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Risk-BasedStructural Integrity Management of
Offshore Jacket Structures
Guidance Note April 2017 NI 624 DT R00 E
Risk-Based Structural Integrity Management of
Offshore Jacket Structures
April 2017
Guidance Note NI 624 DT R00 E
Marine & Offshore 92571 Neuilly sur Seine Cedex – France
Tel: + 33 (0)1 55 24 70 00 – Fax: + 33 (0)1 55 24 70 25 Website: http://www.veristar.com
Email: [email protected] 2017 Bureau Veritas - All rights reserved
Bur
eau
Verit
as
Mar
ine
& O
ffsho
re
Gen
eral
Con
ditio
nsca
refu
lly fo
llow
ed a
t all
times
by
the
Clie
nt.
2.12
“Se
rvic
es”
mea
ns th
e se
rvic
es s
et o
ut in
cla
uses
2.2
and
2.3
bu
t al
so o
ther
ser
vice
s re
late
d to
Cla
ssifi
catio
n an
d C
ertif
icat
ion
such
as,
but
not
lim
ited
to: s
hip
and
com
pany
saf
ety
man
agem
ent
certi
ficat
ion,
shi
p an
d po
rt se
curit
y ce
rtific
atio
n, tr
aini
ng a
ctiv
ities
, all
activ
ities
and
dut
ies
inci
dent
al t
here
to s
uch
as d
ocum
enta
tion
on
any
supp
ortin
g m
eans
, so
ftwar
e, i
nstru
men
tatio
n, m
easu
rem
ents
, te
sts
and
trial
s on
boa
rd.
2.13
“So
ciet
y” m
eans
the
cla
ssifi
catio
n so
ciet
y ‘B
urea
u Ve
ritas
M
arin
e &
Offs
hore
SA
S’, a
com
pany
org
aniz
ed a
nd e
xist
ing
unde
r th
e la
ws
of F
ranc
e, r
egis
tere
d in
Nan
terre
und
er t
he n
umbe
r 82
1 13
1 84
4,
or a
ny o
ther
lega
l ent
ity o
f Bur
eau
Verit
as G
roup
as
may
be
spec
ified
in th
e re
leva
nt c
ontra
ct, a
nd w
hose
mai
n ac
tiviti
es
are
Cla
ssifi
catio
n an
d C
ertif
icat
ion
of s
hips
or o
ffsho
re u
nits
. 2.
14 “
Uni
t” m
eans
any
shi
p or
ves
sel o
r of
fsho
re u
nit o
r st
ruct
ure
of a
ny ty
pe o
r par
t of i
t or s
yste
m w
heth
er li
nked
to s
hore
, riv
er b
ed
or s
ea b
ed o
r no
t, w
heth
er o
pera
ted
or lo
cate
d at
sea
or
in in
land
w
ater
s or
par
tly o
n la
nd, i
nclu
ding
sub
mar
ines
, hov
ercr
afts
, dril
ling
rigs,
offs
hore
ins
talla
tions
of
any
type
and
of
any
purp
ose,
the
ir re
late
d an
d an
cilla
ry e
quip
men
t, su
bsea
or
not,
such
as
wel
l hea
d an
d pi
pelin
es,
moo
ring
legs
and
moo
ring
poin
ts o
r ot
herw
ise
as
deci
ded
by th
e So
ciet
y.
3. S
CO
PE A
ND
PER
FOR
MA
NC
E 3.
1 Th
e So
ciet
y sh
all p
erfo
rm t
he S
ervi
ces
acco
rdin
g to
the
app
li-ca
ble
natio
nal
and
inte
rnat
iona
l st
anda
rds
and
Indu
stry
Pra
ctic
e an
d al
way
s on
the
ass
umpt
ion
that
the
Clie
nt i
s aw
are
of s
uch
stan
dard
s an
d In
dust
ry P
ract
ice.
3.
2 Su
bjec
t to
the
Serv
ices
per
form
ance
and
alw
ays
by re
fere
nce
to
the
Rul
es, t
he S
ocie
ty s
hall:
•
revi
ew t
he c
onst
ruct
ion
arra
ngem
ents
of
the
Uni
t as
sho
wn
on
the
docu
men
ts p
rovi
ded
by th
e C
lient
; •
cond
uct t
he U
nit s
urve
ys a
t the
pla
ce o
f the
Uni
t con
stru
ctio
n;
• cl
ass
the
Uni
t and
ent
ers
the
Uni
t’s c
lass
in th
e So
ciet
y’s
Reg
is-
ter;
• su
rvey
the
Uni
t pe
riodi
cally
in
serv
ice
to n
ote
that
the
req
uire
-m
ents
for
the
mai
nten
ance
of
clas
s ar
e m
et.
The
Clie
nt s
hall
info
rm th
e So
ciet
y w
ithou
t del
ay o
f any
circ
umst
ance
s w
hich
may
ca
use
any
chan
ges
on th
e co
nduc
ted
surv
eys
or S
ervi
ces.
Th
e So
ciet
y w
ill n
ot:
• de
clar
e th
e ac
cept
ance
or
com
mis
sion
ing
of a
Uni
t, no
r its
co
nstru
ctio
n in
con
form
ity w
ith it
s de
sign
, suc
h ac
tiviti
es r
emai
n-in
g un
der
the
excl
usiv
e re
spon
sibi
lity
of t
he U
nit’s
ow
ner
or
build
er;
• en
gage
in a
ny w
ork
rela
ting
to th
e de
sign
, con
stru
ctio
n, p
rodu
c-tio
n or
rep
air
chec
ks,
neith
er in
the
ope
ratio
n of
the
Uni
t or
the
Uni
t’s tr
ade,
nei
ther
in a
ny a
dvis
ory
serv
ices
, and
can
not b
e he
ld
liabl
e on
thos
e ac
coun
ts.
4. R
ESER
VATI
ON
CLA
USE
4.
