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RISING ABOVE DICTATORSHIPS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH
DICTATORS ARISE
Lalana Gunaratne Suffolk University
MPA/MSPS Candidate 2013 April 2, 2012
*Note: For the protection of individuals and families who are directly and indirectly involved in the study, the author has replaced the names and places of one of the case studies with anonymous names and places. Additionally, all sources related to the case study have been removed from the body and the bibliography. Please pardon any inconveniences, disappearances and assassinations of dissenting voices is commonplace in this country. It is a matter to be taken seriously; however, please contact the author at [email protected] with any questions about the sources, which can be arranged to exchange confidentially.
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. WHY DICTATORS COME TO POWER: TWO SCHOLARLY PERSPECITVES 3
A. Introduction 3 B. Where scholars perspectives differ 4
i. The constructivists 4 ii. The economists 4
iii. The realists 5 C. Conclusion 8
III. THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND REALIST PRINCIPLES TO THE RISE OF DICTATORS 10 IV. HOW TO EVALUATE ECONOMIC AND REALIST PRINCIPLES IN DECIPHERING THE RISE OF A DICTATORSHIP 11
A. Case studies 11 B. Defining and operationalizing concepts 12 C. The methodology 15 D. Conclusion 16
V. UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF A DICTATORSHIP: A CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 18
A. Hafiz al-Asad 18 B. Fidel Castro 21 C. John Smith 24 D. Hugo Chavez 27 E. Summary of case analysis 29
VI. CONCLUSION 31 VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY 34
ii
RISING ABOVE DICTATORSHIPS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH DICTATORS ARISE
ABSTRACT
This study uses four cases from various regions of the post-World War II era to evaluate the conditions in which dictators arise. The hypothesis of this study is the greater the level of an instable economy and the more prevalent the predatory characteristic of a political actor, the greater the chances are in the rise of a dictatorship. In combination, economic reasons and realist principles contribute seven conditions, or indicators, that persist during within authoritative regimes that lead to dictatorships. Two of the cases are identified dictatorships, and the remaining two cases are of current powerful leaders. Both independent variables are crucial to understanding the rise of a dictator because the presence of one makes way for the other. Thus, a weakness within the state, which in this study is an instable economy, makes way for a tyrant to practice his predatory characteristics. The research methods for this paper produces ordinal data, which is ranking of the presence of each of the seven indicators based on media sources, reports, and academic sources. Results demonstrate that there is a high probability for leaders to rise to a dictatorship given the presence of the conditions during their initial years in politics. There is a contention in one of the cases because an economic variable is not present; however, there is an alternate weakness within that state which is a civil war. Aside from that discrepancy, the overall evidence supports the hypothesis.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
When Fidel Castro seized control of the government, the people of Cuba referred to him
as the savior of Cuba.1 At the time, Cubans, and the international community, had little way of
knowing Castro’s path leading an authoritarian regime that would devour Cuba well into the 21st
Century. Such legacies of dictatorships are dotted across all regions of the world where powerful
leaders have held their position of power for an, unwelcomed, extended period of time. It is
puzzling how the peoples of such regimes are not only oblivious to the rise of their authoritative
leader but also permits the tyrant to adversely impact their country.
This study focuses on the conditions that permit powerful leaders to become a dictator2 in
the post-World War II era. It is important to understand these conditions because generally by
the time a dictator has arisen, it is difficult to loosen their grip on power. The best way to avoid
such leadership is to beware of the clues and indicators that lead up the rise. Current literature
discusses two compelling variables that constitute the rise of a dictator: economic principles and
realists principles. Together the two schools of thought offer seven indicators that serve as the
conditions that foster the rise of a dictatorship: unstable economy of country, room for additional
wealth gain overtime, manipulative moves by the dictator, cooperation for gains, kin in power,
suppression of ideas, and ousting competition. However, one variable alone does not contribute
to the conditions that account for the rise of a dictator, thus, in the post-World War II era;
dictatorships arise from the weak conditions that result from economic instability of the country,
and consequently fosters the predatory3 characteristics of the powerful leader.
1 Fagen, Richard R. “Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro.” The Western Political Quarterly 18, no. 2 (June 1965): 280, http://www.jstor.org/stable/444996 2 Historically dictators have been men; therefore, gender references will be male. 3 Merriam-‐Webster defines predatory as inclined or intended to injure or exploit others for personal gain or profit.
2
To evaluate the thesis, four cases will be used to detect the presence of the seven
conditions. The cases that will be used are Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Utopia’s
John Smith and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. The diversity amongst the cases encompasses
various regions and time periods that powerful leaders have come to rise and therefore allow
variability in the evaluation. The presence of an indicator is value at one point and then the
probability for the autocrat to arise is calculated depending up on the presence of the number of
conditions. The results show that all the cases have at least five out to the seven variables
present; or 0.714 chances of a powerful leader becoming a dictator. The expectation was to have
at least one economic principle and several of the realists’ principles per powerful leader but the
actual results were a little different. Each tyrant had four out of the five realist principles in
common; however, just one of the economic principles was accounted for and only in three of
the cases. There is much room for adjustments in this study, for instance more cases from each
region or time frame would help the research. However, it must be noted and accounted for that
there are stark similarities amongst powerful regimes throughout the different eras and regions of
the world.
Understanding the similarities that persists through each authoritative regime is beneficial
to not only scholars but also the citizens of the countries. Generally, by the time dictatorship has
taken root it is extremely difficult to change their course of leadership, thus being aware of the
common characteristics can serve as a mechanism to stop predatory leaders in the first place.
Furthermore, this study is important because predatory leaders deprive their respective country
and its citizens of development due to the nature of their regimes.
3
II. WHY DICTATORS COME TO POWER: TWO SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES
A. Introduction
Historically, dictators have come to power and held on to their status in various forms, such
as monarchies, military leadership, and also as civilian leaders. Fidel Castro rose to power in the
midst of an emerging revolution and with full support of the Cuban people and held the position
of president during his reign. The rise of Hafiz al-Asad was due to a coup that he led as
Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army but would not have been as successful without his
allies the Alawis tribesman. Though Hugo Chavez’s coup was unsuccessful, he was elected
Venezuela’s president when President Andre Perez resigned. John Smith was elected president
because he chose to embrace Utopia’s quest for nationalism of the majority ethnicity, the Topees,
in the midst of a civil war.
