Rights & Duties

VOXvoxjournal.co.uk

Issue XIV- Spring 2011

The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhyPublished termly by the club of PeP at the university of york

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CIVIL SOCIETY IS A NECESSARY FEATURE OF MODERN LIFE. IT HAS BEEN A NECESSARY FEATURE OF LIFE SINCE THE

Ancient Greeks. As social animals, human beings find it hard to live a life in complete isolation: as Mr. Hobbes says, life would be “Nasty, Brutish, and short”. However, civil societies can only function if they have certain rules and regulations, or institutions, which every member of that society tries to uphold. To this end, most civil societies have a moral code, by which we are all expected to live, consisting of rights and duties. This issue of Vox will explore these concepts as the fundamental fea-tures of society, considering their foundations, their applications within differ-ent societies, and whether they can transcend the boundaries of individual states into the international arena. We have articles discussing the foundations of rights and duties, and what this means for society (p5, p17, p32). There are articles further exploring how these duties may permit societies to progress: whether it is protesting as a check on the state (p10); educating citizens (p13); Protecting property rights of citizens (p28); or protecting a fundamental free-dom of expression (p7). Finally, we examine whether these rights and duties extend to the level of interstate relations (p20, p24). This will be our last issue as the current editorial team. Thank you to everybody who has been involved with Vox over the last year, we hope you have enjoyed it as much as we have. We wish the best of luck to the new editors, Dan and Firdaus, for the coming year. We are also delighted to announce their first initiative: The Vox Essay Award, which will go to the best essay published this academic year, awarded in the Summer term.

Elena Villarreal and Adam Czopp

EDITORIAL

Sub-Editors:Dan Iley-WilliamsonFirdaus KaderClement Wee

Peer Reviewers and Proofreaders:Abir AhmmedRisga CarsonAlexa MitterhuberVicnan PannirselvamKatherin EichingerDominic FalcaoTianyan Xu

Editor: Elena VillarrealCo-Editor: Adam CzoppLayout Editor: Emily CowardExternal Liaisons: Fay Farstad

EDITORIAL TEAM

VOX - The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy

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VOX The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy

The Club of PEP Journal

voxjournal.co.uk

riGhts & dutiEs

issuE Xiv - sPrinG 2011

THE MISTAKE OF MENCIUSNahi Zchang

THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSIONJessica Yang

MARKET FORCES AND THE DUTY TO EDUCATELaura Wise

DIGNITY: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTSEmily Coward

WHAT SOLIDARITY?Andrew Cope

KANT’S NAIVE THEORY OF PERPETUAL PEACEChiamaka Aniedu

DO WE HAVE ANY RIGHTS?Professor Matt Matravers

EssAYs

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the

University of York and distributed on York’s campus

as well as other universities world-wide.

VOX is a student academic journal that aims to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and insight into the debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

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GLOBAL POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTSDr Kerri Woods

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTYDan Iley-Williamson

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28

24

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17

13

10

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VOX - The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy

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VOX - The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy iSSue XiV - SPring 2011

‘‘The most beautiful things in the universe are the

starry heavens above us and the feeling of duty within us.’’

Indian Proverb

thE mistAkE of mEncius

By Nahi Zchang

“Every duty is a charge, but the charge of oneself is the root of all others.”

Mencius (4th BCE)

THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER’S

idea suffers from a fundamental cat-egory mistake. A student of Philoso-phy, Politics and Economics might ex-press the error as follows: 1. The fulfilling of the duty to one-

self is an insufficient condition for satisfying duties to others.

2. A good citizen can live in a bad republic.

3. Macroeconomics cannot be deduced solely from microeco-nomics.

But this interpretation is subject to a category mistake itself, in that it is separating the thinking of Mencius as an ‘individual’ from the wider tradition of thought that he is part of. Chinese and, more generally, Asian philosophy tends to emphasise the whole over the parts, without neglecting the latter. So it is that Mencius should be under-stood as having a broader meaning about what this ‘self ’ is; a person is an integral whole, interconnected with other humans by virtue of its biologi-cal features. While the giraffe might be

able to stand on its own feet after its mother has given birth to it, the hu-man child requires nurture and care. Biology determines us to be social ani-mals. Necessity requires humans to live in a web of human relations. But sustainability causes further require-ments. Individual and social psychol-ogy has supplied ample evidence that outcasts and pariahs suffer from men-tal disorders. Loneliness and lack of human warmth result in desperation, which is physically and psychologically similar to that suffered during depriva-tion of food. To live a healthy and sus-tainable life, we require human touch. The connection between the micro and the macro is further felt when a human is understood to be a ‘species being’. While being an element of a set, the ‘self ’ that Mencius refers to can only be understood in concrete relation to what the essence of this subject is and how it differs from the other objects around it. For example, by virtue of being a member of the larger group of trees or woodwork, the object ‘tree’ can only be identified as such when it is related to the more general class of trees. A further hint to why indeed the duty to oneself can be seen as the

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source of most ethics, including du-ties to others, is a clear understanding of death. Neither romantic infatua-tion nor pessimistic drapery will do.

Shakespeare indulges in the latter by mystifying that unknown which lies behind that door. For him, death is that mystery that ends the “ slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” and the “sea of troubles” which life is (Ham-let, Act III, Scene I). Free from reli-gious ideology, one can see that death is the mere return of ashes to ashes - a return home - a leaving through the door one has come through. The particles which make up one’s physical existence are sent back: Death is simi-lar to the state where one writes down the instructions “Return to Sender” on a letter that has arrived at one’s flat with the original tenant being present no longer. Far from being mystic or mythical, such a grasp of what life and death is will establish that humans are inherently connected to the earth they are living on. The duty to oneself can, thus, serve as a source for duty to oth-ers in that human life is only compre-

hensible as being embedded in both a social context (the family, the village, the county, the country, etc) as well as a natural context (the farmland used to growing wheat, the trees bearing fruit and the sun yielding warmth). If this interconnectedness is neglected, the bearers of duty will indeed be charged. Gross negligence, if not malicious, wrong doing to-wards Nature over the past centuries have brought the wrath of the earth onto mankind - in the form of climate change. The Associated Press called 2010 “the year the Earth struck back.” (Bell & Borenstein, 2010) The flood-ing in parts of Australia does not stop at any one of its borders, nor does the water distinguish between people of Haiti or its neighbours. Only the petty and persistent imbeciles will continue to uphold religious, racial, and na-tionalistic and other differences that prevent them seeing the connection between the “duties of oneself ” being connected to the “duty to others” in the most total sense. In this vein, the three state-ments at the front of this article are incorrect. From front to back they should read: (iii) The separation

The duty to oneself can, thus, serve as a source for duty to others in that human life is only compre-hensible as being embedded in both a social context... as well as a natu-ral context.

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between micro and macro is impos-sible, and if possible, then wrong any-way. (ii) Good citizens only exist in a rightly governed polity. And finally: (i) Satisfying the duty to oneself is a sufficient condition for satisfying the duty to others because this “oneself ” is only good and right if it is embed-ded and integrated in a greater entity, encompassing other “selves”, that it-self is good. Sartre rightly maintained that you too are a war criminal as long as your protests fail to prevent that invasion. Merely going on rampage with placards and sticks without secur-ing the result is wasted energy, indeed positively harmful in that protesters subsequently go home and feel a relax-

ation in their minds, thinking “at least we have tried”, while sipping their Earl Grey tea.