1 Th
e C
lient
sha
ll al
way
s: (
i) m
aint
ain
the
Uni
t in
good
con
ditio
n af
ter s
urve
ys; (
ii) p
rese
nt th
e U
nit a
fter s
urve
ys; (
iii) p
rese
nt th
e U
nit
for
surv
eys;
and
(iv
) in
form
the
Soc
iety
in
due
cour
se o
f an
y ci
rcum
stan
ces
that
may
affe
ct th
e gi
ven
appr
aise
men
t of t
he U
nit o
r ca
use
to m
odify
the
scop
e of
the
Serv
ices
.4.
2 C
ertif
icat
es r
efer
ring
to t
he S
ocie
ty’s
Rul
es a
re o
nly
valid
if
issu
ed b
y th
e So
ciet
y.4.
3 Th
e So
ciet
y ha
s en
tire
cont
rol o
ver
the
Cer
tific
ates
issu
ed a
nd
may
at
any
time
with
draw
a C
ertif
icat
e at
its
ent
ire d
iscr
etio
n in
clud
ing,
but
not
lim
ited
to,
in t
he f
ollo
win
g si
tuat
ions
: w
here
the
C
lient
fails
to c
ompl
y in
due
tim
e w
ith in
stru
ctio
ns o
f the
Soc
iety
or
whe
re th
e C
lient
fails
to p
ay in
acc
orda
nce
with
cla
use
6.2
here
un-
der.
5. A
CC
ESS
AN
D S
AFE
TY
5.1
The
Clie
nt s
hall
give
to
the
Soci
ety
all a
cces
s an
d in
form
atio
n ne
cess
ary
for
the
effic
ient
per
form
ance
of
the
requ
este
d Se
rvic
es.
The
Clie
nt s
hall
be t
he s
ole
resp
onsi
ble
for
the
cond
ition
s of
pr
esen
tatio
n of
the
Uni
t for
test
s, tr
ials
and
sur
veys
and
the
cond
i-tio
ns u
nder
whi
ch te
sts
and
trial
s ar
e ca
rried
out
. Any
info
rmat
ion,
dr
awin
gs, e
tc. r
equi
red
for t
he p
erfo
rman
ce o
f the
Ser
vice
s m
ust b
e m
ade
avai
labl
e in
due
tim
e.
5.2
The
Clie
nt s
hall
notif
y th
e So
ciet
y of
any
rel
evan
t sa
fety
issu
e an
d sh
all
take
all
nece
ssar
y sa
fety
-rel
ated
mea
sure
s to
ens
ure
a sa
fe w
ork
envi
ronm
ent f
or th
e So
ciet
y or
any
of i
ts o
ffice
rs, e
mpl
oy-
ees,
ser
vant
s, a
gent
s or
sub
cont
ract
ors
and
shal
l co
mpl
y w
ith a
ll ap
plic
able
saf
ety
regu
latio
ns.
6. P
AYM
ENT
OF
INVO
ICES
6.
1 Th
e pr
ovis
ion
of th
e Se
rvic
es b
y th
e So
ciet
y, w
heth
er c
ompl
ete
or n
ot,
invo
lve,
for
the
par
t ca
rried
out
, th
e pa
ymen
t of
fee
s th
irty
(30)
day
s up
on is
suan
ce o
f the
invo
ice.
6.2
With
out
prej
udic
e to
any
oth
er r
ight
s he
reun
der,
in c
ase
of
Clie
nt’s
pay
men
t def
ault,
the
Soci
ety
shal
l be
entit
led
to c
harg
e, in
ad
ditio
n to
the
amou
nt n
ot p
rope
rly p
aid,
in
tere
sts
equa
l to
twel
ve
(12)
mon
ths
LIBO
R p
lus
two
(2)
per
cent
as
of d
ue d
ate
calc
ulat
ed
on t
he n
umbe
r of
day
s su
ch p
aym
ent
is d
elin
quen
t. Th
e So
ciet
y sh
all
also
hav
e th
e rig
ht t
o w
ithho
ld c
ertif
icat
es a
nd o
ther
doc
u-m
ents
and
/or t
o su
spen
d or
revo
ke th
e va
lidity
of c
ertif
icat
es.
6.3
In c
ase
of d
ispu
te o
n th
e in
voic
e am
ount
, the
und
ispu
ted
porti
on
of th
e in
voic
e sh
all b
e pa
id a
nd a
n ex
plan
atio
n on
the
disp
ute
shal
l ac
com
pany
pay
men
t so
tha
t ac
tion
can
be t
aken
to
solv
e th
e di
sput
e.
7. L
IAB
ILIT
Y 7.
1 Th
e So
ciet
y be
ars
no l
iabi
lity
for
cons
eque
ntia
l lo
ss.
For
the
purp
ose
of t
his
clau
se c
onse
quen
tial
loss
sha
ll in
clud
e, w
ithou
t lim
itatio
n:
• In
dire
ct o
r con
sequ
entia
l los
s;
• An
y lo
ss a
nd/o
r de
ferr
al o
f pr
oduc
tion,
los
s of
pro
duct
, lo
ss o
f us
e, lo
ss o
f bar
gain
, los
s of
rev
enue
, los
s of
pro
fit o
r ant
icip
ated
pr
ofit,
loss
of
busi
ness
and
bus
ines
s in
terr
uptio
n, in
eac
h ca
se
whe
ther
dire
ct o
r ind
irect
. Th
e C
lient
sha
ll sa
ve,
inde
mni
fy,
defe
nd a
nd h
old
harm
less
the
So
ciet
y fro
m t
he C
lient
’s o
wn
cons
eque
ntia
l lo
ss r
egar
dles
s of
ca
use.
7.
