1

Faculty of Law

Academic Year 2016-17

Exam Session [1]

Rights of Nature: The Right Approach to Environmental

Standing in the EU?

LLM Paper

by Tamlyn Jayatilaka

Student number: 01605863

Promoter: An Cliquet

2

Table of Contents

I Introduction ................................................................................................................... 4

II Timeline of modern rights of nature ........................................................................... 5

A The United States ............................................................................................................ 6

B Ecuador ........................................................................................................................... 7

C Bolivia ............................................................................................................................. 9

D The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth ........................................... 11

E New Zealand ................................................................................................................. 12

F India .............................................................................................................................. 14

III Gaps in EU law ............................................................................................................ 15

A Standing procedures for judicial review and the Plaumann doctrine .......................... 16

B Aarhus Convention effect on EU Law ........................................................................... 17

C The Aarhus Regulation on administrative review ......................................................... 19

D Post-Lisbon deficiencies remain ................................................................................... 20

IV Analysis of issues in a rights of nature framework proposal .................................. 22

A Philosophical considerations ........................................................................................ 23

1 Indigenous perspectives......................................................................................... 23

2 Theological perspectives ....................................................................................... 25

3 Moral perspectives................................................................................................. 27

B Practical issues ............................................................................................................. 29

1 Conception of rights: property rights, responsibilities and balancing interests..... 30

2 Representation ....................................................................................................... 31

a) Legal fiction....................................................................................................... 31

b) Assumption that actio popularis is nature’s best interest .................................. 32

3 The struggle of incorporating rights into modern politics and economics ............ 34

4 Fitting rights of nature into the EU........................................................................ 36

a) Procedural and substantive options ................................................................... 36

b) Definition nature ............................................................................................... 37

c) Guardian ............................................................................................................ 38

V Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 38

VI Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 41

A Articles .......................................................................................................................... 41

B Books ............................................................................................................................. 43

C Cases and Legislation ................................................................................................... 44

1 National constitutions, legislation and case law .................................................... 44

2 Law and cases of the European Union .................................................................. 45

3 European Court of Human Rights ......................................................................... 46

D International documents ............................................................................................... 46

1 Treaties .................................................................................................................. 46

3

2 United Nations documents .................................................................................... 47

E European documents ..................................................................................................... 48

1 European Union ..................................................................................................... 48

2 Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee ......................................................... 48

F Other Resources ............................................................................................................ 48

1 Websites ................................................................................................................ 48

2 Speeches and conference papers ........................................................................... 49

4

I INTRODUCTION

The planet faces a growing crisis. Global climate change is rapidly advancing, thereby rising

temperatures, melting poles and glaciers, raised sea levels, eroding soil and causing abnormal

weather events. In addition to this, widespread air, water and ground pollution, deforestation

and other soon irreparable destruction continue at critical levels. Millions of people are already

being displaced from their homes. ‘The collapse of ecosystems and species, as well as the

acceleration of climate change, are clear indications that a fundamental change in the

relationship between humankind and the natural world is necessary’.1 Due to the possession of

power to dramatically alter ecosystems, it is clear that unless a drastic change occurs, mankind

will push the planet to ecological collapse, to the detriment of all living beings.2

One of the biggest issues in environmental law is legal standing. Standing is the term for the

entitlement and ability of a party to demonstrate to a court sufficient connection to action

challenged to support that party's participation in the case.3 This procedural dimension is often

not given due accord in the drafting process and leads to an implementation failure of

environmental law.4 Particularly it is felt within the European Union (EU), in which standing

for citizens in environmental matters is governed by a model known as access to justice. This

means that citizens must be able to go to court to if public authorities do not respect the rights

and fulfil the requirements created by environmental laws, to protect health and nature.5 Yet

standing for judicial review in the EU has for years remain severely restricted. Moreover, the

Aarhus Regulation,6 in theory, reflects some of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention.7

However, under the Regulation, it has also proven difficult for an NGO to meet the required

thresholds for administrative review in environmental matters. Despite some efforts, there

remain fundamental flaws in the EU limiting access to justice.

Rights of nature bypasses the issue of standing.8 This framework, which does not exist other

than in literature in the EU, could solve the challenge of legal standing in the EU. Rights of

nature is a tradition of legal and political scholarship that advocates legal standing for certain

1 Mari Margil, ‘Press Release: Colombia Constitutional Court Finds Atrato River Possesses Rights’ (4

May 2017) Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund <https://celdf.org/>. 2 See Gerard Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (Viking Press, 2005). 3 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Commission Notice on Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters (28 April 2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/> 18. 4 Scott Fulton and Steve Wolfson, ‘Strengthening national environmental governance to promote

sustainable development’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds), Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 2014) 15.

5 European Commission, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (27 April 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/>.

6 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13 (‘Aarhus Regulation’).

7 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (entered into force 30 October 2001) (‘Aarhus Convention’).

8 Roderick Frazier Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) 10.

5

natural objects in the environment, or the environment as a whole.9 It acknowledges

that nature’s well-being, as a right holder itself, must be guaranteed as all of its life forms have

‘the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles’.10 Mankind thus have the

legal authority and responsibility to enforce these rights on behalf of ecosystems. International

bodies and nation-states have been extremely hesitant in granting rights to nature. However, in

the past decade the concept has been gaining momentum. It has moved from a strictly

theoretical concept to practical recognition and enforcement, particularly in countries with

indigenous populations, who maintain deep spiritual connections with the earth and a culture

that promotes balanced relationships with all life. Rights of nature represents a paradigm shift

from the Western legal culture of consumerism, capitalism and predation of natural resources,

to include philosophies from indigenous groups more respectful to nature.11

The paper begins by outlining recent case studies on rights of nature in Part 2, before

demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the EU access to justice system in Part 3. This aligns with

the growing recognition worldwide that environmental laws premised on regulating the use of

nature, are and have been so far, unable to protect it sufficiently. However, enforceability of

substantive laws is a core feature of effective environmental governance.12 In Part 4, to address

this problem, socio-legal or law reform research is undertaken by drawing from the recent case

studies to analyse a rights of nature framework for the EU. In answering whether this

framework will be overall beneficial to the goal of increasing nature preservation, there are two

considerations. First, as an issue of focus in environmental and social justice, whether rights of

nature is morally desirable. As a subset, a significant question is whether the presence of

indigenous communities is a precondition to the framework. Secondly, whether such a

framework is practically feasible. Ultimately it is determined that legal standing in

environmental law should continue the path to developing rights to seek redress for natural

objects.

II TIMELINE OF MODERN RIGHTS OF NATURE

In recent years, rights of nature gained motion in moving from a mere theoretical concept to

practical recognition. This part will outline a timeline of milestones for rights of nature in the

United States, Ecuador and Bolivia over the past decade, as well as in recent months in New

Zealand and India. These case studies will be considered further in depth in Part IV when

considering their implications for a proposed framework in the EU. Not addressed is Argentina,

9 Christopher D Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ in

David R Keller (ed), Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 110, 111. 10 Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, What is Rights of Nature? (2017) <therightsofnature.org/>. 11 See also, for example, the reflected in the recent movement from the use of treaty language from

cultural property to cultural heritage, in order to account for non-State actors such as indigenous groups who do not see culture as a bundle of economic rights but rather spiritual relationships characterized by collective possession: Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into force 24 April 1972 compared to Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, opened for signature 17 October 2003, 2368 UNTS 3 (entered into force 20 April 2006)

12 Fulton and Wolfson, above n 4, 15.

6

which has proposed a national regulation on rights of nature, Columbia, which has recognised

the rights of a river, Brazil, with local laws in the process of being established, and Mexico, in

which both local and state laws have been passed.13

A The United States

Rights of nature was first embraced by US Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas in his

famous dissent in Sierra Club v Morton. This case concerned the issue of standing under

the Administrative Procedure Act,14 a federal statute. Sierra Club, an environmental

organisation, made a claim seeking to block the development of a ski resort at Mineral

King Valley, located at Sequoia National Park in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. However, the

Court rejected the suit because the organisation had not alleged any injury. Justice Douglas

argued that ‘public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium’15 should lead the

conferral of legal personhood upon natural entities so that legitimate claims could be made by

those entities for their own preservation:

The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if

we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated... in the

name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and

bulldozers, and where injury is the subject of public outrage.16

Clearly, if the Mineral King Valley had been recognised as having rights itself, it would have

been adversely affected and thus had the necessary standing to bring a claim.

In 2006, the local government of Tamaqua Borough in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania,

sought to ban waste corporations from dumping toxic sewage sludge and coal fly ash into

abandoned mining pits on the edge of town. With the assistance of Community Environmental

Legal Defense Fund (CELDF), it drafted and passed the world’s very first legally enforceable

rights of nature. This law banned sludging as a violation of the rights of nature. In the US rights

of nature provisions are being increasingly adopted at local levels, spurred by the desire to

prevent activities with high environmental costs, such as oil and gas hydraulic well fracturing.17

Currently more than three dozen communities in Pennsylvania, as well as California, New

Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oregon,

Vermont and Virginia, have now enacted similar rights of nature ordinances. Many others are

in the process to securing the rights of nature to exist, regenerate, flourish and evolve, for

example Wales in New York.18 However, none of nature’s rights established in municipal

ordinances have been tested in court.

13 Harmony with Nature United Nations, Rights of Nature Law and Policy (2017)

<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/>. 14 Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat 237. 15 Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972). 16 Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972). 17 Better known as fracking. 18 Harmony with Nature United Nations, Rights of Nature Law and Policy (2017)

<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/>.

7

Many local laws have also since been invalidated due to inconsistencies with by state

constitutions and statutes. For this reason, the local communities and other proponents for

nature’s rights are now instead pursuing enactment of these principles at a state level in the

US.19 Pennsylvania is one state that has already amended its constitution to recognise

environmental rights.20 However, the first proposed state constitutional amendment on the

rights of nature was by way of initiative process, commenced in Colorado in January 2014.21

The Right to Local Self-Government Amendment specifically included the right of counties

and municipalities to pass laws establishing the rights of nature. While the state Supreme Court

approved the amendment, also known as Initiative 40, for ballot petitioning, it did not qualify

for the 8 November 2016 ballot as an initiated constitutional amendment. This was due to a

deficiency in the number of signatures required.22

B Ecuador

Approximately three quarters of nations worldwide have adopted constitutions that address

environmental matters in some fashion, whether it be through committing to environmental

stewardship or ensuring procedural environmental rights.23 In 2008, Ecuador revolutionised

the rights of nature by becoming the first nation in the world to constitutionally establish such

rights. Nature is now endowed with rights under article 10 of the Ecuadorian Constitution.24

Prior to this framework there were difficulties in that, like many other countries, an

environmental suit could be filed only if a human could prove personal injury in connection to

the environment. This paradigm legal shift now bypasses the issue of standing under

Ecuadorian law. Ecuadorians can now file a claim on behalf of the ecosystem, without any

connection to a direct human injury. This appears, on a prima facie view, that it could be

significantly useful, especially to a country in which Texaco, later acquired by Chevron,

discharged billions of gallons of oil into its territory over the period of more than 25 years,

contaminating soil and water.25 With the extraordinary number of species of fauna and flora,

Ecuador is considered one of the most biodiverse countries in the world. The outstanding

biodiversity in natural sites such as the Amazon and the Galapagos Islands, has been recognised

through the World Heritage Convention.26 Yet it is also a country known for the threats to

natural areas by human presence. One of the major threats to these biologically rich areas is

the construction of roads that give access to oil and mineral reserves located in the heart of the

Ecuadorian Amazon.

19 Shannon Biggs, The Rights of Nature: The Case for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother

Earth (The Council of Canadians, Fundación Pachamama and Global Exchange, 2011). 20 Pennsylvania Constitution, art 27. 21 In Colorado, its citizens may initiate legislation as either a state statute or a constitutional amendment. 22 Encyclopedia of American Politics, Colorado Right to Local Self-Government Amendment (2016)

Ballotpedia <https://ballotpedia.org/>. 23 See James R May and Erin Daly, ‘Global Constitutional Environmental Rights’ in Shawkat

Alam, Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera, Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (eds) (Routledge, 2013) 603.

24 It states that ‘Nature shall be the subject of those rights that the Constitution recognizes for it’. 25 See Chevron Corp v Donziger et al, 2nd US Circuit Court of Appeals, No 14-0826. 26 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage Convention: Ecuador

(2017) <http://en.unesco.org/>.

8

The legal status of nature is further developed in Title II, “Rights”, Chapter 7, titled ‘Rights of

nature’, through articles 71 to 74. Article 71 states that nature of Pachamama27 ‘has the right

to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles,

structure, functions and evolutionary processes’.28 It goes on to state that all persons,

communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of

nature.29 Article 72 stipulates that ‘nature has the right to restoration’, particularly in the event

or severe or permanent environmental impact.30 Importantly, article 72 notes that restoration is

separate from the obligations upon Ecuador, persons and other legal entities that are already

required when compensating individuals or communities that depend on affected natural

systems. In addition, Article 73 forbids the introduction of organisms or material that may alter

the national genetic heritage. Thus it aims to prevent activities that cause species extinction,

ecosystem destruction and alternation of natural cycles.31 Finally, article 74 refers to the right

of persons and communities to benefit from natural resources that enable them to enjoy the

good way of living.32 In Chapter 9, titled “Responsibilities”, article 83 states that respect for

the rights of nature, amongst preserving a healthy environment and using natural resources

sustainably, is one of the constitutional obligations of Ecuadorian citizens.33 These additions

seek to overcome the Western hegemonic pattern of relationship between society and nature,

which strives to submit nature to human needs without any consideration of its intrinsic value.

Article 276, found in Title VI “Development Structure”, binds rights of nature to the

constitutional economic model of Ecuador. It establishes the objectives of the legal

development framework, within which it is mentioned that the recovery and preservation of

nature to maintain a healthy and sustainable environment is one.34 Article 395, found in Title

VII “The Good Way of Living”, chapter 2 regarding biodiversity and natural resources,

recognises various environmental principles. In particular, it includes a model of sustainable

development aimed at preserving biodiversity and the capacity of ecosystems to regenerate, in

order to meet the needs of present and future generations. It also signifies the intersection of

nature with all sectors. For this reason, enforcement of environmental management,

participation of affected persons and monitoring harmful activities is constitutionally required.

