training in NATO Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict

Enclosure 6

RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 SEALED BID PRICE PROPOSAL

COMPANY NAME: ABC, Inc.

ADDRESS: Street, City, Post code

TO: Chairman of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, (HQ SACT)

Contracts Award Committee. ATTN: Tonya Bonilla 7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100 Norfolk, VA 23551

Proposed rates must be fully “loaded” [G&A, O/H etc.]. Please note it is expected payment will be made upon the successful completion of each Milestone identified below. Travel Costs including transportation, lodging, per diem and miscellaneous expenses should be included in the cost proposal; no additional travel funding will be provided by HQ SACT. SUBJECT: RFP-ACT-SACT-16-46 Sealed Bid Price Proposal Please find on behalf of Insert: Company Name to provide HQ SACT with services (collectively referred as “ITEMS”), subject to the provisions, terms and conditions stated in RFP ACT-SACT-16-46 and the “Insert : Company Name Technical proposal”, submitted in accordance with solicitation provisions. This is provided as a guideline for the minimum requirements of the price proposal. Companies are encouraged to outline price proposals to reflect the requested payment schedule. PP MUST contain a total cost of all elements.

Please verify and acknowledge propriety of above, by duly completing signatures below. Authorizing Company Official: Printed Name: ____________________________ Position: ____________________________ Title: ____________________________ Authorizing Company (Signature): ---------------------------------, Date: -----------------.

Company name Witness Official: Printed Name: ____________________________ Position: ____________________________ Title: ____________________________ Witness Signature: ----------------------------------------------------------, Date ----------

Milestone/Deliverable Unit Cost Total Cost

$ $

Total $ $

Statement of Requirement

for

Developing a

Proof of Concept Digital Game

for

Training in NATO

Rules of Engagement

and the

Law of Armed Conflict

Headquarters

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

7857 Blandy Road

Norfolk, Virginia 23551-2490

United States of America

Statement of Requirement for Developing a Proof of Concept Digital Game for Training In NATO Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict

Introduction 1. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was formally established after the 2002 Prague Summit where a decision was made to reorganise the NATO Command Structure. Prior to this re-arrangement, the two Supreme Commands had a geographical focus (Europe and Atlantic) but now they have a more functional approach: Allied Command Operations focuses on all NATO operations while ACT focuses on the transformation of the Alliance. 2. ACT is the leading agent for change, driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance. Its strategic objectives are to:

a. Provide appropriate support to NATO missions and operations, b. Lead NATO military transformation, and c. Improve relationships and practical cooperation with partners, nations and international organisations.

3. The main role of ACT is promoting transformation and development as continuous and essential drivers for change, to ensure the relevance of the Alliance in a rapidly evolving global security environment. ACT is organised around four principal functions:

a. Strategic thinking, b. Capability development, c. Education, training and exercises, and d. Co-operation and Engagement.

4. To fulfil these functions ACT is comprised of the Norfolk Headquarters (HQ SACT) and three subordinate entities: Joint Warfare Centre (Norway), Joint Force Training Centre (Poland) and Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (Portugal). Moreover, other NATO education and training facilities as well as nationally-run entities (which are not part of the Command Structure) also coordinate their activities with ACT. To carry out these functions ACT has several Divisions, each has a defined set of competences including Capability Development and Joint Force Training. Frequently these divisions partner to produce a product that will enhance NATO as a whole. This Statement of Requirement is for one of those capabilities in the area of education of the Law of Armed Conflict. Definitions 5. The following common definitions for special terms are used for the purpose of this document:

a. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) - is the part of international law relating to the conduct of armed conflict and military occupations, The NATO agreed upon military minimum standards of knowledge for training in the LOAC is contained in STANAG 2449 and Allied Training Publication-2, Training in the Law of Armed Conflict. b. Rules of Engagement (ROE) - are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. The NATO agreed upon military minimum standards of knowledge for training in NATO

Rules of Engagement is contained in STANAG 2597 and Allied Training Publication-4, Training in NATO Rules of Engagement. c. Scenario – the background story that describes the historical, political, military, economic, cultural, humanitarian and legal events, geography, environmental and circumstances that have led to the current situation, d. Environment – an environment is the particular situation that is occurring as it relates to LOAC. For the purposes of this game there will be three environments::

1) Non-international Armed Conflict (NIAC),

2) International Armed Conflict (IAC), and

3) Peacekeeping; Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief; Stability Assistance (PEACE).

e. Game Level – a level in a video game is the total space available to the player during the course of completing a discrete objective. The term "level" can also refer to difficulty level, as in a degree of difficulty, f. Military Strategic Level – the level at which operations by Allied joint forces are directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational or tactical, based on their intended effect or contribution to achieving the stated objectives, g. Tactical Level – the level where individual battles and engagements are fought, h. Operational Level – the level at which campaigns and major operations are designed, planned, conducted, sustained, assessed, and adapted to accomplish strategic goals, i. Operational Planning - the process of linking strategic goals and objectives to tactical goals and objectives into operational plans. It describes milestones, conditions for success and explains how, or what portion of, a strategic plan will be put into operation during a given operational period, j. Event – the activity that sets the scene for a mission, k. Mission – the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason, and l. Teaching Points (TP) – the smallest segment of information that may be imparted as a self-contained unit to a learner.

6. Note that all documents referenced in this SOR are included as enclosures. Background 7. Rules of Engagement (ROE), the Law of Armed Conflict, and national domestic law are interrelated subjects in NATO. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime and operations prior to commencement of an armed conflict, ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led forces to use force. The conduct of military operations is circumscribed by international law, to include the applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict and human rights law. NATO ROE, and the application of them, never permit use of force which violates applicable international law. The NATO standard for training in Rules

of Engagement is contained in Allied Training Publication-4. The armed forces of nations participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must also adhere to their own national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations, which would constitute a breach of their national laws. When national laws are at variance with NATO ROE included in the ROE for an operation, nations must inform the NAC/DPC and the Strategic Commander of any inconsistencies, as early as possible. NATO nations have a responsibility to train their forces to respect and abide by the law of armed conflict, when it is applicable, and by other international conventions and treaties which may affect military operations. 8. Law of armed conflict (LOAC) is also known as the law of war (LOW) or international humanitarian law (IHL). International law governs relations between states. LOAC is the part of international law that governs the conduct of armed conflict. LOAC is a set of rules which seeks, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It defines the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities. For instance, there are rules designed to save combatants from superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. It also aims to protect persons who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities, such as the sick, wounded and shipwrecked, prisoners of war, religious and medical personnel, and civilians. Certain objects such as cultural property, places of worship and hospitals benefit from special protections. The NATO standard for law of armed conflict knowledge is contained in Allied Training Publication-2. Aim 9. This statement of requirement (SOR) seeks to develop a proof of concept digital game to educate law professionals and non-professionals about the LOAC and ROE from a NATO viewpoint. Scope 10. The game will include information commonly used in common NATO command and control processes by all personnel, officers, non-commissioned officers, and personnel requiring specialized LOAC training such as Commanding officers, Flag and General officers, legal advisors, medical personnel, military police, personnel involved in targeting, personnel who handle captured persons, pilots and military religious personnel such as chaplins 11. In general, the game seeks to train all personnel and personnel requiring specialized LOAC training on the NATO Rules of Engagement to the standard contained in Allied Training Publication-4 and the NATO LOAC standards set forth in Allied Training Publication-2 to several different situations and events.

12. This work will build the shell for the complete game but only implement one teaching strand of the game. In other words, only about 10-20% of the game will initially work, the rest will be greyed out with little or no content behind the buttons. Further work is contingent on the level of success of this work and the issuing of another RFP.

13. A SOR is used in this solicitation to provide the maximum flexibility for bidders to propose an innovative and cost effective development approach and solution to meet the stated objectives. This SOR will provide the basic information required, processes commonly used, possible scenarios and advice commonly given and is provided in the RFP in lieu of a Statement of Work. In effect, this SOR attempts to eliminate the ‘how to’ instructions normally found in a SOW while concentrating on developing a creative product.

Type of Contract and Period of Performance 14. This is a Firm Fixed Price Deliverable contract

General Timeline 15. The following is an indicative schedule of deliverables based on the award date. Note that it is permissible for this timeline to be quickened.

m Award (expected) - Sep 16, n Award + 5 days - initial telephone coordination conversation, o Award + 4 weeks - initial design of ROE/LOAC Game, p Award + 12 weeks - ROE/LOAC Game complete, q Award + 13 weeks - ROE/LOAC Game trials/tests complete, and r Note: telephone conversations will be held with the project officer every two weeks.

Target User Audience 16. The target user audience for this game are students needing a refresher, preparing for deployment, or prior to attending the NATO Law of Armed Conflict course.

Scenario 17. A scenario is defined as “the background story that describes the historical, political, military, economic, cultural, humanitarian and legal events, geography, environmental and circumstances that have led to the current situation. The scenario is designed to support training objectives and, like the setting, can be real, fictionalised or synthetic as is appropriate. 18. The NATO scenario “The Crisis in the Baltic Sea Region” will be utilised in developing this prototype. See the enclosure for a brief description. The complete scenario from which excerpts can be made, will be provided to the contract awardee. Game Concept 19. To develop a training game environment in which the LOAC can be synthesized with the planning process required by NATO ROE. The game application will be utilized by NATO personnel prior to deploying or attending NATO training exercises, and during deployment as a Job tool and refresher on LOAC and NATO ROE principles. 20. Three environments will be developed to incorporate the differing legal frameworks that NATO operates under in different emergent situations, such Peacekeeping, Non-International Armed Conflict, and International Armed Conflict. STANAG 2449 requires that all NATO personnel, Non-Commissioned Officers, Officers, and certain specialties including; Flag and General Officers (FOGO), Medical, Military Police, Legal Advisors, persons handling Detainees, and others be trained with specific requirements. The game will fulfill this requirement and the basis for the content and teaching principles of the game. 21. The player will be required to pass the basic Tactical game level first, followed by the appropriate subsequent game levels (NCO/Officer Operational Planning, and Specializations). The ultimate goal is to familiarize NATO forces with the unique requirements of operating within NATO missions. Game Levels of Play 22. The following game levels of play unlock as the player completes the prior game level. The additional game levels are only required by the position and specialization of the player.

s. Tactical – All players (Appendix B of STANAG I),

t. Operational – NCOs and Officers (Appendix C & D of STANAG I respectively), u. Specialties – As appropriate (Appendix E of STANAG I), and v. HQ – Operational Planning Level (Appendix F of STANAG I and STANAG II)

Pathway 23. The following is an example representation of how the pathway could work. However, vendors are free to submit their own ideas. 24. The player enters the game and receives a brief introduction to the game environment (They have been selected for a NATO force in country Estonia). See diagram 1 below.

a. Arriving at the plane terminal, they choose which gate to enter depending on the following scenarios: NIAC, IAC, PEACE (see Scenario below), b. After embarking upon the airliner, they receive an “in flight” training video/storyboard of basic LOAC required by STANAG 2449 2a-b, and STANAG 2597 LO2, c. They then land in-country and receive their mission brief, d. Next they must play at the Tactical level centered on the Base, e. After they complete the Tactical level, they will be required to play at the appropriate subsequent game level entering the appropriate space (medical, legal, FOGO, Detainee, Military Police, Staff, etc.) These may be wings in a building that will unlock after the tactical level is completed, and f. After completing their specialized training, the Headquarters (HQ) will unlock and they may enter the HQ building and play the Operational Planning level.

Diagram 1 Local Scenario 25. There will be a territory map with the airport, base map with buildings which will unlock, and external base terrain including mountain fighting areas, civilian housing (cities and villages), host nation administration buildings, cultural property (museums,

monuments, archeological sites), Public Works (hydroelectric, power, water treatment infrastructure), NGO buildings, civilian property (farms, houses), and roadways. Areas will include Mountains, Land, City, Desert, Country with Towns, and Sea. Specific scenes will include Airport, HQ base, HQ building, city plaza, mountain, town, desert, air space, and sea coast.

Mission 27. The Missions will be developed to highlight the interplay of ROE, Self-Defence, and LOAC throughout the adventure of the mission. The mission will have a scripted storyline that will be incorporate the TPs into the mission through events that the player will encounter after being sent out on Orders. For instance, there will be a new report of a threat to the Cultural Museum which will be injected into the game. The player would be required to respond. This event can be reused at each level, as there are different requirements at the different levels. Teaching Points 28. In order to deliver the content required by the STANAG 2449 (STANAG I) & 2597 (STANAG II) and ATrainP-2 & ATrainP-4, TPs will be set as pillars within the game environment that the player will need to complete prior to moving on to the next event in the storyline. Various events will intertwine several TPs in a dynamic and realistic way that will allow the player to engage with the material. 29. TPs will be delivered via cutaways from the game which will be presented in a dialogue. The dialogue may be a human narrating in a video, a 2D or 3D cartoon, diagrams, text or some other appropriate presentation. An example TP is enclosed. Once the material has been presented, the player will re-enter the game and apply the knowledge to the orders they have, (e.g. to protect a piece of cultural property). This “experiential” learning will allow the player to engage the knowledge and integrate it in a real world learning environment. 30. TPs will be developed from ATrainP-2 and ATrainP-4 and other materials. Sample TPs:

a. FOGO TP (8): Command Responsibility 1) Overall Command Responsibility (CR), 2) CR for integrating the law, 3) Cooperation with civilian authorities, 4) Tactical situation and military necessity, 5) Decision making and orders, and 6) Control of execution.

b. Basic TP (1): Protection & Distinction (STANAG I, Appendix B) 1) Combatant (2c) (cf ATrainP-2 F-27), 2) Protected persons (2d), 3) Protected objects (2e), 4) Protected and distinctive emblems (2f), 5) Means & methods of warfare, including prohibitions under LOAC and applicable national obligations (2g), and

6) Enforcement of LOAC (2h)

a) State Obligations, b) Individual Responsibility, c) Command Responsibility, d) Prevention of LOAC violations (cf. Appendix C 2i (4)), and e) War crimes.

Example Events 31. Example: Command Responsibility – TP is for FOGO to understand responsibility for all troop actions. The following are examples: 32. Event: Troops fire upon and kill a pig farmer. The family makes a claim, posts videos online, and protests occur outside of the HQ, a lawsuit is filed.

a. Subordination to the tactical situation, b. Legal considerations based on NIAC, c. Political Ramifications, d. Means and Methods analysis, e. Proper training of troops, and f. Claims.

33. Choices will be presented as to how to handle the situation that will have consequences that inure to the benefit or detriment of the mission later in the game. 34. Example: Patrol – NATO forces are sent out on a patrol 35. Event: Forces notice a person dressed as a civilian monitoring them and taking videos and making phone calls for several hours.

a. They are presented with different options: ignore, approach, detain, and fire a warning shot. These will be visually displayed as much as possible to avoid text as much as possible. Icons may be used such as a bullhorn, handcuffs, weapon, and red flag coming from a gun, and b. Different scripts are engaged depending on choices made. For instance, if fire a warning shot is selected, weapons appear for a drag and drop choice: a tank, various rifles and pistols, crowd control measures, etc. The player selects the weapon and fires.

36. Consequences from this action will effect later play (chemical weapons violations, civilian claim, news media relations for killing a farmer, etc.). These may inure several events much later in the script. Game Characteristics 39. The following are considered essential characteristics of the game. Any inability to provide the characteristic should be explained in the proposal:

a. Quick engagement. Easy to play, easy to learn, quick success and reward gameplay that quickly introduces and engages the player in the game,

b. Play duration. Normal play is expected to be 30 minutes, c. Media. The available material with which to construct the game will normally be 2D characters, including a player map, briefing room, aircraft and other environment settings as described earlier. The game design may also incorporate other types of media to engage the student e.g. normal game play, animation, a “follow Waldo” type help system, written documents, PowerPoint presentations, etc. d. Superuser. An ability for super users to update content easily e.g. an SDK or superuser tools, e. Dynamic Decision making effect on Play. There is a need for the user choices to effect outcomes in the game down the road, i.e. consequences for the player and game. f. Assessment. There is a need to keep track of scores and whether players complete certain criteria. At the end of the game a certificate will be issued, g. Human in the loop (other than as a player) is not required, h. Faster than real-time play when required e.g. the ability to leap ahead, i. The game must collect biographical information from the student at the beginning to determine name, rank, and unit for the certificate as well as what level needs to be achieved. j. Delivery Requirement. The training game will be downloadable from the NATO Learning Management System (LMS), and run on the users own or company device. It shall be optimized for mobile devices (Smart Phone to Tablet), but also able to run on a standard PC. The game will be required to upload the users score and other metadata back to the NATO LMS, and advise the user when new versions are posted. All images and videos must be imbedded in the application. To do updates, the superuser shall be able to work on a PC as described in the Hardware section of this SOR, and k. Hosting and Support. It is not expected that after the validation there will be a need for content updates from the vendor. The software must be downloadable and easily updated and maintained by a superuser.

The Actual Mission to be modelled 40. The following storyboard describes a sample mission to be modelled. Bidders are not meant to do this work but use the storyboard as an indication of the level of effort required so that financials may be appropriately estimated. 41. Login

a. Player logs in and selects status: b. FOGO (Different Player levels available of Tactical, Operational, Specialty (includes list of Specialties such as Medical, Legal, Detainee, FOGO) c. Scene 1. Player Arrives at briefing site. d. Brief 1

1) This is in a hanger adjacent to the airport and you see duffle bags and weapons on the floor with no seating.

2) Comic Storyboard Conversation Welcoming on-board (10 screenshots back and forth) 3) Receives common group briefing: 4) <<Welcome to LOAC GAME. You are being mobilized as part of your Nations contribution to NATO. You will be working in a diverse multinational force. >> Intact Scenario data from PDPE16-01 Crisis in the Baltic Sea Region paragraphs 1-2, 29-34). 5) Provide Roadmap of game: You will receive a country briefing, and then head to the airport where you will want to be sure to enter the right gate to the proper NATO mission you will be serving in. You will see gates for missions in NIAC, IAC, and Peace-Keeping Operations. Once you board the plane, you will receive mission specific briefing and training on-board your C-130. Be sure to pay attention to the type of mission as this will affect the type of ROE and Host Nation laws that will apply to your actions while in country. Now, off to the airport. >> 6) Now scene opens to tarmac with several gates leading to different C130’s in the background and the other gate choices are visible for other Scenarios: IAC, NIAC, Peace-Keeping: 7) Player chooses gate for NIAC 8) Scene 2

a) Boards airplane: b) You see the airplane and jet bridge/stairs c) Now Player is seated with other seats around and screen in front of seat (nice commercial planes were contracted!)

e. Brief 2:

1) Receives personal briefing on screen: 2) This is cut and pasted from scenario with country history, status of situation, current events, things to be aware of, escalation of site, etc. (30-90 seconds). 3) PDPE16-01 (paragraphs 1-28) as template for scenes 4) <<Lights out, get some rest. We’ll be arriving in 8 hours.>>

f. Scene 3

1) Lands and arrives at airport: 2) First scene is bright white, as desert light blinds upon exit down stairs of plane and stumbles on the last step. Mountains are visible in background and perimeter fence. Helicopter awaiting loads. 3) Overview of camp from the air after passing mountains and towns and large city. This is the first view of the HQ building and base buildings that will be used for play, as well as mountains, desert, coastal waters, cities and towns.

g. Scene 4

1) Arrives on base for briefing: 2) Greeted at helicopter. 3) + FOGO receives appropriate FOGO welcome aboard and ceremony for assumption of command (10 seconds).

h. Scene 5

1) Goes on mission/assumes position on staff: i. Brief 3

1) During the intake brief: 2) <<Welcome aboard, there has been anticipation of the change of responsibility, and we have intelligence of increased activity by insurgents intent to take advantage of the new leadership of the NATO mission. >> PDPE16-01 (paragraph 35-82).

Events 42. Prior to each event play a dialogue storyboard will teach the Teaching Points required for the lesson in several short dialogue back and forth screenshots (think jpeg with dialogue box).

a. Event 1: Statue of National Hero targeted 1) Teaching Point (TP) 1 – Protection of Cultural Property 2) Soldier walks in at end of brief and interrupts: <<There are rumors of an attack on a statue of a historical figure in the central square of the area. >> 3) <<What should we do, FOGO? We have a force in the area that can be there in 10 minutes. >>

b. Player Choices:

1) Plan ROE and Mission 2) Liaise with local government 3) Deploy force to protect cultural property What are our FOGO’s advisors recommendations (i.e. help?) 4) Depending on choice they will see a new scene, local government office or statue in town square, or Advisors for briefing. 5) Once Deployed, troops will have icons of possible force status (police riot control, weapons, tanks, and player will select these and drag and drop around the perimeter of the statue. 6) Depending on Choice, there will be a consequence:

a) Mob approach demonstration against NATO foreign presence (If deploy without liaison)

b) Insurgents actively targeting statue with munitions (If post military weapons)

c) Local police alongside NATO forces (if liaise with local government)

d) Blow up landmark if seek advisors and delay urgent response.

7) Each of these will have a consequence, such as:

a) unrest in local populace (if NATO forces present at statue) b) insurgents reporting that NATO targeted statue if it was destroyed c) newspaper headlines of capitulation of local government with “foreign invaders” if police presence with NATO

8) Each of these will have a play that will circle back to original Event to correct the answer or lead to the next Event. These will be the TP’s of Command Responsibility, Distinction, Political Considerations contained in Rules of Engagement MC 362/1 specifically see the Appendix A Series 10-43 (A-3 - A-20).

c. Event 2: Insurgent attack NATO forces at site (no matter which occurred including destruction)

1) Teaching Point (TP) 2 – Distinction 2) After being fired upon NATO forces target insurgents 3) Weapon icons are chosen for response (riot agents, guns, tanks, drone, sea based missile 4) These are drag and dropped on the scene and depending on choice there are consequences in two moves. 5) Immediate effect is that insurgents are captured 6) This leads to TP 3 – Detainee Responsibilities 7) Choices for handling detainees 8) With subsequent positive and negative escalation factors in line with choices

d. Event 3: ROE Planning Session

1) Teaching Point (TP) focuses on Political, Operational, Legal considerations and the type of mission, caveats, red cards, and personal responsibility of Commander 2) See NATO Legal Deskbook ROE Part XII for reference material

e. Event 4: Troops fire upon and kill a farmer. The family makes a claim, posts videos online, and protests occur outside of the HQ, a lawsuit is filed.

1) Teaching Point (TP) Command Responsibility – TP is for FOGO to understand responsibility for all troop actions. 2) Subordination to the tactical situation

3) Legal considerations based on NIAC (Host Nation laws apply) 4) Political Ramifications 5) Means and Methods analysis 6) Proper training of troops 7) Claims 8) This leads to Event 5: Meeting with Local Political Leadership (if it has not happened in Event 1).

f. Event 5: Local Political and Host Nation laws that apply

1) Teaching Point (TP) – National Laws applicability to NATO Actions under SOFA 2) War Crimes charges 3) Reported Detainee abuse is brought to the forefront and use of riot weapons on crowd at statue as violation of Geneva Convention? 4) Player must choose responses testing their knowledge learned.

Teaching Points 43. The following TP need to be included:

a. Basic TP Protection & Distinction (STANAG I, Appendix B) b. Combatant (2c) (cf ATrainP-2 F-27) c. Protected persons (2d) d. Protected objects (2e) e. Protected and distinctive emblems (2f) f. Means & methods of warfare, including prohibitions under LOAC and applicable national obligations (2g) g. Enforcement of LOAC (2h)

1) State Obligations 2) Individual Responsibility 3) Command Responsibility 4) Prevention of LOAC violations (cf. Appendix C 2i (4)) 5) War crimes

What is Required to Respond to this RFP 44. The bidder is required to put together a comprehensive plan to achieve the requirements in the SOR. The company will provide their approach to the planned

deliverables in a paper with content not to exceed 10 pages (company background, compliance, etc. outlined in bidders instructions above is not included in the page count). The paper will address:

a. Specific approach that focusses on improving the decision making process of game player to accomplish their mission while also respecting the NATO Rules Of Engagement within the Law of Armed Conflict b. Milestones, c. A proposed In Progress Review (IPR) schedule, d. Quality control measures incorporated to ensure the usability of the product for the multi-cultural NATO environment,

e. An outline of game capabilities and content, f. A diagram similar to diagram 1 showing in much greater detail what will be working and what will be greyed out in the game, g. The development timeline to develop the game, h. The technical characteristics of the game, i. The resources required from NATO to develop the game (if any), j. List the key challenges and critical areas for the success of this project, k. Provide a list of game design team members and CVs for this project, l. Provide the name and CV of the NATO Law of Armed Conflict expert. Or, if none available, detail how much help will be required from NATO, m. The vendor must list any specific expertise or other requirements from NATO besides access for one visit to HQ SACT to gather additional requirements and information, and n. Include any details for software including cost, IP, manuals, superuser abilities, and other specifications.

Language 45. All aspects of this work are to be carried out in English. However, as per the statement regarding superusers, the game must be able to be modified in all aspects including changing language.

Software/Game Engine 46. This RFP does not have preferred software. The software used should be of a common nature and easily modified by the superuser. Vendor must provide a description of the proposed game engine for the project. Annexes: Annex A - Evaluation Matrix

Enclosures: STANAG 2597 – Training in Rules of Engagement ATrainP4, Edition A STANAG 2449 - Training in the Law of Armed Conflict ATrainP2, Edition A NATO Legal Deskbook v.3 Introduction to the Law of Armed Conflict and Rules of Engagement The Crisis in the Baltic Region MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement

HQ SACT General Contract Terms and Conditions

Index of Clauses 1. Definitions 2. Applicable Law 3. Assignment 4. Acceptance 5. Service and Parts Availability 6. Preferred Customer 7. Notice of Shipment 8. Security 9. Inspection 10. Title 11. Supply Warranty 12. Invoices 13. Payment 14. Taxes 15. Excusable Delays 16. Indemnity 17. Disputes 18. Termination for Convenience 19. Termination for Default 20. Limitation of Liability 21. Export Control 22. Risk of Loss 23. Authorization to Perform 24. Performance 25. Travel 26. Proposed Candidates 27. Partial Awards 28. Competition 29. Contractor Notice Regarding Delay 30. Notice of Assistance with respect to Patent and Copy Right Infringement 31. Health and Safety and Accident Prevention 32. Patent Indemnity 33. Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software 34. Software Releases and Updates 35. Inconsistency between English version and Translation of Contract 36. Contract Effective Date 37. Enforcement 38. Order of Precedence 39. Entire Agreement

1. Definitions. As used throughout this contract, the following terms shall have meanings as set forth below: a. “HQ SACT” means the Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Transformation, located at 7857, Blandy Road, Suite 100, Norfolk, Virginia, United States of America. b. Contracting Officer means the person executing and managing this contract on behalf of HQ SACT. c. Inspector means a person appointed by the Contracting Officer for the purpose of determining compliance with the technical requirements of the contract. d. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is hereafter referred to as “NATO”. e. The term "days" shall be interpreted as meaning calendar days 2. Applicable law. Except as otherwise provided in this contract, this contract shall be governed, interpreted and construed with the laws of the commonwealth of Virginia of the United States of America. 3. Assignment. This agreement is not assignable by the Contractor either in whole or in part unless agreed in writing by HQ SACT Contracting Officer in accordance with; a. Any modifications, including changes, additions or deletions and instructions under this contract shall not be binding unless issued in writing by the Contracting Officer b. Sub-contractors shall be limited to citizens or legal entities of member nations of NATO, unless specifically authorized by the Contracting Officer. c. The Contractor shall determine that any sub-contractor proposed by him for the furnishing of supplies or services which shall involve access to classified information in the Contractor's custody has been granted an appropriate facility security clearance by the sub-contractor's national authorities, which is still in effect, prior to being given access to such classified information. 4. Acceptance a. Acceptance or rejection of the supplies shall be made as promptly as practicable after delivery, except as otherwise provided in this contract. b. Acceptance shall be conclusive, except for latent defects, fraud, gross mistakes amounting to fraud, or otherwise stated in the Contract. It is the action by which HQ SACT acknowledges that the Contractor has fully demonstrated that the deliveries are complete and operational. The formal acceptance will take place when the following requirements have been met: - Availability at final destination of all deliverables. - Successful completion of acceptance testing. - Verification of the inventory. - Satisfactory completion of all training or other services, if any, required by that date. - Agreement between the Contracting Officer and the Contractor on a

discrepancy list (if necessary) and corresponding clearance dates. c. When discrepancies exist and if these do not prevent satisfactory use or operation of the supplies, the Contracting Officer may declare the acceptance provisional. In this case he will withhold from payment an amount commensurate with the importance of the discrepancies but in any case not less than ten (10) percent of the total contract value and this until all discrepancies have been cleared; at that time the acceptance becomes final.

5. Service and Parts Availability. Unless as specified otherwise in the Technical Specifications, the Contractor and his subcontractors will maintain and furnish a source of an adequate supply of services, components, spare parts and sub-assemblies to properly maintain the supplies for a period of minimum five (5) years from Contract Effective Date. 6. Preferred Customer a. The Contractor warrants that the prices set forth in this contract are as favorable as those extended to any Government, Agency, Company, Organization or individual purchasing like quantities covered by the contract under similar conditions. In the event that prior to complete delivery under this contract the Contractor offers any of such items in substantially similar quantities to any customer at prices lower than those set forth herein, the Contractor shall so notify HQ SACT and the prices of such items shall be correspondingly reduced by a supplement to this contract. b. Prices in this sense means "Base Price" prior to applying any bonuses. 7. Notice of Shipment a. At the time of delivery of any supplies to a carrier for transportation, the Contractor shall give notice of shipment to the Contracting Officer and to such other persons or installations as are designated by the Contracting Officer. If such instructions have not been received by the Contractor at least one working day prior to such delivery to a carrier, the Contractor shall request instructions from the Contracting Officer concerning notice of shipment to be given. b. The following information shall be included in such notification:

(1) Contract Number (2) Shipping address

From: (Name and complete address of consignor) To: (Name and complete address of consignee)

(3) Listing of supplies by Contract Items(s) (4) Number of and marking on packages(s) (5) Weight and dimensions of packages(s) (6) Name and address of Carrier, mode and date of shipment with waybill number, (7) Customs documents required by Contractor (if applicable).

8. Security a. The Contractor shall comply with all security requirements prescribed by HQ SACT and the National Security Authority or designated security agency of each NATO country in which the contract is performed. b. The Contractor shall be responsible for the safeguarding of NATO classified information, material and equipment entrusted to him or generated by him in connection with the performance of the contract. c. Any known or suspected breaches of security or other matters of security

significance shall be reported by the Contractor to the Contracting Officer and to the National Security Authority or designated security agency.

d. The Contractor shall apply to the Contracting Officer for approval before sub-contracting any part of the work, if the sub-contract would involve the sub-contractor in access to classified information. The Contractor shall place the sub-contractor under security obligations no less stringent than those applied to his own

contract 9. Inspection a. Unless otherwise specifically provided for in the specifications, all equipment, materials and articles incorporated in the work covered by this contract are to be new and of the most suitable grade of their respective kinds for the purposes intended. All workmanship shall be first class. b. All supplies (which terms throughout this clause includes without limitation raw materials, components, intermediate assemblies, and end products) shall be subject to inspection and test by HQ SACT, to the extent practicable at all times and places including the period of manufacture, and in any event prior to acceptance. c. In case any supplies are defective in material or workmanship or otherwise not in conformity with the requirements of this contract, HQ SACT shall have the right either to reject them (with or without instructions as to their disposition) or to require their correction or to accept them against reduction in price which is equitable under the circumstances. d. If any inspection or test is made by HQ SACT on the premises of the Contractor or sub-contractor, the Contractor without additional charge shall provide all reasonable facilities and assistance to inspectors in the performance of their duties. If HQ SACT inspection or test is made at a point other than the premises of the Contractor or a sub-contractor, it shall be at the expense of HQ SACT except as otherwise provided in this contract. In case of rejection HQ SACT shall not be liable for any reduction in value of samples used in connection with such inspection or test. HQ SACT reserves the right to charge to the Contractor any additional cost of HQ SACT inspection and test when supplies are not ready at the time such inspection, when test is requested by Contractor or when re-inspection or retest is necessitated by prior rejection. Failure to inspect supplies shall neither relieve the Contractor from responsibility for such supplies as are not in accordance with the contract requirements nor impose liability on HQ SACT therefore. e. The inspection and test by HQ SACT of any supplies does not relieve the Contractor from any responsibility regarding defects or other failures to meet the contract requirements which may be discovered prior to acceptance. Except as otherwise provided in the contract, acceptance shall be conclusive except as regards latent defects, hidden deficiencies, fraud, or such gross mistakes as amount to fraud. 10. Title. Unless specified elsewhere in this contract, title to supplies furnished under this contract shall pass to HQ SACT upon acceptance, regardless of when or where HQ SACT takes physical possession. 11. Supply Warranty a. Notwithstanding inspection and acceptance by HQ SACT of supplies furnished under the contract or any provision of this contract concerning the conclusiveness thereof, the Contractor warrants that for a period of twelve (12) months following the date of acceptance:

(1) All supplies furnished under this contract will be free from defects in material or workmanship and will conform with the specifications and all other requirements of this contract; and

(2) The preservation, packaging, packing and marking and the preparation for and method of shipment of such supplies will conform with the requirements

of this contract. b. The Contracting Officer shall give written notice to the Contractor of any breach of the warranties in paragraph a. of this clause within thirty (30) days after discovery of any defect. c. Within a reasonable time after such notice, the Contracting Officer may either:

(1) By written notice require the prompt correction or replacement of any supplies or part thereof (including preservation, packaging, packing and marking) that do not conform with requirements of this contract within the meaning of Paragraph a. of this clause; or

(2) Retain such supplies, whereupon the contract price thereof shall be reduced by an amount equitable under the circumstances and the Contractor shall promptly make appropriate payment. d. When return, correction or replacement is required, the Contracting Officer shall return the supplies and transportation charges and responsibility for such supplies while in transit shall be borne by the Contractor. However, the Contractor's liability for such transportation charges shall not exceed an amount equal to the cost of transportation by the usual commercial method of shipment between the designated destination point under this contract and the Contractor's plant and return. e. If the Contractor does not agree as to his responsibility to correct or replace the supplies delivered, he shall nevertheless proceed in accordance with the written request issued by the Contracting Officer per paragraph c to correct or replace the defective or nonconforming supplies. In the event it is later determined that such supplies were not defective or nonconforming within the provisions of this clause, the contract price will be equitably adjusted. Failure to agree to such an equitable adjustment of price shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Dispute". f. Any supplies or parts thereof furnished in replacement pursuant to this clause shall also be subject to all the provisions of this clause to the same extent as supplies initially delivered. Corrected parts will be warranted for a period not less than six (6) months starting at the time the part is received back at the user’s location. g. In case of a provisional acceptance the warranty period starts at the date of provisional acceptance and ends twelve (12) months after the date of provisional acceptance. h. Failure to agree upon any determination to be made under this clause shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause of this contract. i. The word "supplies" as used herein includes related services. j. The rights and remedies of HQ SACT provided in this clause are in addition to and do not limit any rights afforded to HQ SACT by any other clause of the contract. 12. Invoices a. The contractor shall submit an original invoice and three (3) copies (or electronic invoice, if authorized) to the address designated in the contract to received invoices. All invoices shall be submitted no later than 30 days upon completion of work or services performed. An invoice must include: 1) Name and address of the Contractor; 2) Invoice date; 3) Purchase Order number and Purchase Order or Contract line item number; 4) Description, quantity, unit of

measure, unit price and extended price of the items delivered; 5) Shipping number and date of shipment including the bill of lading number and weight of shipment if shipped on a bill of lading; 6) Terms of any prompt payment discount offered; 7) Name and address of official to whom payment is to be sent: and 8) Name, title, and phone number of person to be notified in event of defective invoice. All invoices shall be certified by the signature of a duly authorized company representative. Invoices for Contractor Travel shall include: 1) Contractor name; 2) Date of Travel; 3) Number of days; 4) Destinations. All invoices shall be submitted to:

HQ SACT Accounts Payable

7857 Blandy Road Suite 100, SR-82, Norfolk, VA 23551-2490

b. Electronic Fund Transfer is the prescribed method of payment for HQ SACT. Contractors are requested to submit copies of banking information available at (http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/budfinmain.htm). Such information shall be submitted to HQ SACT 14 days prior to any contract award. 13. Payment. Payment shall be made for items accepted by HQ SACT that have been delivered to the delivery destinations set forth in this contract. Payments under this contract may be made by HQ SACT by electronic funds transfer payments or (check in exceptional cases) and shall submit this designation to the contracting officer as directed. In the event the Contractor, during the performance of this contract, elects to designate a different financial institution for receipt of any payment made using electronic funds transfer procedures, notification of such change and the required information must be obtained by HQ SACT thirty (30) days prior to the date such change is to become effective. The documents furnishing the information required in this clause must be dated and contain the signature, title, and telephone number of the Contractor official authorized to provide it, as well as the Contractor’s name and Purchase Order number. Contractor failure to properly designate a financial institution or to provide appropriate payee bank account information may delay payments of amounts otherwise properly due. Discount time will be computed from date of delivery at place of acceptance or from receipt of correct invoice at the office specified by HQ SACT, whichever is later. For the purpose of computing the discount earned, payment shall be considered to have been made on the date which appears on the payment check or the specified payment date if an electronic funds transfer payment is made. 14. Taxes. The contract excludes all applicable Federal, State, and local taxes and duties. HQ SACT is a tax-exempt organization. 15. Excusable Delays. The Contractor shall be liable for default unless non-performance is caused by an occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor and without its fault or negligence such as, acts of God or the public enemy, acts of HQ SACT in its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, unusually severe weather, and delays of common carriers. The Contractor shall notify the contracting Officer in writing as soon as is reasonably possible after the commencement of any excusable delay, setting forth the full particulars in connection therewith, shall remedy such occurrence with all reasonable dispatch, and shall promptly give written notice to the Contracting Officer of the cessation of such occurrence.

http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/budfinmain.htm

16. Indemnity. The contractor shall indemnify HQ SACT and its officers, employees and agents against liability, including costs for actual or alleged direct or contributory infringement of or inducement to infringe, any United States or foreign patent, trademark, copyright, or other intellectual property right, arising out of the performance of this contract, provided the Contractor is reasonably notified of such claims and proceedings.

17. Disputes. Except as otherwise provided, during the period of performance, any dispute between the parties arising out of the performance of this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the HQ SACT Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of HQ SACT shall be final and conclusive unless, within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to HQ SACT a written appeal. In connection with any appeal of HQ SACT decision under this paragraph, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. A decision shall be rendered within thirty (30) days of receipt of appeal. HQ SACT FC decision is final.

18. Termination for Convenience. HQ SACT reserves the right to terminate this contract, or any part hereof, for its sole convenience. In the event of such termination, the Contractor shall immediately stop all work hereunder and shall immediately cause any and all of its suppliers and subcontractors to cease work. Subject to the terms of this contract, the Contractor shall be paid a percentage of the contract price reflecting the percentage of the work performed prior to the notice of termination, plus reasonable charges the Contractor can demonstrate to the satisfaction of HQ SACT using its standard record keeping system have resulted from the termination. In the event of the failure of the Contractor and the Contracting Officer to agree as provided in paragraph d. upon the whole amount to be paid to Contractor by reason of the termination of work pursuant to this clause, the Contracting Officer shall pay to the Contractor the amounts determined by the Contracting Officer. The Contractor shall not be required to comply with the cost accounting standards or contract cost principles for this purpose. This paragraph does not give SACT any right to audit the Contractor’s records. The Contractor shall not be paid for any work performed or costs incurred which reasonably could have been avoided. 19. Termination for Default a. HQ SACT may, subject to the provisions or paragraph c. below, by written notice of default to the Contractor, terminate the whole or any part of this contract in any one of the following circumstances:

(1) If the Contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or to perform the Services within the time specified herein or any extension thereof; or (2) If the Contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions of this contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger performance of this contract in accordance with its terms and in either of these two circumstances does not cure such failure within a period of ten days (or such longer period as the Contracting Officer may authorize in writing) after receipt of notice from the Contracting Officer specifying such failure.

b. In the event HQ SACT terminates this contract in whole or in part as provided in paragraph a. of this clause, HQ SACT may procure supplies or services similar to those so terminated and the Contractor shall be liable to HQ SACT for any excess costs for such similar supplies or services. The Contractor shall continue the performance of this contract to the extent not terminated under the provisions of this clause.

c. Except with respect to defaults of sub-contractors, the Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the contract arises out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. If the failure to perform is caused by the default of a sub-contractor, and if such default arises out of causes beyond the control of both the Contractor and sub-contractor, without the fault or negligence of either of them, the Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform unless the supplies or services to be furnished by the sub-contractor were obtainable from other sources in sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the required delivery schedule.

d. If this contract is terminated as provided in paragraph a. of this clause, HQ SACT, in addition to any other rights provided in the clause, may require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver to HQ SACT in the manner and to the extent directed by the Contracting Officer: (1) Any completed supplies and (2) Such partially completed supplies and materials, parts, tools, die, jigs, Fixtures, plans, drawings, information and contract rights (hereinafter called "Manufacturing materials") as the Contractor has specifically produced or Specifically acquired for the performance of such part of this contract as has been terminated; and the Contractor shall, upon direction of the Contracting Officer, protect and preserve property in the possession of the Contractor in which HQ SACT has an interest. Payment for completed supplies delivered to and accepted by HQ SACT shall be at the contract price. Payment for manufacturing materials delivered to and accepted by HQ SACT and for the protection and preservation of property shall be in an amount agreed upon by the Contractor and Contracting Officer; failure to agree such amount shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Dispute". HQ SACT may withhold from amounts otherwise due the Contractor for such completed supplies or manufacturing materials such sum as the Contracting Officer determines to be necessary to protect HQ SACT against loss because of outstanding liens or claims of former lien holders.

e. If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provisions of this clause, it is determined for any reason that the Contractor was not in default under the provisions of this clause, or that the default was excusable under the provisions of this clause, the rights and obligations of the parties shall, if the contract contains a clause providing for termination for convenience of HQ SACT, be the same as if the notice of termination

had been issued pursuant to such clause. If, after such notice of termination of this contract under the provisions of this clause, it is determined for any reason that the Contractor was not in default under the provisions of this clause, and if this contract does not contain a clause providing for termination for convenience of HQ SACT the contract shall be equitably adjusted to compensate for such termination and the contract modified accordingly; failure to agree to any such adjustment shall be a dispute

concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes".

f. Both parties are under duty of good faith. The contract includes not only the specific terms, but also law and customary practice applicable in the place where the contract is to be carried out and to the Type of Trade to which the contract relates.

20. Limitation of Liability. Except as otherwise provided by an express or implied warranty, the Contractor will not be liable to HQ SACT for consequential damages resulting from any defects or deficiencies in accepted items 21. Export Control. Contractor warrants that, if applicable all necessary technical assistance agreements (TAA), export control or other associated arrangements shall be valid prior to contract award. Should a Contractor require export pre-approval HQ SACT legal staff will be provided a preview of said companies request PRIOR to the companies submission to a Government entity. Upon validation of request by HQ SACT Legal staff, subject agreement or request may be submitted to appropriate authority. (Please note: There are no specified time delays regarding TAA, or export control request being processed. However, experience has shown request can take anywhere from 30 days to 90 days depending on complexity of request, and administrative preparedness). 22. Risk of Loss. Unless the contract specifically provides otherwise, risk of loss or damage to the supplies provided under this contract shall remain with the Contractor until, and shall pass to HQ SACT upon: 1) Delivery of the supplies to a carrier, if transportation is f.o.b. origin; or 2) Delivery of the supplies to HQ SACT at the destination specified in the contract, if transportation is f.o.b. destination. 23. Authorization to Perform. The Contractor warrants that he and his sub-contractors have been duly authorized to operate and do business in the country or countries in which this contract is to be performed; that he and his sub-contractors have obtained all necessary licenses and permits required in connection with the contract; that he and the sub-contractors will fully comply with all the laws, decrees, labor standards and regulations of such country or countries during the performance of this contract; and that no claim for additional moneys with respect to any authorizations to perform will be made upon HQ SACT. 24. Performance. Candidates/contractors who accept HQ SACT issued contracts, shall, at a minimum, serve in a designated capacity for no less than 180 calendar days from commencement of contract period of performance. Contracts’ with performance periods having less than 180 days in totality shall require contractors to serve a minimum of 50% of estimated performance period. Should a candidate vacate the contract in less time than described, HQ SACT reserves the right to cancel the contract in whole or part. Replacement candidates, if acceptable to HQ SACT, shall be reviewed by HQ SACT for compliance, and, or technical acceptance per the original Statement of Work and final acceptance by HQ SACT Contracting Officer. 25. Travel. In accordance with AFM Section 24, Contractor Travel, travel by contractors in support of the HQ SACT mission will only be performed when a

member of the approved International HQ SACT Peacetime Establishment is unable to perform the mission.

Once contractor travel has been established under a contract and a contractor is tasked to travel, the HQ SACT Contractor Travel Request form must be filled out and approved prior to any travel being conducted. This form may be found at: http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/contractortravel.htm The in-house Travel Agency will set the Transport Ceiling Cost and at that time the contractor may elect to book their transportation with the in-house travel agency. (Please refer to Clause Number 7 above). Transport tickets purchased through the in-house travel agency will be reimbursed by the HQ SACT entity directly to the in-house travel agency, and the applicable travel line of the contract will be charged. These costs will not be invoiced by, or paid to, the contractor company. When transport tickets are purchased through another source only the ceiling cost allocated by the in-house travel agency will be reimbursed to the contractor company. Per Diem is based on the NATO Group One subsistence allowance, which covers meals, lodging, incidental expenses and any applicable overhead and/or fees. Per Diem Reimbursement will only be made at these rate amounts. NATO Group III daily subsistence allowances are posted on HQ SACT website at http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/contractortravel.htm.

26. Proposed Candidates. No proposals shall be accepted or considered for candidates already assigned to an existing contract with HQ SACT, without the prior permission of the Contracting Officer. 27. Partial awards will be allowed when determined in the best interests of NATO. The Contracting Awards Board and the Contracting Officer, when deemed prudent and necessary have the authority to make this determination. Partial bidding shall be consistent with released solicitation. 28. Competition. HQ SACT reserves the right to engage in Full and Open Competition after exclusion of sources. 29. Contractor Notice Regarding Delay. In the event the Contractor encounters difficulty in meeting performance requirements, or when he anticipates difficulty in complying with the contract delivery schedule or date, he shall immediately notify the Contracting Officer in writing, giving pertinent details; provided, however, that this data shall be informational only in character and that this provision shall not be construed as a waiver by HQ SACT of any delivery schedule or date, or of any rights or remedies provided by law or under this contract. 30. Notice and Assistance regarding Patent and Copyright Infringement a. The Contractor shall report to the Contracting Officer, promptly and in reasonable written detail, each notice or claim of patent or copyright infringement based on the performance of this contract of which the Contractor has knowledge. b. In the event of any claim or suit against HQ SACT on account of any alleged patent or copyright infringement arising out of the performance of this contract or out of the use of any supplies furnished or work or services performed hereunder, the Contractor shall furnish to HQ SACT, when requested by the Contracting

http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/contractortravel.htm

http://www.act.nato.int/budfin/contractortravel.htm

Officer, all evidence and information in possession of the Contractor pertaining to such suit or claim. Such evidence and information shall be furnished at the expense of HQ SACT except where the Contractor has agreed to indemnify HQ SACT. c. This clause shall be included in all sub-contracts. 31. Health, Safety and Accident Prevention. If the Contracting Officer notifies the Contractor in writing of any non-compliance in the performance of this contract, with safety and health rules and requirements prescribed on the date of this contract by applicable national or local laws, ordinances and codes, and the Contractor fails to take immediate corrective action, the Contracting Officer may order the Contractor to stop all or part of the work until satisfactory corrective action has been taken. Such an order to stop work shall not entitle the Contractor to an adjustment of his contract price or other reimbursement for resulting increased costs, or to an adjustment of the delivery or performance schedule. 32. Patent Indemnity. If the amount of this contract is in excess of $1,000,000 , the Contractor shall indemnify HQ SACT and its officers, agents and employees against liability, including costs, for infringement of any letters patent (except letters patent issued upon an application which is now or may hereafter be kept secret or otherwise withheld from issue by order of the government which issued the letters patent) arising out of the manufacture or delivery of supplies under this contract, or out of the use or disposal by or for the account of HQ SACT of such supplies. The foregoing indemnity shall not apply unless the Contractor shall have been informed as soon as practicable by HQ SACT of the suit or action alleging such infringement and shall have been given such opportunity as is afforded by applicable laws, rules, or regulations to participate in the defense thereof; and further, such indemnity shall not apply to: a. An infringement resulting from compliance with specific written instructions of the Contracting Officer directing a change in the supplies to be delivered or in the materials or equipment to be used or directing a manner of performance of the Contract not normally used by the Contractor; b. An infringement resulting from an addition to, or change in, such supplies or components furnished which addition or change was made subsequent to delivery or performance by the Contractor; or c. A claimed infringement which is settled without the consent of the Contractor, unless required by a court of competent jurisdiction. 33. Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software a. HQ SACT shall have unlimited rights in:

(1) All technical data and computer software, to include source code, resulting from performance of experimental, developmental, integration, testing, or research work which was specified as an element of performance in this contract.

