UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: August 21, 2006, 7:00 p.m.

Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

Thesis: “[T]he Iraq fiasco occurred not just because the Bush administration engaged in sustained self-deception over the threat presented by Iraq and the difficulty of occupying the country, but also because of other major lapses in several major American institutions, from the military establishment and the intelligence community to the media” (85). Fiasco analyzes the failures of the military establishment.

Cast of Characters. 70 individuals, of whom only 3 are Iraqis (Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, Chalabi) (xi-xiv).

PART I: CONTAINMENT

Ch. 1: A Bad Ending. “[A] mess as big as Iraq” is only possible as the result of “a series of systemic failures in the American system,” of “high officials and powerful institutions” (3-4). U.S. mistakes at the end of the 1991 Gulf war (4-6). Paul Wolfowitz’s regrets (7-8). Operation Provide Comfort relieved Kurds in northern Iraq (8-9). Zinni, as chief of staff there, briefed Wolfowitz in Iraq on Lt. Col. Abizaid’s success in driving the Iraqi army south (9-11).

Ch. 2: Containment and Its Discontents. U.S. containment policy and no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq cost $1-1.5b/year and were tolerated by Saddam Hussein (12-15). Wolfowitz and others criticized containment (15-18). Desert Fox strikes (Dec. 1998) were more successful than at first realized and almost toppled régime (18-22). Skirmishing over Iraq in policy circles in the 1990s, especially by neoconservatives (“essentially idealistic interventionists who believed in using American power to spread democracy” (22-24). Bush advocates restrained use of military in 2000 campaign (24-26). Powell was “winning” an internal struggle with hawks prior to 9/11 (26-28).

Ch. 3: This Changes Everything: The Aftermath of 9/11. Sept. 11, 2001 (29-30). Only Wolfowitz pushed for attacking Iraq at Sept. 15 meeting (30-31). Frustration over lack of intelligence (32). Iraq war planning began in Nov. 2001 (32). Differing accounts of the planning process (33-34). Judy Miller’s Dec. 20, 2001 New York Times article on Iraqi WMDs was untrue (35). Concerns of Ike Skelton (D-MO 4th) (34-35). Feb. 2002: Wolfowitz & Joe Lieberman, at Wehrkunde in Munich, signal that Iraq is in U.S. sights (36). Ken Adelman predicts

“cakewalk” in Wash. Post (36-37). “Prominent Hammer” war games in spring 2002 concluded that Oct. 2002 was too soon to attack Iraq (37). The military sought more troops for the war plan (37-38). Bush’s June 2002 West Point speech (38-39). Sir Richard Dearlove’s Jul. 23, 2002 [“Downing Street”] memo reported to British government that “intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” (39). Maj. Gen. James Mattis warned staff on Aug. 3, 2002, that Iraq invasion was coming (39). Much internal military disagreement; Rumsfeld was responsible for ignoring much internal military criticism of the war plan and for “weakening” the war planning process” (40-43). Isolation of Prince Sultan Air Base, in Saudi Arabia, the base of operations for the southern no-fly zone described (43-45).

Ch. 4: The War of Words. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Jul. 31-Aug. 1, 2002 (46-47). Brent Scowcroft warned “Don’t Attack Saddam” in Wall Street Journal on Aug. 15, 2002 (47). But Scowcroft failed to appreciate that Wolfowitz, Cheney, and George W. Bush had abandoned concern about “stability,” which they saw as “synonymous with stagnation,” and were “at times more in sync with the attitudes of sixties radical Jerry Rubin than with those of Winston Churchill” (47-48). “A spate of cautionary articles” appeared “in publications aimed at military professionals” (48). Powell resisted; Rice went along (48-49). Cheney’s “largely false” Aug. 26 Nashville speech to VFW convention “emphatically shut down the nascent debate” on Iraq (49). Zinni went public with doubts in October, but Cheney’s speech had had a “powerful effect” in government (50-51). A Sept. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate greatly affected internal debate, but was “stunningly wrong” (52-53). Richard Perle’s influence “likely has been overstated” (53-54). Doug Feith’s office cherry-picked intelligence (54-55). New York Times stories on Iraq’s supposed WMDs had an “insidious effect” (55-56). Chalabi’s successful working of the system “was a sad moment in American journalism and governance” (56-57).