BibliographyMencius, (1970) “Mencius Penguin Classics”, Translated by D.C. Lau(Penguin, London)Shakespeare, W. (2003) “Hamlet” (Simon & Schuster, New York)http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40739667/ns/us_news-2010_year_in_review/Bell, J. and Borenstein, S. (2010) in The Associ-ated Press 12/19/2010____________________________________

Nahi Zchang is a first year undergraduate in Economics at Free University Berlin, Ger-many.

thE riGht to frEEdom of thouGht And EXPrEssion

By Jessica Yang

THIS ARTICLE’S INTENTION IS TO AWAKEN OUR MINDS

to the importance of not only our own right but other people’s right to free-dom of thought and expression. In a world like ours, when religious minori-ties are silenced, when people are pe-nalized for an expression of a single thought, when we are expected to think in a certain way, what we need to keep hold of, is this precious right to freedom of thought and expression. J. S. Mill fiercely defends this in Chapter

2 of ‘On Liberty’ which I believe to be an extraordinarily powerful defence of the right to freedom of thought and expression. According to my interpreta-tion of Mill’s arguments, freedom of thought and expression are defended from two directions: one is that reach-ing truth is in our interest and a free discussion maximises the chance of reaching truth; but not only is reach-ing truth good for us, the means by which we reach truth and how we par-

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ticipate in the investigative discussion is also important. Some have argued that Mill’s defence is too dependent on the existence of truth, and the value of human progress, which comes with the discovery of truth. They argue that Mill’s defence of freedom of thought and expression collapses when a dis-cussion involves difficult topics within morality and philosophy. I hope to prove criticisms like these wrong by showing that, because reaching the truth is only one reason why the free-dom of thought and expression should be protected, the fact that sometimes truth is not found does not undermine Mill’s defence. I also want to demon-strate that the capacity of each indi-vidual to think rationally is a powerful argument for Mill as it reduces the risk of blind belief in ideals without con-sideration. Mill famously said: “if all mankind minus one were of one opin-ion, mankind would be no more justi-fied in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justi-fied in silencing [the rest of] mankind” (Mill, 1989, p76). What is so interest-ing about this quote is that, intuitively, we accept this line of thought. But in reality, many of us unconsciously be-lieve that it is perfectly fine to silence this “one person” and not vice versa. After the new wave of religious terror-ism post 11 September 2001, our at-titude towards tolerating other people’s thoughts and expressions has changed. The West thinks that it has the cor-

rect method of doing things, and the Islamic world believes that they also hold the correct method of doing things. We all believe that we hold the ultimate true values, blinded by the be-lief that there exists a universal right way of doing things. Huntington says: “in the emerging era, clashes of civili-sations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilisations is the safeguard against world war” (1996, p321). Many people object to this rather grim conclusion, however, unfortunately this is the out-come awaiting us if the world we live in allows the right to freedom of thought and expression to drift and fade away. Given that we cannot be sure that truth exists in the area of mo-rality and religion amongst clashing views, the best solution seems to be to enter into free discussions in which diverse and opposing views may be expressed, respecting the universal right to freedom of expression. Mill believed that free discussion is essen-tially an opportunity for individuals to make use of their ability to think ratio-nally by evaluating opposing opinions within the discussion. To forbid some

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expressions of opinions would lead to two harms: first, the possibility of truth surfacing is diminished because some opinions are not allowed to en-ter the discussion; second, it deprives individuals the chance to exercise their capacity for reasoning (Mill, 1989). So even in cases where the truth cannot be discovered, there is sufficient rea-son for the protection of freedom of expression. Although Mill emphasises finding truth in all four of his argu-ments in Chapter 2, nowhere does he say that there will always be truth at the end of every discussion. Yet there is a need to protect free discussion because: “the reasons for protection are partly intrinsic, partly instrumen-tal. I see no basis for deciding which is more fundamental.” (Cohen, 1993, p230) If Mill’s sole aim for protecting thought and discussion is to find the truth, then his method is an inefficient one; however, Mill does not only care for the truth. He also thinks that there is an intrinsic value in discussion itself because it enhances each individual’s rational capacities. Critics may reply to my defence by asking: why is the skill to think rationally so important? The capacity to think rationally contributes to Mill’s final goal: human progress, which “is served by the intermediate

end of the self-development of each individual” (Gordon, 1997, p238). By engaging in free discussions, individu-als are given a chance to evaluate argu-ments on both sides, to decide which argument is stronger. If only we could treat the right to freedom of thought and ex-pression with more respect, I think the world we live in would become a more tolerant place, where people holding completely clashing views on life and religion can live peacefully side by side. We must strive to extend this right to those who come from differ-ent cultures, civilisations and religious backgrounds, because the value of free discussions involving all ideas is some-thing that deserves our respect. I think nobody should be exposed to the fear of exchanging ideas with those who probably hold difference views, be-cause the right to freedom of thought and expression protects everyone. BibliographyCohen, Joshua (1993), ‘Freedom of Expres-sion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 207-263Gordon, Jill (1997), ‘John Stuart Mill and the “Marketplaces of Ideas”’, Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp 235-249Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civiliza-tions and the Remaking of the World, (USA, Simon and Schuster) Mill, J.S. (1985) On Liberty, (UK, Penguin Group)____________________________________

Jessica Yang is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

What we need to keep hold of, is this precious right to freedom of thought and expression.

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whAt solidAritY?thE riGht (And dutY) to ProtEst

By Andrew Cope

“The enemy of society is not error but indifference”

(Devlin, 1965, p114)

WHETHER WORLDWIDE D E M O N S T R A T I O N S

against austerity measures, mass pub-lication of leaked confidential US embassy cables, or satirical cartoon-ists shamelessly wielding the quill of pointed mockery, protest in its myriad forms is a “political resource” (Lipsky, 1968, pp1144-1158), and moreover an activity which at its core should be protected as a human right. The ac-cording freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, famously enshrined in the First Amendment of the Ameri-can Constitution, as well as in the 1948 UN Declaration for Human Rights, establish the basic right to protest. However, I argue that beyond just a simple right, we have a duty to protest against unjust laws – and not merely on behalf of ourselves, but (perhaps more importantly) on behalf of others as well. The electrifying word ‘pro-test’, inasmuch as it conjures up vastly different images for different people, encompasses a broad range of activi-ties – some of which are more legal

than others. So to set the boundaries of our discussion, first, a clarification: In order to sensibly defend the lib-erty to protest as a legal and inalien-able right, evidently the subject of our proposition must remain protest in its orderly and non-violent forms exclu-sively (which unequivocally demand full cooperation with state bodies and law enforcement agencies). Protest is defined as express-ing opposition (vocal or otherwise) to-wards the state or those in other roles of governance regarding their policies. “The right to protest plays an impor-tant role in free and democratic societ-ies, providing individuals and groups with an opportunity to influence gov-ernment action through means other than the electoral process” (Dunn, 2005, p328). In this way protest acts, not only as an alternative medium through which to express public opin-ion, but also as an exterior check and balance for the law-makers, albeit a somewhat unpredictable and unreli-able one. Protest is sometimes criti-cized as being distinctly undemocratic, in its attempts to manipulate a nation-ally representative body with the wildly conspicuous actions of a few. This is an important consideration, reminding

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us that, where possible, a protest that garners wider diverse bi-partisan sup-port (such as ‘The Wave’ during the Copenhagen climate summit last year) is always harder to ignore and stands far more chance of success in gaining credibility than the isolated stunts of individuals (notoriously, the politicised pranks of Greenpeace). Yet, it is clear that legitimacy of a protest is not de-termined by the volume of its partici-pant base, for if it were, marginalized minorities would find it impossible to successfully express their grievances (Pech, 1969). Rawls, in his pragmatism, declares that “our natural duty to uphold just institutions binds us to comply with unjust laws and policies, or at least not to oppose them by il-legal means” (1999, p311). Needless to say, to comply with a law and yet be in constant peaceful protest against it is nevertheless a consistent position. Indeed, deference to the law is argu-ably a clever tactic for demonstrators who face ceaseless new efforts by op-position to criminalise their activities