In the event of doubt as to interpretation of these provisions, the most favourable interpretation

to the protection of nature must prevail.35

27 Pachamama is a living being revered by the indigenous people of the Andes. It translates from

Quechua language as Mother Earth. In the Andean spiritual world, this earth deity is placed at the centre of all life, where humans are considered equal to all other entities: Penny Dransart, ‘Pachamama: The Inka Earth Mother of the Long Sweeping Garment’ in Ruth Barnes and Joanne B Eicher, Dress and Gender: Making and Meaning (1992, Berg Publishers) 145-163.

28 Constitution of Ecuador, art 71 (translated version available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/). 29 Ibid. 30 Constitution of Ecuador, art 72. 31 Constitution of Ecuador, art 73. 32 Constitution of Ecuador, art 74. 33 Constitution of Ecuador, art 83(6). 34 Constitution of Ecuador, art 276. 35 Constitution of Ecuador, art 395.

9

However, under Ecuadorian law, the rights of nature are subject to principles of national

development. In the very same chapter, under a different section, article 408 of the constitution

stipulates that all natural resources are the inalienable property of the state. While these assets

can only be produced in ‘strict compliance with the environmental principles set forth in the

Constitution’,36 previous article 407 notes that the President, with approval of the state, has the

power to relax these regulations and exploit natural resources if it is deemed to be of national

interest. While there remains the obligation to consult affected peoples,37 there is no obligation

to abide with the result of a consultation, even if it is detrimental. This obligation of means and

not results is a gaping hole in the protection of the environment and people within it.38

Moreover, there are issues with the ease in which the Constitution can be amended, with the

new constitution being Ecuador’s twentieth since its independence in 1822. The rapid turnover

rate dilutes the significance of each constitution, as well as indicating that the current version

may not continue on past the current presidential term.39

C Bolivia

Evo Morales, elected as Bolivian President in 2005, is Latin America's first indigenous head

of state. Bolivia is feeling the threat of rising temperatures, with glaciers melting and extreme

weather events including more frequent droughts and floods. Research has shown that

temperatures have been steadily increasing for over half a century, with predictions of further

rises by 2050.40 This would turn much of Bolivia into a desert and leave it with a much smaller

ice cap, leading to a crisis in the farming sector and shortages in water supplies, particularly in

the cities of La Paz and El Alto.

In 2009, Bolivia underwent pro-environment and indigenous empowering constitutional

reform to include new rights for citizens to be consulted on decisions that affect the

environment.41 Part of the rationale behind this was to improve environmental conditions

through thwarting climate change and its causes, given it is directly in Bolivia’s interest to do

so. Again, indigenous philosophies were instrumental in the construction of Bolivia’s new

constitution. The preamble states that Bolivia is founded anew ‘with the strength of our

Pachamama’, using the indigenous understanding of nature to shape the very creation of the

revised political state.42 Like in Ecuador, the Bolivian Constitution allows any person to legally

defend environmental rights, which also resolves the issue of problematic standing.43 Despite

36 Constitution of Ecuador, art 408. 37 Constitution of Ecuador, art 45; art 57(7); art 398. 38 Jordi Jaria I Manzano, ‘The rights of nature in Ecuador: an opportunity to reflect on society, law and

environment’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds), Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 2014), 54.

39 Jose Luis Cordeiro, Latin America: Constitution Crazy (6 October 2008) Latin Business Chronicle <http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/>.

40 Nick Buxton, Marisa Escobar, David Purkey, Nilo Lima, Water scarcity, climate change and Bolivia: Planning for climate uncertainties (2013) Stockholm Environment Institute <https://www.sei-international.org/>.

41 Constitution of Bolivia, art 30(2)(10); art 30(2)(15) (translated version available at https://www.constituteproject.org/).

42 Constitution of Bolivia, preamble. 43 Constitution of Bolivia, art 34.

10

this, issues still remain. The formulation is mostly human oriented,44 and much of the language

utilised is aspirational.45

However, Bolivia was the next nation state to follow, passing the world’s first laws granting

nature equal rights to humans. Law 071, known as the Law of Mother Earth was passed by the

Legislative Assembly in 2010 to recognise the rights of Mother Earth and the duties to ensure

such rights. It defines Mother Earth as a ‘dynamic living system comprising an indivisible

community of all living systems and living organisms, interrelated, interdependent and

complementary, which share a common destiny’.46 It further defines living systems as

‘complex and dynamic communities of plants, animals, microorganisms and other beings and

their environment, where human communities and the rest of nature interact as a functional

unit’47 under the influence of various factors. The definition is more inclusive than the standard

of an ecosystem. Rather than acknowledgement of only climatic and geological factors, it

explicitly adds social, cultural and economic dimensions of human communities, for example

‘production practices, Bolivian cultural diversity… the worldviews of nations’,48 as well as of

all ethnic backgrounds within Bolivia.

Article 7 of the law specifies the rights to which Mother Earth is a titleholder. The most

prominent is the right to life, being to maintain the integrity of living systems and capacities

for regeneration. There are also the rights to diversity of life and to pure water and clean air, in

order to preserve the functionality of the water cycle, preserve the quality of air and sustain

other cycles and protect from pollution. It bestows upon Mother Earth the right to equilibrium,

being freedom from interference that disturbs the balance of different components in an

ecosystem, as well as restoration to heal from human activity. Finally, there is the explicit right

of pollution free living, particularly from toxic wastes as a bi-product of human activities.49

These rights are clearly intertwined with the ultimate goal that Mother Earth will ultimately be

able to live healthily and continue reproduction of life in the future. The law also proclaims the

creation of the Office of Mother Earth. In Spanish, the Defensoría de la Madre Tierra is

counterpart to the human rights ombudsman office known as the Defensoría del Pueblo.

However, the structuring intricacies and appointment of an ombudsman are left to future

legislation.50

In late 2012, Law 300, an extension to the agenda of Law 071, was passed. The central

objective of the law, titled the Framework Law of Mother Earth and Holistic Development for

Living Well, is to ‘establish holistic development in harmony and balance with Mother Earth

to live well, guaranteeing the ability of the components and life systems of Mother Earth to

44 See for example Constitution of Bolivia, art 349, in which natural resources such as air, water, soil

and forests are owned. 45 See for example Constitution of Bolivia, art 342, which uses language such as promote. 46 Law 071: Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Bolivia), art 4 (translated version available at

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/). 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid, art 7. 50 Law 071: Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Bolivia), art 10.

11

regenerate, strengthening local and ancestral knowledge...’.51 That is, it aims to link the

concepts of the rights of Mother Earth, holistic development and living well. The concept of

living well, or vivir bien is defined by Article 5.5 as ‘a civilizational and cultural alternative to

capitalism based on the indigenous worldview’ that ‘signifies living in complementarity,

harmony and balance with Mother Earth and societies, in equality and solidarity and

eliminating inequalities and forms of domination’. Further, article 23 elucidates the weight of

biological and cultural diversity to the concept of living well.

The new law creates three new climate change mechanisms, one of which focuses on emission

reductions from forestry,52 and one from non-forestry sectors.53 In addition, there is also the

creation of a new set of climate change institutions such as the Plurinational Authority of

Mother Earth (Autoridad Plurinacional de la Madre Tierra) as a part of the Ministry of

Environment and Water. The role of the Plurinational Authority of Mother Earth is to design

climate change policies and oversee the mechanisms.54 To complement the this institution, the

Plurinational Fund for Mother Earth will obtain, administer and assign financial resources to

the mechanisms.55 The law makes it clear that all programmes related to greenhouse gas

reduction must not involve the commodification of nature or carbon markets.56 However the

law also makes several references to promoting the agriculture, livestock, hydrocarbon and

mining sectors. The distinction that the law makes between these is a fine one. That is, selling

nature’s goods is permitted, but selling nature’s functions is not.57

D The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth

President Morales of Bolivia also led the way for the international adoption of the Universal

Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, which was drafted and endorsed at the 2010 World

People’s Conference on Climate Change in Cochabamba.58 Similar Bolivia’s domestic law, it

begins by recognising ‘that we are all part of Mother Earth, an indivisible, living community

of interrelated and interdependent beings with a common destiny’.59 It further introduces

Mother Earth as the source from which all life stems, and that a capitalist system and other

forms of depredation, exploitation, abuse and contamination puts this life, not an inanimate

resource, at risk.60 Article 1 establishes that all plants, animals, rivers and ecosystems that exist

as a component of Mother Earth, as a subject of inalienable and inherent rights. Article 2 then

51 Law 300: Framework Law of Mother Earth and Holistic Development for Living Well (Bolivia), art 1

(translated version available at http://theredddesk.org/). 52 Ibid, art 54. 53 Ibid, art 55. See also art 56. 54 Ibid, art 53. 55 Ibid, art 57; art 4(2). 56 Ibid, art 32. 57 Ibid, art. 5(8) states describes funciones ambientales, or environmental functions. This refers to what

are often called environmental services, a term that is avoided by Bolivia due to its connotation with the commodification of nature.

58 Pablo Solon, Letter dated 7 May 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 64th sess, UN Doc A/64/777 (7 May 2010) Annex II (‘Draft universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth’).

59 Draft universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth, preamble. 60 Ibid.

12

defines these rights, including the rights to life and existence, to be respected, regenerate and

continue vital life processes free from human disruption, to maintain it’s identity and integrity,

to water, clean air, integral health, to be free from pollution and restoration, amongst others.

The Declaration also includes the right of every being to live free from cruel treatment by

humans.61

The Declaration shows a global shift from not only recognising and defending human rights,

but also the rights of other beings from which humans derive everything to live. Thus, the

Declaration begins to pave the way towards rebalancing relationships between humans and

natural entities. This can ultimately change the incompatibilities of current political, economic

and legal establishments designed to rapidly exploit these entities for growth, rather than

balance the interests of all beings to maintain the health of the whole community. It is these

exploitative relationships that are unsustainable and have already disrupted, and in many cases

irreparably damaged, natural cycles to such an extent that phenomena such as climate change

now threaten the rights and wellbeing of not only humans but also other beings.62

E New Zealand

Across the Pacific, rights of nature in New Zealand has taken a different approach to that of

predecessor nations. Rather than constitutional insertion or the statutory creation of national

laws, the rights of nature instead evolved by way of agreement between the government and

indigenous tribes, before its transformation into legislation. New Zealand has bestowed legal

personhood upon two entities: firstly, the Te Urewera area; and secondly, the Whanganui

River. The colonial conquest of land from native peoples, upon which New Zealand is founded,

resulted in irreparable spiritual and socio-economic losses. In both scenarios, the rights of

nature settlements were symbolic to the process of government remediation and reparation

efforts for this historical injustice.63 It is interesting to note the change in dynamic in the

motivation from previous states. Though all have overlapping factors, the USA’s push for

rights of nature is more human centric and the South American region a movement pushed for

due to the philosophy of indigenous persons, the majority population. In New Zealand, while

the result of rights of nature aligns with indigenous philosophies, making amends for human

rights atrocities and other destructive consequences of colonisation is the more prominent and

driving feature.

The Te Urewera area, a forested region and traditional territory of the Tuhoe people, was given

the status of a national park over sixty years ago. After lengthy negotiations between the Tuhoe

people and the government, 2012 saw the Tuhoe accept an apology, financial redress and the

joint management of Te Urewera lands, which would be vested in a new legal identity by way

of legislation. Central to the Tuhoe and government negotiations was the principle of mana

61 Draft universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth, art 2(3). 62 See also Cormac McCullinan, Wild Law (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011). 63 Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, ‘Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal Personality for Nature

in New Zealand’ (2015) 22 Vertigo (Special Issue), [4]-[5].

13

motuhake, which can generally be described as self-determination.64 In 2014, this culminated

in the area ceasing to be a national park, instead replaced by a legal entity named Te Urewera.

Under the Te Urewera Act 2014 it has ‘all the rights, powers duties and liabilities of a legal

person’.65 At the same time, it declares the area ‘a place of spiritual value’,66 acknowledging

that it is the sacred homeland of the Tuhoe people. Importantly, it not only notes that it is

integral to the culture and identity of the Tuhoe people, but that it is also of intrinsic value to

all New Zealanders.

The former national park area is now managed by the new Te Urewera Board, which comprises

joint Tuhoe and Crown government appointees.67 The Board, as guardian, must ‘act on behalf

of, and in the name of, Te Urewera’.68 The agreement, in which the land is no longer property

of either the Tuhoe or the government, but a legal entity in it itself, appears to be a compromised

conclusion introduced to neutralize the Tuhoe peoples fight for ownership of the lands, against

the government’s stubbornness in renouncing it. It is its own untamed natural presence in and

of itself, with, as per native understanding, its own life force and identity.69 Existing public

access, use and visitor recreation of the park will be preserved. The intention of the changes is

not to create a total ban on activities, but to alter the process of decision making to include the

river’s needs and regulate more effectively. However, the difference is that now permits for

activities such as hunting are now issued with the inclusion of Maori representatives.

In a similar process, the local Maori tribe, the Iwi, helped the Whanganui River and ancestral

lands earn legal personification in 2017. Since the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840,70

the river has been subject to various extractive, navigability and water diversion works. As the

Iwi’s identity is inseparable from the land, this was under great protest and numerous court

challenges in seeking to protect it. When defending their claim to the manage the river as

rightful guardian, it was underscored by the native saying ‘Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au’. This

phrase translates to ‘I am the river and the river is me’, reflecting native values of equal

relations between nature and humans. 71 Formal negotiations with the government began in

2009, before an agreement for the resolution of these grievances was reached in 2012. It

culminated in the Whanganui River Deed of Settlement, signed in 2014, before legislation was

introduced in 2016.72

64 Te Rangimārie Williams, ‘Crown offer to settle the historical claims of Ngāi Tūhoe’ (2012) Maori Law

Review. 65 Te Urewara Act 2014 (NZ) s 11(1). 66 Tom Barraclough, ‘How far can the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River) Proposal be said to Reflect the

Rights of Nature in New Zealand?’ (2013) University of Ontango LLB Disseration. 67 Jacinta Ruru, ‘Tūhoe-Crown settlement – Te Urewera Act 2014’ (2014) Māori Law Review, 16–21. 68 Te Urewara Act 2014 (NZ) s 17(a). 69 Williams, above n 64. 70 Signed by representatives of the British Crown and Māori chiefs. It resulted in the declaration of

British sovereignty over New Zealand. However, there is conflict in the Maori interpretation of the Treaty, who believed they ceded to the Crown a right of governance in return for protection, without giving up their authority to manage their own affairs: Patricia Burns, Fatal Success: A History of the New Zealand Company (Heinemann Reed, 1989) 153.