Ch. 5: The Run-up. Bush administration “pursued and sold” two contradictory “delusions”: worst-case scenarios about Saddam and best-case scenarios about U.S. intervention (58-59). Skelton warned Bush about war’s aftermath in Sept. 2002 (59-60). The administration’s intent to go to war was

apparent to all (60-61). 77 senators and 296 representatives voted for the war resolution (61-63). Max Cleland voted pro-war for political reasons, lost anyway, and felt despair (63-64). James Fallows issued a prescient warning in the Atlantic Monthly (64). Perle dismissed Michael O’Hanlon’s prediction a longterm commitment of more than 100,000 troops will be needed (64-65). Washington Institute for Near East Policy held pessimistic 3-day seminar (65-66). In mid-October, when resistance arose to a draft of a Strategic Guidance for Combatant Commanders that was sent to planning officers around the world ordering that a war on Iraq that was about to be started should be “thought of as” part of the war on terror, Gen. George Casey “laid down the law” (66-67). Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold quietly retired because of disagreement, “the only known departure from the senior ranks of the military over the looming Iraq war” (67). U.S. intelligence “began to shut up” and “the war already was beginning in quiet ways” in Sept. 2002 (67). There were high tensions between Rumsfeld and Army brass (68-70). Aug. 26, 2002, review of the Afghan campaign held at the Army War College in Carlisle, PA (70-71). Zinni warned 1st Marine Division of coming difficulties in Nov. 2002 (71). A National Defense University conference on post-Saddam Iraq warned on “daunting and complex” task (71-72). An Army War College meeting of Army staff with “about two dozen military experts, Middle East area specialists, diplomats, and intelligence officials” on Dec. 10-11 produced a report “stunning in its prescience,” which like the NDU conference specifically warned against disbanding the Iraqi military, and against top-down de-Baathification (72-73). “What is remarkable is that . . . [a]lmost no Middle Eastern experts inside the military were consulted on the war plan” (73). Frustration of officers in the Coalition Forces Land Component Campaign’s senior officers, to whom Franks would give PowerPoint briefing slides instead of orders; Andrew Bacevich comments: “Here may be the clearest manifestation of OSD’s contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession and of the assumption among forward thinkers that technology—above all information technology—has rendered obsolete the conventions traditionally governing the preparation and conduct of war” (74-76). Doug Feith was a disastrously bad manager (76-78). An exhausted military planning staff was inappropriately tasked with creating a postwar plan (78-79). Franks created Joint Task Force IV, whose work was useless (79-80). In Jan. 2003 Rumsfeld persuaded retired Lt. Gen Jay Garner to take charge of postwar operations (80-81). Schwartzkopf lacked confidence in

Rumsfeld (81-83). The war plan was “gutted” of key assets in Jan. 2003 (83-84).