(2) Plans, drawings, manuals or instructional materials prepared or required to be delivered under this contract for implementation management, installation, operation, maintenance and training purposes. b. Technical data and software delivered under this contract shall be marked with the number of this contract, name of Contractor and the rights transferred to HQ SACT. 34. Software Releases and Updates.

a. All software implemented on or delivered with the supplies shall be at the start of acceptance, the most recent versions or releases as available. b. The Contractor shall for duration of minimum five (5) years after acceptance, and upon their availability, offer to HQ SACT all software changes, fixes and new releases. These shall be offered at no cost when they are offered free of charge on the commercial market. 35. Inconsistency between English Version and Translation of Contract. In the event of inconsistency between any terms of this contract and any translation thereof into another language, the English language meaning shall control. 36. Contract Effective Date (CED). The effective date of the contract is the date of last signature by the contracting parties, or a specific date set forth in the Contract. 37. Enforcement. Failure by either party to enforce any provision of this contract will not be deemed a waiver of future enforcement of that or any other provision. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this contract shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and this contract shall be construed in all respects if such invalid or unenforceable provisions were omitted. 38. Order of Precedence. Any inconsistencies in the solicitation or contract shall be resolved by giving precedence in the following order: (1) Special Terms and Conditions; (2) General Terms and Conditions and Purchase Order terms; (3) solicitation provisions if this is a solicitation; (4) the specification/statement of work; (5) other HQ SACT documents, exhibits and attachments; (6) addenda to this solicitation or contract, including any license agreements for computer software, or other Contract agreements. 39. Entire Agreement. This contract sets for the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements or representations, oral or written, regarding such subject matter. HQ SACT shall not be bound by, and specifically objects to any term, condition, or other provision inconsistent with or in addition to any provision of this contract that is submitted by Contractor in any correspondence or any document unless HQ SACT specifically agrees to such provision in a written instrument signed by an authorized representative of HQ SACT.

Annex A

To Statement of Requirement

NATO Law of Armed Conflict

Statement of Requirement for Developing a

Proof of Concept Digital Game for Training In NATO Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict

Bidder Name _____________________________

Item Range Score

The Approach 0-15

Milestones 0-10

In Progress Review (IPR) schedule 0-5

Quality control measures 0-5

An outline of game capabilities and content

0-10

A diagram showing in detail what will be greyed out in the game

0-10

The technical characteristics of the game 0-10

The resources required from NATO to develop the game (if any),

-5 - +5

Key challenges and critical areas for the success of this project

0-10

List of game design team members and CVs for this project.

0-5

Name and CV of the NATO Rule of Law expert. Or, if none available, detail how much help will be required from NATO

0-5

Any specific expertise or other requirements from NATO besides access for one visit to HQ SACT to gather additional requirements and information

-5 - +5

Include any details for software including cost, IP, manuals, superuser abilities, and other specifications.

0-5

Total

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT

ACCORD DE NORMALISATION

STANAG 2597

TRAINING IN RULES OF

ENGAGEMENT FORMATION AUX RÈGLES

D’ENGAGEMENT

EDITION/ÉDITION 1 4 May/mai 2015

NSO(JOINT)0599(2015)NTG/2597

NORTH ATLANTIC

TREATY ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ

DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD

Published by THE NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE

(NSO)

Publié par le BUREAU OTAN

DE NORMALISATION (NSO)

© NATO/OTAN

- i -

4 May/mai 2015

STANAG 2597 Edition/Édition 1

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

LETTRE DE PROMULGATION

STATEMENT

DÉCLARATION

The enclosed NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG), which has been ratified by member nations, as reflected in the NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD), is promulgated herewith.

L’accord de normalisation OTAN (STANAG) ci-joint, qui a été ratifié par les pays membres dans les conditions figurant dans la Base de données des documents de normalisation OTAN (NSDD), est promulgué par la présente.

IMPLEMENTATION

MISE EN APPLICATION

This STANAG is effective upon receipt and ready to be used by the implementing nations and NATO bodies.

Ce STANAG entre en vigueur dès réception et est prêt à être mis en application par les pays et les organismes OTAN d’exécution.

The partner nations are invited to adopt this STANAG.

Les pays partenaires sont invités à adopter ce STANAG.

SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENTS ANNULÉS ET REMPLACÉS

This STANAG does not supersede any document.

Ce STANAG n’annule et ne remplace aucun document.

ACTIONS BY NATIONS

MESURES À PRENDRE PAR LES PAYS

Nations are invited to examine their ratification of the STANAG and, if they have not already done so, advise the NSO of their intention regarding its implementation.

Les pays sont invités à examiner l'état d’avancement de la ratification du STANAG et à informer, s’ils ne l’ont pas encore fait, le NSO de leur intention concernant sa mise en application.

Nations are requested to provide to the NSO their actual STANAG implementation details.

Les pays sont priés de fournir au NSO des informations détaillées sur la mise en application effective de ce STANAG.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

This STANAG is a NATO non classified document to be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

RESTRICTION TO REPRODUCTION

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member or partner nations, or NATO commands and bodies.

Edvardas MAZEIKIS Major General, L TUAF

Director, NATO Standardization Office

CLASSIFICATION DE SECURITE

Ce STANAG est un document OTAN non classifie qui doit etre traite conformement au C-M(2002)60.

RESTRICTION CONCERNANT LA REPRODUCTION

Aucune partie de cette publication ne peut etre reproduite, incorporee dans une base documentaire, utilisee commercialement, adaptee ou transmise sous quelque forme ou par quelque moyen que ce soit (electronique, mecanique, photocopie, enregistrement ou autre), sans l'autorisation prealable de l'editeur. Sauf pour les ventes commerciales, cela ne s'applique pas aux Etats membres ou aux pays partenaires, ni aux commandements et organismes de I'OT AN.

l

Edvardas MAZEIKIS General de division aerienne, L TUAF

Directeur du Bureau OTAN de normalisation

- ii -

STANAG 2597

Edition/Édition 1

- 1 -


TRAINING IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FORMATION AUX RÈGLES

D’ENGAGEMENT

AIM

BUT

The aim of this NATO standardization agreement (STANAG) is to respond to the following interoperability requirements.

Le présent accord de normalisation OTAN (STANAG) a pour but de répondre aux exigences d’interopérabilité suivantes.

INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS

EXIGENCES D’INTEROPÉRABILITÉ

To enhance understanding of MC 362/1 – NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE) as a component of the NATO operational planning process by providing a NATO standard for training in NATO ROE.

Améliorer la compréhension du MC 362/1, intitulé « Règles d’engagement OTAN », en tant que composante du processus de planification opérationnelle de l’OTAN, par la fourniture d’une norme OTAN sur la formation aux règles d’engagement de l’Alliance.

AGREEMENT

ACCORD

Participating nations agree to implement the following standard.

Les pays participants conviennent de mettre en application la norme suivante.

STANDARD

NORME

ATrainP-4, Edition A ATrainP-4, Édition A

OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS

AUTRES DOCUMENTS CONNEXES

MC 362/1 - NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

STANAG 2449 – TRAINING IN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT – ATrainP-2

MC 362/1 – RÈGLES D’ENGAGEMENT OTAN STANAG 2449 – FORMATION AU DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS – ATrainP-2

NATIONAL DECISIONS

DÉCISIONS NATIONALES

The national decisions regarding the ratification and implementation of this STANAG are provided to the NSO.

Les décisions nationales concernant la ratification et la mise en application du présent STANAG sont communiquées au NSO.

The national responses are recorded in the NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD).

Les réponses nationales sont consignées dans la Base de données des documents de normalisation OTAN (NSDD).

STANAG 2597

Edition/Édition 1

- 2 -

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

MISE EN APPLICATION DE L’ACCORD

This STANAG specifies the agreement of member nations to implement a standard, in whole or in part, with or without reservation, in order to meet the interoperability requirement regarding training in NATO ROE.

This STANAG is implemented when nations have incorporated the procedures set down in this agreement into national orders or instructions.

Le présent STANAG précise l’accord par lequel les pays membres s’engagent à mettre en application une norme, en tout ou en partie, avec ou sans réserve, afin de satisfaire à l’exigence d’interopérabilité au regard de la formation aux règles d’engagement OTAN. Le présent STANAG est mis en application par les pays dès que ceux-ci ont incorporé les procédures qu’il établit dans leurs ordres ou instructions nationaux.

Nations are invited to report on their effective implementation of the STANAG using the form in Annex H to AAP-03(J).

Les pays sont invités à rendre compte de la mise en application effective du présent accord au moyen du formulaire figurant à l’Annexe H à l’AAP-03(J).

Partner nations are invited to report on the adoption of the STANAG using the form in Annex G to AAP-03(J).

Les pays partenaires sont invités à rendre compte de l’adoption du présent STANAG au moyen du formulaire figurant à l’Annexe G à l’AAP-03(J).

REVIEW

RÉEXAMEN

This STANAG is to be reviewed at least once every three years. The result of the review is recorded within the NSDD.

Le présent STANAG doit être réexaminé au moins une fois tous les trois ans. Le résultat de ce réexamen est consigné dans la NSDD.

Nations and NATO bodies may propose changes, at any time, through a standardization proposal to the tasking authority (TA), where the changes will be processed during the review of the STANAG.

Les pays et les organismes OTAN peuvent, à tout moment, proposer des modifications en soumettant une proposition de normalisation à l'autorité de tutelle (TA), qui traitera ces modifications lors du réexamen du STANAG.

TASKING AUTHORITY

AUTORITÉ DE TUTELLE

This STANAG is supervised under the authority of:

Le présent STANAG est sous la responsabilité de :

MILITARY COMMITTEE JOINT STANDARDIZATION BOARD/ BUREAU DE NORMALISATION INTERARMÉES DU COMITÉ MILITAIRE (MCJSB)

STANAG 2597

Edition/Édition 1

- 3 -

Executive Working Group NATO Training Group/ Groupe de travail exécutif du Groupe d’entraînement OTAN

(EWGNTG)

CUSTODIAN

PILOTE

The custodian of this STANAG is:

Le pilote du présent STANAG est :

Allied Command Transformation/Commandement allié Transformation (ACT)

ACT Staff Element Europe/Élément d’état-major Europe de l’ACT

Mr./M. Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner Chairman of the LOAC NTG TG/Président du Groupe de travail LOAC du NTG

Legal Office/Bureau du conseiller juridique Bld 136, Room 135

7010 SHAPE, Belgium/Belgique [email protected]

FEEDBACK

INFORMATIONS EN RETOUR

Any comments concerning this STANAG shall be directed to:

Tous les commentaires concernant le présent STANAG doivent être adressés à :

NATO Standardization Office (NSO)

Bureau OTAN de normalisation (NSO)

Boulevard Léopold III

1110 BRUXELLES – Belgique

NATO STANDARD

ATrainP-4

TRAINING IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

Edition A Version 1

RATIFICATION DRAFT 1 MONTH YEAR

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TRAINING PUBLICATION

Published by the NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

© NATO/OTAN

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

[Date] 1. The enclosed Allied Training Publication ATrainP-4 Edition A Version 1, Training in Tules of Engagement (ROE), which has been approved by the nations in the MCJSB, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2597. 2. ATrainP-4, Edition A, Version 1 is effective upon receipt 3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies. 4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Edvardas MAŽEIKIS Major General, LTUAF

Director NATO Standardization Agency

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-4

I Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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II Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

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III Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

ATrainP-4

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]


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TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 1 1.1. TRAINING STANDARD ............................................................................... 1 1.2. DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................... 1 1.3. DETAILS OF THE PUBLICATION ....................................................................... 1 1.3.1. Objective of this publication .............................................................................. 1 1.3.2. Responsibilities ................................................................................................. 2 1.3.3. Objectives of training ........................................................................................ 2 1.3.4. Instruction and training principles ..................................................................... 2 1.3.5. Evaluation of training ........................................................................................ 3 1.4. COORDINATION ................................................................................................. 3 ANNEX A LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND MAIN TEACHING POINTS ............. A-1 LO 1. INTRODUCTION TO NATO ROE ............................................................. A-1 LO 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFENCE AND NATO ROE ..... A-1 LO 3. NATO ROE AND THE USE OF FORCE ................................................... A-1 LO 4. DEVELOPING NATO ROE ............................................................................ A-2 ANNEX B TEMPLATE FOR TRAINING IN NATO ROE ..................................... B-1 ANNEX C NATO ROE TRAINING EXERCISE SCENARIO ................................ C-1 ANNEX D UNIT LEVEL NATO ROE TRAINING GUIDANCE ............................. D-1 ANNEX E GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE LIST............ E-1

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CHAPTER 1

1.1. TRAINING STANDARD

1.1.1. The training standard is to ensure that all Personnel who may be involved in NATO/NATO-led operations receive training on the following four Learning Objectives (LO): (LO1) understand what NATO ROE are; (LO2) understand the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE; (LO3) understand NATO ROE and the use of force in NATO/NATO-led operations; and (LO4) commanders and staff understand the procedures for developing, drafting, issuing and changing NATO ROE for a NATO/NATO-led operation.

1.1.2. Nations must ensure that training is provided to Personnel to the above listed training standard. The main teaching points and training materials in the Annexes represent guidance on how to achieve the standard. The positions contained in the Annexes do not necessarily represent the position of any individual nation, do not establish state practice, and may be adapted, in whole or in part, by nations as they conduct training.

1.2. DEFINITIONS 1.2.1. NATO ROE are ROE derived from MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement (2003). ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied.

1.2.2. The term “Personnel” is defined as all members of the armed forces as determined by each nation, who may be involved in NATO/NATO-led operations.

1.3. DETAILS OF THE PUBLICATION 1.3.1. Objective of this publication

1. The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to nations on the standard of NATO ROE training to be provided to commanders, staff, units and individuals and to provide an outline for NATO ROE training programs. Annex A lists LO to be followed by nations when conducting training in NATO ROE along with main teaching points that may be used in meeting the standard. Annex B offers a template for training in NATO ROE for nations to use in the preparation of their national training documents. Annex C represents an example of a NATO ROE training exercise scenario. Annex D represents

ATrainP-4


training guidance for unit level training on NATO ROE. Annex E contains NATO ROE reference material containing abbreviations used throughout this AtrainP-4 and information about other NATO Doctrines related to NATO ROE.

2. If nations wish to use this publication to train persons other than Personnel, they may do so.

3. Nations ratifying STANAG 2597 continue to be guided by their respective national interpretations of international law.

1.3.2. Responsibilities 1. NATO ROE training is a national responsibility. 2. The responsibility to train staff assigned to NATO headquarters (HQ) rests with the appropriate HQ.

1.3.3. Objectives of training

1. The overall objective of NATO ROE training is to ensure that Personnel properly understand, develop and/or apply NATO ROE commensurate with their position and responsibility.

2. The training objectives are:

a. To enable commanders and staff to understand NATO ROE structure and procedures;

b. To provide Personnel with the knowledge they require to perform their duties in compliance with NATO ROE;

c. To ensure awareness of the potential consequences of breaches of NATO ROE.

1.3.4. Instruction and training principles

1. The following instruction and training principles are to be applied:

a. Personnel engaged in the development and staffing of NATO ROE for NATO/NATO-led operations are to be trained in NATO ROE.

b. Personnel deploying on NATO/NATO-led operations must receive instruction on mission-specific NATO ROE prior to the conduct of operations.

c. NATO ROE training should be commensurate with the degree of responsibility of Personnel and their operational role. Therefore, commanders and staff require specialised NATO ROE training.

ATrainP-4


d. Nations should ensure that NATO ROE training is delivered by properly trained instructors.

e. NATO ROE training should include realistic scenarios and case studies, exercises and practical field training. When preparing units for NATO/NATO-led operations, specific emphasis should be placed upon practical field training and the application of mission-specific ROE.

f. Nations should consider adding NATO ROE training in their military education, individual and collective training, and exercises.

g. The effectiveness of NATO ROE training should be evaluated at all levels of command. Lessons learned and identified and after action reports should be incorporated into the development of training programmes.

1.3.5. Evaluation of training

Nations are encouraged to evaluate their national NATO ROE training programmes and to tailor the evaluation to the specific needs of their audience in accordance with national requirements and this publication. Nations are encouraged to use a combination of methods to evaluate the knowledge of the training audience. Evaluation methods may include class room assessment, test papers and field training scenarios.

1.4. COORDINATION

Nations should regularly inform each other of NATO ROE training programmes.

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ANNEX A TO ATrainP-4

A-1 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

ANNEX A LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND MAIN TEACHING POINTS

LO 1. Introduction to NATO ROE Aim: The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand

what NATO ROE are. The main teaching points for this learning objective are: 1.1 Understand the definition of NATO ROE

1.2 Be familiar with the MC 362/1 structure and content

1.3 Understand the purpose and function of NATO ROE

1.4 Understand the relationship between law and NATO ROE

1.5 Understand the need for compliance with NATO ROE

LO 2. The Relationship between Self-Defence and NATO ROE

Aim: The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE.

The main teaching points for this learning objective are: 2.1 Be aware of the MC 362/1 concept of self-defence and know that the legal basis for use of force in self-defence is an issue of national law

2.2 Know that national laws differ with respect to the use of force in self-defence

2.3 Understand the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE

2.4 Be aware of the NATO concept of “extended self-defence”

2.5 Understand the relationship between self-defence and Commanders’ control of the use of force

LO 3. NATO ROE and the Use of Force

Aim: The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand NATO ROE and the use of force as developed from the principles and concepts contained in MC 362/1.

The main teaching points for this learning objective are: 3.1 Be familiar with MC 362/1 principles on the use of force

3.2 Understand the application of NATO ROE in different operations

3.3 Understand the MC 362/1 concepts of “minimum force” and “deadly force”

ANNEX A TO ATrainP-4

A-2 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

3.4 Understand the MC 362/1 definition of “attack” in the context of NATO

ROE series 42

3.5 Understand the MC 362/1 definition and methodology for determining

“hostile act (not constituting actual attack)” and “hostile intent (not

constituting an imminent attack)”

LO 4. Developing NATO ROE

Aim: The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that commanders and staff understand the procedures for developing, drafting, issuing and changing NATO ROE for a NATO/NATO-led operation.

The main teaching points for this learning objective are:

4.1 Recognise the inter-relationships of the bodies responsible for developing NATO

ROE

4.2 Understand operational planning process and relationship between OPLAN &

NATO ROE

4.3 Distinguish the factors and considerations affecting the development of NATO

ROE

4.4 Know how NATO ROE are drafted and promulgated

4.5 Have a general overview of Annex A to MC 362/1 and understand structure of

NATO ROE

4.6 Understand specific messages format required to establish mission specific ROE

4.7 Understand role of national caveats, restrictions and limitations

4.8 Distinguish and understand the security classification of NATO ROE

4.9 Understand the commander’s role in developing and applying NATO ROE

ANNEX B TO ATrainP-4

B-1 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

ANNEX B TEMPLATE FOR TRAINING IN NATO ROE

• This template develops the Learning Objectives and Main Teaching points addressed in Annex A. It is intended to assist nations to meet the standard for training in NATO ROE and to enhance understanding of MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement, 2003.

• Training in NATO ROE is a national responsibility. Nations are invited to use these training standards based on this template in order to ensure Personnel are properly trained in NATO ROE.

• The training materials contained in this template are recommendations. Individual nations are free to amend and translate any portion of the template used to train their forces in NATO ROE.

• Instructors should consult their chain of command and specialist advisors for additional support and guidance on nationally approved content for training in NATO ROE.

• Training based on this template should be further supported by practical training. A sample training exercise scenario is contained in Annex C.

• Explanation of used abbreviations and supporting NATO doctrine contained in this template correspond with Annex E.



Slide 1.

Topic: LO 1: Introduction to NATO ROE

Suggested image on the slide:

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Suggested text for the slide:

Introduction to NATO ROE

(Learning Objective 01)

Suggested text for the instructors’ notes

The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand what NATO ROE are.



Slide 2.



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Outline

• NATO ROE definition

• MC 362/1

• Structure of MC 362/1 and its Annex A

• Purpose & function of NATO ROE

• Law & NATO ROE

• Compliance with NATO ROE



• Understand the definition of NATO ROE

• Be familiar with MC 362/1structure and content

• Understand the purpose and function of NATO ROE

• Understand the relationship between law and NATO ROE

• Understand the need for compliance with NATO ROE



Slide 3.



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NATO ROE Definition

• “ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied.”


This NATO definition of ROE can be found in MC 362/1, para 2.

[NOTE TO INSTRUCTOR]

NATO defines ROE as “directives” although in some nations they may be considered orders and in others as guidance. Instructors should confirm their national position on whether NATO ROE are considered orders or whether they must be transformed by national authorities into orders to become binding upon Personnel.



Slide 4.



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MC 362/1

• MC 362/1 is the single NATO publication for ROE

• MC 362/1 contains a compendium of strategic and operational ROE and NATO policy for approving and implementing these rules for all NATO/NATO-led operations

• Mission specific ROE developed from MC 362/1 are applicable to all NATO/NATO-led forces at all times and in all places


MC 362/1 provides the policies and procedures to create mission specific ROE, have it approved by the NATO chain of command, and released for use at operational and tactical levels of NATO/NATO-led forces.

MC 362/1 is used to develop NATO ROE for all types of NATO/NATO-led operations and all types of forces.



Slide 5.



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Structure and Basic Contents of MC 362/1

• Five Parts – Part One: Introduction – Part Two: Self-Defence – Part Three: Principles Concerning the Use of Force – Part Four: Political Direction to Military Authorities – Part Five: ROE Structure and Procedures

• Six Annexes – A. Compendium of ROE – B. Guidance on the use of ROE in Air Operations – C. Guidance on the use of ROE in Land Operations – D. Guidance on the use of ROE in Maritime Operations – E. Guidance on the use of formatted ROE messages – F. Definitions and Amplifying Guidance on the Meaning of Terms


MC 362/1 provides written guidance on the use of force, including definitions. The Annexes provide detailed guidance on NATO ROE development and on the use of NATO ROE in operations.

Parts 1-3 define what NATO ROE are and how they apply to the individual, while Parts 4 and 5 are more directed to commanders and staff officers.



Slide 6.



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Compendium of NATO ROE

• Annex A to MC 362/1 provides a compendium of possible NATO ROE

• The “Rules” are grouped into number of “Series” which cover different aspects of military actions

• Every “Rule” is written either as a prohibition or authorisation

Example: Series 37 Use of Electronic countermeasures Rule 370. Use of Electronic countermeasures is prohibited Rule 374. Unrestricted use of Electronic countermeasures is authorised


Annex A of the MC 362/1 provides a compendium of ROE from which mission specific ROE may be chosen.

NATO ROE exist in a pre-written catalogue of “Rules” (message forms) in a numeric order. They range from geographic positioning, detention, harassment and counter-harassment, to attack.

It must be emphasised that some NATO ROE authorise actions and others restrain actions. NATO ROE are intended to regulate all actions that can be construed as provocative at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.



Slide 7.



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Purpose and Function of NATO ROE

• NATO ROE provide political and military direction for the conduct of NATO/NATO-led operations

• NATO ROE are used to control the threat or use of force or actions which might be construed as provocative, both in peacetime and in armed conflict situations

• By authorising or prohibiting certain actions or means, NATO ROE define when, where, how, how much and against whom force may be used

• NATO ROE are not used to assign concrete tasks or missions

• With the exception of self-defence, NATO ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led forces to use force


NATO ROE are the means by which the NAC provides political guidance on the conduct of military operations. They are not used to assign missions or tasks, NATO missions and tasks will be specified in the SACEUR’s OPLAN.

NATO ROE provide parameters within which NATO/NATO-led forces must operate in order to accomplish an assigned mission. For instance, in high intensity conflicts, the ROE enable domination of the battle space. In post-conflict situations, NATO ROE are designed to reduce violence during the NATO/NATO-led operations.

The MC 362/1 distinguishes peacetime NATO ROE from armed conflict ROE by referring to the authorisation of the use of force in peacetime and the limitations of the use of force during armed conflict. However, for policy reasons that have emerged from NATO’s recent operations, this distinction is no longer as certain. Current NATO ROE, whether in peacetime or armed conflict, are a mixture of authorisations and limitations. As a result, any use of force other than in self-defence requires ROE.



NATO ROE are sets of prohibitions and permissions that define:

WHEN force may be used. For instance, to board vessels, prevent interference with freedom of movement, defend military facilities, or attack opposing forces.

WHERE force may be used or Forces may operate. For instance, NATO ROE may limit operations to a specific geographic area.

HOW force may be used to achieve the desired ends. For instance, prohibiting or restricting use of specific weapons in designated circumstances or use of riot control agents.

HOW MUCH force may be used. NATO ROE may limit the degree, intensity and the necessary duration of the use of force. An example is limiting the use of force to the “use of force not including deadly force.”

AGAINST WHOM force may be used. For instance, interfering with NATO/NATO-led mission, persons demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces, or attacking forces declared hostile.

See Learning Objective 02 concerning the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE.



Slide 8.



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Law and NATO ROE

• International law defines the limits for the use of force during NATO/NATO-led operations

• NATO ROE are not the law but reflect the law and policy applicable to NATO/NATO-led operations

• While NATO ROE must not go beyond the limits defined by law, they may impose greater limitations on the use of force or provocative actions than those required by law

• Personnel participating in NATO/NATO-led operations remain bound by their national laws and cannot be obliged to execute tasks or operations which would constitute a breach of their national laws


The conduct of NATO/NATO-led operations is controlled by international law, to include the applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and human rights law. NATO ROE, and the application of them, never permit use of force that violates applicable international law. However, NATO ROE may impose greater limitations on the use of force or provocative actions than those required by law. Personnel participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must adhere to their own national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. National law may limit the use of force in certain types of military operations or in certain situations. For example, some nations’ laws do not permit the use of force or deadly force to protect property. When national laws are at variance with NATO ROE, nations participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must inform the NAC and the SACEUR of the inconsistencies as early as possible. Any such national restrictions and/or instructions, often called “national caveats,” must not be more permissive than the



use of force authorised for the operation. See also Learning Objective 02 for a discussion on self-defence and Learning Objective 04 concerning national caveats.



Slide 9.



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Compliance with NATO ROE

• NATO ROE must be adhered to by all forces engaged in a NATO/NATO-led operation.

• Within implemented ROE, it remains the commander’s responsibility to ensure that forces use only the degree of force that is lawful under the circumstances

• Thus, commanders are responsible for ensuring that subordinates act within the bounds of NATO ROE

• Both commanders and subordinates may be held responsible for any non-compliance with NATO ROE through national disciplinary and other processes


Commanders have a central role in the dynamic process of NATO ROE development, application, review and modification. Commanders have a responsibility to request clarification as well as modification when necessary to achieve mission accomplishment.

Commanders should be aware of further political statements / indications that may be contained in NATO ROE. See Learning Objective 04.



Slide 10.



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Summary

• NATO ROE provide guidance on the use of force and provocative actions across the spectrum of NATO/NATO-led operations

• MC 362/1 represents the NATO publication for ROE

• NATO ROE contain political and military direction for the conduct of NATO/NATO-led operations

• NATO ROE comply with international law

• In the application of NATO ROE, Personnel remain bound by their national law

• NATO ROE are a command and control tool


None.



Slide 11.

Topic: LO 2: The Relationship between Self-Defence and NATO ROE


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The Relationship between Self-Defence and NATO ROE



The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE.



Slide 12.



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Outline

• MC 362/1 definition of self-defence

• Meaning of terms in the MC 362/1 definition of self-defence

• Self-defence and NATO ROE

• MC 362/1 definition of extended self-defence

• Self-defence and Commanders’ control of the use of force



• Be aware of the MC 362/1 concept of self-defence and know that the legal basis for use of force in self-defence is an issue of national law

• Know that national laws differ with respect to the use of force in self-defence

• Understand the relationship between self-defence and NATO ROE

• Be aware of the NATO concept of “extended self-defence”

• Understand the relationship between self-defence and Commanders’ control of the use of force



Slide 13.



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Introduction

• Any use of force during NATO/NATO-led operations must be authorised by NATO ROE or in self-defence


See Part I, para 2 (p. 2) and Part II (p. 4) of MC 362/1.

When the use of force is not justified by self-defence, force may only be exercised within the constraints of and permissions authorised by NATO ROE. See Learning Objective 01 slide 7 and Learning Objective 03 slide 25.



Slide 14.



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MC 362/1 Definition of “Self-Defence”

• “Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.”


The concepts of individual and unit self-defence are distinct from state self-defence (e.g. see Article 51 UN Charter). The right of self-defence described in MC 362/1 refers to the individual and unit rights of self-defence and not the right of state self-defence.

This definition of individual and unit self-defence, found in MC 362/1 para 7 and Annex F, is used as a baseline for planning purposes for NATO/NATO-led forces. The aim of this definition is to provide a general definition of self-defence for use in discussions and planning, which may differ from national definitions. See Learning Objective 04.



Slide 15.



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Meaning of Terms in the MC 362/1 Definition of “Self-Defence”

• “Necessary” means that use of force is indispensable for securing self-defence

• “Proportional” means a response commensurate with the perception of the level of the threat posed. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary for self-defence and no more

• “Imminent” means that the need to defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming

• “Attack” is the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel

• “Deadly Force” means force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death


These are NATO definitions contained in para 7 of MC 362/1 and thus its meaning is related to the MC 362/1 concept of self-defence. Deadly force is defined in Annex F to MC 362/1. Be aware that the explanation of the term “Proportional” as mentioned on the slide is different from the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) principle of proportionality. Under LOAC, the principle of proportionality requires the evaluation of whether an attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The terms and definitions used in MC 362/1 regarding self-defence do not necessarily reflect the legal notion of self-defence in national laws. Members of the force shall adhere to their national laws on self-defence.



Slide 16.



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Self-Defence and NATO ROE

• NATO ROE do not limit the right of self-defence

• In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law

• Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins

• Personnel must be aware of their national interpretation of the concept of self-defence


See Appendix 1 to Annex A of MC 362/1 for the full discussion of what has been agreed upon by NATO nations.

If you have any questions about your national rules on self-defence, ask your national chain of command.


The legal basis for the use of force in self-defence is an issue of national law. Present your nation’s rule on individual self-defence.



Slide 17.



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MC 362/1 Definition of “Extended Self-Defence”

• “Within the general concept of self-defence, NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from attack or imminent attack.”


This definition is contained in para 8 of MC 362/1.

This MC 362/1 definition of extended self-defence is used as a baseline for planning purposes for NATO/NATO-led forces.

Commanders must be aware that some nations’ laws or policies on self-defence may not include the use of force to protect A) other NATO/NATO-led forces and persons; B) persons not belonging to NATO/NATO-led forces (e.g. civilian population); and/or C) property.



Slide 18.



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MC 362/1 concept of “PDSS” and “PRDSS”

• Some nations’ laws on self-defence do not include the use of force to protect persons not belonging to NATO/NATO-led forces and property

• NATO ROE can authorise use of force to defend designated persons and property using MC 362/1 concepts of PDSS and PRDSS

PDSS = Persons with Designated Special Status PRDSS = Property with Designated Special Status


Because some nations’ laws or policies on self-defence may not include the use of force to protect persons not belonging to NATO/NATO-led forces (e.g. civilian population) and property, the commanders and staff must also consider whether NATO ROE are required to allow such protection for mission accomplishment. In this case, commanders might need NATO ROE to ensure that NATO/NATO-led forces use force uniformly to defend the foregoing from attack or imminent attack.

The MC 362/1in this regard refers to “PDSS” or “PRDSS”

1. Use of force may be authorised within the NATO ROE framework to defend “Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS)”.

NATO ROE 337 is an example of how this use of force would be authorised.

2. Use of force may be authorised within the NATO ROE framework to defend “Property with Designated Special Status (PRDSS)”.

NATO ROE 333 is an example of how this use of force would be authorised.

PRDSS is usually assigned to mission essential military property or other objects such as water purification plants, electrical generators and communication towers.

Personnel must be aware that designation of special status requires NAC approval. This authority may be delegated.



Slide 19.



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Self-Defence and Commanders’ Control of the Use of Force

• Commanders may give orders to control the use of force by individuals and units

• Subject to national law and policy, such orders may be able to control the exercise of the right of self-defence


Commanders need to ensure their troops understand their right to use force in self-defence as defined by their national law.


Present your nation’s position on the relationship between self-defence and Commanders’ control of the use of force.



Slide 20.



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Summary

• In NATO/NATO-led operations, actions in self-defence may differ according to national concepts

• Self-defence is a national concept that applies according to your national law (e.g. principle of necessity, proportionality etc.)

• NATO ROE helps assure the commanders of a combined force that force will be used uniformly


None.



Slide 21.

Topic: LO 3: NATO ROE and the Use of Force


None.


NATO ROE and the Use of Force



The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that Personnel understand NATO ROE and the use of force as developed from the principles and concepts contained in MC 362/1.



Slide 22.



None.


Outline

• MC 362/1 Principles on Use of Force

• NATO ROE in Different Operations

• MC 362/1 Concept of Use of “Minimum Force”

• MC 362/1 Definition of “Attack” in the Context of NATO ROE Series 42

• MC 362/1 Concepts of “Hostile Act (not constituting actual attack)” and “Hostile Intent (not constituting an imminent attack)”



• Be familiar with MC 362/1 Principles on the Use of Force

• Understand the application of NATO ROE in different operations

• Understand the MC 362/1 concepts of “minimum force” and “deadly force”

• Understand the MC 362/1 definition of “attack” in the context of NATO ROE series 42

• Understand the MC 362/1 concepts of “hostile act (not constituting actual attack)” and “hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)”



Slide 23.



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MC 362/1 Principles Concerning the Use of Force in Peacetime Operations and in Operations Prior to the Commencement of Armed Conflict

• Generally, effort should be made to control a situation without the use of force

• If possible, give warning and opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions

• With respect to mission accomplishment, the degree, intensity and duration of the force used must be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective


NATO ROE for peacetime operations and in operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict consist of authorisations and restrictions a commander may use to direct, control and order the use of force to achieve an assigned mission, or to protect NATO-led or non-NATO forces and Personnel. During periods of tension or crisis, violence, conflict or hostilities may erupt without amounting to an armed conflict. Generally, NATO ROE in such circumstances will only permit the use of force in response to threats. Reasonable and prudent effort should be made to control a situation without the use of force. When time and conditions permit, the potential hostile forces should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. With respect to mission accomplishment, the degree of force used must be no more than that necessary to carry out duties and accomplish assigned objectives of the mission. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective. NATO/NATO-led forces generally should avoid action which may be perceived as provocative or aggressive.



Slide 24.



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Principles Concerning the Use of Force in Armed Conflict

• For operations entailing participation in armed conflict, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies

• Under LOAC, the use of force is governed by the principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality and humanity


Because any NATO ROE that violate the law of armed conflict are unlawful, it is important that Personnel are familiar with the law of armed conflict and any other legal regime that may be applicable. NATO ROE are self-imposed rules that must fall within the scope of the law of armed conflict.


Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, AJP 3.9, provides information in the NATO procedures on the planning and conduct of operations involving kinetic and non-kinetic means. The principles of LOAC are explained in STANAG 2449, Edition 2. In some nations, as a matter of policy LOAC principles are applied to military operations abroad regardless of whether it is an armed conflict. Instructors should research their national position on this point and present it during their training.



Slide 25.



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NATO ROE in Peacetime Operations and Armed Conflict

• All use of force during NATO/NATO-led operations must be in accordance with NATO ROE except for use of force in self-defence

• MC 362/1 provides that NATO ROE for peacetime operations are formulated as permissions, while NATO ROE for armed conflict are formulated as restrictions

• Current NATO ROE, whether in peacetime or armed conflict, are a mixture of authorisations and limitations


The general premise is that all use of force during NATO/NATO-led operations must be in accordance with NATO ROE except for use of force in self-defence. The MC 362/1 distinguishes between NATO ROE for peacetime operations from armed conflict operations by authorising the use of force in peacetime and limiting the use of force during armed conflict. However, for policy reasons, the distinction is no longer as certain, and current NATO ROE are a mixture of authorisations and limitations for all types of operations. Because NATO ROE rarely will permit all use of force that would otherwise be lawful, due to political and military considerations, NATO ROE will generally limit or restrict the otherwise lawful use of force. Furthermore, current practice is that all use of force must be in accordance with the applicable NATO ROE, regardless of the type of operation. This means that if there is no NATO ROE allowing a certain use of force or other provocative action, that action is not permitted. In such circumstances, a commander may decide to request new NATO ROE. New NATO ROE must be authorised by the NAC. Concerning the relationship between law and NATO ROE, see Learning Objective 01.



Slide 26.




Differences in the Use of NATO ROE for Different Operations

• For peacetime operations and operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict, NATO ROE will be drawn from Series 10, 20 and/or 30, and Rules 421-426

• For armed conflict, NATO ROE will be drawn from all Series, including Rules 427-429

Suggested text for the instructor’s note:

Peacetime operations and operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict will generally be conducted in order to limit or de-escalate the situation in order to avoid hostilities. In some cases, however, provocative measures may be authorised in order to determine strengths, capabilities and reactions of enemy forces and to defend NATO/NATO-led forces and operations in situations not covered by the right of self-defence.

Series 30 Series 10/20

Rules 427 to 429

Rules 421 to 426

Actions that could be seen as provocative

Use of minimum force to

accomplish designated

mission

Attack against elements

constituting a threat to NATO/

NATO led

forces

Attack against forces

declared

hostile



During armed conflict, persons and objects may be designated hostile in accordance with the law of armed conflict, and attacked on the basis of this status. Rules 427-429 are used to authorise such attacks.



Slide 27.



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NATO ROE Apply the Following Use of Force Concepts

• Use of Force not including deadly force

• Use of Minimum Force

• Attack o Attack in response to hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) o Attack in response to hostile act (not constituting actual attack) o Attack on lawful targets to include objects and persons declared hostile


This use of force concepts are developed and covered by MC 362/1 definitions in the following slides. Apart from NATO ROE, use of force may also be based on self-defence. See Learning Objective 02.



Slide 28.



None.


Use of Force Not Including Deadly Force

• For political or other reasons, the use of force may be limited to use of force not including deadly force

• If this strategic decision is made, for example, the following NATO ROE may be provided:

Rule 333: “Use of non-deadly force to prevent the taking possession of or destruction of water facilities is authorised”


NATO ROE are provided for mission accomplishment. In some situations, it may be appropriate to authorise the use of force not including deadly force. If there is a decision to authorise use of force not including deadly force, the rule will be drafted as shown in the example above.


Annex A of MC 362/1 in each of its ROE series explains procedures to follow when the NATO ROE prohibits the use of deadly force in certain situations.



Slide 29.



None.


Use of Minimum Force

• Use of “minimum force” includes, by definition, the authority to use up to and

including “deadly force”

• Minimum Force is defined as “force, up to and including deadly force, limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective”

• Deadly Force is defined as “force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death” Example:

• Rule 333: “Use of minimum force to prevent the taking of possession or destruction of radio tower is authorised”


Use of minimum force in NATO ROE includes the authorisation to use up to and including deadly force. In any situation, the force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective.

These definitions can be found in Annex F of MC 362/1.



Slide 30.



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Attack in the Context of NATO ROE Series 42

• Under NATO ROE Series 42, NATO/NATO-led forces and Personnel may be authorised to attack:

o in response to hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) o in response to hostile act (not constituting actual attack) o on lawful targets to include objects and persons declared hostile


In the context of NATO ROE Series 42, the term “attack” is generally used to mean the use of force by NATO/NATO-led forces against DESIG persons, forces, or targets. Note, however, that when referred to as “actual attack” or “imminent attack,” “attack” means the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces (or DESIG forces or personnel).

See Learning Objective 02 slide 15 for the discussion of attack on NATO/NATO-led forces in the context of self-defence.



Slide 31.



None.


Hostile Intent (not constituting an imminent attack)

“Hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)” is defined as a “likely and identifiable threat recognisable on the basis of both the following conditions:

a) capability and preparedness of individuals, groups of personnel or units which pose a threat to inflict damage and,

b) evidence, including intelligence, which indicates an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage”


Rules 421 and 423 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who demonstrate hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or Personnel.

In case of imminent attack, use of force in self-defence is permitted and therefore not regulated by NATO ROE. “Imminent” means a condition that is manifest, instant and overwhelming; usually refers to a threat to which defensive action is required (see Annex F of MC 362/1).

MC 362/1 lists non-exhaustive tactical and non-tactical events that may lead military personnel to respond against designated forces or individuals who demonstrate hostile intent:

a) manoeuvring into weapons launch positions (whether within effective range or not)

b) the deployment of remote targeting methods and the use of shadowers or tattletails to provide picture compilation

c) increased indications of mobilisation or warlike gestures revealed to public or gained from intelligence

d) increased movements of ammunition and the requisition of transportation



Note that isolated acts of harassment without intelligence or other information indicating an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage, will not normally be considered hostile intent.

[NOTE TO INSTRUCTOR] Use examples from your current national practice.



Slide 32.



None.


Hostile Act (not constituting actual attack)

• NATO ROE can authorise NATO/NATO-led forces to attack designated forces and individuals who commit or directly contribute to a hostile act (not constituting actual attack)

• “Hostile Act (not constituting actual attack)” is defined as “any intentional act causing serious prejudice or posing a serious danger to NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or Personnel.”


Rules 422 and 424 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who commit or directly contribute to a hostile act not constituting an actual attack. In case of actual attack, use of force in self-defence is permitted and therefore not regulated by NATO ROE.

The status of the crisis, the political situation at the time and, if known, the intent of the perpetrator (e.g., a defecting pilot) all play a part in determining if a “hostile act (not constituting actual attack)” has occurred.

MC 362/1 provides a non-exhaustive list of four examples of “hostile act (not constituting actual attack)”:

a) one or more units conducting mine-laying operations imposing restrictions upon the movements of NATO/NATO-led forces or PDSS;

b) military aircraft penetrating NATO airspace or airspace over a secure area and refusing to comply with interception instructions;

c) intentionally impeding NATO/NATO-led military operations; or

d) breaching or attempting to breach the security of a NATO/NATO-led military installation or restricted area.


Use examples from your current national practice.



Slide 33.



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Summary

• Except for use of force in self-defence, NATO ROE provide the sole authority on use of force for mission accomplishment in all NATO/NATO-led operations

• Current NATO ROE, whether in peacetime or armed conflict, are a mixture of authorisations and limitations

• MC 362/1 provides different series of ROE on provocative actions, use of force for mission accomplishment and attack

• Personnel should be aware of MC 362/1 key concepts and terminology for use of force in NATO/NATO-led operations:

o “minimum force” and “deadly force” o “attack” in the context of NATO ROE series 42 o “hostile act (not constituting actual attack)” and “hostile intent (not

constituting an imminent attack)”


None.



Slide 34.

Topic: LO 4: Developing NATO ROE


None.


Developing NATO ROE



The aim of this learning objective is to ensure that commanders and staff understand the procedures for developing, drafting, issuing and changing NATO ROE for a NATO/NATO-led operation.



Slide 35.



None.


Outline

• NATO ROE as a commander’s tool

• Bodies responsible for developing NATO ROE

• Operational planning process; OPLAN & NATO ROE

• Factors and different considerations affecting development of NATO ROE

• Drafting and promulgating NATO ROE

• Structure of Annex A to MC 362/1 and example of ROE

• NATO ROE specific messages (ROEAUTH, ROEREQ, ROEIMPL)

• Dormant, spare, and retained ROE

• National Caveats, restrictions and limitations

• The commander’s role in developing and applying NATO ROE

• Security Classification



• Recognise the inter-relationships of the bodies responsible for developing NATO ROE

• Understand operational planning process and relationship between OPLAN & NATO ROE

• Distinguish the factors and considerations affecting the development of NATO ROE

• Know how NATO ROE are drafted and promulgated

• Have a general overview of Annex A to MC 362/1and understand structure of NATO ROE

• Understand specific messages format required to establish mission specific ROE

• Understand role of national caveats, restrictions and limitations

• Distinguish and understand the security classification of NATO ROE

• Understand the commander’s role in developing and applying NATO ROE



Slide 36.



None.


NATO ROE as a Commander’s Tool

• NATO ROE are a tool for command and control

• Commanders at all levels are responsible for the application of force by their subordinates and must therefore understand the implications of the development and application of NATO ROE


None.



Slide 37.

Topic: LO4: Developing NATO ROE



Responsible Bodies

• NATO ROE Development is a cooperative political / military process

• NAC authorises the goals of NATO/NATO-led operations

• SACEUR directs subordinate commands to provide their input on the ROE development


The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body and oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance.

These political decisions are influenced by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), actions by other international organisations and the national perspectives of the member nations of the Alliance.

The NAC gives direction on the goals to be achieved during the NATO/NATO-led mission.

SACEUR (development)

NAC (authorisation)

Subordinate Commands (implementation)



In the NATO ROE Development process, SACEUR, who directs Allied Command Operations (ACO), then directs subordinate commands to provide their input to the multi-phased NATO military staff process for NATO ROE Development.



Slide 38.



None.


Operational Planning Process

• The Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) is the key NATO publication for operational planning

• Operational planning and NATO ROE development are parallel but collaborative processes


The Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) represents key NATO publication for operational planning. (COPD Interim Version 2.0, as of 4 October 2013).

COPD outlines the procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, implementation, assessment and review of operations plans to ensure a common approach to operations planning.

It details the path of the Alliance operations planning process and it translates political direction into military operation reality.

Consideration of the application of the military element of power begins whenever the NAC is concerned about a developing situation. The creation of NATO ROE are the result of a continuous planning sequence that begins with the monitoring of a situation and concludes with the delivery of an approved OPLAN with Annex E providing the operational NATO ROE. NATO ROE are developed to meet the requirements of the Strategic Planning Directive issued by SACEUR.



Slide 39.



None.


NATO OPLAN & ROE

• For each operation, a strategic OPLAN (approved by the NAC) and an operational OPLAN (approved by SACEUR) are produced

• The NATO ROE staffing and approval process may be independent from the staffing of an OPLAN, but it is always linked to it

• Mission specific ROE are an integral part of the OPLAN and are designed to facilitate mission accomplishment

• Authorisation to use force for mission accomplishment is contained in Annex E to OPLAN

• When OPLAN is put into effect it becomes “Operation Order” (OPORD)


An Operation Plan (OPLAN) is a “plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.”

An Operation Order (OPORD) is a “directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.”

(AAP-06 NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, 2012, Ver.2.)

The NATO ROE staffing and approval process may be independent from the staffing of an OPLAN, but it is always linked to the development or revision of the relevant OPLAN.



The NAC authorises NATO ROE and sends that authorisation to SACEUR. SACEUR then implements those NATO ROE by including them in the OPORD. It is only at that point that they are available to the commander for mission accomplishment.

As a product of the NATO operational planning process, NATO ROE are the responsibility of the operational staff. Subject matter experts will contribute: the legal advisor (LEGAD), political advisor (POLAD), gender advisor (GENAD), and civilian advisor (CIVAD).



Slide 40.



None.


Key Areas for NATO ROE Development

• Concept of Operations (OPLAN Annex A) • Task Organisation & Command Relationships (OPLAN Annex B)

• Forces, Missions and Tasks (OPLAN Annex C)

• Use of Force (OPLAN Annex E)

• Legal (OPLAN Annex AA)

• Targeting (OPLAN Annex II)


These are key areas where NATO ROE are addressed in the OPLAN.

INFO OPS and PSYOPS, CIMIC, Force Protection are other areas that may be considered in developing NATO ROE.

Because the potential use of force is central to the military contribution to a comprehensive approach, the development of NATO ROE will be affected by the design of the entire OPLAN.


Dependent on the audience, attention may be invited to one or more of these annexes.



Slide 41.




Factors Affecting development of NATO ROE

• Political considerations

• Operational considerations

• Legal considerations


The NAC provides SACEUR direction on the goals to be achieved when undertaking NATO/NATO-led operations.

The other complementary factors that influence the creation of NATO ROE are:

Political considerations

The ROE developed must reflect the political guidance provided by the NAC in the NAC Initiating Directive (NID) to achieve a desired end state.

ROE

OPERATIONAL LEGAL

POLITICAL

https://www.google.nl/url?q=http://cartesianproduct.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/venn-diagrams-for-11-sets/&sa=U&ei=KBpNU-LJIMSV0AXy8IGYAQ&ved=0CEwQ9QEwDzgo&usg=AFQjCNEkEaSHJr9pU-Pte1jw_jBGamrpHQ



Operational considerations

The ROE developed must enable mission accomplishment by taking into account key factors such as mission objectives and end state, available forces, military capabilities, area of responsibility, and geography.

Legal considerations

The ROE developed must reflect the NAC authorisation and the applicable legal framework for the NATO/NATO-led operation (which may include a UNSC mandate, host nation consent, law of armed conflict, international human rights law, host nation law, status of forces provisions).



Slide 42.



None.


Political Considerations for NATO ROE Development

• What are NATO’s policy objectives and constraints?

• What are the policy objectives and constraints of Partner and Host Nations?

• What are the Political Policy Statement (PPS) and Political Policy Indicators (PPI)?


These are questions that those developing NATO ROE should be asking.

The use of force framework will be guided by international law, NATO policy direction and, if applicable, national law. In addition to the considerations on the slide, the anticipated impact on civilians, the sensitivity of the operation to collateral damage and the appropriate PPI may also affect the development of NATO ROE.

The NAC will provide the guidance on its political policy in a PPS. The aim of the NAC’s PPS is to reflect the overall policy that will be incorporated into the authorised ROE and provide the proper context for the mission. PPS enable commanders to respond appropriately as the situation develops. For this reason PPS may change as the mission objectives change.