2 In
any
cas
e, th
e So
ciet
y’s
max
imum
liab
ility
tow
ards
the
Clie
nt
is li
mite
d to
one
hun
dred
and
fifty
per
-cen
ts (1
50%
) of t
he p
rice
paid
by
the
Clie
nt t
o th
e So
ciet
y fo
r th
e pe
rform
ance
of
the
Serv
ices
. Th
is li
mit
appl
ies
rega
rdle
ss o
f fau
lt by
the
Soci
ety,
incl
udin
g br
each
of
con
tract
, bre
ach
of w
arra
nty,
tort,
stri
ct li
abili
ty, b
reac
h of
sta
tute
. 7.
3 Al
l cl
aim
s sh
all
be p
rese
nted
to
the
Soci
ety
in w
ritin
g w
ithin
th
ree
(3)
mon
ths
of th
e Se
rvic
es’ p
erfo
rman
ce o
r (if
late
r) th
e da
te
whe
n th
e ev
ents
whi
ch a
re r
elie
d on
wer
e fir
st d
isco
vere
d by
the
C
lient
. An
y cl
aim
not
so
pres
ente
d as
def
ined
abo
ve s
hall
be
deem
ed w
aive
d an
d ab
solu
tely
tim
e ba
rred
.
8. IN
DEM
NIT
Y C
LAU
SE
8.1
The
Clie
nt a
gree
s to
rel
ease
, ind
emni
fy a
nd h
old
harm
less
the
Soci
ety
from
and
aga
inst
any
and
all
clai
ms,
dem
ands
, law
suits
or
actio
ns f
or d
amag
es,
incl
udin
g le
gal
fees
, fo
r ha
rm o
r lo
ss t
o pe
rson
s an
d/or
pro
perty
tang
ible
, int
angi
ble
or o
ther
wis
e w
hich
may
be
bro
ught
aga
inst
the
Soc
iety
, in
cide
ntal
to,
aris
ing
out
of o
r in
co
nnec
tion
with
the
per
form
ance
of
the
Serv
ices
exc
ept
for
thos
e cl
aim
s ca
used
sol
ely
and
com
plet
ely
by t
he n
eglig
ence
of
the
Soci
ety,
its
offic
ers,
em
ploy
ees,
ser
vant
s, a
gent
s or
sub
cont
ract
ors.
9. T
ERM
INA
TIO
N
9.1
The
Parti
es s
hall
have
the
right
to te
rmin
ate
the
Serv
ices
(an
d th
e re
leva
nt c
ontra
ct)
for
conv
enie
nce
afte
r gi
ving
the
oth
er P
arty
th
irty
(30)
day
s’ w
ritte
n no
tice,
and
with
out
prej
udic
e to
cla
use
6 ab
ove.
9.2
In s
uch
a ca
se, t
he c
lass
gra
nted
to th
e co
ncer
ned
Uni
t and
the
prev
ious
ly i
ssue
d ce
rtific
ates
sha
ll re
mai
n va
lid u
ntil
the
date
of
effe
ct o
f th
e te
rmin
atio
n no
tice
issu
ed,
subj
ect
to c
ompl
ianc
e w
ith
clau
se 4
.1 a
nd 6
abo
ve.
10. F
OR
CE
MA
JEU
RE
10.1
Nei
ther
Par
ty s
hall
be r
espo
nsib
le f
or a
ny f
ailu
re t
o fu
lfil a
ny
term
or p
rovi
sion
of t
he C
ondi
tions
if a
nd to
the
exte
nt th
at fu
lfilm
ent
has
been
del
ayed
or
tem
pora
rily
prev
ente
d by
a f
orce
maj
eure
oc
curr
ence
with
out t
he fa
ult o
r neg
ligen
ce o
f the
Par
ty a
ffect
ed a
nd
whi
ch,
by t
he e
xerc
ise
of r
easo
nabl
e di
ligen
ce,
the
said
Par
ty i
s un
able
to p
rovi
de a
gain
st.
10.2
For
the
purp
ose
of th
is c
laus
e, fo
rce
maj
eure
sha
ll m
ean
any
circ
umst
ance
not
bei
ng w
ithin
a P
arty
’s r
easo
nabl
e co
ntro
l inc
lud-
ing,
but
not
lim
ited
to: a
cts
of G
od, n
atur
al d
isas
ters
, epi
dem
ics
or
pand
emic
s, w
ars,
ter
roris
t at
tack
s, r
iots
, sa
bota
ges,
impo
sitio
ns o
f sa
nctio
ns,
emba
rgoe
s, n
ucle
ar,
chem
ical
or
biol
ogic
al c
onta
min
a-tio
ns,
law
s or
act
ion
take
n by
a g
over
nmen
t or
pub
lic a
utho
rity,
qu
otas
or
proh
ibiti
on,
expr
opria
tions
, de
stru
ctio
ns o
f th
e w
orks
ite,
expl
osio
ns, f
ires,
acc
iden
ts, a
ny la
bour
or
trade
dis
pute
s, s
trike
s or
lo
ckou
ts
11. C
ON
FID
ENTI
ALI
TY
11.1
The
doc
umen
ts a
nd d
ata
prov
ided
to o
r pr
epar
ed b
y th
e So
ciet
y in
pe
rform
ing
the
Serv
ices
, and
the
info
rmat
ion
mad
e av
aila
ble
to t
he S
ocie
ty,
are
treat
ed a
s co
nfid
entia
l ex
cept
whe
re t
he
info
rmat
ion:
• is
alre
ady
know
n by
the
rec
eivi
ng P
arty
fro
m a
noth
er s
ourc
e an
d is
pr
oper
ly a
nd la
wfu
lly in
the
poss
essi
on o
f the
rec
eivi
ng P
arty
prio
r to
th
e da
te th
at it
is d
iscl
osed
;•
is a
lread
y in
pos
sess
ion
of t
he p
ublic
or
has
ente
red
the
publ
ic
dom
ain,
oth
erw
ise
than
thro
ugh
a br
each
of t
his
oblig
atio
n;•
is a
cqui
red
inde
pend
ently
fro
m a
thi
rd p
arty
tha
t ha
s th
e rig
ht t
o di
ssem
inat
e su
ch in
form
atio
n;•
is re
quire
d to
be
disc
lose
d un
der a
pplic
able
law
or
by a
gov
ernm
enta
l or
der,
decr
ee,
regu
latio
n or
rul
e or
by
a st
ock
exch
ange
aut
horit
y (p
rovi
ded
that
the
rece
ivin
g Pa
rty s
hall
mak
e al
l rea
sona
ble
effo
rts to
gi
ve p
rom
pt w
ritte
n no
tice
to th
e di
sclo
sing
Par
ty p
rior
to s
uch
disc
lo-
sure
.11
.2 T
he S
ocie
ty a
nd t
he C
lient
sha
ll us
e th
e co
nfid
entia
l in
form
atio
n ex
clus
ivel
y w
ithin
the
fram
ewor
k of
thei
r ac
tivity
und
erly
ing
thes
e C
ondi
-tio
ns.