Ch. 6: The Silence of the Lambs. “[T]he failures in Congress were at once perhaps the most important and the least notices” (85). “[T]he Iraq fiasco occurred not just because the Bush administration engaged in sustained self-deception over the threat presented by Iraq and the difficulty of occupying the country, but also because of other major lapses in several major American institutions, from the military establishment and the intelligence community to the media” (85). Congress’s were “mainly sins of omission” (85). Congress accepted Feith’s inability to answer key questions at Feb. 2003 hearing (86-87). Zinni grew more and more alarmed (87-88). Sen. Byrd expressed astonishment at the silence (88). The media took their cue from Congress’s silence (88). Democrats were “cowed by the post-9/11 atmosphere” (88-89). “Congress faced an unusually strong secretary of defense and an unusually weak chairman of the Joint Chiefs,” Air Force Gen. Richard Myers; Marine Gen. Peter Pace “was seen as even more pliable” (89). Powell’s U.N. speech was “a house of cards” but he “didn’t know it” (90-94). Rumsfeld encountered resistance at the annual Wehrkunde security conference from German foreign minister Joschka Fischer (94-95). Wolfowitz visited Iraqi Americans in Detroit (95-96). On Feb. 27, 2002, Wolfowitz rejected Gen. Shinseki’s prediction made two days earlier that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be needed for the occupation of Iraq, calling it “wildly off the mark,” adding that Iraq “can really finance its own reconstruction” (96-100). In March, both Myers and Rumsfeld publicly asserted that WMDs, not Saddam Hussein, were the issue (100-01). Cheney forced State Dept.’s Tom Warrick, who headed its Future of Iraq project, off Garner’s staff (101-04). In mid-March, after Garner spoke dismissively of Chalabi and Feith upbraided him, Garner told him: “You can shut the fuck up, or you can fire me” (104-05). Rumsfeld struggled to revise the composition of Garner’s staff to include DoD personnel (105-07). Many foresaw reconstruction problems (107-08). Domestic political fallout to the reconstruction problems was much less than anticipated (108). The head of USAID said in late March or early April 2003 that the U.S.’s contribution to Iraqi reconstruction would amount to $1.7b (108-09). “As the war was about to begin,” there was “no Phase IV plan” (109-11).

PART II: INTO IRAQ

Ch. 7: Winning a Battle. Iraq war plan “perhaps the worst war plan in American

history” (115-16). The initial attack attempting to kill Saddam Hussein was based on false information (116-17). About 145,000 troops invaded on the ground (117). Guerrilla-style attacks began on Mar. 22; no Iraqi commanders surrendered, confounding predictions (118). The adequacy of the invading force was publicly debated (118-20), and internally debated (120-23). Chalabi communicated with Iran (123). Central Command was initially indifferent to training Iraqi forces (124). Success of the drive to Baghdad demoralized the Iraqis (124-25). “Thunder runs” in Baghdad (125-27). Tommy Franks misunderstood strategy, though one Central Command planner pinned this failure of understanding on Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith (127-29). There was too much focus on the fall of Baghdad, because post-Vietnam, the U.S. military revised doctrine to focus on “going after the enemy’s center of gravity” (130-33). Iraq’s information minister, Mohammed Saeed Sahhaf (“Baghdad Bob”) believed the false reports he was giving were true (133-34). After the fall of Saddam’s statue on Apr. 9, many in the military warned that the war was not over (134-35). Rumsfeld fundamentally misunderstood the Apr. 2003 looting in Iraq (135-36). Gary Anderson, a defense consultant, predicted in the Wash. Post that phase 2 of the war would be a protracted guerrilla war (137-38). Degenerating relations in Fallujah and Ramadi were linked to lack of planning for al Anbar province (138-40). Apr. 28 & 30 incidents became a cause célèbre for people in Fallujah (140-42). Flubbed Marines-to-Army handoff in Tikrit (142-44). Bush’s May 1 declaration was premature (145). The preoccupation with WMDs “unintentionally protected the insurgents during the spring of 2004” (145-46). Pentagon was slow to adapt to the emergence of an insurgency (146-48).