– for example, the Obama adminis-tration’s labelling of Julian Assange as a “terrorist”, (MacAskill, 2010). Civil disobedience also buckles under the attack ‘But what if everyone did that?’ (Wasserstrom, 1969), however, the general right to protest as we have framed it here suffers no such defeat when challenged about prospects for universality (a basic essential test for any human right) . Kant, (the typical champion of moral universality), establishes through the Categorical Imperative our imperfect duty to contribute to the happiness of others. Convention-ally, we understand protest as a me-dium whereby we solely express our own grievances. Yet, the most glori-fied struggles against oppression are seldom of this nature. Such protests not only incorporate dissenters over a broad spectrum, but, more significant-ly, include the ‘oppressors’ themselves, over-riding their perceived complicity as the usual beneficiaries of the con-tested status quo. Was not part of the power of the civil rights movement the racial diversity spread across all of its advocates? Take person X and fel-low citizens Y: If X campaigns for his ‘pursuit of happiness’ (see VOX previ-ous issue XIII), and the justice of his society (upon which the former is de-pendent) through protest – the act of which is afforded the status of a right – and to protest as such is personally acknowledged by X as a duty, besides which X has an imperfect duty to see

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to the betterment of Y too and in the same fashion that X does so for him-self, then X has a duty to protest on behalf of Y for their betterment also. From here on I shall argue to this end; the extension of protest for oneself and for others from being a right to a duty. It has been written that within the context of international law, “the violation of the right of any neutral nation is the violation of a right com-mon to every neutral, and a claim to violate the right of one is in effect a claim to violate the right of any or all if the belligerent shall believe it to be to its advantage so to do” (Scott, 1916, p343). This notion that if “one suf-fers, we all suffer”, articulated through Marshallian social citizenship, is at the foundation of the concept of solidar-ity: “the idea that ordinary people do not only claim rights for themselves, they also create and enforce them for others” (Gready, 2004, p2). And hence if we should campaign on behalf of ourselves, we must likewise do so for others. This builds on Durkheim’s orig-inal concept of ‘mechanical solidarity’ (1947) – that we are united by our re-semblances (our universal deserving of equal rights) – but requires going further to self-construct, through per-sonal empathy, an identification with the oppressed. (Appropriately, protests of non-violence nurture this solidarity, and vice versa – see Bruyn & Rayman, 1979).

Amidst today’s ‘transnational civil so-ciety’ such solidarity has explosive po-tential. The Gramscian counter-move-ment of ‘globalisation-from-below’ (Falk, 2001) is arguably indispensible in the promotion of global justice: “In the absence of sustained campaigns and lobbying efforts by INGOs and particular individuals, probably not a single human right would have been written into international law” (Risse 2000, p.184). Obviously the extent of freedoms which can be enjoyed across our planet is tantamount only to the extent to which we meet our duty to protest. As one student scrawled on a UC Berkeley wall recently, “Your apa-thy = Your fees”. Ultimately, our right to protest is a right worth protesting to keep.

BibliographyBruyn, S.T. & Rayman, P. (1979) ‘Introduction’, in Nonviolent Action and Social Change, pp1-12, IrvingtonDevlin, P. (1965) The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford University PressDunn, C. (2005) ‘Balancing the Right To Pro-test in the Aftermath of September 11’ in Har-vard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, 40(2) pp327-357Durkheim, E. (1947) The Division of La-bor in Society trans. Simpson, G. The Free,

This notion that if “one suffers, we all suffer”, articulated through Marshallian social citizenship, is at the foundation of the concept of solidarity.

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Press:IllinoisFalk, R. (2001) ‘Resisting ‘globalization-from-above’ through ‘globalization-from-below’’, pp45-56, in Gills, B. (ed.) Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, Basingstoke: PalgraveGready, P. (2004) ‘Introduction’ in Fighting for Human Rights, Gready, P. (ed.), pp1-32, Rout-ledgeLipsky, M. (1968) ‘Protest as a Political Re-source’ in The American Political Science Re-view, 62(4), pp1144-1158MacAskill, E. (2010) ‘Julian Assange like a hi-tech terrorist, says Joe Biden’ in The Guardian (online), Sunday 19th December 2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/19/assange-high-tech-terroristbiden, ac-cessed 20/12/2010 19:00 GMTPech, B. (1969) ‘Radical Disobedience and its Justification’ in Civil Disobedience Bedau, H. A. (ed.), pp.263-268, PegasusRawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice, revised

edn., Oxford University PressRisse, T. (2000) ‘The power of norms versus the norms of power: transnational civil soci-ety and human rights’, pp177-209, in Florini, A. M. (ed.) The Third Force: the rise of trans-national civil society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, and Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceScott, J.B. (1916) ‘The Right of Neutrals to Protest Against Violations of International Law’ in The American Journal of International Law, 10(2), pp341-343Wasserstrom, R.A. (1969) ‘The Obligation to Obey the Law’ in Civil Disobedience, Bedau, H. A. (ed.), pp.256-263, Pegasus____________________________________

Andrew Cope is a third year undergraduate reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of York.

mArkEt forcEs And thE dutY to EducAtE

By Laura Wise

THROUGHOUT ALL THE DEBATE, COMMENT AND

discourse resulting from the recent government efforts to restructure higher education, from the right-wing media executive to the passionate stu-dent campaigner, one general consen-sus is clear: education is important. Not only is it important, but it is im-portant to everyone who is aware of the concept, and almost everyone pos-sesses an opinion about the provision, function and purpose of education.

The sudden explosion of these opin-ions onto the streets, in universities and between people of all different ages and backgrounds demonstrates just how universally relevant people view education to be, regardless of your political affiliation. However, the reception of the newly active, anti-fees and cuts student movement by the government, the press and the general public has been one of confusion, dis-missal and rejection. Not only is this disappointing, but it is also damaging

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to the society that these students are a part of, and in this article I will attempt to explain why members of civil soci-ety, in whatever capacity they can, have a duty to support and join the student movement. At the advent of modern pub-lic education systems in the 19th Cen-tury, one of the aims and purposes of compulsory learning, which was free at the point of delivery, was to assist in the advancement of human and soci-etal development. The Enlightenment ideal of progress is one which has not lost its relevance today and yet through the “conversion of genuine education into market-driven job training” (Hall-ward, 2010) achievement of human progress through education is being hindered. The proposed reforms to the way in which higher education is structured, and the view that individu-als approach a university degree with a purely materialist and capital gains purpose, both fail to take into account human limitations of foresight.

By giving institutions the opportunity to charge up to £27,000 for an under-graduate course, the government is promoting the perception of universi-ties as a method to gain a pass to the next level of life, on which there will be a high paying job that will recoup this investment and will utilise the knowledge you gain from doing such a course. However, we are regularly told that we live in times of unprecedented austerity. If that is the case, students will no longer look for a course that could improve their ability to critically engage and will instead choose courses which provide them with a narrower skill set of relevant knowledge, to im-prove their chances of getting a spe-cific job in a specific sector. Although there is nothing wrong with this for students who know what they want to eventually do with their lives, for many school pupils applying to university this isn’t the case. Does this mean that in times of austerity, university is no longer for them? The narrowing of our abili-ties to be critical and flexible with our knowledge is not only a loss to indi-viduals, and an exacerbation of the modern day class struggle between the ‘highly educated’ and those who have left the education system at a young-er age, it is also a devastating loss to civil society. As the possession of a degree becomes less of a guarantee of employment, and students choose courses based on their suitability for a particular career, we move closer and

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closer to a society in which those who have been educated lose their flex-ibility with regards to knowledge and skill, and more and more individuals become unable to adapt to changes in an uncertain marketplace. We also find ourselves in a society in which people are only trained to do what is economically rewarding. So rather than being a civil society rich in diversity of sciences, humanities and arts, all of which have equal merit for human development (Robinson, 2009), we be-come a civil society that is dominated by market forces. This society actively discourages its citizens from engaging with subjects that are not considered to be as economically beneficial to the individual on a short term basis, si-multaneously withdrawing the support that made human development and di-versity possible in the first place.

