Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics

7/30/2019 Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics

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Perceptual Content in the Stoics

RICHARD SORABJI

There is a view about animal phantasia in the Stoics which has the best possible

credentials', and is likely to become an orthodoxy. And yet I hope that some-how it can be resisted, because if it is true, I believe the Stoics will be in deep

trouble, while if it is false they will be in the clear.

According to this view, animal phantasia is rudimentary. It is not propositio-nal in form. Its closest analogue is perhaps Plato's account of the senses in

Theaetetus 184D-187B. The soul uses the senses, according to Plato here, for

perceiving such qualities as whiteness, but cannot use them for hitting on

something's being the case (ousia) or the truth (aletheia). If this is all that

phantasia supplies to animals, on Stoic theory, how can we explain all that they

do in the world? Typically, an animal that follows a scent does not merely

perceive the scent in isolation, but perceives it as lying in a certain direction, and

otherwise would not go in the right direction for it. But this already involves

predication: the scent is connected with a direction. We can put this by sayingthat the animal has the perceptual appearance that the scent comes from that

direction, or the perceptual appearance of it as coming from there (these are not

sharply distinguished by the Stoics). I shall describe such appearances as

propositional, meaning no more than that one thing is predicated of another.

I have argued elsewhere' that the narrowing ofperception posed no problem

for Plato, because he did not, on the whole, deny animals doxa, belief. Even in


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those passages in which he denies them a reasoning part of the soul - and even

on this he wavers - he still allows the lower parts of the soul to enjoy doxai. The

problem, therefore, came when Aristotle denied doxa to animals. He then

needed enormously to expand the content ofsense perception, if animals wereto be able to cope. And this, I believe, he did, allowing both sense perceptionand perceptual appearance to be propositional. A man can have the perceptual

appearance (phantasia) that the sun is very small, and a lion can perceive that

the ox is near and that he will have a meal. Since memories are based on sense

perception, and experience (empeiria) is a collection ofmemories, Aristotle is

able to compensate animals reasonably handsomely for robbing them of doxa.

The Stoics, on the favoured view, undid all this. While still robbing animals of

doxa, they left the content of animal perception as narrow as Plato had left it.

Were they, then, unaware ofwhat animals needed to be able to do? This seems

unlikely. It is well known that Chrysippus describes a hunting dog as performingthe analogue of a syllogism at the crossroads where its quarry might have gonein any of three directions. The dog sniffs the first two, perceives no scent and

takes the third without sniffing. Ofcourse, Chrysippus did not propose to admit

that the dog was actually reasoning or forming doxai, beliefs. It was only doing

something analogous. But how could there be any analogy, if its sense percep-tion allowed it only to grasp a scent? If its behaviour is to be explicable, it must

apprehend the absence of a scent and apprehend it as pertaining to one direction

rather than another, all of which involves predication.It may seem that there is an insuperable objection. How can an animal's

perceptual appearance (phantasia) be propositional, even in my weak sense of

involving predication, if it does not have concepts? Conceptions (ennoiai) and

preconceptions (prolepseis) for the Stoics are acquired only at a late stage, not

only after perception, but after memory and experience (empeiria) has been

acquired.' The absence ofconcepts from animals and infants has been given as

one reason for denying that in Stoic theory their perceptual appearances have

propositional content.4

But this immediately connects with contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy.A major issue under discussion at present is how the content of belief differs

from the content of perception. And one constituent question is whether the

kind ofpropositional perception I have been talking about involves the percei-ver's using concepts. One group of philosophers says `no'.5 They may use


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arguments, such as an appeal to Frege's conception of what individuates con-

cepts. Or they may appeal to intuition: why should not a Hottentot who lacks

the concept of 8, or even of counting, nonetheless see octagonal structures as

octagonal, just as well as I can?6 We should need to discuss whether hisrecognitional capacity really fell short of having a concept, but for present

purposes we need not discuss who is right on this issue. The point is rather that it

is not obvious to many leading contemporary philosophers, and need not have

seemed obvious to the Stoics, that propositional perception in my sense must

involve the perceiver's use ofconcepts. At the very least, the Stoics may have

thought that animals without concepts can perceive something as white. If this is

conceded, it may still be objected that perceiving as falls short ofperceiving that

something is white, that this latter content does involve the deployment of

concepts and that it alone would be counted by the Stoics as a proposition(lekton). But I am not aware that either the Stoics or we ourselves make such a

neat distinction between as and that.