The PPS will be complemented by PPI, which guide the interpretation and application of appropriate NATO ROE. The PPI clarify how the situation is expected to develop when the ROE are employed, that is, whether the situation should de-escalate, the situation should remain as it is, or whether escalation is acceptable. This will affect, for instance, the degree of force used to ensure mission accomplishment and the authorisation level of attack on designated hostile forces or the use of force expected to cause collateral damage.

The PPS and PPI will be stated in the NATO ROE (Annex E of the OPLAN).

Often during NATO operations, policy considerations may narrow the otherwise lawful use of force. For example, during Operation Unified Protector in Libya, the



NAC invoked an “expectation of zero civilian casualties”. Consequently, no target was approved for engagement if there was the likelihood that there would be a single civilian casualty, even though the proposed strike may have met LOAC requirements of the principle of “proportionality.” In Afghanistan, in order to address domestic Afghan policy concerns, limitations were placed on the use of Close Air Support in civilian populated areas, the conduct of night raids, and detention.



Slide 43.



None.


Political Policy Indicators (PPI)

• XRAY – De-escalation: o Political/military strategy is to minimise NATO involvement in the crisis

to that necessary to achieve the aim.

• YANKEE – Maintain status quo: o Political/military strategy is to use NATO forces to maintain current

regional balance or return to previous status quo following destabilisation.

o Significant use of force to support specific objectives may be authorised under PPI YANKEE.

• ZULU – Risk of Escalation is Acceptable: o Political/military strategy is to authorise the use of force to support

achievement of the grand strategy including change of the status quo ante to generate a more favourable environment.

o Implicit in the approval of PPI ZULU is political recognition that military action may lead to escalation of the crisis.


These PPI categories can be found in para 14 of the MC 362/1.

From “XRAY” to “”ZULU” the level of response increases. The PPI may increase or decrease depending on the current situation or in accordance with planned phases.



Slide 44.



None.


Operational Considerations for NATO ROE Development

• What are the key military objectives to be fulfilled?

• What is your operating environment?

• What forces and capabilities are available to conduct the operation?


These are examples of operational questions that drafters of NATO ROE should be asking when developing NATO ROE. Other examples are mission variables, enemy, terrain, weather, troop support available, civil considerations, etc. In order to produce the best possible ROE, operators, assisted by subject matter experts, take the lead in the ROE development process.



Slide 45.



None.


Legal Considerations for NATO ROE Development

• The legal considerations for developing NATO ROE include: o the NAC authorisation (NID) o the legal basis for initiating the operation (for instance, a UNSC

mandate, Article 51 of the UN Charter, Host Nation Consent, or Customary International Law)

o the law relevant for conducting the operation (for instance, if applicable: LOAC, international human rights law, law of the sea, environmental law, status of forces provisions, host nation law, space law)


This slide shows some of the issues that may be necessary to consider during NATO ROE development.

For example, the legal basis for initiating the NATO/NATO-led operation Unified Protector provided the authority to use “all necessary measures” but formulated a limitation on operations within the Libyan territories by stating “excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (see UNSCR 1973). When authorising the operation, even though the mandate contained in UNSCR 1973 did not exclude ground elements, the NAC made a decision in the NAC Initiating Directive (NID) to have “no boots on the ground” during this air and maritime operation.

Host Nation Consent with the presence of NATO/NATO-led forces on its territory, usually captured in Host Nations Agreements, provides a legal framework for NATO to engage in operations to the extent agreed by the host nation. Operations based on Host Nation Consent may include, for example, security assistance operations, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), disaster relief operations, or other humanitarian assistance. A practical example is Special Operations Forces (SOF) executing defined Military Assistance tasks to mentor and train HN Special Police.



Such operations may include participation throughout all phases of a specified police tasks, but usually under Host Nation jurisdiction and authorities.

The rules of Customary International Law have been developed as a result of state practice and their acceptance as law; they are legally binding on states. See STANAG 2449 ed. 2 on Training in LOAC.

The legal classification of the operation will place legal limitations on the development of the NATO ROE. This can result in restrictions or limitations of activities of the NATO/NATO-led force. For instance, the use of force permitted by NATO ROE will be different during peacetime operations and operations in armed conflict.

One issue to be aware of is the complex operations involving both armed conflict and law enforcement paradigms, because it may be challenging to conduct operations under both at the same time. The NATO ROE may have to cover both legal regime scenarios at the same time, e.g. use of tear gas as a riot control agent covering law enforcement tasks versus controlling that tear gas is not used as a means of war under the armed conflict part of the operation.



Slide 46.




Influence of each factor affecting development of NATO ROE

• NATO ROE drafting teams must understand the flow of this image

• Each of the factors influences the development of NATO ROE

• Each of the factors plays a distinct role in the development of NATO ROE

o Operational force capabilities/considerations – DEVELOP/EVALUATE o Legal – REVIEW o Political - APPROVE


The NATO ROE process of development consists of three major phases. First, the different command levels develop or evaluate the ROE required, based on operational requirement. Then, the draft NATO ROE are subjected to legal review to ensure that they comply with applicable legal limitations before they finally are given political approval.

It is essential for drafting teams to be familiar with the legal and operational environment in which the NATO/NATO-led force will be operating and with NATO’s political and strategic goals developed by the NAC for given NATO/NATO-led operation. Throughout the drafting process, operational planners and the chain of command must continuously review the NATO ROE to ensure that they are in



compliance with NATO’s objectives and that those NATO ROE are sufficiently flexible to permit the military to accomplish its mandated operations. If the NATO ROE do not properly support the mission, planners/commanders must request a change of NATO ROE through the chain of command.



Slide 47.



None.


Examples of Questions to Be Answered When Developing NATO ROE

• Are there any geographical limitations?

• Are there any weapons that NATO does not want used?

• Who else may NATO Forces protect / defend? To what level of force?

• Is it permitted to defend property?

• Are kinetic operations permitted?

• Are information operations / cyber operations permitted?


NATO ROE generally reflect multiple elements, ranging from political guidance to operational and legal considerations for the specific mission.

These are examples of questions that may be asked when developing NATO ROE.

For instance, the use of anti-personnel mines can be controversial as there are different views within NATO. Although for some NATO nations the laying of mines is not prohibited by law, it can be restricted in NATO ROE for political reasons.

Similarly, national views may differ on questions relating to the protection of persons with designated status or protection of property of specific value or status.

Persons with designated status are certain groups of people that NATO/NATO-led forces are set to protect and NATO ROE might give further guidelines on what force to use in order to protect them.

Moreover, the NATO ROE might give specific guidance to NATO/NATO-led forces regarding protection of property of specific value or status.



Slide 48.



None.


Drafting NATO ROE

• NATO ROE are developed at the strategic and operations levels

• Drafting NATO ROE is the responsibility of the operations staff

• NATO ROE must be clear and concise


After the assigned mission has been determined and all considerations (policy, operational and legal) have been assessed, the process of drafting NATO ROE can begin.

The NATO ROE compendium, from which the drafters may choose, is provided in Annex A to MC 362/1. They are organised in numbered series that may contain up to ten rules.

To the maximum extent possible, NATO ROE are developed for a joint environment. However, when it is necessary to limit the application of the NATO ROE to a specific component, that limitation will be made clear in the text of the NATO ROE.

Drafting the NATO ROE is the responsibility of the operations staffs (i.e., J3/J5). Subject matter experts like political, legal, gender, and civilian advisors will assist with their expertise.

When drafting NATO ROE, commanders shall ensure internal staff coherence and coordinated development of the NATO ROE with the development of the OPLAN already from the beginning.



Slide 49.




Structure of Annex A to MC 362/1

• NATO ROE exist in a pre-written catalogue of “Rules” (message forms) in a numeric order

• The “Rules” are grouped into four “Series”

• Every “Rule” is written either as a prohibition or authorisation


The above image shows that individually numbered Rules can generally be organised into Series (categories). Rules are written as a series of prohibitions and authorisations (permissions) applicable to activities in a wide range of NATO/NATO-led operations.

When issued as prohibitions, the rules are orders to commanders not to take the designated action(s).

When issued as permissions, they define the limits of the threat or use of force, or of actions which might be construed as provocative, that commanders may take to accomplish their mission. However, permission is not an order to take a specific action. It simply provides authority to use force up to a specified threshold should that level of force be required.

Series 30 Series 10 - 20 Rules 427 - 429

Rules 421 - 426

Actions that could be seen as provocative

Use of minimum force to

accomplish mission

Attack against elements

constituting a threat

Attack on forces

declared hostile



Note that there is no series for self-defence, as MC 362/1 declares self-defence to be a right determined by the nations. NATO ROE are not required for use of force in self-defence.

Series 10 and 20 can be generally construed as “Provocative measures”. This may include actions such as positioning of forces, use of electronic counter-measures, the conduct of simulated attacks etc.

Series 30 contains rules needed for mission accomplishment. Remember, that the use of minimum force to accomplish designated mission can by definition always include deadly force. See Learning Objective 03.

Series 40 contain only Series 42 “Attack”. The rest of the 40 series are “spare”.

The NATO ROE from 421 to 426 are Rules on attack against elements constituting a threat to NATO/NATO-led forces. These rules help commander of NATO/NATO-led force to respond uniformly to threats (defensive NATO ROE).

The NATO ROE from 427 to 429 are Rules on Attacks of forces declared hostile and thus represent the offensive NATO ROE.



Slide 50.



None.


Example of a Series/Rule from MC 362/1: Annex A

11 RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES

Purpose: To apply relative positioning limitations on operations by NATO/NATO-led forces.

110. (SC) Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces closer than DESIG range of DESIG forces is prohibited.

111. Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces relative to DESIG forces is unrestricted.

112. - 119. Spare.


This is an example of ROE series from Annex A to MC 362/1.

Where DESIG is used, the drafters must designate, for instance the vessels, aircraft, vehicles, persons, area or type of force as appropriate. This means they or the class of vehicle etc. must be identified.

Where ‘SPARE’ is used in NATO ROE series this means that if ROE drafters do not find a suitable measure in the catalogue provided they can draft and ask for approval of a new rule, as required.

Some rules have the indicator “(SC)” at the beginning of the rule. This means that when such rule is chosen by drafters, the “(SC)” which means Strategic Commander (SACEUR) must immediately notify the NAC when such NATO ROE are implemented.



When multiple rules with the same number are requested during an operation, the SC (SACEUR) will add consecutive letter suffixes (i.e., A, B, C . . . AA, BB, CC . . .) for each proposed rule.



Slide 51.



PROCEDURES

SACEUR

MC

North Atlantic Council

ROEIMPL

ROEAUTH

ROEREQ

ROEREQ

JFC

ROEREQ

SACEUR

JFC

CC

ROEIMPL

MATRIX

TCN Forces


The ROE Request – ROEREQ

• ROEREQ are the commander’s tool for requesting initial or further authorisations for NATO ROE

• When requesting additional NATO ROE, it is done through ROEREQ message to a higher HQ

• The final ROEREQ will be reviewed by NAC


A full analysis of mission requirements must be undertaken before submitting the ROEREQ.

Based on the OPLAN, the mission and tasks, and the development of the situation, the SACEUR will consider the appropriate ROE to be implemented in support of mission accomplishment. The SACEUR requests NATO ROE from the NAC via Military Committee through a ROE Request message (ROEREQ).

ROEREQ messages are used by:

• The SACEUR to seek authority through the MC from the NAC to implement, modify or cancel ROE.

• A commander to seek the implementation, modification, or cancellation of ROE by a superior commander.

• Commanders to request authority to implement ROE not listed in the compendium in Annex A to the MC 362/1 (i.e., Spares).

The NAC will, based on Military Committee advice, authorise all, none, or part of the requested ROE and forward its decision to the SACEUR through a ROE

ROEREQ are the commander’s tool for requesting initial and further authorisations



Authorisation message (ROEAUTH). NATO ROE may be subsequently revised by the NAC based upon a new SACEUR ROEREQ.

When preparing ROEREQ, always follow MC 362/1 and try to avoid restating strategy and doctrine, LOAC, tactics, and safety related restrictions. National caveats should be emphasised.



Slide 52.



None.


ROEREQ Example

ROEREQ/131//

GENTEXT/1/ROETEXT/ROE ONE THREE ONE (131)/PHYSICALLY OBSTRUCTING TO PREVENT BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE OF THE DESIGNATED HIGH-VALUE UNIT(S) IS AUTHORIZED// GENTEXT/2/JUSTIFICATION/REQUIRED TO ENABLE DE-ESCALATORY AND DEFENSIVE ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE DESIGNATED HIGH-VALUE UNIT(S)//

GENTEXT/3/RISK IF NOT APPROVED/INADEQUATE AUTHORITY TO PROPERLY DE-ESCALATE SITUATIONS AND PROTECT THE DESIGNATED HIGH-VALUE UNIT(S), WHICH MAY PREVENT MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND LEAD TO LOSS OF ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY//


This is an example of a requested ROE serial.



Slide 53.



PROCEDURES

SACEUR

MC


ROEIMPL

ROEAUTH

ROEREQ

ROEREQ

JFC

ROEREQ

SACEUR

JFC

CC

ROEIMPL

MATRIX

TCN Forces


Process of promulgating NATO ROE

• Through “ROEAUTH” the NAC authorises those drafted ROE it considers appropriate for mission accomplishment

• SACEUR promulgates NATO ROE through ROE Implementation (ROEIMPL) messages

• ROEIMPL messages are sequenced and must be continuously promulgated

• The NAC may authorise a revision to NATO ROE based upon a “ROEREQ” from SACEUR


Once the development of NATO ROE is finalised (based on OPLAN), the drafted NATO ROE are endorsed by Military Committee (MC) and then either authorised or denied by NAC through “ROEAUTH” messages. That NATO ROE that have been authorised by NAC are then contained in Annex E to OPLAN.

Based on the OPLAN, the mission and tasks and the development of the situation, the SACEUR will consider the appropriate NATO ROE to be implemented in support of mission accomplishment.

SACEUR will request NAC to approve those rules to be appropriate for the mission accomplishment via ROE Request message (ROEREQ). The NAC will then, based on advice from the Military Committee, authorise all or only part of the requested NATO ROE.

SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe JFC – Joint Force Command (a directly subordinate HQ to SHAPE) MC – Military Committee TCN – Troop Contributing Nations CC – Component Command/Subordinate HQ



The authorised NATO ROE will then be implemented to each level of subordinate command by SACEUR through NATO ROE Implementation message (ROEIMPL).

When implementing NATO ROE, a commander must act within the NATO ROE authorised, but is not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised NATO ROE.

If the superior authority later withdraws or restricts NATO ROE previously implemented, commanders must immediately update their direction to subordinates to ensure compliance with the updated NATO ROE.

Even within implemented NATO ROE, it remains the commander’s responsibility to ensure that forces use only that degree of force which is lawful under the circumstances.



Slide 54.



PROCEDURES

SACEUR

MC


ROEIMPL

ROEAUTH

ROEREQ

ROEREQ

JFC

ROEREQ

SACEUR

JFC

CC

ROEIMPL

MATRIX

TCN Forces


ROEAUTH

• ROEAUTH messages are used by the NAC to authorise or to deny NATO ROE

• ROEAUTH messages must contain the entire text of each ROE serial being authorised

• Only authorised NATO ROE can be further implemented and used for mission accomplishment


NATO ROE are issued in ROE authorisation messages (ROEAUTH). NATO ROE will be listed in numerical order.

If a requested ROE is denied, ROEDENY will be placed at the start of the serial.

ROEAUTH will normally also contain general statements providing guidance on the implementation of the authorised ROE and may also address the political, diplomatic, and legal frameworks that support the mission.

Drafted NATO ROE are authorised by the NAC using an authorisation message (ROEAUTH).



Slide 55.



None.


ROEAUTH Example

If the ROE is approved, it will have the following format:

ROEAUTH/222// GENTEXT/ROETEXT/ROE TWO TWO TWO (222)/USE OF ALL ILLUMINANTS OR

ILLUMINATION SYSTEMS IS AUTHORIZED//


This is an example of an authorised ROE serial. The ROEAUTH message will contain all ROE serials currently approved.



Slide 56.



None.


Dormant NATO ROE

• Dormant ROE are NATO ROE that have been authorised by the NAC but have not been implemented by SACEUR because they will become available at a designated decision point

• Dormant ROE allow the SACEUR to prepare plans, orders, training, and materiel to be used once the dormant ROE become operative


Dormant NATO ROE are authorised by the NAC but only implemented at a particular milestone. Such NATO ROE are useful in rapidly evolving operational environments and may, for instance, be part of a branch plan. The NAC must also take into account the naturally uncertain circumstances of military operations.

Therefore, a milestone that describes the circumstances under which a dormant ROE may be declared operative must be formulated in terms of detailed and objective criteria, including at what level the decision that the milestone is met should be made. The NAC may set an expiry date/event after which the dormant ROE may not be implemented. The operative date/event or contingent nature of this ROE must be clearly set out in all references to such dormant NATO ROE.

The SACEUR must notify NAC through the MC immediately when dormant NATO ROE becomes operative.



Slide 57.



PROCEDURES

SACEUR

MC


ROEIMPL

ROEAUTH

ROEREQ

ROEREQ

JFC

ROEREQ

SACEUR

JFC

CC

ROEIMPL

MATRIX

TCN Forces


ROEIMPL

• SACEUR promulgates NATO ROE through ROE implementation messages (ROEIMPL)

• Each ROEIMPL message will contain the entire text of every NATO ROE serial that is currently implemented for the operation


When implementing NATO ROE for forces, a commander must act within the authorised NATO ROE.

ROEIMPL messages are used by a commander to control the application of ROE that has been authorised by higher headquarters. It may contain additional guidance or restrictions, or may withhold certain NATO ROE which have been authorised.

ROEIMPL are used to implement or cancel selected NATO ROE

• Additional guidance

• Restrictions

• Withhold



Slide 58.



None.


ROEIMPL Example

ROEIMPL/321B// GENTEXT/ROETEXT/ROE THREE TWO ONE BRAVO (321B)/USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS WHERE NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF MISSION EXECUTION IS AUTHORIZED, BUT ONLY WHERE SUCH USE IS NOT A METHOD OF WARFARE// AMPN/USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS MUST NOT VIOLATE THE 1993 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION/ONE OF THE PERMITTED USES OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS LAW ENFORCEMENT INCLUDING DOMESTIC RIOT CONTROL PURPOSES//


This is an example of an implemented ROE serial. This example also contains amplification on how to apply the ROE serial [see slide 60 on ROE Amplification (AMPN)]. The ROEIMPL message will contain all ROE serials currently implemented.



Slide 59.



None.


Retained NATO ROE - Implementation

• When implementing ROE for forces, a commander must act within the ROE authorised, but is not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised ROE


Commanders may either implement the whole mission specific ROE in force or they may narrow them to fit component-specific circumstances. However, they may not exceed the delegated authority.

Retained NATO ROE are not the same as Dormant ROE (see slide 56).



Slide 60.



None.


ROE Amplification (AMPN)

• AMPN is a clarification instruction contained within a ROEREQ, ROEAUTH or ROEIMPL message.

• Clarification for any or all of the ROE may be included in amplification lines that follow each requested, authorised or implemented ROE serial.

• The aim of the AMPN is to provide additional information

EXAMPLE:

AMPN/THIS ROE IS NOT TO BE DELEGATED BELOW CC//


AMPN provide additional information and guidance with respect to one or more of the ROE measures that have been authorised.

See also slide 58 for another example of an AMPN.



Slide 61.



None.


National Caveats, Limitations on and Interpretations of NATO ROE

• While consensus will be reached to approve the NATO ROE, individual nations may declare caveats or impose restrictions on their application to reflect their national laws and policies

• Commanders and staff must also be aware that nations may have differing interpretations of NATO ROE

• Such limitations on and interpretations of NATO ROE may impact on the ability of national forces to perform assigned tasks

Suggested text for the instructor’s note:

Caveats are defined as: “In NATO operations, any limitation, restriction or constraint of any nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO Command and Control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy or employ these assets fully in line with approved OPLAN. Note: A caveat may apply inter alia to freedom of movement within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the approved ROE.”

NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 Edition 2012, Ver.2.

National caveats are a doctrinally accepted way of stating anticipated nations’ limitations on the employment of their national forces. National caveats are raised by nations because they confer operational control over national contingents to the NATO Commander. Such caveats should be conveyed to NATO in advance of operations. It is usually done through a Transfer of Authority message. If national interpretations or policies are more restrictive than those of NATO ROE, the affected forces must comply with their national constraints. If the national interpretations permit more aggressive action than NATO intends, the NATO limitations apply.



Commanders must be aware of any national limitations or interpretations affecting forces under their command, and take this into consideration when planning for the use of those forces. A nation may raise additional restrictions during deployment of its forces. These restrictions are unanticipated and thus not characterised as caveats. This is done using a so called “Red Card.” The Red Card Holder is assigned specific authority by its own nation on the use of national assets. A Red Card Holder is usually established when sensitive means of combat are deployed (e.g. attack helicopters or fighter planes) in area of operations. The Red Card Holder has formal authority to deny the use of national assets to perform a specific mission assigned to that national contingent by the NATO commander.



Slide 62.



None.


Reasons to raise National Caveats

• Legal requirements of nations

o Constitutional constraints on use of military force o National parliamentary authorisation on involvement in a mission o International law/Treaty obligations

• Political and policy interests

• Overlap/Gaps between NATO mandate and other coalition operations

• Language, cultural and terminology differences


A nation may have various reasons to raise national caveats to NATO ROE. They may be either legal, political or others, such as cultural. When raising a national caveat, the nation notifies SACEUR of the restrictions placed on its forces.



Slide 63.



None.


Commander’s Role

• Commanders must review and understand NATO ROE issued to them

• Commanders should ask: o Do I have the NATO ROE that I need to:

– Do what I need to do to accomplish my mission? – Go where I need to go? – Protect those I need to protect?

o Which of the NATO ROE do I have to push down to my subordinates? o Are retained ROE held at the right level? o Do I need to submit a ROEREQ?


Commanders have the responsibility to ensure that the NATO ROE provided are suitable for their mission.

NATO ROE should be continuously reviewed by commanders to ensure that they are clear and lawful, that they are sufficient to address the requirements of the mission, and that they provide commanders with the necessary powers to deal effectively with the threat. If not, commanders must request further authorisations via a ROEREQ.

Commanders may always use less force than is permitted by the NATO ROE when appropriate. Commanders may never permit any action that will exceed the use of force provisions laid out in the applicable ROE.



Slide 64.



None.


NATO ROE Can Be Changed

• NATO ROE should be constantly reviewed for correspondence with political direction and proper support for the Commander’s mission

• NATO ROE may be altered: • If the situation so requires • If it does not support policy • If it jeopardises or does not properly support military operations


The NATO ROE system is designed to be flexible. It includes a process for constant review and amendment to correspond to emerging situations.

The NATO ROE should be changed, for example, when the mission changes, the threat changes, the unit is assigned with new tasks, force capabilities change or commanders do not believe they have the right NATO ROE for the mission.

Requests for new ROE must be approved by NAC, which means that the process may be very time consuming. Furthermore, those developing the ROE would have been of the opinion that the existing ROE are the most appropriate for the missions. Therefore, a request for new ROE is most likely to succeed if it can be demonstrated that there is a situation that the planners had not foreseen and that the current ROE do not fit.



Slide 65.



None.


Commanders’ Role in Developing and Applying NATO ROE

• Commanders must understand how NATO ROE affect their ability to accomplish the mission and ensure force protection

• Commanders must understand how the Political Policy Statement (PPS) and Political Policy Indicators (PPI) affect the application of NATO ROE

• In cases where modification or clarification is required, the commander must request action and guidance from higher command


Commanders have a central role in the dynamic process of NATO ROE development, application, review and modification. Commanders have a responsibility to request clarification as well as modification when necessary to achieve mission accomplishment.

Commanders should be aware of PPS and PPI that may be contained in NATO ROE. See Slides 42-43 of this Learning Objective O4.

As commanders are responsible for providing Force Protection within their operational areas, they must constantly assess whether the authorised and implemented NATO ROE provide them with a sufficiently available range of force protection measures.

Force Protection is defined as a “set of measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.”

For more information, see Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection AJP-3.14 (November 2007).



Slide 66.



None.


Security Classification

• Security classification of the mission specific ROE for an operation will be determined by the NAC, taking into account the prevailing political and operational circumstances

• ROE Messages (ROEREQ, ROEAUTH, ROEIMPL) will ordinarily take on the same security classification as the OPLAN


Any amendment to the security classification of the NATO ROE necessary because of its release will be authorised by the NAC at the same time.



Slide 67.



None.


Summary

• NATO ROE are means by which the NAC provides political direction for the conduct of NATO/NATO-led operations

• NATO ROE are product of the NATO operational planning process

• NATO ROE are usually contained in Annex E to the OPLAN

• Drafting NATO ROE are a responsibility of the operations staff

• NATO ROE are a commander’s tool and responsibility


None.



INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX C TO ATrainP-4

C-1 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

ANNEX C NATO ROE TRAINING EXERCISE SCENARIO

C.1. PURPOSE

This Annex C provides an outline of a training exercise in NATO ROE. A completed training exercise has been developed by the Joint Warfare Centre, and this package can be found at https://XXX. This training exercise may be used to train commanders and staff as well as to fulfil the unit level training identified in Annex D. Nations may adjust the training exercise to their needs for training in NATO ROE.

C.2 CONTENT OF THE TRAINING EXERCISE The scenario depicted in this exercise provides background about a situation involving several nations. The training package contains the following documents:

a. A geographical map

b. The historical background of the situation

c. The UN Security Council Resolutions

d. The NAC Initiating Directive

e. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

f. The ROE annex to the NATO Operation Plan (OPLAN)

The map, historical background and CONOPS will allow the audience to have a general understanding of the scenario. The audience will be aware of the location, timelines, the actors, and the intention of the commander on how he or she will address the situation. The training audience will also gain a general understanding of the political factors influencing the situation through the UN Security Council Resolutions. The CONOPS describes in detail the objectives, means and methods the commander intends to utilise to meet those objectives.

C.3 HOW TO USE THE TRAINING EXERCISE a. For Training of Commanders and Staff

This training exercise may be used to train commanders and staff who are responsible for developing NATO ROE as part of the operational planning process. For a description of the ROE Development process, see Learning Objective 04 in Annex B. The training audience is required to develop the ROE necessary for the operation described in the CONOPS. The intention of this exercise is for the training audience to plan at the strategic and operational level while recognising the tactical implications of their decisions.

ANNEX C TO ATrainP-4

C-2 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

In this exercise, the CONOPS is given. In this CONOPS, the general outline of the conflict and the general objectives of the operation are depicted. The audience is required to draft a ROE annex for an OPLAN based on the information given (the map, historical background, UNSCR and CONOPS). The training audience needs to consider a variety of issues, such as the constraints given by the UNSCR and how they will affect the development of NATO ROE. The commander’s intent plays a vital role in developing the ROE. It is also important to consider the situation in which the operation takes place (see Annex B and its Learning Objective 03 slides 23 – 26). These considerations will affect the development of NATO ROE. This includes any Political Policy Indicators (PPI) that may apply (see Annex B and its Learning Objective 04 slides 42 – 43). The objective is that the training audience is able to understand the process for developing NATO ROE. b. For Unit Level Training

This exercise may also be used for unit level training. The training audience is provided an ROE matrix developed from the OPLAN and will use it to apply NATO ROE in a series of training vignettes that may arise during the conduct of the NATO/NATO-led operation.

The training is focused on the practical application of the NATO ROE. The training audience does not need to develop the ROE; rather it needs to apply the ROE in the training vignettes. The intention is to train Personnel on the concepts and principles listed in Para 2 in Annex D.

ANNEX D TO ATrainP-4

D-1 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

ANNEX D UNIT LEVEL NATO ROE TRAINING GUIDANCE

D.1. INTRODUCTION

This Annex D provides recommendations to nations on conducting unit level training on NATO ROE.

Unit Level training means collective training. The aim of such training is to prepare teams, units and other elements to perform military tasks in accordance with defined doctrine standards.

In order to achieve the standard for training on NATO ROE and to enhance understanding of MC 362/1, nations are invited to adopt these recommendations when conducting training on NATO ROE.

NATO ROE training remains a national responsibility. The responsibility to train staff assigned to NATO headquarters (HQ) remains with the respective HQ. Due to the changing nature of NATO/NATO-led operations, it has become increasingly important that nations ensure that their Personnel are properly trained in NATO ROE prior to deployment. Personnel should receive appropriate generic training and mission specific instruction on ROE, in a manner chosen by each nation, regardless of their role. Training on NATO ROE should include a variety of possible missions in which NATO/NATO-led forces may be involved. NATO/NATO-led forces must be capable of operating across the spectrum of operations. This annex offers recommendations on how nations may prepare and conduct NATO ROE training. It recommends NATO standards that nations should accomplish when conducting their training. Best practices and techniques that nations may use are also provided.

D.2. PURPOSE OF UNIT LEVEL TRAINING

After receiving NATO ROE training, Personnel should possess an understanding of the following information:

• Why all NATO/NATO-led operations will have NATO ROE;

• NATO ROE for all NATO/NATO-led operations will consist of a mixture of authorisations and restrictions, and, with the exception of self-defence, will provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led forces to use force;



• NATO ROE use of force principles;

• NATO concepts of “hostile act (not constituting actual attack)” and “hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)”;

• NATO concept of “extended self-defence” as defined in MC 362/1 part II;

• That the concept of individual and unit self-defence may differ in each NATION; and

• The difference between use of minimum force and use of non-deadly force and the circumstances under which each level of force may be used.

D.3. TRAINING AND EVALUATION

In development of their NATO ROE training programmes nations are encouraged to use following training processes:

a. Analysis: Analysis of missions and the requirements to support these missions; Nations should utilise the Lessons Learned from recent NATO/NATO-led operations, and exercises when planning their training programme.

b. Design: Design all aspects of training to ensure that training objectives are met; Training on NATO ROE should be conducted at all levels, with special emphasis at the operational and tactical level.

Nations should ensure that both general and mission specific training in ROE are provided. Generic training on NATO ROE is a fundamental building block to prepare Personnel for mission specific ROE training. Nations should be aware that mission specific training is essential so that Personnel are familiar with the use of force authorisations and limitations that will apply to a given NATO/NATO-led operation. It is the responsibility of commanders to ensure that Personnel deploying on a mission are trained, understanding that in situations of short notice the ability to train in NATO ROE may be limited. Furthermore, the training conducted should correspond to possible mission scenarios.

c. Development: Development of the course, staff, material and apparatus; Nations should refer to Annex B to AtrainP-2 when developing their ROE training package/programme. Scenarios should match the conflict paradigm. NATO ROE used for training should correspond to the training scenario.

In addition, ROE cards for Personnel may be developed. However, these cards should not be a restatement of the OPLAN or OPORD. Their primary function should be to advise Personnel on the situations they may use force.



d. Conduct: Execution of the training;

Personnel should be briefed on the exercise of NATO ROE as if they were participating in a real mission. In all training scenarios NATO ROE that are used should be similar in nature and scope to those NATO ROE that would be used in an actual mission of that type.

It is desirable that members of the operations, planning, training or legal staff with NATO ROE expertise are present during the execution of the training to ensure proper application of NATO ROE and note any violations. These violations should be addressed and corrected in a timely manner.

e. Evaluation: The assessment whether the training has achieved the learning

objectives in the most effective and efficient way;

Nations should conduct Lessons Learned functions, such as an After Action Review (AAR), to identify weaknesses or shortfalls.

f. Validation: To evaluate if the training conducted actually met the operational

requirements. Nations should use the Lessons Learned to correct or modify their training when appropriate. Further references:

– Bi-SC 75-2, Education & Training Directive, 2 October 2013

– MC 458/2, NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy (Final), 12 October 2009



INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX E TO ATrainP-4

E-1 Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1

ANNEX E GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCE LIST

This Annex E presents: 1. Glossary of Abbreviations used throughout the ATrainP-4 and its Annexes A - D; 2. Reference list of NATO Doctrine related to development and training in NATO

ROE in ATrainP-4 and its Annexes A-D. E.1. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR After Action Review

ACO Allied Command Operations

AJP Allied Joint Publication

AMPN Amplification

CC Component Command(er)

CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation

CIVAD Civil Adviser

CONOPS Concept of Operations

COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

DESIG Designated

GENAD Gender Adviser

GENTEXT General Text

INFO OPS Information Operations

JFC Joint Force Command

JWC Joint Warfare Centre

LEGAD Legal Adviser

LOAC Law of Armed Conflict

MC Military Committee

NAC North Atlantic Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

NID NAC Initiating Directive

OPLAN Operation Plan

OPORD Operation Order

PDSS Persons with Designated Special Status

POLAD Political Adviser

PPI Political Policy Indicator(s)

PPS Political Policy Statement

PRDSS Property with Designated Special Status

PSYOPS Psychological Operation

ROE Rule(s) of Engagement

ROEAUTH ROE Authorisation



ROEDENY ROE Denial

ROEIMPL ROE Implementation

ROEREQ ROE Request

ROESUM ROE Summary

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SC Strategic Commander (SACEUR)

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe

SOF Special Operation Forces

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

E.2 REFERENCE LIST OF NATO DOCTRINE RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT

AND TRAINING IN NATO ROE

This reference list represents a non-exhaustive list of NATO directives and policies that should be taken into account when developing and training on NATO ROE. Many of these documents will also be relevant during mission execution. NATO ROE must be read in conjunction with related NATO policies, directives, doctrines and other publications such as:

– MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement

– STANAG 2528, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection AJP-3.14

– STANAG 2285, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting AJP-3.9

– STANAG 2180, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations AJP-3.4

– STANAG 2181, Peace Support Operations AJP-3.4.1

– Bi-SC Directive 15-23 Policy on Legal Support

– Bi-SC Directive 40-1 Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure

– MCM-0016-2012 Children and Armed Conflict

– Bi-SC 80-3 Reporting Directive, Volume III, Operations and Situations Reports (for message formats, chapters 20-22)

– Bi-SC 75-2, Education & Training Directive, 2 October 2013

– MC 458/2, NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy (Final), 12 October 2009

– ACO Directive 80-70 Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO

– ACO Manual 80-70 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to Prosecute Time Sensitive Targets

– Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive – Interim Version 2.0

– AAP 6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions



INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-4(A)(1)

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT

ACCORD DE NORMALISATION

STANAG 2449

TRAINING IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

FORMATION AU DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS

EDITION 2/ÉDITION 2 20 March/mars 2013

NSA(JOINT)0402(2013)NTG/2449

NORTH ATLANTIC

TREATY ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ

DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD

Published by THE NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY

(NSA)

Publié par l’AGENCE OTAN

DE NORMALISATION (AON)

© NATO/OTAN

- i -

20 March/mars 2013 STANAG 2449

Edition/Édition 2

LETTER OF PROMULGATION LETTRE DE PROMULGATION

STATEMENT DÉCLARATION

The enclosed NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG), which has been ratified by member nations, as reflected in the NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD), is promulgated herewith.

L’accord de normalisation OTAN (STANAG) ci-joint, qui a été ratifié par les pays membres dans les conditions figurant dans la Base de données des documents de normalisation OTAN (NSDD), est promulgué par la présente.

IMPLEMENTATION MISE EN APPLICATION

This STANAG is effective and ready to be used when nations have incorporated procedures set down in this agreement into national orders or instructions.

Ce STANAG entre en vigueur dès réception et est prêt à être mis en application dès que les pays ont incorporé les procédures qu’il énonce dans leurs ordres ou instructions nationaux.

The partner nations are invited to adopt this STANAG.

Les pays partenaires sont invités à adopter ce STANAG.

SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS ANNULÉS ET REMPLACÉS

This STANAG supersedes the following document:

Ce STANAG annule et remplace le document suivant :

STANAG 2449, Edition 1, dated 29 March 2004

STANAG 2449, Édition 1, du 29 mars 2004

ACTIONS BY NATIONS MESURES À PRENDRE PAR LES PAYS

Nations are invited to examine their ratification of the STANAG and, if they have not already done so, advise the NSA of their intention regarding its implementation.

Les pays sont invités à examiner l'état d’avancement de la ratification du STANAG et à informer, s’ils ne l’ont pas encore fait, l’AON de leur intention concernant sa mise en application.

Nations are requested to provide to the NSA their actual STANAG implementation details.

Les pays sont priés de fournir à l’AON des informations détaillées sur la mise en application effective de ce STANAG.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

This STANAG is a NATO non classified document to be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

RESTRICTION TO REPRODUCTION

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies.

Dr. Cihangir AKSIT, TUR Civ

Director, NATO Standardization Agency

CLASSIFICATION DE SECURITE

Ce STANAG est un document OTAN non classifie qui doit etre traite conformement au C-M(2002)60.

RESTRICTION CONCERNANT LA REPRODUCTION

Aucune partie de Ia presente publication ne peut etre reproduite, incorporee dans une base documentaire, utilisee commercialement, adaptee ou transmise quelle qu'en soit Ia forme ou par les moyens electroniques ou mecaniques, de photocopie, d'enregistrement et autres sans l'autorisation prealable de l'editeur. Sauf pour les ventes commerciales, cela ne s'applique pas aux Etats membres ou aux pays du Partenariat pour Ia paix, ni aux commandements et organismes de I'OTAN.

M. Cihangir AKSIT, Ph. D., TUR Civ.

Directeur de I' Agence OTAN de normalisation

- ii-

STANAG 2449

Edition/Édition 2

- 1 -


TRAINING IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

FORMATION AU DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS

AIM BUT

The aim of this NATO standardization agreement (STANAG) is to respond to the following interoperability requirements.

Le présent accord de normalisation OTAN (STANAG) a pour but de répondre aux exigences d’interopérabilité suivantes.

INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS EXIGENCES D’INTEROPÉRABILITÉ

To standardize training in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) by establishing a minimum standard of training to ensure that NATO operations are conducted in accordance with LOAC, where applicable.

Normaliser la formation au droit des conflits armés (DCA) en établissant une norme minimale en la matière pour garantir que les opérations de l’OTAN seront menées conformément au DCA, le cas échéant.

AGREEMENT ACCORD

Participating nations agree to implement the following standard.

Les pays participants conviennent de mettre en application la norme suivante.

STANDARD NORME

ATrainP-2, Edition A – Training in the Law of Armed Conflict

ATrainP-2, Édition A – Formation au droit des conflits armés

OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS AUTRES DOCUMENTS CONNEXES

N/A s.o.

NATIONAL DECISIONS DÉCISIONS NATIONALES

The national decisions regarding the ratification and implementation of this STANAG are provided to the NSA.

Les décisions nationales concernant la ratification et la mise en application du présent STANAG sont communiquées à l’AON.

The national responses are recorded in the NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD).

Les réponses nationales sont consignées dans la Base de données des documents de normalisation OTAN (NSDD).

STANAG 2449

Edition/Édition 2

- 2 -

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

MISE EN APPLICATION DE L’ACCORD

This STANAG is implemented when nations have incorporated the procedures set down in this agreement into national orders or instructions.

Le présent STANAG est mis en application dès que les pays ont incorporé les procédures qu’il énonce dans leurs ordres ou instructions nationaux.

Nations are invited to report on their effective implementation of the STANAG using the form in Annex H to AAP-03(J).

Les pays sont invités à rendre compte de la mise en application effective du présent accord au moyen du formulaire figurant à l’Annexe H à l’AAP-03(J).

Partner nations are invited to report on the adoption of the STANAG using the form in Annex G to AAP-03(J).

Les pays partenaires sont invités à rendre compte de l’adoption du présent STANAG au moyen du formulaire figurant à l’Annexe G à l’AAP-03(J).

REVIEW RÉEXAMEN

This STANAG is to be reviewed at least once every three years. The result of the review is recorded within the NSDD.

Le présent STANAG doit être réexaminé au moins une fois tous les trois ans. Le résultat de ce réexamen est consigné dans la NSDD.

Nations and NATO bodies may propose changes, at any time, through a standardization proposal to the tasking authority (TA), where the changes will be processed during the review of the STANAG.

Les pays et les organismes OTAN peuvent, à tout moment, proposer des modifications en soumettant une proposition de normalisation à l'autorité de tutelle (TA), qui traitera ces modifications lors du réexamen du STANAG.

TASKING AUTHORITY AUTORITÉ DE TUTELLE

This STANAG is supervised under the authority of:

Le présent STANAG est sous la responsabilité de :

Military Committee Joint Standardization Board/Bureau de normalisation interarmées du Comité militaire (MCJSB)

NATO Training Group(NTG)/Groupe d’entraînement OTAN

CUSTODIAN PILOTE

The custodian of this STANAG is: Le pilote du présent STANAG est :

STANAG 2449

Edition/Édition 2

- 3 -

Mr. Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner – Chairman of the LOAC NTG TG/

M. Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner – Président du LOAC NTG TG

Legal Adviser/Conseiller juridique

Allied Command Transformation Staff Element Europe/ Élément d’état-major Europe du Commandement allié Transformation

7010 SHAPE, Belgium/Belgique

[email protected]

FEEDBACK INFORMATIONS EN RETOUR

Any comments concerning this STANAG shall be directed to:

Tous les commentaires concernant le présent STANAG doivent être adressés à :

NATO Standardization Agency (NSA)

Agence OTAN de normalisation (AON)

Boulevard Léopold III

1110 BRUXELLES – Belgique

NATO STANDARD

ATrainP-2

TRAINING IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Edition A Version 1

MARCH 2013

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TRAINING PUBLICATION

Published by the NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

© NATO/OTAN

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION {NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY {NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

20 March 2013

1. The enclosed Allied Training Publication ATrainP-2 Edition A Version 1, TRAINING IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, which has been approved by the nations in the MCJSB, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2449.

2. ATrainP-2 Edition A Version 1 is effective upon receipt.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dr. Cihangir Aksit, TUR Civ Director NATO Standardization Agency

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-2

I Edition A Version 1

RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

ATrainP-2

II Edition A Version 1

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-2

III Edition A Version 1

RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

General GRC


ATrainP-2

IV Edition A Version 1

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ATrainP-2

V Edition A Version 1

RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

GRC (1) p.133/Slide No 70/Suggested Text for the Instructor

Note/par.1/line 5: Art 64 Par.1 GCIV raises a reservation concerning the jurisdiction applied to the occupied territory for security reasons or in order to implement the GCIV. For this reason, the text has to be modified as follows: "of the occupied territory in principle shall remain in force".

(2) p.148/Slide No77/ Suggested Text for the Instructor

Note/par.4: Awaiting for the internal ratification process concerning the review of the ICC Statute as decided during the relevant conference held in Uganda (2010).


ATrainP-2

VI Edition A Version 1

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ATrainP-2

VII Edition A Version 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 1-1 ANNEX A LOAC REFERENCE MATERIAL A-1 ANNEX B LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR ALL PERSONNEL B-1 ANNEX C LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS C-1 ANNEX D LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR OFFICERS D-1 ANNEX E SPECIALIZED LOAC TRAINING E-1 ANNEXF LOAC TRAINING MODULE TEMPLATE F-1

ATrainP-2

VIII Edition A Version 1

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-2

1-1 Edition A Version 1

CHAPTER 1

1. TRAINING STANDARD GOAL The training standard goal is to standardize training in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) by establishing a minimum standard of training to ensure that NATO operations are conducted in accordance with LOAC, where applicable. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1. In the context of this publication, LOAC is the part of international law relating to the conduct of armed conflict and military occupations. 2.2. The training guidelines are meant for Personnel, that is in the context of this publication to all members of the armed forces. 3. DETAILS OF THE PUBLICATION 3.1. Objective of this publication This publication provides guidance on the minimum standard of training in the LOAC. Annex A lists LOAC reference material which Nations may draw from when conducting their LOAC training. Annexes B - D lists topics that should be covered in the training of Personnel. Specialized LOAC training may be required for categories of Personnel identified in Annex E. Annex F offers a template for Nations to use in the preparation of their national training documents. If Nations wish to use this publication to train persons other than members of the armed forces, they may do so. 3.2. Responsibilities for training 3.2.1. In order to meet the legal obligations placed upon them by LOAC, Nations are required to train their Personnel in LOAC. LOAC training is a national responsibility. 3.2.2. Obligations under LOAC are binding on Nations and individuals. Those in command shall ensure that Personnel under their command are aware of their obligations under LOAC and that they comply with LOAC. 3.2.3. Nations shall ensure that legal advisors are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of LOAC and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.

ATrainP-2


3.3. Objectives of training 3.3.1. The overall objective of LOAC training is to ensure in all circumstances an appropriate knowledge of and adherence to LOAC by all Personnel. 3.3.2. The training objectives are:

a. To provide Personnel with the knowledge they require to conduct their duties in compliance with LOAC.

b. To reaffirm the awareness of possible criminal liability and other consequences of a breach of LOAC.

c. To provide Personnel with the ability necessary to properly apply LOAC and to react accordingly.

d. To enable commanders and staff officers to take into account LOAC limitations and precautions during the planning, the preparation and the conduct of operations within the framework of their assignment.

e. To enable commanders to solve the problems inherent in the application of LOAC and to take decisions accordingly.

3.4. Instruction and training principles The following instruction and training principles are to be applied:

a. All Personnel are to be trained in LOAC. Forces deployed on NATO operations should conduct training prior to and during the operation.

b. LOAC training should be incorporated in all levels of military education, individual and collective training, and exercises.

c. LOAC training should be commensurate with the degree of responsibility of Personnel and their operational role. Training for Personnel should be more detailed and progressive according to rank and responsibilities.

d. The basic level of instruction for all Personnel is outlined in Annex B. e. NCOs and officers require a more detailed appreciation and

understanding of LOAC. As such, enhanced instruction and training, as outlined in Annexes C and D, is recommended.

f. Certain individuals and functions may require specialized training, as identified in the non-exhaustive list in Annex E.

g. Nations should ensure that LOAC training is delivered by properly trained instructors.

h. LOAC training should include scenarios, exercises and practical field training. When preparing units and staff for NATO operations, specific emphasis should be placed upon practical field training.

i. Nations are encouraged to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies in LOAC training.

j. The effectiveness of LOAC training should be evaluated at all levels of command. Lessons learned and after action reports should be incorporated into the development of training programmes.

ATrainP-2


3.5. Evaluation of training Nations are encouraged to evaluate their national LOAC training programmes and to tailor the evaluation to the specific needs of their audience in accordance with national requirements and with their own training standards. Nations are encouraged to use a combination of methods to evaluate the knowledge of the training audience. Evaluation methods may include class room assessment, test papers and field training scenarios. 4. COORDINATION Nations should regularly inform each other of LOAC training programmes.

ATrainP-2


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ANNEX A to ATrainP-2

A-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX A LOAC REFERENCE MATERIAL

LOAC obligations primarily arise from customary international law and treaties. This non-exhaustive list does not impose any obligation on States that are not party to one or more of the listed treaties.

TITLE ABBREVIATION

Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008 CCM 2008

Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 2005

AP III 2005

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 2000

Opt Prot CRC 2000

Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict The Hague, 1999

Hague Prot 1999

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998

ICC Statute 1998

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997

AP Mine Ban Conv 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 1993

CWC 1993

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (“Convention on Conventional Weapons”), 1980. (Amendment article 1, 21 December 2001)

CCW 1980 / CCW Amdt 2001

Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) 1980 to the Convention on Conventional Weapons

CCW Prot I 1980

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) 1980 to Convention on Conventional Weapons (Protocol II as amended in 1996)

CCW Prot II 1980



TITLE ABBREVIATION

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) 1980 to the Convention on Conventional Weapons

CCW Prot III 1980

Protocol on blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV) 1995 to the Convention on Conventional Weapons

CCW Prot IV 1995

Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) 2003 to the Convention on Conventional Weapons

CCW Prot V 2003

Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1977

AP II 1977

Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977

AP I 1977

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1976

ENMOD Conv 1976

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972

BWC 1972

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 1954

Hague Prot 1954

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 1954

Hague Conv 1954

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, signed at Geneva, 1949

GC I 1949

Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, signed at Geneva, 1949

GC II 1949



TITLE ABBREVIATION

Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, 1949

GC III 1949

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed at Geneva, 1949

GC IV 1949

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly, 1948

Genocide Convention 1948

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 1925

Geneva Gas Prot 1925

Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 1907, and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land

Hague Reg 1907

Declaration (IV, 3) concerning Expanding Bullets, signed at The Hague, 1899

Hague Declaration 1899

Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grams Weight, signed at St Petersburg, 1868

St Petersburg Declaration 1868



INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX B to ATrainP-2

B-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX B LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR ALL PERSONNEL

1. Upon completion of the training all Personnel should know their rights and duties relating to LOAC.

2. All Personnel are to receive training on the following topics:

a. Introduction

(1) Historical background

(2) Purpose and rationale of LOAC

(3) LOAC applicability

(4) Relationship between LOAC and national law

(5) Importance of LOAC in planning and conduct of operations

b. Basic principles

(1) Military necessity

(2) Proportionality

(3) Humanity

(4) Distinction

c. Combatants

d. Protected persons

e. Protected objects

f. Protective and distinctive emblems

g. Means and methods of warfare, including prohibitions under LOAC and applicable national obligations

h. Enforcement of LOAC

(1) State obligations

(2) Individual responsibility

(3) Command responsibility

(4) War crimes

ANNEX B to ATrainP-2

B-2 Edition A Version 1

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX C to ATrainP-2

C-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX C LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

1. Upon completion of training NCOs should:

a. Know their rights and responsibilities relating to LOAC.

b. Be able to ensure compliance with the essential LOAC rules at their level.

c. Be able to fulfill their command responsibilities relating to LOAC and LOAC violations.

d. Be able to take proper action in the face of a breach of LOAC.

e. Apply LOAC limitations and precautions during the planning, the preparation and the conduct of operations.