Members of civil society, in what-ever capacity they can, have a duty to support and join the student movement.

If you combine this reshap-ing of the societal influence that the educated have, with the increasing dif-ficulty of less privileged students of getting into top universities (Lampl, 2010), the result is a society which, rather than progressing, actually re-gresses in its development. For civil

society to function - let alone progress - we require diversity and educated in-dividuals whose ability to critically en-gage has been given the chance to ex-plore its potential in the direction that the individual chooses (Wollstonecraft, 2008). This potential cannot possibly be fully explored if individuals are not given the opportunity to attend the university they choose, regardless of their background, economic goals (or lack thereof) and unstructured ambi-tion (Owen, 1841). Surely the desire to explore, engage and participate in the act of learning and personal growth is of more value to civil society than the ceaseless pursuit of profit? Even if you do not view human capacity as more than an economic resource, the ability of education to produce this resource is under threat. The fact that the proposed £150 fund to support ‘free school meal receiving’ students could only afford to support 5,555 students (if fees were raised to £9,000 per year) (Million, 2010) means that the most disadvantaged will not be the only ones who will be deterred from pursuing the dream of a university ed-ucation. And there are very few econo-mists who propose that a decrease in graduates is of benefit to society. There are many who criticise and defame the student movement for being ‘selfish’ and ‘greedy’, whilst at the same time benefiting from the ser-vices that graduates such as doctors, engineers and lawyers provide. Rather than prejudice, perhaps acknowledg-

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ing what student activists are actually fighting for is the first step towards ful-filling a duty that every member of so-ciety has; the preservation of a system originally designed for the advance-ment of that society, and the protec-tion of the chance for all to participate in that system.

BibliographyHallward, P. (2010) ‘A new strategy is needed for a brutal new era’. Times Higher Education http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=414573&c=2 (accessed 13th January 2011) Lampl, P. (2010) ‘Private school pupils 55 times more likely to go to Oxbridge than poor stu-dents’. The Sutton Trust http://www.sutton-trust.com/news/news/private-school-pupils-

55-times/ (accessed 13th January 2011)Million, ‘Scholarship scheme ‘unworkable’, says university group’ BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-11928289 (accessed 15th January 2011)Owen, R. (1841) A Development of the Prin-ciples & Plans on which to establish self-sup-porting Home Colonies. London: The Home Colonisation Society Robinson, K. (2009) ‘Fertile minds need feed-ing’. Education Guardian (London), 9th Febru-ary, p. 5Wollstonecraft, M. (2008) A vindication of the rights of women. U.S.A: ICON Classics

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Laura Wise is a second year undergradu-ate reading International Relations and the Third World at Aberystwyth University.

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diGnitY lAYinG thE foundAtions for humAn riGhts

By Emily Coward

HUMAN DIGNITY: IT IS PROTECTED, CAN BE

violated, but as we understand it to be inherent in everyone, it can be nei-ther lessened nor eliminated (Streiffer, 2009). Often used within discussions of human rights, human dignity, so in-alienable from humanity, could offer a foundation of human rights applicable to every person simply on account of their being human. If it were success-ful, it would offer us an option that is “less heavenly or lofty than religion... and less earth-bound or down-to-earth than just law” (Sharma, 2003, p70). Religion plays an important role in the field of human rights, par-ticularly with regard to the concept of dignity. However, this can be problem-atic: if we seek a definition of human dignity that is worthy of people’s con-fidence, it should not be founded on an idea less certain than the one we are seeking to justify. In light of this, I would like to find a secular account of dignity, to “[cohere] with plausible thinking” (Metz, 2010, p81) and avoid reliance on potentially contentious claims. A hypothetical, perfect argu-ment justifying human rights and rely-ing on the existence of God would be attacked on all sides for a dependence

on the uncertainty of the transcen-dent. Thaddeus Metz explained why we should look beyond religion when considering the morality of killing, and his logic can similarly be applied to dignity: many people are more confi-dent in the existence of human dignity than they are in the existence of God (or gods, or any sort of “divine realm” (Metz, 2010)). A justification for hu-man rights leaving no space for God or religion would be unacceptable to the vast proportion of the world’s popu-lation with religious inclinations. The justification of human rights likely to be most widely accepted is one that is indifferent toward religion, leaving space for it without relying on it. Kant held that humans have an intrinsic value in virtue of their hu-manity (Johnson, 2010), but in Kant’s view it is because humanity grants them rationality, and this rationality is what gives us ‘dignity’. Kant’s view de-nies any intrinsic value to babies, the very mentally ill, the senile, and every other category of person that cannot be said to possess rationality. He de-nies them dignity as humans by deny-ing their humanity. If it is to even be considered that human rights could be founded in human dignity, to fol-

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low Kant’s conception is to deny these people any human rights - a disagree-able notion if there ever was one. If we are to cling to the no-tion of human dignity as a basis for human rights - and with it leave space for religion - we need a different an-swer to the question of human rights. I offer you a modified version of Kant’s conception: to define the dignity or value of humans as flowing from their potential for rationality. As we will see, this allows us to suggest a foundation for human rights that grants them to all humanity.

It is true that there is currently no ‘cure’ for some mental illnesses, veg-etative states, etc., and we may never discover any – the human potential for knowledge is unlikely to be infinite. However, given this, we cannot ever be certain that these conditions are nec-essarily permanent. The next person to enter a vegetative state may pos-sess a new genetic mutation, meaning that they will remain in that state for a year, and yet on the 366th day, will wake up right as rain. It is not outside the realms of possibility that a scien-tist may soon discover a new medicine

that reverses the effects of demen-tia. There are many possibilities that thwart any certainty that these people will never again possess rationality. Fol-lowing this train of thought we cannot deny their potential for rationality. The same can be said of babies and small children, who while alive, always have the potential to grow and develop into perfectly rational adults. While we are alive, we always have the chance, even if only a slim one, to realise our po-tential rationality. Consider our human dignity to consist in this potential, and you grant all those excluded on Kant’s account of rationality its advantage and protection. If we accept this, we can accept that while we live, our dig-nity may consist in this new value of potential rationality. Active rationality allows us to recognise dignity in ourselves – to see our own intrinsic value, and then to see the same in others, even if they have not realised their own rational potential and thus cannot see it for themselves. If we can recognise the dignity of others, we are aware of their value. They are, therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, valuable, and things that are valuable are to be treated with care. Acceptable ways to treat others, in light of their human dignity, can be said to be in-keeping with their human rights; while unacceptable treatment of dignified beings is a violation of those rights. In this way, the dignity in-herent in all members of the human race in virtue of their potential for ra-

In this way, the dignity inherent in all members of the human race in virtue of their potential for ratio-nality is what grounds the idea of human rights.

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tionality is what grounds the idea of human rights. Therefore, as long as it would be possible for some rational human to recognise the potential ra-tionality of all humanity, all humans have human rights. As all humans are potentially rational beings, this is po-tentially possible, and so where there are humans, there are human rights. Human rights are universal (Sharma, 2003; Habermas, 2010).

However, it could still be argued that the diversity of conceived human rights causes a problem here: if dignity as the source of human rights is uni-versal, how has this variation occurred? In answer, consider that our new foun-dation for human dignity allows a wide variety of human rights to flow from the same source. It allows for the vast diversity of human rights between cultures. Humans may all share the same dignity that is the source of hu-man rights, but it is only the source.