11.3
Con
fiden
tial i
nfor
mat
ion
shal
l onl
y be
pro
vide
d to
third
par
ties
with
th
e pr
ior
writ
ten
cons
ent o
f the
oth
er P
arty
. How
ever
, suc
h pr
ior
cons
ent
shal
l no
t be
req
uire
d w
hen
the
Soci
ety
prov
ides
the
con
fiden
tial
info
r-m
atio
n to
a s
ubsi
diar
y.
11.4
The
Soc
iety
sha
ll ha
ve t
he r
ight
to
disc
lose
the
con
fiden
tial i
nfor
-m
atio
n if
requ
ired
to d
o so
und
er re
gula
tions
of t
he In
tern
atio
nal A
ssoc
ia-
tion
of C
lass
ifica
tions
Soc
ietie
s (IA
CS)
or a
ny s
tatu
tory
obl
igat
ions
.
12. I
NTE
LLEC
TUA
L PR
OPE
RTY
12
.1 E
ach
Party
exc
lusi
vely
ow
ns a
ll rig
hts
to i
ts I
ntel
lect
ual
Prop
erty
cr
eate
d be
fore
or
afte
r th
e co
mm
ence
men
t da
te o
f th
e C
ondi
tions
and
w
heth
er o
r not
ass
ocia
ted
with
any
con
tract
bet
wee
n th
e Pa
rties
.12
.2 T
he I
ntel
lect
ual
Prop
erty
dev
elop
ed f
or t
he p
erfo
rman
ce o
f th
e Se
rvic
es in
clud
ing,
but
not
lim
ited
to d
raw
ings
, cal
cula
tions
, and
rep
orts
sh
all r
emai
n ex
clus
ive
prop
erty
of t
he S
ocie
ty.
13. A
SSIG
NM
ENT
13.1
The
con
tract
res
ultin
g fro
m to
thes
e C
ondi
tions
can
not b
e as
sign
ed
or tr
ansf
erre
d by
any
mea
ns b
y a
Party
to a
third
par
ty w
ithou
t the
prio
r w
ritte
n co
nsen
t of t
he o
ther
Par
ty.
13.
2 Th
e So
ciet
y sh
all h
owev
er h
ave
the
right
to
assi
gn o
r tra
nsfe
r by
an
y m
eans
the
said
con
tract
to a
sub
sidi
ary
of th
e Bu
reau
Ver
itas
Gro
up.
14. S
EVER
AB
ILIT
Y 14
.1 I
nval
idity
of
one
or m
ore
prov
isio
ns d
oes
not
affe
ct t
he r
emai
ning
pr
ovis
ions
.14
.2 D
efin
ition
s he
rein
take
pre
cede
nce
over
oth
er d
efin
ition
s w
hich
may
ap
pear
in o
ther
doc
umen
ts is
sued
by
the
Soci
ety.
14.3
In
case
of
doub
t as
to
the
inte
rpre
tatio
n of
the
Con
ditio
ns,
the
Engl
ish
text
sha
ll pr
evai
l.
15. G
OVE
RN
ING
LA
W A
ND
DIS
PUTE
RES
OLU
TIO
N
15.1
The
Con
ditio
ns s
hall
be c
onst
rued
and
gov
erne
d by
the
law
s of
En
glan
d an
d W
ales
.15
.2 T
he S
ocie
ty a
nd t
he C
lient
sha
ll m
ake
ever
y ef
fort
to s
ettle
any
di
sput
e am
icab
ly a
nd in
goo
d fa
ith b
y w
ay o
f neg
otia
tion
with
in th
irty
(30)
da
ys f
rom
the
dat
e of
rec
eipt
by
eith
er o
ne o
f th
e Pa
rties
of
a w
ritte
n no
tice
of s
uch
a di
sput
e.15
.3 F
ailin
g th
at, t
he d
ispu
te s
hall
final
ly b
e se
ttled
by
arbi
tratio
n un
der
the
LCIA
rul
es, w
hich
rul
es a
re d
eem
ed to
be
inco
rpor
ated
by
refe
renc
e in
to th
is c
laus
e. T
he n
umbe
r of a
rbitr
ator
s sh
all b
e th
ree
(3).
The
plac
e of
ar
bitra
tion
shal
l be
Lond
on (U
K).
16. P
RO
FESS
ION
NA
L ET
HIC
S 16
.1 E
ach
Party
sha
ll co
nduc
t al
l act
iviti
es in
com
plia
nce
with
all
law
s,
stat
utes
, rul
es, a
nd re
gula
tions
app
licab
le to
suc
h Pa
rty in
clud
ing
but n
ot
limite
d to
: ch
ild l
abou
r, fo
rced
lab
our,
colle
ctiv
e ba
rgai
ning
, di
scrim
ina-
tion,
ab
use,
w
orki
ng
hour
s an
d m
inim
um
wag
es,
anti-
brib
ery,
an
ti-co
rrup
tion.