2. Training for NCOs should emphasize the following areas:

a. Introduction






b. Basic principles


(2) Proportionality

(3) Humanity

(4) Distinction

c. Combatants


e. Role of ICRC

f. Protected objects

g. Protective and distinctive emblems

h. Means and methods of warfare, including prohibitions under LOAC and applicable national obligations

i. Enforcement of LOAC



ANNEX C to ATrainP-2

C-2 Edition A Version 1


(4) Prevention of LOAC violations

(5) War crimes

ANNEX D to ATrainP-2

D-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX D LOAC TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR OFFICERS

1. Training for officers should be more detailed and progressive according to rank and responsibilities. Upon completion of the training, officers should:

a. Know their rights and responsibilities relating to LOAC.

b. Be able to ensure compliance with the essential LOAC rules at their level.

c. Be able to fulfill their command responsibilities relating to LOAC and LOAC violations.

d. Be able to take proper action in the face of a breach of LOAC.

e. Apply LOAC limitations and precautions during the planning, the preparation and the conduct of operations.

f. Know that in multinational operations obligations may vary among personnel of different nationalities according to national law or LOAC obligations, and reflect this in the planning and conduct of operations.

2. Training for officers should include the following areas in relation to LOAC:

a. Introduction






b. Basic principles


(2) Proportionality

(3) Humanity

(4) Distinction

c. Combatants


e. Role of ICRC

f. Protected objects

g. Protected places and zones

h. Protective and distinctive emblems

i. Means and methods of warfare, including prohibitions under LOAC and applicable national obligations

j. LOAC in planning and conduct of operations

k. Truce and armistice

ANNEX D to ATrainP-2

D-2 Edition A Version 1

l. Law of occupation

m. Enforcement of LOAC




(4) Prevention of LOAC violations

(5) War crimes

ANNEX E to ATrainP-2

E-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX E SPECIALIZED LOAC TRAINING

Depending on each Nation’s requirements, the categories of Personnel on the following non-exhaustive list may be provided with specialized LOAC training:

a. Commanding officers

b. Flag and general officers

c. Legal advisors

d. Medical personnel

e. Military police

f. Personnel involved in targeting

g. Personnel who handle captured persons

h. Pilots

i. Religious personnel

j. Special operations forces

ANNEX E to ATrainP-2

E-2 Edition A Version 1

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ANNEX F to ATrainP-2

F-1 Edition A Version 1

ANNEX F LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TRAINING MODULE TEMPLATE

Training in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

• The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols provide that States shall disseminate the text of the Conventions as widely as possible. In order to meet the legal obligations placed upon States by LOAC and to ensure that military operations conducted by NATO forces are carried out in accordance with LOAC, where applicable, it is imperative that all Personnel be properly trained in LOAC. The responsibility for training in LOAC always rests with the national authorities.

• This document is intended to serve as an exemplar or template for Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) to use in the conduct of LOAC training that addresses the topics contained in Annexes B - D in the publication. This training module template (in format of power-point presentation) may be adapted, completely or partially, for use in format, substance, and structure by TCN. The abbreviations concerning international treaties and conventions used in the instructor´s notes correspond with the Annex A (LOAC Reference material) of this publication. This presentation does not prescribe the substance of LOAC that must be taught; it is fully recognised that each TCN is responsible for providing LOAC instruction based on national interpretation.

• Nothing in this Annex shall be construed as any of the STANAG 2449 Edition ATrainP-2 ratifying nations deviating from their national standpoints regarding international law, in particular, LOAC. It is only for training purposes and does not necessarily constitute a part of any nations’ state practice or the NATO position on the substance of LOAC.

• Instructors should consult their legal advisors for additional support and guidance as to the appropriate, nationally approved content for LOAC training.



Slide 1.

Topic: TITLE


NOT NECESSARY, THIS IS A TITLE PAGE


LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Suggested text for the instructor note



Slide 2.

Topic: INTRODUCTION




OUTLINE


Outline:

- Introduction to Law of Armed Conflict

- Basic principles - Combatants - Protected persons - Role of ICRC - Protected objects - Protective and distinctive emblems - Means and methods of warfare - LOAC in the Planning and Conduct of Operations - Truce and ceasefires or armistices - Law of Occupation

- Enforcement of LOAC

- Summary

The instructor should tailor this slide to identify the topics to be covered according to the rank

and responsibilities of the target audience as outlined in Annexes B - D of STANAG 2449 Edition ATrainP-2



Slide 3.

Topic: INTRODUCTION




INTRODUCTION

TO THE

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT




Slide 4.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



What is LOAC?

LOAC is a set of rules which:

• defines the rights and obligations of the parties to an armed conflict

• limits the effects of armed conflict by restricting the means and methods of warfare

• protects persons and objects in armed conflict


Law of armed conflict (LOAC) is also known as the law of war (LOW) or international humanitarian law (IHL).

International law governs relations between states. LOAC is the part of international law that governs the conduct of armed conflict.

LOAC is a set of rules which seeks, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.

It defines the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities. For instance, there are rules designed to save combatants from superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

It also aims to protect persons who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities, such as the sick, wounded and shipwrecked, prisoners of war, religious and medical personnel, and civilians. Certain objects such as cultural property, places of worship and hospitals benefit from special protections which will be discussed later.



Slide 5.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



Historical Background


The cornerstone of LOAC are the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The first was signed by 12 countries in 1864. For centuries before then, rules had applied to the conduct of war, but they were based on custom and tradition and were local or just temporary. Year 1864 changed all that and began a process of building a body of law that is still evolving today.

The initiative for the first convention came from five citizens of Geneva. One of them, Henry Dunant, had, by chance, witnessed the battle of Solferino in 1859. He was appalled by the lack of help for the wounded and organized local residents to come to their aid. Out of this act came one of the key elements of the first Geneva Convention of 1864 – the humane treatment of those no longer taking part of the battle, regardless of which side they were on.

New Geneva Conventions were concluded in 1906 and 1929, so as to improve the conditions of sick and wounded soldiers in the field and to define new rules on the protection of prisoners of war. In 1899 and 1907, the Hague Conventions concerning respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Reg 1907, mainly aimed at regulating the conduct of warfare, were also adopted. In August 1949, the four Geneva Conventions as we know them today were adopted. This time they also included the protection of civilians, reflecting the terrible experience of World War II.

Protocols were added to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 (AP I, AP II) and 2005 (AP III).

The reach of LOAC has been expanded by a range of other international conventions and protocols covering specific areas such as:

• certain conventional weapons (e.g. blinding laser weapons, non-detectable fragments);

• chemical and biological weapons;

• anti-personnel mines;

• cluster munitions; and

• protection of children in armed conflicts.



The core, however, remains the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005. They combine clear legal obligations and enshrine basic humanitarian principles.



Slide 6.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



Purpose of LOAC

• To protect combatants from unnecessary suffering;

• To protect those who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities;

• To protect certain objects and the natural environment from the effects of armed conflict; and

• To facilitate the restoration of peace and resumption of friendly relations between belligerents following hostilities.


LOAC has evolved to its present content over centuries and has at its core the following rationales:

LOAC represents the international community’s attempt to balance two basic criteria – military necessity and concerns that affect the successful planning and execution of military operations, and the humanitarian concerns which allow all societies to meet the basic moral and ethical norms. This balance has taken place, and continues to take place, in all cultures and times. Where the balance is struck in any particular conflict or operation may vary, just as the specific application of LOAC has varied across cultures and times, however, the basic principles remain.

By regulating the conduct of hostilities, the purpose of LOAC is:

- to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering;

- to protect those who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities; such as the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war (POWs) or civilians;

- to protect certain objects and the natural environment from the effects of armed conflict; and

- to facilitate the restoration of peace and resumption of friendly relations between belligerents following hostilities.

Compliance with LOAC aims to prevent brutality and savagery in conflict, which will inevitably affect future friendly relations. Respect of LOAC contributes to the restoration of peace.



Slide 7.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



Rationale of LOAC

(reasons to comply)

Principled

• Common human nature

• Professionalism

• Chivalry

• Conscience

• Legal Obligation

Pragmatic

• Operational Effectiveness

• Reciprocity

• Foreign and Domestic Support

• Criminal Liability


Principled Reasons for Personnel to Obey LOAC:

Common human nature: hostilities, if not avoidable, shall not aim at purposeless destruction, but achieve the military goals with least destruction, suffering and casualties.

Professionalism: the controlled application of force is the hallmark of an honourable, regulated and disciplined armed force.

Chivalry: armed forces exhibit honour, courtesy and justice in all their undertakings.

Conscience: all Personnel possess a conscience and should know the difference between right and wrong. Minimising human suffering is a noble and praiseworthy aim. In short, following LOAC is the right thing to do.

Legal obligation: Nations have accepted responsibilities for the conduct of their armed forces and these responsibilities create legal obligations for their Personnel at individual and command levels.



Pragmatic Reasons to Obey LOAC:

Operational Effectiveness: LOAC is consistent with the economic and efficient use of force which in turn preserves military resources.

Reciprocity: belligerents must treat their opponents in the same manner that they themselves wish to be treated. By treating others as one wants to be treated, according to the rules of LOAC, we encourage our enemies to do likewise.

Foreign and Domestic Support: compliance with LOAC, long established rules which aim to limit unnecessary suffering, will more likely result in domestic and foreign support.

Criminal Liability: to address breaches of LOAC there are criminal and disciplinary sanctions.



Slide 8.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



LOAC Applicability

• International armed conflict

• Non-international armed conflict

• Occupation


The term armed conflict is not defined in international law. LOAC only states that violence below a certain threshold does not qualify as “armed conflict”.

For the assessment whether an armed conflict exists, the factual circumstances are relevant. In this respect, both the extent and duration of armed violence are the key factors. For example, many isolated incidents such as border clashes and naval incidents are not treated as “armed conflict” as they often do not involve the level of intensity necessary to be considered “armed conflict”. As well, situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature are not considered to qualify as “armed conflict”.

Decisions of international courts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, although being only binding upon the parties in a particular case, may be used as subsidiary means for the determination of the law. With this in mind, for example, one such definition is found in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia decision (1997) in the Tadic case:

International Armed Conflict: “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”.

Non-International Armed Conflict: “whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised groups within a State”.



The specific provisions concerning the applicability of LOAC in situations of international and non-international armed conflicts are as follows:

International Armed Conflicts:

Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions 1949 (GC IV) reads as follows:

“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”.

Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1949 (AP I 1977) applies the same provisions of LOAC as applicable in International Armed Conflicts to armed conflicts in which “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”. The conflicts referred to in article 1(4) are largely a thing of the past. The article is only binding upon the states parties to Additional Protocol I.

Non-international Armed Conflicts:

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 1949 reads as follows: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:[…]”.

Article 1 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 1949 (AP II 1977) reads as follows:

“1.This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol 2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” The article is only binding upon the states parties to Additional Protocol II.

Occupation:

Article 42 of Hague Regulations of 1907 (Hague Reg.) reads as follows:



“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”

Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions 1949 reads as follows:

“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”



Slide 9.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



The law of use of force and the law of armed conflict

• The law of use of force – jus ad bellum

• The law of armed conflict – jus in bello


The law of use of force (jus ad bellum):

LOAC applies to armed conflicts. It does not regulate whether a State may actually use force; this is governed by an important, but distinct, part of international law. The law of use of force is the body of international law that regulates the circumstances when states may use force.

The Charter of the United Nations contains basic rules, including a general prohibition on the use of force, which nonetheless recognizes the inherent right of the States to individual and collective self-defence, and the authority of the UN Security Council to impose measures including the use of military force to maintain international peace and security.

UN Charter

Article 2 (4):

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

Article 42:

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 51:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.



Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

The difference between the law of use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed conflict (jus in bello):

The purpose of LOAC is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and assisting its victims to the extent possible. LOAC addresses the reality of armed conflict without considering the reasons for or legality of the initial resort to force. It regulates only those aspects of the conflict which are of humanitarian concern. Its provisions apply to the warring parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict and whether or not the cause upheld by either party is just. The application of LOAC does not involve the denunciation of the parties to a conflict as that would be bound to arouse controversy and paralyse implementation of the law, since each adversary would claim to be a victim of aggression. Moreover, LOAC is intended to protect war victims and their fundamental rights, no matter to which party they belong.



Slide 10.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



Main Sources of LOAC

Treaty Law

Agreements which have been concluded by States in writing and which are legally binding on these States only.

Customary International Law

Rules which have been developed as a result of State practice and of their acceptance as law and which are legally binding on all States.


Sources of LOAC:

LOAC is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between States and other subjects of international law, such as intergovernmental organizations, or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

International law is contained in international treaties, in customary international law and in general principles of law.

LOAC, like other parts of international law, arises principally from these two basic sources: treaty and customary law.

Treaty law mainly arises through the conclusion of international treaties between two or more States (there are also treaties between States and intergovernmental organizations, or between intergovernmental organizations). Generally, treaties are binding only on States party to them. Other terms for “treaty” include: Convention, Charter, Protocol, Covenant, etc.

Customary international law consists of rules which have been developed as a result of State practice accompanied by the respective legal belief (opinio juris sive necessitatis) over a period of time. Generally, customary international law is binding on all States, except for those states having persistently objected to the application of such a rule to them.

Much of LOAC in today’s environment comes to us through a mixture of these sources.



According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, judicial decisions (and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists) may be applied as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Some examples of international courts and tribunals are:

- International Court of Justice (ICJ)

- International Criminal Court (ICC)

- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

- Special Court for Sierra Leone

- Special Tribunal for Cambodia

- Special Tribunal for Lebanon

- Special Court for East Timor

- International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (1945-49)

- International Military Tribunal of Tokyo (1946-48)



Slide 11.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



Relationship between LOAC and National Law


Rules and provisions contained in international conventions on the LOAC are usually implemented in national laws and regulations through different legal acts, e.g. acts of parliament, governmental decrees, ministerial decrees, military manuals etc.

Personnel shall be aware of obligations stemming them from international conventions to which their state is a party to, as well as obligations arising from national laws. Because not all states are parties to the all international conventions, Personnel should be aware that in multinational operations their obligations may differ.

Provisions of the conventions with criminal liability implications are normally implemented in national criminal codes. Jurisdiction over Personnel usually rests with national authorities although in circumstances when nations are unable or unwilling to hold person criminally liable for violations of LOAC, some international criminal tribunals may have jurisdiction over them.



Slide 12.

Topic: INTRODUCTION



LOAC in the Planning and Conduct of Operations

In the planning and the conduct of operations, LOAC must be considered at all levels and at all times.


LOAC does not only have to be considered by decision making authorities at the command level, but also by all persons involved in the execution of military operations.

Each phase of an operation must be verified for conformity with LOAC during planning stage and continually evaluated during execution to ensure compliance. The overall effects of the operation must be similarly scrutinized during both planning and execution.

LOAC therefore must be part of both the planning and execution of operations.



Slide 13.

Topic: BASIC PRINCIPLES




BASIC PRINCIPLES




Slide 14.




Military Necessity

• States may only use force not otherwise prohibited by LOAC that is necessary for the defeat of the enemy.

• Military necessity is not an overriding principle allowing breaches of LOAC rules.

It does not justify violations of LOAC.


Principle of Military Necessity:

• This principle could be considered, in many ways, as the foundation of all of LOAC. Under this principle, States may only use force not otherwise prohibited by LOAC that is necessary for the complete submission of the enemy. Thus, the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited (cf. Art. 22 Hague Reg 1907).

• Military Necessity according to NATO Definition (AAP 6, 2010): “The principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by the laws of war.”

• The only legitimate objective which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy – St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868.

• The quotation from the St. Petersburg Declaration demonstrates the longstanding nature of the principle of military necessity in treaty law. However, modern authors have suggested that one should aim to ‘defeat’ rather than simply ‘weaken’ the enemy.



Slide 15.




Proportionality

Civilian losses resulting from military action (collateral damage) must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.


Principle of Proportionality:

• This principle requires that the anticipated military advantage must be balanced against other consequences of the action. It involves weighing the interest in a successful operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effects upon protected persons and objects, such as civilians and civilian objects, on the other hand. Collateral damage arising from military operations must not be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from such operations.

• Collateral damage is the loss of life or injury to civilians or civilian objects resulting from military action. Such damage must never be the objective of an attack. Collateral damage refers only to damage that is incidental to the military action, even if foreseeable.

• The test to determine if an attack is proportionate is whether such attack “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”

[Article 51 (5)(b) of the AP I 1977]

• The anticipated military advantage must be balanced against other consequences of the action, such as the adverse effect upon civilians or civilian objects. It involves weighing the interests arising from the success of the operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful effects upon protected persons and objects on the other.

• Although application of the principle of proportionality may result in incidental harm and damage to civilians and civilian objects, attacks against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited.



[Articles 51(5)(b) & 57(2)(b) of the AP I 1977]

Slide 16.




Humanity

• Where LOAC does not provide specific rules, the principle of humanity applies as a general standard of behaviour in armed conflict.

• Furthermore, this principle is the basis for LOAC provisions regarding the standard of treatment of protected persons and the specific prohibition against the infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.


Principle of Humanity:

• Where LOAC does not provide specific rules, the principle of humanity applies as a general standard of behaviour in armed conflict (cf. the so-called Martens’ clause – further comprised e.g. in Article 1 ( 2) AP I 1977: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”)

• Protected persons shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. Inhumane treatment of protected persons is a (war) crime.

• Military personnel may not use methods or means of warfare that are calculated or expected to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.



Slide 17.




Distinction

Requires to distinguish between:

• Combatants and civilians

• Military objectives and civilian objects

Military attacks shall be directed only at military objectives (combatants and military targets).

Civilians or civilian property must not be the object of attack.


Principle of Distinction:

• The principle of distinction is set out in Article 48 of the AP I 1977. It reads that: “…Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”

Military Objectives:

• Military objectives are combatants and those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

[Article 52(2) of the AP I 1977]

• Military force may be directed only against military objectives, and not against civilian objects. Under the principle of distinction, the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, may not be made the object of attack.

• Constant care shall be taken to spare civilian life and civilian objects, such as consideration of populated areas, possibilities of shelter, movements of civilians, pattern of life, different periods of day, etc.

• The application of the principle is dependant on the information available to the commander at the time he makes his decision. Accordingly, if commander makes



reasonable efforts, in good faith, to discover the status of a target he will not automatically violate this principle if the target turns out to be civilian.



Slide 18.

Topic: COMBATANTS




COMBATANTS


The principle of distinction requires that military force may be directed only against military objectives, and not against civilian objects. The presentation will now turn to the rights and obligations of combatants.



Slide 19.

Topic: COMBATANTS



Combatants

• Members of the armed forces, except medical and religious personnel, are combatants

• Combatants have the right under international law to participate directly in hostilities

• Combatants can attack enemy combatants or legitimate military objectives causing death, injury and destruction in accordance with LOAC


Member of Armed Forces:

• Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

[Article 4 of the GC III 1949]

• Armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units that are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.


• Militias, volunteer corps and organized resistance movements must “belong” to a party to the conflict in the sense that they are acknowledged by that party as fighting on its behalf or in its support.

[Article 43 (1) of the AP I 1977]

• The right to directly participate in hostilities is not an individual right but is given because the individual is a member of the armed forces.



Paramilitary / Law Enforcement Agents:

• If a party to a conflict incorporates paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies into its armed forces, it must inform other parties to the conflict of this fact.

• These forces are then considered lawful combatants.




Slide 20.

Topic: COMBATANTS



Levée en masse


Levée en masse:

• As a general rule, civilians cannot lawfully engage in hostilities. There is, however, an exception to this rule for inhabitants of a territory that has not been occupied by an enemy.

• Where they have not had time to form themselves into regular armed units, inhabitants of a non-occupied territory are regarded as combatants if:

a. on the approach of the enemy they spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces;

b. they carry arms openly; and

c. they respect the LOAC.

• This situation is referred to as a “levée en masse”.

[Article 2 of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 4 (6) of the GC III 1949]



Slide 21.

Topic: COMBATANTS



Combatant Immunity

The LOAC provides combatant immunity for the lawful acts of combatants during armed conflict


• Together with the combatant’s right to directly participate in hostilities, international law affords combatant immunity for lawful acts committed by a combatant during armed conflict.

• As such, combatants cannot be held criminally responsible for lawful acts within the bounds of LOAC and any national directions regarding the use of force.



Slide 22.

Topic: COMBATANTS



Spies and Mercenaries


Spies:

• Any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy but are still entitled to basic minimum rights.

[Common Article 3 to the GC / Article 75 of the AP I 1977]

• A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces.

[Article 46 of the AP I 1977]

Mercenaries:

• A mercenary is not a combatant neither a prisoner of war.

• A mercenary is any person who: is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.




Slide 23.

Topic: PROTECTED PERSONS




PROTECTED PERSONS




Slide 24.




Permanent Medical Personnel

They shall not be attacked.

Temporary Medical Personnel

They shall not be attacked while engaged in medical duties.


Medical Personnel – protection and treatment:

Permanent Medical Personnel:

• Personnel of the armed forces permanently assigned to medical activities, to the administration of medical units and to medical transport (“medical duties”) are Medical Personnel.

• Permanent medical personnel shall be protected and respected at all times. They shall not be attacked.

• Permanent medical personnel are not combatants. They may carry light individual weapons for self-defence and defence of wounded under their charge. They do not lose their protection solely for the reason of being so armed.

[Article 22 of the GC I 1949]

• If captured, permanent medical personnel will be returned to their own armed forces unless they are retained by the detaining power to assist POWs.

[Articles 24, 28 (1) & 30 (1) of the GC I 1949; Articles 37 (1) & (2) of the GC II 1949; Article 33 (1) of the GC III 1949; Articles 8 (3) & 43 (2) of the AP I 1977]



Temporary Medical Personnel:

• Personnel of the armed forces temporarily assigned to medical duties during a limited period of time, such as stretcher-bearers, are non-combatants when engaged in such duties.

• Temporary medical personnel must be protected and respected while engaged in medical duties. They may not be attacked while so engaged.

• If captured, temporary medical personnel become POWs.

[Articles 25 & 29 of the GC I 1949]

Distinctive Emblem:

• All permanent medical personnel must display the distinctive emblem (red cross, red crescent or red crystal). Temporary medical personnel must wear the distinctive emblem when engaged in performing medical duties.

[Articles 38 & 39 of the GC I 1949]

• All permanent medical personnel, in addition to wearing the identity distinction mentioned in Article 16 of the GC I 1949, shall also carry a special identity card bearing the distinctive emblem.




Slide 25.




Religious Personnel

• Chaplains of the armed forces and other religious personnel are not combatants

• They must be respected and protected

• They shall not be attacked


Religious personnel:

• Chaplains (and other religious personnel) of the armed forces are not combatants. They may not be attacked. If captured, they will be returned to their armed forces unless they are retained by the Detaining Power to assist POWs.

[Articles 24, 28 (1) & 30 (1) of the GC I 1949; Articles 36 & 37 (1) & (2) of the GC II 1949; Article 33 (1) of the GC III 1949; Article 43 (2) of the AP I 1977]

• The obligation to respect and protect religious personnel goes back to the 1864 Geneva Convention and was repeated in the subsequent Geneva Conventions of 1906 and 1929. It is now set forth in Article 24 of the GC I 1949 and Article 36 of the GC II 1949. The scope of this protection was expanded in Article 15 of the AP I 1977 to cover civilian religious personnel in addition to military religious personnel in all circumstances.

• Religious personnel may carry light individual weapons for self-defence and defence of those in their care. They do not lose their protection solely for the reason of being so armed.

[Article 22 of the GC I 1949, Article 35 of the GC II 1949, Article 13 of the AP I 1949]



Slide 26.




Civilians

• Any person who is not a member of the armed forces or taking part in a levée en masse is a civilian

• Civilians may not be attacked unless they participate directly in hostilities

• Civilians shall not be the object of reprisals

• Nothing in LOAC restricts the individual’s right to self-defence

• Civilians shall be protected from the effects of hostilities

• Women and Children deserve special considerations for treatment


Civilians:

• A “civilian person” means any person who does not belong to the armed forces and is not taking part in a “levée en masse”.

[Articles 43 & 50 of the AP I 1977, Article 4 of the GC III 1949]

• Civilians must be protected against direct attack, "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities".


• Civilians shall not be the object of reprisals.

[Article 33 of the GC IV 1949, Art 51 (6) of the AP I 1977]

• One of the key elements of LOAC is the clear distinction between members of the armed forces and civilians. In contemporary armed conflicts, however, the proximity of civilians to military operations leads to confusion as to the implementation of the principle of distinction.




The ‘Doubt Rule’:

• In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian or not, that person shall be considered as a civilian. The presence of individuals other than civilians within civilian population does not deprive the population of its civilian character.


Protection of civilians:

• Civilians shall be protected from the effects of hostilities. In particular, they shall not be directly attacked. Civilians shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.

Treatment of civilians:

• Civilians are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Special Considerations for Women and Children:

• Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. Pregnant women and mothers having dependent infants who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, shall have their cases considered with the utmost priority.

[Article 27 of the GC IV 1949, Article 76 of the AP I 1977]

• Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other reason.


• The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.




Slide 27.




Persons Accompanying the Armed Forces


Persons Accompanying the Armed Forces:

• Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof (such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces), provided that they have received authorisation from the armed forces which they accompany, are civilians and are protected as such.

• They risk, however, being injured or killed incidentally to a lawful attack on a legitimate target. They must not be deliberately attacked.

• If captured, they are entitled to POW status.

[Article 13 of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 4A (4) GC III 1949]

• A similar protection is offered to civilians aboard merchant marine vessels and civil aircraft of Parties to a conflict.

[Article 4A (5) of the GC III 1949]



Slide 28.




Journalists and War Correspondents


Journalists:

• Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered civilians. As such, they may not be attacked. If a journalist is detained, his/her status will be that of a civilian.


• Like other civilians, journalists lose their protection against attack when and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. This principle is also recognized in Article 79(2) of the AP I 1977, which grants protection to journalists “provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status”.

War Correspondents:

• Journalists are not to be confused with “war correspondents”. The latter are journalists who accompany the armed forces of a State without being members thereof. As a result, they are civilians and may not be made the object of attack Pursuant to Article 4(A) (4) of the GC III 1949, however, war correspondents are entitled to prisoner-of-war status upon capture.

• War correspondents are civilians. They risk, however, being injured or killed incidentally to a lawful attack on a legitimate target. They must not be deliberately targeted.

[Article 13 of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 4A (4) of the GC III 1949]



Slide 29.




Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked

• Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked personnel must be respected, protected and treated humanely

• Search and Collection Obligations


Treatment of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked:

• Members of the armed forces who are wounded or sick or shipwrecked and who cease to fight are to be respected, protected and treated humanely. No adverse distinctions in treatment may be established because of gender, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in medical treatment.

[Article 12 of the GC I 1949, Article 12 of the GC II 1949]

• Such protection ceases if they commit any act of hostility.


Search and Collection of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked:

• All possible measures must be taken at all times to collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked and to ensure their adequate medical assistance.

[Article 15 GC I 1949, Article 11 of the AP I 1977]



Abandoning the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked:

• If compelled to abandon the wounded and sick to the enemy, commanders must leave medical personnel/material to assist in their care, as far as military considerations permit

[Article 12 of the GC I 1949].



Slide 30.




Missing Persons and the Dead

• Obligations regarding missing persons

• Obligations regarding remains


Obligations regarding missing persons and remains:

• As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party. Such adverse Party shall transmit all relevant information concerning such persons in order to facilitate such searches.


• At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to […] search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.


• Bodies shall not be cremated except for imperative reasons of hygiene or for motives based on the religion of the deceased. The Parties to the conflict shall further ensure that the dead are honorably interred, if possible according to the rites of the religion, to which they belonged, that their graves are respected, grouped if possible according to the nationality of the deceased, properly maintained, and marked so that they may always be found.


• Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the same bureau, certificates of death or duly authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and forward through the same bureau one half of the double identity disc, last wills or other documents of importance to the nest of kin, and any personal items belonging to the deceased.



• One half of the double identity disc, or the identity disc itself must remain with the body.

[Articles 16 &17 of the GC I 1949]

• For more information see STANAG 2070 (1999) “EMERGENCY WAR BURIAL PROCEDURES”



Slide 31.




Prisoners of War (POW) Status

• Persons Entitled to POW Status

• Persons Not Entitled to POW Status

• Determining POW Status in Case of Doubt

• POW status provides certain rights and protections


Persons Entitled to POW Status:

• If captured, the following persons are entitled to POW status:

- combatants;

- persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof (such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, supply contractors, war correspondents, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) provided they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany;

- members of crews of the merchant navy or civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict;

- personnel of the armed forces temporarily assigned to medical duties during a limited period of time;

- persons involved in a levée en masse. [Article 4 of the GC III 1949]

Persons Not Entitled to POW Status:



• If captured and detained, the following persons are not entitled to POW status, but they must nevertheless be treated humanely:

- civilians, including civilians who take a direct part in hostilities other than a levée en masse; - mercenaries; and

- spies.

[Articles 43, 46 (1) & 47 (1) of the AP I 1977, Article 29 – 31 of the Hague Reg 1907]

[Common Article 3 to GCs 1949, Art. 75 of the AP I 1977]

Determining POW Status in Case of Doubt:

• When there is doubt as to whether a particular captive is entitled to treatment as a POW, the captive shall be treated as such until the status of the person detained has been determined by a properly constituted tribunal.

[Article 5 (2) of the GC III 1949, Article 45 (1) & (2) of the AP I 1977]

Prisoner of War Status:

• POW status provides certain rights and protections.

• The whole body of GC III 1949 is dedicated to the treatment of Prisoners of War.

[Articles 25 & 29 of the GC I 1949, Article 4A of the GC III 1949]



Slide 32.




Prisoners of War (POWs)

• Rights of POWs

• Treatment of POWs


Rights of POWs:

• POWs must be released and repatriated without delay after the close of active hostilities.

[Article 118 (1) of the GC III 1949]

Right to humane treatment:

• POWs are not in the hands of individuals; rather they are detained by the state to whose armed forces the capturing unit belongs (“detaining power”).

• The detaining power is responsible to ensure that POWs are treated humanely at all times.

[Articles 12 & 13 (1) of the GC III 1949]

• Persons in enemy hands who are entitled to POW status or treatment continue in that position from the moment of capture until their release and repatriation. Moreover, they cannot, even of their own free will, surrender any of the rights of protection they enjoy under GC III 1949.

[Articles 5 (1) & 7 of the GC III 1949]



Treatment of POWs:

• Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.


• The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely.

• The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention.


• Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.

• The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs.


• POWs must at all times be treated humanely and must be protected, particularly against any acts of violence or intimidation, as well as against insults and public curiosity.


• Unlawfully causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war is prohibited.


• Reprisals against POWs are prohibited.


• POWs are to receive medical and spiritual attention, if possible from doctors or chaplains attached to their own forces or of their own nationality.

[Articles 30-37 of the GC III 1949]

• Female POWs must be treated with due regard to their gender and must in no case be treated less favorably than male POWs. Their gender must also be taken into account in the allocation of labor and in the provision of sleeping and sanitary facilities. They must also be specially protected against rape and other sexual assaults.

[Articles 14, 25 (4), 29 (2), 49(1) & 97 (4) of the GC III 1949; Articles 75 (5) & 76 (1) of the AP I 1977]



• Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.


Hygiene and Medical Attention:

• The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.


Rank and age:

• Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age. Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.

[Articles 44 & 45 of the GC III 1949]

Jurisdiction:

• A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders.


Escape:

The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:

(1) POW has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied Power;

(2) POW has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said Power;

(3) POW has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power, in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of the last named Power.




Transfer of POW`s:

• Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such Transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.


See also:

• AJP-2.5 Ed. (A) CAPTURED PERSONS, MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTS

• APP-12 NATO MILITARY POLICE DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES (28 OCT 2002). CHAPTER 7: PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) OPERATIONS

http://nsa.hq.nato.int/NSAWEB/STRAP/APdetails.asp?APNo=906&LA=EN%22=%22_blank



Slide 33.

Topic: ROLE OF ICRC




ROLE OF ICRC




Slide 34.

Topic: ROLE OF ICRC


- Red cross, red crescent and red crystal

- ICRC logo


• Central Tracing Agency

• Maintaining records of POWs, inspecting their camps and providing relief

• Providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of countries in conflict

• Assisting states to comply with LOAC

• Acts as Protecting Power when none appointed


Role of the ICRC:

• Founded in 1863, the ICRC is a special organization that has played a seminal role in the development and implementation of the LOAC relating to the protection of war victims.

• It was on the ICRC’s initiative that States adopted the original Geneva Convention of 1864. Since then, the ICRC, with the support of the entire Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, has constantly urged governments to adapt international humanitarian law to changing circumstances, in particular to modern developments in the means and methods of warfare, so as to provide more effective protection and assistance for conflict victims.

• Today, all States are bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which, in times of armed conflict, protect wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of war and civilians.

• During World War II, the ICRC supplemented the efforts of the protecting powers, and undertook efforts on behalf of POWs. Those efforts included the establishment of a Central Prisoner of War Agency with 40 million index cards, the conduct of 11,000 visits to POW camps, and the distribution of 450,000 tons of relief items.

• The role of the ICRC as an impartial humanitarian organization is formally recognized in the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC endeavours to ensure the protection of military and civilian victims of armed conflict, and to serve as a neutral intermediary between



belligerents. According to the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC has the discretion to exercise its initiative on humanitarian issues.

[Articles 9-11 & 125 of the GC III 1949]

• The ICRC maintains a confidential dialogue with all parties to an armed conflict and may submit recommendations to the parties aimed at ensuring better compliance with LOAC. Its policy is not to cooperate with any investigation nor testify before a court on issues related to potential LOAC violations.

Central Tracing Agency:

• Each party in a conflict is responsible for forwarding information regarding the fate of protected civilians, POWs and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked who are in its powers.

[Article 136 of the GC IV 1949, Article 122 of the GC III 1949, Article 16 of the GC I 1949]

• ICRC collects, registers, processes and transmits such data as provided by the parties in conflict.

[Article 123 of the GC III 1949, Article 140 of the GC IV 1949]

Maintaining records of POWs, inspecting their camps and providing relief:

• ICRC responsible maintaining records of POWs, inspecting their camps and providing relief.

[Articles 125 & 126 of the GC III 1949, Articles 142 & 143 of the GC IV 1949]

Providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of countries in conflict:

• In cooperation with parties to a conflict, the ICRC may provide humanitarian assistance to affected civilian populations.

[Articles 125 & 126 of the GC III 1949, Articles 142 & 143 of the GC IV 1949]

Assisting states to comply with LOAC:

• ICRC may assist states to comply with LOAC.

[Article 11 of the GC I-III 1949, Article 12 of the GC IV 1949]

Acts as Protecting Power when none appointed:

• If the parties fail to appoint a Protecting Power ICRC may undertake this function.




Slide 35.

Topic: ROLE OF ICRC


- Red cross emblem

- ICRC logo


Role of ICRC

• Emblem

• Logo


Emblem:

• The red cross is the official emblem used by the ICRC.

• The red cross emblem was recognized under the 1864 Geneva Convention and has been confirmed by subsequent Conventions. GC I 1949 explicitly establishes its right to do so.

• During hostilities, a large-sized emblem is used (on flags, in the form of large badges, and on dossiers/bibs/tabards/aprons, etc.) as the visible sign of protection, especially for marking personnel, vehicles, boats or ships, aircraft and buildings.

The ICRC uses the ICRC emblem to:

- make its buildings identifiable from the air;

- make its aircraft identifiable from the ground and the air by painting red crosses (as large as possible) on their tops, sides and undersides;

- make its ships and boats identifiable by painting red crosses (as large as possible) on the hulls and, if possible, on other surfaces as well;

- make vehicles that belong to it identifiable from the air (done primarily for helicopters) by painting a red cross (as large as possible) on the roof.



This being said, the ICRC has developed a long-standing and accepted practice of using its "roundel" (i.e., a red cross enclosed in two concentric circles between which the words "COMITE INTERNATIONAL GENEVE" are written) for protective purposes.

The ICRC logo:

• The ICRC logo is composed of the ICRC “roundel” with the appropriate initials (CICR, ICRC, MKKK, etc.)

References:

Articles 38-44 & 53 of the GC I 1949

Articles 41-45 of the GC II 1949

Articles 18 & 20 of the GC IV 1949

Articles 18, 37, 38, 85 and annex II of the AP I 1977

Article 12 of the AP II 1977

AP III 2005



Slide 36.

Topic: PROTECTIVE AND DISTINCTIVE EMBLEMS




PROTECTIVE AND DISTINCTIVE EMBLEMS




Slide 37.



- RED CROSS / RED CRESCENT / RED CRYSTAL


Protective and Distinctive Emblems

• Red Cross

• Red Crescent

• Red Crystal

• other emblems, signs or signals


"Distinctive emblem" means the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red crystal on a white background when used for the protection of medical units and transports, or medical and religious personnel, equipment or supplies.

[Article 8 of the API 1977 as modified by APIII 2005]

It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem (red cross, red crescent or red crystal or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the GC 1949 or AP I. The Article 38 of the API also refers to possibility of use of the “red lion and sun” emblem. This emblem was used in past but it is no longer in use by any state. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property. [Article 38 of the API 1977 as modified by AP III 2005]

See the table with all emblems located on the last page of this template.



Slide 38.



- RED CROSS / RED CRESCENT / RED CRYSTAL


Use of Distinctive and Protective Emblems

• Medical and Religious Personnel

• Medical Units and Transports

• Hospital Ships

• Medical Aircraft


Medical and Religious Personnel:

• Medical and religious personnel, whether belonging to the belligerents, relief societies or neutral powers, are required to wear on their left arm a water-resistant armlet bearing the distinctive emblem (Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Crystal on a white background), issued and stamped by the military authority to which they are attached.

• They are also required to carry an official identity card.

[Articles 24 & 40 of the GC I 1949, Article 42 of the GC II 1949, Article 8 of the API 1977]

Medical Units and Transports:

• With the consent of the competent authority, all medical units and transports shall also be clearly marked with the distinctive emblem. Fixed or mobile units like hospitals or ambulances shall, for example, fly a flag portraying the distinctive emblem and if the unit belongs to a neutral state the national flag should be flown together with the flag of the belligerent to which they are attached.

[Articles 36(2), 38, 39, 42(1) & 43 (1) of the GC I 1949, Article 18(1) & (2) of the AP I 1977]



Hospital Ships:

• Military hospital ships, and hospital ships used by national Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies and other recognized relief societies or private persons, whether belonging to nationals of a party to the conflict or a neutral, must be painted white with large dark red crosses, red crescent or red crystal on the sides and on horizontal surfaces so they may be visible from the sea and the air.

[Article 43 of the GC II 1949, Articles 18(5) & 23(1) of the AP I 1977]

Medical Aircraft:

• Medical aircraft must be marked clearly with the distinctive emblem together with the national emblem on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces, as well as with any other emblems, which may be agreed upon by the parties to the conflict.

[Article 39 (2) of the GC II 1949, Article 18 (5) of the AP I 1977]

Protected Status:

• Marking merely facilitates the identification and recognition of protected persons and objects. Even if not clearly marked, protected persons or objects are to be respected and protected, if they can through other means, such as intelligence information, be recognized as such.



•

Slide 39.

Topic: PROTECTED OBJECTS




PROTECTED OBJECTS




Slide 40.



- Photograph of an inhabited area (houses, school, playground, shops)


Civilian Objects

• A civilian object is any object which is not a military objective.

• Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals.


Civilian Objects:

• A civilian object is any object which is not a military objective. This is a similar definition to that of the civilian person; therefore it serves the purposes of LOAC to limit the scope of conduct of hostilities, and direct military activities towards persons and objects who directly serve military objectives.

• Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals.


• Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

• In case of doubt, an object shall be presumed to be a civilian object.

[Articles 52 (2) & (3) of the AP I 1977]

• In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.




Slide 41.


- Suggested image on the slide:

- PHOTOGRAPHS ON EXAMPLES OF

- MEDICAL PERSONNEL

- MEDICAL VEHICLES

- FLAG WITH RED CROSS / CRESCENT / CRYSTAL


Medical Units and Medical Transports

Fixed or mobile medical units, Medical transports of all types (land, sea and air) are protected and shall not be made the object of attack.


Medical Units and Medical Transports:

• Medical units and establishments shall be respected, protected and shall not be made the object of attack.

[Article 19 (1) of the GC I 1949, Articles 22 (1), 23 & 24 of the GC II 1949, Article 18 (1) of the GC IV 1949, Article 12 (1) & (2) of the AP I 1977, Article 11 (1) of the AP II 1977]

• Medical transports of all types (land, sea and air) are protected and shall not be made the object of attack. Each party to the armed conflict shall endeavour to ensure that medical transports are identifiable.

[Articles 36 & 42 of the GC I 1949, Article 18 of the API 1977]



Slide 42.



-


Loss of Protection


Loss of Protection:

• Protections can generally be lost through misuse of protective emblems, signs or status

• The loss of protection for medical units is particularly detrimental

• Medical establishments lose their protection if they carry out acts harmful to the enemy, after prior warning has been given.

[Article 21 of the GC I 1949, Article 13 of the AP I 1977]

• The following acts shall not result in loss of protection:

• The use of arms by medical staff for their own protection or the protection of the wounded and sick;

- The use of sentries of escorts in respect of medical personnel / transports;

- Medical personnel acting as sentries for the protection of their medical establishments;

- The retention of war material from the wounded and sick;




Slide 43.


PROTECTION OF OBJECTS


- FLAG OF TRUCE (WHITE FLAG)


Flag of truce

(WHITE FLAG)

• Flag of surrender

• Sign of negotiation


Uses for flag of truce / white flag:

(truce = cease-fire)

Surrender:

• Any intention to surrender must be clearly expressed: raising arms, throwing away weapons, holding up a white flag, etc.

Negotiations / Parlementaire:

• A person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability, as well as any person who may accompany him.

• The parlementaire loses his rights of inviolability if it is proved in a clear and incontestable manner that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treason.



Slide 44.




- PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS (PG, PW), IC


Prisoner of War Camps / Internment Camps

• POW camps shall not be attacked

• They are marked with the letters “PW” or “PG”

• Internment Camps shall not be attacked

• They shall be marked with ”IC”


Prisoner of War Camps:

• POW camps shall not be attacked.

• Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the

day-time by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps shall be marked as such.


Internment Camps:

• The internment camps shall not be attacked.

• Whenever military considerations permit, the internment camps shall be indicated in the day-time by the letters IC, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only internment camps shall be marked as such.

[Article 83 of the GCIV 1949]



Slide 45.




- CIVIL DEFENCE SIGN


Civil Defence

Protection from Attack

Civil defence buildings and materiel, as well as shelters provided for the civilian population, are considered “civilian objects” and shall not be attacked or subjected to reprisals.


Identification:

• The international distinctive sign of civil defence set out in API consists of an equilateral blue triangle on an orange background.

• Those involved in civil defence should wear clothing with the above emblem. Additionally, their buildings and materiel should also display this emblem.

[Articles 66 & Annex 1, Article 4 of the AP I 1977]

Improper Use of Emblems:

• It is prohibited to make improper use of this emblem.


Civil defence performs humanitarian tasks for the following purposes:

• to protect the civilian population against the dangers arising from hostilities or other disasters;

• to help it to recover from the immediate effects of such events;



• to provide the conditions necessary for its survival.

Civilians engaged in civil defence work must be respected and protected. They are entitled to carry out the civil defence tasks except in case of imperative military necessity

[Articles 61 & 62 of the AP I 1977]

Protection from Attack:

• Civil defence buildings and materiel, as well as shelters provided for the civilian population, are considered “civilian objects” and shall not be attacked or subjected to reprisals.




Slide 46.




- CULTURAL PROPERTY – DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM


Cultural Property

• Cultural property

• Protection

• Distinctive Emblem


Cultural property is property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments, archaeological sites, works of art, important collections or archives.

Protection:

• Cultural property is already protected as civilian property, but is also granted specific protection.

• Parties to an armed conflict are not allowed to direct hostilities against cultural property. They must avoid incidental damage to such property and avoid locating military personnel and material in or near cultural property. Using cultural property for military purposes and reprisals directed against cultural property are prohibited.

Exceptions to this general prohibition exist if either:

a. the use of cultural property for military purposes; or

b. an attack on the cultural property,

is required for reasons of “imperative military necessity”.



Imperative military necessity means that:

a. cultural property may only be used for purposes which may expose it to damage or destruction when no choice is possible between such use and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage; or

b. an act of hostility may only be directed against cultural property when it has been made into a military objective and there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility against that objective.

Where possible the opposing force should be warned to stop using a cultural object or place of worship for military purposes before an attack is launched.

[Article 4 of the Hague Conv 1954, Article 6 of the Hague Prot 1999]

Special protection and enhanced protection:

• Under certain conditions, cultural property of very great importance may be placed under special protection or under enhanced protection. In both cases, higher standards of protection apply.

[Articles 8 – 11 of the Hague Conv 1954, Articles 10 – 14 of the Hague Prot 1999]

Distinctive Emblem:

• Cultural property may be marked with the distinctive emblem. The distinctive emblem repeated three times may be used as a means of identification of immovable cultural property under special protection, and, under certain conditions, of the transport of cultural property or of improvised refuges. However, the absence of such marking does not deprive such objects of protection.

• It is prohibited to make improper use of the emblem.

[Article 27 (2) of the Hague Reg 1907, Articles 16 & 17 of the Hague Conv 1954, Article 20 of the Regulations for the Execution of Hague Conv 1954]



Slide 47.




- PROTECTIVE SIGN OF WORKS AND INSTALLATIONS CONTAINING DANGEROUS FORCES


Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces

• Dams, dykes and nuclear power stations

• Protection

• Distinctive Emblem


Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces:

• are dams, dykes and nuclear power stations.

Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces:

• Dams, dykes and nuclear power stations shall not be attacked, even where they are legitimate targets, if such an attack might cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

[Article 56 (1) of the AP I 1977, Article 15 of the AP II 1977]

• Other legitimate targets located at or near dams, dykes and nuclear power stations shall not be attacked if such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from those works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

[Article 56 (1) of the AP I 1977, Article 15 of the AP II 1977]



• The parties to a conflict should avoid locating legitimate targets near dams, dykes and nuclear power stations. Weapons co-located for the sole purpose of defending such installations are permissible.


Ending of Protection:

• The protection that the LOAC provides to dams, dykes, nuclear power stations, and other legitimate targets near those installations is not absolute. The protection ends in the following circumstances:

a) for a dam or dyke, only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such

support;

b) for a nuclear power station, only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and only if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; and

c) for other legitimate targets located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations, only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.


Protective Emblem:

• Dams, dykes and nuclear power stations should be marked with a special sign consisting of three bright orange circles on the same axis. See last slide of this template for a display of this emblem.

[Article 56 and Annex 1 Article 17 of the AP I 1977]

• Even if they are not marked with the special sign, they are still entitled to all the protections described above.

• It is prohibited to make improper use of this emblem.




Slide 48.




- PHOTOGRAPH OF A CORN FIELD / LIVESTOCK


Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population

• Food-stuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works

• Protection


Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population:

• It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population for whatever motive.


• The following is a non-exhaustive list of “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”:

a. foodstuffs;

b. agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs;

c. crops;

d. livestock;

e. drinking water installations and supplies; and

f. irrigation works.




Exceptions:

• Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population may be attacked if they are used by an adverse party:

• as sustenance solely for the member of its armed forces; or

• in direct support of military action, provided that actions against these objects do not leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water so as to cause its starvation or force its movement.


• Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population shall not be made subject

to reprisals.

[Article 54(4) of the API 1977]



Slide 49.




- PHOTOGRAPH OF A RIVERSIDE OR SIMILAR NATURAL LANDSCAPE


Natural Environment

• Protection

• Environmental Modification


Protection of the Natural Environment:

• Care shall be taken in an armed conflict to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.

[Articles 35 (3) & 55 (1) of the AP I 1977]

• Attacks, which are intended or may be expected to cause damage to the natural environment, which prejudices the health or survival of the population, are prohibited.

[Article 55 (1) of the API 1977]

• Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.


Environmental Modification:

• Environmental modification techniques having widespread, long lasting or severe effects are prohibited.

[ENMOD Conv 1976]



Slide 50.

Topic: PROTECTED PLACES AND ZONES


- Image of Sign for Hospital and Safety Zones


Places and Zones under Special Protection

• Hospital Zones

• Safety Zones

• Neutralized Zones

• De-militarized Zones

• Non-defended Localities


Places and Zones under Special Protection:

• The Parties to an armed conflict may agree to establish hospital and safety zones and localities to protect from the effects of the conflict the wounded and sick as well as personnel entrusted with the organization and administration of these zones and localities and with the care of the persons assembled therein

[Article 23 & Annex 1 of the GC I 1949, Article 14 & Annex 1 of the GC IV 1949]

• Parties to an armed conflict may propose to establish, in the regions where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones.

[Article 15 GC IV 1949]

• Hospital and safety zones and localities and neutralized zones shall not be the object of attack. They must be protected and respected at all times.