Let me turn now to a consideration on the other side. I think the Stoic texts

show that a perceptual appearance which is propositional in the sense explaineddoes not depend on being verbalised by its owner. For the texts repeatedly insist

on using the modal idea that such propositional appearances are verbalisable,not that they are verbalised. If they are in fact verbalised, this is due to an

independent operation of the mind. For example, the Stoics say not that

perceptual appearance sets out in words what appears, but that it comes first(proegeitai), and that subsequently (eita) thought (dianoia) sets out in words

(ekpherei log6i) how one is affected by the perceptual appearance.' Similarly,

perceptual appearance is something in accordance with which we are able to say

(eipein ekhomen) - whether or not we do say - that there is a white subject

acting on us.' Again, a true or false perceptual appearance is one ofwhich it is

possible (esti) to make, not one which itself makes, a true or false assertion

(kategoria). An example is the false assertion that the oar under water is bent.9

Similarly, a rational perceptual appearance (logike phantasia) is that in accor-


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dance with which it is possible (esti) to present in words (parastesai log6i) what

appears (to phantasthen ).10 There are also several related points: things percei-ved (aistheta) are true not directly (ex eutheias), but by reference to parallel

(parakeimena) things thought (nota).l1 Again, a proposition (axi6ma) is defi-ned as assertible (apophanton), rather than asserted'2, and a lekton, roughly

speaking a proposition, is literally not a thing said, but a sayable. (I call it only

roughly a proposition, because lekta also include not only aximata but also

questions, oaths and commands.)13 It is clear that not all lekta are actually said,

because the effects ofcauses are all lekta, albeit 'incomplete ones', that is, theyare predicates like being cut or being burned'4, and many such effects have

presumably never been put into words.

This is already enough to show that perceptual appearances that something is

the case, or as of something being the case, do not depend on people puttinginto words the proposition which appears to them. Nor presumably do they

depend on people conceiving it as a thought, if the thought is merely 'parallel' to

the perception. It may be objected that this last testimony is isolated and that

propositional appearances may therefore still depend on being conceptualised,even if they do not depend on being verbalised. But the Stoics do not draw

attention to the possibility ofconceptualisation without verbalisation: - on one

interpretation they even exclude it. 15

The suggestion that propositional appearances do not depend on being

conceptualised is quite compatible with the claim that adult humans do as amatter of fact always conceive their perceptual appearances as thoughts. And

there are texts which imply this, for we are repeatedly told that rational

appearances, i.e. those of rational beings, are thoughts (noeseis), and that a

phantasma falling on a rational soul is a thought (ennoma).16 But what convin-

ces me less is the view" than an adult human's perceptual appearance dependsfor its existence on the conceptualisation which it is given. The concept-


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ualisation may be invariable, but, like the verbalisation, I think it may be a

logically independent operation.Whatever may be true of adult humans, what are we to think of animals and

infants? I have been saying that propositional appearances are defined asverbalisable and conceptualisable, not as verbalised and conceptualised. But

must they be verbalisable and conceptuablisable by their owners, or is it enoughthat they should be in principle verbalisable and conceptualisable by us? The

texts do not say directly, but the weaker requirement, that propositional

appearances need only be verbalisable and conceptualisable by us, would allow

animals and infants to have perceptual appearances of a propositional sort.

There are at least four apparent obstacles. First, we are told that rational

perceptual appearances (logikai phantasiai) are those of rational animals and

are thoughts (noeseis), while non-rational appearances are those ofnon-ratio-nal animals.'8 It may then seem that the appearances enjoyed by non-rational

animals are not conceptualisable at all, and a fortiori not conceptuablisable as

propositions. But the conclusion does not follow. For rational appearances

might still be only a subclass of those that are conceptualisable, namely, those

that are conceptualisable by their owners.

A second apparent obstacle is that a lekton (a proposition or sayable) is

defined as corresponding only to a rational appearance. 19 If rational appearan-ces are confined to rational animals, then it may seem to follow that what

appears to a non-rational animal cannot have corresponding to it a propositionor sayable. But in fact this conclusion does not follow. For the lekton is beingdefined in the passage in question by reference to a sufficient, not a necessary,condition: what subsists in accordance with a rational perceptual appearancewill certainly be a lekton, but there may be other lekta too. Indeed, we know

there are. The ones that would interest us would subsist in accordance with

non-rational perceptual appearances. But we know there must be lekta which

correspond to no appearances at all: the effects of causes which have never been

noticed, and so have never appeared to anyone.A third reason for doubt has been drawn from the text, if it represents Stoic

theory at al12which tells us that 'this is white' can be perceived (percipere) onlyin a way by the senses; it has to be grasped (comprehendere) by the mind

(animus). But so far from casting doubt on the propositional character of

appearance in animals, this may even confirm it. For ifthe senses can 'in a way'

perceive 'this is white', that may be precisely because they present a non-

verbalised appearance as of something's being white. There is another much

more emphatic text that has been cited, which says that sense perception notices

or grasps (epiballein, lambanein) only colour, flavour and sound, whereas 'this


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is white', or 'this is sweet' is someting that does not fall under it. 21But this is the

theory of Plato's Theaetetus, and there is nothing I know of in the passage to

connect it to the Stoics. Finally, no conclusion can be drawn from the text which

tells us that the five senses are reporters (nuntii) of what they sense, the mind

passes judgement (iudicat) on what they report (nuntiare) and deliberation and

reflection (deliberatio, consideratio) gather (colligere) from the reports what

each thing is.22For this leaves it open how much the senses can be said to report.