The path they take will shape the rights that result, just as a river is diverted by rocks, hard ground and vegetation. The rights that emerge will be shaped by the culture in which they develop, the other values common to people in that environment, their working lives and occurrences in nature. These are our river’s rocks, hard ground and vegetation. And yet the similarities in conceptions of the most basic human rights, such as a fundamental right to life, to not be tortured, and so on can, still be explained by the shared source: the innate, inalienable dignity of human beings; their potential for rationality, possessed in virtue of their humanity. All people share humanity, and so will have shared interests, such as the desire for survival and to avoid pain (Hume, 1975), and so on. These shared interests cause the resemblanc-es between the various opinions of what constitute human rights. To ground human rights in a dignity based on the value of the po-tential rationality of all humanity is very appealing. It grants human rights to all humans, regardless of their states of development or consciousness. It allows for the variety of human rights between cultures, and yet also for the similarities between conceptions of basic human rights that have evolved across these cultures. It does not rely on the possibly contentious beliefs of any religion, and yet it does not deny religion either. It coheres with our hu-man intuitions and with our experienc-

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kAnt’s nAivE thEorY of PErPEtuAl PEAcE

By Chiamaka Aniedu

THIS ESSAY WILL CONSIDER THE COMPATIBILITY OF

Kant’s Perpetual Peace with the his-tory of political progress. I believe that it fails in many areas to attribute certain properties to international re-lations that have been demonstrated throughout history, thus making theo-retical and practically unsound claims. Kant’s requirements for perpetual peace include the use of vices, with the guiding arm of providence, to instruct states towards a peaceful end of his-tory (Kant, 1970, p41), in which they submit the power they have come to

value in reverence of morality (ibid., p130). This is not practical or realistic in interstate relations. It is the condi-tions of reason and man’s ability to find the moral path that made Kant conceive such an optimistic end of his-tory (ibid., p88). However, the course of history has shown that peace along Kantian lines, including universal dis-armament, international federation with no coercive powers (ibid., p105; p127) and the use of morality to guide reason in international politics (ibid., p130), is not possible given the way in which the world has developed.

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es. In short, it is both a highly plausible and attractive foundation for human rights.

BibliographySharma, A., (2003) ‘The Religious Perspective: Dignity as a Foundation for Human Rights Discourse’ in Human Rights and Responsibili-ties in the World Religious, Runzo. J et al. (ed), OxfordStreiffer, R., (2009) “Human/Non-Human Chimeras”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (May 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chimeras/#5/>.)Habermas, J., (2010) ‘The Concept of Hu-man Dignity and the realistic utopia of human

rights’ in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 41, No. 4, July 2010Metz, T., (2010) ‘Human Dignity, Capital Pun-ishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights’ in Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2010Johnson, R., (2010) ‘Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/kant-moral/.Hume, D., (1975) ‘Enquiries Concerning Hu-man Understanding and Concerning The Prin-ciples Of Morals’, Oxford: Clarendon Press ____________________________________

Emily Coward is a third year undergradu-ate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

In Kant’s political writings we are offered an incredibly optimistic ac-count of inter-state relations, which are guided by providence and nature to secure man a positive cosmopolitan end (ibid., p105). Thus the endlessly conflicting nature of human beings and their state counter parts serve a positive end (Nussbaum, 1997, pp43-44), while the rigours of war nourish our intellectual capacity, fostering it, giving the “resultant evils a beneficial effect” (Kant, 1970, pp48-49). Indeed, it is our natural disposition, “unsocial sociability” and slavery to our pas-sions that both destroy and promote this end of history (ibid., pp44-45), so it comes to be that the continual mis-fortune and international social chaos instruct man’s “grubby ascent” (Hoff-mann, 1965, p80). This natural state of man that Kant both esteems and despises (Kant, 1970, p87; Galston, 1975, p235) and its tendency towards amour propre, a kind of self-love that depends upon the opinion of others, and arises only within society (Rousseau, 1987, p81), is not conducive to the end of history Kant writes of, but rather destruction as we continue to progress (Rousseau, 1987, p68; Gauthier, 1969, p208). For these qualities of amour propre in man, namely greed and ambition, come to bear on human actions and politics as they induce a lust for wealth and power (Galston, 1975, pp58-59) that overtakes our moral sense of duty to each other. This creates competi-

tion for wealth and fosters inequali-ties among men, which in turn breeds conflict (Rousseau, 1987, pp76-77). To this we know Kant agrees (Kant, p51), however amour propre has unforeseen consequences on human and interstate relations (Pierre, 1997, p202). Amour propre at state level is much worse than it is in individuals (Pierre, 1997, p202). Inequalities cre-ate war on a domestic level which leads to conflict on a national and interna-tional level (Hoffmann, 1965, p68), which results in war for resources, to achieve national aims, and for the sake of security (Gauthier, 1969, p208). Although in Kant’s view this means the promotion of economic in-terests above espionage and war, thus the end of the latter (Kant, p114), it is not the case in history. Instead, we find that common interests are not enough to limit aggression and conflict be-tween states ambitious for resources (Forde, 1992, p63; Hoffmann, 1965, p68; Galston, 1975, pp58-59). Kant’s ambitions for man’s aggressive faculties were indeed cor-rect, though perhaps not as he envi-sioned. We have devised ways to profit from the gloom and misfortune that war brings - BAE Systems made an as-tounding £2.37bn in 2008 before tax and has good growth projections for the coming years (Hoffmann, 1965, p62) - using what Kant believed was a natural disposition of man (Nuss-baum, 1997, p44) for man’s immediate gain (Hoffmann, 1965, p64). The un-

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abated development of these faculties, beyond what is necessary to survival (Rousseau, 1987, p47) places Kant’s theory of perpetual peace in severe doubt. The progress rooted at the heart of Kant’s perpetual peace is the capacity for states to follow the duties prescribed by morality (Kant, p89), de-spite their inherent self interestedness and primary concern with self-preser-vation (Forde, 1992, p76). Kant relies on individual states following their own moral judgement to bring about his world federation, without any legal coercion in operation by any group of states or the world institution itself (Habermas, 1997, pp116-117). However, the following of a state’s moral compass in international relations would only happen if a judg-ment perceived to be moral was in alignment with state interests (Pierre, 1997, p218; Gauthier, 1969, pp208-211). If we believe, like the realist, that the function of the state is to secure its own people’s welfare (Donaldson, 1992, p153; Forde, 1992, p63), then no true moral action is strong enough to make the primacy of state interests in world politics redundant (Forde, 1992, p67). States are not directly analogous to the Kantian concept of the moral man (Donaldson, 1992, p145; Kant, pp112-113), but a conglomerate of in-terests and desires (Pierre, 1997, p202; Gauthier, 1969, pp210-211). This is not suitable for Kant; morality is and should always be a

dictate of reason, not what happens to be in line with your foreign poli-cy agenda (Donaldson, 1992, p142; pp153-154). But this denies states their essential nature (Gauthier, 1969, pp210-211): the interdependence of international relations (Pierre, 1997, p214), and the competitive conditions it engenders between states (Gauthier, 1969, p208). Furthermore, it imposes on states a kind of compassion that they do not have (Pierre, 1997, p202). These conditions promote a state of affairs in which states utilize the con-cept of ‘human rights’ for their own benefit (Habermas, 1997, p136). A federation of states was supposed to guard against this out-come, and maintain the appropriate balance and the use of positive inter-national law for the good of world society (Kant, 1970, p130). Instead, as history has shown, a voluntary federa-tion of states with no coercive powers is not enough to stop conflict or the illicit use of ‘human rights’ to moral-ize state action (Carson, 1988, p179; Habermas, 1997, pp136-140). As such, an organisation without its own mili-tary fails in these areas. However, one with arms would raise other questions, such as what the limit on this organisa-tion’s powers should be to enable it to

Kant’s perpetual peace is failing to be a reality because of the way in which history has unfolded.