71 Magallanes, above n 63, [12]. 72 Anne Salmond, ‘Tears of Rangi: Water, power and people in New Zealand’ (2014) 4(3) Journal of

Ethnographic Theory.

14

The finalised (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill was passed by a vote of Parliament on

15 March 2017. With this passage, the river is the first water system in the world to be

designated as a rights-bearing entity and labelled ‘an indivisible and living whole’,

incorporating all physical and metaphysical elements.73 The consequence of this aspect of the

statute is that the river is no longer considered property. Instead it owns itself. The practical

implications for management are extremely similar under both settlements. Like Te Urewara,

the river is now co-governed. All future decisions regarding development in the area and the

river’s interests are entrusted by a council of equal membership between the government and

indigenous representation. By electing tribe advisors and incorporating their beliefs,

knowledge and practices, it empowers the local Iwi.74 The Act also provides for public

consultation and genuine engagement. This new legislation creates a strong platform for the

future protection of nature in New Zealand.

F India

New Zealand was also of great influence in India. After CELDF efforts in partnership with

other Indian-based NGOs, 20 March 2017 saw the High Court of Uttarakhand at Naintal, in

the northern State of Uttarakhand, issue a ruling declaring that the River Ganga75 and River

Yumana are legal persons and should be treated as ‘living entities’.76 The Whanganui decision

of mere days before was cited within the judgment. The matter related to mining and other

activities such as stone crushing along the banks of the Ganges. It was explained that the holy

rivers, so central to the wellbeing of the Hindu Indian population, must be granted personhood

‘in order to preserve and conserve’77 them. In exercising extraordinary jurisdiction vested

within it, it ordered that certain people, including the Director of the Namami Gange

Programme,78 as well as the Chief Secretary and Advocate General of Uttarakhand, act as the

legal parents of the rivers. These officers are bound to ‘uphold the status’ of the two rivers, as

well as promote their ‘health and well being’.79

Less than 2 weeks later, the same court extended personhood status to the Gangotri and

Yamunotri glaciers, as well as a great deal of the surrounding Himalayan nature. According to

the Court, any injury or harm caused to these areas, is to be treated as it would to any human

being. The judgment comes after India’s long battle to combat severe pollution from human

sources, with the existence of the rivers in jeopardy. In addition, the glaciers, which are the

73 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ), s 12. 74 Ibid, s 32. 75 Also known as the Ganges or Maa Ganga, translating to Mother Ganga. 76 Salim v State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (PIL) No 126 of 2014 (20 March 2017), 11-12. 77 Ibid. 78 It has been reported however by the National Green Tribunal that previous efforts to clean the Ganga

by the programme yielded zero results. It has also been amidst controversy for the constant changes in the mission director’s position: Nihar Gokhale, Namami Gange project: mission director Rajat Bhargava removed from post (3 September 2016) Catch News <http://www.catchnews.com>.

79 Salim v State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (PIL) No 126 of 2014 (20 March 2017), 11-12.

15

primary source feeding the two rivers, have been receding at alarming rates.80 The High Court

of Uttarakhand, when granting legal rights in the ruling of March 30, 2017, stated that:

We, by invoking our parens patriae jurisdiction, declare glaciers including Gangotri &

Yamunotri, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests

wetlands, grasslands, springs and waterfalls, juristic person having the status of a legal

person, with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person, in order

to preserve and conserve them.81

Parens patriae is the guardianship of the state of the rights of entities that are unable to fight

for their own rights.82 Accordingly, the duties of parents of the river were also extended to the

listed entities.

III GAPS IN EU LAW

Ensuring strong substantive environmental standards is essential to conserve our planet.

However, these are rendered meaningless if they are unable to be enforced through procedural

mechanisms.83 The essential role of procedural features for achieving environmental

sustainability, including to favour private sector access to justice in environmental matters is

reinforced in instruments such as the The Future We Want,84 the Stockholm Declaration,85 the

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,.86 And Agenda 21, which even promotes

increased support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to enhance their role in

implementation.87 In Europe, various interest groups and individuals have attempted to bring

legal claims against the EU as steward of the environment. However, often these efforts are

thwarted at the outset by the most common barrier: a lack of standing to bring the suit in direct

contradiction to such instruments.88 This is because the threshold for standing has the effect on

the human plaintiff bringing the legal action, rather than to nature, making a connection

difficult to establish. Furthermore, while the right to life and respect for private and family life

has in some cases encompassed environmental issues,89 the European Court of Human Rights

does not offer any reprieve from the EU’s courts, making it clear that public interest litigation

80 Ajay K Naithani, H C Nainwal, K K Sati and C Prasad, ‘Geomorphological evidences of retreat of the

Gangotri glacier and its characteristics’ (2001) 80(1) Current Science, 2001, 87, 87-94. 81 Miglani v State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (PIL) No 140 of 2015 (30 March 2017), 64. 82 Ibid, 42-59. 83 Fulton and Wolfson, above n 4, 15. 84 Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, UN Doc A/CONF.216/16 (22

June 2012), Annex A/66/L.56, [44] (‘The Future We Want’). 85 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN DOC

A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (5 June 1972), principle 10 (‘Stockholm Declaration’). 86 Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (13 June 1992), principle

10. 87 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item

21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 1992). 88 Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph and Ilya Fedyaev, ‘Obstacles to Environmental Litigation in Russia and the

Potential for Private Actions’ (2006) 29 Environs 221. 89 Öneryıldız v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 48939/99, 30

November 2004) [111]–[118]; Lopez Ostra v Spain (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 16798/90, 9 December 1994) [58]; Taşkin and others v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 46117/99, 10 November 2004) [126].

16

is not envisaged.90 This section will outline a brief history of standing under EU law that has

led to this situation.

A Standing procedures for judicial review and the Plaumann doctrine

In the European Union, citizens can participate in environmental litigation in three ways. While

the public authorities of a particular Member State and it’s courts have the main responsibility

for the application of EU law, citizens can submit a complaint to the European Commission

about any measure taken, the absence of a measure or certain conduct by a Member State

incompatible with EU law. The European Commission can then decide to bring infringement

proceedings against a Member State.91 Given that this action is commenced either by detected

failures of the Commission’s own monitoring or in response to citizen complaints, many are

initiated because of citizen complaints.92 However, this is only relevant with regard to the

authorities of a Member State. Any other conflicts between private entities must be resolved at

domestic level.

National courts are not competent to decide on the validity of an act which was taken by an EU

institution. However, individuals can indirectly access the Court of Justice of the European

Union via a preliminary ruling through the national courts of Member States, if it is requested

by the national judge.93 It should concern the validity of acts of any of the institutions bodies,

officers or agencies of the Union and the application of the measure into national law.94 The

national court is obliged to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice to give

interpretations of EU law in national legislation where there is no further avenue for appeal.95

Individuals and associations can directly bring a claim against any EU institution before the

General Court to either annul an act,96 or for a failure to act.97 However, this procedure is again

confined by its inability to extend to private relations. Moreover, because individuals are

considered non-privileged applicants, the condition is that they may only institute proceedings

‘against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form

of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern

to the former’.98 The iconic Plaumann v Commission case clarified this position. Direct concern

90 Ilhan v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 22277/93,

27 June 2000) [52]–[53]. 91 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2009] OJ C

115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993) (‘TFEU’), art 258. 92 See J Mertens de Wilmars and I M Verougstraete, Proceedings Against Member States for Failure to

Fulfil their Obligations (1970) 7 Common Market Law Review 385-406; Peter H Sand, ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ (1991) 18(2) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 213, 269-271.

93 TFEU, art 267. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 TFEU, art 263. 97 TFEU, art 265. 98 TFEU, art 263(4). The same is required for TFEU, art 265.

17

is to directly affect the legal situation of the applicant with no discretion to the addressees of

the measure.99 As the individual concern:

persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be

individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes

which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are

differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them

individually just as in case of the persons addressee.100

This position was confirmed in a later case, holding that individuals or members of an NGO

applicant must be affected by a contested measure in a special manner over and above a

situation which is, or could in the future be, experienced by any other local residents or users

in the area.101 In that case, Greenpeace challenged a decision of the Commission to provide a

financial grant to Spain to construct power stations in the Canary Islands. Supported by some

residents of the Canary Islands, the decision was challenged on the grounds that no

Environmental Impact Assessment had been conducted in accordance with EU law. However,

as none of the applicants were considered to be individually concerned by the decision, the

claim was ruled inadmissible. While the necessary remedies were still available in the national

courts via a preliminary ruling, this was only against the legality of the permit given by Spanish

authorities, which the Court of Justice said could only directly affect the applicant’s rights,

rather than against the financial assistance given by the EU. However, there are different rules

nationally as to standing, so this provides no assurances.102

The Court’s jurisprudence on standing for individuals has been consistently criticized as too

restrictive. For example, in Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council,103 Advocate General

Jacobs argued for the alternative interpretation of recognising individual concern as a measure

having a ‘substantial adverse effect’ on a person’s interest, to be able to have to an effective

remedy. However, the Court of Justice was not prepared to relax this stance.104

B Aarhus Convention effect on EU Law

The progressive Aarhus Convention, adopted by the EU in 2005, sets out procedural rights and

duties upon signatory states. One set of authors even describes all other agreements for public

participation as ‘hortatory’.105 It aims to improve access to justice in three distinct ways, with

the relevant aspect for this paper’s purposes found in article 9(3) of the Convention. This

provision requires parties of the Convention to provide access to the public to administrative

99 NTN Toyo Bearing v Council (113/77) [1979] ECR, 1185; Societe pour l’exportation de sucre (132/77)

[1978] ECR, 1061; TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Germany (C-188/92) [1994] ECR, I-833. 100 Plaumann v Commission (C-25/62) [1963] ECR, 95. 101 Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission (C-321/95P) [1998] ECR, I-1651. 102 Ibid. 103 (C-50/00/P) [2002] ECR, I-6677. 104 See Danielsson a.o. v Commission (T-219/95R) [1995] ECR, II-3051, where even the applicant’s life

is in danger does not make him individually concerned because it was a general interest that all residents may be affected in health by nuclear testing.

105 James R May and Erin Daly, ‘The Future We Want and constitutionally enshrined procedural rights in environmental matters’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds), Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 2014) 37.

18

or judicial procedures to challenge contraventions to procedures not respecting environmental

law in general, whether acts or omissions, through a right to file a public interest law suit.106

The criteria for such access to be provided remains an aspect to be laid down in national law.

In this case, it means the issue of standing is still to be primarily determined by EU law.107

Recent case law of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) also highlights the

flexibility of the Convention in either defining certain requirements to be included or that which

should be avoided. It is stated that while parties are not obliged to establish a system to establish

a system of actio popularis,108 it is clear that criteria laid down by national law cannot be an

excuse for introducing or maintaining ‘so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost

all of environmental organizations from challenging acts or omissions’ in breach of national

law.109

This flexibility, sometimes a blessing, is also its curse. When examining the implementation

of this right with the EU requirements for non-privileged applicants, it is discovered that the

concept of individual and direct concern is not only incompatible but contradictory to the

Aarhus rights.110 NGOs and individuals would de facto be unable to exercise this right because

of the nature of environmental damage. In an anthropocentric perspective, an injury to the

environment is an injury to everyone and therefore an injury to no one as it does not

individually concern anyone person, but many people, even if it is far more severe in nature.

As it is virtually impossible for environmental harm to fulfil the strict test, it is a loss to

environmental standing and also the environment.111 The Court of First Instance112 in Jégo-

Quéré v Commission attempted to redefine the rules governing individual access to courts,

stating that no reason is compelling to read into the notion of individual concern, a requirement

that a citizen challenge against a general measure must be differentiated from all others affected

by it. Rather, it was held that individually concerned could be fulfilled if the measure affected

an individual’s legal position:

in a manner which is both definite and immediate by restricting his rights or by

imposing obligations on him. The number and the position of other persons who are

likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that

regard.113

Furthermore, the EU institutions, particularly the Court of Justice deny the rule of law by

effectively ruling out every form of public interest litigation, contrary to the case law of the

ACCC. Not only is it conflicting with Aarhus, but also with the rule of law, a fundamental

106 See also Belgium ACCC/2005/11, [27]. 107 Aarhus Convention, art 9(3). 108 Deriving from Roman penal law and also known as open standing, this is an action which can be

brought by any member of the public in the interests of the public as a whole: A J Boudewijn Sirks, ‘Cognitio and Imperial and Bureaucratic Courts’ in Stanley N Katz (ed), The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History. (Oxford University Press, 2009).

109 Belgium ACCC/2005/11, [35]. 110 Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Findings and recommendations with regard to

Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the European Union, adopted on 14 April 2011 (‘2011 ACCC Part I Findings and Recommendations’). This was based on a communication from ClientEarth in 2008.

111 Ibid. 112 Now known as the General Court. 113 Case T-177/01 [2002] ECR II-2365.

19

principle of the European Union, which hold that neither Member States nor institutions can

avoid review of measures adopted by them.114 The procedures afforded to individuals are

rendered meaningless if they are inaccessible.

C The Aarhus Regulation on administrative review

After much criticism, the EU made a feeble attempt to compensate for its blocked access to

judicial review, through the drafting of the Aarhus Regulation. The Aarhus Regulation

introduced an internal review mechanism. Article 10 of that regulation provides that any NGO

who satisfied the requirements in Article 11,115 is entitled to make a request for internal review

of any institution that has adopted or failed to adopt an ‘administrative act’ under

environmental law.

Apart from the Plaumann doctrine remaining as good law, there remains three fundamental

issues with the Aarhus Regulation. First, it does not extend to individuals as is required by

article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Second, according to Article 10 of the Aarhus

Regulation, the request for internal review is to be addressed against the EU body that had

adopted the measure. It is thus the same EU body which adopted the original measure that shall

decide on the internal review, denying fairness to article 9(3) decisions as required by article

9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.116 Finally, the Aarhus Regulation narrowly defines the range

of administrative acts to be ‘any measure of individual scope under environmental law, taken

by a Union institution or body, and having legally binding and external effects’.117 Individual

scope is severely limited as it does not encompass many environmental measures of a general

nature.118 Therefore, as pointed out in March 2017 by the ACCC, the internal review procedure

in the Aarhus Regulation does not fulfil the requirements of article 9(3) Aarhus Convention.119

The understanding that the Aarhus Regulation’s limitation to administrative acts of individual

scope was incompatible with the Aarhus Convention was confirmed in the General Court. In

Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stitchting Stop Luchtverontreiniging v Commission, the Dutch

government sought to postpone the attainment deadline for the annual limit for nitrogen dioxide

under an EU Directive, to which the Commission agreed. An NGO, one of the objects of which

114 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament (C-294/83) [1986] ECR 1339; Treaty on European

Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2009] OJ C 115/13 (entered into force 1 November 1993), art 2 (‘TEU’).

