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Riccardo Mariani, Intel Fellow, IOTG SEG, Chief Functional Safety Technologist

Riccardo Mariani, Intel Fellow, IOTG SEG, Chief … · ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics –FTTI Time to detection and time to reaction are important characteristics of the safety

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Riccardo Mariani, Intel Fellow, IOTG SEG, Chief Functional Safety Technologist

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Autonomous syStems: computing platform

Intelligent eyes Vision.

Intelligent & powerful brain Perception and fusion. Modeling and planning. Decision making. Machine learning.

We need high-performance computing, flexibility, and programmability.

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Autonomous systems: e2e

GATEWAY

NETWORKINFRASTRUCTURE DATA CENTER/

CLOUDTHINGS

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…but can we trust autonomous systems ?

H/W and S/W complexity is expected to growth at least by a factor 20 in the next few years, so higher risk of failures....

Connectivity brings security threats....

...and autonomous systems are expected to detect & controlfailures !

I’m sorry Dave. I’m afraid I CAN’T do that.

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The design space of autonomous systems

H/W and S/W complexity is expected to growth at least by a factor 20 in the next few years, so higher risk of failures....

Connectivity brings security threats....

...and autonomous systems are expected to detect & controlfailures !

H/W failures

S/W bugs

Security threats

Unintented functionality

Ris

kFault-free function

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the path to trust

Agent Independent Safety (FuSa) at element

level

Multi-agent formal-based

safety + SOTIF

Anomaly

detection and

reaction

Adaptive Learning

Se

curi

ty

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We need functional safetyThe absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by

malfunctioning behaviour of E/E systems

Random H/W failures(permanent faults, transient faults occurring while using the system)

Systematic failures(Bugs in S/W, H/W design and Tools)

IEC

61508

ISO 26262

Automotive

IEC 61511 Process Sector

IEC 61513 Nuclear Sector

ISO 62061

Machinery

IEC 61800-Electr. Drives

EN 50128 Railway

applicationsIEC 50156 Furnaces

…..etc.

Ruled by International Standardssetting the “state of art” (for liability)

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Automotive requirements (iso 26262)

ASIL A

e.g.

60% faults detected and controlled

ASIL B

e.g.

90% faults detected and controlled,≤ 100 FIT

ASIL C

e.g.

97% faults detected and controlled, ≤ 100 FIT

ASIL D

e.g.

99% faults detected and controlled,≤ 10 FIT

ADAS,ADS/W Defined cockpit,

VISION, Com link1 FIT = 1 «failure in time» = 1 failure in 1 billion of hours

SW defined cockpitVision

Central brain

5G

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Not just automotive.....

DronesFusa is a concern for both

Consumer andIndustrial drones

IndustrialIt is expected 70% of s/w

defined industrial systems will require fusa in 2020

ROBOTICSHuman robotic as the next

frontIer of the human-machine interaction

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factory automation

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High performancecluster

Vision accel.

F

P

G

A

High performancecluster

Vision accel.

F

P

G

A

Safety architectures trend – HW LEVEL

100% H/W-based FuSa (e.g. Dual core lock step).

S/W-based redundancy (e.g. Loosely coupled lock step).

Heterogeneousand reconfigurable systems supported by FuSa hooks in H/W.

Safety for high-performance high-safety systems

High performancecluster

Specialized

F

P

G

A

MCU (actuation)

Safety «island», i.e. central brain for FuSa (for error detection and control)

Time Sensitive Network

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ISO 26262-10, clause 12.2.5.5

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – fail operational

«Guidance for system development with safety-related availability requirements», i.e.fail operational systems including the possibility of degrading to a lower ASIL in case of a fault...

fault

reaction

safe state

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ISO 26262-10, clause 4.4.2.2

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – FTTI

Time to detection and time to reaction are important characteristics of the safety architecture

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ISO 26262 2nd edition:>180 pages guideline on how to apply Fusa to semiconductors

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – HWTrending toward an holistic H/W level view, from ECU down to System On Chip, e.g.:

Identifying link between fault-error-failures.

Performing fault injection at different level of abstractions (safe vs dangerous, soft errors vulnerability,...).

Etc...

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – Dependent failuresIS

O 2

62

62

-11

, clau

se 4

.7.6

ISO 26262-11 has a chapter dedicated to dependent failures of semiconductor devices.

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – fault injection

Fault injection at different abstraction level...