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fulfil humanitarian objectives without becoming akin to a totalitarian world state (Carson, 1988, pp180-197). Thus Kant’s perpetual peace is failing to be a reality because of the way in which history has unfolded. The limits on the conduct of war and peace-time activity that would make peace possible (Kant, pp96-97; p170) is in itself impossible when faced with state interests (Hoffmann, 1965, p85). Furthermore the social conflicts (Habermas, 1997, p133) that increas-ingly cause war in the modern age are not resolved by Kant’s naive theory of world structure. For the concep-tion that perpetual peace will ensue if all states were republics (Kant, p104; Carson, 1988, pp180-181) can only be called such. War is not a problem that needs to be solved; instead it is the re-sult of divergent interests (Hoffmann, 1965, p60; Habermas, 1997, p133). The guiding providence and reason behind human history that Kant provides is nothing but an at-tempt to make the world intelligible (Shell, 1997, p60), but it does not cor-respond to historical facts (Galston, 1975, pp42-43; p215). For if the world was intelligible in the manner Kant would have us believe, an effective world federation would have arisen af-ter the events of the twentieth century (Pierre, 1997, p214). Instead we got two devastating world wars and two very weak world organisations (Hoff-mann, 1965, p70; Habermas, 1997, pp129-130).

Bibliography:Carson, T. L. (1988) Perpetual Peace; What Kant Should Have Said (Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 14, No. 2)Donaldson, T. (1992) ‘Kant’s Global Rational-ism’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed) Tra-ditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressForde, S. (1992) ‘Classical Realism’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed), Traditions of Interna-tional Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity PressGauthier, D. (1969) The Logic of the Levia-than, Oxford: Clarendon PressGlaston, W. A. (1975) Kant and the Problem of History, Chicago: Chicago University PressHabermas, J. (1997) ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace’ in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. R. (ed) Tra-ditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressHassner, P. (1997) ‘Rousseau and the Theory and Practices of International Relations’ in Orwin, C. and Tarcov, N. (ed) The Legacy of Rousseau, Chicago: Chicago University Press Hobbes, T. (1994) Leviathan, London: HackettHoffmann, S. (1965) State of War, London: Pall Mall PressKant, I. (1991) Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressNussbaum, M. C. (1997) ‘Kant and Cosmopol-itanism’, in Bohman, J. and Lutz-Bachmann, M. (ed) Perpetual Peace, London: MIT PressRousseau, J (1987) Basic Political Writings, London: HackettShell, S. (1997) ‘Rousseau, Kant and the Begin-ning of History’ in Orwin, C. and Tarcov, N. (ed) The Legacy of Rousseau, Chicago: Chi-cago University Press

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Chiamaka Aniedu is a third year under-graduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of York.

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GloBAl PovErtY And humAn riGhts

By Dr Kerri Woods

THE FACTS OF GLOBAL POV-ERTY ARE WELL-KNOWN

and deeply alarming: Half the world’s population have less than US$3.50/day, 24,000 children die of poverty-related illness every day, over 1 billion people lack secure access to clean wa-ter, hunger, malnutrition and readily preventable diseases are endemic in the poorest countries of the world, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. The conventional understand-ing of human rights is that they im-pose morally weighty duties upon us all. We ought not to violate a human right. If human rights ought to protect us against the worst indignities that we can suffer, or if they ought to guaran-tee us a minimally decent life, then it seems plausible to claim that we have human rights against absolute poverty. Onora O’Neill (2005) doubts the use-fulness of thinking about global pov-erty in terms of human rights. Her concern is that knowing that someone has a right to something does little to help secure the object of that right, unless we can also identify the relevant duty-bearer, who can be held to ac-count if they fail to perform their duty. This criticism holds if we think of

positive human rights obligations as imperfect duties; that is, as things that it would be morally good for us to do, but not morally obligatory. But one prominent human rights scholar, Thomas Pogge (2000), suggests that human rights should be understood as imposing a universal negative duty not to cause harm. Insofar as we ac-cept the duty not to cause harm as a perfect duty in Kant’s sense – that is, as a duty that must always be honoured – then human rights impose very strong moral obligations on us all. Pogge holds that our relations with distant others are mediated by institutions, such as corporations or trading systems like the WTO. Insofar as we support these institutions, and insofar as these institutions are coer-cively imposed and create conditions that foster the under-fulfilment of hu-man rights, then we as individuals are complicit in the harm that results from the under-fulfilment of human rights in communities distant from our own. So, on this understanding of human rights, if you own a pair of Converse trainers, or have ever shopped at Tes-co’s, you have failed to honour your negative human rights duties.

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Pogge’s own example illustrates the point well: Imagine a slave owning so-ciety; you might think that as long as you do not own slaves, then you have done nothing wrong. But Pogge says someone in a slave owning society who contributes their taxes to the gov-ernment that upholds property laws making slavery possible is also guilty of contributing to the harm of slavery (Pogge, 2002). By analogy, we all have a perfect duty not to participate in un-just institutions. In practice, that is going to be quite difficult. Pogge suggests one might escape complicity in injustice in the slave-owning society by emigrating or becoming a hermit. Today, there is nowhere to emigrate to that would be isolated from global trade structures that are in Pogge’s view perpetrating injustice, so emigration is not an op-tion. Becoming a hermit also looks practically impossible for most people. So, what ought we to do?

If we fail to honour our univer-sal negative duty, Pogge (2002) says we acquire derivative compensatory duties, which we can discharge in one of two ways, in direct proportion to our complicity in harm: (i) campaign for change, (ii) give direct monetary compensation. One way or another, then, it seems that we acquire a duty to get involved with organisations like Oxfam. This is quite a strong demand. It has gone from being ‘good but not obligatory’ for me to take action on global poverty (on the traditional view), to it being something I have to do because I failed to become a her-mit! But note that Pogge says the extent of our compensatory duties is proportionate to our complicity in harm, so if I minimise my indirect involvement in exploitative practices (e.g., by buying fair trade, having my savings with a cooperative rather than a corporate bank, and working in the public sector instead of for an arms company), then I minimise my com-pensatory duties. But there is another problem that we should note. I do not imagine that Pogge really wants us all to become hermits, not least because it would not do the global poor any good if people in rich countries did; the global econ-omy would collapse, and it is not at all obvious that the global poor would be better off.

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This thought raises diffi-cult questions about what constitutes harm. The normative force of Pogge’s argument comes from the intuitive ap-peal of the universal injunction not to cause harm. Some contemporary eco-nomic practices are clearly exploitative, but it is not obvious how to move from where we are to a global economic sys-tem in ways that will better protect hu-man rights. So we must ask ourselves, if we own Converse trainers, suppose they were made by someone working in sweatshop conditions, is it better over the long term that they have a job, and the chance of a developing econo-my and the opportunities that that of-fers, or is it better that I withdraw my purchasing power from the economy? Where do all these questions leave us? Overall, a somewhat unsatis-fied, I suspect. Recall that if we follow Pogge down the path of construing human rights obligations in negative terms, then they look like perfect du-ties. If we violate a perfect duty we do something that is unjust. Pogge needs that claim to generate the obligation to accept compensatory duties. But for a Kantian, this is not how duties are sup-posed to work: you do not get to the duty that is actually morally right by vi-olating a perfect duty. And what Pogge is really interested in is justifying the compensatory duty to do something about global justice, because it is global poverty that strikes him as unjust. So let us return to the claim that the extent of our compensatory

duties is a function of our complic-ity in injustice. This position assumes that some ethical calculus is available to measure (1) our complicity in harm, and (2) to convert that into compensa-tory duties.