[Article 11 & Annex 1 of the GC I 1949, GC IV 1949]

• Hospital and safety zones and localities and neutralized zones shall be clearly marked.

[Article 6 & Annex 1 of the GC I 1949, GC IV 1949]

• Any Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a neutral State or some humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish, in the regions



where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war the following persons, without distinction:

(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants;

(b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character.

[Article 15 of the GC IV 1949]

• It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to extend their military operations to zones on which they have conferred by agreement the status of demilitarized zone, if such extension is contrary to the terms of this agreement.


• The attack or bombardment of non-defended localities is prohibited. The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party.

[Article 59 of the AP I 1977, Article 25 of the Hague Reg 1907]



Slide 51.

Topic: MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE




MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE




Slide 52.



- PHOTOGRAPH A LAUNCHED MISSILE OR OTHER WEAPON WITH WELL KNOWN EFFECTS


Basic Principles

• The right to choose the means and methods of warfare is not unlimited

• It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.


Means and Methods of Warfare –Weapons:

• LOAC limits the types of weapons that may be used and the manner in which those weapons are used (the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited).

• Weapons, projectiles, materials and means of warfare that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited.

• Likewise, weapons which cannot be directed at specific legitimate targets or the effects of which cannot be limited are prohibited.

[Article 23 (e) of the Hague Reg 1907, Articles 35 (1), (2) & 51 (4) of the AP I 1977]

• Parties to an armed conflict are limited in their choice of weapons, and in the means and methods of warfare they use. When developing or acquiring new weapons, States should determine whether they comply with these rules. Current advances in new technologies mean that it continues to be vitally important for States to assess the legality of new weapons with LOAC.




Slide 53.



- PHOTOGRAPH OF AMMUNITION


Prohibited Ammunition

• bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body

• bullets that have been poisoned


The following types of ammunition are prohibited:

a. bullets that expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope that does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions (that is, hollow point or “dum-dum” bullets);

[Hague Declaration 1899]

and

b. bullets that have been poisoned.

[Article 23 (a) of the Hague Reg 1907]



Slide 54.




Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons

Bacteriological (biological) weapons are prohibited as a means and method of warfare.


Use of bacteriological (biological) weapons is prohibited by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC 1972).

Biological warfare involves the use of biological agents as weapons to cause disease outbreaks.

Biological Weapons can include organisms such as bacteria, virus, toxin, fungi.

Each State Party to this Convention is prohibited to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain bacteriological (biological) weapons.

[Article 1 of the BWC 1972]



Slide 55.



- Soldiers in chemical protective equipment


Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons (those chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity to humans or animals) and munitions or devices designed to carry such chemicals, are prohibited as a means of warfare.


Chemical weapons are prohibited by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC 1993).

Chemical weapons (those chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity to humans or animals) and munitions or devices designed to carry such chemicals, are banned.

[Articles 1 (1) & 2 (1) - (3) of the CWC 1993]

The use of chemical weapons in war had been widely condemned since the end of the First World War. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol expressly prohibited the use of poisonous or other gases. The Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 already banned the use of poison or poisoned weapons as a means of conducting warfare. All these prohibitions are based on the basic LOAC principle, that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.

Chemical weapons can include agents such as nerve agent, blistering agent, choking agent, incapacitating agent.

Prohibitions: The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits each State party to:



- develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons; - use chemical weapons; - engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; - assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited

under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

[Article 1(1) of the CWC 1993]

Riot Control Agents:

• The use of riot control agents, including tear gas and other gases that have debilitating but non permanent effects, as a means of warfare is prohibited.

• In humans, riot control agents can rapidly produce sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.

[Articles 1(5) & 2(7) of the CWC 1993]

Gas:

• The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases is prohibited at all times and under all circumstances.

[Geneva Gas Prot 1925]



Slide 56.




Anti-Personnel Mines

Anti-personnel mines are prohibited for states parties to the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention signed in 1997.


Anti-Personnel mines are prohibited to the state parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Producing and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (AP Mine Ban Conv 1997).

An “anti-personnel mine” is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.

Anti-personnel mines cannot distinguish between civilians and soldiers. They continue to kill and maim civilians long after the fighting has ceased. Communities can be affected for decades after the end of an armed conflict.

The state parties are prohibited from using anti-personnel mines, developing, producing, or otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring to anyone, directly or indirectly.

[Article 2(3) of the CCW Prot II 1980 (1996), Article 1 & 2 of the AP Mine Ban Conv 1997]



Slide 57.




Cluster Munitions

Cluster munitions are prohibited for states parties to the Cluster Munitions Convention signed in 2008


The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM 2008) prohibits in particular the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of Cluster Munitions as defined by the Convention.

Civilian casualties during and post conflict often occur because cluster munitions scatter huge numbers of explosive sub-munitions over very large areas. The Parties to the convention were concerned that the remnants kill or maim civilians.

This Convention also requires State Parties to destroy the cluster munitions in their stockpiles and commits them to clearing areas contaminated with unexploded sub-munitions or abandoned cluster munitions.



Slide 58.




Other Conventional Weapons Deemed Excessively Injurious

or Having Indiscriminate Effects

• Non-Detectable Fragments

• Mines, booby-traps and other devices

• Incendiary Weapons

• Blinding Laser Weapons


Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW 1980)

Non-Detectable Fragments:

• Weapons that cause injury by the use of fragments undetectable by X-ray in the human body are prohibited.

[Article 1 of the CCW Prot I 1980]

Booby Traps:

• A “booby trap” is any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

[Article 2 (4) – (5) of the CCW Prot II 1980 as amended in 1996]

• Booby traps and other devices, attached to or associated with certain objects are prohibited.



• Where booby traps are lawfully used, they must not cause unnecessary injury or suffering or be used indiscriminately.

• It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either:

(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective; or (b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning sentries, the issuing of warnings or the provision of fences.

[Article 7 of the CCW Prot II 1980 as amended in 1996]

Incendiary Weapons:

• Incendiary weapons include any weapon or munitions designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to humans through the action of flame, heat or a combination of the two caused by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target.

• The use of incendiary weapons against combatants is not prohibited unless such use results in superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. However, it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.

[Article 23(a) of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 35 (2) of the AP I 1977, Article 2 (1) of the CCW Prot III 1980]

Blinding Weapons:

• Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision (that is, to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices) are prohibited.

[Article 1 of the CCW Prot IV 1980]



Slide 59.




Prohibited Methods of Warfare

• Perfidy

• Denial of quarter

• Starvation of civilian population

• Terrorizing the civilian population

• Hostages

• Human Shields


Perfidy:

• Perfidy is an act inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence.

“It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy: (a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; (b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; (c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.”




Ruses of war:

• Ruses of war or stratagem are intended to mislead the enemy or to induce the enemy to act recklessly.

“Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.”


Denial of quarter:

• It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.


Starvation of the civilian population:

• Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

• It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.


Terrorizing of civilian population:

• The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.


Hostages:



• The taking of hostages is prohibited.

[Common Article 3 to the GCs, Article 34 of the GC IV 1949]

Human Shields:

• The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.


• The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attack or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.

[Article 51of the AP I 1977]



Slide 60.




Reprisals


Reprisals:

• Reprisals are coercive measures which would normally be contrary to international law but which are taken in retaliation by one party to a conflict in order to stop the adversary from violating international law. They can only be directed against combatants and military objectives.

• Because of their political and military significance, reprisals shall only be authorized by the highest political level. No individual soldier or officer is authorized to order reprisals on his own accord.

Reprisals are specifically prohibited against:

• wounded, sick and shipwrecked;

• medical and religious personnel;

• medical facilities and supplies;

• prisoners of war;

• civilians and civilian objects;

• cultural objects and places of worship;

• works and installations containing dangerous forces;

• objects indispensable to the survival of the population;

• the natural environment.



Slide 61.

Topic: LOAC IN PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS




LOAC IN PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS




Slide 62.




LOAC

in the Planning and Conduct of Operations


During Operational Planning consideration must be given to LOAC:

• during planning at political, strategic, operational and tactical levels;

• during execution at all levels of execution (command / unit / individual levels.);

• at each section of execution, especially in targeting.

Within the whole context of LOAC, especially the following principles, rules and aspects shall be taken into account during planning of operations:

- military necessity;

- proportionality;

- distinction;

- protected personnel, objects;

- reliable and sufficient intelligence for targeting, verification of military character of targets;

- taking precautions;

- warnings and recommendations when tactical situation permits;

- the psychological effect of the planned operation.

The overall effects of missions, and not only the individual phases, should also be evaluated in terms of LOAC to ensure conformity.

Planning of operations shall provide measures and resources for the logistic support of taking care of protected persons (food, shelter, POW camps, etc).



Slide 63.




LOAC in the Planning and Conduct of Operations

• Distinction

• Attacks

• Indiscriminate attacks


Distinction:

• In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.


• Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.


Meaning of “Attacks”:

• “Attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.


Meaning of “Military Objectives”:

• Military objectives are combatants and those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.




Indiscriminate Attacks:

• Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:

(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

• Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:

(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

[Article 51 (4)-(5) of the AP I 1977]



Slide 64.




Precautions in the attack


Precautions in the attack:

• In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

• In planning or deciding upon an attack, all personnel shall:

o do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives;

o take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;

o refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;

o cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;

o give an effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

• When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.




Slide 65.

Topic: TRUCE AND ARMISTICE




TRUCE AND ARMISTICE




Slide 66.




Truce, Ceasefires and Temporary Suspension of Hostilities


Truce, Ceasefires and Temporary Suspension of Hostilities:

• Truces, ceasefires and the temporary suspension of hostilities are terms that have a similar meaning which is that they are short term. These are generally decisions made at the tactical level for a specific purpose and geographic area such as to collect the wounded.

• A person is regarded as a parlementaire (spokesman) who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability unless it is proved in a clear and incontestable manner that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treason.

[Articles 32 -34 of the Hague Reg 1907]



Slide 67.




Armistice


Armistice:

• An armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties.

• An armistice may be general or local. The first suspends the military operations of the belligerent States everywhere; the second only between certain fractions of the belligerent armies and within a fixed radius.

[Articles 36 – 37 of the Hague Reg 1907]

• Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.

[Article 40 of the Hague Reg 1907]

• Local armistices are also referred to as cease-fires or local arrangements. The foregoing regulations are applied analogously.

• They generally serve humanitarian purposes, in particular searching for and collecting the wounded and the shipwrecked, rendering first aid to these persons, and removing civilians.

[Article 15 of the GC I 1949, Article 18 of the GC II 1949, Article 17 GC IV 1949]



Slide 68.

Topic: LAW OF OCCUPATION




LAW OF OCCUPATION




Slide 69.




Occupation

• Occupation

• Commencement of Occupation

• End of Occupation


Occupation:

• Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile armed forces.

• The Occupying power must be able to exercise its authority over the territory. An occupying power can only claim to occupy a foreign territory once it is capable of enforcing its directions issued to the civilian population residing in that territory.


• The occupying power shall assume responsibility for the occupied territory and its inhabitants

[Articles 29 & 47-135 of the GC IV 1949, Article 43 of the Hague Reg 1907]

Commencement of Occupation:

• The occupying power should proclaim to the population of invaded territory as soon as possible the fact that the territory is occupied and the effects, which result from the occupation.

• The occupying power shall take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.



• The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. If the occupying power is able to maintain effective power over the territory through the use of only a small body of troops, then this fact does not of itself terminate the occupation.

• Occupation is not invalid because some of the inhabitants are in a state of rebellion or a local resistance movement is in existence.

End of Occupation:

• This is a question of fact concerning the exercise of governmental functions and dependent upon political agreements.




Slide 70.




General Effects of Occupation

• Limits on Legislative Power of Occupant

• Maintenance of Public Order


Limits on Legislative Power of Occupant:

• The powers of the occupant are of a temporary nature and it should only take measures, which are essential for the purposes of the armed conflict, the maintenance of order and safety and the proper administration of the occupied territory. The administration of the occupied territory shall be given the opportunity to carry on its activities. The jurisdiction of the occupied territory shall remain in force.


• The laws of the occupied territory shall, in principle, remain in force. Penal legislation which constitutes a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of humanitarian law may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power.

[Article 43 of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 64 of the GC IV 1949]

• The occupying power may enact legal provisions of its own if military necessity or the obligation to maintain public order so demand.

[Article 64 of the GC IV 1949, Article 43 of the Hague Reg 1907]

• The occupying power may set up administrative bodies of its own if military necessity or the obligation to maintain public order so demand.

Maintenance of Public Order:



• The occupying power must take all measures in its power to restore and maintain public order within the occupied state. The occupying power is also obliged, under GC IV, to carry out certain duties with regard to the inhabitants of the territory.




Slide 71.




Rules Applicable in Occupied Territory

• Rights of Inhabitants of Occupied Territory

• Control of Persons in Occupied Territory

• Forced Enlistment

• Compulsory Labor

• Public Officials in Occupied Territory

• Rights of Non-nationals to Leave Occupied Territory


Rights of Inhabitants of Occupied Territory:

• Protected persons in all circumstances are entitled to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices and their manners and customs. They must be humanely treated at all times and they must be especially safeguarded against all acts of violence or threats of violence and against insults and public curiosity. Generally, criminal attacks on their person are punished as if committed in time of peace.

• Women must be especially protected against any attack on their honour; in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault.

• All protected persons must be treated with the same consideration, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.

[Articles 27 (1) - (3) of the GC IV 1949]



Control of Persons in Occupied Territory:

• Military authorities in occupied territories have the right to perform police functions and to protect their own security.

The following measures of population control are forbidden at all times:

a. physical or moral coercion, particularly to obtain information;

b. brutality;

c. punishment for acts of others, that is, reprisals or collective penalties; and

d. deportations.

[Articles 31, 32, 33 (1) & (3) & 49 (1) of the GC IV 1949]

Forced Enlistment:

• The occupying power is prohibited from compelling protected persons to enlist in its armed forces and may not use any pressure or propaganda aimed at securing their voluntary enlistment. To compel the population of occupied territory so to enlist is a grave breach of GCIV.

[Article 51 (1) of the GC IV 1949]

Compulsory Labor:

• The occupying power may only compel persons over the age of eighteen to work, and only on work for the needs of the army of occupation, the public utility services, or for the feeding, clothing, sheltering, transportation or health of the population of the occupied territory.

• The population cannot be compelled to participate in any work which would involve participation in military operations.

[Article 51 (2) of the GC IV 1949]

Public Officials in Occupied Territory:

• The occupying power is the administrator of the occupied territory. As such, it has an unlimited power to remove public officials, including judges, from their posts. However, the occupying power may not apply sanctions, other than removal, against public officials who refuse to carry out their functions for reasons of conscience.




Rights of Non-nationals to Leave Occupied Territory:

• Non-nationals of the former sovereign under the occupation of the adverse party must be allowed to leave the territory in accordance with the procedures laid down by the occupying power.




Slide 72.

Topic: ENFORCEMENT OF LOAC




ENFORCEMENT OF LOAC




Slide 73.




State Obligations

Discipline and Prevention of LOAC violations


States are under an obligation to:

• require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.


• require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.


• issue orders and instructions requiring compliance with LOAC and to take steps to ensure that these are observed.

[Article 1 of the Hague Reg 1907, Article 80 of the AP I 1977]

• Make the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions 1949 and the two Additional Protocols 1977 as widely known as possible in peace and war.

[Article 47 of the GC I 1949, Article 48 of the GC II 1949, Article 127 of the GC III 1949, Article 144 of the GC IV 1949, Article 83 of the AP I 1977, Article 19 of the AP II 1977]



• Require that commanders ensure that members of the armed forces are aware of their LOAC obligations.


• Provide legal advisers, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of LOAC and on LOAC training to be provided to members of the armed forces.


• Put in place an effective legal system to prevent, investigate and/or prosecute breaches of LOAC and, in particular, to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, war crimes.

[Article 49 of the GC I 1949, Article 50 of the GC II 1949, Article 129 of the GC III 1949, Article 146 of the GC IV 1949]



Slide 74.




Command Responsibility

Commanders are responsible for preventing violations of the law and for taking necessary action.


Command Responsibility:

• Commanders are responsible for preventing violations of the law and for taking necessary action.


• Failure to act - the fact that a breach of LOAC was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.


Duty of commanders:

• to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol;

• commensurate with their level of responsibility, ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under LOAC;

• if aware that subordinates or other persons under their control are going to commit or have committed a breach of LOAC, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent



such violations of LOAC, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.


Article 28 of the ICC Statute 1998:

• For State Parties to the ICC Statute, Article 28 of the Statute lays down that a military commander or a person “effectively” acting as a military commander is criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC committed by forces or persons under his effective command and control, or effective authority and control, where:

1. he either knew, or owing to the circumstances, should have known that the forces or persons were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

2. he failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Responsibility of civilian superiors:

• Similarly, a hierarchical superior in a non-military relationship with subordinates is criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC committed by subordinates under his effective authority and control, where:

a. he knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;

b. the crimes concerned activities that were within his effective responsibility and control; and

c. he failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.



Slide 75.




Individual Responsibility

Individuals are responsible for crimes they commit or assist others to commit.


Individual Responsibility:

• LOAC is binding not only on states but on individuals as well. In that regard every state is obliged to search for persons alleged to have committed war crimes and shall bring such persons before its own courts. In all circumstances the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence.


• According to Article 25 of the ICC Statute 1998, individuals are responsible for any criminal acts (including war crimes) that they:

(a) Commit, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; (b) Order, solicit or induce the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission; (d) In any other way contribute to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.

• Obeying superior orders does not in itself absolve the subordinate from criminal responsibility.



Slide 76.




War Crimes

• Grave Breaches

• Other Breaches


Breaches of LOAC may result in committing War Crimes (grave breaches of the all four Geneva Conventions 1949 or the AP I 1977) or may constitute other breaches.

Grave Breaches (War Crimes):

• War crimes are criminally punishable.

• The following acts are examples of grave breaches as constituted in all four Geneva Conventions 1949 (war crimes) when committed against protected persons or property:

- willful killing - torture or inhuman treatment; - biological experiments; - willfully causing great suffering; - causing serious injury to body or health; - extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; - compelling a prisoner of war or a protected civilian to serve in the armed forces of the hostile Power; - willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Conventions; - unlawful deportation or transfer; - unlawful confinement of a protected person; - taking of hostages.




• The following acts are examples of grave breaches as constituted in AP I 1977 (war crimes):

- Seriously endangering, by any willful and unjustified act or omission, physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power of the adverse Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of an armed conflict, in particular physical mutilations, medical or scientific experiments, removal of tissue or organs for transplantation which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned or not consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be applied under similar medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of the Party conducting the procedure and in no way deprived of liberty.

[Articles 11 (1) (2) & 85 of the AP I 1977]

When committed willfully and if they cause death or serious injury to body and health:

- making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; - launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects; - launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage civilian objects; - making non-defended localities and demilitarised zones the object of attack; - making a person the object of an attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat; - the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross and red crescent or other protective signs;


When committed willfully and in violation of the Conventions and the Protocol:

- the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; - unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; - practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination; - attacking clearly recognised historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of people and to which special protection has been given, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof when such objects are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives or used by the adverse party in support of its military effort; - depriving a person protected by the Conventions or by Protocol I of the rights of fair and regular trial.




Other Breaches:

• Apart from repression of grave breaches, states shall take all necessary measures to suppress all other breaches of the GC`s 1949 and AP I 1977 which results from failure to act when under a duty to do so.




Slide 77.




Prosecution of war crimes

• National Prosecution

• Universal jurisdiction over war crimes

• International prosecution


National Jurisdiction:

• Members of the armed forces are primarily subject to their nation’s criminal or other penal justice system for the commission of war crimes.

Universal jurisdiction over war crimes:

• The repression of war crimes is essential to ensuring respect for international humanitarian law. Universal jurisdiction refers to the assertion of jurisdiction over offences regardless of the place where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrator. It is held to apply to a range of offences whose repression by all States is justified, or required, as a matter of international public policy. Any state may try those accused of war crimes, whatever the accused’s nationality or wherever alleged offence took place.

• The Geneva Conventions provide for mandatory universal jurisdiction, since they oblige States to try those who have allegedly committed grave breaches or institute the necessary procedures to extradite such persons. Protocol I of 1977 additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 extends the principle of universal jurisdiction to grave breaches of the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities. It also qualifies all grave breaches as war crimes.




International Prosecution:

International Criminal Court

• The right, or in some cases the obligation, to prosecute war crimes under universal jurisdiction existed before the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In its preamble, the Statute affirms that national courts have primary responsibility for trying such crimes. The ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes is thus considered to be complementary: the ICC will exercise its jurisdiction only when a State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.

[Article 17 (1) (a) of the ICC Statute 1998]



Slide 78.

Topic: SUMMARY



QUESTIONS?




RED CROSS

WORKS AND INSTALLATIONS CONTAINING DANGEROUS FORCES

RED CRESCENT

INTERNMENT CAMP

RED CRYSTAL

PRISONER OF WAR CAMP

ICRC LOGO

CIVIL DEFENCE

CULTURAL PROPERTY

FLAG OF TRUCE / FLAG OF SURRENDER

CULTURAL PROPERTY - SPECIAL PROTECTION

HOSPITAL AND SAFETY ZONE

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

ATrainP-2(A)(1)

PART XII INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Disclaimer: The NATO Legal Deskbook is published by Allied Command Transformation/Staff Element Europe and contains sections written by legal Staff working at NATO, Ministries of Defence, and selected authors. However, this is not a formal NATO document and therefore may not represent the official opinions or positions of NATO or individual governments, or organisations. The intellectual property rights reside with NATO and the contributors and absent specific permission, the NATO legal Deskbook can not be sold or reproduced for commercial purposes. Additionally, the following section is provided solely for the purposes of illustration for those bidding on the Statement of Requirement for the Digital Game – NATO Law of Armed Conflict and related purposes.

References and suggested reading:

- AAP-6 (2014), NATO Glossary of terms and definitions (English and French)

- MC 362/l, NATO Rules of Engagement

- STANAG 2449, Training in the Law of Armed Conflict, dated 20 March 2013

- STANAG 2597, Training in Rules of Engagement, dated 4 May 2015

- CAN: The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Canadian Forces,

(B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 / 2001-08-13)

- CAN: The Use of Force in CF Operations, Canadian Forces, 2008 (B-GJ-005-501/FP-001)

- UK Ministry of Defence: The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University

Press, Oxford, 2004

- USA: Law Of War Deskbook, International And Operational Law Department International

And Operational Law Department The Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center and School,

U.S. Army Charlottesville, VA, USA, 2012

- USA: Law Of War Documentary Supplement, International And Operational Law

Department The United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School

Charlottesville, VA, USA, 2011

- USA: Operational Law Handbook, International and Operational Law Department, The

Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2015

(annual publication)

- USA: Department of Defence Law of War Manual, June 2015

- www.icrc.org/ihl

- ICRC Opinion Paper March 2008: “How is the term “armed conflict” defined in

International Humanitarian Law?” available at

https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf

- Chalanouli, Nikoleta-Paraskevi and Bumgardner, Sherrod Lewis, ‘Rules of engagement,

NATO’s approach and national caveats’ in Zasady użycia siły (ang. Rules of Engagement) –

wybrane problemy prawne [Rules of Engagement – legal problems], Barbara Janusz-Pawletta

(ed.), Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw, 2011, Ch. 2.

- Cooper, Camilla Guldahl: ‘Rules of Engagement Demystified: A Study of the History,

Development and Use of ROEs’, Military Law and the Law of War Review 53/1, 2014

- Dinstein, Yoram: The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict.

Cambridge University Press, 2004

- Fleck, Dieter: (ed.) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University

Press, Oxford, 2008

- Fournet, Caroline: International Crimes: Theories, Practice and Evolution, Cameron May,

London, 2007

- Fournier, Sylvain: "NATO Intervention Abroad: How Roe Are Adopted and Jurisdictional

Rights Negotiated", in Criminal Law between War and Peace: Justice and Cooperation in

Criminal Matters in International Military Interventions : Proceedings of the Xvth

International Congress on Social Defense, edited by Stefano Manacorda and Adán Nieto

Martin. Spain: Ministerio de Justicia, 2009

- Green, Leslie: The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict, Melland Schill Studies in

International Law / Juris Publishing, 3 edition, 2008

- Hosang, J.F.R. Boddens: ‘Self-Defence in Military Operations: The Interaction between the

Legal Bases for Military Self-Defence and Rules of Engagement’, 47 Military Law and Law

of War Review 25 (2008)

http://www.icrc.org/ihl

- Levine, Eugenia: Command Responsibility, Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org,

2005

- Martin, Mark S: Rules of engagement for Land forces, A Matter of Training not Lawyering,

Military Law Review Vol. 143, Winter 1994, 1-160

- Roach, Ashley: ‘Rules of engagement’, US Naval War College Review Jan/Feb 1983, 46

- Roberts, Adam and Guelff, Robert: Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford University

Press, Oxford, 2000

- Rogers, A.P.V.: Law on the Battlefield, Juris Publishing, Manchester, 2004

- Sagan, Scott D., ‘Rules of engagement’ in George, Alexander L. (ed): Avoiding war –

Problems of Crisis Management, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991- Sassòli, Marco and Bouvier,

Antoine (eds.): How does law protect in war? Cases, documents and teaching materials on

contemporary practice in international humanitarian law, ICRC, Geneva, 2nd edition 2006

- Solis, Gary D.: The law of armed conflict: international humanitarian law in war.

Cambridge University Press, 2010

- Wallach, Evan and Marcus, Maxine: ‘Command Responsibility’, in Cherif Bassiouni,

International Criminal Law: Vol. III International Enforcement, Brill, Leiden, 2008

INTRODUCTION

A primary function of the legal adviser is the provision of advice and training on the Law of

Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement. This section will provide an overview of these

subjects. First, a brief overview of the sources and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict

(LOAC) will be provided. Next, NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE) doctrine and

terminology are introduced, before the final part of this section deals with planning and

drafting of NATO ROE.

LOAC and ROE are related subjects about which there have been volumes written, and much

continues to be written on these subjects, both from the NATO perspective and from the

perspective of different national military forces. For this reason, the discussion below should

not by any means be considered exhaustive. Any legal adviser who intends to work in the

operational context should invest time in a detailed course of instruction as well as more

detailed reference texts on the subjects.

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

1. Introduction, sources and principles

Law of armed conflict (LOAC) is the part of the international law relating to the conduct of

armed conflict and military occupation. It is also known as the law of war (LOW),

international humanitarian law (IHL) or jus in bello. LOAC represents the international

community’s attempt to balance two basic criteria: military necessity and concerns that affect

the successful planning and execution of military operations on the one hand, and the

humanitarian concerns which allow all societies to meet the basic moral and ethical norms, on

the other. This balance has taken place, and continues to take place, in all cultures and times.

Where the balance is struck in any particular conflict or operation may vary, just as the

specific application of LOAC has varied across cultures and times. However, the basic

principles remain.

By regulating the conduct of hostilities, the purpose of LOAC is:

- to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering;

- to protect those who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities; such as

civilians, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and prisoners of war (POWs);

- to protect certain objects and the natural environment from the effects of armed

conflict; and

- to facilitate the restoration of peace and resumption of friendly relations between

belligerents following hostilities.

Whilst LOAC regulates the means and methods of armed force during armed conflict, the

circumstances when states may use force in the first place is regulated by jus ad bellum.

LOAC addresses the reality of armed conflict without considering the reasons for or legality

of the initial resort to force. As soon as we are in presence of an armed conflict, LOAC

applies. Its provisions apply to the warring parties irrespective of the reasons for the conflict

and whether or not the cause upheld by either party is just.

LOAC applies in international armed conflicts (IAC), non-international armed conflict

(NIAC), and occupation. LOAC does not, however, provide a clear definition of armed

conflict. For the assessment of whether an armed conflict exists, the factual circumstances are

relevant. In this respect, both the extent and duration of armed violence are key factors. For

example, many isolated incidents, such as border clashes and naval incidents, are not treated

as “armed conflict” because they often do not involve the level of intensity necessary to be

considered an “armed conflict”. Furthermore, situations of internal disturbances and tensions,

such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature are not

considered to qualify as “armed conflict”. 1

IAC may be defined as “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”, and

NIAC as “whenever there is protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and

organised groups within a State”.2 The Hague Regulation provides the following definition of

occupation: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority

of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has

been established and can be exercised.”3

i. Sources

LOAC, like other parts of international law, arises from two basic sources: customary and

treaty law.

Customary international law encompasses rules which, as a result of state practice

accompanied by the respective legal belief (opinion iuris) over a period of time, have become

accepted as legally binding.4 Generally, customary international law is binding on all States,

except for those states having persistently objected to the application of such a rule to them.5

1 For a discussion on the definition of armed conflict, see ICRC Opinion Paper March 2008: “How is the term

“armed conflict” defined in International Humanitarian Law?” available at

https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf 2 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on

Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, para. 70. The definition has been adopted by other international bodies

since then. 3 Art. 42 of Hague Regulations of 1907 (Hague Reg.) 4 See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 (1) b): “general practice accepted as law”. 5 See for instance C.G. Guldahl: “The role of persistent objection in International Humanitarian Law”, Nordic

Journal of International Law 77 (1), 51-86.

Treaty law mainly arises through the conclusion of international agreements and treaties

between two or more States (there are also treaties between States and intergovernmental

organisations, or between intergovernmental organisations). Generally, treaties are binding

only on the States party to them. Much of LOAC in today‘s environment is a mixture of these

sources. For IAC, there is extensive applicable LOAC treaty law, most importantly the four

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the first Additional Protocol of 1977 and various

conventions regulating the means and methods of warfare (so-called “Hague stream”

conventions). During NIAC, however, there is significantly less applicable treaty law. This

does not mean that States do not apply any LOAC, but rather that customary law plays a

greater role. For instance, many of the provisions found in Additional Protocol I have been

recognised as customary law.

LOAC initially developed through two different streams. The Geneva stream, which emanates

from the various Geneva Conventions, provides the international community‘s perspective on

protection of victims of war. The Hague stream, originating from the Hague Conventions of

the late 19th and early 20th century, focuses on the means and methods of warfare, such as

bombardment, weapons, and perfidy. Note, however, that this distinction no longer is as clear,

especially because AP I provides regulation both on protection and on means and methods of

warfare.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of LOAC sources. Note that not all NATO Member

States are party to all.

- 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive

Projectiles under 400 Grams Weight (St Petersburg Declaration 1868)

- 1899 Hague Declaration (IV, 3) concerning Expanding Bullets (Hague Declaration

1899)

- 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and

its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Reg

1907)

- 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or

Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Gas Prot 1925)

- 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted

by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly (Genocide

Convention 1948)

- 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III

1949)

- 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War (GC IV 1949)

- 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and

Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I 1949)

- 1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and

Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II 1949

- 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed

Conflict (Hague Conv 1954)

- 1954 Hague Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the

Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Prot 1954)

- 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling

of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC

1972)

- 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of

Environmental Modification Techniques, adopted by the General Assembly of the

United Nations (ENMOD Conv 1976)

- 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating

to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (AP I 1977)

- 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating

to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (AP II

1977)

- 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional

Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects (“Convention on Conventional Weapons”), and Amendment

Article 1, 21 December 2001 (CCW 1980 / CCW Amdt 2001)

- 1980 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on

Conventional Weapons (CCW Prot I 1980)

- 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and

Other Devices (Protocol II) to Convention on Conventional Weapons (Protocol II as

amended in 1996) (CCW Prot II 1980)

- 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons

(Protocol III) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW Prot III 1980)

- 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and

Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC 1993)

- 1995 Protocol on blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention on

Conventional Weapons (CCW Prot IV 1995)

- 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer

of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”) (AP Mine

Ban Conv 1997)

- 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute 1998)

- 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural

Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Prot 1999)

- 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the

involvement of children in armed conflict (Opt Prot CRC 2000)

- 2003 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V) to the Convention on

Conventional Weapons (CCW Prot V 2003)

- 2005 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating

to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III) (AP III 2005)

- 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM 2008)

According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, judicial decisions

(and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists) may be applied as subsidiary means

for the determination of rules of law.

ii. Principles

Arising from these agreements, and as will be more fully discussed below, are the following

core principles of LOAC:6

- Military Necessity

- Distinction

6 The list of basic principles of LOAC varies, and other lists may include additional principles such as non-

discrimination, chivalry, limitation, good faith or military objective. The present list is taken from NATO

STANAG 2449, second edition, of 2013.

- Proportionality

- Humanity

Generally speaking, these principles trace their origins in 1907 Hague Convention,

acknowledging that the rights of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not

unlimited. It is important to note that all these principles interact with each other.

a. Military Necessity

This principle could be considered, in many ways, as the foundation of all of LOAC. Under

this principle, States may only use force (not otherwise prohibited by LOAC) that is necessary

or required for the submission of the enemy. Thus, the right of belligerents to adopt means of

injuring the enemy is not unlimited.7 The principle contains two additional elements: the force

used can be and is being controlled, and unnecessary force is unlawful. Necessity is a

condition precedent to legitimacy, not a final determiner; in other words, military necessity is

not an overriding principle allowing breaches of LOAC rules. It does not justify violations of

LOAC because it is already factored into LOAC.

Military necessity is defined in AAP 6 (2014) as: “The principle whereby a belligerent has the

right to apply any measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a

military operation and which are not forbidden by the laws of war.”

In the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 it is stated that “The only legitimate objective which

States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the

enemy”. This quotation demonstrates the longstanding nature of the principle of military

necessity in treaty law. However, modern authors have suggested that it is permissible to aim

to ‘defeat’ rather than simply ‘weaken’ the enemy.

b. Distinction

This principle is central8 to LOAC and requires forces to identify and differentiate between

civilians and combatants, and between military objectives and civilian objects. Military

attacks may only be directed at military objectives (combatants and military targets). Civilians

or civilian property must not be the object of attack.9 The application of the principle is

dependant on the information available at the time the decision is made. AP I 1977 requires

that those who plan or decide upon an attack “do everything feasible to verify that the

objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special

protection but are military objectives”10. If reasonable efforts are made, in in good faith, to

determine the status of a target, but it later proves to be a mistake, this will generally not be a

LOAC violation.

Combatants are lawful targets unless they are hors de combat.11 Civilians are generally

protected from attack; however, this protection is lost if and while they directly participate in

7 Cf. Art. 22 Hague Reg 1907 and Art. 35.1 AP I 1977. 8 See advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 26, 257. The court

recognised this principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. 9 The principle of distinction is set out in Art. 48 of AP I 1977: “[T]he parties to the conflict shall at all times

distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives

and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 10 AP I 1977 Art. 57.2.a.i. 11 AP I 1977 Art. 41 and 43.

hostilities.12 Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives, namely objects

which “by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military

action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances

ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”13 The application of this test will in

some cases result in an object such as a bridge, a power grid or an airport both being a

military objective and used by civilians – so-called dual use objects. In such cases, the object

is still a lawful target, but the civilian use will have to be taken into consideration as well.

This is done through the application of the principle of proportionality.

c. Proportionality

Having determined that an object or a person may be the object of an attack (i.e. is a lawful

target), it must be considered whether it would be lawful to carry out the intended attack. The

principle of proportionality requires that the incidental loss of civilian life or damage to

civilian objects, the humanitarian interest, must not be excessive compared to the concrete and

direct military advantage anticipated, the military interest. The commonly stated principle of

proportionality is summarised in Articles 51 (5) (b) and 57 (2) (b) of AP I 1977: “an attack

which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to

civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the

concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is considered to be disproportionate.”

Attacks which are not proportionate are considered to be indiscriminate, and are hence

unlawful.

As in the case of distinction, the assessment must be made based on the information

reasonably available at the time (“expected” incidental losses and “anticipated” military

advantage). AP I 1977 require those who plan or decide upon an attack to ”take all feasible

precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any

event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian

objects”. Furthermore, if the attack is expected to cause disproportionate incidental loss of

civilians, they must “refrain from deciding to launch [the] attack”.14

Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects is also referred to

as “collateral damage”. Such damage must never be the objective of an attack, but may be

lawful even if foreseeable. The key is that such unintended damage must not be excessive or

disproportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained from the act or

attack.

d. Humanity

The principle of humanity, or humanitarian considerations as it is also referred to, prohibits

the infliction of personal suffering or destruction of property that is not necessary for

compelling the submission of the opposing forces. This principle places limits on actions that

might otherwise be justified by the principle of necessity. For instance, a Commander could

say that military necessity requires him to kill wounded enemy combatants, on the basis that

once recovered, they would continue to fight. However, humanity intercedes on behalf of the

12 AP I 1977 Art. 51.3. This complex rule is further elaborated on in the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the

notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities in International Humanitarian Law (2009). Parts of this publication

have, however, received significant criticism. See for instance New York University Journal of International

Law and Politics 42:3 (2010). 13 AP I 1977 Art. 52.2. 14 AP I 1977 Art. 57.2.a.ii-iii.

wounded, recognising that they are out of action (hors de combat) and no longer an

immediate threat, and requires them to be protected and treated humanely.

This principle is the basis for LOAC provisions prohibiting the employment weapons,

projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or

unnecessary suffering. This prohibition is found both as a general rule in AP I 1977 Article

35.2, and more specifically in several conventions limiting or prohibiting the use of certain

means and methods of warfare, such as Geneva Gas Protocol 1925, BWC 1972, and CCW

1980 and its Protocols. Humanity is also reflected in provisions regulating the standard of

treatment of protected persons.15 Protected persons shall in all circumstances be treated

humanely, and inhumane treatment of protected persons is a grave breach of the Geneva

Conventions and hence a war crime.16

Finally, where LOAC does not provide specific rules, the principle of humanity applies as a

general standard of behaviour in armed conflict. This is the so-called Martens’ clause, which

first appeared in the Preamble to 1899 Hague Convention II on Laws and Customs of War on

Land, and is repeated amongst others in Article 1.2 AP I 1977: “In cases not covered by this

Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the

protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established

custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”17

2. Enforcement of LOAC Principles

It should first be kept in mind that LOAC was developed and continues to bear legitimacy

because it serves higher purposes. Those purposes have traditionally included the goal of

reducing unnecessary suffering; protection of the victims of armed conflict - both combatants

and non-combatants; and, through these two purposes, the higher purpose of facilitating an

earlier restoration of peace than might otherwise be the case.

Militaries have, over the years, found a number of reasons to obey LOAC. These include the

principled reasons of common human nature, professionalism, chivalry, conscience, and legal

obligations. Aside from these principled reasons, though, there are some very pragmatic

reasons to comply with LOAC as well. Avoiding criminal liability for LOAC violations, both

individual and of the command, is one such reason. Reciprocity is often cited as another,

particularly important, pragmatic reason. Belligerents must treat their opponents in the same

manner that they themselves wish to be treated. By treating others as we want to be treated

ourselves, in accordance with the rules of LOAC, we encourage our enemies to do likewise.

Compliance with the law by one party is therefore a strong inducement for the adverse party

to comply with the law. For instance, if one party treats Prisoners of War (PoWs) properly or

confines its attacks to military objectives, the adverse party may be less likely to be tempted

to breach the law. Another reason to comply with LOAC is the goal of operational

effectiveness. LOAC and its requirement of military necessity is consistent with the economic

and efficient use of force, which in turn preserves military resources. Finally, and especially

important in the current climate of global information sharing, is the desire for maintaining

public support – foreign as well as domestic. Alleged violations of LOAC severely threaten to

15 See e,g, GC I-IV Common Art. 3, GC I Art. 12, first para., GC II Art. 12, first para., GC III Art. 13, GC IV

Art. 5 and 27, first para., AP I Art. 75.1 and AP II Art. 4.1. 16 See GC I Art. 50, GC II Art. 51, GC III Art. 130, GC IV Art. 147, and AP I Art. 85. 17 See also Art. 63 GC I, Art. 62 GC II, Art. 142 GC III, Art. 158 GC IV, and Preamble of AP II.

undermine the perceived legitimacy of a nation‘s or coalition‘s efforts, and with the erosion of

public support comes a reduction of political and economic support.18

Note that the obligation to respect and ensure respect for LOAC does not depend on

reciprocity.19 This means that violation of LOAC by one party will not release the other party

of its obligations.

3. Individual criminal responsibility

It is a basic principle of criminal law that individuals are responsible for crimes they commit

or assist others to commit, and the application of this principle to LOAC has been recognised

since the 1863 Lieber Code. According to Article 25 of the ICC Statute 1998, individuals are

responsible for any criminal acts (including war crimes) that they:

a. Commit, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person,

regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

b. Order, solicit or induce the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is

attempted;

c. For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise

assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means

for its commission;

d. In any other way contribute to the commission or attempted commission of such a

crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.

States are required to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for

persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of LOAC. Furthermore,

States are under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have

ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of

their nationality, before its own courts or hand such persons over for trial to another State that

has made out a ' prima facie ' case.20 Individual responsibility for acts done by individual

service members is primarily addressed by national sanctions.

Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of criminal responsibility unless the

person was under a legal obligation to obey the order; the subordinate did not know that the

order was unlawful; and the order was not manifestly unlawful.21

4. Command responsibility

18 Other sources: in Dieter Fleck‘s Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, the following factors are

grouped under enforcement measures: public opinion, reciprocal interests, maintenance of discipline, reprisals,

penal and disciplinary measures, compensation, protecting powers, international fact finding, ICRC‘s activities,

diplomatic activities, dissemination of humanitarian law, and personal liability. The Canadian The Law of

Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels (B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 / 2001-08-13) lists the following

among “Preventative and enforcement measures”: dissemination, command responsibility, state responsibility,

reprisals, complaint procedure under the Geneva Conventions, complaints, good offices, mediation and

intervention, fact-finding commission under Protocol I. 19 See GC I-IV 1949 Common Art. 1 emphasises that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to

ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” (emphasis added). See also Common Art. 3 and

AP I 1977 Art. 1.1. 20 See e.g. GC I Art. 49, GC II Art. 50, GC III Art. 129, GC IV Art. 146, AP I Art. 85, Hague Conv 1954 Art. 28,

Hague Prot 1999 Art. 15, CCW Prot II 1980 Art. 14, AP Mine Ban Conv (Ottawa Conv) 1997 Art. 9, and Opt

Prot CRC 2000 Art. 4. 21 ICC Statute, Art. 33.

Commanders are responsible for preventing violations of the law and for taking necessary

actions to prevent and report violations by their subordinates. Commensurate with their level

of responsibility, Commanders also have a duty to ensure that members of the armed forces

under their command are aware of their obligations under LOAC.22

Under the concept of command responsibility, Commanders may be held criminally

responsible not only for acts they have ordered, but also for acts committed by their

subordinates that the Commander should have been aware of. The concept of command

responsibility is old, but a modern version is codified in Article 86.2 of AP I 1977 where it is

stated that Commanders may be held responsible for the acts of a subordinate: “if they knew,

or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the

time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take

all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach”

HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

“In 1439 when Charles VII of France issued the Ordinance of Orleans, which imposed

blanket responsibility on Commanders for all unlawful acts of their subordinates,

without requiring any standard of knowledge. The first international recognition of

Commanders‘ obligation to act lawfully occurred during the trial of Peter von

Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal in the Holy Roman Empire who convicted Von

Hagenbach of murder, rape, and other crimes which ‘he as a knight was deemed to

have a duty to prevent’”.23

In 1625, Grotius wrote that: “As for the ways by which rulers over others may become

implicated in their crimes, there are two…tolerance and protection…we must hold that

a person who knows of a crime and is able and bound to forbid it and does not do so,

himself commits a crime...the people or the king are [not] rigidly bound to surrender

the offender, but…they [must] either surrender or punish him.”24

On 24 April 1863, during the United States Civil War, President Lincoln passed

General Orders no. 100, setting out the “Lieber Code” which imposed criminal

responsibility on Commanders for ordering or encouraging soldiers to wound or kill

already disabled enemies. The first codification of the concept in treaty law was in the

1907 Hague Convention (IV).

In 1946, General Yamashita was charged and convicted for having “unlawfully

disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of

the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other

high crimes against people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies,

particularly the Philippines; and he … thereby violated the laws of war."25 However,

later cases have come to the conclusion that there is a limit to what a Commander is

expected to have knowledge of. In the Von Leeb Nuremberg case, the court stated

that: “A high Commander cannot be kept completely informed of the details of

22 AP I Art. 87. 23 E. Levine: ‘Command Responsibility’, Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org, 2005. 24 H. de Groot (Grotius): The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis), L. Loomis Trans., Walter Black,

NY pp 235-237 (1949), cited in Evan Wallach and Maxine Marcus, ‘Command Responsibility’, in C. Bassiouni,

International Criminal Law (3rd Ed., Brill, 2008), p. 459. 25 United States Supreme Court, Yamashita case, Judgement, 4 February 1946, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

http://www.globalpolicy.org/

military operations of subordinates and must assuredly not know of every

administrative measure. He has the right to assume that details entrusted to responsible

subordinates will be legally executed”.26

Contemporary developments and contribution to the concept of command

responsibility may be found in the case law of Nuremberg and Tokyo trials; AP I

1977; the rulings passed by the International Criminal Tribunals for the former

Yugoslavia and Rwanda27; and the doctrine codified by Article 28 of the Rome Statute

of the International Criminal Court.

For State Parties to the ICC Statute, Article 28 of the Statute lays down that a military

commander, or a person effectively acting as a military commander, is criminally responsible

for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC committed by forces or persons under his or her

effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a

result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:

a. he or she either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known

that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

b. he or she failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power

to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent

authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Similarly, a civilian hierarchical superior, not effectively acting as a military commander,

shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by

subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to

exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:

a. he or she either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated,

that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;

b. the crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control

of the superior; and

c. the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her

power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent

authorities for investigation and prosecution.

NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT28

1. Introduction

The MC 362/l, “NATO Rules of Engagement” was approved by the North Atlantic Council in

2003. It provides the policies and procedures to create mission specific ROE, have it approved

by the NATO chain of command, and released for use at operational and tactical levels of

NATO/NATO-led forces. The MC 362/1 is used to develop NATO ROE for all types of

NATO/NATO-led operations, and all types of forces and other provocative actions.

26 See Law-Reports of Trials of War Criminals, The United nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. XII, London

1949, no. 72, the High Command Trial: United States-Von Leeb et al. United States Military Tribunal,

Nuremberg. 27 See C. Fournet, International Crimes: Theories, Practice and Evolution, London: Cameron May 2007, p. 116-

123 and the websites <http://www.un.org/icty/> and <http://www.69.94.11.53/>. 28 This part is largely based on the forthcoming STANAG 2597 and its Allied Training Publication in Training in

Rules of Engagement, and the quotations and references to MC 362/1 therein.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are defined in MC 362/1 as:

“ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the

circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might

be construed as provocative, may be applied."

NATO ROE provide the parameters within which NATO/NATO-led forces must operate in

order to accomplish an assigned mission. They are not used to assign missions or tasks, which

will be specified in SACEUR’s OPLAN. Instead, ROE are an important instrument by which

the political and strategic leadership exercises control of the means of armed force. They have

an important role in ensuring that military force is used to contribute to the solution a social or

political problem. As Clausewitz stated in his treatise, “war is not merely an act of policy but

a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means

(…) The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be

considered in isolation from their purpose.”29 Furthermore, the ROE play an important role as

a command and control tool for the Commanders at all levels. For the Commander, they

ensure that the forces can be expected to act in a foreseeable manner, and for the forces, they

provide a framework within which they have room for manoeuvre.

Basically, NATO ROE are sets of prohibitions and authorisations that define:

When force may be used. For instance, to board vessels, prevent interference with

freedom of movement, defend military facilities, or attack opposing forces.

Where force may be used or forces may operate. For instance, NATO ROE may limit

operations to a specific geographic area.

How force may be used to achieve the desired ends. For instance, prohibiting or

restricting use of specific weapons in designated circumstances or use of riot control

agents.

How much force may be used. NATO ROE may limit the degree, intensity and the

necessary duration of the use of force. An example is limiting the use of force to the

“use of force not including deadly force.”

Against whom force may be used. For instance, interfering with NATO/NATO-led

mission, persons demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)

against NATO/NATO-led forces, or attacking forces declared hostile.

The ROE are normally formulated on the basis of three important categories of

considerations:30

Political considerations: The ROE developed must reflect the political guidance

provided by the NAC in the NAC Initiating Directive (NID) to achieve a desired end

state.

Operational considerations: The ROE developed must enable mission

accomplishment by taking into account key factors such as mission objectives and end

state, available forces, military capabilities, force protection, area of responsibility,

and geography.

29 C.von Clausewitz, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret: On war, Princeton University Press,

Princeton NJ, 1984, p. 87. 30 The Use of Force in CF Operations (issued 2008 by Canadian Forces, B-GJ-005-501/FP-001) lists a fourth

one: c. Diplomatic Considerations (p.2-5): “During international operations and, in particular, during combined

operations, the overall military objectives and the use of force will be influenced by the collective objectives of

the alliance or coalition. These diplomatic considerations may ultimately limit legitimate uses of force, or they

may permit a greater latitude in the use of force than would be permitted in a purely Canadian operation”.

Legal considerations: The ROE developed must comply with the applicable legal

framework for the NATO/NATO-led operation (which may include amongst others a

UNSC mandate, host nation consent, law of armed conflict, international human rights

law, host nation law, status of forces provisions).