Each leader has in common not only several personal traits but also economic and
political conditions within their respective country when they began their rise to power. This
paper will focus on the conditions in which authoritarian leaders of post-World War II era have
come to power across different regions of the globe. However, this paper controls for the
historical context of each country in order to look at the specific traits and circumstances in
which it was possible. This is important because it allows for comparison of the leaders across
continent and time frames to understand their rise to power. Various scholars have argued for
diverse theories as to why demagogues come to power. The constructivists contend that dictators
are constructed by the citizens and society;4 but this theory does not offer sufficient evidence or
explanations for the characteristics of the authoritative leader, the state and the people during the
rising period. The economic and realist schools, however, offer the best evidence for a tyrant’s
4 Batatu, Hanna. “Some Observation on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance.” Middle East Journal 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 340, www.jstore.org/stable/4326249
4
rise. The economic school offer an explanation for how poor economic conditions contributes to
the rise of a tyrant, while the realist school offers the strongest account of the leader’s actions
and behaviors. Though the realists offer the strongest explanation for the rising leader’s
authoritative characteristics, the contribution of the economic school cannot be ignored due to
the major contributions the economic conditions of the country provide for a tyrant’s rise.5
B. Where Scholars’ Perspectives Differ
i. The Constructivists
The constructivists argue that dictators are cyclic in nature. Since the citizens do not fully
recover from their traumatic experiences of one tyrant, they are perpetually trapped in a cycle
because they do not know how to avoid the rise of a new autocrat.6 They do not have political
and social ideas and interests formulated to avoid such leaders, and actually have societal
expectations that make way for a super leader. Essentially the leader is created by his followers.7
Though this argument offers a good explanation of chronic dictatorships, it does not offer a good
explanation of what conditions contributed to the rise of these regimes in the first place. The
conditions are far more complex than the citizens creating the grounds for a leader to come to
power. Thus, constructivism is acceptable for explaining why some regions are more prone to
dictatorships than others, but does not offer enough insight to be a solid theory for the conditions
in which dictators arise.
ii. The Economists
The point that economists make is crucial because it gives insight into the societal
conditions in which dictators are created, and also their personal intentions in terms of wealth. 5 Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships.” Economics & Politics 18, no. 1 (March 2006): 21-‐23, EBSCOHOST 6 Rosenberg, Tina. 1995. “Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship.” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 134 7 Fagen, 276
5
They argue that economic instability constitutes one of the conditions which give rise to
predatory leaders. Some scholars claim that such leaders will rise to power when the economy is
deteriorating so they can extract the capital for this own gains.8 In all of the dictatorships
described above, the economic and political stability of the state was fragile. In Cuba, the
citizens were fighting against the Batista regime that was extracting wealth from the people.9
Hugo Chavez sided with the poor oppressed peoples of Venezuela to get support.10 Syria was in
a state of transition from merchant and landed elites to military power when Hafiz al-Asad was
able to enforce his leadership.11 And John Smith came to power during the midst of a downturn
in the civil war.12 During their rise, the dictators-to-be will contribute rents and cooperate to
appease the citizens and his subordinates.13 Thus, they begin their rise to power during an
economically unstable point in their respective country. Further, the tyrant will be motivated to
stay if they are able to extract wealth for personal gain. It is crucial to understand the economic
conditions of a state because the instability within allows a window of opportunity for the
authoritative leader to practice realist principles to establish their powerful position.
iii. The Realists
The realist school of thought offers the best and most thorough explanation for the
conditional characteristics of the dictator-to-be. There are five main premises that demonstrate
the conditions: manipulation of the citizens, acts of cooperation, kin in positions of power,
ousting opposition and suppression of ideas. The first premise is manipulation, and the realist 8 Overland, Jody, Kenneth L. Simons, and Michael Spagat. “Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships.” Public Choice 125, no. 3/4( December 2005): 448, www.jstore.org/stable/30026744. 9 Bonsal, Philip W. 1967. “Cuba, Castro and the United States.” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 2 (January 1967): 264-‐266, www.jstor.org/stable/20039231. 10 Cannon, Barry. “Class/Race Polarization in Venezuela and the Electoral Success of Hugo Chavez: a break with the past or the song remains the same?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2008): 731-‐748. EBSCOHOST (accessed September 28, 2011). 11 Batatu,331-‐34 12 Contact Author 13 Gandhi and Przeworski, 1-‐2
6
principle that demonstrates it is that weak actors are absorbed by powerful actors.14 In these
regimes, the powerful actors are the dictators-to-be and the weak are their subordinates. Due to
the chaotic atmosphere of their state, the desperate citizens subconsciously establish norms for
their ideal leader. The autocrat takes advantage of their vulnerability and becomes far more
powerful than his subordinates. He finds the opportune moment to assume the role of the ideal
leader and manipulates the citizens by temporarily pleasing them. The citizens are weak and
blindly fall into this trap allowing predators to take control of their country and their
livelihoods.15 This formulation holds true for each leader mentioned above. For instance, in
Cuba, the Bastia regime embraced imperialist United States and neglected the peoples’ interests.
Castro used this opportunity to fulfill the needs of Cubans by rejecting the West and favoring
Cuban nationalism. Cubans saw Castro as a leader that was interested in their needs, and he was
able to unit Cubans against the common enemy.16
These episodes of manipulation are viewed as cooperation efforts by the people and those
cooperation efforts continue during their rise. The element of cooperation, as described by
realists, is a tender deed and must be used with caution because it could lead to gains for rival
actors. However, when cooperation does occur it must happen in the context where gains of
others are not harmful to self.17 Thus, cooperation exists between the despot and the citizens if
they see it as an opportunity for absolute gain. A dictator-to-be will make payments, in the form
of infrastructure and favorable economic policies, to his followers if he believes that investments
could lead to longer terms in his position.18 For instance, Chavez spends a less than half of the
14 Baylis, John, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 5th Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 85-‐99. 15 Rosenberg, 142 16 Bonsal, 265-‐267 17 Baylis, Smith and Owens, 85-‐99 18 Overland, Simons, and Spagat, 448-‐458
7
Venezuelan budget on social welfare programs.19 However, what his followers do not realize is
that Chavez intentionally keeps these services basic which do not empower the peoples because
that would be a potential threat to his power. Citizens will consider these small moments of
cooperation as reason to believe that their powerful leader is a legitimate ruler with the best
intentions for the good of the state and the people.
Leaders in such positions are in constant paranoia about potential threats; therefore they
will attempt to hold ultimate power by ensuring that they have authority over the all sectors of
society. They often rely on their kinship group to administrate their regime, which is generally
anti-bureaucratic and unstable.20 The leader at most times will preach bureaucracy, order, and
structure but will inevitably form institutions according to his interests to ensure his ultimate
power. Castro, for example, declared that official organizations will be in place to oversee
development of Cuba; however, he placed himself at the top of these institutions and anyone
below him was chosen on the basis of loyalty, and not expertise.21 The conditions are similar in
al-Asad’s rise to power; he ensured that his tribesmen, family or military was in charge of
leading the significant parts of the government. When necessary, autocrats will rely on their kin
to govern because they are a tool for enforcing and protecting his regime22. Thus, the dictator-to-
be will extend their power to excessive lengths to ensure they reduce threats and opposition.