Eac
h of
the
Parti
es w
arra
nts
that
nei
ther
it, n
or it
s af
filia
tes,
ha
s m
ade
or w
ill m
ake,
with
res
pect
to th
e m
atte
rs p
rovi
ded
for
here
un-
der,
any
offe
r, pa
ymen
t, gi
ft or
aut
horiz
atio
n of
the
pay
men
t of
any
m
oney
dire
ctly
or
indi
rect
ly, t
o or
for
the
use
or b
enef
it of
any
offi
cial
or
empl
oyee
of t
he g
over
nmen
t, po
litic
al p
arty
, offi
cial
, or c
andi
date
.16
.2 In
add
ition
, the
Clie
nt s
hall
act c
onsi
sten
tly w
ith th
e So
ciet
y’s
Cod
e of
Eth
ics
of B
urea
u Ve
ritas
. ht
tp://
ww
w.b
urea
uver
itas.
com
/hom
e/ab
out-
us/e
thic
s+an
d+co
mpl
ianc
e/
1. IN
DEP
END
ENC
Y O
F TH
E SO
CIE
TY A
ND
APP
LIC
AB
LE T
ERM
S1.
1 Th
e So
ciet
y sh
all r
emai
n at
all
times
an
inde
pend
ent
cont
ract
or
and
neith
er th
e So
ciet
y no
r an
y of
its
offic
ers,
em
ploy
ees,
ser
vant
s,
agen
ts o
r su
bcon
tract
ors
shal
l be
or a
ct a
s an
em
ploy
ee, s
erva
nt o
r ag
ent o
f any
oth
er p
arty
her
eto
in th
e pe
rform
ance
of t
he S
ervi
ces.
1.
2 Th
e op
erat
ions
of
the
Soci
ety
in p
rovi
ding
its
Ser
vice
s ar
e ex
clus
ivel
y co
nduc
ted
by w
ay o
f ra
ndom
insp
ectio
ns a
nd d
o no
t, in
an
y ci
rcum
stan
ces,
invo
lve
mon
itorin
g or
exh
aust
ive
verif
icat
ion.
1.3
The
Soci
ety
acts
as
a se
rvic
es p
rovi
der.
This
can
not b
e co
nstru
ed
as a
n ob
ligat
ion
bear
ing
on t
he S
ocie
ty t
o ob
tain
a r
esul
t or
as
a w
arra
nty.
The
Soc
iety
is
not
and
may
not
be
cons
ider
ed a
s an
un
derw
riter
, br
oker
in
Uni
t’s
sale
or
ch
arte
ring,
ex
pert
in
Uni
t’s
valu
atio
n, c
onsu
lting
eng
inee
r, co
ntro
ller,
nava
l ar
chite
ct,
man
ufac
-tu
rer,
ship
build
er,
repa
ir or
con
vers
ion
yard
, ch
arte
rer
or s
hipo
wne
r; no
ne o
f the
m a
bove
list
ed b
eing
relie
ved
of a
ny o
f the
ir ex
pres
sed
or
impl
ied
oblig
atio
ns a
s a
resu
lt of
the
inte
rven
tions
of t
he S
ocie
ty.
1.4
The
Serv
ices
are
car
ried
out
by t
he S
ocie
ty a
ccor
ding
to
the
appl
icab
le R
ules
and
to
the
Bure
au V
erita
s’ C
ode
of E
thic
s. T
he
Soci
ety
only
is q
ualif
ied
to a
pply
and
inte
rpre
t its
Rul
es.
1.5
The
Clie
nt a
ckno
wle
dges
the
late
st v
ersi
ons
of th
e C
ondi
tions
and
of
the
appl
icab
le R
ules
app
lyin
g to
the
Serv
ices
’ per
form
ance
. 1.
6 U
nles
s an
exp
ress
writ
ten
agre
emen
t is
mad
e be
twee
n th
e Pa
rties
on
the
appl
icab
le R
ules
, th
e ap
plic
able
Rul
es s
hall
be t
he
rule
s ap
plic
able
at
the
time
of t
he S
ervi
ces’
per
form
ance
and
con
-tra
ct’s
exe
cutio
n.
1.7
The
Serv
ices
’ per
form
ance
is s
olel
y ba
sed
on th
e C
ondi
tions
. No
othe
r ter
ms
shal
l app
ly w
heth
er e
xpre
ss o
r im
plie
d.
2. D
EFIN
ITIO
NS
2.1
“Cer
tific
ate(
s)”
mea
ns c
lass
cer
tific
ates
, atte
stat
ions
and
repo
rts
follo
win
g th
e So
ciet
y’s
inte
rven
tion.
The
Cer
tific
ates
are
an
appr
aise
-m
ent
give
n by
the
Soc
iety
to
the
Clie
nt,
at a
cer
tain
dat
e, f
ollo
win
g su
rvey
s by
its
surv
eyor
s on
the
leve
l of c
ompl
ianc
e of
the
Uni
t to
the
Soci
ety’
s R
ules
or
to t
he d
ocum
ents
of
refe
renc
e fo
r th
e Se
rvic
es
prov
ided
. The
y ca
nnot
be
cons
trued
as
an im
plie
d or
exp
ress
war
ran-
ty o
f saf
ety,
fitn
ess
for t
he p
urpo
se, s
eaw
orth
ines
s of
the
Uni
t or o
f its
va
lue
for s
ale,
insu
ranc
e or
cha
rterin
g.
2.2
“Cer
tific
atio
n” m
eans
the
activ
ity o
f cer
tific
atio
n in
app
licat
ion
of
natio
nal
and
inte
rnat
iona
l re
gula
tions
or
stan
dard
s, i
n pa
rticu
lar
by
dele
gatio
n fro
m d
iffer
ent g
over
nmen
ts th
at c
an r
esul
t in
the
issu
ance
of
a c
ertif
icat
e.
2.3
“Cla
ssifi
catio
n” m
eans
the
clas
sific
atio
n of
a U
nit t
hat c
an re
sult
or n
ot i
n th
e is
suan
ce o
f a
clas
s ce
rtific
ate
with
ref
eren
ce t
o th
e R
ules
. 2.