ROE must be differentiated from the Law of Armed Conflict. The conduct of NATO/NATO-

led operations is controlled by international law, including the applicable provisions of the

law of armed conflict (LOAC) and human rights law. NATO ROE, and the application of

them, may never authorise the use of force that violates applicable international law.

However, NATO ROE may impose greater limitations on the use of force or provocative

actions than those required by law. This may be done for political or policy reasons, or due to

operational considerations, as depicted on the diagram below. Troop Contributing Nations

must also ensure that ROE are in compliance with their respective national legislation. See

part D.2 below below for further information on ROE compliance with applicable law.

As mentioned above, NATO ROE defines the boundaries within which NATO/NATO-led

forces must operate in order to accomplish an assigned mission. For instance, in high intensity

conflicts, the ROE should enable domination of the battle space. In post-conflict situations,

NATO ROE are designed to reduce violence during the NATO/NATO-led operations. The

more complex the operational and tactical environment, the more complex the ROE will

likely be. It is therefore critical that the development and application of ROE is fully

understood, so that the ROE are as well tailored to deal with situation as possible. This will

reduce the risk that the application of ROE will result in either an under-reaction or an over-

reaction to a situation.

2. ROE in the NATO framework:

The MC 362/1 provides guidance and direction on rules of engagement for NATO in both

joint and combined operations. The current version, which is NATO UNCLASSIFIED,31 was

promulgated in 2003 and is an update of NATO MC 362 of 1999. The document‘s function,

31 Note that NATO UNCLASSIFIED does not mean open access. According to C -M(2002)60, THE

MANAGEMENT OF NON-CLASSIFIED NATO INFORMATION, of 11 July 2002, para. 2.a: “NATO

UNCLASSIFIED information shall only be used for official purposes and only individuals, bodies or

organisations that require it for official NATO purposes may have access to it. NATO information marked

NATO UNCLASSIFIED is subject to the release procedures, set out in paragraphs 11-15 [of this document]”.

as stated earlier, is to provide NATO policy and procedural guidance on the use of force and

other provocative actions. The document also provides a generic ROE catalogue of individual

rules, in Annex A. As a ROE Catalogue, it groups and integrates land, sea and air rules. The

rules contained within, as well as the more general guidance, are designed for all aspects of

operations, from peace through crisis and, potentially, up to armed conflict. NATO ROE are

intended to regulate all actions that can be construed as provocative at all levels: strategic,

operational, and tactical.

The rules in Annex A are in message forms and in a numerical order. They are grouped into a

number of “Series” which cover different aspects of military actions. These range from

geographic positioning, detention, harassment and counter-harassment, to attack. For instance,

Annex A contains amongst others the following series:

14 - Intervention in Non-military Activities

17 – Boarding

32 – Riot Control Agents

33 – Use of Force in Designated Operations

37 – Use of Electronic Countermeasures

42 – Attack

When developing the ROE for a mission, the appropriate rules for the operation are selected

from the various series. Some NATO ROE authorise actions and others restrain actions, and

every “Rule” is written either as a prohibition or authorisation. For instance, in series 37 on

“Use of Electronic countermeasures”, two of the alternative rules are:

Rule 370. Use of Electronic countermeasures is prohibited.

Rule 374. Unrestricted use of Electronic countermeasures is authorised.

Not all series may be relevant, and in some cases more than one rule may be needed from a

series. When multiple rules with the same number are requested during an operation,

SACEUR will add consecutive letter suffixes (i.e., A, B, C . . . AA, BB, CC . . .) for each

proposed rule.

Some possible ROE contain the element DESIG, requiring further specification to adopt the

ROE to mission at hand. The following is an example of an ROE with DESIG elements being

identified:

Rule132. Use of DESIG force to prevent boarding, detention or seizure of DESIG

vessels, aircraft, vehicles or property is authorised.

Rule 132. Use of minimum force to prevent boarding, detention or seizure of NATO

vessels, aircraft, vehicles or property is authorised.

Some rules have the indicator “(SC)” at the beginning of the rule. This means that when such

rule is chosen by drafters, the “(SC)” which means Strategic Commander (SACEUR) must

immediately notify the NAC when such NATO ROE are implemented.

Other examples of ROE commonly used are:

Rule 321 Use of DESIG riot control agents for DESIG purposes, subject to DESIG

restrictions is authorised.

Rule 331 Use of up to non-deadly force to prevent interference with NATO-led

personnel during the conduct of the mission is authorised.

Rule 337 Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent commission of DESIG crimes that

are occurring or are about to occur in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

Rule 421 Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile

intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces is

authorised.

Rule 422 Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) which commit or directly

contribute to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against NATO/NATO-led

forces is authorised.

Rule 423 Attack against DESIG forces or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile

intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against DESIG forces or personnel is

authorised.

Rule 424 Attack against DESIG forces or DESIG target(s) which commit or directly

contribute to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against DESIG forces or

personnel is authorised.

The MC 362/1 distinguishes peacetime NATO ROE from armed conflict ROE, stating that

during peacetime and operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict, the ROE

provide the sole authority for the use of force, with the exception of self-defence. During

armed conflict, ROE generally limit the otherwise lawful use of force. This may be

interpreted to mean that ROE peacetime would only include the authorisation of the use of

force, while during armed conflict, the ROE would consist of prohibitions. However, for

policy reasons that have emerged from NATO’s recent operations, this distinction is no longer

as certain. Current NATO ROE, whether in peacetime or armed conflict, are a mixture of

authorisations and limitations. As a result, any use of force other than in self-defence requires

ROE.32

Peacetime operations and operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict will

generally be conducted in order to limit or de-escalate the situation in order to avoid

hostilities. Although civilian law enforcement is not a NATO function, situations may arise

where NATO/NATO-led forces become involved in support or the conduct of civilian law

enforcement functions. Furthermore, in some cases, provocative measures may be authorised

in order to determine strengths, capabilities and reactions of enemy forces and to defend

NATO/NATO-led forces and operations in situations not covered by the right of self-defence.

For peacetime operations and operations prior to the commencement of armed conflict,

NATO ROE will be drawn from Series 10-19, 20-29 and/or 30-39, and Rules 421-426.

During armed conflict, persons and objects may be determined to be lawful targets (“declared

hostile”) in accordance with the law of armed conflict, and attacked on the basis of this status.

Rules 427-429 are used to authorise such attacks. Therefore, for armed conflict, NATO ROE

will be drawn from all Series.

32 STANAG 2597 Training in Rules of Engagement (4 May 2015), Annex B to ATrainP-4, slide 25.

MC 362/1 ROE generally do not specify the means or methods to be used. This makes the

ROE more flexible and adoptable to changes such as new technology. For instance, the

development of drones has therefore not resulted in a need for new ROE. The ROE focus is

on the activity, not the tool. The ROE previously applied to aircrafts will also be applicable to

drones, whether they are involved in information gathering or attack. Similarly, NATO is of

the view that the ROE regulating the Use of Electronic countermeasures sufficiently cover the

need for cyber ROE.

The next part will look in more detail on elements of NATO ROE. See Part D: “Planning

ROE” for further information on the development of ROE.

3. Use of force

NATO ROE apply the following use of force concepts:

Use of force not including deadly force

Use of minimum force

Attack

o Attack in response to hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)

o Attack in response to hostile act (not constituting actual attack)

o Attack on lawful targets to include objects and persons declared hostile

i. Use of force not including deadly force

NATO ROE are provided for mission accomplishment. In some situations, it may be

appropriate to authorise the use of force not including deadly force. If there is a decision to

authorise use of force not including deadly force, the rule will be drafted as shown in the

following example:

Rule 333: “Use of non-deadly force to prevent the taking possession of or destruction

of water facilities is authorised”

ii. Use of minimum force

Use of “minimum force” includes, by definition, the authority to use up to and including

“deadly force”. Minimum force is defined in MC 362/1 as “force, up to and including deadly

force, limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective”, while

Series 30-39 Series 10-19

/20-29 Rules

427 to 429

Rules

421 to 426

Actions that

could be seen

as

provocative

Use of

minimum

force to

accomplish

designated

mission

Attack against

elements

constituting a

threat to

NATO/NATO

-led forces

Attack

against

forces

declared

hostile

deadly force is defined as “force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting

in death”. 33

Example:

Rule 333: “Use of minimum force to prevent the taking of possession or destruction of

radio tower is authorised”

iii. Attack

In the context of NATO ROE Series 42, the term “attack” is generally used to mean the use of

force by NATO/NATO-led forces against DESIG persons, forces, or targets. Note, however,

that in references to “actual attack” or “imminent attack”, “attack” means the use of force

against NATO/NATO-led forces (or DESIG forces or personnel).

a. Attack in response to hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)

“Hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)” is defined as a “likely and identifiable

threat recognisable on the basis of both the following conditions:

a) capability and preparedness of individuals, groups of personnel or units which pose a

threat to inflict damage and,

b) evidence, including intelligence, which indicates an intention to attack or otherwise

inflict damage”

In case of imminent attack, use of force is permitted in self-defence and therefore not

regulated by NATO ROE (see part 4 below). “Imminent” means a condition that is manifest,

instant and overwhelming, and usually refers to a threat to which defensive action is

required.34

MC 362/1 provides a non-exhaustive list of tactical and non-tactical events that may lead

military personnel to respond against designated forces or individuals who demonstrate

hostile intent:

a) Manoeuvring into weapons launch positions (whether within effective range or

not).

b) The deployment of remote targeting methods.

c) The use of shadowers or tattletales to provide picture compilation.

d) Increased indications of mobilisation or warlike gestures revealed to public or

gained from intelligence.

e) Increased movements of ammunition and the requisition of transportation.

Note that isolated acts of harassment without intelligence or other information indicating an

intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage, will not normally be considered hostile intent.

b. Attack in response to hostile act (not constituting actual attack)

“Hostile Act (not constituting actual attack)” is defined as “any intentional act causing serious

prejudice or posing a serious danger to NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or

Personnel.” NATO ROE can authorise NATO/NATO-led forces to attack designated forces

and individuals who commit or directly contribute to a hostile act (not constituting actual

attack). Note that the definition of hostile act (not constituting actual attack) includes any act

that could cause serious prejudice, and not just threats that have not yet materialised into a

self-defence situation. NATO “hostile act” should therefore not be perceived as on the same

33 Annex F of MC 362/1 34 Annex F of MC 362/1

timeline as self-defence, as not all cases have the potential to escalate into a self-defence

situation. For instance, the destruction of a bridge (when there is no-one on or near the bridge)

to impede the freedom of movement of NATO/NATO-led forces would be a hostile act (not

constituting actual attack).

In case of actual attack, use of force is permitted in self-defence and therefore not regulated

by NATO ROE.

The status of the crisis, the political situation at the time and, if known, the intent of the

perpetrator (e.g., a defecting pilot) all play a part in determining if a “hostile act (not

constituting actual attack)” has occurred.

MC 362/1 provides a non-exhaustive list of four examples of “hostile act (not constituting

actual attack)”:

a) one or more units conducting mine-laying operations imposing restrictions upon the

movements of NATO/NATO-led forces or PDSS;

b) military aircraft penetrating NATO airspace or airspace over a secure area and

refusing to comply with interception instructions;

c) intentionally impeding NATO/NATO-led military operations; or

d) breaching or attempting to breach the security of a NATO/NATO-led military

installation or restricted area.

c. Attack on lawful targets to include objects and persons declared hostile

This category refers to objects and persons that are lawful targets under the law of armed

conflict. Precisely who and what is considered lawful targets for the specific mission will not

be defined in the ROE, but be provided in a note or appendix to the ROE, and may further be

elaborated on in a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

4. Self-defence

Any use of force during NATO/NATO-led operations must either be authorised by NATO

ROE or be in self-defence. NATO has left self-defence as a national issue, meaning that it is

defined and regulated by the national legislations of the respective Troop Contributing

Nations. Still, MC 362/1 contains the following definition: “Self-defence is the use of such

necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and

personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.”35 This definition of

individual and unit self-defence should be read as a baseline for planning purposes for

NATO/NATO-led forces, rather than as a NATO definition of self-defence. The aim of this

definition is to provide a general definition of self-defence for use in discussions and

planning.36

The following explanations are provided for the MC 362/1 definition:

“Necessary” means that use of force is indispensable for securing self-defence

“Proportional” means a response commensurate with the perception of the level of the

threat posed. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration

necessary for self-defence and no more

“Imminent” means that the need to defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming

35 MC 362/1 para 7 and Annex F 36 STANAG 2597 Training in Rules of Engagement (4 May 2015), Annex B to ATrainP-4, slide 14.

“Attack” is the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel

“Deadly Force” means force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury

resulting in death

Although this may correspond with various national interpretations of self-defence, it may

also differ in certain areas, especially with regards to the interpretation of imminence.

Members of NATO/NATO-led forces shall adhere to their national laws on self-defence.

Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to

where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE

begins. Note, however, that for operations involving the participation in armed conflict, the

legal basis for the use of force will primarily be the Law of Armed Conflict (as further

specified by the ROE).37

MC 362/1 also refers to “Extended self-defence”. This is defined as follows: “Within the

general concept of self-defence, NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to

take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend

other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from attack or imminent attack.”38 Similarly to

be definition above, this MC 362/1 definition of extended self-defence is used as a baseline

for planning purposes for NATO/NATO-led forces. It is thus not a binding or common

definition, but a common reference to enable discussions and understanding of the national

differences.39

As a general rule, NATO ROE do not limit the right of self-defence. However, Commanders

may give orders to control the use of force by individuals and units, and subject to national

law and policy, such orders may be able to control the exercise of the right of self-defence. As

an example, the Canadian Forces Use of Force Manual states that “there is no obligation to

use force in self-defence and commanders may legitimately order individuals or units under

their command not to respond to hostile intent. Such an order would be based on that

commander's responsibility, in certain circumstances, to control the escalation of force.”40

Similarly, Admiral Woodward, Commander of the UK forces during the Falklands War, has

stated in his accounts that “I had, in effect, taken away some of my Commanders‘ right of

self-defence, further restricting the rules from home which allowed them to fire back. But I

did not want this war to go off at half-cock, because that would likely cause disastrous

confusion and loss of control.”41

When reference is made to self-defence, it is important to be clear on which legal concept is

being referred to; personal self-defence, unit self-defence or State self-defence. While State

self-defence refers to the ability of a State to respond to a threat to the State and is primarily

relevant prior to the initiation of an armed conflict, personal and unit self-defence are

37 For a useful contribution to this debate, see I. Henderson and B. Cavanagh: ‘Military members claiming self-

defence during armed conflict – Often misguided and unhelpful’, – Often misguided and unhelpful’, in in J.

Petrovic (ed): Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law - Essays in honour of Tom

McCormack, Routledge, London/New York, 2016, chapter 4. 38 Annex F of MC 362/1. 39 STANAG 2597 Training in Rules of Engagement (4 May 2015), Annex B to ATrainP-4, slide 17. 40 The Use of Force in CF Operations p.2-2. Note that hostile intent in this context refers to the requirements for

self-defence and is therefore different to the NATO concept of hostile intent (not constituting imminent attack). 41 S. Woodward: One hundred days: The memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander,

HarperCollins Publishers, 1992, pp. 107-108, cited in G. R. Phillips: ‘Rules of engagement: A primer’, The Army

Lawyer, Department of Army Pamphlet 27-50-248, July 1993, p. 16.

applicable even during armed conflict. As mentioned above, personal self-defence is regulated

by national legislation. Although there is agreement that unit self-defence exists, there is

debate whether it should be perceived as State self-defence, collective personal self-defence,

or something separate.42 State self-defence is set out in the Caroline incident of 1837 and in

the UN Charter Article 51, and would be the legal basis for a NATO Article 5 – operation.

5. PDSS and PRDSS

NATO ROE can authorise use of force to defend designated persons and property using

MC 362/1 concepts of PDSS (Persons with Designated Special Status) and PRDSS (Property

with Designated Special Status). PDSS may for instance be assigned to partners such as host

nation forces or UN forces. PRDSS is usually assigned to mission essential military property

or other objects such as water purification plants, electrical generators and communication

towers. Designation of special status requires NAC approval; however, this authority may be

delegated.

Some nations’ laws or policies on self-defence do not include the use of force including

deadly force to protect:

a) other NATO/NATO-led forces and persons;

b) persons not belonging to NATO/NATO-led forces (e.g. civilian population); and/or

c) property.

Forces from these nations are thus dependent on having ROE permitting the use of force to

defend these categories.

6. Legal effect of ROE

Compliance with NATO ROE is essential for NATO mission success. It is therefore

important that NATO ROE are adhered to by all forces engaged in a NATO/NATO-led

operation. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that subordinates act within the bounds

of NATO ROE. Within implemented ROE, it remains the Commander’s responsibility to

ensure that forces use only the degree of force that is lawful under the circumstances.

Both Commanders and subordinates may be held responsible for any non-compliance with

NATO ROE through national disciplinary and other processes. For some countries, ROE are

guidance only, with little independent legal effect. For most countries, however, ROE are

orders, the violation of which is punishable just as any other violation of orders might be.

NATO defines ROE as “directives”, and leaves the determination of the legal effect of the

ROE to be decided by the respective Troop Contributing Nations.

Even though ROE are formulated and applied in accordance with international and national

law, compliance with ROE may not necessarily be relied upon as a defence against an

allegation of wrongdoing. It may, for instance, be the case that the use of force was excessive,

or that the person attacked had become hors de combat and therefore no longer a lawful

target. If the case arises in a country where ROE are considered as orders, a defence of

42 For a useful overview, see J.F.R Bodden Hosang: ‘Self-Defence in Military Operations: The Interaction

between the Legal Bases for Military Self-Defence and Rules of Engagement’, 47 Military Law and Law of War

Review 25 (2008), pp. 33-64.

superior order may be relevant.43 Regardless of whether ROE are seen as orders or guidance,

however, it may be assumed that NATO States intended the application of the ROE to be

lawful. As such, ROE may be a relevant factor in the question wrongfulness, especially in

areas where treaty law is unclear and state practice plays a greater role.

PLANNING AND DRAFTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT44

1. Background

This section provides a brief overview of the concepts used for planning and drafting NATO

ROE, as well as some advice and guidance to be considered by nations and training entities

involved in these processes. Further assistance may be found in the STANAG 2597 on

Training in the Rules of Engagement (4 May 2015). This section is not intended in any way to

establish or state substantive policy, but rather to provide concepts for consideration and

further elaboration or development in the training of ROE. The material is provided for the

benefit of legal advisers and all others who are part of the ROE planning process. It is

important that the legal adviser does not have sole responsibility for ROE, but rather be the

primary adviser to the Commander and ROE Operations Officer on legal aspects of ROE.

This helps ensure that the development of ROE is demand driven.

2. Compliance with applicable law

Compliance with international law, including LOAC, is primarily a national responsibility. As

a matter of NATO policy, NATO forces, whether engaged in armed conflict or in peace

support operations, will comply with the spirit and principles of LOAC in all operations.

Personnel participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must also adhere to their own

national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a

breach of their national laws. National law may further limit the use of force in certain types

of military operations or in certain situations otherwise permitted by the ROE. For example,

some nations’ laws do not permit the use of force or deadly force to protect property. When

national laws are at variance with NATO ROE, nations participating in NATO/NATO-led

operations must inform the NAC and the SACEUR of the inconsistencies as early as possible.

While consensus will be reached to approve the NATO ROE, individual nations may declare

national restrictions on and/or instructions for the application of their forces/personnel in

order to reflect their national laws and policies. Any such “national caveats” must not be more

permissive than the use of force authorised for the operation. Caveats are explained further in

part 7 below.

3. Rules of engagement (ROE) development

As explained above, ROE are the means by which the NAC provides political direction for

the conduct of military operations, including authorisations for or limitations on the threat or

use of force or other actions that might be construed as provocative. The purpose of ROE is to

ensure that the application of force is controlled, by directing the degree of constraint or

43 See for instance Art. 33 of the Rome Statute. See also parts B.3 and B.4 above on individual criminal

responsibility and command responsibility. 44 As with Part C, this part is largely based on the STANAG 2597 (4 May 2015) and its Allied Training

Publication in Training in Rules of Engagement, and the quotations and references to MC 362/1 therein.

freedom permitted when conducting an assigned mission. The process of translating this

political direction into tactical instructions and orders to soldiers, sailors, and air personnel

requires Commanders at all levels to exercise considerable judgment. The mission specific

ROE will be contained in the Use of Force Annex (Annex E) to the Operational Planning

document (OPLAN) (when the OPLAN is put into effect, it becomes an Operation Order

(OPORD)),.45 In addition, guidance on the use of force may also be contained or referred to in

other sections of a planning document or order. Where this occurs, particular care must be

taken to ensure that the ROE and different sections containing use of force guidance are

harmonised, and are not contradictory, ambiguous, or confusing.

Drafting the ROE and the remainder parts of the Use of Force Annex is the responsibility of

the operations staff (i.e. J3/J5). Subject matter experts like legal, political, gender, and civilian

advisors will assist with their expertise. Legal staff will assist to ensure the Annex is

consistent with International Law (including LOAC), the mission‘s political mandate, and the

respective national policies and laws of NATO nations. The NATO ROE staffing and

approval process may be independent from the staffing of an OPLAN, but it is always linked

to the development or revision of the relevant OPLAN/OPORD. When drafting NATO ROE,

Commanders must ensure internal staff coherence and coordinated development of the NATO

ROE with the development of the OPLAN already from the beginning. The ROE will become

classified when approved and implemented in the OPLAN/OPORD.

The NATO ROE process of development consists of three major phases. First, the different

command levels develop or evaluate the ROE required, based on operational requirements.

Then, the draft NATO ROE are subjected to legal review to ensure that they comply with

applicable legal limitations, before they finally are sent to NAC for political approval.

It is essential for drafting teams to be familiar with the legal and operational environment in

which the NATO/NATO-led force will be operating and with NATO’s political and strategic

goals developed by the NAC for given NATO/NATO-led operation. Throughout the drafting

process, operational planners and the chain of command must continuously review the NATO

ROE to ensure that they are in compliance with NATO’s objectives and that the planned ROE

for the operation are sufficiently flexible to permit the military to accomplish its mandated

operations. If the NATO ROE do not properly support the mission, planners/Commanders

must request a change of NATO ROE through the chain of command.

When preparing a Use of Force Annex and ROE, the following considerations should be

taken into account:

- Follow MC 362/1 Guidance. The instruction contained in the ROE Annex must be

consistent with MC 362/1, as this document provides standing NATO policy for

approving and implementing ROE for NATO/NATO-led operations.

- Avoid Strategy and Doctrine. The ROE Annex should not be used as a mechanism

to convey strategy or doctrine. The commander should express his campaign

philosophy through the main body of the COP/SDP/OPLAN and supporting annexes.

45 Note that the complete set of authorised ROE is referred to in several ways; as for instance the (applicable)

ROE, the ROE set, the ROE profile, or ROE package.

- Avoid Restating the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Commanders may

emphasise an aspect of International Law that is particularly relevant to their Plan in

the ROE, but ROE should not include an extensive discussion of LOAC.

- Avoid Tactics. Tactics and use-of-force guidance are complementary, not

synonymous. The ROE Annex provides boundaries and guidance on the use of force

that are neither tactical control measures nor substitutes for the exercise of military

judgment.

- Avoid Safety-Related Restrictions. This Annex should not deal with safety-related

restrictions. While certain weapons may require specific such safety-related, pre-

operation steps, these should not be detailed in an ROE Annex, but may appear in a

tactical or field SOP.

- Highlight any National Caveats. When national laws or policies are at variance

with the ROE approved by the NAC, MC 362/1 calls upon nations to provide notice of

these variances. This information should be included in the ROE documentation so

that Commanders and staffs are aware of the variance and can plan accordingly.

A Use of Force Annex (Annex E to the NATO OPLAN) should normally contain the

following substantive information, usually in its main body:

- Mission Mandate. A brief articulation of the political, diplomatic, and legal

framework that underpins the mission. This should include a Political Policy

Statement, and the applicable Political Policy Indicator (see subsection 4.vi).

- International Law including LOAC. A brief articulation of the applicability of

International Law to the mission. Depending upon the nature of the mission, this may

include a discussion of the applicability of certain provisions of International Human

Rights Law and other obligations as well as the applicability of LOAC to the mission.

- Applicability of National Laws. An explanation of the relationship between the

mission and the national laws of contributing nations. Where nations have expressed

caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats should be summarised, and

the resultant impact on the mission identified. Forces of participating nations must

adhere to their own national laws and are not obliged to execute any mission or task

that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Nations may issue amplifying

instructions in some form to their forces to ensure this compliance. Such instructions

should be coordinated with the NATO Commander in advance.

- Self-Defence. An explanation of the relationship of self-defence to the mission‘s

ROE. Individuals and units have an inherent right to defend themselves against attack

or an imminent attack, and NATO ROE issued for a mission do not limit this right.

Because national laws differ, there will not always be a consistency between

multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use

of force authorised by the mission ROE begins. This must be discussed and addressed

during the planning and implementation phases.

- Extended Self-Defence/Protection of Friendly Forces. Amplify the meaning of

extended self-defence as it applies to this mission. If authorised by their national

authorities, NATO-led forces involved in operations may be permitted to use

necessary and proportional force to defend other friendly forces in the vicinity from

attack or imminent attack. The ROE may also be used to define the meaning of the

word “forces” and as its application to civilians operating as integral members of a

Troop Contributing Nation‘s (TCN) commitment.

- Protection of Persons and Property with Designated Special Status. Explain the

mission‘s policy for protecting members and property of international, regional, or

local organisations (e.g., NGOs and PVOs). Define any relevant terms, and discuss

effect of relevant TCN national laws and policies.

- Obligations of NATO/NATO-led Forces. Whilst not restating the general precepts

of LOAC, the ROE can be used to provide special instructions or guidance on how the

LOAC principles must be applied in the context of the specific operation. In this

regard, amplifying and mission-specific guidance can be provided on such subjects as,

for instance: what constitutes military necessity, the duty to challenge or warn, duty to

observe fire or target identification for indirect fire, avoidance of collateral damage,

the duty to report certain incidents that could constitute violations of ROE or LOAC,

and the duty to report ROE incompatibilities.

- Key Definitions. The Use of Force Annex may be used to repeat and where

appropriate amplify key definitions approved in MC 362/1 and AAP 646 that apply to

the mission. Additionally, because there are often situations where no single definition

of a term exists or existing definitions are inadequate, the Use of Force Annex can be

used to flag these terms, provide a working definition that matches the circumstances

surrounding the mission, and ensure that all forces are operating off the same

definition.

- Appendices. There are a number of Appendices that normally appear in a Use of

Force Annex to an OPLAN. The following list is intended to be illustrative, not

exclusive:

- Appendix 1 – ROE Implementation. The latest or updated version of the

implemented ROE for the operation.

- Appendix 2 – ROE Matrix. Provides an overview of the implemented ROE

and their respective authorisations levels (i.e. whether any are retained, and if

so, at which level of Command).

- Appendix 3 – Hostile Act / Hostile Intent. This section looks at mission-

specific indicia that could be judged as constituting a hostile act or hostile

intent (not constituting an actual or imminent attack respectively), justifying a

use of force under ROE 421-424.

- Appendix 4 - Mission Accomplishment ROE. Explains the purpose of the

mission ROE and to whom and when they would apply, be promulgated,

updated or changed.

- Appendix 5 - Guidance on the Use of ROE in Land Operations. Specifics for

land forces, including guidance on search and seizure, crowd and riot control,

prevention of serious crimes, detention, etc.

- Appendix 6 - Guidance on the Use of ROE in Air Operations. Weapons

release criteria, air interdiction, intervention, and interception procedures,

enforcement of military restricted airspace, etc.

- Appendix 7 - Guidance on the Use of ROE in Maritime Operations. Guidance

on maritime interception, diversion and seizure of cargo, boarding, use of

warning shots, disabling, and non-disabling fire, etc.

46 AAP-6 (2014) Glossary of Terms and Definitions is a NATO Allied Publication. The agreement of nations to

use this publication is recorded in STANAG 3680.

- Appendix 8 - ROE for Open Publication. Because ROE may contain sensitive

information, the release of which could be harmful to the mission, this

Appendix should indicate what information is releasable to the public.

4. ROE Procedures

PROCEDURES

SACEUR

MC


ROEIMPL

ROEAUTH

ROEREQ

ROEREQ

JFC

ROEREQ

SACEUR

JFC

CC

ROEIMPL

MATRIX

TCN Forces

Based on the draft OPLAN, the mission and tasks, and the development of the situation, the

SACEUR will consider the appropriate ROE to be implemented in support of mission

accomplishment. The SACEUR requests NATO ROE from the NAC via Military Committee

through a ROE Request message (ROEREQ). The NAC will, based on Military Committee

advice, authorise all, none, or part of the requested ROE and forward its decision to the

SACEUR through a ROE Authorisation message (ROEAUTH). NAC approval requires

unanimity. The NATO ROE that have been authorised by the NAC are then contained in

Annex E to the OPLAN/OPORD. Because the development of the OPLAN and ROE is

interdependent, it is difficult to complete one without the approval of the other. It may

therefore be advisable to forward a draft ROEREQ to the NAC together with the CONOPS

for the operation when this is sent for approval. This will provide guidance on how the NAC

is likely to receive the planned ROE, which is useful to the completion of the OPLAN.

The authorised NATO ROE will then be implemented by SACEUR to each level of

subordinate command through a NATO ROE Implementation message (ROEIMPL). When

implementing NATO ROE, a Commander must act within the NATO ROE authorised, but is

not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised NATO ROE. The

ROE authorised by the NAC/DPC delineates the limits or scope for the use of force. Within

this scope, Commanders will be given flexibility to exercise discretion and judgment on

whether force should or should not be used. The inclusion in the ROE of Political Policy

Statement (PPS) and Political Policy Indicators (PPI) helps the Commander in the exercise of

this judgment (see part vii below). The Commanders must ensure that forces under his or her

command only use the degree of force that is lawful under the circumstances. If the superior

authority later withdraws or restricts NATO ROE previously implemented, Commanders must

immediately update their direction to subordinates to ensure compliance with the updated

NATO ROE.

The NATO ROE system is designed to be flexible. It includes a process for constant review

and amendment to correspond to emerging situations. The NATO ROE should be changed,

for example, when the mission changes, the threat changes, the unit is assigned with new

tasks, force capabilities change or Commanders do not believe they have the right NATO

ROE for the mission. MC 362/1 sets forth the specific procedures for submitting ROE

Requests (ROEREQ). Requests for new ROE must be approved by NAC, which means that

the process may be time consuming. It is therefore important that the initial ROE are not too

rigid. Furthermore, those developing the ROE would have been of the opinion that the

existing ROE were appropriate for the mission. Therefore, a request for new ROE is most

likely to succeed if it can be demonstrated that there is a situation that the planners had not

foreseen and that the current ROE therefore do not fit.

i. ROEREQ – the ROE request

ROEREQ messages are used by:

The SACEUR to seek authority through the MC from the NAC to implement, modify

or cancel ROE.

A Commander to seek the implementation, modification, or cancellation of ROE by a

superior Commander.

Commanders to request authority to implement ROE not listed in the compendium in

Annex A to the MC 362/1 (i.e., Spares).

Example of a ROEREQ:

ROEREQ/131//

GENTEXT/1/ROETEXT/ROE ONE THREE ONE (131)/PHYSICALLY

OBSTRUCTING TO PREVENT BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE OF THE

DESIGNATED HIGH-VALUE UNIT(S) IS AUTHORISED//

GENTEXT/2/JUSTIFICATION/REQUIRED TO ENABLE DE-ESCALATORY

AND DEFENSIVE ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE DESIGNATED HIGH-VALUE

UNIT(S)//

GENTEXT/3/RISK IF NOT APPROVED/INADEQUATE AUTHORITY TO

PROPERLY DE-ESCALATE SITUATIONS AND PROTECT THE DESIGNATED

HIGH-VALUE UNIT(S), WHICH MAY PREVENT MISSION

ACCOMPLISHMENT AND LEAD TO LOSS OF ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY//

iv. ROEAUTH or ROEDENY – the response from higher authority denying or

authorising measures as may be the case

ROEAUTH messages are used by the NAC to authorise or to deny NATO ROE, and must

contain the entire text of each ROE serial being authorised or denied. Only authorised NATO

ROE can be further implemented and used for mission accomplishment. It is uncommon for

ROE to be denied by NAC. This is because those preparing the ROE ensure that they are

realistic and likely to be accepted by member states before the request is sent to NAC.

Example of a ROEAUTH:

ROEAUTH/222//

GENTEXT/ROETEXT/ROE TWO TWO TWO (222)/USE OF ALL ILLUMINANTS

OR ILLUMINATION SYSTEMS IS AUTHORISED//

ii. Dormant ROE – authorised but not implemented ROE

Dormant ROE are NATO ROE that have been authorised by the NAC, but have not been

implemented by SACEUR because they are intended to become available at a designated

decision point. Dormant ROE allow the SACEUR to prepare plans, orders, training, and

materiel to be used once the dormant ROE become operative. Such NATO ROE are useful in

rapidly evolving operational environments and may, for instance, be part of a branch plan.

The NAC must also take into account the naturally uncertain circumstances of military

operations. The milestone should be formulated in terms of detailed and objective criteria,

including at what level the decision that the milestone is met should be made. The NAC may

set an expiry date/event after which the dormant ROE may not be implemented. The operative

date/event or contingent nature of this ROE must be clearly set out in all references to such

dormant NATO ROE. The SACEUR must notify NAC through the MC immediately when

dormant NATO ROE become operative.

iii. ROEIMPL – a communication implementing the ROE in a specific

operational context

SACEUR promulgates NATO ROE through ROE implementation messages (ROEIMPL).

Each ROEIMPL message will contain the entire text of every NATO ROE serial that is

currently implemented for the operation. ROEIMPL messages are used by a Commander to

control the application of ROE that has been authorised by higher headquarters. It may

contain additional guidance or restrictions, or may withhold certain NATO ROE which have

been authorised (“retained ROE”).

Example of a ROEIMPL:

ROEIMPL/321B//

GENTEXT/ROETEXT/ROE THREE TWO ONE BRAVO (321B)/USE OF RIOT

CONTROL AGENTS WHERE NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF MISSION

EXECUTION IS AUTHORISED, BUT ONLY WHERE SUCH USE IS NOT A

METHOD OF WARFARE//

AMPN/USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS MUST NOT VIOLATE THE 1993

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION/ONE OF THE PERMITTED USES OF

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

IS LAW ENFORCEMENT INCLUDING DOMESTIC RIOT CONTROL

PURPOSES//

iv. Retained ROE – implemented but withheld ROE

When implementing ROE for forces, a Commander must act within the ROE authorised, but

is not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised ROE.

Commanders may either implement the whole mission specific ROE in force or they may

narrow them to fit component-specific circumstances. However, they may not exceed the

delegated authority. Retained ROE require thorough planning to ensure that the ROE is

available when needed. Retained ROE may be released for a certain period or certain

operation, or may require that the Commander in question is involved at the time the ROE is

going to be used, for instance over the phone or by being present.

v. ROEAMPN – amplification of ROE where needed

AMPN is a clarification instruction contained within a ROEREQ, ROEAUTH or ROEIMPL

message intended to provide additional information and guidance. Clarification for any or all

of the ROE may be included in amplification lines that follow each requested, authorised or

implemented ROE serial.

Example of a ROEAMPN:

AMPN/THIS ROE IS NOT TO BE DELEGATED BELOW CC//

vi. ROESUMS - summary

In order to avoid confusion and misunderstandings, summaries of ROE which have already

been approved or modified should be provided. This should include both the numbers and the

full text of the ROE.

vii. PPS and PPI – political policy statement and indicator

The NAC will provide the guidance on its political policy in a Political Policy Statement

(PPS) at the beginning of the ROE profile. The aim of the NAC’s PPS is to reflect the overall

policy that will be incorporated into the authorised ROE and provide the proper context for

the mission. PPS enable Commanders to respond appropriately as the situation develops. For

this reason, PPS may change as the mission objectives change.

The PPS will be complemented by a Political Policy Indicator (PPI), which guide the

interpretation and application of appropriate NATO ROE. The PPI clarify how the situation is

expected to develop when the ROE are employed. This will affect, for instance, the degree of

force used to ensure mission accomplishment and the authorisation level of attack on

designated hostile forces or the use of force expected to cause collateral damage. MC 362/1

sets out the following PPI:

XRAY – De-escalation:

o Political/military strategy is to minimise NATO involvement in the crisis to

that necessary to achieve the aim.

YANKEE – Maintain status quo:

o Political/military strategy is to use NATO forces to maintain current regional

balance or return to previous status quo following destabilisation.

o Significant use of force to support specific objectives may be authorised under

PPI YANKEE.

ZULU – Risk of Escalation is Acceptable:

o Political/military strategy is to authorise the use of force to support

achievement of the grand strategy including change of the status quo ante to

generate a more favourable environment. Implicit in the approval of PPI

ZULU is political recognition that military action may lead to escalation of the

crisis.

The PPS and PPI will be stated in the NATO ROE (Annex E of the OPLAN).

5. Commander’s role

NATO ROE should be continuously reviewed by Commanders to ensure that they are clear

and lawful, that they are sufficient to address the requirements of the mission, and that they

provide Commanders with the necessary powers to deal effectively with the threat and ensure

force protection.47 If more permissive ROE are required, an additional ROEREQ has to be

47 Force Protection is defined as a “set of measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel,

facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and

operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.” For more information, see Allied Joint

Doctrine for Force Protection AJP-3.14 (November 2007).

sent to the NAC for approval and follow the same process as described in Section 4 (ROE

Procedures) above.

These are examples of questions Commanders should ask themselves:

Do I have the NATO ROE that I need to:

o Do what I need to do to accomplish my mission?

o Go where I need to go?

o Protect those I need to protect?

Which of the NATO ROE should I release to my subordinates?

Are retained ROE held at the appropriate level?

Do I need to submit a ROEREQ?

Commanders have the right to further restrict the authorised and implemented NATO ROE,

provided this right has not been limited by a higher level of Command. However,

Commanders may never permit any action that will exceed the use of force provisions laid out

in the applicable ROE, unless the use of force was necessary and proportionate self-defence.

6. Plain Language ROE

ROE must be understood and implemented by tactical personnel. Every Commander should

therefore consider whether the ROE should be restated in a “plain language” version, capable

of being kept on a kneeboard card, pocket reference card (“soldiers’ card”), or other easily

consulted format by troops in the field. In developing such reference aids, great care must be

taken to make the ROE easily understood by even the most junior soldier, sailor, or airman,

but also to ensure that the specific policies and guidance contained in the ROE, as approved

by the NAC, are not altered. Such a “Plain Language” ROE document should not be seen as a

substitute for the official ROE Implementation message, and should only be used in

combination with training in the official ROE. See part 8 “Training and dissemination” below

for further detail.

7. National caveats, limitations on and interpretations of NATO ROE

After the NAC has approved a set of ROE, NATO Member States and other Troop

Contributing Nations are responsible for making them applicable to their own forces. Some

States may, due to national legal or political reasons, impose additional restrictions on the

employment of their national forces. National caveats are a doctrinally accepted way of

stating such anticipated limitations. National caveats are raised by nations because they confer

operational control (OPCON) over national contingents to the NATO Commander, and

should be conveyed to NATO in advance of operations. This is usually done through a

Transfer of Authority message.

Caveats are defined as: “In NATO operations, any limitation, restriction or constraint of any

nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or

otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy or employ

these assets fully in line with approved OPLAN. Note: A caveat may apply inter alia to

freedom of movement within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the approved

rules of engagement.”48

48 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 Edition 2014. For further reading on caveats in the NATO

context, see for instance N-P. Chalanouli and S. L. Bumgardner: ‘Rules of engagement, NATO’s approach and

If the national interpretations permit more aggressive action than NATO intends, the NATO

limitations apply. If national interpretations or policies are more restrictive than those of

NATO ROE, the affected forces must comply with their national constraints. In fact, nothing

precludes an individual NATO member State from adopting its own set of rules as long as

they respect the NATO rules. However, the existence of parallel ROE sets may be a cause for

confusion. Commanders must be aware of any national limitations or interpretations affecting

forces under their command, and take this into consideration when planning for the use of

those forces.

There are several grounds why States decide to have caveats on the use of their forces:

National law. A State may caveat a particular ROE in order to respect its national

legislation, for instance a constitutional constraint on use of military force, or a

requirement of national parliamentary authorisation on involvement in a mission.

International law. Similarly a State may caveat a ROE because of its interpretation of

international law or due to special obligations under international law that would be

conflicted by a ROE rule.

Interpretation. A State may disagree with the interpretation given for instance to a UN

mandate and therefore caveat a particular ROE.

Limitation/Restriction. Nations may invoke limitations on other grounds:

o Policy considerations; as a self-constraint on specific type of activities, or

using specific type of weapons. For instance, a nation may refuse to use rubber

bullets or tear gas.

o Geographical limitation; refusing to send troops in a particular area within the

theatre of operation.

o Language, cultural and terminology differences.

o Overlap/gaps between NATO mandate and other coalition operations.

o Logistical or other capability reasons, for instance lack of resources or skills.

They may refuse to use certain capabilities or weapons to accomplish a

mission.

A nation may raise additional restrictions during deployment of its forces. These restrictions

are unanticipated and thus generally not characterised as caveats. This is done using a so

called “Red Card.” The Red Card Holder is a person assigned specific authority by its own

State on the use of national assets. A Red Card Holder is usually established when sensitive

means of combat are deployed (e.g. attack helicopters or fighter planes) in the area of

operations, or the operation itself is politically sensitive. The Red Card Holder has formal

authority to deny the use of national assets to perform a specific mission assigned to that

national contingent by the NATO Commander.

8. Training and dissemination

Training in NATO ROE is a national responsibility, but resources and guidance may be found

in NATO STANAG 2597 and its Annexes. Instructors should consult their chain of command

and specialist advisors for additional support and guidance on nationally approved content for

training in NATO ROE.

national caveats’ in Zasady użycia siły (ang. Rules of Engagement) – wybrane problemy prawne [Rules of

Engagement – legal problems], B. Janusz-Pawletta (ed.), Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw, 2011, pp.

107-113.

Training and dissemination of ROE should be a part of the general training and the mission

specific training of the troops. General training may for instance focus on knowledge of

standing ROE such as MC 362/1, and the planning, development, interpretation and structural

logic of the ROE. The training should be tailored to the level of the troops. For instance, the

personnel higher up the chain of command will need more extensive knowledge of the ROE

development processes than those at lower levels. Mission specific training should be carried

out both before and during an operation, and should be led by the Commander and his or her

staff. This will help ensure that all personnel share their Commander’s interpretation of the

applicable ROE.

Furthermore, training should be both theoretical and practical. Both general theory of what

ROE are and how they function, and training in the application of ROE is recommended. For

instance, cases highlighting ROE challenges may be the subject of both classroom discussions

and field exercises.

Another concrete measure is the abovementioned ROE soldier’s cards or pocket cards. Such

ROE cards are a summary or extract of mission specific ROE. They shall be clear, concise,

and preferably an unclassified distillation of the ROE. It is important, however, that the ROE

card does not become a substitute for proper pre-deployment training. The ROE card is only

intended to be a reminder of the basic principles. For this purpose a ROE card should be:

- brief and clear, using simple language,

- understandable for soldiers at every level, and

- mission-specific, including a brief explanation of the situation.

Finally, it is important that any changes to the ROE are properly disseminated, both through

widespread distribution of the updated version of the current ROE, through training and by

updating the ROE cards.49 This will for instance be the case if previously retained ROE are

released or dormant ROE are implemented.

49 Several sample of ROE card may be found in: Operational Law Handbook (USA) issued by International and

Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army,

Charlottesville, Virginia (available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-

handbooks.html), p. 103.

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-handbooks.html

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-handbooks.html

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RELEASABLE TO SFPDPE16 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

THE CRISIS IN THE

BALTIC SEA REGION

30 June 2016


ii RELEASABLE TO SFPDPE16

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Caveat

This scenario document was produced by International Solutions Group, Limited (ISG) under ACT Purchase Order 154001429 for Support for Key Leader Training Exercises (IFIB-ACT-SACT-13-07) and specifically in support of exercises STEADFAST PYRAMID/ STEADFAST PINNACLE 2016 (SFPDPE16).

It has been developed to provide the geo-strategic setting and the sequence of major events enabling SFPDPE16 participants, syndicate facilitators, supporting staff and subject matter experts to conduct learning activities and practical work to achieve the SFPDPE16 exercise objectives and desired learning outcomes.

Request for copies of this document and/or other SFPDPE-related training materials should be forwarded to HQ SACT JFT JETE E&IT, Attention: CDR Brian Hodges, SACT JFT JETE E&IT, Tel: +1 (757) 747-3741.

Any comments or suggestions for improvement of this document should be forwarded to ISG at the address below.

Prepared by

International Solutions Group, Limited [email protected]

www.isglimited.com 1000 Hope Mills Road

Fayetteville, North Carolina 28304 United States of America


http://www.isglimited.com/


iii RELEASABLE TO SFPDPE16

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Evolving Crisis Situation………………………………………………………………………...1 Ethnic Unrest and Violence Erupt in Estonia ....................................................................... 1

Increase in Organised Armed Violence ............................................................................... 2

The Emergence of Armed Pro-Bothnian Militias ................................................................. 2

Police Struggle to Restore Law and Order .......................................................................... 4

Increasing Evidence of Bothnia’s Involvement .................................................................... 5

Bothnia Puts Pressure on Estonia ....................................................................................... 6

Increase in Cyber Attacks ................................................................................................... 6

Escaping Ethnic Violence .................................................................................................... 7

The International Response ................................................................................................ 7

Estonia Considers a State of Emergency ............................................................................ 8

Estonia Invokes the EU Solidarity Clause ........................................................................... 8

NATO Consultation ............................................................................................................. 9

Bothnia Threatens to Intervene ........................................................................................... 9

The Major Actors…………………………………………………………………………………….10 Bothnia .............................................................................................................................. 10

The Baltic States ............................................................................................................... 15

Arnland .............................................................................................................................. 16

Framland ........................................................................................................................... 17

Osto ................................................................................................................................... 18

The Russian Federation .................................................................................................... 18

The European Union ......................................................................................................... 18

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ................................. 21

NATO ................................................................................................................................ 21

Annex A – Map of The Baltic Sea Region…………………………………………………….....A-1

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Ethnic violence spreads in Estonia…………………………………………..1

Figure 2 - Attack on Supreme Court in Tartu ........................................................... 2

Figure 3 – Pro-Bothnian Militia in Ida-Viru................................................................ 3

Figure 4 - Pro-Bothnia Unrest in Maardu ................................................................. 3

Figure 5 - Dockworkers Strike in Paldiski ................................................................. 4

Figure 6 - Captured Weapons Caches ..................................................................... 5

Figure 7 – Increase in Illegal Trafficking ................................................................... 5

Figure 8 – Displaced Populations Head for Safety .................................................. 7

Figure 9 – Bothnia’s A2/AD Capability ................................................................... 10

Figure 10 - XIX Century Bothnian Empire .............................................................. 11

Figure 11 - Bothnia-Speaking Minorities ................................................................ 15

Figure 12 - Klaipeda LNG Terminal ........................................................................ 16

Figure 13 - Inčukalns UGS Facility ......................................................................... 16

Figure 14 - European Dependence on Bothnian Natural Gas .............................. 20


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THE CRISIS IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

THE EVOLVING CRISIS SITUATION

Ethnic Unrest and Violence Erupt in Estonia

1. The unanimous decision by Estonia’s Supreme Court on 14 April 2016 to ban the People’s Unity Party for openly advocating the creation of autonomous ethnic Bothnian regions within Estonia with closer relations to the Bothnia sparked a wave of protests and ethnic unrest among the ethnic Bothnian communities in Estonia. Small protests by a hard core of pro-Bothnian activists in Tallinn gradually grew into mass, often violent, demonstrations, inciting widespread public disorder and attacks on government buildings and public facilities. Confrontations with Police quickly erupted into violence, sparking further protest and an increasing spiral of violence resulting in several deaths, countless injuries, extensive damage to property and numerous arrests.

2. Several thousand pro-Bothnian demonstrators, organised by the Association of Bothnians in Estonia (Botnialaste Eestis), remain encamped in Raekoja Plats, the town square in the Old Town of Tallinn, close to the Bothnian Embassy. Demonstrators clash regularly with the Police who have showed restraint in containing the demonstrators and preventing them from erecting barricades. Demonstrators carrying Bothnian flags have declared their solidarity with the Bothnian World (Maailman Botnian) and called for a referendum on autonomy for ethnic Bothnian regions. By mid-May, ethnic unrest and violence had spread to other cities and regions in Estonia with large ethnic Bothnian populations, particularly in and around Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Tartu and Parnu.

Figure 1 - Ethnic violence spreads in Estonia



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Increase in Organised Armed Violence

3. Since July there has been a spate of attacks by unnamed perpetrators against government officials and facilities, especially Police, critical infrastructure and public figures who have spoken out against the Pro-Bothnian movement. These attacks have gradually become more sophisticated and more daring in the use of automatic weapons and military grade explosives, including the PVV-5A plastic explosive manufactured in Bothnia.

4. After several days of rioting by Pro-Bothnian militants in Tartu, a group calling itself the Uku (god of thunder) Special Battalion claimed responsibility for the 25 August attack on the Riigikohus, Supreme Court of Estonia, in retribution of the Court’s decision to ban the pro-Bothnian People’s Unity Party. The attack killed a Supreme Court Judge, two security guards, and nine innocent civilians as well as injuring many others.