Fourthly a number of inferences have been drawn from Seneca's statement

that the appearances (visus speciesque) enjoyed by animals are turbid and

jumbled (turbidas et confusas). But this does not tell us that they are inarticulate

or unconnected with lekta (sayables).23Let me turn from the obstacles to the positive evidence. One of the most

important considerations is Chrysippus' hunting dog. When it comes to its

three-way crossroads, it is said 'virtually' (dunamei) to go through a syllogismabout its quarry: 'The animal went either this way, or that way, or the other

way. But not this way, or that way. So that way'.24 Chrysippus is not here

conceding that the dog really reasons. But he presumably allows that it has

perceptual appearances, even negative ones corresponding to the absence of a

scent. And he seems quite happy to think that he, Chrysippus, can concept-ualise and verbalise those appearances and do so in propositional form. The dogis not simply perceiving an unlocated scent.

Also important is what the Stoics Chrysippus, Seneca and Hierocles sayabout the self-preservation of animals depending on their awareness of their

own persons." Here it would not be enough to secure preservation that an

animal's own body should appear to it without further characterisation. The

richest set ofexamples is supplied by Hierocles. Admittedly neither he nor the

others use the verb 'to appear' (phainesthai). But he repeatedly says that

animals grasp (antilambanesthai, katalambanein) or are conscious ([sun]ais-

thanesthai) that their parts serve such and such a purpose, or that this is a strong

point, that a weak point, in themselves or others. Or again, the frog is conscious

of how far the distance for a leap should be. At least in many cases, then (I am

not saying in all), the perceptual content ofanimal perception can be expressedin propositional (that is, in predicational) form.

Another striking piece of evidence is the method some Stoics choose for

downgrading the mental capacities of animals by a process of redefinition.


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Animals cannot, for example, remember what is absent, but only what is

perceptually present. 26 Their memory, therefore, is redefined as merely the

apprehension of a proposition (katalepsis aximatos) in the past tense of which

the present tense has been apprehended from perception. 27 Here in the very actofdowngrading animal capacities, the Stoics concede to them the apprehensionof propositions.

Exactly the same happens with one of the other Stoic redefinitions. Seneca

denies that animals are capable of anger, becauce they are not rational,whereas anger involves rational assent to the appearance of injustice (species

iniuriae).z9 They merely seem to be angry because they have an appearance,albeit a muddled and confused one30, and an involuntary reaction (impetus),which is not however a rational one. Once again, in downgrading their capaci-

ties, a Stoic nonetheless concedes that animals entertain at least a muddle

appearance. And that muddled appearance is presumably a propositional one -

the appearance that injustice has occurred.

The same view of animals is put into the mouth of a non-Stoic character, but

with the standard Stoic example of a syllogistic premise, by Plutarch:

Wolves, dogs and birds surely perceive (aisthanesthai) that it is day and light. But

that, ifit is day, it is light, nothing other than man understands."

This passage, though not explicitely about the Stoics, gains significance from a

closely related one which is. The Stoics hold that inference from signs is peculiarto man. Such inference involves syllogistic premisses of an 'if - then' variety,like those discussed in the Plutarch passage. In reserving it for man, the Stoics

concede that non-rational animals receive perceptual appearances. What then

do they deny? Not, it turns out, that these appearances are propositional,

although that would have clinched the case, but only that these animals have

appearances arising from inference and combination (metabatike, sunthetike),

appearances which explain (dioper) our having the concepts of logical im-

plication (akolouthia) and sign.32

Finally, Sextus Empiricus argues against the Stoics and other dogmatists that

the perceptual appearances of other animals are not inferior to our own. 33If he

had known of a Stoic theory that they are not even propositional, he would have

had to combat this first.

My interpretation implies an opposite answer to the interesting question that


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has been raised in recent literature, whether we should compare the Stoics with

Donald Davidson or Daniel Dennett.34 Davidson would be the orthodox choice,because he denies propositional attitudes to animals. But I would prefer Den-

nett, if a selection is to be made, because he allows the ascription ofpropositio-nal attitudes to animals, provided their behaviour can be analysed by us in

intentional terms. 35

King's College London

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Richard Sorabji, Perceptual Content in the Stoics