4 “C
lient
” m
eans
the
Party
and
/or i
ts re
pres
enta
tive
requ
estin
g th
e Se
rvic
es.
2.5
“Con
ditio
ns”
mea
ns t
he t
erm
s an
d co
nditi
ons
set
out
in t
he
pres
ent d
ocum
ent.
2.6
“Ind
ustr
y Pr
actic
e” m
eans
Int
erna
tiona
l M
ariti
me
and/
or O
ff-sh
ore
indu
stry
pra
ctic
es.
2.7
“Int
elle
ctua
l Pr
oper
ty”
mea
ns a
ll pa
tent
s, r
ight
s to
inv
entio
ns,
utili
ty m
odel
s, c
opyr
ight
and
rela
ted
right
s, tr
ade
mar
ks, l
ogos
, ser
vice
m
arks
, tra
de d
ress
, bus
ines
s an
d do
mai
n na
mes
, rig
hts
in tr
ade
dres
s or
get
-up,
rig
hts
in g
oodw
ill o
r to
sue
for
pass
ing
off,
unfa
ir co
mpe
ti-tio
n rig
hts,
rig
hts
in d
esig
ns,
right
s in
com
pute
r so
ftwar
e, d
atab
ase
right
s, t
opog
raph
y rig
hts,
mor
al r
ight
s, r
ight
s in
con
fiden
tial
info
r-m
atio
n (in
clud
ing
know
-how
and
tra
de s
ecre
ts),
met
hods
and
pro
to-
cols
for
Ser
vice
s, a
nd a
ny o
ther
inte
llect
ual p
rope
rty r
ight
s, in
eac
h ca
se w
heth
er c
apab
le o
f re
gist
ratio
n, r
egis
tere
d or
unr
egis
tere
d an
d in
clud
ing
all a
pplic
atio
ns fo
r and
rene
wal
s, re
vers
ions
or e
xten
sion
s of
su
ch r
ight
s, a
nd a
ll si
mila
r or
equ
ival
ent r
ight
s or
form
s of
pro
tect
ion
in a
ny p
art o
f the
wor
ld.
2.8
“Par
ties”
mea
ns th
e So
ciet
y an
d C
lient
toge
ther
. 2.
9 “P
arty
” m
eans
the
Soci
ety
or th
e C
lient
. 2.
10
“Reg
iste
r”
mea
ns
the
regi
ster
pu
blis
hed
annu
ally
by
th
e So
ciet
y.
2.11
“R
ules
” m
eans
the
Soci
ety’
s cl
assi
ficat
ion
rule
s, g
uida
nce
note
s an
d ot
her
docu
men
ts.T
he R
ules
, pro
cedu
res
and
inst
ruct
ions
of t
he
Soci
ety
take
into
acc
ount
at t
he d
ate
of th
eir
prep
arat
ion
the
stat
e of
cu
rren
tly a
vaila
ble
and
prov
en t
echn
ical
min
imum
req
uire
men
ts b
ut
are
not
a st
anda
rd
or
a co
de
of
cons
truct
ion
neith
er
a gu
ide
fo
r m
aint
enan
ce,
a sa
fety
ha
ndbo
ok
or
a gu
ide
of p
rofe
ssio
nal
prac
tices
, all
of w
hich
are
assu
med
to b
e kn
own
in d
etai
l and
B
urea
u Ve
ritas
Mar
ine
& O
ffsho
re G
ener
al C
ondi
tions
-Ed
ition
Jan
uary
201
7
GUIDANCE NOTE NI 624
Risk-Based Structural Integrity Management ofOffshore Jacket Structures
SECTION 1 GENERAL
SECTION 2 RISK-BASED STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF OFFSHORE JACKET PLATFORMS
SECTION 3 SERVICE PROVISION
APPENDIX 1 TYPICAL PLATFORM’S DATA
April 2017
Section 1 General
1 General 5
1.1 Context1.2 Scope of the document1.3 Overview of API guidance1.4 Overview of the Society’s methods1.5 Organization of the document
2 References 6
2.1
3 Acronyms 6
3.1
Section 2 Risk-based Structural Integrity Management of Offshore Jacket Platforms
1 Introduction 8
1.1 General1.2 Inspection plan1.3 Risk reduction1.4 Benefits of risk-based approach for SIM1.5 Issues for jacket offshore structure1.6 Risk-based SIM framework
2 Collection of data 10
2.1 Purpose2.2 Typical data2.3 Source of data2.4 Quality of data
3 Risk assessment 11
3.1 General3.2 API risk categorization for existing platforms3.3 Factors to consider for specific risk assessment3.4 Risk ranking
4 Inspection plan 15
4.1 Definition of risk-based inspection plan4.2 Motives for risk-based inspection strategy4.3 Some knowledge from inspection experience4.4 Inspection frequency4.5 Inspection scope4.6 Inspection methods4.7 Deployment method
5 Risk reduction 18
5.1 General5.2 Exposure reduction5.3 Likelihood reduction
2 Bureau Veritas April 2017
6 Reassessment of the risk-based inspection strategy 20
6.1 General6.2 Significant change of the assessment premise6.3 After an inspection6.4 After the implementation of a mitigation strategy6.5 After a set of time period
7 Types of risk assessment 21
7.1 General7.2 Qualitative risk assessment7.3 Quantitative risk assessment7.4 Semi-quantitative risk assessment
8 Reporting on risk-based SIM 24
8.1 General8.2 Recommended content
9 Reference documents 24
9.1 API-RP-2SIM9.2 ISO 19901 - 99.3 Final report of the JIP on underwater inspection9.4 Final report of the JIP on SIM9.5 ISO 199029.6 API-RP-5809.7 API-581-BRD
Section 3 Service Provision
1 High level risk-based SIM method 29
1.1 General1.2 Method description1.3 Data gathering1.4 Likelihood of failure1.5 Consequence of failure1.6 Risk ranking1.7 Inspection planning
2 Risk-based SIM method for one jacket platform 32
2.1 General2.2 Method description2.3 Data Gathering2.4 Preliminary assessment2.5 Global risk level assessment2.6 Local risk levels assessment2.7 Inspection strategy
3 Fatigue-based probabilistic method 36
3.1 General3.2 Method description3.3 Data Gathering3.4 Risk acceptance criteria3.5 Tag system3.6 Fatigue analysis3.7 Pushover analysis3.8 Detailed RBI analysis3.9 Scheduling
April 2017 Bureau Veritas 3
Appendix 1 Typical Platform’s Data
1 Platform’s data 41
1.1 Characteristic data1.2 Condition data
4 Bureau Veritas April 2017
NI 624, Sec 1
SECTION 1 GENERAL
1 General
1.1 Context
1.1.1 The API-RP-2SIM has emphasized the value of usingrisk-based approach to develop effective inspection strategyand program. It provides general guidelines to assign a riskcategory to a platform and details on the inspection strategyderived from the risk results. It sets out, also, the main factorsto consider in assessing platforms' risks when owner/opera-tors decide to adopt specific risk categorization e.g. detailrisk assessment techniques or complex risk matrices.