115 The NGO must satisfy four requirements: that it be an independent and non-for-profit legal person; its primary aim is to promote environmental protection; it has existed for more than two years and actively pursues its environmental goals; and the subject matter of internal review is covered by its objective.

116 Anais Berthier and Ludwig Kramer, The Aarhus Convention: Implementation and compliance in EU law (2014) The European Union Aarhus Centre <https://www.clientearth.org/>.

117 Aarhus Regulation, art 2(1)(g). 118 For example, a decision amending Directive 91/414/EEC to include several hazardous substances

was inadmissible, as well as a Common Fisheries Policy regulation establishing total allowable catches an upcoming fishing season.

119 Findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee concerning compliance by the European Union with the Aarhus Convention (ACCC/C/2008/32(EU)) – 17 March 2017 (‘2017 ACCC Findings and Recommendations’), [52]-[53], [94]. For other criticisms see paragraph [104].

20

was to improve air quality, wished to challenge this decision by subjecting it to an internal

review. However, the Commission refused, citing that it was not an administrative measure of

individual scope pursuant to the Aarhus Regulation. The NGO then initiated an annulment

action under article 263 TFEU, arguing that it was an individual scope, or alternatively that

article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation contravenes 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention by limiting the

scope of acts that could be challenged. While the former argument inevitably failed, the

alternative succeeded due to the fact that the object and purpose of the Aarhus Convention

could not be to limit acts in an environmental context, where most are of general application.120

Despite these decisions, there still remain deep limitations. First, the outcome merely annuls

the Commission’s finding that the decision was inadmissible for internal review, but has no

effect as to the substance of the case.121 Second, it was made clear that:

A measure of individual scope will not necessarily be of direct and individual concern

to a non-governmental organisation which meets the conditions laid down in Article

11 of [the Aarhus Regulation].122

In any event, the cases were disappointingly overturned by the Court of Justice on appeal,

avoiding a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation.123 It was held that international law is

only capable of being relied on directly as a standard of review if obligations are unconditional

and sufficiently precise in nature. In this case article 9(3) was found not to be.124 As only

citizens who meet the criteria laid down in national law are entitled to exercise the rights

provided for in article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, the provision is subject to article 263 to

access EU Courts, or in the case of internal review, to article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation.

Consequently, individuals cannot rely directly on article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention before

the Courts of the European Union.

D Post-Lisbon deficiencies remain

To recall, there are three possibilities to initiate an action under article 263 TFEU. The first

limb is the possibility for an individual to institute proceedings when personally addressed by

an act. The second limb allows a person to bring a claim where an act is of ‘direct and individual

120 Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stitchting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission (General

Court, T-396/09, 14 June 2012). See also Stitchting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission (General Court, T-338/08, 14 June 2012).

121 See also TestBioTech eV v Commission (General Court, T-177/13, 15 December 2016), [56]. 122 Stitchting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission (General Court, T-

338/08, 14 June 2012), [71]-[84]. 123 Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht

(Court of Justice of the European Union, C-401/12 P to C-403/12 P, EU:C:2015:4, 3 January 2015), [52] (‘Council v VM and SSLU’); Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-404/12 P to C-405/12 P, EU:C:2015:5, 13 January 2015), [44]. See also Hendrik Schoukens, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the Rulings of the Court of Justice of 13 January 2015: Kafla Revisited?’ (2015) 31(81) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 46, 48.

124 Council v VM and SSLU, [54]-[55]. See also Lesoochranarske Zoskupenie VLK (General Court, C-240/09, 8 March 2011), [45], a preliminary ruling concerning NGO request to be a party to proceedings regarding the issues of protection of brown bears under the Habitats Directive in Slovakia in which the Court found that article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention cannot have direct effect.

21

concern’. As discussed above, in the ACCC’s 2011 findings, it was revealed their

interpretations were not in compliance with the Aarhus Convention because environmental

associations could not be encompassed as a part of members of the public.125 The Lisbon Treaty

came into force 1 December 2009.126 On a prima facie view, it appeared to facilitate public

access through the introduction of a third limb. The phrase that any natural or legal person may

institute proceedings against ‘regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and do not

entail implementing measures’ was added, thus removing the requirement for individual

concern.127 However, the ACCC, the compliance mechanism put into place under the Aarhus

Convention, reviewed the Lisbon changes to standing and the courts’ jurisprudence on access

to the EU Courts for environmental matters (criticisms on the Aarhus Regulation by the ACCC

were laid out above). Overall, the ACCC came to the conclusion that the EU is non-compliant

with article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, as will be explained.128

In the Inuit case, it was clarified that a regulatory act covers all acts of general application with

the exception of legislative acts.129 This seemingly wider access is still considerably narrower

than the wording of ‘acts and omissions’ in article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.130

Furthermore, and in any event, it is countered by a more stringent applicant of the notion of

direct concern, in which an altered economic state would not reach the threshold. This was

illustrated in the case, through a regulation which prohibited the import of seal products into

the EU.131 The General Court found that only the importers into the EU of seal products were

directly concerned. This is because, in contrast to the hunters of seals, the subject of the

Regulation was the import of seal products and not the hunting of seals.

The criterion of direct concern was also interpreted by the General Court in the Microban case

in the same manner as the second limb prior to Lisbon. It still requires that an individual’s legal

situation must be directly affected.132 While there is hope than an individual can claim that an

interfering EU measure affects their interest to enjoy a clean environment,133 the ACCC

criticized that it is still non-compliant with article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. This is

because most NGOs in the environmental sector would not fulfil this criterion when acting

against a particular contested measure. This approach was already confirmed by a 2016

judgment of the General Court, in which Pan Europe, an environmental NGO, was denied

standing because it could not be considered directly concerned on that basis.134 As pointed out

125 2011 ACCC Part I Findings and Recommendation, [77]. 126 Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ C 191/1 (entered into

force 1 November 1993), as amended by Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, opened for signature 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/1 (entered into force 1 December 2009).

127 TFEU, art 263(4). 128 2017 ACCC Findings and Recommendations, [83]. 129 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (T-

18/10) [2011] ECR, II-75, [56]. 130 2017 ACCC Findings and Recommendations, [71]. 131 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009

on trade in seal products [2009] OJ L 286, 39. 132 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) (T-262/10) [2011] ECR II-0000. 133 But this has not been tested. 134 PAN and others v Commission (General Court, T-600/15, 28 September 2016).

22

by the ACCC, though article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention provides parties, like the EU, with

a margin of discretion to establish benchmarks for standing in national law, this discretion

could ‘not be used to exclude all NGOs acting solely for the purpose of promoting

environmental protection’.135

As a final note, an act not entailing implementing measures was read by the General Court

in Microban as meaning that such an act must leave no discretion to the addressees of the

measure entrusted to implement it.136 Again, the ACCC held that some of the acts that should

be subject to review pursuant to article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention would not fulfil this

benchmark.137

European courts continue to interpret access to justice criteria so rigidly that it precludes

challenges, particularly by NGOs, against the decisions of EU institutions, agencies and bodies.

The EU should take the present findings seriously and not continue to ignore shortcomings

despite its many warnings. It should not have a monopoly in preserving the environment. Public

participation is needed to keep these institutions in check and accountable for mistakes,

corruption or passivity, especially where member states are unwilling to prosecute.138

Importantly, it also fosters public empowerment.139 In order to strengthen the EU’s

environmental governance, more drastic action is needed to ensure compliance through more

effective procedural guarantees. This can be achieved through a rights of nature framework,

backed by administrative capacities to implement and enforce it.140

IV ANALYSIS OF ISSUES IN A RIGHTS OF NATURE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL

Clear and enforceable standards is not only an attribute, but a prerequisite for effective

environmental governance at a national level and thus protection of the environment.141 As we

have seen, the alternative option to this failing EU system, other than a radical new proposal,

is simply to continue to expand the procedural rights given to citizens and NGOs under the EU

Directive. However, this has proven not to enhance environmental protection through standing

over the past decade.142 This section will debate the current issues with a framework proposal

for rights of nature within the EU, including ethical and practical. As will be seen, using the

EU’s current machinery, an altered treaty and new regulation will be able to fulfil rights of

nature effectively.

135 2017 ACCC Findings and Recommendations, [75]. 136 It is purely automatic and resulting from EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate

rules: Dreyfus v Commission (C-386/96 P) [1998] ECR, EU:C:1998:193, [43]. 137 2017 ACCC Findings and Recommendations, [78]. 138 Jonathan Adler, ‘Stand or deliver: citizen suits, standing and environmental protection’ (2001) 12

Duke environmental law and policy forum 39. 139 Richard P Hiskes, The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational

Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 131. 140 Fulton and Wolfson, above n 4, 14; Francesca Spagnuolo, ‘Beyond participation: administrative-law

type mechanisms in global environmental governance: Toward a new basis of legitimacy?’ (2009) 15 European Public Law 49, 59-60; May and Daly, above n 105, 32.

141 Fulton and Wolfson, above n 4, 13. 142 Schoukens, above n 123, 66.

23

A Philosophical considerations

This section will outline the philosophical considerations of the rights of nature. As seen in

Part I, the origins indeed stem from indigenous values and beliefs. First, it will be determined

whether the presence of an indigenous population is a prerequisite to a rights of nature

framework, before delving into the various ethical perspectives. Ultimately, it will be

discovered that legislating rights of nature is the morally appropriate course of action, but

successful implementation it will depend on the willingness of the EU.

1 Indigenous perspectives

While there is no internationally accepted definition for indigenous peoples, it is accepted that

there are common elements. Generally, they are a distinct community through continuity of a

traditional society with common ancestry to the original inhabitants of the land, that have

resided in, or have uninterrupted ties to a particular region, depending on the conditions of

settlement of that territory. Members must also identify as individually belonging to that

group.143 The customary lifestyle includes a determination to ‘preserve, develop and transmit

to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their

continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social

institutions and legal system.144 Each group will have specific manifestations of culture, for

example through language, religion, lifestyle and/or livelihood.

Out of the ethnic groups traditionally inhabiting European countries, many majority

populations, for example the Greeks, can be seen as native, because the current European

populations are the product of three major migrations that took place in prehistory.145 However,

within the EU territories, there are very few present-day indigenous populations that reach the

threshold of an indigenous people, due to the loss of living as a traditional society and strong

connection to the land. The majority of EU Member States now live abiding by Western

philosophies, especially as languages have died and merged, races mixed and clans faded.

However, two notable minority indigenous populations within EU Member State territory

remain. They include the Basque people of northern Spain and southern France and the Sami

people of northern Scandinavia.146 These limited populations would make it extremely difficult

for the EU to implement rights of nature should indigenous populations be needed.

143 Derived from various sources such as UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and

Protection of Minorities, Report on the Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (1986) [379]-[382] (‘UN Sub-Commission Indigenous Report’); International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention C169, adopted 27 June 1989 (entered into force 5 September 1991); United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Indigenous peoples: conflict, peace and resolution, 15th sess (May 2016).

144 UN Sub-Commission Indigenous Report, [379]-[382]. 145 Torsten Gunther and Mattias Jakobsson, ‘Genes mirror migrations and cultures in prehistoric Europe

— a population genomic perspective’ (2016) 41 Current Opinion in Genetics & Development 115. 146 There are of course other European indigenous populations residing in modern day Russia, which is

not part of the EU.

24

Indigenous populations are becoming influential as political actors realigning how the natural

world is conceived. It was made clear from the studies above that especially in Ecuador and

Bolivia, the presence of a majority indigenous population or even minority, as was the case in

New Zealand, was a large inspiration in the modern movement for rights of nature.147 These

groups not only conceptualise the relationship between humans and nature as equal, rather than

that of dominance and subordination, but they also have a deep spiritual connection with nature,

considering it a living entity. Indeed, as mentioned above, the Whanganui Iwi are known as

the River People, who often say, ‘Ko au te awa. Ko te awa ko au’, which translates to ‘I am

the river. The river is me’.148 Another example is the concept of “good living” or “living well”,

which pervades the whole constitution of Ecuador in the preamble, and was seen specifically

at article 74, amongst others. This is a Quichua expression known as sumak kawsay, and also

known in Spanish as buen vivir. The idea centres on harmonised and balanced living amongst

nature, rather than living materialistically better. It is respectful of nature and all it gives us.149

In the Northern Hemisphere, Chief Seattle, a 19th century American Indian chief from the

Duwamish Tribe, famously talked about every inch of the earth being sacred, the strange notion

of selling natures commodities, such as water, when we do not own them,150 as well as

comparing nature to family.151

While it is established that in all countries that have adopted rights of nature laws thus far, the

common denominator is the presence of local peoples, only one country so far has truly

required the presence of indigenous groups to be able to function. New Zealand is this country,

giving equal representation of the areas given rights to the government and native tribes. In

contrast, it was seen that in Bolivia and Ecuador any citizen was constitutionally guaranteed

standing to bring an action to enforce these rights. Thus, while indigenous philosophies

definitely helped to spur and develop the rights of nature movement globally, there is no reason

discovered why there would need to be an indigenous presence for a rights of nature framework

to be workable. The indigenous understanding of mankind’s relationship to the natural world

that underpins the rights of nature is just that. While it may seem strange to those unaccustomed

with curtails to freedom,152 it is an understanding that Western nations can choose to base

themselves off, even if they operate within the legal structures that are not conducive to

indigenous philosophies. This is because, it is a moral issue, which depends on the willingness

and commitment of each nation to fundamentally shift its values. In fact, if the example is taken

of New Zealand, the concluded settlements are only adapted to the values of a particular tribe,

and other local inhabitants of other faiths do not have their beliefs acknowledged. This gives

grounds that rights of nature should be a purely moral issue, in order to maintain the neutrality

of pluralism and secularism, which the EU displays elsewhere in its policies.

147 Especially in New Zealand and India, the local people’s ability to undertake their role as steward of

the rivers have been violated through commercial interference. 148 Magallanes, above n 63. 149 Alberto Acosta, ‘El buen vivir para la construccion de alternativas’ in Albert Acosta, Bitacora

Constituyente (Abya-Yala, 2008). 150 Nash, above n 8, 275-277 referring to Chief Seattle various speeches and works such as How can

one sell the air? 151 Ibid. 152 Perhaps because these philosophies devalue individual human life relative to integrity, diversity and

continuation of the ecosystem: Nash, above n 8, 73, 121-160.