Ch. 8: How to Create an Insurgency (I). Military thinking in mid-2003 was based on persistent incorrect assumption (149). Morale of U.S. forces was affected (150). As Baghdad “was falling apart in front of the eyes of the U.S. military,” there was still no Phase IV plan (150-52). Special Forces in northern and western Iraq did better (152-54). Garner was ousted in April (154-55). Franks was oddly detached at this time (155-56). Shinseki retired in June (156-57). Odd choices were made for the chain of command (157-58). Bremer insisted on his May 16 de-Baathification order (“Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1”) over many strong objections (158-61). Ditto his May 23 disbanding of Iraq’s army (CAP Order No. 2) (161-63). The two orders, apparently at Chalabi’s insistence, threw “more than a half million people” out of work and alienated many more (163-66). The CPA is indifferent to Iraqi public opinion (166-67). Back in Washington, officials seemed

detached or caught in a “cloud of cognitive dissonance” (167-70). Commanders denied that guerrilla warfare was occurring (170-72). On Jul. 2, 2003, Bush taunted: “Bring ‘em on” (172). Maj. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez was very inadequate (172-76). In mid-2003 soldiers on patrol could feel the occupation “teetering on the edge” (176-78). The very nature of the CPA and its authority was fundamentally clear, there was not clear chain of command, and the relation of the Dept. of Defense and the Dept. of State was unclear (179-82). Relations were difficult with the Baghdad police (182-83). In July, when Gen. John Abizaid took over Central Command and described the situation in Iraq as “war,” Pentagon spokesperson Lawrence Di Rita’s dismissiveness of the question exemplified the leadership’s strategic confusion (183-85). The confusion cost lives (185-86). Wolfowitz had Gary Anderson pitch the idea of a native constabulary force as a way of combatting the insurgency, but Bremer dismissed it (187-88).

Ch. 9: How to Create an Insurgency (II). Though British Lt. Gen. Aylmer Haldane succeeded in keeping the Iraqi uprising of Jul.-Oct. 1920 from turning into an insurgency, the U.S. did not in 2003 (189-90). Insurgencies’ main problems are arms, finance, and recruitment; U.S. policies facilitated recruitment, especially (190-91). The Army’s doctrine of prevailing through “presence” was counterproductive (192). The need for intelligence led to cordon-and-sweep operations that swamped the system with prisoners (193-95). Officials affected and often felt optimism in mid-2003 (196). The beginning of the insurgency was “like a change in the weather” (197). As it began, “institutionalized abuse” of prisoners began; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller arrived from Guantánamo on Aug. 31, 2003 (197-200). Some accounts of guerrilla attacks (200-02).

Ch. 10: The CPA: “Can’t Produce Anything.” CPA was poorly staffed with “ideologically minded Republicans whose only professional experience was working on election campaigns” (203). Staff worked hard “pasting feathers together, hoping for a duck” (204). Bremer was a poor leader, and lacked authority over the key area of security (205). Life in the bubble of the Green Zone was surreal (206-08). Relations deteriorated between the CPA and the press corps (208-09). The military saw the CPA as dysfunctional, and understood the U.S. mission in Iraq very differently (209-11). In communications, the CPA was more concerned about the U.S. audience than Iraqis (211). CPA-military relations became adversarial (212). Early on, the CPA lacked resources, esp. to address the security situation (213).