ISO 26262-11, clause 4.8

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ISO 26262-10, clause 13

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – tools

Confidence in the use of software tools is crucial for autonomous systems

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Safety architectures trend – SW LEVEL

A full stack of S/W components from front-end to back-end...... + FuSa.

Need to support multiple and heterogeneous programming models.

Complex OS compliant with Functional Safety standards.

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ISO 26262 2nd edition:New examples on ASIL decomposition

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SWTrending toward a combination of different techniques to achieve Functional Safety of S/W components, e.g.:

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) at least at S/W architecture level. ASIL/SIL decomposition and/or sand-boxing (e.g. for legacy F/W). S/W statistical analysis. Etc...

Note: QM+QMcannot lead to

ASIL

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Autonomous systems that rely on sensing, can miss their goal and cause safety violations in absence of H/W or S/W failure…

ISO WD PAS 21448 1Safety of Intended Functionality (SOTIF)

Safety of intended functionality

Causal factor of hazard with example Scope

System E/E System failures ISO 26262

Unintended behaviour without

fault or failure (including E/E

System performance limit)

SOTIF guidance

Foreseeable user misuses SOTIF Annex

External factor Security violation Mentioned as necessary to ensure a

safe behaviour, but not addressed in

this document (See ISO21434:XXXX

or SAE J3061)

Impact from active Infrastructure

and/or vehicle to vehicle

communication.

Can be necessary for a safe behaviour

but not fully addressed in this

document (ISO 20077 can be

considered)

Impact from car surroundings

(other users, “passive”

infrastructure, environment:

weather, EMC…)

Included in SOTIF scope

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ISO

WD

PA

S 2

14

48

1S

afe

ty o

f In

ten

de

d F

un

ctio

na

lity

(S

OT

IF)

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIF

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ISO

WD

PA

S 2

14

48

1S

afe

ty o

f In

ten

de

d F

un

ctio

na

lity

(S

OT

IF)

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIF

Scene: snapshot of the environment including the scenery and dynamic elements, as well as all actors’ and observers’ self-representations, and the relationships among those entities

Situation: selection of an appropriate behaviour pattern at a particular point of time

Example: critical situation analysis • Weather conditions • Mechanical

disturbance • EMC disturbance • Acoustic

disturbance • Bad reflection

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ISO

WD

PA

S 2

14

48

1S

afe

ty o

f In

ten

de

d F

un

ctio

na

lity

(S

OT

IF)

ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIF• The use cases in which it is activated;• The sensing and arbitration concept and technologies;• The level of authority over the vehicle dynamics; and• The interfaces with the other systems and functions of the vehicle and the road

infrastructure.

• Severity and controllability are considered to determine thescenario for which a credible harm can result from thesituation misinterpretation. For controllability, a delayedreaction may need to be considered

• System improvement to avoid or reducethe risk which leads to a safety violationas a result of encountering a criticaloperational situation

• Functional restriction to reduce ormitigate critical operational situationeffects

• Handing over the authority from asystem to a driver to improve thecontrollability of critical operationalsituation effects

• Reduction or mitigation of foreseeablemisuse effects

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIFISO WD PAS 21448 1 Annex E

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIFISO WD PAS 21448 1 clause 10.2

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SAE J3101 - Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security for Ground Vehicle Applications

Secure Boot.

Secure Storage.

Secure Execution Environment.

OTA, authentication.

...

SAE J3061 - Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems

Attacks enumeration.

Threat analysis.

Reduction of attacks surface.

Security testing.

...

We need securityThe prevention of risks related to malicious intrusions,

through computer and/or communication networks

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hOT TOPICS – safety & security

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hOT TOPICS – safety & securityISO 26262-4 :2018Cybersecurity related changes

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We need self-adaptable systems

Failure and threat analytics, combined with autonomous mission anomaly detection and control, are a great opportunity to build anomaly-aware and self-adaptable systems in cooperation with Machine Learning and AI.

Failure analyticsfrom silicon level «sentinels»

Attack warnings from security «sentinels»

Detection of mission anomalies

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ISO 26262 2nd edition hot topics – SOTIFISO WD PAS 21448 1 Annex I

Off-line Machine Learning Process Flow

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Call to action – key topics for researchH/W How to implement cost effective fault tolerant concepts tuned to new fault models

S/W How to make modern & complex S/W systems safe

SOTIF How to fill the gap between «ultimate» and «our» reality

Automation How to implement a Design for Safety & Security automated flow

AI How to use AI/DL/ML for mission anomaly detection

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