25

In fact, the requirement of the presence of an indigenous population would only serve to

conflate the right to culture with rights of nature. For example, Jordi Manzano argues that the

constitutional inclusion of rights of nature in Ecuador equates them with the rights of man and

ultimately leads to the subjugation of environmental rights to economic rights that contradicts

the notion sumac kawsay.153 The economic aspects are discussed further below. However,

indigenous cultural worldviews should not be simply transferable to a legal framework for

nature. This assumes that community interests are always compatible with nature. Yet the

homogenization of divergent interests has already been done to some extent.154 In Bolivia, it

was seen that the definition of nature even included human communities. While humans,

particularly indigenous groups, are dependent upon and have deep connections with the land,

it should not be forgotten that this proposal is one for nature. It should not be subsumed within

a human rights movement where its force may become weak because first, only those parts of

nature seen as worthy of protecting by humans will be afforded it, and second, it may create

the potential for conflict between human and nature’s rights.155 Thus, in some ways the very

driving forces for rights of nature become the flaws in current regimes.

2 Theological perspectives

Even if such presence was needed, and noting the EU’s small indigenous populations, religious

values could align with and therefore also provide the grounds for a rights of nature framework

to be accepted by Europeans. That is because theology of the natural world also asserts the

intrinsic worth of the non-human world.156 According to a 2012 poll on religion in the European

Union by Eurobarometer, it was found that 72% of EU citizens are Christians.157 Of that,

Catholicism is the most widespread denomination, accounting for 48% of EU citizens.

It is stated in Genesis 1:28, ‘God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and

subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and

over every living thing that moves on the earth”’.158 Dominion over every living thing is the

phrase at issue, which could be construed as an open invitation to boast human feats over the

rest of creation. Under the influence of legal positivists, as well as growth in mercantile activity,

property became detached from theological reflection and more readily associated with

commercial value.159 Removing these influences, one can denote having dominion over the

153 Manzano, above n 38, 51. 154 Most prominently, rhetoric in the Ecuadoran constitution and some United Nations documents fails to

make distinctions between the rights of nature as a separate entity and the indigenous right to culture. See UN Economic and Social Council, Study on the need to recognize and respect the rights of Mother Earth, UN Doc E/C.19/2010/4, 14, which study contends that nature is so intertwined with humanity in the indigenous worldview that it is Pachamama.

155 Laurel Fish, ‘Homogenizing Community, Homogenizing Nature: An Analysis of Conflicting Rights in the Rights of Nature Debate’ (2013) Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal, 6, 9.

156 Nash, above n 8, 112: For example, many Asian religions such as Shinto, Buddhism and Hinduism also have at the core of their faith the rejection of anthropocentrism.

157 European Commission, Discrimination in the EU Report: Special Eurobarometer 393 (2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/> 233.

158 Holy Bible, revised standard edition (Thomas Benson and Sons edition, 1953). 159 Sean Coyle and Karen Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property,

Rights and Nature (Hart Publishing 2004) 103-104.

26

earth not as a divine commandment for humans to reign the world solely for man’s benefit, but

as a trustee or steward to protect all of God’s creatures.160 The basis for Catholic concern over

environmental issues such as climate change is also exemplified in Psalm 24:1 when it is stated

that ‘the earth is the Lord’s and all that it holds’. From a theological perspective, it could be

argued that Christianity supports the rights of nature as a part of loving and caring for all God’s

creations. By extension, to continue with improper and destructive behaviours against earth

would not only endanger the livelihood of all of these creations, but dishonour God and the

life-sustaining air, water and fruits that He bestowed upon mankind.

This seems to have found support by the Catholic Church for many decades, particularly in

recent years by Argentinian Pope Francis, dubbed the “great reformer”.161 His Holiness, on

World Environment Day 2013, stated that, ‘we are losing the attitude of wonder,

contemplation, listening to creation. The implications of living in a horizontal manner [is that]

we have moved away from God, we no longer read His signs’.162 However, he was not the first

Pope to raise such issues. In January of 2010, Pope Benedict XVI stated that, ‘if we wish to

build true peace, how can we separate or even set at odds, the protection of the environment

and the protection of human life’.163 This was echoed, further back on World Peace Day in

1990, by Pope John Paul II, who raised concerns about the consequences of human interference

upon ecosystems and the wellbeing of future generations, going as far to say that common

heritage points to the ‘necessity of a more internationally coordinated approach to the

management of the earth’s goods’.164

While it is highlighted in this paper that the concept of rights of nature can have roots within

indigenous as well as religious philosophies that may make it palatable for many of the EU

citizens, it argues that neither of these are necessary. Atheism is the negation of theism, that is,

the denial of the existence of a God or Gods. Thus, an atheist holds the belief that there is no

God.165 Atheism is on the rise worldwide, with the latest estimate at 7% of the global adult

population.166 Expanding the category to “no religious affiliation” in general, non-religious is

now the world’s third largest “faith”, at around 16.5% of the global adult population, behind

only Christianity and Islam.167 The same survey by the Pew Research Survey stated that 18.2%

of Europe is religiously unaffiliated.168 Specifically, there are a number of Member States that

made the list for the highest percentage of atheists, including France, Sweden, Estonia,

160 Nash, above n 8, 88-90, 92. 161 Austen Ivereigh, The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope (Picador, 2015). 162 Pope Francis, Untitled (Speech delivered at St Peter’s Square, Vatican City, 5 June 2013). 163 Pope Benedict XVI, ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to the Members of the Diplomatic

Corps for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings’ (Speech delivered at the Sala Regia, Vatican, 11 January 2010).

164 Pope John Paul II ‘The Ecological Crisis a Common Responsibility, Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all Creation: Message of His Holiness for the Celebration of World Peace Day January 1 1990’ (Speech delivered at the Vatican, 8 December 1989).

165 Simon Blackburn (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008). 166 Ariela Keysar and Juhem Navarro-Rivera, ‘A World of Atheism’ in Stephen Bullivant and Michael

Ruse, Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford University Press, 2013). 167 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, The Global Religious Landscape: Religiously Unaffiliated (18

December 2012) Pew Research Center <http://www.pewforum.org/>. 168 Including both atheists and agnostics.

27

Germany, Belgium, Finland and the United Kingdom, amongst others. Non-religious is now

even the majority in the Czech Republic, while in the Netherlands, almost 70% of the

population in 2015 had no religious affiliation, since steadily increasing from 33% in 1966.169

As seen below, it will be explained you do not need to belong to an indigenous group or practice

Hinduism to understand that nature has a right to exist, but is continuously being destroyed.

3 Moral perspectives

For two thousand years, western ethicists have focused almost exclusively on the conduct of

people towards each other.170 Similarly, while environmental regulation currently manifests

itself through an array of provisions concerned with curbing negative consequences arising

from human action, there is not to be found any deeper rationale beyond this purely

instrumental concern with human wellbeing and erosion of our quality of life, whether it be

health or economic related.171 This section will discuss whether this notion deserves to be

rejected and whether, regardless of religious beliefs or values, the environment is worthy of

protection intrinsically and not as a mere instrument to managing a contemporary social

problem.172

Philosopher John Locke stated that ‘every person, by virtue of their existence, shared a natural

right to continue existing’.173 He also reasoned that animals can suffer and that harming them

needlessly is morally wrong. However, it was not noted from the perspective that it is cruel to

animals, but that it is degrading for humans who would not be compassionate to their own

kind.174 It took many years for this right to move towards the inclusion of non-human subjects

into this sphere. However, in the last century, advocates for the rights of non-human subjects

have been more forthcoming.175 For example, Henry More was an animist from Cambridge

University who believed that there was a spirit of the world in every part of nature that held it

together. He pointed to the interconnectedness of all life, for example the death of one creature

which will, as nutrients in soil, nourish the earth to support other life.176 Holmes Rolston also

theorized that there is intrinsic value where there is positive creativity.177 As everything

originates in nature, it can be argued that there is value that should be inherently recognised

and protected, even if its health and thriving provide no immediate measurable financial benefit

to humans living nearby. It was stated by scholar Edward Payson Evans that man is truly a part

and ‘product of nature as any other animal and attempt to set him up on an isolated point outside

169 Tom Bernts and Joantine Berghuijs, God in Nederland: 1966-2015 (Ten Have, 2016). 170 Nash, above n 8, 121-122; David R Keller (ed), Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Wiley-

Blackwell 2010) 1. 171 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 1-2, 9, 199, 212. 172 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 199. 173 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1967) 289. 174 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (A and J Churchill, 1693). 175 Since the 1940s, scholars such as James Lovelock, and Arne Naess have developed the framework

for the recognition of rights that acknowledged human interdependence with the environment: UN Economic and Social Council, Study on the need to recognize and respect the rights of Mother Earth, UN Doc E/C.19/2010/4 (15 January 2010), [47].

176 Donald Worster, Natures Economy: The Roots of Ecology (San Francisco, 1977) 41-42. 177 Holmes Rolston III, ‘Naturalizing Values: Organisms and Species’ in Louis Pojman (ed),

Environmental Ethics (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2nd ed, 1998) 107-119.

28

of it is philosophically false and morally pernicious’.178 However, no matter how many support

the view stipulating that humans should not be placed above nature, it still remains unclear as

to the justification of why it would be wrong to do so.

The opposing view is of course that the treatment of nature does not matter as the environment

has no consciousness or awareness, and cannot suffer. There is no pain, only physical

reactions.179 It becomes somewhat clearer when you include every living being, including

animals, who can suffer, in the definition of nature. Approval or disapproval of human conduct

could then be considered by the ‘extent to which an action increases or decreases the health of

the whole community and the quality or intimacy of the relationships between its

members’.180 As Aldo Leopold’s famous land ethic states, ‘a thing is right when it tends to

preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends

otherwise’.181 He described ethics itself as self-imposed limitations on freedom of action that

derive from the recognition that the ‘individual is a member of a community of interdependent

parts’.182 It is also encapsulated by John Muir, an environmental philosopher:

How narrow we selfish, conceited creatures are in our sympathies! How blind to the

rights of all the rest of creation! Why should man value himself more than as more than

a small part of the one great unit of creation?183

As already alluded to by Locke, nature has many benefits to humans, from practical uses such

as food, medicine, science and industrial products, to cultural, recreational, educational and

aesthetical uses.184 It was even seen in the case study of Bolivia, that while indigenous

philosophies played a major role, the fact that climate change will drastically affect the citizens

of Bolivia was just as strong a driving force. As there are many anthropocentric motivations to

rigorously protect the environment,185 some prefer to argue its protection through human rights

such as the right to culture and education, amongst others.186 Indeed, many nations have also

expanded human rights to include the right to a healthy environment.187 As ecosystems are

pushed to collapse, such rights cannot be fulfilled without securing rights of nature itself. So,

even from an anthropocentric view, rights of nature can be seen as necessary for the

178 Edward Payson Evans, Evolution, Ethics and Animal Psychology (Appleton and Co, 1898). 179 P S Elder, ‘Legal Rights for Nature: The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question’ (1984) 22(2)

Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 285, 288-289. 180 McCullinan, above n 62. 181 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, 1949) 204, 224-225. 182 Ibid 203-205, 218, 226. 183 John Muir, A Thousand Mile Walk to the Gulf (1867) 324, 326. 184 Cyril de Klemm, ‘The Conservation of Species: The Need for a New Approach’ (1982) 9(4)

Environmental Law and Policy 117. 185 Elder, above n 179, 290. 186 Mark Sagoffi, ‘On Preserving the Natural Environment’ (1974) 84 Yale Law Journal, 205, 221-222. 187 Countries from within the EU include Finland, Greece, Spain and France. The ECHR does not

guarantee a right to a healthy environment, but the European Convention on Human Rights may be implicated in environmental cases as mentioned earlier.

29

achievement of other human rights.188 Thus even if nature does not suffer, mankind will if it

does not act upon the unique knowledge it possesses to refrain from destructive practices.189

One author even argues that humans, as part of nature and through its manipulation, have

simply proved that they are better suited for survival in comparison to other forms of life.190

However, this is indeed where human responsibility to protect the environment is derived from.

The power that humans have acquired has enabled rapid and widespread transformation to

nature.191 Simply because humans possess this power does not morally entitle the destruction

of life forms that have taken millennia to come into being. To the contrary, the dominant

position brings responsibility for the welfare and fate of millions of species. Even if one

disagrees, the continuation of environmental manipulation in destructive manners should at

least be stopped given it jeopardizes our survival as a species.192 Though rights are not

demanded by nature, humans have the responsibility to articulate and defend nature as another

occupant of the planet. This is irrelevant of whether an underlying moral attitude is agreed with

or it is simply that human interest is argued, as both lead to the conclusion that the environment

must be preserved. This is not the say that immediate human and environmental needs will

always align, but that overall protection is a common goal. However, it remains a complex

challenge to change to the underlying assumption that human interests and environmental

protection should coincide, even if they do not currently.193

B Practical issues

While it has been determined through an interest based analysis that a more drastic

environmental movement is needed, the rights of nature is still riddled with practical issues.

This section will now discuss the possibility of the initiative from a realistic and achievable

point of view. The first main theme will be to compare whether a framing of rights is more

appropriate than responsibilities, which includes the prioritising of competing rights and any

potential conflict with property ownership. Second will concern the issue of representation,

including whether, even if it is possible for humans to act on behalf of nature and know its

needs, humans will always act in accordance with such needs, even when it means sacrificing

these short-term desires. Ultimately it will be determined whether these issues can be

overcome, or if they will pose permanent obstacles to rights of nature, before the rights of

nature proposal is submitted for within the current EU system of standing. Finally, it will

conclude with a comment of political and economic hurdles.

188 This is confirmed in Stockholm Declaration, which states that ‘Both aspects of man's environment, the

natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself’.

189 Diamond, above n 2. 190 Elder, above n 179, 290. 191 See Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age

(University of Chicago, 1985); Holmes Rolston III, ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’, 18 Yale Journal of International Law (1993) 251, 263.

