62 ARMY n April 2008

Right, 2nd Lt. James Marionekeeps radio contact with his

company commander as hisplatoon mans a tactical check-

point during a security cor-don mission around the town

of Bermel for NationalWomen’s Day celebrations.Below, PFC John Giasullo,platoon medic, quickly as-

sesses wounded Spc.Bradburn during the

ambush in the village of Gairo.

Right, maneuvering toward sniper fire from abuilding during operations in Ghazni, Sgt.

Matthew Vera dashes for a safe position.

April 2008 n ARMY 63

It was not yet 10 A.M.

Another cold, damp January day, and we were

on our way to the second of the day’s missions.

The small sign alongside the road in the thin

pine forest pointed to “Gairo,” and the nine up-

armored Humvees of the platoon and its company

command element turned off the asphalt onto the

mud path leading to that tiny village soon visible

in the clearing just ahead.

Platoon leader 1st Lt. Mike McBride wasn’t

overly concerned about this mission, which was

Text and PhotographsBy Paul Avallone

a simple escort operation—bringing a district leader to aregional meeting and setting up a secure perimeter tosearch people as they arrived. It was the first operationearlier, at dawn, for which Lt. McBride had done his heavi-est planning. That operation had required his platoon toenter the city of Ghazni to establish security for the WorldHealth Organization’s (WHO) scheduled medical civic ac-tion program (medcap) and then pick up the district leaderfor escort to Gairo.

The sky was still graying with dawn as Lt. McBride led a

dismounted squad into the city whilethe remainder of the platoon pulledcordon security just outside in theirHumvees. “I expected a major attack,from all the possible buildings around,”Lt. McBride admitted later. “Andmaybe a suicide bomber.” What hegot was simply two snipers located onthe second story of just one building;while he and his dismounts tookcover, he brought in his Humvees fortheir firepower and then maneuveredfoot elements to enter the buildingand kill the snipers. His platoon sus-tained no casualties; made a success-ful link up with the local Afghan Na-tional Police (ANP), securing the areafor the medcap; and then brought inthe WHO medical team. Mission com-plete, the platoon then headed forGairo where, as soon as Lt. McBridebrought his vehicles into the village,all hell broke loose.

Sitting ducks—within minutes of taking Dishka machine-gun and RPG fire from a variety of positions in the woodline across the clearing—Lt. McBride’s platoon quickly losttwo vehicles and one-third of its men. The dim, whinybeeeeeeeeeep of multiple integrated laser engagement sys-tem (MILES) going off and calls of “Medic!” could beheard between the incoming and return fire, and Lt.McBride found himself with a rifle squad, on foot behindthe cover of a functioning gun truck, heading for the woodline to assault the enemy. When the end of the exercise wascalled before noon, the major question raised by the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC) observer/controllers(O/Cs) wound up being: Should the platoon leader be run-ning around with the radio?

Age and civilian work experience under his belt, a de-

64 ARMY n April 2008

PAUL AVALLONE, a former Green Beret, served in Afghanistanin 2002–03. He was an embedded journalist there with the10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in 2006 and haswritten several articles for ARMY Magazine.

Pvt. 2 Brian Rokita maneuvers to contactto kill the last of the insurgents from the

ambush in Gairo.

Using the Humvee as cover, 1st Lt. MikeMcBride, trailing, and platoon membersmove toward the wood line to attempt toneutralize the sporadic gunfire still pepper-ing the platoon at the tail end of the ambush in Gairo.

April 2008 n ARMY 65

gree in history from Brown University(concurrently ROTC at nearby Provi-dence College) and with four yearsReady Reserve and four now on ac-tive duty, Lt. McBride already knewthe answer. But having lost so manymen, including squad leaders, he rea-soned, “Someone’s got to do theshooting,” he told me later.

This is a lesson—lessons—learnedunder simulated battle situations, withblanks and MILES instead of real bul-lets and blood, coordinated and over-seen by O/Cs. That’s the purpose ofJRTC—preparation for the real thing.Lt. McBride’s platoon will deploy thisspring to Afghanistan, part of the 101stAirborne Division’s (Air Assault) 4thBrigade Combat Team, 506th InfantryRegiment, which takes over RegionalCommand East.

The brigade had participated in afull JRTC exercise just a few months earlier, and each bat-talion’s return rotation in January was a shortened, intensefour-day series of exercises—a refresher, a final honing. Itwas also an opportunity for the junior commanders andNCOs who had missed the fall training to catch up.