Ch. 11: Getting Tough. In the fall of 2003, U.S. tactics “toughened” and the military worked hard, but “Civilian leaders and top military commanders had failed to define what kind of war was being fought” (214-15). On Aug. 7, 2003, a car bomb killed 11 and wounded 50 at the Jordanian embassy (215). On Aug. 19, U.N. headquarters were bombed, killing 22, incl. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the chief of the U.N. mission, and international organizations began to pull out (216). The IED is the characteristic artifact of the Iraq war (217-21). An Aug. 29 bombing killed the leader of SCIRI (221). The U.S. military had difficulty conceptualizing the situation (222). A new plan in Oct. 2003 to improve intelligence helped little (223-24). In the words of Maj. Gen. Robert Scales “The center of gravity was the will of the people,” but the U.S. focus on its own forces’ security led the military to violate “a lesson of every successful modern counterinsurgency campaign: Violence is the tool of last resort” (225). Gen. Sanchez failed to coordinate the military’s decentralized operations (225-28). Maj. Gen. David Petraeus had some success with counterinsurgency commanding the 101st Airborne the Mosul area until the unit left in spring of 2004 (228-32). Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno used a criminally brutal approach in the northern part of the Sunni Triangle (232-34). In the same division, brigades and batallions sometimes pursued contradictory approaches (234). The military committed the classical mistake of radicalizing the population through indiscriminate arrests (235-38). Too many were arrested (238-39). Sanchez approved “unacceptably aggressive” interrogation techniques (239-40). On Sept. 12, 2003, U.S. military killed 8 Iraqi police in a mistaken firefight (240-41). Zinni began to speak out publicly again in fall 2003 (241-42). Rumsfeld, Bremer, Sanchez, and Wolfowitz blamed the media for not reporting progress (242-43). Sanchez blamed Col. Teddy Spain for death of Lt. Col. Kim Orlando (243-46). In the Ramadan offensive of late Oct. 2003 “the foe turned fully on U.S. forces” (246-49). On Nov. 11, 2003, Rumsfeld said the U.S. was “in a low-intensity war” (249). Col. Hogg got a lecture on counterinsurgency from a subordinate and listened (250-52; cf. 234). Some soldiers knew their tactics were counterproductive (252-53). Bremer announced a lengthy plan in Wash. Post article on Sept. 8 (254). Robert Blackwill and Rice shortened the plan radically, and on Nov. 15 the U.S. announced a turn-over of sovereignty in June 2004 (254-55). Elaborate bases and their “huge support system” “may have undermined the goal of winning” (255-57). Convoys were “trigger-happy” (257-58). Retired Col. Stuart Herrington, a veteran of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, visited Iraq in Dec. 2003 and wrote a

scathing report, but only 2 copies were made (258-60). The later Fay report vindicated Herrington’s view that the military’s response to the rise of the insurgency was “fundamentally misguided” (261). After Saddam Hussein was captured on Dec. 14, 2003, an opportunity for an opening to Sunnis was missed (262-64). For reasons that are not clear, the military violated basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare laid out in an essential text, Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1963) (264-67). Frustration with Bremer was high; change often had to be forced upon him (267-68). Lt. Col. Holshek was affected by the death of PFC Charles Bush Jr. in a driving accident: “We had met the enemy, and he was us” (269).

Ch. 12: The Descent into Abuse. In Mosul, the 101st Airborne acted promptly to bring prisoner abuse under control (270-72). Cf early incidents in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armored Division (272-74). Abuse by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in western Iraq (274-78), and by the 82nd Airborne near Fallujah (278-79). In Gen. Odierno’s 4th Infantry Division, many incidents occurred (including the Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman affair [284-88]) (279-90). Abu Ghraib was the result of “[a]ll of the Army’s problems in Iraq in 2003—poor planning, clumsy leadership, strategic confusion, counterproductive tactics, undermanning, being overly reactive” (290-97).

PART III: THE LONG TERM

Ch. 13: “The Army of the Euphrates” Takes Stock. The U.S. military encountered in Iraq the recent strategic nightmares of Bosnia (“heavily armed factional fighters using AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and land mines to attack U.S. troops, and blending in with the population”) and Afghanistan (“quickly taking the country,” then “mired and suffering increasing casualties”) (301-02). Informal debriefs for the first troop rotations (302-04). Advice for convoys (304-05). Warnings against complacency (305). The home front (305-06). Soldiers find people in U.S. don’t understand their experience (306-08). “In some quiet but significant ways, the Army was moving into intellectual opposition to the Bush administration” (308-09). Stars & Stripes reported on low morale in fall 2003 (309-10).

Ch. 14: The Marine Corps Files a Dissent. The Marine Corps criticized the Army’s heavy-handedness (311-13). Maj. Gen. James Mattis prepared a “velvet glove” approach in replacing the 82nd Airborne in Anbar province (313-17). Mattis assigned officers 1000 pages of background reading and emphasized learning from others’ experience (317-18). Maj. Gen.