192 Manzano, above n 38, 57-59. 193 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 157-158.

30

1 Conception of rights: property rights, responsibilities and balancing interests

Property rights and the freedoms accompanying them tend to demarcate the scope of concern

associated with use in ways harmful to the environment. While a right is a moral entitlement

to have or do something, restrictions arise when the overwhelming needs of the common good

demand it.194 Rights of nature, however, does not have to seek to eliminate property ownership,

but to the authority of an owner to cause substantial harm to natural entities that not only exist

as that property, but depend upon it. This would prove too difficult to overhaul in many nations,

in which property law forms a fundamental basis of the legal systems. Even in the case study

of Ecuador, it was seen that natural resources remain the property of the state. If you take the

example of humans, human labour can be used within an employment context, without

automatically denying human rights.195

Ownership has as much to do with obligations as rights,196 and this can extend to duties outside

human relationships. The question then becomes if it is necessary to give rights to nature, in

preference to thinking in terms of responsible freedom. One author has argued that it isn’t more

rights that are needed, but less. He advocates for an approach not focused in the paradigm of

rights, but rather a ‘holistic approach in which nature is not one subject amongst others, but the

place where all subjects live’.197 This approach sees humans committing to the stewardship of

nature, where rights such as ownership are read in conjunction with responsibilities owed to

nature.198 However, it is argued here that there is no reason to see rights and responsibilities as

mutually exclusive. This conception of rights of nature, where humans have duties towards

nature, is exactly what the movement aims for, where humans are a part of, not apart from, the

earth community.199 But maintaining it within the framework of rights resolves the issue of

standing that mere restrictions to freedoms could not.200 By putting ecosystems on an equal

footing with humans, also as a living entity, the conception of humans as masters or as separate

from nature is dismissed.201 It is also a reflection the high value humans must place upon nature,

making nature harder to ignore, when balancing competing rights.202 Therefore, rights of nature

can help to alleviate the tension between the idea that property rights results in minimum legal

accountability and the social collective interest for property owners to take care in exercising

194 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 57. 195 Nash, above n 8, 129. 196 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 4-5. 197 Manzano, above n 38, 57. 198 Ibid, 57-59; Holmes Rolston III, ‘Environmental Ethics: Values and Duties to the Natural World’ in

Frederick Herbert Bormann and Stephen R Kellert (eds), The Broken Circle: Ecology, Economics, Ethics (Yale University Press, 1991); Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The Idea of Property in Land’ in Susan Bright and John Deward (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 1998) 15.

199 Murat Arsel, ‘Between “Marx and Markets”? The State, the “Left Turn” and Nature In Ecuador’ (2012) 103(2) Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography) 150.

200 If the view is taking that other rights should be ready subject to nature merely as a responsibility, this remains in the substantive field of law. Whereas rights will enable a claim to be brought from the perspective of nature and not humans.

201 Eduardo Gudynas, ‘Buen Vivir: Today's Tomorrow Development’ (2011) 54(4) Development 441. 202 Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 7.

31

those rights.203

Of course, while giving nature legal personhood will resolve some enforcement issues in

environmental law, EU legislators and the judiciary will inevitably need to prioritise rights in

tough circumstances where substantive rights of nature may conflict with economic or social

policy.204 If the example of Ecuador is taken, the rights of nature are surrounded by a broad list

of other constitutionally enshrined rights, including nutritional food, access to communication

technologies, even ‘the practice of sports and free time’ and ‘tax exemptions for elderly

persons’.205 The inclusion of such an extensive spectrum of rights risks the ability to effectively

prioritise the enforcement of these rights, thus diminishing the significance of the entire list as

a whole.206 There will even be situations where competing interests within and between

ecosystems exist. For example, given that hydropower can substitute for fossil fuel use, a court

may find itself balancing the negative affects to a river versus the harms caused by air pollution

and oil extraction from fossil fuels and disruption to species’ habitat.207 These conundrums are

more prominent when only certain elements in an ecosystem have rights, such as is the case in

New Zealand.

As seen in the previous paragraph, comparing and prioritising competing rights will inevitably

entail sacrifices. Nevertheless, it is a necessary mode of resolving tensions.208 For these reasons

rights of nature, although separate to any human right, should not be looked at in isolation

when determining violations.209 If these tensions are not acknowledged, the overall

consequences can be high. This is demonstrated further through a Nepalese case. In that case,

the development of a college was denied due to environmental reasons. However, this deprived

the community in question of much needed doctors.210 In contrast, there will likely be scenarios

where certain actions will be in violation of both natural and human communities. While this

paper does not try to imply that it will not be a difficult task, it will in many ways be useful as

a pressuring force upon society to restrain consumerism and shift not only its actions, but

attitude away from a utopian frame of mind where all interests can be fulfilled through

exploiting and protecting nature simultaneously.211

2 Representation

a) Legal fiction

203 Mark Shephard and Paul Martin, ‘The political discourse of land stewardship reframed as a statutory

duty’ in Brad Jessup and Jim Rubenstein, Environmental Discourses in Public and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 71-72; Coyle and Morrow, above n 159, 107.

204 Fish, above n 155, 10. 205 Constitution of Ecuador, art 13; art 16; art 24; art 37; art 66. 206 Manzano, above n 38, 57. 207 Fish, above n 155, 9. 208 Fish, above n 155, 10. 209 Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, ‘The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights under Ecuador’s Constitution:

Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite’ (2011) 20(3) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 671, 671-675.

210 Yogi Narahari Nath v Honorable Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala NKP 33. 211 Manzano, above n 38, 56-61.

32

Throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights upon some new entity has always

initially been absurd and ridiculed, whether it was for women, children, foetuses, people with

disabilities, African-Americans and so forth.212 However, the unthinkable gradually (and on

occasion, violently) becomes conventional.213 Like corporations, estates, universities and other

inanimate objects that can be parties for the purposes of adjudicatory processes, nature would

be, under a framework proposal, an artificial person for the purposes of standing in the EU. As

stated above, like corporations, estates universities and so forth, nature does not speak.

Nonetheless, inarticulation does not mean the absence of interest. Lawyers, like is the case for

most citizens, will speak on behalf of the interests of these entities. As touched upon in Part A,

one of the main arguments put forward against rights of nature is how can human advocates

determine what it is that nature needs. For example, Christopher Stone, in his now famous

article ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’, recounted a case in which the rights of two dolphins

were asserted after a lab assistant activist released them from their tanks back into the wild.

When he was subsequently charged for theft of property, the assistant responded that he was

not stealing, but actually saving two juristic persons from slavery. However, because marine

biologists testified that dolphins bred in captivity are not adequately equipped to survive a life

in the wild, the assistant was sent to jail.214

This case does not prove that humans are ill-equipped to act in the interests of nature. In fact,

to the contrary, it easily overcomes an argument that nature cannot convey its desires. Through

scientific developments, the definite needs of nature can be determined. Without fulfilling such

needs, both perceptible and non-visible deterioration occurs. For example, if a lawn needs

water, scientific methods will discover a dry soil, apart from the more obvious signs of dry,

yellowed spot, or shrivelled texture.215 All the previous case serves to illustrate is that there

should be some requirements for who can bring an action on behalf of nature.

b) Assumption that actio popularis is nature’s best interest

While the question of whether it is possible that humans have the ability to act on behalf of

nature in their interests was answered affirmatively, a pressing conundrum in the

implementation of a framework remains to be determined. That is, who is the most appropriate

representative of nature and whether they will choose to act in the best interests of nature. As

was seen in both Ecuador and Bolivia, the constitutional language correlates to an enshrined

right of actio popularis to enforce rights of nature. That means there open standing for any

citizen to bring an action in defence of the rights of nature, regardless of whether or not direct

harm has been suffered (see above). While there have been some victories in Ecuador, even

these decisions can be criticised and there have been many more failures. This framing of

nature’s rights can not only create litigious burdens or excess strain on courts, but presumes

that advocates will not only act without ulterior motives, but acknowledge the heterogeneous

interests in a given society.216 But this will not always be the case given that open standing, in

212 Stone, above n 9, 110-111. 213 Nash, above n 8, 8. 214 Stone, above n 9. 215 Ibid. 216 Fish, above n 155, 7-8.

33

actuality, can include non-locals unfamiliar with the territory and even corporate interests using

a claim to further personal agendas.

The first “successful” instance to vindicate the rights of nature occurred in Ecuador in Wheeler

c Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja. On 30 March 2011, the rights of

the Vilcabamba River were recognised in the Provincial Court of Justice in Loja in a case

against the Provincial Government of Loja, after being denied in the first instance for a lack of

standing. In this case the local government were responsible for the Vilcabamba-Quinara road

expansion project parallel to the river. It was argued that they were in breach of nature’s rights

through the dumping of construction debris into the river, which resulted in the narrowing of

its width and increasing its flow, subjecting nearby populations to flooding and other risks.217

The project was done also without an environmental impact assessment. The case is significant

because damage only need be proved to nature. Moreover, the Provincial Court set an important

precedent in holding that nature’s rights would prevail over other constitutional rights in the

event of a conflict. The proceedings also confirmed that the burden of proof is upon the

defendant to show there is no damage.218

However, the claim was filed on behalf of the river by Richard Wheeler and Eleanor Huddle,

two American citizens who live part-time in Ecuador and own valuable riverside property

downstream from the project. After some investigation, it was discovered they have plans to

develop a retreat outside of Vilcabamba. Thus, it can be deduced that concern for a victory was

not for nature, but a personal interest in a prime development that was and would continue to

be adversely affected as a result of flooding.219 While the claim probably did have at least some

positive effect for the river and surrounding environment, a tourist resort will likely have an

equal or greater impression on the area. This case therefore displays the oversight of power

disparities in actio popularis by facilitating claims that are disconnected from both local and

broader societal needs.220 It also reinforces an assertion that rights of nature must be

contextualised and balanced with social implications. In this case the economic impact or

increased mobility and access provided by the road, as well as local perspectives, were

seemingly ignored. In any event, enforcement of the ruling was weak, with the Provincial

Government of Loja slow to comply with the mandated reparations.221

While Ecuador faces instability and corruption within its legal and political systems,222 as well

as large wealth disparities between foreigners and citizens, which enhances the possibility for

successful personal interest claims, the threat still applies in the EU. It is intended that rights

217 Natalie Greene, The first successful case of the Rights of Nature implementation in Ecuador, The

Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature <http://therightsofnature.org/>. 218 Erin Daly, ‘Ecuadorian Exemplar: The First Ever Vindications of Constitutional Rights’ (2012)

21(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 63, 63-66. However, it could also be argued that it is superfluous as did not actually use the rights of nature but reversal or burden of proof.

219 Erin Daly, Ecuadorian Court Recognizes Constitutional Right to Nature (2011) Widener Environmental Law Center <http://blogs.law.widener.edu/>.

220 Fish, above n 155, 7-8. 221 Daly, above n 218. 222 Whittemore, above n 209.

34

of assist in fighting back against destructive corporations and developers, and largely deny the

possibility of personal interest claims. However, even with open standing, there may be two

categories of communities. The first may vigorously oppose projects for personal reasons or

otherwise, which can then simply then be moved to other neighbourhoods, being the second

stream of communities. These, seen from the case above, may not have the resources, or even

desire to oppose projects.223 To conclude, this analysis shows that there should be some limits

to open standing, in order to filter guardians that not only have a lack expertise to act in nature’s

best interest as seen earlier, but also to filter those who will purposefully choose not to.

Conversely, New Zealand and India take a different approach to standing, in that rivers and

other parts of nature have been appointed a guardian figure. This, on the other end of the

spectrum, is too closed, only allowing a small number of people to act on behalf of the entities

interests. Not only does it not provide access to justice, New Zealand’s formulations of the

rights of nature does require the presence of an indigenous group, which was criticised earlier.

The EU can learn from these flaws when formulating a framework, as will be seen below.

3 The struggle of incorporating rights into modern politics and economics

The other major failure of nature’s rights seen in the case studies above is the heavy dependence

on natural resources that remains in many modern economies and has led to some

unsatisfactory decisions. As stated, there have been some small victories in Ecuador. In 2009,

a case was brought by involved community members from the canton Santo Domingo de los

Colorados, who complained of water soil and air contamination from a pork-processing plant.

Interestingly, the rights on nature in articles 71-72 of the Constitution were not claimed. While

the applicants claimed the constitutional rights to health, as well as a safe and clean

environment, the judge applied rights of nature independently.224

However, the failures are many more. In 2014, the Tangabana highlands in the Chimborazo

province, an ecosystem of great importance for water and carbon capture, became the first case

in which a demand for rights of nature was lost. Here the claimants, environmental groups,

brought a claim against a private company to remove a pine tree plantation to reforest and

restore the ecosystem. At both first instance and on appeal, the applicants failed because they

could not prove they owned the land. It is now currently being appealed again by the activists,

this time to the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, who argue ownership is irrelevant because of

open standing within the Constitution.225 Moreover, in 2013, local communities and NGOs

objected to an open-pit mining project in El Condor Mirador, a biodiversity hotspot, on the

basis that the development’s environmental impact assessment confirmed contamination in the

area and lead to the extinction of at least three endemic amphibian species and one reptilian

species that call the ecosystem home. Despite this risk, the project proceeded in violation of

article 73, even after appeal, with the judge found no violation of nature’s rights, despite clear

223 Fish, above n 155, 7-8. 224 Craig Kauffman and Pam Martin, ‘Testing Ecuador’s Rights of Nature: Why Some Lawsuits Succeed

and Others Fail’ (Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Atlanta, 18 March 2016), appendix titled ‘Table 1 Ecuador’s Rights of Nature Cases’.

225 Ibid.

35

evidence. The judge even stated that, contrary to the earlier Vilcabamba River case, that

development, as a public interest, will always prevail.226 Even when nature’s rights are

constitutionally embedded, it seems to be a façade and that states will overlook them, or

interpret them flexibly, in the case of economic development. These cases question the

legitimacy and abiding power of these rights.227

In República del Ecuador Asamblea Nacional, Comisión de la Biodiversidad y Recursos

Naturales (2011), the Ecuadorian government filed a claim against illegal gold mining

operations in the remote districts of San Lorenzo and Eloy Alfaro of the north Esmeraldas

province. The rights of nature were found to be violated by the operations, who were polluting

nearby rivers. The ruling was swiftly enforced, after military armed forces were ordered to

conduct operations to seize equipment and destroy the sites.228 This shows that Ecuador’s

jurisprudence is extremely arbitrary, especially when comparing the previous El Condor

Mirador case. While both concerned similar situations, only the 2011 case produced a positive

outcome. The only differences are that the 2011 case was filed by the government and it was

against an illegal mine. This implies that the government is willing to take action only where

they are losing income they would have if it was not an illegal mine. 14.8 percent of gross

domestic product (GDP) in Ecuador comes from profits from natural resources.229 This

paradoxical situation means the ability to fulfil rights of nature, as well as guarantee social

rights and the economic opportunity of citizens,230 as required within the Constitution, depends

on increased income from activities of significant environmental impact.231 It is clear from the

cases above that the tension between development and environmental protection appears so far

to be resolved in favour of the former.232

Like Ecuador, the Bolivian government must also balance leniency for powerful environmental

movements, with a rights of nature framework at odds with economic realities. Bolivia’s

economy is also heavily dependent on the extractive industries of tin, silver, gold and other raw

materials, with profits comprising 12.6 percent of Bolivia’s of the country’s GDP.233 Even

Pablo Solon, a high-profile rights of nature advocate, resigned his post as Bolivian ambassador

to the UN. In a letter from September 2011 from Pablo Solon to President Morales, it was

allegedly stated that ‘there must be coherence between what we do and what we say’.234 It

appears clear that the reason for his departure is that he could not lobby for the rights of nature

at an international level, while his country’s hypocritical extractive policies remained in place.