What would this calculus look like – one pair of converse trainers = 4 let-ters to my MP? Or can two years work-ing in the private sector be offset by giving 10% of my salary to Oxfam? It seems to be up to individual agents to decide this for themselves. One final point is more trou-bling still. Assume I have worked out that I owe £50 of compensation to the global poor, where should I direct my funds? There are literally thousands of NGOs all working in the sector, com-peting for our attention and funds, some more effective than others, some committed to particular groups of people, or types of problems, or coun-tries. How should I choose between them? Faced with these myriad practi-cal questions, Pogge gives a really quite startling answer. He says “It is per-fectly permissible for you to help one

On this understanding of hu-man rights, if you own a pair of Converse trainers, or have ever shopped at Tesco’s, you have failed to honour your negative human rights duties.

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needy stranger and not another, even when the latter’s needs are somewhat greater. [...] And you may do this be-cause you like the story of the one, or her face.” (Pogge, 2002, p90) What I think this tells us, if anything, is that Onora O’Neill is rather right about human rights, they do very little useful work in helping us to identify the relevant duty-bearers with respect to global poverty. This is a troubling conclusion. Human rights have become the dominant moral lan-guage in which to advance normative claims, and yet that language, and the conceptual framework it offers

in terms of rights and duties, is inad-equate to the task of confronting one of the most urgent moral problems we face.

Bibliography:O. O’Neill (2005) ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’, International Affairs, 81.2.T. Pogge (2000) World Poverty and Human Rights, Oxford: Blackwell. T. Pogge (2002) ‘Cosmopolitanism: A De-fence’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 5.3.____________________________________

Dr Kerri Woods is a British Academy Post-doctoral Fellow, teaching at the University of York, specialising in Political Philosophy.

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“The first man who, having fenced off a plot of land, thought of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him was the real founder of civil society.”

(Rousseau, 1988, p34)

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, AS JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

asserts, is central to the notion of a civil society; without it, without dis-tinctions between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’, societal life would break down under the competing demands and strains of the multiple interests and wants of peoples. John Locke agrees: individu-als need to leave the state of nature be-cause “it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases… self-love will make men partial to themselves” (Locke, 1988, p275), and so too does David Hume: the “avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions… is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and di-rectly destructive of society” (Hume, 1978, p492). Both, then, see the need for government and the enforcement of property rights as being necessary in order to stop the mutual destruction of unrestrained interest. Yet they both justify property rights in radically dif-ferent ways, and although they arrive

at not wholly different conclusions, the dissimilarity in approach reverber-ates throughout their political theory, and for that reason their respective ac-counts of the right to property is wor-thy of close attention. Locke’s account of property rights begins with the premise of God-given self-ownership: “every man has a property in his own person. This no body has any right to but himself ” (Locke, 1988, p287). With the notion that God has left each individual the owner of his own being, and that God has given the earth to man for culti-vation (Locke, 1988, p286), Locke believes that when an individual re-moves an item from the state of na-ture and has “mixed his labour with” it, he “thereby makes it his property” (Locke, 1988, p288). So, the idea goes, because each individual is the owner of himself, when he mixes his self-ownership with an un-owned good, the individual in so doing extends his self-ownership over the item, mak-ing it his. But because God has given the earth to humanity as a whole, and commanded humanity to make maxi-mal use of it, if anyone acquires such an amount that he is wasteful, and does

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thE riGht to ProPErtYAs told BY lockE And humE

By Dan Iley-Williamson

not allow others to acquire a share, he goes beyond the “bounds, set by rea-son” and it is “more than his share” (Locke, 1988, p290), and so should be restricted by government. Having built a rough outline of Locke’s theory of property it can be seen that one extends self-owner-ship to goods through one’s labour. The only constraint on property own-ership through labour-mixing is if an individual acquires more than he can use, or deprives others of the ability to enjoy property ownership. There are attractive elements to it: to the modern day reader, an argument for the redis-tribution of property is rare coming from the 17th century and, generally, a cherished thing. More fundamentally, however, the theory of labour-mixing ownership does not appear to be en-tirely convincing: it is not clear why, and in what way, one extends one’s self-ownership (itself a highly dubious

notion) over an object simply through labour. As Robert Nozick mockingly asks, “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its mole-cules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” (Nozick, 1974, p175). It is not clear how Locke would answer (and nor, for that matter, is it clear what Nozick turns to in his similar theory, but that is a different matter). As such, it seems reasonable to say that Locke’s theory of property rights is, at the very least, unconvincing. So too thought Hume. He al-ludes to Locke when commenting that “some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that ev-ery one has a property in his own la-bour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole.” (Hume, 1978, p505fn)

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We are left in the unhappy situation of, on the one hand, having an im-plausible theory of property rights, which prescribes something closer to what our modern sensibilities pre-fer (...), and, on the other hand, a plausible theory of property rights, which is oblivious to our egalitarian inclinations.

Hume rejects such Lockean thinking for two key reasons: Firstly, due to the vagueness as to what constitutes mix-ing property (he uses the example of cattle grazing on a meadow – does the cattle owner thereby also own the meadow?); and secondly, we only mix our labour with an object in a “figu-rative” sense: all we are actually doing is altering, not mixing ourselves with it (Hume, 1978, pp505-506fn). Conse-quently, Hume thinks that Locke offers an empty notion of property rights, and so he should – given Hume’s, at the very least, deep religious scepti-cism, he could not assent to a theory so reliant on faith to establish property rights, espcially considering how vitally important he thought they are to soci-ety’s well-being. Furthermore, in mod-ern times, where secular arguments are all that carry weight, Hume’s secular theory of property rights may well be more relevant. So, what is Hume’s theory of property rights? Ultimately, he thinks

that property, and its consequential social virtue, justice, are “artificial” (Hume, 1978, p484). This is because there is no natural inclination that de-termines the rules of justice (Hume, 1978, p496); instead the benefits of justice, i.e. the rules determining and enforcing property ownership, are found through experiencing the need for stable property ownership, eventu-ally leading them to be established as “conventions” (Hume, 1978, p489). Such conventions are formed when men gradually come to see that prop-erty rights are necessary to forming stable human relations, rather than the constant flux of anarchic avidity let loose, which he think is potentially true of all men (Hume, 1978, p492). Hume therefore provides a naturalistic account of property rights; where they have been established through an evo-lutionary process, given the restraints set by humanity’s particular condition. This is evident where he considers a situation where resources were severe-ly limited: in such a case, justice could not be established, for each would be too desperate in seeking his own goals. Equally, if resources were unlimit-edly bountiful, then there would be no need of justice, for all would have ex-actly what they desired (Hume, 1978, pp493-495). But, as man is, and as his situation is, justice is necessary: the limited resources and limited gener-osity of man ensure division between possessions is necessary. Thus far, the picture Hume

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paints seems quite plausible: through the particular condition mankind finds himself in, he must adopt certain pat-terns of behaviour that regulate and control potential societal conflict, namely, rules of justice. Yet these rules of justice are, for Hume, somewhat limited: property should be stable, and this means, for Hume, policies redis-tributing property are not considered. Indeed, he does considers the possibil-ity of complete equality in property ownership, but rejects it: such a policy would have to fight against the natu-ral inequalities in ability between men, and in so doing, force all men into a state of impoverishment (Hume, 1975, p194). Although this rejection is plau-sible, Hume fails to consider any redis-tributive policies, and as such has been criticised by some modern commen-tators (for example, see Plamenatz, 1963). Therefore, we are left in the unhappy situation of, on the one hand, having an implausible theory of prop-erty rights, which prescribes something closer to what our modern sensibilities prefer (a degree of egalitarianism), and, on the other hand, a plausible theory of property rights, which is oblivious to our egalitarian inclinations (no redistributive policies). However, although Hume says nothing of prop-erty redistribution himself, the frame-work he builds does allow us to import certain political values. This is because Hume says that property and justice are conventions that arise due to their

usefulness to mankind. We may well add that property redistribution is a highly useful way of ensuring all can have a degree of subsistence, rather than being faced with impoverish-ment. Consequently, although Hume does not say anything on this himself, the plausible framework he builds al-lows us to do the work, and prescribe that which we think is beneficial to so-ciety. From this, we have more reason to accept Hume’s account of property rights, for not only is it a more plau-sible argument, it can also be altered to say much of what we would like to say; namely, giving all a fair chance in life, whatever that may mean.