Figure 2 - Attack on Supreme Court in Tartu

The Emergence of Armed Pro-Bothnian Militias

5. On 25 August, armed groups, claiming to be part of the Viru Patriotic Brigade seized municipal buildings in Jöhvi, the capital of Ida-Viru County, jailed the Governor and the head of Municipal Government, and installed a new Peoples Governor to represent the county’s 70% majority ethnic Bothnian population. The new Governor has declared his intention to take control of the shale oil mines and power plants in Ida-Viru which provide nearly 90% of the electricity to Estonia and call for a referendum for political autonomy.

6. In the following days local workers backed by armed groups from the Viru Patriotic Brigade seized the power station and Eastman chemical factory In nearby Kohtla-Järve, the 5th largest city in Estonia (after Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Parnu). Another group of armed workers has since taken over the Ahtme Power Plant. A number of senior plant managers are being held by the militiamen.



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Figure 3 – Pro-Bothnian Militia in Ida-Viru

7. Pro-Bothnian demonstrators backed by masked gunmen in Maardu stormed the town hall and the police station on 29 August, where they are still holding six police officers. Dock workers from Muuga Harbour, the largest cargo port in Estonia, have gone on strike in support of the demonstrators, ransacked the Muuga Border Guard station and blocked access to the port facilities leaving two cargo ships and one tanker stranded with two others standing by off-shore.

Figure 4 - Pro-Bothnia Unrest in Maardu



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8. A group calling itself the Arnold Meri Regiment, in honour of the celebrated communist wartime hero, has seized control of the Iru Thermal Power Plant and are holding the plant staff from Eesti Energia hostage. They have threatened to cut off electricity and heat to Tallinn.

9. In Paldiski, workers at the Northern Port and the South Harbour have responded to the appeals made on the local station, MTÜ Paldiski Raadio, to show solidarity with their comrades in Muuga by declaring their own strike, shutting down the ports and blocking access to the port facilities, including the natural gas terminal for the underwater Baltic Link located at the South Port. MTÜ Paldiski Raadio is operated by the Bothnian owned Baltic Media Alliance which has been promoting the idea of ethnic Bothnian unity in the Baltics.

Figure 5 - Dockworkers Strike in Paldiski

Police Struggle to Restore Law and Order

10. The Estonian Police have increasingly struggled to maintain public order in the face of widespread ethnic unrest and the organised use of force by armed pro-Bothnian groups across northern Estonia as well as in other areas. Police from the Southern and Western Prefectures have reinforced the Northern and Ida Prefectures to protect government facilities and critical infrastructure from further seizures.

11. In the Northern Prefecture Police have managed to contain the demonstrators in Old Tallinn and prevent them from barricading Raekoja Plats. They have contained the striking dockworkers at Muuga Harbour and established a Police cordon around the Iru Thermal Power Plant. However, they have not attempted to retake control over any of the facilities.

12. In the Ida Prefecture the Police have struggled to contain the heavily armed groups in Jöhvi and Kohtla-Järv who have superior fire power over the Police. Police operations have been constantly disrupted by persistent cyber-attacks against Police networks and jamming



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of their tactical communications, making it impossible to coordinate effectively with the Police and Border Guard Board and the Ministry of Interior in Tallinn.

Increasing Evidence of Bothnia’s Involvement

13. The Police and Border Guards have had some successes in identifying and interdicting pro-Bothnian networks engaged in organising and supporting illegal armed groups operating in the area of Harju and Ida-Viru Counties. Police counter-terrorism raids on the headquarters of the Bothnian Foundation (Botnia Fond) and the Bothnian League (Bottenhavet Ligan), which are Bothnian NGOs operating in Estonia, uncovered computer records which revealed their involvement in orchestrating pro-Bothnian activism and armed violence in Estonia. These records led to the discovery of several caches of weapons and explosives, some of which have been traced back to Bothnia, as well as the identity of a number of operatives. Police subsequently arrested several Bothnian nationals, including two members from the Bothnian Embassy believed to be Federal Security Service (FSS) operatives, as well as staff from Botnia Fond and Bottenhavet Ligan.

Figure 7 – Increase in Illegal Trafficking

14. In recent weeks the Border Guard stations in Paldiski, Tallinn, Muuga, Kunda, and Sillamäe have been reported suspected arms trafficking by sea and have intercepted several illegal arms shipments off Harju and Ida-Viru counties. Manufacturing details and payment trails have been traced, with the help of EUROPOL, back to criminal organisations

Figure 6 - Captured Weapons Caches



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in Bothnia, in particular the Kallio Brotherhood (Kallio Veljeys), known to be used by the Bothnian FSS. The Kallios’ criminal network extends into Osto and Russia giving them a number of routes into Estonia. Several Border Guards have recently reported being approached with bribes to relax their control of certain entry points.

15. Most recently, a raid carried out by the Estonian Police, including K-Commando, to rescue 12 hostages being held by members of the Viru Patriotic Brigade in Jöhvi led to the capture of two Bothnian intelligence agents, five foreign volunteers and a large cache of weapons of Bothnian origin.

Bothnia Puts Pressure on Estonia

16. Bothnia has stepped up its media campaign against the Government of Estonia and blames the escalating crisis on its policy of discrimination against its ethnic Bothnian minority and its crackdown on pro-Bothnian political and cultural activities. Bothnian state media is providing continuous coverage of “Crisis in Estonia” with live broadcasts of pro-Bothnia demonstrations and clashes with Police, as well as interviews with members of the “people’s militias” protecting government buildings in Jöhvi and the new Peoples Governor.

17. President Olamao has expressed his support for the ethnic Bothnian minority in their struggle for identity and a political voice in Estonia. He has warned Estonia against the use of force against its Bothnian minority and reminded the international community that he has a constitutional obligation to protect ethnic Bothnians abroad if their safety is threatened. He has offered to help mediate the crisis.

18. Bothnia is also putting its case against Estonia’s treatment of its ethnic Bothnian minority to the international community. Its Ambassador to the UN has succeeded in raising the issue in the Security Council through the Russian Federation which is sympathetic to Bothnia’s concerns. It has also placed the matter before the OSCE as a growing threat to regional peace and security.

19. On 1 September, Bothnia announced a series of economic sanctions against Estonia and suspended the supply of natural gas to Estonia, which in turn denies supplies downstream to Latvia and Lithuania. Cutting the supply of natural gas to the Baltic States will disrupt the build-up of reserves in the underground gas storage (UGS) facility at Inčukalns, Latvia, which Estonia depends on to meet peak winter demands. Without access to these reserves Estonia would have only 3 days of reserves of its own.

Increase in Cyber Attacks

20. As the crisis has continued to escalate so have the number and severity of cyber-attacks against government and commercial websites and on-line services increased. Since August a number of pro-Bothnian social media websites have been appealing to patriotic “hacktivists” to join in a cyber war against Estonia and provide useful technical information to target specific government websites, pro-western media outlets, and major banks. The internet and social media are now being inundated with pro-Bothnian messages, blogs and websites blaming Estonia for human rights abuses against ethnic Bothnians. Hackers have managed to penetrate several government public websites and plant links to bogus information and fake websites designed to discredit the government.

21. A series of sophisticated distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks by robot networks (botnets) have shut down several public service websites and on-line banking for up to 12



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hours. However, even more worrying are the recent ‘malicious manipulation’ cyber-attacks against the SCADA systems1 that control the gas regulating and monitoring stations (GRS/GMS) along the main Tallinn - Viresi Latvia gas pipeline causing pressure blow-outs which have required segments of the grid to be shut down for repair. A similar attack against the Elering A.S, the Estonian electricity Transmission System Operator (TSO) on 7 September required an emergency shutdown of the grid serving Tallinn. Together these attacks have added to the growing public sense of alarm and uncertainty about the future.

22. Estonia has placed its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) under a special regime and reinforced by the Cyber Defence League and non-governmental specialists. The Estonian Information Security Agency (EISA) now claims to have forensic evidence linking the Bothnian Business Network (BBN), which is one of the world’s most capable cybercrime organizations, with a number of these attacks. BBN is known to have connections to the Bothnian Federal Security Service (FSS).

Escaping Ethnic Violence

23. Armed pro-Bothnian militias in and around Jöhvi and Kohtla-Järv have increasingly targeted the local ethnic Estonian and Ostonian minorities forcing significant numbers to flee to safer areas, mainly Tallinn and Tapa. It is estimated that some 3,000 residents have already fled to Tallinn and hundreds more are arriving daily.

Figure 8 – Displaced Populations Head for Safety

24. So far local authorities effectively handled the influx of people and families seeking safety. However, this is adding further pressure on public services and the level of anxiety over the continuing crisis and its impact on daily life.

The International Response

25. The international response to the situation in Estonia reflects the alternative narratives offered by Bothnia and the international media. The EU member nations generally

1 Supervisory control and data acquisition systems which exchange coded signals over communication channels to monitor the status of remote equipment and control the performance of certain functions.



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empathise with Estonia and appreciate the sensitive nature of the problem. Arnland and Osto in particular support an active role of the EU in resolving the crisis peacefully and avoiding any possible pretext for Bothnia to intervene militarily.

26. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has issued a statement on the situation in Estonia condemning the extremist violence while praising the Estonian Government’s measured response in maintaining public order. She pledged EU support across its range of competencies to assist Estonia in restoring the rule of law and called upon Bothnia refrain from interfering in Estonia’s internal affairs.

Estonia Considers a State of Emergency

27. On 21 September the Prime Minister of Estonia acting on behalf of state and local authorities, formally notified the President and the Commander of the Defence Forces in accordance with the State of Emergency Act that the level of violence against state institutions and the use of force by armed militias to seize local areas, government buildings and critical infrastructure posed a clear threat to the constitutional order of Estonia. The Government has established a crisis committee to assess the situation and the President has convened the National Defence Council to provide advice. In the meantime, the President has publically addressed the nation and called on those engaged in and giving support to illegal acts of violence and public disorder to immediately cease such unlawful activity and engage in a peaceful dialogue to express any grievances.

28. In the absence of any signs of improvement in the situation in the coming days, the Riigikogu is expected to declare a state of emergency. This will allow the Government to place elements of the Defence Forces and, or the Defence League under the Ministry of Interior to prevent further attacks against government institutions and vital facilities as well as to counter unlawful activities by illegally armed groups within Estonia.

Estonia Invokes the EU Solidarity Clause

29. The EU has contributed significant finance to the economic development of the region. Its goals are to promote and support regional stability in the region, to prevent crisis and conflict occurring, and to prevent further deterioration. On 22 September, Estonia invoked the “solidarity” clause under Article 222 of the EU treaty. In an Emergency meeting of the European Council Estonia presented its request for EU assistance in protecting its democratic institutions and its civilian population from terrorist attacks. In response, the Council agreed to establish an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) and consider assistance that could be provided by the European Commission and its Directorates, in particular COMM (Communication), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), ENER (Energy) and HOME (Migration and Home Affairs) as well as EUROPOL (European Police Office), ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) and FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU). Council also agreed that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would lead EU diplomatic efforts to bring an end to Bothnia’s



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interference in Estonia’s internal affairs and oversee the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis.

NATO Consultation

30. Estonia also invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and asked for consultations on possible security assistance from NATO to counter external interference in provoking ethnic conflict within its territory and supporting armed proxies which carry out acts of armed force against the State. On 24 September, NATO's 28 member states met as the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Council agreed that the evidence presented by Estonia clearly indicated Bothnia’s involvement in inciting, organising and sustaining the use of force by armed groups in Estonia. While noting that Bothnia’s actions do not constitute an armed attack against NATO under Article 5, they do constitute an armed aggression which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Estonia. On this basis Council agreed to conduct a full political and military estimate of the situation as a basis for determining an appropriate response.

Bothnia Threatens to Intervene

31. Bothnia was quick to respond to press statements from the EU and NATO, rejecting Estonia’s allegation of Bothnian involvement in Estonia’s ethnic problems as pure fabrications to divert its own blame. President Olamao admonished Estonia for dragging the EU and NATO into problems of its own making and warned that Bothnia would consider any NATO military involvement in Estonia against ethnic Bothnians as a threat to Bothnia and trigger an appropriate military response.

32. In view of the military capabilities of Bothnia and its increasingly aggressive posture toward NATO in recent months, these warnings were taken seriously by NATO. In the last three months alone, NATO air policing fighters have scrambled at least 50 times to intercept Bothnian aircraft violating NATO airspace over the Baltic States. These have included Bothnian SU-34 FULLBACK fighters, TU-22M3 BACKFIRE and TU-160 BLACKJACK bombers and A-50 MAINSTAY surveillance aircraft, as well as multi-aircraft packages in attack formations. The most recent in the series of close encounters between Bothnian and NATO forces operating at sea and in the air over the Baltic Sea was an incident last week when a Bothnian Su-24 Fencer buzzed a NATO naval warship on exercise in the Baltic Sea.



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33. Bothnia’s recent deployment of technically advanced, long range SA-21 GROWLER surface to air missiles (SAM), SS-26 STONE tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) and SS-N-27 SIZZLER anti-ship cruise missiles (ACSM) on Gotland and in the vicinity of Brehea, near the coast of the Gulf of Finland, give Bothnia an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability that covers most of the Baltic Sea, all of Estonia and significant portions of Latvia and Lithuania. In the event of a time-sensitive, collective defence situation, these systems would pose a serious threat to NATO’s strategic lines of communications and entry into the Baltic States, especially Estonia.

34. In addition, Bothnia has continued to invest in the readiness of its armed forces for regional power projection. During the last strategic “snap readiness” exercise called by President Olamao, Bothnia demonstrated its capability to deploy a joint reaction force of over 60,000 troops, including three modernised brigades as well as naval and amphibious task groups in six days. This demonstration gives substance to President Olamao’s threat to intervene if required to protect ethnic Bothnians in Estonia.

THE MAJOR ACTORS

Bothnia

Resurgence as an Energy “Super State”

35. The dissolution of the Bothnian Empire, which for centuries dominated the Baltic Sea Region, left Bothnia in a state of economic, political and social decline and powerless to resist the extension of the European Union (EU) and NATO into its historic spheres of influence. However, since gaining power in 2003, President Franz Olamao and the Bothnian National Party have systematically consolidated and centralised the authority of the state within a small political elite composed of former colleagues from the Bothnian security services and oligarchs from energy, industry and banking sectors. This so-called power vertical exercises total authority over all aspects of the corporate state with full control over the different state institutions as well as Bothnia’s national capital and energy resources, which they have used to rebuild the economy, revamp the armed forces, improve social welfare and promote Bothnian ultra-nationalism.

Figure 9 – Bothnia’s A2/AD Capability



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36. President Olamao has made natural gas the fulcrum of Bothnia’s return to power in the region and influence on the world stage. Under the Olamao doctrine the corporate state manages the natural resources of the state as an instrument of national power for economic growth, social welfare, regional influence and national security. By investing state revenues to develop the Barents Sea natural gas fields, which are estimated to contain to 3.7 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, and infrastructure for the transmission and distribution of gas to Northern and Central Europe, President Olamao has transformed Bothnia into an “energy super-state” using natural gas as an instrument of national power.

37. Having established his autocratic authority and restored much of Bothnia’s power in its near-abroad, President Olamao is now committed to further developing Bothnia as a regional and global power by re-establishing Bothnia’s historic privileged interests in the Baltic Sea Region and preventing any further expansion of the EU and NATO. However, the recent glut in global oil and gas markets and surge in renewable energy sources have caused a dramatic fall in Bothnian energy revenues. Faced with a hard choice between preserving social welfare and continuing to modernise the armed forces, President Olamao has banked on the power of state media to preserve his popularity at home by parading its new military might that will restore Bothnia’s place as a regional power and as a global actor on the international stage.

Bothnia’s Compatriot Policy

38. A key component in Bothnia’s efforts to re-establish its sphere of influence in the Baltic Sea Region is to formalise the connection between Bothnian-speaking minorities living abroad and the Bothnian homeland. According to its revised Compatriot Policy as laid out by President Olamao in 2010, Bothnia is responsible for promoting and preserving the Bothnian language and culture, and has a moral duty as well as a legal responsibility to protect Bothnian-speaking minorities abroad.

39. Implementation of this policy focuses on building organised communities of Bothnian "compatriots" through a global network of state funded compatriot organizations, such as the Bothnian Foundation (Botnia Fond), Bothnian World (Botnia Maailma) and the Bothnia House (Botnia Talo) network, which operate under the oversight of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture. Their activities abroad are coordinated through local Compatriots’ Coordination Councils under the direction of each Bothnian Embassy as instruments of “soft power” for achieving Bothnia’s strategic interests; especially in the Baltic Sea Region.

Non-governmental Organisations

40. The Bothnian government sponsors a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to promote Bothnian interests in neighbouring countries, especially in the Baltic

Figure 10 - XIX Century Bothnian Empire



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States where there are large Bothnian–speaking communities. Officially, the purpose of these NGOs is to provide information and coordinate activities designed to preserve and promote Bothnian culture, ethnic identity and language under its Compatriot policy. In practice however, their main focus is on promoting Bothnia’s political agenda by mobilising Bothnian-speaking minorities to influence the social and political environment in favour of Bothnian interests.

41. In recent years Bothnia has increased state funding for these NGOs as instruments of soft power to build up networks of pro-Bothnian groups including youth movements, political activists and human rights advocates to promote Bothnian interests in neighbouring states. The most influential Bothnian NGOs operating in the Baltic States are the Bothnian Foundation, which focuses on social and political engagement and the Bothnian League (Botnia Ligan) which promotes political activism and sponsors the Youth League (Nuoriso Ligan). Youth League summer camps are popular among Bothnian-speaking youth and offer military “adventure” training. Bothnian Foreign Intelligence Service operatives are known to use Bothnian NGOs to provide covert support to certain extremists groups, including the far right “Night Watchmen” (Öövalvurid) and its youth group, “Voice of the Young” (Nuorten Ääni), as well as the far left Constitution Party (Perustuslaki Puolue).

42. Bothnian NGOs also promote and fund local political parties and candidates sympathetic to Bothnia’s views and in favour of closer ties with Bothnia. The most prominent of these are the Centre Party in Estonia and the Harmony Party in Latvia, which captured 24.8% and 23% respectively in the most recent elections. The success of these parties was in large measure helped by Bothnian media broadcasts encouraging Bothnian-speakers to support these parties. Both parties have close relationships with President Olamao’s Bothnian National Party and typically support his ambitions in the region.

State Controlled Media

43. Bothnian state-owned and commercial media broadcasts in the Baltic States have become highly influential tools for promoting Bothnia’s strategic message and narrative of events especially among the large Bothnian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Most Bothnian-speakers get their information from Bothnian media outlets and put more trust in them. In addition to increasing the funding for state and commercial broadcasting into the Baltic States, Bothnia has helped in funding the purchase of local broadcasting companies, which deliver Bothnia’s political message and promote a pro-Bothnian strategic narrative while denigrating Bothnia’s opponents. Local broadcasting companies such as the Baltic Media Alliance’s First Baltic Channel (PBK) has been closely associated with the Centre Party and played a key role its success during the latest election. PBK owns and operates a number of local radio stations broadcasting to Bothnian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia.

Natural Gas as an Instrument of Power

44. President Olamao considers natural gas as an instrument of national power to be used by the state in pursuit of its strategic interests. NorraGas acts as the primary commercial entity of the state for managing the development and exploitation of Bothnia’s natural gas resources, including the extensive infrastructure for extraction, transmission, storage and distribution to markets in the Baltics and Europe. The state owns 62 per cent of the shares in NorraGas and another 18 per cent are held by oligarchs with close connections to the President. Since his election in 2003, President Olamao has personally selected all of the



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Chairmen of NorraGas from his inner circle and moved them in and out of high level political appointments.

45. NorraGas wholly owns 52 foreign subsidiaries and is a major shareholder in 41 other enterprises in the energy sector including all the major natural gas companies in the region. NorraGas is the largest share owner of Eesti Gaas. It is also the second largest shareholder in Latvijas Gāze, the Latvian natural gas company, and Lietuvos Dujos, the Lithuania natural gas company, which have monopolies on the transmission, storage and sales of natural gas in Latvia and Lithuania respectively. In addition to its claim to ownership of the original Baltic Gas Grid, which was built by Bothnia in the 1970s, NorraGas is a joint owner of most of the new supply, transmission and distribution infrastructure developed in the region since 2004.

46. With the opening of the new Trans-Bothnian twin pipeline from the Barents Sea gas fields, the NorraGas Unified Gas Distribution System (UGDS) comprises a network of 62,000 km of gas pipelines with 76 compressor stations capable of distributing 71 billion cubic metres of gas directly to markets in Europe. The recently completed joint underwater Baltic Interconnector Link project with Estonia now connects the Trans-Bothnian pipeline terminal at Inga, Bothnia, with the Estonian pipeline at Paldiski, Estonia, and the Baltic Gas Grid. Given the overall scarcity of storage facilities in the region, NorraGas has also been working jointly with Latvijas Gāze to develop additional UGS capacity at Inčukalns in Latvia.

47. NorraGas gives Bothnia President Olamao significant control over critical strategic infrastructure for the supply and distribution of natural gas to Baltic States and Europe. Therefore, the EU requirement for member states to break up national gas monopolies as part of the EU policy for energy security will significantly impact NorraGas’ influence over the Baltic gas grid and energy markets. Bothnia has taken the matter to the International Court of Justice and reserves its right to protect state resources from unlawful seizure if required.

Bothnian Military Power

48. Bothnia’s approach to the use of military power in the 21st century has been shaped by the “shock and awe” effects of conventional missile strikes and “electronic knockdown” seen during the 2003 Gulf War and the effects of media, especially social media, used as a means for mobilising popular uprisings during the “Arab Spring”; as well as lessons learned from its 2012 invasion of Framland. Bothnia now sees the fusion of conventional and special operations forces, armed proxies and internal opposition as well as information and other means in hybrid operations throughout the entirety of an opponent’s territory to neutralise its security forces and collapse state authority. These hybrid forces enable Bothnia to carry out seamless and unrecognisable operations to achieve significant, but limited, political and military objectives in a “strategy of ambiguity”. Key components supporting this strategy are:

Sustained, long-term information campaign abroad to control narratives, foment dissent, create confusion, denigrate opponents, sow fear and weaken opposition;

Mobilisation of Bothnian-speaking communities to influence the political and social environment abroad in favour of Bothnia’s political interests;

Instigation of subversive activity by manipulating Bothnian-speaking minorities and extremists to create instability, provoke violence and overwhelm state security forces;



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Positioning of large conventional forces, poised for intervention, to protect Bothnian-speaking minorities and deter action against subversives;

Providing covert support to subversive groups, including training, equipment and “volunteers”, to build formations capable of seizing and holding key terrain;

Leveraging ambiguity and strategic flexibility using deception, disinformation, diplomacy and deterrence to divide the international community and prevent a coherent response;

Leveraging European dependence on Bothnian gas for economic coercion to divide EU and NATO Allies;

Intervening directly to secure an area where state authority has collapsed to present a fait accompli from which to control escalation and negotiation.

49. President Olamao has increased defence spending by 31 per cent since 2009 to reorganise and modernise Bothnia’s conventional and nuclear forces with a further 43 per cent increase planned over the next five years. Defence spending, which now equates to four per cent of GDP, continues to have public support thanks to public perception of the growing military threat to Bothnia from Europe and North America. Strategic priorities enabling hybrid operations include:

Streamlining the military command structure under the order of the President;

Developing high readiness and highly flexible reaction forces, including airborne/air assault and amphibious forces, with a strength of 65,000 troops;

Increasing the capabilities of the Gotland Defence Command to control the Baltic Sea in time of crisis including the acquisition of Russian SS-N-27 anti-ship missiles;

Upgrading strategic air defences through the acquisition of Russian SA-21 surface to air missile systems;

Achieving enhanced operational-tactical missile strike capabilities with acquisition of Russian SS-26 surface-to-surface missiles;

Enhancing nuclear deterrence capabilities.

50. Since 2010 President Olamao has ordered “snap” military exercises to test the readiness of Bothnian armed forces to deploy rapidly on short notice by air, sea and rail over distances of up to 1500 km. These unannounced combat readiness tests are specifically organised with the participation of President Olamao and provide a visible demonstration of Bothnia’s ability to project significant military power within the region with little or no warning.

Bothnian Cyberwarfare Capabilities

51. With considerable technical assistance from experts in Russia and China, Bothnia has developed a robust cyberwarfare capability which it demonstrated during its brief war against Framland in 2012. Bothnia’s cyber capabilities serve as tools for ‘Information Warfare’ designed to suppress opposing command and control, navigation and communication



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systems, as well as to undermine public moral using cyber means. Bothnia’s cyberwarfare components belong to the Federal Security Service (FSS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Military Intelligence Directorate. They include an extensive network of cybercriminals who can be called upon to organise ‘hacker-patriots’ and conduct more sophisticated cyber-attacks on behalf of the state. Among these, the most notable is the Bothnian Business Network (BBN) identified by international security and law enforcement communities as the major source of the most advanced persistent threats (APT) to the global cyberspace.

The Baltic States

Independence and Membership in the EU and NATO

52. The Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – became EU members as part of the fifth enlargement in 2004 and were granted membership in NATO the same year. Having gained their independence from the Bothnian Empire, the Baltic States are concerned by the resurgence of Bothnia and its efforts to reassert its influence in the Baltic Sea Region. These concerns are heightened by their geographic proximity to Bothnia, Bothnia’s manipulation of their Bothnian-speaking minorities, and their dependence on Bothnian natural gas as well as their separation by up to 600 km from the rest of Europe and some 2000 km from the centre of the EU.

Bothnian-Speaking Minorities

53. Bothnian-speaking minorities constitute approximately 28 per cent of the population in Latvia, 25 per cent in Estonia, and 6 per cent in Lithuania. In certain areas around Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda the percentage can be more than 50 per cent. The legacy of these large Bothnian-speaking communities since the dissolution of the Bothnian Empire has posed certain challenges for the Baltic States regarding citizenship, social integration and relations with Bothnia. While each succeeding generation of Bothnian-speakers has been more inclined to adopt a European identity, the older generations and certain segments of the young, including extremists, continue to emphasise their separate Bothnian identity which Bothnia promotes.

54. Efforts by the Baltic States to address these challenges have been undermined by Bothnia’s 2010 Compatriot policy which aims at promoting a separate identity for Bothnian-speaking communities and strengthening their patriotic bonds with Bothnia. President Olamao uses this special relationship to influence the attitudes and behaviour of these communities, to include creating ethnic tensions and internal unrest in pursuit of his political agenda in the Baltic States, while reminding them that Bothnia reserves the right to intervene if necessary to ensure the safety of the Bothnian-speaking minorities.

Figure 11 - Bothnia-Speaking Minorities



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Challenges to Energy Security

55. Despite the determination of the Baltic States to integrate more closely with the rest of Europe and minimise their dependence on Bothnia, the reality is that they will continue to depend on Bothnia for natural gas. The Baltic Gas Grid depends on critical infrastructure for the transmission and distribution of gas from Bothnia via the Baltic Interconnector Link at Paldiski to the main Tallinn – Karksi line to the Inčukalns UGS facilities and then the main line from Riga to Vilnius.

56. The pipeline grid, originally constructed by Bothnia in the 1970’s, only allows the flow of gas in from north to south. A reverse flow from the single connection to European Pipeline System through Poland is not possible. Consequently the Baltic States will remain an energy island, with no alternatives to Bothnian natural gas until at least 2020 when the EU plans to interconnect the Baltic and Europe gas grids. While the opening of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal at the port of Klaipeda at the end of 2014 provides an alternative source of natural gas for Lithuania, supplies cannot be pumped upstream to Latvia and Estonia due to the lack of reverse flow capabilities of the existing pipelines. Lithuania is increasingly concerned about the security of this facility and the LNG tankers.

57. The volume of gas flow through the Baltic Gas Grid is insufficient to meet peak demands of the Baltic States in winter. However, with Latvia’s relying on its gas from its UGS facility at Inčukalns, near Riga, there is just enough capacity in gas flow to supply Lithuania and Estonia. It is therefore necessary to fill the Inčukalns gas storage facility during the summer in order to build up essential reserves to meet peak winter demands. In the event of any disruption, Estonia would have only 3 days of reserves.

Arnland

58. Arnland joined the EU with the Fourth Enlargement and has maintained positive relations with the other Baltic Sea States. Although Arnland depends on Bothnia for all of its natural gas, its geographic position on the Skagerrak with a bridge to Denmark allows closer economic cooperation with the rest of Europe, reducing its economic dependence on Bothnia. In addition, the Bothnian-speaking minority in Arnland is quite small and well integrated.

59. Arnland recognises that all the states in the Baltic Sea Region share similar security concerns and supports regional cooperation on security matters. Although Arnland chose not to join NATO, it is a NATO partner and contributes to NATO Reaction Forces. Since Bothnia’s invasion of Framland, Arnland’s security and defence policy has been revised to

Figure 13 - Inčukalns UGS Facility

Figure 12 - Klaipeda LNG Terminal



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reflect the changing security environment in the region as well as its commitments to other EU members under the mutual defence and solidarity clauses in the Lisbon Treaty.2

60. Arnland has adopted the EU ‘solidarity declaration’ in its national defence legislation which declares that Arnland will not remain passive if a disaster or an attack should afflict another EU member state, and that Arnland expects these countries to act in the same manner if it is ever attacked. Further to this, the legislation requires Arnland’s armed forces to be prepared to both provide and receive military assistance.

Framland

61. Framland, formerly part of the Bothnian Empire, has maintained close relations with Bothnia and depends on Bothnia for all of its natural gas, which accounts for 38% of its energy supplies. In exchange for discounted gas supplies, Framland has allowed Bothnia a long-term lease of its naval base at Sundsvall as well as access to its commercial seaports at Gavle, Soderhamn, Sundsvall and Ornsköldsvik for trade and transportation links across the Gulf of Bothnia. Ethnic Bothnians account for more than 34 per cent of population.

62. Relations with Bothnia deteriorated after the 2010 elections which brought the Framland Democratic Party into government riding a wave of popular support for democratic reform and closer cooperation with the EU. As viewed by Bothnian President Olamao, this was another “coloured” revolution orchestrated by the west. Despite his repeated warnings that Framland’s future prosperity and security depended on maintaining friendly relations with Tyr, Prime Minister Rita Kolbeinson continued to push for closer cooperation with the EU and a road map for eventual EU and NATO membership.

63. After months of negotiations failed to persuade Framland to drop its bid for EU membership, NorraGas announced a new fluctuating price structure and doubled the price of gas being pumped to Framland. When Framland publically protested, Bothnia cut off the flow of gas for 2 weeks in January 2012. With virtually no gas storage capacity in Framland, industrial production fell by 22 per cent, workers were laid off and factories closed. By April NorraGas claimed that Framland owed over $2 billion in unpaid gas debts -- nearly 2% of Framland’s GDP. Incidents and demonstration involving Bothnian-speaking communities erupted in Gavle and Sundsvall and became violent. As the crisis escalated Framland appealed for international assistance in mediating the conflict and for loans to pay off its gas debt.

64. On 20 September 2012, Bothnian Forces entered Framland at the direction of President Olamao to protect the ethnic Bothnian communities and secure the Sundsvall naval base until Framland was able to pay its gas debts and negotiate a settlement. While cyber-attacks took down the government websites and email servers, Bothnian air and naval forces prevented any organised response by Framland’s meagre armed forces and allowed Bothnian air assault and amphibious forces to secure key air and seaports and rapidly isolate the capital of Sundsvall.

65. Having suffered damage to the economy, the psychological effects of being invaded and isolation from the international community, Prime Minister Kolbeinson had no choice but to accept President Olamao’s conditions for the withdrawal of Bothnian forces. Framland’s bid for closer cooperation with the EU and eventual membership were effectively taken off

2 See Paragraph 75 below.



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the table. The pro-Bothnian political opposition won the 2013 elections and Framland joined Bothnia as a member of the Baltic Sea Economic Community.

Osto

66. Osto joined the EU during the Fourth Enlargement following the dissolution of the Bothnian Empire. However, in the interest of maintaining good relations with Bothnia and Russia, Osto decided not to seek NATO membership, but entered the NATO Partnership for Peace programme at the same time as Russia, in 1994. Osto contributes operational capabilities to NATO Reaction Forces and has increased practical cooperation with NATO members since Bothnia’s invasion of Framland. Bothnia is concerned about Osto’s closer military cooperation with NATO and has warned Osto that its membership in NATO would be seen as an unwise political decision and a military threat.

67. Geographically, Osto is the most remote and isolated EU member state in the Baltic Sea Region. Its infrastructure interconnects only with Bothnia and Russia which has hindered closer integration with EU. It remains totally dependent on Bothnia for natural gas which accounts for 11 per cent of its energy supplies.

68. Osto is concerned by Bothnia’s increased air and naval activity in the Suomenlahti (Gulf of Finland) and has declared publicly that Osto strongly adheres to the EU solidarity and defence clauses of the EU Lisbon Treaty. Its defence policy commits Osto to provide military assistance to other EU member states in the region in the event of a disaster or an attack. However, given its extended borders with Bothnia, Osto will avoid any provocations.

69. Osto’s population is largely homogeneous with only a small ethnic Bothnian minority of around one per cent. However, Osto’s long wilderness borders with Bothnia and Russia are difficult to control and pose other security concerns, especially related to criminal trafficking between Russia and Bothnia through Osto.

The Russian Federation

70. Russia has remained officially neutral in the current crisis but shares Bothnia’s concerns regarding NATO and EU expansion. Russia takes a similar view to Bothnia as regards its right to protect ethnic Russians living abroad. In addition, Russia is itself a major consumer of Bothnian natural gas. As a permanent member on the UN Security Council, Russia would likely block any Council resolutions that would infringe on Bothnia’s actions with respect to these issues and veto any measures against Bothnia.

The European Union

EU Engagement in the Baltic Sea Region

71. The EU’s Fourth and Fifth Enlargements in 1995 and 2004 extended the EU’s reach into the Baltic Sea Region and increased the number of EU member states to eight of the 11 countries that share interests in the Baltic Sea for their economic prosperity, livelihoods and recreation. However, growing concerns regarding the environment, development and safety in and around the Baltic Sea prompted the member states in 2006 to call for the EU to develop a strategy for dealing with the most significant challenges and opportunities in the Baltic Sea Region. In June 2009 the European Council adopted an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) to provide an integrated framework for action to address environmental challenges to the Baltic Sea, to contribute to regional development and to



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promote prosperity and competitiveness. It identified a programme of initiatives to accomplish three main objectives:

Save the Sea – promote clean shipping, clean water, biodiversity, and safety at sea.

Connect the Region – improve transport infrastructure; interconnect energy markets.

Increase Prosperity – increase trade, share knowledge, and connect people.

72. The EU cooperates with its non-EU neighbours (Bothnia, Framland, Norway and Russia) in areas of common interests through the EU’s Northern Dimension3, the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)4 and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)5.

EU Approach to Energy Security

73. Europe is the world's largest energy importer and heavily dependent on fossil fuels with very few sources of supply. Currently, 16 EU countries depend on natural gas from Bothnia to meet their energy needs as shown in Figure 14 below. Of these 14 are members of NATO. Any disruption in energy supplies, especially natural gas, would have significant economic and social consequences.

74. Therefore, energy security has become a vital interest for most European nations, especially in the Baltic Sea Region. The EUSBSR lays out a strategy for improving energy security by creating a more integrated, interconnected and competitive pan-European energy market to ensure the uninterrupted availability of energy products and services at affordable prices. It outlines actions required to develop critical infrastructure for the diversification of energy sources, promote competition in energy markets and improve security of energy supplies necessary to meet regional demands. The EU’s Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) further specifies the actions and infrastructure projects required to physically interconnect energy markets in Baltic Sea Region and Europe by 2020. However, a number of key projects have still to be funded.

3 Forum regrouping European Union, Russia, Norway, Iceland, Bothnia and Framland. 4 CBSS is a political forum for regional inter-governmental cooperation. Members are the thirteen states of the Baltic Sea Region as well as the European Commission -- Arnland, Bothnia, Denmark, Estonia, Framland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Osto, Poland, Russia and a representative of the EU Commission. 5 The Nordic Council of Ministers complements the Nordic Council and is an intergovernmental forum, for economic cooperation, trade and customs issues, environmental protection, etc. It regroups five full members (Arnland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Osto), three associates (Aland Islands, Faroe Islands, and Greenland) and five observers (Bothnia, Estonia, Framland, Latvia and Lithuania).



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Figure 14 - European Dependence on Bothnian Natural Gas

Common Security and Defence

75. Under the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union the members are committed to implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to include framing a common defence policy under direction of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. There are two key clauses that give meaning to the development of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP):

The Solidarity Clause, Article 222: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, to include mobilising all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources,6 and

The Mutual Defence Clause, Article 42: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. … Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.7

76. Following from these commitments the EU has established an autonomous body in the form of the EEAS to assist the High Representative (HR) in developing and implementing foreign, security and defence policy. The EEAS also serves as the primary response

6 The Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part 5 - External action by the Union Title 7. 7 Ibid, Title 5 - General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions, Chapter 2 - Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy, Section 2 - Provisions on the common security and defence policy.



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mechanism for comprehensive crisis management using the different instruments available to the EU through the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA), in close collaboration with the European Parliament (EP). However, practical arrangements to date have focused on the EU’s response to external crisis situations that did not affect directly the national security of any EU member state and have stopped short of articulating a role for the EU in collective defence other than as a partner to NATO.

77. Under their commitments to implement the EU’s CSDP, the members have pledged to generate 13 high-readiness EU Battlegroups (EUBG), including one from the Nordic-Baltic States, for short notice deployment under a joint force HQ with air and maritime forces. However, until now their missions are limited to the Petersberg Tasks, which only cover military tasks of a humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-making nature. Tasks related to territorial defence are considered to belong to NATO.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

78. All of the parties to the current crisis are OSCE members. However, until now the Permanent Council representing the 57 members have been unable to reach an agreement as to role for the OSCE.

NATO

79. The NAC adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in November 2010 which reconfirmed NATO’s core security tasks, including collective defence, but added its commitment to carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring the defence of the NATO territory against the full range of emerging security challenges, including visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies.

80. Although the Bothnia’s war with Framland lasted only four days, it fundamentally changed the security environment in the Baltic Sea Region. It demonstrated that Bothnia was both capable and willing to use force to achieve limited military objectives in order to secure its strategic interests in the region. NATO responded quickly to implement a series of crisis response measures and selected preventive options. SACEUR was authorised to intensify intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and to develop a contingency plan for the protection of the territory and populations of member states as well as critical infrastructure and lines of communication in the region. However, it was clear that Bothnia posed a potential threat to NATO security interests in the region.

81. During the September 2014 Wales Summit, the Allies reaffirmed their commitment in accordance with the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to act together should the security of one member be threatened. In recognition of the emerging security challenges they agreed a “Readiness Action Plan” to further enhance NATO’s preparedness and responsiveness, including its readiness posture and to increase the defence expenditures. Since then NATO has agreed a number of additional assurance measures, including additional exercises and enhanced Air Policing, as well as adaptation measures aimed at improving NATO ability to respond to threats in the region by establishing a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) enhancing the NRF and creating NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs).



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82. Working in close cooperation with the EU, NATO has developed a new strategy for countering hybrid warfare which the NATO Foreign Ministers adopted in November 2015.8 This strategy, which is harmonised with the EU’s framework on countering hybrid threats9 recognises that while individual states remain the first responder to such threats, close cooperation between the EU and NATO can provide the combine civilian and military means required to enhance situational awareness, build resilience and provide assistance as may be required to protect government institutions, civilian populations and critical infrastructure.

8 P0{2015)0673, Strategy on NATO's Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare, dated 26 November 2015 9 JOIN(2016) 18 final, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats, dated 6 April 2016


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ANNEX A – MAP OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION

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NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

~June 2003 MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

MILITARY DECISION ON MC 362/1

NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement, which is at Enclosure, was endorsed by the Military Committee on 27 June 03, and is forwarded for approval by the North Atlantic Council. On approval by Council, MC 362/1 will supersede MC 362 (FINAL), 11 Jan 00.

2. This document is releasable to Partner nations, the European Union, SFOR/KFOR, the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) and Australia.

3. This document clears IMSWM-058-03, 07 Feb 03 and SDs thereto.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Enclosure 1. MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement Copy To SOL Z, IS/DPAO, IS/PA Action Officer Capt Bull, OPS,(5498)

G:\OPS 2003\DOCS\MC's\MC 362_1\MC 362_1 Draft Military Decision.doc

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j/11/2_ SIR PAUL HADDACKS Vice Admiral, UKNA Director International Military Staff

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MC 362/1

NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

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MC 362/1 -NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

PART I - INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

1. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the authorisation for, or limits on, the use of force during military operations. Formulation of ROE is influenced by a variety of factors. ROE first must be lawful. International law defines the lawful limits for the use of force during military operations. National law may further limit the use of force by member States in certain types of military operations or in certain situations. Within this legal framework, the North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Committee (NAC/DPC) provides political direction for the conduct of military operations, including authorisations for, and limitations on, the threat or use of force or actions which might be construed as provocative. ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence.

DEFINITION

2. ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime and operations prior to commencement of an armed conflict, which may include declarations of counter surprise or counter aggression, ROE provide the sole authority to NATO/NATO-led forces to use force. The use of force, and in particular, the authority to use deadly force by NATO/NATO-led forces to accomplish a mission receives detailed scrutiny and attention by the NAC/DPC. Every member of the NATO/NATO-led force who may be required to use force in self-defence or to accomplish a mission must receive appropriate training on the ROE and its supporting doctrine. After the commencement of an armed conflict ROE generally limit the otherwise lawful use of force.

PURPOSE

3. This document contains a compendium of strategic and operational ROE and NATO policy for approving and implementing these rules for all NATO/NATOled military operations.

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APPLICABLE LAW

4. International Law.

a. The conduct of military operations is circumscribed by international law, to include the applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict and human rights law. NATO ROE, and the application of them, never permit use of force which violates applicable international law.

b. NATO nations have a responsibility to train their forces to respect and abide by the law of armed conflict, when it is applicable, and by other international conventions and treaties which may affect military operations. These standards are not restated in this document.

c. Where some NATO nations, but not others, have ratified relevant conventions and treaties, every effort will be made to ensure, consistent with the obligations assumed by those who have ratified, and respecting the rights of those who have not ratified, that a common approach is adopted by Member States for the purposes of military operations.

5. National Laws.

The armed forces of nations participating in NATO/NATO-led operations must also adhere to their own national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations, which would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, it is recognised that nations will issue restrictions and/or amplifying instructions in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national restrictions and/or instructions must not be more permissive than the use of force authorised for the operation. When national laws are at variance with NATO ROE included in the ROE for an operation, nations must inform the NAC/DPC and the Strategic Commander of any inconsistencies, as early as possible.

6. NATO/NATO-led forces may find themselves in situations where the military objectives include protecting persons to whom the provisions of self-defence, even extended self-defence, do not apply. These situations may include humanitarian operations aimed at countering ethnic cleansing, protecting refugees or noncombatant evacuation operations. Likewise, other military operations may include amongst their military objectives the protection of property, e.g. safeguarding humanitarian relief supplies. Other military operations may require certain critical property in order to succeed. Examples of such property may be vital medical, communications or transportation equipment. To effectively deal with all these situations such NATO/NATO-led forces may require the ability to use force to protect certain persons or property. Such an ability is provided for in the ROE dealing with Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) or Property with Designated Special Status (PROSS). Some nations' laws do not permit the use of

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force or deadly force to protect property and commanders must be aware of any resulting national restrictions.

PART II - SELF-DEFENCE

7. Self-Defence. It is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. ROE do not limit this right. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. The following definitions apply:

a. "Necessary" means that use of force is indispensable for securing self-defence.

b. "Proportional" means a response commensurate with the perception of the level of the threat posed. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary for self-defence and no more.

c. "Imminent" means that the need to defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming.

d. With respect to self defence, "Attack" is the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel.

8. Extended Self-Defence. In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from attack or imminent attack.

9. In circumstances during peacetime and operations, prior to commencement of an armed conflict, and where the use of force is not justified by self-defence, force may only be exercised within the constraints of and permissions authorised by ROE. Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in self-defence and extended selfdefence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins (see Appendix 1 to Annex A (Hostile Intent and Hostile Act) for details). In cases of inconsistency, ROE within a given operation shall not be interpreted as limiting the right of selfdefence.

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PART Ill- PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE USE OF FORCE

USE OF FORCE DURING PEACETIME OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT

1 0. During NATO/NATO-led military operations, the following general principles apply:

a. ROE applicable during peacetime operations draw their authority from the NAC/DPC and are in compliance with international law. They consist of a standard bank or menu of authorisations and restrictions that commanders may use to direct, control and order the use of force to achieve an assigned mission in support of broad NATO interests, or to protect NATO-led or non-NATO forces/ personnel. Member states may issue national restrictions.

b. A period of tension or crisis may exist prior to the commencement of armed conflict when diplomatic relations are so strained that violence, conflict or hostilities may erupt. Periods of tension or crisis may last for hours, days, months or possibly years before reverting to normal peacetime conditions or escalating to sustained armed conflict. To address potential threats during these periods, and to enhance survivability of NATO/NATO-led forces during the crisis, the ROE applicable in peacetime provide for the regulation of offensive measures.

c. Reasonable and prudent effort should be made to control a situation without the use of force. When time and conditions permit, the potentially hostile forces should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions, and further warned that NATO/NATO-led forces will take action, as necessary. The on-scene commander should consider actions that do not involve the direct application of force to warn potentially hostile forces.

d. With respect to mission accomplishment, the degree of force used must be no more than that necessary to carry out duties and accomplish assigned objectives of the mission. Force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective.

e. Use of force may be authorised within the ROE to defend non-NATO forces/personnel.

f. NATO/NATO-led forces may take reasonable and necessary actions to defend their national property, and the property of other NATO/NATO-led forces. The degree of force used depends upon the ROE, the circumstances, national law, and the nature of the property.

g. Unless specifically directed otherwise, a NATO/NATO-led force being subjected to harassment, intrusion, or other interference should continue exercises

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and operations to the maximum extent possible in order to achieve all assigned objectives. No NATO/NATO-led force should yield to any effort to impose such interference upon its movement. However, in most peacetime missions, such as humanitarian assistance, NATO/NATO-led forces generally should avoid action which might be perceived as provocative or aggressive. Should actions to counter such interference be deemed necessary, they must be authorised by ROE.

11. Civilian law enforcement is not a NATO function. During NATO/NATO-led military operations the situation may arise, however, where NATO/NATO-led forces, when specifically directed by the NAC/DPC in accordance with an international mandate (e.g. a UNSCR), may become involved in support or the conduct of civilian law enforcement functions. In such exceptional circumstances, the extent of the NATO/NATO-led forces' involvement will be determined by the political direction given by the NAC/DPC, and specified in the NATO Strategic Commander's (SC's) OPLAN/ROE.

THE USE OF FORCE FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT

12. Following commencement of armed conflict, which may include declarations of counter-surprise or counter-aggression, involving NATO/NATO-led forces as combatants, the law of armed conflict applies. The NAC/DPC and NATO commanders will continue to use the policies and procedures in this document to authorise and implement required ROE after a commencement of armed conflict. In such cases, ROE generally limit or restrict the otherwise lawful use of force in accordance with law of armed conflict. Care must be taken in such situations to ensure that any ROE requested and authorised do not unduly restrict, beyond the restrictions imposed by international law, the commander's ability to effectively carry out the mission and obtain Military Advantage. In lieu of requesting ROE, consideration should be given to seeking further political direction and guidance from the NAG as and if required, or issuing appropriate operational and tactical direction and guidance through the chain of command to ensure appropriate control of the situation.

PART IV- POLITICAL DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

13. The NAC/DPC will give SC, through the Military Committee (MC), direction on the goals to be achieved when undertaking a mission. The direction may include, as appropriate, limitations, authorisations, or restrictions on the scope of the military action a commander may take to achieve his mission. Specific instructions on the degree of force permitted, or restrictions on the use of force, will be reflected in the ROE authorised for the mission. These must be succinct and unambiguous, leaving the commander and his subordinates with no doubt as to the limits or restrictions on the degree of force that they may use.

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14. The NAC/DPC will provide ROE authorisations that reflect political policy. The NAC/DPC will also provide succinct narrative guidance on its political policy to enable commanders to respond appropriately as a situation develops in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS). The PPS will be explained in plain language and reflect the overall policy aim to frame the authorised ROE in the proper context for the mission. The PPS may change as mission objectives and ROE authorisations mature to reflect changes in policy. The PPS will be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPis) which clarify the trends regarding the foreseeable or expected development of the situation. These PPis are divided into 3 categories X, Y and Z according to the following criteria:

XRAY - De-escalation

Political/military strategy is to minimize NATO involvement in the crisis to that necessary to achieve the aim. An example would be a NEO where the objective is to rescue NATO entitled persons but without becoming involved in the resolution of any local crisis.

YANKEE - Maintain status quo

Political/military strategy is to use NATO forces to maintain current regional balance or return to previous status quo following destabilisation. Significant use of force to support specific objectives may be authorised under PPI Yankee. PPI YANKEE would be appropriate for enforcement of agreed UN sanctions.

ZULU - Risk of Escalation is Acceptable

Political/military strategy is to authorise the use of force to support achievement of the grand strategy including change of the status quo ante to generate a more favourable environment. Implicit in the approval of PPI ZULU is political recognition that military action may lead to escalation of the crisis. PPI ZULU would be appropriate for a crisis on the scale of the Gulf Conflict 1991.