Though keeping kinship in power is beneficial, the leader is constantly aware of his
potential opposition and will oust threats. Realists contend that relative gains of other actors are a
potential threat to their survival. This is because realists are concerned with gains accumulated
19 Cannon, 743 20 Fagen, 282 21 Fagen, 280 22 Gandhi and Przeworski. 17-‐19
8
by other actors and the potential threat that those gains may cause more than absolute gain.23
After his second run for presidency, President Smith put his opponent, Colonel Andrew Neilson,
in jail for war crimes that the entire government, including Smith, was responsible during the
climax of the war.24 Chavezs’ policies on the other hand, intimidated and bullied the educated
classes causing an exodus of people from the country.25 Tyrants keep strong hold of their power
by ensuring that challenges against their rule, kinship or otherwise, are inhibited.26
Challenges for the dictator-to-be can also arise from interests and ideas taking root within
the society that are harmful to their regime. To prevent such competition, tyrants forcibly
suppress the ideas of their people. In each of the case studies, the leader denies political
opposition, free press and scholarly thought. The tyrant will impose propaganda that focuses on
his mission and interests, while disqualifying moral values for power and personal gains. The
forceful suppression of ideas leaves states in vulnerable positions.27 People of such regimes do
not have the opportunity to develop their political interests and ideas; as a result, autocrats are
able to vigorously dominate the political arena. Therefore, they are left unchecked, with near
complete control of ideas and opinions during their reign.
C. Conclusion
Economic and realist principles provide the best explanation for the conditions in which
dictators arise. Though the constructivists offer a compelling argument as to why dictatorships
are cyclic in nature, they fail to explain how dictators arise in the first place. They also neglect to
look at the potential dictator and explain his behavior during his rise to power. Economists,
23 Baylis, Smith and Owens, 85-‐99 24 Contact Author 25 Lynn, Jonathan and Jon Hemming. “U.N. experts say Venezuela’s Chavez Creating Fear.” Reuters, 16 December 16 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/16/us-‐venezuela-‐judge-‐idUSTRE5BF3SU20091216 (accessed September 28, 2011). 26 Rosenberg, 137-‐139 27 Rosenberg, 136-‐140
9
however, make points that are crucial to understanding the realist practices that predatory leaders
engage in during their rise. This school of thought sets the stage for how the leader is able to get
his foot in the door to gain power, and why they would go to such lengths. The economic
instability of a country leaves the citizens vulnerable to predation, and a leader with extreme
realist ideals step into the plate for his personal gains.
Realist principles, however, coherently pull together the leader, actors and common
characteristics of authoritarian regimes. They explain that citizens are weak and they are
engrossed by the powerful leader because he manipulates them into thinking that he is their ideal
leader. When necessary he cooperates with the citizen because there are absolute gains for him.
Then the leader achieves absolute control over his government, and when necessary relies on this
trusted kinship to govern. However, if there are threats or opposition to his reign by kin or any
others, the tyrant will oust them. Furthermore, he takes extra steps to prevent the penetration of
ideas against him by suppressing the citizen’s minds. The predatory leader must practice realist
principles in order to be successful in his ascent to power.
In combination, the economic principles and realist principles offer the best explanation
for the conditions that explains a dictator’s rise to power. In the post-World War II era,
instability and predation constitutes the conditions for dictators’ arise because it allows room to
examine the complexity of the conditions in which authoritarian leaders come to power. In
combination with the economic principles, which are economic instability of the state, and room
for wealth gain; and the realists principles, which are manipulating citizens, cooperating for
gains, placing kin in power when necessary, annihilating opposition and suppressing ideas of
citizens, account for the conditions that powerful leader are able to rise to power.
10
III. THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND REALIST PRINCIPLES TO THE RISE OF DICTATORS
Realist and economic principles gives the most compelling explanation for the conditions in
which dictators come to power. Simply put:
à
To be able to understand the full scope of how dictators come to power it is essential to
look at both of these schools. The economic conditions permit the predatory political actor to
seize the chance to realize his full potential and become a dictator. This is because poor
economic conditions foster vulnerable citizens who will be captured by a powerful political
actor. The powerful leader will practice politics with realist intentions in mind. The dictator-to-
be convinces the citizens that he is their leader that will save them from their political misery.
Once in power, the leader demonstrates his concern for the people by appearing to give to the
citizens through acts of cooperation. He also ensures that his position is secure by placing his kin
in necessary positions of power; if anyone threatens his increasingly powerful position he will
oust them, whether they are kin, other individuals and even ideas. Thus, the greater the level of
an unstable economy and the more prevalent the predatory characteristics of a political actor, the
greater the chances are in the rise for a dictatorship. A vulnerable state compromises the citizens’
ability to think thoroughly about their best political options which contributes in favor of the
dictator-to-be to practice power politics in his ascent to power.
Level of economic instability and the more predatory the
characteristics of a political actor
The likelihood for the rise of a dictatorship
11
IV. HOW TO EVALUATE ECONOMICS AND REALIST PRINCIPLES IN DECIPHERING THE RISE OF A DICTATORSHIP
As the literature suggest, there are several explanations for how dictators arise. The most
compelling and constant arguments that describe the conditions in which a dictator rises come
from economic principles and realist principles. Interestingly, the conditions in which a dictator
arises are not based on just economic or just realist principles but are based on interconnected
variables. The literature suggests that when there is a weakness within the country, such as
economic instability, then the powerful leader imposes his predatory practices. It is crucial to
delve into understanding how powerful leaders become dictators because, though there have
been exceptions, the consequences of dictatorships have adverse impact on society. For instance,
tyrants are able to position themselves where they can make personal gains from the country and
the citizens. And what is puzzling is how citizens are able to tolerate the predatory nature of their
leader and government?
To evaluate this contention about dictators and the societies that foster such leaders this
study will evaluate the seven conditions, or indicators, presented by the economic and realist
principles. The economic school of thought offers two indicators: unstable economy of country,
and room for additional wealth gain over time. The realist school of thought offers five
indicators: manipulative moves by the dictator, cooperation for gains, kin in power, suppression
of ideas and ousting competition. The two schools in combination help understand the conditions
in which powerful leaders can rise to dictatorships.