The Society contributed to the joint industry project for thedevelopment of the API-RP-2SIM. It has produced risk-based structural integrity methodologies for offshore jacketplatforms based on API recommendations. It has, also,developed a fatigue-based probabilistic method to deter-mine inspection frequency of tubular welds with higherlikelihoods of fatigue failure.
1.2 Scope of the document
1.2.1 This Guidance Note sets out the main recommenda-tions and requirements of the API-RP-2SIM for implement-ing a risk-based structural integrity management for offshorejacket platforms. It includes, also, relevant guidance fromother international standards and from reference reportsand papers.
The Society service offer is also presented. It includes meth-ods which apply, respectively, to a fleet of platforms, a plat-form unit and the structural components. It implements alltypes of risk assessment from qualitative to fully quantitative.
1.3 Overview of API guidance
1.3.1 The API-RP-2SIM includes guidance for risk-basedapproach to structural integrity management of offshorejacket platforms. It provides general guidelines for assigninga risk category to the platforms in terms of the exposure cat-egory and the likelihood of failure. The exposure category isdefined with respect to life safety exposure and conse-quence of failure including the environmental and the eco-nomic impact. A description of the relevant factors toconsider for determining the life safety exposure categoryand the level of consequence of failure is also given. Thestandard allows qualitative, semiquantitative, or fully quanti-tative methods to be used in assessing the level of likelihoodof failure. However no detail is given on how to implementthose methods. Only general guidelines are defined for theassessment of the likelihood of failure category.
The risk-based inspection strategy is specifically concernedwith the routine underwater inspections. However, itrequires that a baseline inspection was conducted and itshould use the findings from the above-water inspectionsand the eventual post-event inspections. The API-RP-2SIMgives detailed recommendations for determining inspectionstrategy from the risk categorization, including risk-basedinspection intervals and work scope, survey techniques anddeployment methods. Typical ranges of risk-based inspec-tion intervals are provided with respect to the platform risklevel along with a description of the inspection scope ofwork. The associated risk-based inspection program has tobe a minimum level II survey, according to the API classifi-cation of survey levels, but has to specify if higher surveylevels (e.g. level III and IV) are required.
When risk-based approach is not adopted, API provides adefault inspection program including pre-defined in-serviceinspection intervals and survey levels based on the expo-sure category only.
The recommended practice provides, in addition, generalguidelines on risk reduction options when a jacket platformis deemed as no longer fit-for-purpose.
1.4 Overview of the Society’s methods
1.4.1 The Society has developed three methods for riskassessment and inspection plan development as part of therisk-based structural integrity management of offshorejacket platforms, namely:• a high level risk-based SIM method• a risk-based SIM method for a jacket platform
• and a fatigue-based probabilistic method.
1.4.2 The high level method applies to a fleet of jacket plat-forms and uses a qualitative risk assessment method. Itallows a risk category to be assigned to each platform of afleet and inspection intervals and general inspectionrequirements to be developed based on the API guidanceand the inspection trends. The risk assessment methodserves as a mean to provide relative risk ranking of the plat-forms in a fleet, in order to identify the platforms most atrisk and which require more inspection focus or a detailedrisk analysis. It can also serve as a mean to compare giveninspection strategies in order to identify the best one withrespect to the risk impact or to another specific decision cri-teria adopted by owner/operators.
1.4.3 The risk-based SIM method for a jacket platform pro-vides a global risk assessment which allows inspectioninterval and inspection requirements based on API guid-ance to be defined. It provides also local risk ranking of theplatform's structural components, which allows, if required,the local inspections' scope of work to be defined. Theglobal risk assessment allows using of the qualitative
April 2017 Bureau Veritas 5
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approach of the high level method or structural analysisresults (e.g. reserve strength ratio) to develop inspectionplanning. The local risk ranking uses a semi-quantitativeapproach based on the results from in-place analysis andfatigue analysis. The method should be applied, followingthe high level method, on the platforms the most at risk andwhich require a more detailed risk analysis.
1.4.4 The fatigue-based probabilistic method uses a fullprobabilistic approach to develop inspection planning for aplatform's welded joints subject to fatigue. It requires afatigue analysis and several ultimate strength analyses to becarried out. The fatigue analysis allows the welded jointswith higher likelihood of fatigue failure to be identified. Theultimate strength analyses include a pushover analysis ofthe structure in its intact condition and pushover analyses ofthe structure in damage condition assuming a fatigue failureon the identified higher-fatigue welded joints taken sepa-rately. Structural reliability methods are used to computethe probabilities. The probabilities of fatigue failure of theselected welded joints and the probabilities of collapse fail-ure of the associated damaged structures are computed.Those probabilities are then combined to derive the proba-bility of collapse failure of the platform. The optimal inspec-tion plan is given by the one that minimizes the expectedoperational cost, including inspection and maintenancecost and failure cost. This method suits the jacket platformsfor which the welded joints that are critical for the structuralintegrity (e.g. end connections of primary members) arereported to have higher likelihood of fatigue failure.