PARTV-ROESTRUCTUREANDPROCEDURES

STRUCTURE

15. The ROE in this document are written as a series of prohibitions and permissions applicable to activities in a wide range of military operations. When issued as prohibitions, the rules are orders to commanders not to take the designated action(s). When issued as permissions, they define the limits of the threat or use of force, or of actions which might be construed as provocative, that commanders may take to accomplish their mission. The ROE listed in this

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document are, however, only a menu of possible options. The specific circumstances of each operation may require that nations or commanders propose for approval ROE not listed in this document.

16. The ROE are listed in multiple series in Annex A. Each series may contain up to ten rules. Each rule is numbered. When multiple rules with the same number are requested during an operation, the SC will add consecutive letter suffixes (i.e., A, B, C, ... AA, 88, CC, ... ) for each proposed rule. Some rules have the indicator "(SC)" at the beginning of the rule, which highlights those ROE which may be implemented by the SC. To the maximum extent possible ROE should be developed for a joint environment. However, where it is required to limit a ROE to a specific component, that limitation will be made clear in the text of the ROE.

17. The "DESIG" element of each requested and authorised rule must be completed. Where further clarification of a rule is required, this may be achieved through the addition of an amplification line.

APPLICABILITY

18. During NATO/NATO-led military operations, these policies and procedures are applicable to all NATO/NATO-led forces operating under a NATO commander at all times and in all places. The rules in this document are designed to be used for all types of operations and forces. In order to achieve the objectives of an operation, it may be necessary for commanders to issue clarifying ROE guidance, or to further limit the use of force. Such guidance must never exceed the authority to use force provided by superior Headquarters and the NAC/DPC. Certain roles or operations will require standing ROE that may be modified from time to time, as required.

19. In situations where units or forces under different NATO commanders cooperate or operate in proximity to each other, SC will ensure that their respective ROE are compatible and disseminated.

20. NATO/NATO-led forces occasionally operate in conjunction with forces under national, European Union (EU), or other command. When this occurs, the ROE of NATO/NATO-led and non-NATO forces must be compatible and disseminated (to the extent possible consistent with NATO procedures) to ensure operational cohesion and the optimum employment of forces. All commanders should understand the authorisations and limitations of the various ROE in effect.

PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING, AUTHORISING AND IMPLEMENTING ROE

21. ROE shall be authorised by the NAC/DPC. The ROE staffing and approval process may be independent from the staffing of an OPLAN. However, it is

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important that ROE are staffed parallel with and linked to the development or revision of the relevant OPLAN. Use of Force guidance is also an integral part of an OPLAN Annex E and as such this guidance is reviewed and approved by the NAC/DPC during the OPLAN approval process.

22. Based on the OPLAN, the mission and tasks, and the development of the situation the SC will consider the appropriate ROE to be implemented in support of mission accomplishment. The SC requests ROE from the NAC/DPC via the MC through a ROE Request message (ROEREQ). The NAC/DPC will, based on MC advice, authorise all or part of the requested ROE and forward its decision to the SC through a ROE Authorisation message (ROEAUTH). The SC will implement the authorised ROE through a ROE Implementation message (ROEIMPL).

23. ROE with the indicator "(SC)" are authorised, but the SC must immediately notify the NAC/DPC when such ROE are implemented. If time permits, such notice should precede implementation. Guidance on the use of ROE messages is at Annex E.

24. Dormant ROE allow the SC to plan, prepare orders, training and materiel to be used once the dormant ROE become operative. Dormant ROE are approved by the NAC/DPC but only operative at a particular milestone. Such ROE are useful in rapidly evolving operational environments. The NAC/DPC must also take into account the naturally uncertain circumstances of military operations. Therefore, a milestone that describes the circumstances under which a dormant ROE may be declared operative must be formulated in terms of detailed and objective criteria. The NAC/DPC may set an expiry date/event after which the dormant ROE may not be implemented. The operative date/event or contingent nature of this ROE must be clearly set out in all references to such ROE. The SC must notify NAC/DPC through the MC, immediately when dormant ROE becomes operative.

25. When implementing ROE for forces, a commander must act within the ROE authorised, but is not obliged to pass along to subordinates the full range of the authorised ROE. If superior authority later withdraws or restricts ROE previously implemented, commanders must immediately update their direction to subordinates in order to comply with the updated ROE. Even within implemented ROE, it remains the commander's responsibility to ensure that forces use only that degree of force which is lawful under the circumstances.

26. Nations may translate the ROE into their own language to facilitate understanding. All commanders are responsible for ensuring that all personnel act within the bounds of the ROE.

SECURITY

27. The classification of the ROE for an operation will be determined by the prevailing political and operational circumstances. All ROE messages will ordinarily

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take on the same classification as the OPLAN. Occasionally, the NAC/DPC may deem it appropriate to release ROE to others. Any amendment to the classification of the ROE necessary because of release of ROE will be authorised by the NAC/DPC at the same time.

PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY

28. Authorisation of rules by the NAC/DPC should be accompanied by guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.

Annexes A. Compendium of Rules of Engagement B. Guidance on the use of ROE in Air Operations C. Guidance on the use of ROE in Land Operations D. Guidance on the use of ROE in Maritime Operations E. Guidance on the use of formatted ROE messages F. Definitions and Amplifying Guidance on the Meaning of Terms

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Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

COMPENDIUM OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

International law and national law govern the lawful limits for the use of force in military operations. ROE never limit the right of self-defence, but provide political, legal and policy direction for the conduct of military operations. Even if no rule from a particular series is included, the relevant principles of law apply.

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INDEX OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

SERIES RULES PAGE

10 GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES A-3 11 RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES A-3 12 SPARE 13 PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE A-4

OF CIVILIAN PROPERTY 14 INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES A-5 15 WARNINGS A-6 16 DIVERSIONS A-6 17 BOARDING A-7 18 DETENTION OR SEIZURE A-8 19 SPARE 20 SPARE 21 SPARE 22 INFRARED AND VISUAL ILLUMINATION A-9 23 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL TARGETS PRIOR TO A-9

ENGAGEMENT 24 EXERCISING IN THE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL A-10

ENEMY 25 THE CONDUCT OF SIMULATED ATTACKS A-10 26 SPARE 27 SPARE 28 DESIGNATION OF TARGETS A-11 29 HARASSMENTANDCOUNTE~HARASSMENT A-11 30 SPARE 31 SPARE 32 USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS A-12 33 USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS A-13 34 SPARE 35 PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC A-14

WEAPONS IN DESIGNATED CIRCUMSTANCES 36 INFORMATION OPERATIONS A-15 37 USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES A-16 38 MINES A-17 39 ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS A-18 40 SPARE 41 SPARE 42 ATTACK A-19 43 SPARE A-20

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10 GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES

Purpose: To apply geographical limitations to operations by NATO/NATO-led forces.

100. (SC) Entry to DESIG geographic area and/or airspace and/or territorial waters is prohibited.

1 01. (SC) Entry into territorial seas and/or archipelagic waters, internal waters, national airspace, and territory for combat search and rescue operations is authorised.

102. Entry into DESIG geographic area and/or airspace and/or territorial waters for DESIG purposes is authorised.

103. - 109. Spare.

11 RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES

Purpose: To apply relative positioning limitations on operations by NATO/NATOled forces.

11 0. (SC) Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces closer than DESIG range of DESIG forces is prohibited.

111 . Positioning of DESIG NATO/NATO-led forces relative to DESIG forces is unrestricted.

112.- 119. Spare.

12 SPARE

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13 PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE OF CIVILIAN PROPERTY

Purpose: To authorise actions to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or property and to control the use of force in those operations.

130. (SC) Use of force to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or other property is prohibited.

131. (SC) Physically obstructing to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or other property is authorised.

132. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent boarding, detention, or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or property is authorised.

133. - 139. Spare.

NOTES: 1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted. 2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless rohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.

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14 INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Purpose: To authorise intervention in non-military activities and to control the use of force in such intervention operations.

140. (SC) Intervention in DESIG non-military activities is prohibited.

141. Intervention in DESIG non-military activities to implement NATO direction of, and/or to take military control of DESIG trade and/or services, is authorised.

142. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene to implement NATO direction of DESIG trade and/or services is authorised.

143. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene to take military control of DESIG trade and/or services is authorised.

144. Use of minimum/DESIG force to intervene in DESIG non-military activities by DESIG actions is authorised.

145.- 149. Spare.

NOTES: 1 . Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If

deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.

2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35 or 38.

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15 WARNINGS

Purpose: To authorise the passing of warnings and to control the means that may be used for warning purposes.

150. (SC) Passing of warnings to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is prohibited.

151. (SC) Passing of warnings to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons by DESIG means in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

152. - 159. Spare.

NOTES: The means that may be used for warning purposes may include the use of warning shots/bursts as described in ANNEX B Para 8 and/or ANNEX D Para 14.

16 DIVERSIONS

Purpose: To authorise the ordering of diversions and control the use of force during those operations.

160. (SC) Ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is prohibited.

161. Ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

162. Use of minimum/DESIG force to compel compliance with the ordering of diversion(s) to DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

163. - 169. Spare.

NOTES: 1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted.

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2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.

17 BOARDING

Purpose: To authorise boarding operations and control the use of force during those operations.

170. (SC) Boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft, or vehicles is prohibited.

171. (SC) If unopposed, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft, or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. (See Annex D for maritime boarding)

172. (SC) If non cooperative, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. Use of DESIG force is authorised. (See Annex D)

173. If opposed, boarding of DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles for DESIG purposes is authorised. Use of minimum/DESIG force is authorised. (See Annex D for maritime boarding)

174.-179. Spare.

NOTES: 1 . Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted. 2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under series 32, 35 or 38.

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18 DETENTION OR SEIZURE

Purpose: To authorise and define the scope of detention or seizure in military operations.

180. (SC) Detention or seizure of vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s), personnel, goods, cargoes or equipment is prohibited.

181. Detention and/or seizure of DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s), personnel, goods, cargoes or equipment in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

182. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicle(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

183. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG person(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

184. Use of minimum/DESIG force to detain DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicle(s) and their personnel in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

185. Use of minimum/DESIG force to seize DESIG cargo(es), goods, or equipment in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

186. Use of minimum/DESIG force to seize DESIG vessels, aircraft or vehicles in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

187.- 189. Spare

NOTES: 1. Minimum force includes by definition the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted. 2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under series 32, 35 or 38.

19-20-21 SPARE

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22 INFRARED AND VISUAL ILLUMINATION

Purpose: To control the use of infrared or visual illuminants.

220. (SC) Illumination of DESIG forces is prohibited.

221. (SC) Illumination of DESIG forces by DESIG means is authorised.

222.- 229. Spare.

NOTE: These rules do not preclude the use of hand-held methods of illumination, (e.g. flashlights/torches) nor do they apply to illuminants required for SAR operations.

23 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL TARGETS PRIOR TO AN ENGAGEMENT

Purpose: To define the criteria to identify potential targets.

230. (SC) Engagement without prior positive visual identification is prohibited.

231. (SC) Identification is to be established visually or by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit), electro-optic, electronic warfare support measure, track behaviour, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, acoustic intelligence, or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

232. (SC) Identification is to be established visually or by one or more of the following means: IFF (or other systems requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit), electro-optic, electronic warfare support measure, track behaviour, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, acoustic intelligence, or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from the unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

233. - 239. Spare.

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24 EXERCISING IN THE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL ENEMY

Purpose: To authorise and control exercising in the presence of a potential enemy.

240. (SC) DESIG exercising in the presence of DESIG unit(s) is prohibited.

241. (SC) DESIG exercising in the presence of DESIG unit(s) is authorised.

242.- 249. Spare.

25 THE CONDUCT OF SIMULATED ATTACKS

Purpose: To authorise the conduct of overt simulated attacks.

250. (SC) Conduct of simulated attacks against DESIG unit(s) is prohibited.

251. Conduct of simulated attacks against DESIG unit(s) by DESIG actions in a DESIG area is authorised.

252. Conduct of simulated attacks is authorised.

253. - 259. Spare.

26-27 SPARE

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28 DESIGNATION OF TARGETS

Purpose: To control means of target designation.

280. (SC) Designation of targets is prohibited.

281. (SC) Designation of targets by DESIG means is authorised.

282. - 289. Spare.

29 HARASSMENT AND COUNTER-HARASSMENT

Purpose: To authorise actions in response to harassment and control the use of force when conducting counter-harassment and harassment operations.

290. (SC) Harassment is prohibited.

291. (SC) Warning off DESIG units/elements engaged in harassment against DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is authorised.

292. (SC) Riding off DESIG units/elements engaged in harassment against DESIG vessels, aircraft, vehicles, or persons is authorised.

293. Counter harassment to a similar extent and degree to that experienced by any unit/element in the DESIG area(s) is authorised.

294. Counter harassment to a higher extent and degree to that experienced by any unit/element in the DESIG area(s) is authorised.

295. Harassment which does not result in physical damage is authorised.

296. Harassment which may result in physical damage is authorised.

297.-299. Spare.

30-31 SPARE

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32 USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

Purpose: To regulate the use of riot control agents either as a use of force aside from controlling riots or in the context of riot control.

320. (SC) Use of DESIG riot control agents is prohibited.

321. Use of DESIG riot control agents for DESIG purposes, subject to DESIG restrictions is authorised.

322.-329. Spare

NOTE: The use of certain riot control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited under "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" of 13 January 1993. Some nations consider the use of riot control agents of a gaseous nature in Peace Support Operations to be a violation of domestic law.

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33 USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS

Purpose: To authorise the use of force under specified circumstances in designated operations.

This series is intended to be applied primarily to the peculiar conditions that may arise during operations such as peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid, etc.

330. Use of force to prevent DESIG interference with NATO/NATO-led personnel during the conduct of their mission is prohibited.

331. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent interference with NATO/NATO-led personnel during the conduct of their mission is authorised.

332. Use of minimum/DESIG force to defend DESIG non-NATO forces in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

333. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent the taking possession of or destruction of DESIG property is authorised.

334. Use of minimum/DESIG force to defend against intrusion into DESIG areas is authorised.

335. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent the escape of DESIG detained person(s) is authorised.

336. Use of minimum/DESIG force to secure the release of DESIG personnel, vessel(s), aircraft, vehicles(s), or installation(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

337. Use of minimum/DESIG force to prevent commission of DESIG crimes that are occurring or are about to occur in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

338. Use of minimum/DESIG force for DESIG purposes in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

339. Spare.

NOTES: 1. Minimum force includes, by definition, the authority to use deadly force. If deadly force is to be excluded, the DESIG element must be completed, and the term "minimum" deleted. 2. All non-nuclear weapons, ordnance or other means are authorised for use unless prohibited under Series 32, 35, or 38.

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34 SPARE

35 PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS IN DESIGNATED CIRCUMSTANCES

Purpose: To prohibit or restrict the use of designated weapons, including nonlethal weapons not including riot control agents addressed in Serial 32.

This series is intended to be applied primarily to the peculiar conditions that may arise during operations such as peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid, and riot control situations (by means not addressed in Serial 32).

350. Use of DESIG weapons in DESIG circumstances is prohibited.

351. Use of DESIG weapons in DESIG circumstances is subject to DESIG restrictions.

352. - 359. Spare.

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36 INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Purpose: To authorise and control the use of Information Operations. (See also Annex A, Appendix 2)

360. (SC) Use of DESIG Information Operation is prohibited.

361. Control of DESIG suspected adversary military information distribution mechanisms with the intent of utilizing DESIG abilities to influence and persuade DESIG audiences is authorised.

362. Control of DESIG civilian information distribution mechanisms with the intent of utilizing DESIG abilities to influence and persuade DESIG audiences is authorised.

363. DESIG response against adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged NATO computers, computer networks, or information in NATO computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into DESIG intermediary systems or networks and damage to DESIG adversary systems or networks are authorised.

364. DESIG response against adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into NATO computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into DESIG intermediary systems or networks and damage to DESIG adversary systems or networks are authorised.

366. Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against DESIG adversary computers or computer systems in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

367 - 369 Spare.

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37 USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Purpose: To authorise and control the use of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).

370. The use of ECM is prohibited.

371. Use of ECM against underwater sensors & communications/non-satellite VHF or UHF communications/search & acquisition radars/missile & fire control radars is authorised.

372. Use of ECM against DESIG communications/broadcasts is authorised.

373. Use of ECM against DESIG navigation/positioning systems is authorised.

37 4. Unrestricted use of ECM is authorised.

375. Employment of ECM against DESIG communication, DESIG information systems, DESIG non-communication sensors, DESIG navigation aids, and/or DESIG weapons systems is prohibited.

376. Employment of ECM against DESIG communication, DESIG information systems, DESIG non-communication sensors, DESIG navigation aids, and/or DESIG weapons systems is authorised.

377. - 379. Spare.

NOTES: 1 . These rules do not constrain the use of self-protection ECM sub-systems. 2. The DESIG within requests for ROE 372 may also be drafted to include civilian communications or broadcasts.

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38 MINES

Purpose: To control the use of land and maritime mines.

380. (SC) Laying of DESIG mines in DESIG area(s) is prohibited.

381. Use of DESIG mines in DESIG area(s) for DESIG purposes, subject to DESIG restrictions is authorised.

382. - 389. Spare.

NOTES: 1. With respect to land mines, each State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 3 December 1997 (Ottawa Convention) has undertaken never under any circumstances: a. to use anti-personnel mines; b. to develop, produce , otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; c. to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention. 2. States Not Party to the Ottawa Convention have stated that they retain the right to employ Anti-Personnel Mines/Mixed Munitions on a national unilateral basis during a NATO operation. The actions of States Not Party to the Ottawa Convention must take into account that States Party Forces have to be in compliance with obligations of the Ottawa Convention and their national legislation.

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39 ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS

Purpose: To authorise and control the prosecution of submarine contacts.

390. (SC) Tracking of DESIG submarine contact(s) within DESIG area(s) with DESIG sensors is prohibited.

391. (SC) Tracking submarine contact(s) within DESIG area(s) with DESIG sensors is authorised.

392. DESIG action(s) against DESIG submarine contact(s) within DESIG area or DESIG range of DESIG unit or force is authorised.

393. Prosecution to destruction against DESIG submarine contacts within DESIG area is authorised.

394. - 399. Spare.

40-41 SPARE

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42 ATTACK

Purpose: To authorise and control attack(s) to accomplish NATO missions during NATO/NATO-led operations. These authorisations and controls are distinct from (and hence do not overrule or in any way effect) the definition of "attack" as that term is used concerning self-defence in Part II, paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.

420. (SC) Attack on DESIG force(s) or targets is prohibited.

421. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).

422. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s) which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against NATO/NATO-led forces is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).

423. Attack against DESIG person(s) or DESIG target(s) demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack) against DESIG forces or personnel is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).

424. Attack against DESIG person(s) or DESIG target(s) committing or directly contributing to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against DESIG forces or personnel is authorised (See Note 1 and Appendix 1 to this ANNEX).

425. Attack against DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s), which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack, is authorised (See Note 2).

426. DESIG Commanders are authorised to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.

427. Attack on DESIG military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, and unit(s) which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens DESIG force(s), person(s) or property is authorised.

428. Attack on DESIG force(s) or DESIG target(s), which make an effective contribution to the conduct of hostile military operations against DESIG force(s), or persons or property with designated special status is authorised.

429. Attack on DESIG force(s) in DESIG circumstances is authorised.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR/KFORIISAF/AUSTRALIA

NOTES: 1 . Some nations may need to issue clarifying guidance to their commanders to clarify the differences between national and NATO definitions of the terms "hostile act" and "hostile intent" whenever Rules 421, 422, 423 and/or 424 are authorised. See Appendix 1 to this Annex for further discussion. 2. Rule 425 shall never be used as a retaliatory measure. Its purpose is to prevent the continuation of hostile actions by units which continue to pose a potential threat and have shown the will to attack NATO/NATO-led forces. 3. A response based solely on self-defence (as discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the main body of this document) must be measured by what is necessary and commensurate with the threat. See Appendix 1 to this Annex for further discussion.

43 SPARE

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR!KFOR/ISAF/ AUSTRALIA


HOSTILE INTENT AND HOSTILE ACT

Appendix 1 to Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

(Amplifying Guidance for use with Rules 421, 422, 423 or 424)

INTRODUCTION

1. Military personnel may respond to an attack, or an imminent attack, under the principle of self-defence, as defined at Paragraphs 7 and 8, under the heading 'SelfDefence' within the main body of this document. There are many instances of action by a potential enemy which, though not rising to a level of threat requiring selfdefence measures, nevertheless clearly pose a threat to NATO/NATO-led forces or persons with designated special status (PDSS). Under such circumstances, a military commander may need to respond to these actions. The authorisation of rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 provides the military commander with clear authority to respond as he deems necessary in such circumstances.

2. Because national laws differ, there will not always be consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins; the authorisation or non-authorisation of Rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 are without prejudice to such national rights of self-defence. Authorisation of rules 421, 422, 423 and 424 helps assure the commander of a combined force that the forces under his command will respond uniformly to the actions of a potential enemy.

HOSTILE INTENT (NOTCONSTITUTING AN IMMINENT ATTACK)

3. Rules 421 and 423 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who demonstrate hostile intent against NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or personnel. "Hostile intent" is a likely and identifiable threat recognisable on the basis of both the following conditions:

a. capability and preparedness of individuals, groups of personnel or units which pose a threat to inflict damage and,

b. evidence, including intelligence, which indicates an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage.

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4. The capability and preparedness to inflict damage can be taken to exist when certain tactical events occur. These may include manoeuvring into weapons launch positions, whether within effective range or not, the deployment of remote targeting methods and the use of shadowers or tattletails to provide picture compilation. Evidence may also come from non-tactical events such as increased indications of mobilisation or warlike gestures revealed in public or gained from intelligence, increased movements of ammunition and the requisition of transportation. The weight of evidence and intelligence indicating intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage must demonstrate a clear and substantial threat. Isolated acts of harassment, without intelligence or other information indicating an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage, will not normally be considered hostile intent.

HOSTILE ACT (NOT CONSTITUTING ACTUAL ATTACK)

5. While self-defence permits the use of force to defend NATO/NATO-led forces against an imminent or actual attack, Rules 422 and 424 permit attack against designated forces or individuals who commit or directly contribute to any intentional act causing serious prejudice or posing a serious danger to NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or personnel. The status of the crisis, the political situation at the time and, if known, the intent of the perpetrator (e.g., a defecting pilot) all play a part in determining if indeed a hostile act has occurred. Specific examples of hostile acts include, but are not limited to:

a. one or more unit conducting mine laying operations imposing restrictions upon the movements of NATO/NATO-led forces or PDSS;

b. military aircraft penetrating NATO airspace or airspace over a secure area and refusing to comply with interception instructions;

c. intentionally impeding NATO/NATO-led military operations; or

d. breaching or attempting to breach the security of a NATO/NATO-led military installation or restricted area.

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Appendix 2 to Annex A to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Info Ops)

1. This Appendix establishes Info Ops related policies and procedures. Further policy guidance is contained in MC 422/1, "NATO Military Policy on Information Operations," dated 19 September 2002. Info Ops must be synchronized with air, land, sea, space, and special operations and conducted in conformity with political and diplomatic NATO efforts.

2. Info Ops should be an integral part of the Alliance's overall means for reaching objectives, whether in crisis or routine circumstances. Info Ops plans are an essential force-multiplier and provide the Alliance with the potential to avoid or to shorten conflict. At the strategic level, Info Ops are coordinated actions to influence political or military decision makers and information-dependent processes, whether human or automated, in support of NATO political and military objectives. At the operational level, Info Ops are coordinated plans and activities targeted toward key decision makers or the information/information systems of those decision makers. These plans are developed in support of and linked closely with strategic Info Ops objectives. At the tactical level, Info Ops are actions taken to influence decision makers by affecting their information, information based processes, C2 systems and Communications and Information systems (CIS) while exploiting and protecting one's own information and/or information systems.

3. All aspects of Info Ops related information dissemination must be coordinated and synchronized. Operational and tactical commanders must carefully manage the synchronization and harmonising of all activities and especially Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Information (MPI) and Psychological Operations functions to preserve the integrity and credibility of each of these disciplines as well as the separation of target audiences where necessary. In addition, Info Ops often involves complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review. Legal advisors should be consulted to ensure that activities are consistent with International and Domestic law. 1 All Info Ops target audiences must be legitimate military objectives and must offer a definite military advantage. Any incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, caused by the use of Info Ops against these targets must not be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage to be gained.

4 . NATO Commanders must plan for and conduct protective, defensive, and restoration measures for both classified and unclassified information systems and

1 Some nations have a more restrictive approach to some issues; they cannot be involved in operations that go counter to their

position.

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processes under their control, including systems that could come under computer network exploitation (CNE) and attack (CNA). CNE are actions undertaken to gain access to computers or computer information systems as well as the information hosted on those computers or computer information systems, including the ability to make use of the system itself. CNA is a hostile action undertaken to disrupt, deny, deceive, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer systems. Because source attribution is extremely difficult to determine, unless specific ROE are in effect NATO Commanders will ensure responses to adversary CNA do not intrude into or damage adversary or intermediary systems or networks.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR/KFOR/ISAF/AUSTRALIA

Annex B to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ROE IN AIR OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annex supplements the policy, guidance, and procedures contained in the main document and Annexes A, E and F. It amplifies the ROE considerations and gives guidance on the detailed procedures required to conduct a range of operations by air forces. Various national positions are covered by MC 54/1, MC Concept of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), and should be consulted.

AUTHORISED COMMANDER

2. An Authorised Commander is a commander to whom the authority to implement the ROE authorised for air operations has been delegated. The following, or their designated representatives, may be Authorised Commanders for air operations, and should be identified in the OPLAN/OPORD:

a. Strategic Commander (SC);

b. Regional Commander (RC);

c. Commander Combined Joint Task Force (COMCJTF);

d. Regional Air/Air Defence Commander (COMAIR/RAC/RADC);

e. Air Component Commander (ACC), or in case of a campaign executed outside the established NATO military command structure, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC);

f. Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) Commander;

g. Commander NATO Task Group (NTG), NATO Task Force (NTF) and NATO Expanded Task Force (NETF).

h. NATO Response Force Commander (NRFC).

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APPLICABILITY

3. The MC 54/1 should be consulted when planning air operations and their associated ROE.

AIR DEFENCE (AD) OPERATIONS

4. General. The procedures which follow address identification, interception, intervention, and engagement during air operations.

5. Identification. Identification of all air movements is one of NATINADS' major functions and a prerequisite for follow-on actions. NATO forces will comply with NATO standard procedures using appropriate air defence regulations. ROE drawn from the 23 series govern identification.

6. Interception. When interception of an aircraft is ordered, the interceptor is to comply with NATO standard interception procedures in effect for the operation. Whenever possible the intercept is to be conducted under close control.

7. Intervention. Intervention is governed by ROE drawn from the 14, 15, 24, 25, and 29 Series. When intervention is ordered, the intervening pilot is to use International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) procedures to:

a. divert an aircraft from its intended flightpath;

b. permit designated aircraft to proceed, reporting their marking to the controller;

c. order designated aircraft to land;

d. escort designated aircraft that comply with warnings out of the airspace concerned.

8. Warning Burst. During an intervention a Warning Burst is the final step in attempting to induce compliance by an intercepted aircraft short of the use of direct force. If authorised by the 15 series ROE, the authorised commander may order to fire a burst for warning purposes. Tracer ammunition should normally be used. If the aircraft still refuses to comply with the directions, and following reasonable time for discussion and consultation between the pilot of the intercepted aircraft and his controlling authority, an additional burst may be fired.

9. Engagement. Engagement (action taken against an airborne asset with intent to destroy it) may only be authorised by the appropriate commander (see Paragraphs 2 and 3 above). In cases other than in self-defence, the commander exercising OPCOM or OPCON will provide amplifying guidance on the specific circumstances in which an authorised commander may order engagement. In these

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cases, weapons will not be released unless the target is identified (23 Series ROE apply).

OTHER AIR OPERATIONS

1 0. The conduct of other air operations such as interdiction, offensive counter air, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), heliborne/air mechanised operations, and reconnaissance (RECCE) requires ROE which address target designation, target identification, electronic warfare and the designation of the circumstances in which it may be carried out. The authorisation of 22, 23, 25, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, and 42 Series ROE may be required.

10. Close air support (CAS) may require additional scenario-specific ROE, e.g. ROE which describe the circumstances when attacks may be carried out and/or guidance on the use of Forward Air Controllers (FAC).

CO-ORDINATION

12. It is of the utmost importance for successful military operations that ROE are consistent for all forces operating in the same area, for example:

a. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft may be tasked to support different commanders.

b. Air assets conducting different operations may be tasked for cross boundary/outside JOA operations.

c. AD and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) forces under different operational control may operate in the same geographical area.

13. Detailed arrangements for co-ordination between adjacent air defence regions are to be made by the appropriate commanders. These commanders may, however, delegate their authority for the application of these procedures to subordinate air defence commanders and may issue further detailed directives in order to meet their particular requirements. Such directives are to be forwarded to other appropriate commanders for information.

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Annex C to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ROE IN LAND OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annex supplements the policy, guidance, and procedures contained in the main document and Annexes A, E and F. It amplifies the ROE considerations and gives guidance on the detailed procedures required to conduct a range of operations by land forces.

DETAILED PROCEDURES

2. Detailed procedures may be required to be promulgated by force or formation commanders for the following actions and operations which could lead to the use of force:

a. Challenging procedures.

b. Issuing warnings.

c. Use of warning shots.

d. The conduct of demolition operations.

e. The conduct of cordon and/or search operations.

f. The operation of check points.

g. The designation and operation of secure areas.

h. Weapons release authority.

i. Other operations as may be required by the local situation.

3. Use of deadly force in support of civil law enforcement functions is a particularly sensitive issue and in preparing the ROE all force options should be considered.

4. Detailed procedures must be consistent with the authorised ROE and may include:

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a. A prescribed tactical sequence to be followed for both unit and individual situations (ROE card).

b. Where relevant, the languages to be used, e.g., to include the indigenous people's predominant language.

SECURE AREAS AND DETENTION

5. Land operations may require the establishment of secure areas and procedures for dealing with civilians, paramilitary and military forces.

a. Secure Areas. Designated areas which could include Military Restricted Areas and Safe Areas. Designated commanders may be authorised to declare and establish Secure Areas and to clear them of unauthorised weapons, items or persons. Secure Areas should be no larger than military prudence dictates or maintained longer than necessary, given the required task and operational environment. The location and conditions governing the use of Secure Areas must be widely and thoroughly publicised, and be well marked and patrolled.

b. Detention. 18 Series ROE may be used to authorise the detention of persons, including civilians, who either:

(1) Interfere with the accomplishment of a mission, or

(2) Use or threaten the use of force against NATO/NATO-led forces or persons with designated special status or persons under their protection and their equipment and/or property, or

(3) Enter an area under the control of NATO/NATO-led forces without prior approval, or

(4) Who are suspected of serious crimes or breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

The exercise of this authority to detain in cases (3) and (4) above, requires careful co-ordination with civil authorities. In all cases, the authorised ROE must contain appropriate guidance on the degree of force authorised to effect a detention and to maintain control over persons so detained. Detained persons must be treated in accordance with international law and transferred to competent civilian government agencies, or to personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross- Red Crescent, as appropriate, as soon as practicable.

THE USE OF INDIRECT FIRE

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFOR!ISAF/ AUSTRALIA

6. The designation of munitions, observation requirements, targeting criteria, and weapons release authority for indirect fire should be in accordance with the 28 Series ROE.

SPECIFIC WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE

7. Certain types of weapons or ordnance require specific additional guidance:

a. Unattended means of force are normally prohibited, except that, subject to national laws, land mines may be used in accordance with the 38 Series and other unattended means of force when authorised under international law, such as booby traps, may be used when used in compliance with such law.

b. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited.

c. Restrictions on the use of some non-lethal weapons may require provisions under the 35 series ROE.

d. Riot control agents must be authorised by the 32 Series ROE.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFORIKFOR!ISAF/ AUSTRALIA


Annex D to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ROE IN MARITIME OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annex supplements the policy, guidance and procedures contained in the main document and Annexes A, E and F. It amplifies the ROE considerations and gives guidance on the detailed procedures required to conduct a range of operations by maritime forces.

2. Normally, the nation concerned will respond to harassment of its flag, merchant, and fishing vessels or other national property in international waters. The commander of a NATO/NATO-led uniVforce in the vicinity of a harassment to a vessel of an NATO/allied nation, carried out by a uniVforce of a non-NATO nation, is authorised to endeavour to restore the situation to normal by establishing a presence in the area. Actions taken in such circumstances must be in accordance with ROE in force. The commander will also immediately report the event to his superiors, all other relevant NATO commanders, and pertinent national authorities.

3. In peacetime and in a crisis situation where the detachment of a unit does not jeopardise the conduct of the mission, he will detach, on national request, a participating unit of the nation concerned, directing it to comply with national instructions and national ROE.

VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS

4. Violation of territorial waters of a NATO/allied nation should be dealt with by forces of the nation concerned acting in accordance with national instructions. Other units under the OPCOM/OPCON of the SC may not counter such violations until the NAC/DPC has specifically promulgated such authority to the SC. Once the authority has been received, the SC will co-ordinate with the appropriate national authorities before further authorising units under their OPCOM/OPCON to enter national territory, territorial waters and/or airspace to counter violations of national boundaries by a potential enemy.

5. The commander of a NATO/NATO-led force that is in pursuit of a unit that will enter the territorial waters of a NATO/allied nation will immediately detach the participating forces of the nation concerned, directing them to comply with national instructions, in order that the unit may continue to be tracked, localised and/or countered. The commander will immediately report the situation to the SC, all other relevant NATO commanders, and appropriate national authorities. Should no forces

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of the nation concerned be assigned, or if assigned, be deemed inadequate for the task, the commander will report the situation and await further instructions before crossing any national boundary.

6. In the event that a NATO/NATO-led unit/force is witness to a violation of the territorial waters of a NATO nation, the commander will immediately report the violation to the SC, all other relevant NATO commanders, and appropriate national authorities. At the same time, he will detach participating forces of the nation concerned, directing them to comply with national instructions. The commander will also bring his unit/force to an appropriate state of readiness to be prepared to respond in accordance with the instructions of his SC or the NAC/DPC/MC. Should no forces of the nation concerned be assigned to the force, the commander will await further instructions.

MARITIME INTERDICTION GUIDELINES

7. Maritime interdiction, as described in this Annex, is an operation to enforce prohibitions on the transport of specified persons or material within a defined geographic area. These prohibitions or sanctions will be derived from international law, treaty or convention, or the resolutions or enactments of the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or another international or regional security organisation. For a more comprehensive description of Maritime Interdiction Operations AJP 01 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 5, should be consulted.

8. These guidelines address considerations which will have to be expanded and tailored, to take account of the political and legal constraints of each operation. Maritime interdiction interferes with the navigation rights of shipping and may require the use of force. It may involve ships and aircraft in establishing recognised surface and air pictures, intercepting, identifying, interrogating, boarding, searching, and diverting vessels in a specified geographic area. In peacetime, these operations must be conducted in a fully transparent manner, being subject to close public scrutiny and political control. The use of force will not normally be necessary, but it can and should be used as part of a graduated response as authorised in the ROE.

9. Interception and Interrogation. Designated maritime traffic entering a specified geographical area should be intercepted, identified and interrogated in order to determine whether or not they are complying with mandated sanctions (1 0, 11, 13, 14, 17, 22, and 23 Series ROE may apply). The Master should be questioned in a firm, but non-threatening manner, in order to determine whether boarding or diversion is necessary. Initial contact may be established by:

a. Radio communications.

b. Signal flag.

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c. Signal light.

d. Loudspeaker/hailer.

If boarding and/or diversion is not judged to be necessary, then the intercepted vessel should be allowed to proceed.

10. Diversion. Any vessel found to have inadequate cargo documentation, or whose cargo cannot be satisfactorily inspected, may be allowed to choose to divert out of the area or be diverted to a port selected by the Scene of Action Commander (SAC) in accordance with the authorised 16 series ROE. Diversion ports or anchorages and procedures for their administration must be established prior to commencing the operation. Masters who are found to be breaking sanctions should be dealt with in accordance with international law and/or UN or other applicable enforcement measures.

11. Boarding. When the commander of the intercepting unit determines that a vessel should be boarded (17 series ROE apply), the active cooperation of the Master of the intercepted vessel should be sought. The Master should be informed of the following:

a. The intention to board.

b. The authority under which the boarding is taking place.

c. The purpose of the boarding.

d. That no harm will be done to the vessel, crew or cargo and that he should slow or stop to facilitate the embarkation of a boarding party.

12. Unopposed Boarding. If the Master of the vessel is co-operative, a boarding party should be dispatched to the vessel. If found or suspected to be in violation of a sanction, the Master should be given direction on where and when to proceed.

13. Non-cooperative Boarding. If the SAC is satisfied that his orders have been understood, and a reasonable time has been allowed for those orders to be complied with; or if the Master does not acknowledge communications or cooperate in establishing his purpose in the area, or if the Master continuously refuses to cooperate in allowing boarding to take place, then the boarding is to be regarded as non cooperative. The SAC should, as the first steps, prepare for the use of force while continuing to induce the Master to comply through manoeuvring, launching of helicopters, overt preparation of boarding forces and continued communications by all possible means, and then the SAC may utilise any measure consistent with authorised Rules of Engagement (17 series ROE apply).

14. Opposed Boarding. If the master actively refuses to allow boarding to take place, then any subsequent boarding is to be regarded as opposed and appropriate

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measures taken. In addition to those measures outlined in paragraph 13 above, the SAC may utilise any measure consistent with authorised Rules of Engagement (17 Series ROE apply).

15. Use of Warning Shots. Warning shots are the final step in attempting to induce compliance by the Master short of the use of direct force. If all previous actions fail to elicit a satisfactory response from the Master, warning shots should be considered. If authorised by the 15 series ROE, the SAC may proceed to fire, or order firing by another unit involved in the interdiction incident, for warning purposes. The calibre, type and number of rounds used are to be determined by the SAC in

consultation with the firing unit. In selection of the means, the SAC should have regard to the aim of making clear to the Master the requirement to submit to boarding. Inert rounds should normally be used. If the Master still refuses to comply with the directions, and following reasonable time for discussion and consultation between the Master and his controlling authority or owner, additional round(s) may be fired.

16. Use of Direct Force. When it is certain that all means short of the use of direct force have failed to achieve compliance with instructions, firing at the vessel or a takedown should be considered. (33 series ROE apply)

a. Non-Disabling Fire. If authorised by current ROE, the SAC should inform the Master that unless he slows or stops his vessel immediately and allows boarding, his vessel will be fired on. The Master should be informed of the area at which the round(s) are to be fired and allowed time to contact his superiors for guidance and to vacate personnel from the designated area. The determination of the length of this time will be made by the SAC. Following the time period's expiration, inert rounds should be fired at the designated area. Non-disabling fire should be directed at an area which is not vital to the safe operation of the vessel.

b. Disabling Fire. If non-disabling fire and warnings do not induce compliance, and if authorised by current ROE, the Master should be warned that if the vessel does not slow or stop to permit boarding, additional rounds will be fired at a designated and vital area of the ship. Following a reasonable period to allow the Master to communicate further with his superiors and to allow personnel to clear the designated area, rounds should be fired until the Master stops the vessel or indicates an intention to do so. The designated area should be chosen to minimise the risk to the vessel's crew, cargo, and the ship itself, whilst inducing it to stop.

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Annex E to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF FORMATTED ROE MESSAGES

INTRODUCTION

1 . The following types of formatted message are used to request, authorise, deny, or implement ROE:

a. ROE Request (ROEREQ).

b. ROE Authorisation or denial (ROEAUTH).

c. ROE Implementation or cancellation (ROEIMPL).

ROEREQ and ROEAUTH messages must contain the entire text of each ROE being requested/authorised. Each SC ROEIMPL message will contain the entire text of every ROE that is currently implemented for the operation. Message text formats and detailed instructions for their use can be found in appropriate NATO reports publications.

ROEREQ MESSAGES

2. ROEREQ messages are used by:

a. The SC to seek authority through the MC from the NAC/DPC to implement, modify, or cancel ROE.

b. A commander to seek the implementation, modification, or cancellation of ROE by a superior commander.

c. Commanders to request authority to implement ROE not listed in the compendium in ANNEX A (i.e., Spares).

3. ROEREQ can be originated by:

a. The SC to NATO Headquarters (HQ), addressing it for information to national Capitals and appropriate RC/COMCJTF.

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b. A RC/COMCJTF, or other Commander directly under the Command or Control of the SC, to the SC and addressing it for information to adjacent Regional Commanders and other appropriate Commanders.

c. A COMJC/COMCC to his RC/COMCJTF, or a CTG to his COMJC/RC, addressing it for information to adjacent COMJCs/COMCCs, CTGs and other appropriate commanders.

d. A unit or other subordinate commander to his operational commander or controller whichever is appropriate.

ROEAUTH MESSAGES

4 ROEAUTH messages are used by the NAC/DPC to authorise or deny ROE to sc.

ROEIMPL MESSAGES 5. ROEIMPL messages are used by commanders to implement or cancel ROE.

6. ROEIMPL may be transmitted by SC, RCs or other commanders to subordinate commanders keeping NATO HQ and nations informed.

AMPLIFICATION

7. Clarification for any or all of the ROE within any of these messages may be included in amplification lines.

8. The complete formats for all ROE messages are in the BI-SC Reporting Directive 80-3 Volume Ill.

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Annex F to MC 362/1 (Military Decision)

DEFINITIONS AND AMPLIFYING GUIDANCE ON THE MEANING OF TERMS

Definitions to be used when applying MC 362/1 are given below. Where precise definition is not possible, guidance on the meaning of the term is given.

Term

Air Defence

Attack

Beacon

Booby Trap

Definition

All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. (AAP-6(2003))

active air defence I

Direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defence weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air defence role and electronic warfare. See also air defence. 1/11/86

passive air defence I

All measures, other than active air defence, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction. See also air defence. 1/11/85

The use of force by or against any force or personnel or directed at a target or objective.

A surface based electronic device, used in conjunction with aircraft radar targeting, to designate a range and bearing to a target.

A device designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, which functions when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act. (AAP-6(2003))

Computer Network Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information Attack resident in computers and computer networks, or the

computers and computer networks themselves.

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Term

Computer Network Exploitation

CounterAggression

Counter-surprise

Countermarker

Deadly Force

DESIG

Designation

Detention

Disabling Fire

Diversion

Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)

Definition

Operations to gain access to computers or computer networks as well as the information hosted on those computers or computer networks, including the ability to make use of the computers or computer networks.

Counter-aggression marks the transition from a condition of preparation and development of readiness to one of authorisation for the employment of NATO Forces against non-state actors, a nation, or nations, and against forces which are conducting or actively supporting aggression against NATO territory and/or forces.

Those defensive military actions which must be taken quickly to enable NATO forces to survive and retain the capability to carry out their mission under circumstances (attack or imminent attack with little or no warning) which cannot be met solely by precautionary measures which may have been implemented at that time.

A unit maintaining contact on a marker from a position which enables it to counter the threat presented by the marker.

Force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death. (AAP-6(2003))

The use of "DESIG" indicates that descriptive text is required to complete the meaning of the rule.

The act of indicating a target to a weapon system.

The act of holding in custody for lawful purpose such as prosecution, maintenance of public safety, or pursuant to legal order.

Fire directed at a vessel so as to impair its manoeuvrability but not its seaworthiness. (AAP-6(2003))

The act of deflecting or turning persons or objects from their planned route. (AAP-6(2003))

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of electromagnetic spectrum through the use of electromagnetic energy. There are three subdivisions of electronic countermeasures: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralisation. (AAP-6(2003))

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Term

Electronic deception


Definition

In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems. (AAP-6(2003))

Electronic jamming The deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness of hostile electronic devices, equipment or systems. (AAP-6(2003))

Electronic Neutralisation

Engagement

Harassment

Hostile Act

Hostile Intent

Identification

Imminent

Interception

Interrogation

In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum. (AAP-6(2003))

1. In the context of Rules of Engagement, action taken against a hostile force with intent to, deter, damage, or neutralise it.

2. In the context of Rules of Engagement, action taken against an aircraft with the intent to destroy it. (AAP-6(2003))

Repeated, deliberate and intimidating activities intended to discourage, impede and disrupt. (AAP-6)(2003)

See Appendix 1 to Annex A

See Appendix 1 to Annex A

The determination of the origin, nature, and characteristics of a detected person, object or phenomenon. This may be accomplished by various means including visual recognition, electronic interrogation, flight plan correlation and the interpretation of acoustic information, behaviour and/or hostile action. (AAP-6(2003))

A condition that is manifest, instant and overwhelming; usually refers to a threat against which defensive action is required.

An operation by which aircraft effect visual or electronic contact with other aircraft.

Action taken in an attempt to determine the identity of an unidentified aircraft or vessel.

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Term

Intervention

Intrusion

Lethal weapon

Marker

Master

Military Advantage

Military Control

Military Restricted Area

Military objective

Minimum force

Mission essential Forces

Definition

Action taken to exert influence over, modify or control a specific activity. (AAP-6(2003))

Movement of a potentially hostile force within a specified area of NATO/NATO-led operations outside NATO territory, territorial waters or airspace for the purpose of surveillance or intelligence gathering.

Any weapon which can be used to cause death or serious bodily injury and includes firearms, rocks, knives, clubs, gasoline bombs, explosive devices.

In maritime operations, a maritime unit which maintains an immediate offensive or obstructive capability against a specified target. (AAP-6(2003))

A person who, according to the vessel's documents, is responsible for the vessel and its cargo (captain of the vessel).

Military advantage is the concrete and direct result anticipated of a military operation. It is achieved with either offensive or defensive actions in order to conquer, destroy or neutralise a military target.

Taking command or control of a vehicle or property and assumption of responsibility for safe operation and maintenance of the vehicle, property, cargo and associated personnel.

A secure area in a designated location, used by NATO/NATO-led forces, in which the movement of nonNATO/NATO-led personnel is restricted.

Combatants and objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers definite military advantage.

Force, up to and including deadly force, limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective. (AAP-6(2003))

Forces and/or assets, the lack of which would likely preclude the successful accomplishment of the commander's mission. (AAP-6(2003))

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO PfP/EU/SFOR/KFORJISAF/ AUSTRALIA

Term

Non-disabling fire

Non-Lethal Weapon

Ordnance

Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS)

Property with Designated Special Status (PROSS)

Riding off

Riot Control Agents

Riot Control Means

Safe Area

Definition

Fire directed at a non-vital part of a vessel so as not to impair its seaworthiness and manoeuvrability. (AAP-6(2003))

A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate or repel personnel or material, while minimising fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.

Explosive or pyrotechnic device.

Individuals, groups, or organisations as designated by appropriate NATO authority.

Property as designated by appropriate NATO authority. By way of illustration (but not limited to):

1) Property or information, including classified material under the control of friendly forces or persons with designated special status (PDSS), the loss of which would increase the risk of grave injury or death to friendly forces or PDSS, or would increase the risk of substantial damage to or loss of critical property, identified below;;

2) Essential public utilities, medical facilities, and other mission essential structures, facilities, property, or areas specifically designated.

The manoeuvre of an escort ship to interpose itself between an escorted unit or units and an opposing force to cause the latter to turn away. (AAP-6(2003))

A chemical not listed in a schedule of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which can rapidly produce irritant or disabling physical effects that disappear shortly after termination of exposure. (AAP-6(2003))

Any means, short of deadly force, used to deter or prevent riots and other violent civil disorders. This may include, but is not limited to such means or devices as tear gas, foam or bean bags.

In peace support operations, a secure area in which NATO or NATO-led forces protect designated persons and/or property. (AAP-6(2003))

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Term

Secure Area

Seizure

Self-defence

Serious Crime

Tactical Air Reconnaissance

Takedown

Tattletale

Tracking

Warning

Warning Off

Warning Shot(s)

Definition

A designated location or area within which NATO or NATOled forces accept a specified degree of responsibility for persons or property and may impose restrictions on movement. Note: the use of force may be authorised to establish and protect a secure area. (AAP-6(2003))

The act of taking possession of property.

The use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel against attack or an imminent attack.

Murder, rape, aggravated assault or, as specifically designated by an appropriate NATO authority, any other unauthorised act or omission which does, or could reasonably be expected to, kill or cause serious bodily harm.

The use of air vehicles to obtain information concerning terrain, weather, and the disposition, composition, movement, installations, lines of communications, electronic and communication emissions of enemy forces and own weapon effects.

The insertion of specifically trained forces onto a vessel to compel the master to submit to a search by a boarding party. (AAP-6)(2003)

In naval operations, a unit maintaining contact with a target from a position which enables it to pass targeting information to other units. (AAP-6(2003))

Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical or other means. (AAP-6(2003))

Informing potential enemy units that their actions are interfering with NATO/NATO-led operations and may lead to the taking of countermeasures by NATO/NATO-led forces.

Notifying potentially hostile units that their actions are interfering with NATO or NATO-led operations and ordering them to stop forthwith. Note: normally used in naval operations. (AAP-6(2003))

Shot(s) fired to demonstrate resolve, or to convince persons to stop, or as a prelude to the actual use of deadly force or disabling force.

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