A. Case Studies
To observe the seven indicators, this study uses four cases from various regions: Cuba’s
Fidel Castro, Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, and Utopia’s John Smith. The
first two cases, Castro and al-Asad, are acknowledged and studied dictatorships. Both arose at
12
about the same time but are from different regions of the world. While both used military to rise
to power, their methods of governances were significantly different. Al-Asad relied heavily upon
his military to ensure his rule, while Castro was comparatively a politician. Both of these leaders
took to government by force. Smith and Chavez, on the other hand were democratically elected
as the president of their respective nations.28 They have emerged recently and are currently
serving in office. Both leaders have not only been subject to criticism for their style of
leadership, but their governments have also been labeled as authoritarian regimes. Though there
have been debates about both Smith’s and Chavez’s political intentions, they have not been
officially labeled dictators.
The case selection serves several purposes. First they take into account the time and
space factor of the original question which encompasses the post-World War II era, additionally
the four cases are scattered in the timeframe span between WWII to the present day. Second,
since this paper is about the conditions which permit the rise of a dictator the cases of Castro and
al-Asad, which are declared dictatorships, provide as a check for the methods of this study.
Chavez and Smith on the other hand are not dictators but they are certainly authoritative leaders,
therefore these cases are a test for the study. Finally, each leader contributes variety and
uniqueness such as the region of the world, type of predecessor and their national history.
Variety is crucial because it allows some range for testing the hypothesis, which seeks to
understand the rise of a wide range of dictators that vary with region, time, and type.
B. Defining and Operationalizing the Concepts
To test the hypotheses, this study will solely focus on the empirical data presented by the
four cases since it is impossible to simulate the characteristics of a dictator and his country. The
28 Since ideologies vary by region, state, culture, etc. this study is objective to each respective state’s idea of democratic elections.
13
hypothesis states that the greater the level of an unstable economy and the more prevalent the
predatory characteristics of a political actor, the greater the chances are in the rise of a
dictatorships. Historical data and historical accounts will be the best source of information to
evaluate the conditions that fosters dictatorships in the post-World War II era for this study.
The independent variables are the economic and political principles that the country and
the dictator display during the rise of an authoritarian leader. There are two economic conditions
that serve as indictors for the pending rise of a dictator. First condition is unstable economic
situations within their respective country, which includes political policies that causes civil
unrest, long drawn famines or droughts, and volatile currency. The second condition is that if the
dictator-to-be deems there is room for more personal wealth gain over time, for instance by
exploiting natural resources, then that serves as an incentive for the leader to pursue their realist
intentions. Thus, both of the economic conditions permits a weakness with in the country or
society that the dictator-to-be can utilize to rise to power.
For from the realist perspective, there are five conditions in which the predatory leader
will begin his arise to a dictator position. First they display various actions to manipulate the
peoples of his country, for instance, by making promises, supporting mild views to entice various
supporters, or displaying strong emotions. Second, the dictator-to-be will strategically cooperate
through acts that are beneficial to the people such as providing grants, building roads, or
providing welfare programs, in order to appease his followers for temporary gainful reasons. To
protect his position and to keep any threat in check, the powerful leader will place kin, such as
family or close friends or military comrades, in power positions. To further ensure that citizens
or oppositions do not rise against him, the powerful leader will begin to suppress political ideas
and thoughts. And the final principle that the realists school contends is that the powerful dictator
14
will oust competition by any means necessary. Thus together the two schools provide seven
indicators total that can be used to evaluate the position of the leaders in each case study.
The dependent variable is the likelihood for the rise of a dictatorship, which will be
determined by the presence of the independent variables. The dependent variable takes into
account both the correlative and causal relationship between the independent and dependent
variable. There is correlation because the study implies presence of the conditions strongly
relates to the presences of a dictatorship; while the presences of the conditions are causal factors
of a dictator’s arise. Hence, the relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable constitutes a dual relationship.
It is important to clarify here that due to the intricacies of each case, the timeframe of the
rise for this study cannot be defined in terms of number of years or any fixed period of time.
Each leader, country, economy, government and other varying factors are so unique that setting a
time limit would be adverse to the intentions of this study. Additionally, this study is concerned
with the conditions that persisted for the leader’s regime to take root; therefore, the indicators
may or may not be present before they take their power position. Some of these conditions will
be present before they assume power and others will come after they have established an
executive position, this is simply because powerful leaders do not campaign to be a dictator and
nor do they assume their executive position as a dictator. Often it takes time for their roles to be
developed and for society to realize. Thus there will not be a time frame designated in this study
to observe for the conditions; however, the author has controlled her research to when the
authoritative leader became politically active to the years leading up to the powerful leader
acquiring their executive position and several years afterwards to find evidence of the variables.
15
Due to the nature of the evidence that is necessary, this study will not only look at
scholarly articles but also at media sources such as newspapers, magazines and interviews to
demonstrate presence of the indicators. Most of the scholarly sources are from the JSTOR search
engine and the Foreign Affairs magazine. The news sources are mainly from the British
Broadcasting Company and the New York Times websites. It is important to shift through
various sources because this study is looking for the presence of the indicators that demonstrates
the conditions.
C. The Methodology
To demonstrate the relationships between the independent and the dependent variable this
study will use the formula:
∑ (all present indicators) = the probability of a dictator to arise. X
The summation symbol ( ∑ ) represents the action of adding of all variables. The X
represents the number of all indicators being studied. Each indicator is measured with whole
numbers only. The presence of the indicator is valued at 1, while the lack of an indicator will
have 0 values. For each case study, the seven indicators will be evaluated by searching through
sources for evidence of each indicator. The sum of all present indicators will be divided by the
total number of indicators, which is 7. Then the result of formula is the probability that a dictator
will arise given the presence of the indicators.
The probability of the rise of a dictator will range between 0 and 1. Zero probability will
mean that since there is a lack of the given indicators there will be an unlikely rise to a
dictatorship; and the probability of one will signify a likely rise of a dictatorship. Thus, by
adhering to simple mathematics, the closer the value is to 1 the higher the probability that a
dictatorship will arise. If the indicators are not present when evaluating the dictator then there is
16
clear evidence that independent variable needs to be revaluated, thus the formula is also a check
on the evidence.
The formula follows as so:
∑ (a + b + c + d + e + f + g) = the probability of a dictator to arise. X Indicator Coder: a = (unstable economy of country) b = (room for additional wealth gain over time) c = (manipulative moves by the dictator) d = (cooperation for gains) e = (kin in power) f = (suppression of ideas) g = (ousting competition) X = total number of variables = 7
In the analysis, each case will be studied separately for the presence of the indicators.