Swannack, the 82nd Airborne commander, criticized Mattis’s plans (319-20).

Ch. 15: The Surprise. Troop levels dipped to 110,000 in early 2004 (321-22). Rotation degraded U.S. capabilities (322-24). Sanchez and Bremer were widely regarded as poor leaders (324-25). In the spring of 2004, both Iraqis and Americans sensed the U.S. was failing (326-27). The effort to train Iraqis, contracted out, was poorly executed and underfunded (328-29). Three days after the hand-off, a bombing led to a 36-hour-long series of firefights in Fallujah (330-31). Four Blackwater contractors ambushed and massacred, with CNN coverage (331-32). Civilian leadership (esp. Blackwill, also “the White House”) overrode Mattis’s preference for a “methodical” response, calling for “a swift and tough retaliatory raid” (332-33). Operation Vigilant Resolve began on Apr. 5, 2004 (333-35). Fighting spread to Ramadi, then Moqtada al-Sadr, whose newspaper Bremer had shut down, attacked with his Shiite militia (335-38). The Iraqi army refused to fight (338-41). A unilateral cease-fire was ordered, over Mattis’s objections (“It isn’t really clear where the order came from”) (341-43). The turn-over to “the Fallujah Brigade” was a victory for the insurgency (343-45). Summary of other fighting in 2004 (345-46). The coalition shrunk (346-48). The military felt it had too few troops (348-50). After April 2004, “Iraq felt different” (350-52). Insurgent & U.S. tactics grew more sophisticated (352-57). U.S. military negotiated a truce with Sadr’s forces (358-59). Danger to reporters increased (359-61). Many in military see Iraq as another Vietnam, with the U.S. losing strategically while winning tactical engagements (361-62).

Ch. 16: The Price Paid. One year on, the Army was confronting “its first significant setback since the Vietnam War” (363). Funeral of 2nd Lt. Cowherd, a platoon commander (363-65). Capt. Oscar Estrada (UC Berkely grad) argued in the Wash. Post on Jun. 6, 2004, that the U.S. was alienating Iraqis (365-67). Criticism from Special Forces urging that the U.S. “pull back” and be less visible was never accepted by conventional commanders, but by the end of 2005 ih had prevailed (367-70). There were tensions between military and the 60,000 “security contractors” in Iraq (370-72). Frustration and discontent were high inside the military (373).

Ch. 17: The Corrections. All U.S. rationales for the war were undermined by events (374-75). No WMDs (375-77). No connection to international terrorism (377-78). No liberation from oppressive tyranny (given Abu Ghraib) (378-79). But no high-level officials were held responsible (379). In spring 2004, editorialists

grew critical of the war in Iraq (380-81). The saga of Judith Miller and the New York Times (381-85). Congress grew more critical in spring 2004, then “backed away from the subject of Iraq (385-87). Capt. Ian Fishback began his challenge to detainee practices (387-88). U.S. fell out with Chalabi (388-89).

Ch. 18: Turnover. CPA turns over sovereignty “almost stealthily” on Jun. 28, 2004 (390-91). Negroponte and Casey were an improvement over Bremer and Sanchez (391-92). Casey’s “strategy shop” (“Doctors Without Orders”) developed a counterinsurgency plan (392-94). A new training program under Petraeus began (394-95). Public attention waned; the battle of Najaf in Aug. 2004 “attracted only passing notice in the United States” (395-98). In Nov. 2004, the U.S. won the second battle of Fallujah with “extraordinary” fire power (398-402). Videotape by NBC’s Kevin Sites showing a Marine (unidentified) killing a subdued prisoner evoked resignation rather than scandal in the U.S. public (402-03). Marines systematically used heavy “preparatory fire” prior to entering buildings (403-04). Simultaneous uprising in Mosul (404-05). Ricks assesses the 2nd battle of Fallujah ambiguously (405). Iraqi troop performance was unimpressive (406). Powell told Bush and Blair the troop levels are inadequate, and resigned on Nov. 12, 2004 (406-07). Some pessimistic assessments (CIA station chief; Army Col. Derek Harvey, a senior U.S. military intelligence expert who speaks Arabic and has a Ph.D. in Islamic studies) reached President Bush in Dec. 2004; Harvey said the core of the insurgency was “the old Sunni oligarchy using religious nationalism as a motivating force” (407-09). Mattis and Petraeus return to the U.S.; Bush administration “bulled on” (409-12)