Because I expect to be embedded with the brigadeduring its Afghanistan deployment, I was giventhe privilege of joining 3rd Battalion for its JRTCweek. The battalion is the 1st Squadron, 61st

Cavalry Regiment (1-61 Cav), the RSTA (recon surveil-lance target acquisition), whose heritage is World War II’s601st Tank Destroyers and its most famous hero, AudieMurphy. Being a cavalry squadron, the 1-61’s companiesare troops, and at random I was placed with Troop C, the

light dismounted recon element.Troop C Cav commander Capt. Tho-

mas Kilbride already knows Afghani-stan from firsthand experience. Theupcoming deployment will be histhird combat tour there; the first twowere as a platoon leader in the 1stRanger Battalion. Add to that twocombat tours in Iraq—the first withthe 82nd Airborne Division, as hemodestly says, “toward the end of theinitial assault,” and later with theRangers. A 2002 West Point graduate,Capt. Kilbride has spent three-and-a-half of his six years in the Army de-ployed overseas. Airborne, Air As-

sault, Ranger and even Scuba, the only badge Capt.Kilbride seems to lack is the Special Forces tab, and thatwas by choice; when he had to make that career decision, itwas either going the Special Forces route or taking a Rangerplatoon to combat. He chose the immediate leadership role,as anyone wearing the crossed rifles would understand.One might say it’s in Capt. Kilbride’s DNA; his father spent27 years as a marine, both enlisted and officer, and all threeof his older siblings graduated from West Point.

By January, Capt. Kilbride already knew he would besetting down his troop command along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. “I’m going to hold my battlespace withmy company,” he told me—meaning he will be the com-mander of a remote, small forward operating base (FOB).

With a brand-new platoon leader, First Platoon’s 2nd Lt.James Marione, and some team lead-ers who had missed the fall’s JRTC ro-tation, Capt. Kilbride was glad tohave the opportunity to get themthrough the lanes in the shortenedtrain-up, mainly, he said, “to developthe combat team that we are actuallygoing to go overseas and fight with.”

As for fighting, Capt. Kilbride’scompany is bound to see its share.The Army has been moving aggres-sively out of the bigger FOBs and into

Troop C commander Capt. Kilbridekeeps radio contact with both higherheadquarters and his platoonleaders. “They are my eyes and earson the battlefield for that sector,” hesays about his lieutenants. “And I amthe squadron’s eyes and ears.”

First Lt. Mike McBride, overwatching his squad maneuver toward a sniper during the platoon’s security operation in the city of Ghazni, keeps radio contact with company commander Capt. Thomas Kilbride.

66 ARMY n April 2008

smaller ones at the center of the tribalareas along the avenues of Taliban in-filtration—and in the heart of therural population, the villagers. ForCapt. Kilbride and his fellow com-manders, from platoon leaders on up,the day-to-day aspect of personal en-gagement with Afghans is even moreimportant than actual combat.

Capt. Kilbride will most likely have attached more thana company of the Afghan National Army (ANA) at hisFOB, and that will mean constant interaction with a cul-ture, language and military process different from ourown. In the counterinsurgency (COIN) nature of the war,Capt. Kilbride’s battlefield success might very well rest onhis relations, and those of his subordinates, with theircounterpart ANA and with the local populace, beginningwith the elders and leaders.

With that in mind, 1-61 Cav’s train-up beganwith instruction at JRTC’s Engagement Uni-versity, the essence of which can be summedup with a quotation from the new counterin-

surgency manual, FM 3-24: “The cornerstone of any COINeffort is establishing security for the civilian populace.Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms canbe implemented and disorder spreads.”

The instruction was for leaders and NCOs, learning thebasics in leader engagement, that week specifically for 1-61Cav, American to Afghan. The classroom portion empha-sized leader preparation—going intoany meeting with as much knowledgeas possible, fully in control; knowingthe issues, war-gaming the avenues inand around them; and solidifying theexact outcome one expects from theengagement. There is no place for try-ing to wing it. A number of dos anddon’ts were stressed, including:

n Don’t agree to the first offer.n Don’t lie, bluff or make threats.n Don’t assume your counterpart

does not speak English.n Do avoid talk of politics, religion

or policy.

n Don’t look at your interpreter; do make eye-to-eyecontact with your counterpart.

n Don’t promise beyond your control and ability to deliver.n Do know if your counterpart is the decision maker.Classroom instruction is one thing, but the university pro-

vides an actual engagement for the leaders, with native-bornAfghans role-playing village leaders and interpreters. I wasable to observe new platoon leader Lt. Marione’s session, asfour very stern, very serious Afghans, speaking nothing butPashto, gave Lt. Marione their litany of grievances againstthe previous U.S. commander in their area and made theirdemands of him. The university had provided Lt. Marionethe scenario beforehand—history, personalities, options, re-strictions—to give him the opportunity to prepare and notrely on improvisation. A Pennsylvania native and politicalscience graduate from Colgate University, with Officer Can-didate School and Ranger School en route to this first assign-ment as First Platoon leader of Troop C, Lt. Marione con-ducted the engagement with far more poise and confidencethan I had expected of a second lieutenant. In fact, afterward,with Lt. Marione out of the room, the immediate, universal

Observer/controller SFC R.L. Montgomerywatches the leaders engagement con-

ducted by 2nd Lt. James Marione with thefour role-playing Afghan “village elders.” Aspart of the realism of Engagement Univer-sity, the four role-playing elders are actual

Afghan nationals, and they speak no English during the meetings.

Lt. Marione listens to a litany ofgrievances from “village elders”

during leaders engagement training.

opinion of the O/C and Afghans was that Lt. Marione wasfar better than most of the students coming through; Lt. Mar-ione had more than held his own.