The sum of all present variables will be added and then divided by X which is the total number
of variables, which is seven. Then the probability of the dictator to arise will have a numerical
value. Given that two of the cases are studied and declared dictatorships, the formula will be a
check on the conditions and their relationship to the rise of a dictator. For the remaining cases,
the formula is a mechanism to determine the probability of the leader’s rise through the
behaviors they are displaying. This formula also leaves room to rank each of the tyrants and also
to compare across variables to see which ones are more prevalent and which ones are not.
D. Conclusion
The concepts and methodology in this study are designed to withstand time and new
discoveries. It is important to note that X can change. Future studies may discover that there are
new variables that contribute to the conditions in which a dictator arises, or that the current
variables are obsolete. Thus the equation can stay the same while new indicators can be added or
17
old ones withdrawn as necessary. The formula allows a mechanism to measure the likelihood for
a dictator to rise in relations to the indicators.
However, there are limitations to this methodology, the foremost being that the indicators
are subject to bias since determining the ramifications of each indicator is at the discretion of the
researcher. For instance what the author may perceive as the presence of one indicator may not
be shared by others. Furthermore, the severity or the intensity in which the indicators are
displayed in each regime is deliberately not taken into account because it would take away from
the original question, which asks what the conditions are for a dictator to arise. Thus the author
has deemed the severities of the conditions are irrelevant because this study is only seeking to
discover those conditions; however, a future study can be developed to take into account the
variability. After the analysis the methodology section will need to be revisited to evaluate its
validity.
18
V. UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF A DICATORSHIP: A CROSS CASE ANALYSIS
How are dictators able to pry into the lives of citizens, hold down opposition and manage
to stay in power for extended periods of time? Unfortunately, citizens of dictatorship regimes are
often too late to realize the full intentions of their powerful leader. This study intends evaluate
the conditions in which a powerful leader is able to become an authoritative leader. Though there
is variability in the types of dictatorships that arise, the literature demonstrates that there are in
fact similarities amongst the various types of authoritative dictatorships. The literature presents
two different independent variables, the economic school of thought and the realist school of
thought. Together, the two independent variable offer seven conditions, or indicators, that persist
in the rise of a dictatorship are an unstable economy, room for additional wealth gain,
manipulative moves by the leader, cooperative moves by the leader, kind in power, suppression
of ideas, and ousting competition. This section will evaluate four case studies for the presence of
each condition, account for which conditions are most persistent across each case, and then use
the probability formula to determine the likelihood of an arise given the presence of the
conditions.
A. Hafiz al-Asad
In the mid-1900s the bourgeoisie ruling class began to fall apart as a result of intra-class
conflicts. The military, which was comprised of the rural tribesmen and the poor, had historically
been a fail-safe for the landed elites during power shifts amongst themselves to keep domestic
turmoil in check. However, during the conflicts in 1940s the military took it upon themselves to
seize the government.29 The initial military hold was by no means stable; there were factions
within the military, as well as factions amongst the proletariat, such as those who supported the
29 Pipes, Daniel. “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria.” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4(October 1989): 440-‐442www.jstore.org/stable/4283331.
19
Ba’th Party’s socialist principles and where others didn’t, aspiring to take control of the
government. And even deeper were the factions within Syria due to the religious, socioeconomic,
and ethnic diversity.30
Amongst the contention Hafiz al-Asad began to gain power, he was a powerful military
leader who also had support from the Ba’th party. Al-Asad took hold of the country on
November 13, 1963 by a bloodless coup against a stricter Ba’th civilian government.31 Many
subgroups in Syria appreciated him because of his rural background and also his policies. He was
from a rural tribe, the Alawis, and therefore earned much respect from the rural and poor
peoples. Also, most of the wealthy supported him because of his liberal economic policies,32
which contrasted starkly with his opposition that believed in nationalizing land and agrarian
reform33. Additionally, Al-Asad chose invest to into domestic development programs that
improved the infrastructure such as building ports, roads and dams.34 Thus, in his rise to power
al-Asad manipulated and catered to the needs of the various subgroups in his country.
Al-Asad began his manipulation long before he seized control of Syria. About a year
prior to his coup, al-Asad forced the government to accept policies that alters its structure in
favor of the military. And as soon as he seized control he began to enforce those policies.35
However, al-Asad was not home free by the time he assumed power; he inherited many
economic problems posed by the prior leaders whose policies varied to certain extremes, such as
30 Van Dam, Nikolas. “Sectarian and Regional Factionalism in the Syrian Political Elite.” Middle East Journal 32, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 201-‐203, www.jstore.org/stable/4325740. 31 Galvani, John. “Syria and the Baath Party.” MERIP Reports, no. 25 (February 1974): 9-‐10, www.jstore.org/stable/3011567. 32 Van Dam, 207 33 Galvani, 5 34 Galvani, 3 35 Galvani, 10
20
the socialist principles of the Ba’th party.36 Moreover, basic goods were not available on the
shelves of grocery stores, and the country was so heavily indebted to their neighbors, the West
and international organizations, such as the World Bank refused to give out loans to the Syrian
government.37 Additionally, right before al-Asad’s coup, Syria was in turmoil in terms of land
distribution and economic disputes.38 Thus, Syria was extremely unstable and economically
distraught due to the alternating governments and various factions of political ideology.
Though Al-Asad was favored by various factions of Syria, he also had opposition that
specifically came from the Sunni majority. They often accused al-Asad and the Alawis of
conspiring to appropriate the government over a long period of time.39 To maintain control, Al-
Asad relied heavily on his kin to reduce the threat of uprising, and to keep his opposition in
check.40 His trustworthy military colleagues, who were overwhelmingly Alawis and rural
tribesmen, were in charge of running the different regions of Syria.41 And al-Asad placed his
brother, Rifaat al-Asad, in charge of running the military and his personal army. Rifaat carried
out his mission and ensured that al-Asad was on top until Rifaat decided to compete against al-
Asad at which point Rifaat was forced into exile.42
In the case of al-Asad, his rise to authoritarian rule demonstrates the presence of five of
the seven variables: a, c, d, e and g. He entered his leadership position during an especially
economically instable period and held his position by manipulating to the needs of the different
factions within Syria. Al-Asad cooperated with the people by fostering development projects that
36 Galvani, 3 37 Dickey, Christopher. “Assad and His Allies: Irreconcilable Differences?” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 1 (Fall 1987): 65, www.jstor.org/stable/20043292. 38 Galvani, 7-‐9 39 Pipes, 440-‐442 40 Batatu, 331-‐333 41 Dickey, 63 42 Dickey, 60
21
benefited not only the poor but also the wealthy, therefore gaining support for his leadership
while he was establishing a hold on government. And finally, once al-Asad took hold of his
position in government, he put his family, tribesmen and military colleagues to work by placing
his most trusted kin in positions of power. However, al-Asad never took any threat, even from
his kin, light heartedly; he forced his brother into exile as soon as it became clear that his brother
had intentions to rule Syria as well.