BibliographyHume, D. (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University PressHume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University PressLocke, J. (1988) Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressNozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell PublishingPlamenatz, J. (1963) Man and Society, London: LongmansRousseau, J-J. (1988) ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men’ in Rousseau’s Political Writings, London: W. W. Norton

____________________________________Dan Iley-Williamson is a second year undergraduate reading Philosophy and Politics at the University of

York.

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IN WHAT FOLLOWS, I OF-FER SOME VERY GENERAL

thoughts on the nature (if any) of hu-man rights. My purpose is not to be comprehensive – or even particularly systematic – but rather suggestive and (I hope) thought provoking. In that spirit, I end with some undefended claims about where we might look to ground human rights practices. In one sense to ask whether we have any rights is odd. Of course we do. As an adult, sane(ish), non-bankrupt citizen of the UK, I have the right to sign contracts, to walk in certain places, to forms of legal pro-tection, and so on. Such rights are important. Their existence ensures all manner of things both for me as an individual and for me given that I live together with many millions of other people on a small island and we inevi-tably bump up against one another. However, it is not these kinds of legal rights that are usually at stake when people express scepticism about the existence of rights. Rather, scepti-cism is aimed at further claims that are made such as that these legal rights are means to give form to other, more ab-stract, rights that I enjoy merely in vir-tue of being human. My right to sign

a legal contract gives form to a right to human dignity or equality that takes a certain shape given the community in which I live. Moreover, were I de-prived of that right, or were my more abstract right threatened, I could ap-peal directly to my ‘human’ right. Scepticism about human rights has a long philosophical pedi-gree. Bentham famously described natural rights as ‘nonsense’ and ‘natu-ral and imprescriptible rights, rhetori-cal nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts’ (Bentham, 1987, p53). Marx thought that the language of natural right hid the fact that rights can only be proper-ly understood against the background of social and economic phenomena so that the famed rights declared in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen were only the rights of ‘egoistic man’; man ‘as he is in civil society’ (Marx, 1987, p147). The contemporary moral and politi-cal philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is even more direct: ‘the truth is plain’, he writes, ‘there are no [human] rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p69). MacIntyre’s way of writing is interesting because it captures some-

do wE hAvE AnY riGhts?

By Professor Matt Matravers

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thing of the puzzlement of human rights sceptics. The assertion that all humans have rights just in virtue of being human looks to be very odd; at least as odd as the assertion that uni-corns roam the forests. And both look odd simply because there is no reason to believe them. Of course, there are those who have offered justifications of hu-man rights. The American philosopher Alan Gewirth has argued over many years and publications that, since I have reason to value my freedom and well- being as prerequisites of my agency, I must recognize that the value of your freedom and well-being. However, few people find this convincing (although a form of it – ‘if you claim rights for yourself, you have to grant them to ev-eryone else’ – is very common in or-dinary discussions). Of course, I may value my freedom and well-being and you may value your freedom and well-being, but it does not follow from that that you and I have ‘value’ as such, or that you and I have reason to value one another’s freedom and well-being (un-less we happen to want to do so). Others, convinced that foun-dational accounts such as Gewirth’s cannot succeed, have taken the moral equality of human beings – and so their standing as human rights bearers – to be axiomatic (Brian Barry takes this view in Barry 1995), or have pre-sumed that we have reason to wish to live together in a certain kind of rela-tion (a relation of equality) with one

another (a sophisticated version of this argument can be found in Scan-lon 1998). And perhaps this is the best way to proceed. That is, not to look for foundations for human rights, but to think of them as things we have, that people agree that we have, and that have the potential to make life better for everyone. Certainly, the rhetoric of human rights is politically important and its loss is, at present, unimaginable (even if in practice many people and States that use the rhetoric do not follow through in recognising the de-mands made by it).

If this is correct, then our worries about the expansion of human rights – to things such as relaxation or paid holidays from work – ought not to centre on whether such rights can be justified all the way down, but on whether the (perhaps consistent) ex-tension of the argument from core rights (such as the right to life) to these less core rights will undermine the in-ternational consensus that presently

Humans do not have rights in virtue of being human (...). But, human beings interacting with one another in social practices and con-ventions, may be able rationally to endorse a language of rights as pro-viding the scaffolding on which those conventions rest.

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holds. That is, if foundational justi-fications cannot be found, then, like monetary currencies, the value of a unit of ‘human rights’ depends on the agreement of those who use it. In such circumstances, devaluing the currency is a real threat (and note that is true whether or not the response of those who lose confidence in the ‘unit’ is jus-tified). Possibly, though, we should not despair of finding a justification of human rights. However, I do not think that the most likely path to justification lies in the kind of foundationalism exemplified by Gewirth and I do not think that the kind of ‘human’ rights that we can justify will be the kind with which we are familiar. Humans do not have rights in virtue of being human (like MacIntyre, I find the claim that they do just baffling). But, human be-ings interacting with one another in social practices and conventions, may be able rationally to endorse a lan-guage of rights as providing the scaf-folding on which those conventions rest. Perhaps rights – including recog-nising the rights of others – advance

our interests. If so, then they can be given some grounding. If not, my fear is that we will all realise that they are like unicorns, and the international consensus will collapse, before there has been time to turn them fully into the kind of dull, but easily grounded, legal rights with which I began.

BibliographyBarry, B. (1995) Justice as Impartiality: Volume 2 of A Treatise on Social Justice, Oxford: Clar-endon Press Bentham, J. (1987) ‘Anarchical Fallacies’, in Waldron, J. (ed) Nonsense Upon Stilts: Betham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, Lon-don: Methuen MacIntyre, A. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2 edn), Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press Marx, K. (1987) ‘On the Jewish Question’, in Waldron, J. (ed) Nonsense Upon Stilts: Betham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, Lon-don: Methuen Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Oth-er, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press

____________________________________Professor Matt Matravers is Director of the School of Politics, Economics and Philosphy at the University of York.

voX call for Papers

VOX - the Student Journal for Politics Economics and Philosophy is calling for articles to be submitted for the Summer Issue 2011, with the broad theme ‘The Rational Animal’. Articles should be between 1,000 and 1,500 words in length, and fully-referenced using the Harvard style.

If you would like to write on this theme, please e-mail your article to [email protected] by the 1st April 2011.

You may wish to write on a topic from the list below:

• Homo economicus: Just a model or a tangible possibility?• Must we always prefer the rational alternative?• An exploration of the State of Nature• Is humanity nature in its conscious form?• The role of passion in religious sentiment• Should the law be “reason free from passion” (Aristotle)?• The future belongs to reason. Discuss.• Where has reason led us: a critical evaluation of our civilisation• ____________ (your own idea) Undergraduates, graduates and academics all welcome. All undergraduate submissions will be conisdered for the Vox Essay Award.

Back issues and bibliographies are available at: www.voxjournal.co.uk.

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