The central part of JRTC being the self-critique andlearning following any training, what followed for Lt.Marione was a sit-down with the O/C and the Afghans toreview his engagement. Lt. Marione had made one signifi-cant error, but that’s what the training is for—to make er-rors now, and not in the real thing. He had mixed up hisnumber figures and had promised the village leaders$10,000 in reparations, when it should have been 10,000Afghanis (at 50 Afghanis per dollar, a considerable amountless), the most he was authorized to offer. The mistake, inreal life, would surely cause some friction at the next meet-ing, when the Afghans would look at it as a promise bro-ken. The lesson learned: Lt. Marione might have caughtthe error had he not failed to finish the meeting with an es-sential point of the course’s instruction, reviewing with

your counterpart all agreements just made. There is no way around the fact that the flat, pine forest

landscape of Fort Polk cannot replicate that of Afghanistan,nor do the mock towns and villages resemble Afghanistan’s16th-century mud-dirt settlements, though the names, suchas Ghazni, Gairo and Bermel, are actual places in Afghani-stan. On the other hand, JRTC creates scenarios and pro-vides participants straight from Afghanistan. Afghan na-tionals are used throughout the training events as the majorrole-players, pretending to neither speak nor understandEnglish. Even when the roles of the Afghan security forcesor villagers are filled by American soldiers or localLouisiana civilians, no English is spoken, and an interpretermust be used for all communication.

On Day Two, Troop C’s mission was working withthe local ANP to cordon off and secure the townof Bermel, to ensure peace for the town’s Na-tional Women’s Day celebrations. Capt. Kilbride

took his headquarters element to Bermel to meet with theANP, while his two platoons established tactical roadcheckpoints. Lt. Marione’s First Platoon’s checkpoint washit by a suicide bomber, resulting in casualties and theneed for evacuation. In the midst of that, a suicide bomberstruck the town’s celebration, resulting in mass civilian ca-sualties that required Capt. Kilbride to coordinate histroop’s immediate first aid and evacuation.

On Day Three, the Ghazni and Gairo missions wound upwith Lt. McBride’s platoon in a world of hurt. Meanwhile,Lt. Marione would take his platoon for a full 24 hours onthe live-fire lanes.

On Day Four, Capt. Kilbride and his headquarters ele-ment and Lt. McBride’s Second Platoon would return toBermel for another National Women’s Day celebration.They would secure the town, one platoon shy this time,having been hit with an insurgent attack on one roadcheckpoint and a suicide bombing in the town. Events

68 ARMY n April 2008

Left, 1st Lt. Mike McBride gives his platoon a detailed oporder for the next day’s missions. Below, with an interpreterat his side, Capt. Kilbride discusses the day’s activities withthe district governor during National Women’s Day celebra-tions in Bermel. The interpreters and the major role-playersare all Afghan nationals, and all leader engagements, likethis one, are conducted in Pashto.

Maneuvering toneutralize sniperfire from a build-

ing during a secu-rity operation in

the city of Ghazniare Sgt. Matthew

Vera trailed by 1stSgt. Marlin Heater.

70 ARMY n April 2008

came fast and violently, with Capt. Kilbride coordinatingbetween his own subordinates, the ANP and the districtgovernor there for the town’s events.

Day Five, with the training finished and his sol-diers packing up for the 13-hour bus ride backhome to Fort Campbell, Ky., Capt. Kilbrideshared some of his thoughts about the previous

days’ train-up. “JRTC tries to replicate, as much as theycan, the operations currently going on in Afghanistan andin Iraq,” he told me. “They put you in scenarios and situa-tions that might not be exactly replicated, but it gives youan idea, or a baseline to think about—‘How would I actu-ally engage them? What would I change?’ JRTC isn’t sup-posed to make you ready for combat. It’s supposed to getyou prepared. They don’t critique you, they just say, ‘Hey,this is what you need to work on. What do you think yoursustainments and improves are?’ Normally, if you messedup, they’ll get you in the right direction, what you need tofix.”

With four previous combat tours in Afghanistan andIraq, Capt. Kilbride is a man whose words are weightedwith serious experience. With that in mind, a final caveat

sums up well the deploying brigade’s prior fall JRTC rota-tion as well as Capt. Kilbride’s troops’ shortened refresher:“Overall,” he told me, “I think you’re constantly lookingfor self-improvement, and if not, you’re going to becomecomplacent, and that’s going to kill soldiers.” M

Top left, Troop C’s 1st Sgt. Marlin Heater directs theevacuation of wounded civilians, the victims of asuicide bomber striking National Women’s Day cel-ebrations in the town of Bermel. Above, squadleader Sgt. Preston Jackson (right) and medic PFCJohn Giasullo (left) carry to safety for medical evac-uation an “Afghan National Army soldier” woundedby a suicide bomber at Second Platoon’s tacticalcheckpoint. Left, PFC Giasullo assesses one of themany civilians wounded from the suicide-bomberattack. Below, following the Gairo mission, squadleader Sgt. Jackson critiques his squad; that cri-tique is the heart of the intent of all JRTC training.