Further, it seems that rights of nature is more of a national vision than concrete obligation.

226 Ibid. 227 Manzano, above n 38, 48. 228 Daly, above n 218. 229 Kiana Herold, The Rights of Nature: Indigenous Philosophies Reframing Law (6 January 2017) Earth

Law Centre <https://www.earthlawcenter.org/>. 230 See, eg, Constitution of Ecuador, art 277, in which the State in responsible for economic

development, as well as 284. 231 Manzano, above n 38, 53-54 referring to Agustin Grijalva, ‘Regimen constitucional de biodiversidad,

patrimonio natural y ecosistemas fragiles: y, recursos naturales renovables’ (2010). 232 Manzano, above n 38, 53-54 referring to Julio Echeverria, ‘Complejizacion del campo politico en la

construccion democratica en el Ecuador’ (2010). 233 Herold, above n 229. 234 Jason Mark, ‘Natural Law’ (2012) 27(1) Earth Island Journal.

36

Even in European countries, a strong link is found between satisfaction of social rights and

increased pressure of natural resources,235 where the main commodities exported include

machines and motor vehicles, plastics and pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, also high on the list

of exports is iron and steel, fuels, wood pulp and paper products.236 While this does not pose

an issue for a procedural change to standing, it would be still to substantive rights of nature.

But as renewable energy gains traction, it rights of nature may generate innovation in this field

and pose less of an issue, particularly within the EU. In many respects, it is a question of

willingness on behalf of a nation. Of course, a shift in priorities is required. At time, social

benefits or other human desires may be sacrificed in order to achieve the long-term goal of a

more sustainable planet. If sincere commitment to protect rights of nature cannot be given, the

concept of granting nature essential should be reconsidered in terms of the capacity and

willingness of a nation to adhere to them. Unwavering reliance on an extractive economy with

no real ability to change simply makes rights of nature antithetical and idealistic.

4 Fitting rights of nature into the EU

In Part 1 of the practical issues of a rights of nature framework so far it is concluded that rights

of nature, and not simply more limitations are needed. This section will discuss how to frame

the concept of rights of nature in EU law and whether there is already the machinery to do so.

a) Procedural and substantive options

As briefly alluded to, there are two options which could be employed within the EU. The first

is to regard nature as a living entity. In this regard, nature would be considered a natural or

legal person for the purposes of article 263 and 265 TFEU, enabling it to undertake judicial

review. The consequences for an action to annul under article 263 TFEU is that the act is

declared void.237 A regulation, similar to the Aarhus regulation, could also be enacted to enable

nature to be able to conduct administrative review.238 There would need to be separate rules on

who could act on behalf of nature, discussed further below. By changing who would qualify as

directly effected in standing would enable a guardian on behalf of nature to enforce already

existing substantive environmental laws. A procedural amendment should be comparatively

easy to implement in contrast to the elastic quality of a substantive environmental right, given

its basis in procedure rather than ecology. This is because procedural obligations are clear,

explicit and objective. There is no act of balancing or searching for definitions which can affect

the environment on the one hand, and the economy on the other, depending on how narrow or

wide an interpretation is taken. It is strictly judicial.239

235 Dietrich Murswiek, Umweltschutz Als Staatszweck (Economica Verlag, 1995) 48. 236 Economy Watch, Europe Trade, Imports and Exports (9 April 2010)

<http://www.economywatch.com/>. 237 TFEU, art 264. This paper does not address compensation or damages to nature, which should be

dealt with at a national level, between individuals and a Member State, or between individuals. 238 In addition to fixing non-rights of nature issues such as individual scope, as outlined in Gaps in EU

law. 239 May and Daly, above n 105, 44-46.

37

This leads to the second option. A procedural proposal could work alone or in conjunction with

the second option, which is to take a step further and create substantive rights for nature in EU

law. In this option, actions that injure nature itself in violation of its rights could be rendered

void, in addition to enforcing current substantive environmental laws. While the purpose of

this paper is not to delve into the latter option, it will briefly describe what rights should then

be expected. To recall, in the Bolivian case study it outlined the right to vital life, to diversity

of life, to pure water and clean air, the right to equilibrium and restoration.240 Similar rights

were also seen in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Nature. However, one could argue

that these rights are too vague and uncertain as any questions arise. Does a single tree has the

right to life? If not, how many trees would need to be cut down to violate this right? If nature

should have the right to be free from cruel treatment, what is cruel? This of course will be a

balancing act.

If we consider nature as an ecosystem, which is discussed below, it will involve the

consideration of many factors. For example, take the tree example once more, it will not just

be the amount of a particular tree that was deforested, but whether that tree is endangered, or

is an ancient forest and takes longer to regenerate. These types of factors will lean towards a

violation and should be non-exhaustive. However, other factors such as restoration within the

ecosystem, or in other ecosystems, would contribute towards compliance with such rights.

Ultimately when considering rights of nature, it is important to reflect upon which human

activities are unnecessarily destabilizing the Earth’s climate, alternative options, and the ease

and cost of these options.241 This is necessary as to not hinder development and growth, but

also providing an incentive to find more efficient uses of the environment.

b) Definition nature

It must be determined what aspects, whether nature generally, or specific parts, will be

protected. This paper proposes that ecosystems should be the nature considered a living entity

and protected with rights. An ecosystem is a biological of community of interacting living

organisms, with their non-living or physical components of their environment.242 Nature as an

ecosystem is generally echoed in Ecuador and Bolivia, in more spiritual terms.243 In a local bill

from Spokane, Washington, this the definition of nature was also given as ‘ecosystems,

including but not limited to, all groundwater systems, surface water systems and aquifers’.244

As was seen in the first section of ‘Practical issues’, discussing the conception of rights, single

entities, such as the case with the river in New Zealand, will make balancing competing

interests more difficult. To the extent possible, nature should be seen as a whole. Nevertheless,

240 Bolivian Constitution, art 7. 241 This is particularly important but more so in non-EU countries, to make sure nature’s rights do not act

against the poor and marginalised because they have limited options. 242 This includes aspects such as air, sunlight, water and minerals. Eugene P Odum, Fundamentals of

Ecology (Saunders, 3rd ed, 1971). 243 See Part II, with the general consensus theme that nature is an indivisible, living community of

interrelated beings. However, this proposal opts for a secular view. 244 Fish, above n 155, 7.

38

some legal title must be afforded to it. Therefore, the definition of nature at an EU level should

be modelled from the basic definition of an ecosystem.

c) Guardian

Here it will be concluded as to who will act on behalf of nature in order for it to be able to bring

a claim to enforce current laws or its rights. In the representation section of ‘Practical issues’,

it was seen that both actio popularis and a limited guardian situation both have potential

disadvantages, especially where such guardians are a representative of indigenous populations

and therefore risk conflating human interests and natures. Thus, a balance must be struck

between the two so that the guardians are truly acting in nature’s best interest to the best of

human capabilities. Accordingly, the EU should enable applicant’s acting on behalf of nature

have knowledge of the ecosystem, a general interest in its wellbeing and that can accurately

represent it in proceedings.245 NGOs for many years have already acted as a voice that nature

does not have itself.246

Currently under the Aarhus Regulation, an NGO must satisfy four requirements. The NGO

must be an independent and non-for-profit legal person with the primary aim is to promote

environmental protection. Furthermore, it must have existed for more than two years and

actively pursues its environmental goals. Finally, the subject matter of internal review must be

covered by its objective.247 The Aarhus Regulation criteria already provides a good filter for

rights of nature in the EU. With small tweaks, they could be appropriate for NGOs to act on

behalf of nature in judicial proceedings. The first three criterion are essential, and could stay

as is. While the goal of environmental protection is a necessity, a two-year existence ensures

that the NGO is somewhat competent, established and organised. Moreover, ensuring that the

NGO is actively pursuing goals shows that the it has a genuine and sincere intention to acting

in nature’s interest, rather than a facade. The final criteria is also relevant, as the NGO will

have knowledge of the relevant type of ecosystem at issue. However, it should instead it should

read ‘the subject of judicial review’. For these reasons, NGOs are the actors capable of crucial

steward role in a rights of nature framework.

V CONCLUSION

Environmentalists work to minimize damage can only go as far as ineffective laws, especially

when they remain in the context of a deeply flawed system. Traditional environmental

activism, including mere regulation and the human centric view of standing, have proven to be

ineffective thus far. This particularly so in the European Union, where it was seen that there

have been failures at two levels in trying to improve access to justice. Both standing in judicial

review under the TFEU and subsequent administrative review measures in the Aarhus

245 Fish, above n 155, 10. 246 Kal Raustiala ‘The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law’ (1997) 21 Harvard

Environmental Law Review, 537, 567. 247 Aarhus Regulation, art 11.

39

Regulation are highly restrictive. In the latter case, it is only applicable more NGOs and not

individuals. In any event, the requirement of individual scope is virtually useless against

environmental measures of a general purpose. In the former case, Lisbon Treaty amendments

may show some reprieve for individuals with the addition of a third limb removing the

individual concern requirement, but it remains virtually impossible for NGOs to bring a claim.

There are two broad reasons supporting rights of nature to be adopted. Firstly, to continue

unlimited growth assumes the unfettered use of nature for convenience and profit and this is

the genesis of the crisis that humanity now faces today. Economic systems and development

policies are founded upon anthropocentric models, assuming that nature would never fail or,

where it does, technology will save the day. Environmental degradation spawned from this

wasteful and consumer based society is propelling us towards a major planetary catastrophe.

While humans naturally try to maximize their own accumulation of benefits, a society that

wishes to survive and flourish must identify and take account of real consequences.248

Secondly, and equally important, is the morally appropriateness of the action. For these

reasons, nature should secure not only the highest legal protection, but highest societal value,

through the recognition of rights, irrelevant of intrinsic or extrinsic motivations to protect the

environment. ‘If the machine of government… is of such a nature that it requires you to be the

agent on injustice to another, then, I say break the law’.249 Thus, this paper suggests that there

should be a fundamental change in that standing should not begin and end with humans, to

avoid access to justice in EU stalled for another ten years on non-compliance.250

Many countries have begun to implement a rights of nature framework. This paper analysed

those in the United States, Ecuador, Bolivia, New Zealand and India. Such movements were

spurred and shaped by indigenous populations within those countries, which shed light to an

alternative to the human presumption of sovereignty over the natural world. The impact of

rights of nature through “limitations” to conventional ideals indicates a decline or at least

rupture in the significance of state sovereignty in international law and politics. With or without

such rights, the trend is nevertheless that environmental governance moves towards a dynamic

global civil society influenced by citizen and NGO contribution, particularly through access to

dispute resolution mechanisms. The turning point is that now the construction of legal systems

can be done in a manner both inspired and empowered by the expansion of procedural

assurances to non-State actors such as indigenous groups, as well as private individuals. This

does not undermine but strengthens the efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of regulatory

systems.251

While rights of nature are ingrained within indigenous philosophies that are community-

centric, culturally sensitive and ecologically-balanced, the ability remains for such rights to

248 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, 1962). 249 Henry David Thoreau, ‘Resistance to Civil Government’ Aesthetic Papers (G P Putnam Sons, 1849). 250 Schoukens, above n 123. 251 Raustiala, above n 246, 538-539, 558. See also Kal Raustiala, ‘States, NGOs and International

Environmental Institutions’ (1997) 41 International Studies Quarterly 719.

40

extend to nations with no indigenous populations. Rights of nature should not be confined

simply because such rights signal the influence of native groups as political actors. In any case,

many religions can be interpreted in an eco-theological manner. Moreover, as can be seen in

Ecuador and Bolivia, even nations that have a majority indigenous population and are the first

to ambitiously guarantee the rights of nature do not, in any event, have the capabilities to

effectively implement the new framework, or conflate human and nature’s interests.

It is acknowledged that there are many challenges involved in formulating a functioning rights

of nature framework. Nevertheless, the current system is already preposterous in many ways.

In this paper, it is argued that many of these issues can be overcome and managed in an EU

proposal for rights of nature. It proposes nature, and specifically an ecosystem, be granted legal

personhood, in order to be undertake judicial review of the EU institutions, with NGOs as its

guardian. An NGO provides the balance between non-pluralistic and limited indigenous

guardians on one hand, and open standing, on the other. It is also possible that apart from

simply solving an issue of standing to enforce current substantive laws, rights of nature can

also extend to substantive law itself. The elasticity of such rights makes the latter option more

difficult to implement, but not impossible.

Of course, much of nature’s rights enforcement and path forward depends on the mind set and

commitment to such an issue, by both the government and its citizenry. 252 This paper does not

attempt to say there are no complications to fully realise the rights of nature. As rights of nature

currently stand there are deep limitations, with economic dependence on non-renewable

industries to name one. It will require a necessary shift in public attitude and society’s

assumptions about human control. However, the willingness to give up certain freedoms, such

as sovereignty for states, and luxuries for individuals, will be the willingness for a healthy

future. At the very least, the discussion that humankind should reimagine its relations with and

protection of nature that was previously non-existent is generated by rights of nature. No matter

the obstacles, it thus raises awareness and brings mankind closer to a more sustainable way of

living that will allow the Earth to be preserved for future generations of nature and humans

alike.

252 Marc Becker, ‘Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador’

(2011) 38(1) Latin American Perspectives 47, 47-62.