Likelihood of al-Asad of becoming an authoritarian leader:
∑ (a + c + d + e + g) = 5 = 0.714 = the probability of a al-Asad to arise X 7 The probability of al-Asad to rise to power is 0.7 given the presence of the conditions. Thus, the
case of al-Asad supports the thesis because both independent variables are present and it also
demonstrates a high likelihood of his rise to power.
B. Fidel Castro
In the 1950s Cuba was experiencing a deteriorating economy as the US government and
companies were reaping the profits of not only Cuban sugar harvests but also infrastructure such
as railroads and electricity.43 The government at the time was run by Fulgencio Batista who was
allowing his country to succumb to US control for his personal benefit. Batista added to the
turmoil within his country by committing murder by the masses. Fidel Castro attempted on
multiple occasions to win elections against the Batista regime, however, he was either jailed or
exiled during all of his initial attempts.44
In the 1958 elections, Fidel Castro ran against Batista and lost; however, the Cuban
people were captured by his efforts to run for election and were intrigued by his guerrilla efforts
43 Bonsal, 264-‐265 44 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. “Background Note: Cuba.” US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm (accessed December 10, 2011).
22
in the North against the Batista regime that all opposition against Batista united together in favor
of Castro.45 His charisma and extraordinary leadership skills served as most beneficial as he
drew strengths from all segments of society during his efforts against the Batista regime. When
Batista fled Cuba in early January of 1959, Castro used his military strength to hold down and
oust any opposition; by mid-February of that year, has assumed his power position.46
Though Castro’s stance was based on anti-American measures, which most all Cubans
sought, the position he took initially for other political issues were relatively mild compared to
what it became later down the road.47 In essence, he capitalized on the common enemy of the
Cuban people to band them together in order to come to power. While many people at the time
believed that Castro was their savior from the US control, they quickly realized that he had
alternative intentions.48 Those that posed a threat to Castro either fled the country or were
executed. Reports of more than 3,000 executions have been accounted for during his initial years
in executive leadership.49 The people that posed as threat to Castro were the elite, the educated
and those who had alternate political agendas. To Castro, loyalty was so crucially important, that
he often ruthlessly held down any one that opposed him.50 During his early years of rule he
caused a mass exodus of educated and politically active Cubans to the US in fear of their
lives.5152
45 Bonsal, 256-‐266 46 US Department of State, Background Notes: Cuba 47 Bonsal, 266-‐267 48 Fagan, 278-‐281 49 US Department of State, Background Notes: Cuba 50 “History: Fidel Castro.” BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/castro_fidel.shtml (accessed September 24, 2011). 51 Cave, Damien. “Exiles Want to Expand U.S.-‐Cuba Relations.” BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/us/politics/09cuba.html?_r=3&th&emc=th (November 22, 2011). 52 Pedraza, Silvia. “Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migration.” Cuba in Transition: ASCE (1995): 312-‐315, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume5/pdfs/FILE26.pdf.
23
Thus, to keep his position in check, he only entrusted his kin to carry out his mission.
Castro placed his brother, Raul Castro, as his second and relied on his longest standing ally and
Che Guevara for advice on how to lead Cuba through the revolution.53 Castro assumed many
positions in office, and those he was not able to control, he placed individuals into positions
based on loyalty and not expertise.54
The Cubans that were not able to prosper during the prior regimes greatly benefited from
Castro’s regime because he implemented basic social welfare programs, such as free education
and healthcare. During his rise to power, Castro went through two phases in terms of his
relationships with the citizens. At first he manipulated all the Cubans to rise against the Batista
regimes; however, once he was in power, he empowered the lower socioeconomic classes and
ousted the elite and educated classes to prevent strong opposition or threat to his rule.
During Castro’s rise to power, six out of the seven variables were present: a, c, d, e, f, and
g. Castro began his path to authoritarian rule in the middle of an economic debate where Cubans
were increasingly being neglected their fair share of the profits from their natural resources.
Castro captured the Cubans and ousted Batista from government. However, he also ousted all
other threats to his power position by exiling or executing politicians, the wealthy and
intellectuals. Thus he suppressed ideas as well. He placed only his loyal subjects into positions of
power, and reciprocated to the remaining Cubans, who were of lower socioeconomic classes, by
offering basic welfare and education programs.
Likelihood of Castro of becoming an authoritarian leader:
∑ (a + c + d + e + f + g) = 6 = 0.857 = the probability Castro to arise. X 7
53 “History: Fidel Castro” 54 Faagn, 284
24
Fidel Castro’s case also supports the thesis because both independents variables are present and
the likelihood of Castro’s rise to an authoritarian rule is high.
C. John Smith
John Smith was rightfully elected to his position. He came to office in the middle of a
thirty year civil war against between the majority Topees Majority government and the Piaas
minority guerrillas called the Piaas Liberators (PL). Smith came with the pretenses of ending the
war and having a peaceful consensus to its end.55 During his campaign Smith maximized his
support by referring to his personal background. He is Topees elite yet from the rural south, thus
he was able to align himself with the many factions of Topees majority population.56 His
relationships with the minority populations were at first mild and widely accepted by the Topees
majority during his arise. He promised to dissolve some of the presidential powers and assign
them to provincial governors because that entrusts some power to minority populations and
would avoid conflicts.57
However, once in office, Smith began to practice rather aggressive politics that ended the
Civil War. When his approval ratings were high, he passed a proposal at the start of his second
term that removes presidential term limits from the constitutions, allowing him to run for a third
and possibly an unlimited number of terms.58 Furthermore, he revised the 17th amendment of the
constitution to empower the president to appoint certain members such as the Elections
Commissioner and the Investigator of Corruption; this measure contradicts the very intentions of
the 17th amendment which is to reduce the power of the president.59 However, he rewards those
who support him such as the police force of Utopia, who is being offered a grant if they choose
55 Contact Author 56 Contact Author 57 Contact Author 58 Contact Author 59 Contact Author
25
to raise a third child.60 Smith took advantage of his ratings at the time by convincing the people
that he is passing such measures for the goodness of the people and the country.