Ch. 19: Too Little Too Late? In 2005, the insurgency “intensified” despite “a solid year of fighting” and 3 major elections (412-13). The military’s approach adapted to a counterinsurgency approach (414-16). Meanwhile, the quality of life “improved remarkably” for most U.S. soldiers (416-17). But the latter development “may have been fundamentally at odds” with the former, since “classic counterinsurgency doctrine says that the only way to win such a campaign is to live among the people” (417-18). Casey’s COIN Academy 5-day course in counterinsurgency for commanders was one of many ways the military has sought to adapt (418-19). Col. H.R. McMaster did an “extraordinary job” leading the 3rd ACR in recapturing Tall Afar (419-24). Journalists, in a difficult situation, are much hated by those in the military (424-26). In 2005, the “battle of Baghdad” focused on “the ‘Iyahs”—

Mahmudiyah, Yusufiyah, Latifiyah, and Iskandiriyah, on the “flat agricultural plain south and southwest of the capital” (426-28). At the end of 2005, the “foremost” question was whether Iraq was moving toward a civil war, making the U.S. military “irrelevant” (428). “Is it too little, too late?” asked Army Reserve Lt. Col. Joe Rice (429).

Afterword: Betting against History. In mid-2006, indications “aren’t good” (430). The administration’s denials undercut efforts to make corrections (431). The U.S. has incurred “policy costs”: The preemption doctrine has been discredited (431-32). Islamic extremists may “underestimate the genuine strength of the West, which is extraordinary, and barely tapped yet” (432). U.S. legitimacy in international affairs is damaged (432). U.S. military strength is weakened (432). Adversaries may be emboldened (433). Scenarios: “Success” means staying in Iraq for years, as in the Philippines (433-34). If the U.S. cannot remain, a sovereign Iraq government is a “middling” outcome (435-36). Defeat means civil war, partition, and regional war, as the U.S. intervention has shifted power to Shiites (436-37). One Army officer’s prediction: “In 2009, after we withdraw, the south turns into Shiastan, and the Kurds declare independence, and Turkey invades, and Sunnistan leads to the fall of the house of Saud, and Arabia becomes the first step in the

caliphate, and oil goes to two hundred dollars a barrel, then we have to invade Arabia with a broken Army, and then it’s our Algeria” (437). An even worse “nightmare scenario”: a new Iraqi leader becomes a new Saladin, unifying the country, perhaps the region, leading to a pan-Arab caliphate (438-39).

Notes. 22 pp. “[N]ot an academic study . . . This book is based foremost on several hundred interviews and my own coverage of events” and “a vast number of documents” (441); Ricks estimates he has read more than 37,000 pages of official document (442). Books and essays cited as important: Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm (2002); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (2004); Army’s official version of the 2003 invasion, entitled On Point (2004); Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (2004); Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America’s Second War against Iraq (2004); Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (2004); Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” (2004); Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency: Problems and Approaches.”

Acknowledgments. Written while at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at the invitation of Kurt Campbell. Ricks thanks Washington Post journalists and editors, and other journalists, esp. at Army Times and Stars & Stripes. Two books influenced Fiasco especially: Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace and David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfaire: Theory and Practice. Intellectuals, including Andrew Bacevich. John Collins and his Warlord Loop. Globalsecurity.org. Senior officers “who, despite the current atmosphere of intimidation in the Pentagon,” spoke to Ricks.

Index. 17 pp.