41

VI BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Articles

Arsel, M ‘Between “Marx and Markets”? The State, the “Left Turn” and Nature in Ecuador’

(2012) 103(2) Journal of Economic & Social Geography 150-163

Bassi, M, ‘La Naturaleza O Pacha mama de Ecuador: What Doctrine Should Grant Trees

Standing?’ 2009 (11) Oregon Review of International Law 461-478

Becker, M, ‘Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador’

(2011) 38(1) Latin American Perspectives 47-62

Daly, E, ‘Ecuadorian Exemplar: The First Ever Vindications of Constitutional Rights’ (2012)

21(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 63-66

de Klemm, C, ‘The Conservation of Species: The Need for a New Approach’ (1982) 9(4)

Environmental Law and Policy 117-128

de Wilmars, J M and I M Verougstraete, Proceedings Against Member States for Failure to

Fulfil their Obligations (1970) 7 Common Market Law Review 385-406

Dransart, P, ‘Pachamama: The Inka Earth Mother of the Long Sweeping Garment’ in Ruth

Barnes and Joanne B Eicher, Dress and Gender: Making and Meaning (1992, Berg

Publishers) 145-163

Elder, P S, ‘Legal Rights for Nature: The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question’ (1984) 22(2)

Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 285-295

Fish, L, ‘Homogenizing Community, Homogenizing Nature: An Analysis of Conflicting Rights

in the Rights of Nature Debate’ (2013) Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal, 6-11.

Fulton, S and Steve Wolfson, ‘Strengthening national environmental governance to promote

sustainable development’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds),

Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 2014) 13-29

Gray, K and Susan Francis Gray, ‘The Idea of Property in Land’ in Susan Bright and John

Deward (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 1998) 15-

51

Gudynas, E, ‘Buen Vivir: Today's Tomorrow Development’ (2011) 54(4) Development 441-447

Gunther, T and Mattias Jakobsson, ‘Genes mirror migrations and cultures in prehistoric Europe

— a population genomic perspective’ (2016) 41 Current Opinion in Genetics &

Development 115-123

Keysar, A and Juhem Navarro-Rivera, ‘A World of Atheism’ in Stephen Bullivant and Michael

Ruse, Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford University Press, 2013) 553-586

42

Manzano, J J I, ‘The rights of nature in Ecuador: an opportunity to reflect on society, law and

environment’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds), Global

Environmental Law at a Crossroads: The IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Series

(Edward Elgar, 2014) 48-62

Magallanes, C J I, ‘Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal Personality for Nature in

New Zealand’ (2015) 22 Vertigo (Special Issue) (online)

Mark, J, ‘Natural Law’ (2012) 27(1) Earth Island Journal (online)

May, J R, and Erin Daly, ‘Global Constitutional Environmental Rights’ in Shawkat Alam, Jahid

Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera, Routledge Handbook of

International Environmental Law (eds) (Routledge, 2013) 603-616

May, J R, and Erin Daly, ‘The Future We Want and constitutionally enshrined procedural rights

in environmental matters’ in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds),

Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 2014) 30-47

Naithani, A K and H C Nainwal, K K Sati and C Prasad, ‘Geomorphological evidences of

retreat of the Gangotri glacier and its characteristics’ (2001) 80(1) Current Science,

2001, 87-94

Plater, Z J B, ‘From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short

History of Environmental Law’ (1994) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 981-1008

Raustiala, K ‘States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions’ (1997) 41

International Studies Quarterly 719-740

Raustiala K, ‘The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law’ (1997) 21

Harvard Environmental Law Review, 537-586

Rolston III, H, ‘Environmental Ethics: Values and Duties to the Natural World’ in Frederick

Herbert Bormann and Stephen R Kellert (eds), The Broken Circle: Ecology, Economics,

Ethics (Yale University Press, 1991) 65-85

Rolston III, H, ‘Naturalizing Values: Organisms and Species’ in Louis Pojman (ed),

Environmental Ethics (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2nd ed, 1998) 107-119

Rolston III, H, ‘Rights and Responsibilities on the Home Planet’, 18 Yale Journal of

International Law (1993) 251-279

Ruru, J, ‘Tūhoe-Crown settlement – Te Urewera Act 2014’ (2014) Māori Law Review (online)

Sagoffi, M, ‘On Preserving the Natural Environment’ (1974) 84 Yale Law Journal, 205-267

Salmond, A, ‘Tears of Rangi: Water, power and people in New Zealand’ (2014) 4(3) Journal of

Ethnographic Theory (online)

Sand, P H, ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ (1991) 18(2) Boston

College Environmental Affairs Law Review 213-276

43

Schoukens, H, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the Rulings of the Court of

Justice of 13 January 2015: Kafla Revisited?’ (2015) 31(81) Utrecht Journal of

International and European Law 46-67

Shephard, M, and Paul Martin, ‘The political discourse of land stewardship reframed as a

statutory duty’ in Brad Jessup and Jim Rubenstein, Environmental Discourses in Public

and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 71-95

Sirks, A J B, ‘Cognitio and Imperial and Bureaucratic Courts’ in Stanley N Katz (ed), The

Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History (Oxford University Press, 2009)

(online)

Spagnuolo, F, ‘Beyond participation: administrative-law type mechanisms in global

environmental governance: Toward a new basis of legitimacy?’ (2009) 15(1) European

Public Law 49-62

Stone, C D, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ in David

R Keller (ed), Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 110-

119

Whittemore, M E, ‘The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights under Ecuador’s Constitution:

Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite’ (2011) 20(3) Pacific Rim

Law & Policy Journal Association 659-691

Williams, T R, ‘Crown offer to settle the historical claims of Ngāi Tūhoe’ (2012) Maori Law

Review (online)

B Books

Bernts, T and Joantine Berghuijs, God in Nederland: 1966-2015 (Ten Have, 2016)

Blackburn, S (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008)

Biggs, S, The Rights of Nature: The Case for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother

Earth (The Council of Canadians, Fundación Pachamama and Global Exchange, 2011)

Burns, P Fatal Success: A History of the New Zealand Company (Heinemann Reed, 1989)

Carson, R, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, 1962)

Coyle, S and Karen Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property,

Rights and Nature (Hart Publishing, 2004)

Diamond, G, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (Viking Press, 2005)

Evans, E P, Evolution, Ethics and Animal Psychology (Appleton and Co, 1898)

Hiskes, R P, The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational

44

Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2009)

Holy Bible, revised standard edition (Thomas Benson and Sons edition, 1953)

Ivereigh, A, The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope (Picador, 2015)

Jessup, B and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Environmental Discourses in Public and International

Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Jonas, H, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age

(University of Chicago, 1985)

Keller, D R (ed), Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

Leopold, A, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, 1949)

Locke, J, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (A and J Churchill, 1693)

Locke, J, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1967)

McCullinan, C, Wild Law (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011)

Murswiek, D, Umweltschutz Als Staatszweck (Economica Verlag, 1995)

Nash, R F, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (University of Wisconsin

Press, 1989)

Odum, E P, Fundamentals of Ecology (Saunders, 3rd ed, 1971)

Percival, R V, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds), Global Environmental Law at a

Crossroads: The IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Series (Edward Elgar, 2014)

Sand, P H, The History and Origin of International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2015)

Shawkat, A, Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera, Routledge

Handbook of International Environmental Law (eds) (Routledge, 2013)

Thoreau, H D, ‘Resistance to Civil Government’ Aesthetic Papers (G P Putnam Sons, 1849)

Wolf, S and Neil Stanley, Wolf and Stanley on environmental law (Routledge, 6th ed, 2014)

Worster, D, Natures Economy: The Roots of Ecology (San Francisco, 1977)

C Cases and Legislation

1 National constitutions, legislation and case law

Constitution of Bolivia

45

Constitution of Ecuador

Chevron Corp v Donziger et al, 2nd US Circuit Court of Appeals, No 14-0826

Law 071: Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Bolivia)

Law 300: Framework Law of Mother Earth and Holistic Development for Living Well (Bolivia)

Miglani v State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (PIL) No 140 of 2015 (30 March 2017)

Pennsylvania constitution

Salim v State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (PIL) No 126 of 2014 (20 March 2017)

Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972)

Te Urewara Act 2014 (NZ)

Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ)

Wheeler c Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja (30 March 2011)

Yogi Narahari Nath v Honorable Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala NKP 33

2 Law and cases of the European Union

Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging

Utrecht (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-401/12 P to C-403/12 P,

EU:C:2015:4, 3 January 2015)

Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe (Court

of Justice of the European Union, C-404/12 P to C-405/12 P, EU:C:2015:5, 13 January

2015)

Danielsson a.o. v Commission (T-219/95R) [1995] ECR, II-3051

Dreyfus v Commission (C-386/96 P) [1998] ECR, EU:C:1998:193

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union

(T-18/10) [2011] ECR, II-75

Jégo-Quéré v Commission (T-177/01) [2002] ECR II-2365

Lesoochranarske Zoskupenie VLK (General Court, C-240/09, 8 March 2011)

Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) (T-262/10) [2011] ECR II-75

NTN Toyo Bearing v Council (113/77) [1979] ECR, 1185

46

PAN and others v Commission (General Court, T-600/15, 28 September 2016)

Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament (C-294/83) [1986] ECR 1339

Plaumann v Commission (C-25/62) [1963] ECR, 95

Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September

2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ L 286, 39

Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 September

2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to

Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in

Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13

Societe pour l’exportation de sucre (132/77) [1978] ECR, 1061

Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission (C-321/95P) [1998] ECR, I-1651

Stitchting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission (General

Court, T-338/08, 14 June 2012)

TestBioTech eV v Commission (General Court, T-177/13, 15 December 2016)

TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Germany (C-188/92) [1994] ECR, I-833

Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council (C-50/00/P) [2002] ECR, I-6677

Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stitchting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission

(General Court, T-396/09, 14 June 2012)

3 European Court of Human Rights

Ilhan v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 22277/93,

27 June 2000)

Lopez Ostra v Spain (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 16798/90,

9 December 1994)

Öneryıldız v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No

48939/99, 30 November 2004)

Taşkin and others v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application

No 46117/99, 10 November 2004)

D International documents

1 Treaties

47

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447

(entered into force 30 October 2001)

Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, opened for signature 17

October 2003, 2368 UNTS 3 (entered into force 20 April 2006)

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer

of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS

231 (entered into force 24 April 1972)

International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention C169, adopted

27 June 1989 (entered into force 5 September 1991)

Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ C 191/1 (entered

into force 1 November 1993), as amended by Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on

European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, opened for

signature 13 December 2007, [2007] OJ C 306/1 (entered into force 1 December 2009)

Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2009] OJ C 115/13 (entered

into force 1 November 1993)

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2009]

OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993)

2 United Nations documents

Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, UN GAOR, 46th sess, Agenda

Item 21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 1992)

Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN DOC

A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (5 June 1972)

Pablo Solon, Letter dated 7 May 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Plurinational

State of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 64th sess, UN

Doc A/64/777 (7 May 2010) Annex II (‘Draft universal declaration of the rights of

Mother Earth’)

Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, UN Doc

A/CONF.216/16 (22 June 2012), Annex A/66/L.56, [44] (‘The Future We Want’)

Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (13 June 1992)

UN Economic and Social Council, Study on the need to recognize and respect the rights of

Mother Earth, UN Doc E/C.19/2010/4 (15 January 2010)

UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Indigenous peoples: conflict, peace and resolution,

15th sess (May 2016)

48

UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report on

the Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (1986)

E European documents

1 European Union

European Commission, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (27 April 2016)

<http://ec.europa.eu/>

European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Commission Notice on Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters (28 April 2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/>

European Commission, Discrimination in the EU Report: Special Eurobarometer 393 (2012)

<http://ec.europa.eu/>

2 Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee

Belgium ACCC/2005/11

Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Findings and recommendations of the Aarhus

Convention Compliance Committee concerning compliance by the European Union with

the Aarhus Convention (ACCC/C/2008/32(EU)) – 17 March 2017

Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Findings and recommendations with regard to

Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the European

Union, adopted on 14 April 2011

F Other Resources

1 Websites

Anais Berthier and Ludwig Kramer, The Aarhus Convention: Implementation and compliance

in EU law (2014) The European Union Aarhus Centre <https://www.clientearth.org/>

Economy Watch, Europe Trade, Imports and Exports (9 April 2010)

<http://www.economywatch.com/>

Encyclopedia of American Politics, Colorado Right to Local Self-Government Amendment

(2016) Ballotpedia <https://ballotpedia.org/>

Erin Daly, Ecuadorian Court Recognizes Constitutional Right to Nature (2011) Widener

Environmental Law Center <http://blogs.law.widener.edu/>

49

Jose Luis Cordeiro, Latin America: Constitution Crazy (6 October 2008) Latin Business

Chronicle <http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/>

Kiana Herold, The Rights of Nature: Indigenous Philosophies Reframing Law (6 January 2017)

Earth Law Centre <https://www.earthlawcenter.org/>

Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, CELDF working in India to Recognize Rights of the

Ganga River Basin (28 March 2017) <http://therightsofnature.org/>

Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, What is Rights of Nature? (2017)

<therightsofnature.org/>

Harmony with Nature United Nations, Rights of Nature Law and Policy (2017)

<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/>

Mari Margil, ‘Colombia Constitutional Court Finds Atrato River Possesses Rights’ (4 May

2017) Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund <https://celdf.org/>

Natalie Greene, The first successful case of the Rights of Nature implementation in Ecuador,

The Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature <http://therightsofnature.org/>

Nick Buxton, Marisa Escobar, David Purkey, Nilo Lima, Water scarcity, climate change and

Bolivia: Planning for climate uncertainties (2013) Stockholm Environment Institute

<https://www.sei-international.org/>

Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, The Global Religious Landscape: Religiously

Unaffiliated (18 December 2012) Pew Research Center <http://www.pewforum.org/>

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage Convention:

Ecuador (2017) <http://en.unesco.org/>

2 Speeches and conference papers

Craig Kauffman and Pam Martin, ‘Testing Ecuador’s Rights of Nature: Why Some Lawsuits

Succeed and Others Fail’ (Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual

Convention, Atlanta, 18 March 2016), appendix titled ‘Table 1 Ecuador’s Rights of

Nature Cases’

Pope Benedict XVI, ‘Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to the Members of the

Diplomatic Corps for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings’ (Speech

delivered at the Sala Regia, Vatican, 11 January 2010)

Pope John Paul II ‘The Ecological Crisis a Common Responsibility, Peace with God the

Creator, Peace with all Creation: Message of His Holiness for the Celebration of World

Peace Day January 1 1990’(Speech delivered at the Vatican, 8 December 1989)

Pope Francis, Untitled (Speech delivered at St Peter’s Square, Vatican City, 5 June 2013).