To ensure his position, Smith has been empowering his family members, which include
his wife, sons, brother, aunts, etc. to take leadership roles in the government. His young son,
Jordan, was elected into the parliament recently; President Smith has given him the blessing to
be the president one day in place of his father.61 His brother Joe is the Defense Secretary, whose
position has expanded to Control of the Armed Forces to the Land Reclamation and
Development Corporation. Jerry, a younger brother, is the Economic-Development Minister,
whose duties have expanded to include wildlife conservation.62 His cousin, Jeff, is elected
Speaker of Parliament with the power to agree or to disagree to certain motions, such as in the
case of presidential impeachment motion.
Smith has taken many measures to suppress ideas and prevent opposition to his
government. The two most popular actions are the alleged assassination of dissenting journalist
and the arrest of his strongest opposition, Colonel Andrew Neilson, in his second round of
elections. Three days after the assassination of Bernard Williams, a journalist and editor, his last
editorial was published. In the article, Williams called out Smith, amongst many things about his
regime, for his death. And instead of searching for the killer or providing condolences for his
family, the government attempted pin it on the opposition parties and the Piaas as conspiracy
against the government.63 At the end of the civil war, Colonel Andrew Neilson was as popular as
Smith for his tactics at the end. However, when Neilson ran for presidential elections, the
government began accusing him of war crimes, illegal handling of weapons and conspiring with
60 Contact Author 61 Contact Author 62 Contact Author 63 Contact Author
26
the enemy during the war.64 Neilson became extremely unpopular from the allegations and was
unable to compete with Smith’s monopoly in the media and government. Right after the
elections, which Smith won by a landslide, Neilson was court-martial and imprisoned for the
supposed crimes he committed.65
The case of Smith presents five out of the seven conditions: c, d, e, f and g. Smith
manipulated the people of Utopia twice; during his initial campaign, he adhered to the agenda of
the Topees factions and the minority populations. Then when he defeated the PL, he used his
high ratings to boost his power as the president. He relies on his family to run the government
and keep any opposition in check. Rise of major opposition and ideas was ruthlessly denied.
However, his policies support those that support him, which tend to be policies that favor the
Topees majority.
Likelihood of Smith of becoming a dictator:
∑ (c + d + e + f + g) = 5 = 0.714 = the probability of a Smith to arise X 7 Though Smiths regime has high likelihood of arising to a dictatorship, it does not support the
entire thesis. Only the realist independent variable is present. Though Utopia does not have a
constantly stable economy, it was not significantly volatile. And indicator ‘b,’ which is
additional room for wealth gain, does not appear to be part of Smith’s agenda. It can be
speculated that ending the civil war can account for a condition, or indicator, that gives the
powerful leader an opportunity to practice his predatory characteristics, instead of the economic
condition.
64 Contact Author 65 Contact Author
27
D. Hugo Chavez
Hugo Chavez was a paratrooper that attempted a coup six years before he was elected
President in 1998. Though his coup failed, he was widely received by the lower socioeconomic
peoples of Venezuela when he ran for president.66 Right before elections the former president,
Carlos Perez, had passed neoliberal economic policies that benefited the small wealthy classes
and hindered the poor majority of Venezuela. 67 Chavez sided with the dark and poor natives by
often referring to his own skin color to relate to his supporters.68 Chavez used class and racial
divide as a manipulation tool to gain support and he declares that he is just like the poor.
Once in office, he enforced policies that rejected neoliberal regulations which privatized
enterprises that range from oil companies to wealthy businesses. Instead, he nationalized many
operations including the oil reserves of Venezuela, declaring it Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PdVSA).69 Chavez rejects the wealthy and the West for their economic policies, and promised
the poor that he will serve them well. A portion of the proceeds from the oil reserves go toward
policies that aim to make the conditions for the poor better.70 Chavez instilled programs call
“missiones” that are welfare programs which reach out to the rural community to provide
services such as basic education and healthcare programs.71 Much of the programs are aimed at
providing for the poor and indigenous populations of the country, which make up an
66 Cannon, 732-‐734 67 Gott, Richard. “Venezuela under Hugo Chavez: The Originality of the Bolivarian Project.” New Political Economy 13, no. 4 (December 2008): 482-‐484, EBSCOHOST. 68 Cannon 734-‐ 735 69 Gott, 481-‐483 70 Cannon, 739-‐740 71 Cannon, 733
28
overwhelming portion of the population. Many call Chavez supporters emotional supporters
because they are capture by his charisma and not necessarily his policies.72
Chavez has loyalty from not just the poor of Venezuela but also from the military counter
parts which take part in his mission to oust competition.73 When Chavez was overthrown in a
coup in 2002, he was quickly replaced because of his support from the poor majority and
military loyalties.74 Chavez does not allow opposition to foster and has tight control over his
regime. Many of Chavez’s opponents have been forced to exile or accused of corruption or put to
trial by Chavez’s forces.75 His policies in government include that of an amendment that allows
him to be the president for termless limits.76 Chavez also has the power to appoints his vice
president, choose his cabinet members and change any parts of legislation he feels necessary.
In the case of Chavez, six out of the seven conditions are present: a, c, d, e, f, and g.
Chavez seized the government at a time when his predecessor was implementing policies that
were progressively hindering the economic wellbeing to the majority of the Venezuelan citizens.
He manipulated the citizens by relating to his own class and racial background as a mechanism
to rally support. Once in power Chavez only relies on his loyal kin and military to carry out his
tasks, and further secures his positions by suppressing alternate ideas of the wealthy and
intellectuals by jailing or exiling them. Chavez receives most of his support from the lower
socioeconomic classes because he provides them with basic welfare and health programs.
72 Cannon, 742-‐743 73 “Hugo Chavez.” The New York Times, 20 October 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/hugo_chavez/index.html?scp=1-‐spot&sq=hugo%20chavez&st=cse (accessed November 24, 2011). 74 “Profile: Hugo Chavez.” BBC News, 29 September 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-‐latin-‐america-‐10086210 (accessed December 5, 2011). 75 “Factbox: Chavez opposition aims to unite for 2012 vote.” Reuters, 13 September 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/us-‐venezuela-‐chavez-‐opposition-‐idUSTRE78C6HF20110913 (accessed November 24, 2011). 76 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. “Background Note: Venezuela,” US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm (accessed December 10, 2011).
29
Likelihood of Chavez of becoming an authoritarian leader:
∑ (a + c + d + e + f + g) = 6 = 0.857 = the probability of a Chavez to arise X 7 Chavez’s regime demonstrates support for the thesis because both independent variables are
accounted for, and a high probability to rise to a dictatorship is also evident.
E. Summary of Case Analysis
Table 1 Presence of Conditions in Powerful Regimes
In each of the cases studied there is high probability that a dictatorship would arise given
the indicators that were present during their initial stages of leadership. All cases had at least five
of the seven indicators present, and none had all indicators present. Two of the cases had a
probability of 0.714, Hafiz al-Asad and Utopia, and the remaining two 0.875, Fidel Castro and
Hugo Chavez. The differences between two declared dictatorships are not significantly different
from the two current powerful leaderships. The two Latin American dictatorships have the most
in common; both have the same six of the seven variables present. Indicator c, d, e, and g were
present in all the cases while indicator b was not present in any of the cases. During the study, it
Conditions (Indicators) Hafiz a-Asad Fidel Castro John Smith Hugo Chavez Total a: unstable economy
1 1 0 1 3
b: personal wealth gains
0 0 0 0 0
c: manipulative moves
1 1 1 1 4
d: cooperation for gains
0 1 1 1 3
e: kin in power
1 1 1 1 4
f: suppression of ideas
1 1 1 1 4
g: ousting competition
1 1 1 1 4
Probability of an arise 0.714 0.875 0.714 0.875
30
was difficult to decipher how indicator b can be accounted for because to label a cause as “room
for additional wealth gain” would have to be based on assumptions and not on evidence. For
instance, Venezuela and Syria have oil, but the evidence that pins the leaders of their stay to gain
wealth from oil was a difficult endeavor. Thus none of the cases had viable evidence to establish
indicator b.
There is however one contention in the cases. In three cases both the independent
variables were present; however, in President Smith’s case, only the five realist indicators were
present. Thus the case of Smith only supports part of the hypothesis. It is important to note
however, that Smith was responsible for ending a 30 year civil war, and therefore his popularity
jumped significantly during his arise. Whether this counts as an intervening variable or a variable
that needs further research remains to be studied, but this fact cannot be ignored.
Overall however, the evidence supports the hypothesis, which states that the greater the
level of an unstable economy and the more prevalent the characteristics of a political actor, the
greater the chances are for the rise of a dictatorship. Both of the declared dictatorships
demonstrate a high probability in the likelihood of a rise to a dictatorship, and the current
powerful regimes show evidence of moving towards a dictatorship. With the exception of
Utopia, the evidence shows that economically hard times are the most vulnerable times that
foster powerful leaders. Somehow economic hard times allow citizens to justify the predatory
nature of the leader. This can be a deadly combination for the citizens and the development of a
country, as dictatorships in the past have unveiled.
31
VI. CONCLUSION
It is curious how predatory leaders have taken root in society. Fidel Castro and Hafiz al-
Asad relied on their military to establish control and rule within their respective countries; while
Hugo Castro and Smith were elected into office. All of these leaders have a long history of
political involvement, demonstrated strong leadership skills and were able to find the window of
opportunity that ultimately lead to their rise to power. How do these leaders convince their
country and the citizens of their authoritarian leadership? And why do citizens accept a leader
that becomes increasingly powerful? Such questions are the contentions that revolve around
dictatorships. The literature show that there a variety of explanations for how a dictator arises
that range from psychological explanations to economic explanations. The author however has
found that two schools of thought offer the most compelling evidence: the realist and economic
schools.
The realist and economic schools together can best explain the conditions in which a
dictator arises. Most of the literatures either explains why a dictator stays in power or evaluates
what sort of behaviors powerful leaders display. This study however, is about the conditions in
which a dictator arises, and the realist and economic school together offer seven indicators that
signify those conditions. The seven indicators are unstable economy, room for additional gains,
manipulative moves by dictator-to-be, cooperation for gains, kin power, suppression of ideas,
and ousting competition. Thus, a powerful leader rises to a dictatorship by way of unstable
economic conditions of the country and pursuing realist principles that are predatory by nature.
To investigate the thesis, the author constructed a formula to evaluate the evidence. In the
formula the seven conditions that were extracted from the literature was given a value of 1 unit
each. Using whole numbers, the presence of an indicator is worth 1 point and the lack of it was 0
32
points. Then the total of all indicators present was divided by the total number of indictors,
which is seven, to find the probability of a dictator’s arise. The formula was applied to four
cases, Al-Asad of Syria, Fidel Castro of Cuba, John Smith of Utopia and Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela.
All the cases demonstrated high probability of a dictator to arise. Each leader
demonstrated realist characteristics but not all the cases demonstrated significant economic
vulnerability. Smith’s case is slightly different from the others because he became the president
in the middle of a long drawn civil war and ended it before his second term began, thus there is
an intervening variable in Smith’s case that account for the weak point of the citizens’ agenda.
Instead of pointing to a perpetrator that hindered the economy of the country, he pointed his
finger at the rebels for causing hardship over the years. Essentially, Smith found something other
than a failing economy to round the citizens together.
The most impressive maneuver by the autocrats is their ability to relate with the various
factions within their society. Hafiz al-Asad had the most factions out of all the cases combined.
Al-Asad was dealing with people of different socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnicities, religions,
tribes and so much more. Where his predecessors failed was their inability to come to consensus
with the various groups, and where al-Asad succeeded was his ability to initially practice mild
politics and relate to variety of subgroups in Syria. Such manipulative maneuvers were the most
abundant evidence available in each case.
There is much research that needs to be done on this specific topic. There are a few
weaknesses about this study that could be improved. First is to include many more cases for a
better evaluation, and also include cases that are not authoritative leaderships. Second would be
to have better standards for determining the presence of each indicator. And finally, it would be
33
beneficial for both the study and any patron using the methods for evaluating a leader to have an
actual time frame for detecting the variables. The last point alone can constitute a study of its
own. Though there are drawbacks to this study, the fact that there are overwhelming similarities
among the cases cannot be ignored. Additionally, the role that the economic conditions play on
the realists conditions implies a causal relationship that constitutes for the rise of dictatorship.
This relationship is an important subject for future research because it could possibly reveal why
some powerful leader rise and others do not.
Overall the thesis holds rather well. Though there is the lack of the economic variable in
the case of Smith, the presence of the civil was as an intervening variable makes up for the
purpose of the economic variable. From this exercise, it can be determined that the two current
leaderships, though not officially declared dictatorships, are fostering the conditions in which
dictators arise. Citizens of vulnerable countries can take this study into account and evaluate
their current or potential leaders for the presence of the indicators to determine the likelihood of
the leader’s path. It is so important to understand the conditions in which a dictator arises
because like garden weeds, once a tyrant have a strong hold of the government, it is not only a
daunting task to remove but the remnants of their presences will linger and the possibility of
another up rise is likely. Thus, the most effective method to preventing predatory leaders is to
understand the conditions in which they arise so that they can be stopped at the earliest detection.
34
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