1.5 Organization of the document
1.5.1 In addition to the current introductive section, thisGuidance Note includes two sections. The first oneaddresses the key elements the risk-based SIM of offshorejacket structures according to the API-RP-2SIM supple-mented with relevant guidelines from other internationalstandards and reference reports and papers. The second onepresents the Society service provision, including the highlevel SIM method, the SIM method for one jacket platformand the fatigue-based probabilistic method.
2 References
2.1
2.1.1
a) API-RP-2SIM, Structural Integrity Management of FixedOffshore Structures, 1st ed., Washington: API PublishingServices, 2014.
b) API-RP-2A-WSD, Recommended Practice for Planning,Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms-Working Stress Design, 22nd ed., Washington: API Pub-lishing Services, 2014.
c) API-RP-2A-WSD, Recommended Practice for Planning,Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms-Working Stress Design, 21st ed., Washington: API Pub-lishing Services, 2000.
d) API-RP-580, Risk-Based Inspection Technology, 2nd ed.,Washington: API Publishing Services, 2009.
e) API-RP-581, Risk-Based Inspection Technology, 2nd ed.,Washington: API Publishing Services, 2008.
f) API-581-BRD, Base Ressource Document - Risk-BasedInspection Technology, 2nd ed., Washington: API Pub-lishing Services, 2000.
g) ISO 19902:2007, Petroleum and natural gas industries -Fixed steel offshore structures, ISO, Ed., Geneva: ISO,2007.
h) ISO 19901-9, Structural integrity management Offshorestructures, ISO, under preparation.
i) MSL, "Rationalization and Optimization of UnderwaterInspection Planning consistent with API-RP-2A section14": JIP Final Report, 2000.
j) Atkins, "Development of Guidance on Structural Integ-rity Management of Fixed Offshore Structures": JIP FinalReport, 2011.
k) Nelson A., Technical Performance Measures for NorthSea Jacket Structures, HSE Research report, 2003.
l) DeFranco S., O'Connor P., Tallin A., Roy R. and PuskarF., Development of a Risk Based Underwater Inspection(RBUI) Process for Prioritizing Inspections of LargerNumbers of Platforms, OTC 10846, 1999.
m) Turner J. W., Wisch D. J. and Guynes S. J., A Review ofOperations and Mitigation Methods for Offshore Plat-forms, OTC 7486, 1994.
n) Faber, M. H,. Risk-based inspection: The framework.Structural engineering international, 12(3), 186-195,2002.
o) Goyet J., Boutillier V. and Rouhan A., Risk-basedInspection for Offshore Structures, Ships and OffshoreStructures, 8 (3-4), 303-318, 2013.
3 Acronyms
3.1
3.1.1 ACFM : Alternating Current Field MeasurementACPD : Alternative Current Potential Drop
API : American Petroleum InstituteCoF : Consequence of failureCP : Cathodic Protection
CVI : Close Visual InspectionECD : Eddy Current DetectionETA : Event Tree Analysis
FEM : Finite Element ModelFFP : Fitness-For-Purpose
FMD : Flooded Member DetectionFORM : First Order Reliability MethodFTA : Fault Tree Analysis
GPS : Global Positioning SystemGVI : General Visual InspectionHAZID : HAZard IDentification
JIP : Joint Industry ProjectLAT : Lowest Astronomical Tide
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LoF : Likelihood of FailureMPI : Magnetic Particle InspectionNDT : Non Destructive TestingPA : Phase ArrayPLL : Potential Loss of LifePOB : Personnel On BoardPoD : Probability of DetectionPoF : Probability of FailureQRA : Quantitative Risk AssessmentRAC : Risk Acceptance CriteriaRAO : Response Amplitude Operator
RBI : Risk-Based Inspection
ROC : Receiver Operating Curve
ROV : Remote Operating Vehicle
RP : Recommended Practice
RSR : Reserve Strength Ratio
RT : Radiographic Technique
SCF : Stress Concentration Factor
SIM : Structural Integrity Management
SMR : Strengthening Modification and Repair
TOFD : Time of Flight Diffraction.
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SECTION 2 RISK-BASED STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF OFFSHORE JACKET PLATFORMS
1 Introduction
1.1 General
1.1.1 Risk-based SIM uses risk analysis to develop SIMstrategy, including inspection strategy and risk reductionmeasures, with respect to the actual risk level.
1.2 Inspection plan
1.2.1 The overall inspection plan for offshore jacket struc-tures includes the following types of inspections:
• routine above-water inspections to evaluate the condi-tion of the platform topsides and which should be con-ducted on an annual basis
• a baseline underwater inspection to determine the as-installed condition of the platform
• routine underwater inspections to evaluate the condi-tion of the underwater portion of the platform andappurtenances
• and special or post-event inspections to determine thecondition of the platform after events such as extrememetocean event or collision.
Among them, only the routine underwater inspections canbe driven by the platform risk level. However, implement-ing risk-based routine underwater inspections requires thata baseline inspection was conducted and should take intoconsideration data from the other inspections types e.g.above-water inspections and post-event inspections.
A risk-based routine underwater inspection provides:
• an inspection interval or a next inspection date consis-tent with the platform risk level
• the inspection coverage
• the inspection techniques to be used
• and the expected residual level of risk after inspectionor the mitigation actions.
In particular, inspection coverage can specify the criticalstructural details from a risk point of view and which haveto be inspected or a percentage of structural details to beinspected in order to provide representative condition dataon the overall structure.
1.3 Risk reduction
1.3.1 Whenever the estimated risk level for the platform ishigher than an acceptable limit, modifications on the plat-form should be considered to reduce this risk level. Twocategories of risk reduction measures can be carried out:
• Exposure mitigation e.g. reduction of hydrocarboninventory, reduction of the manning level
• Likelihood reduction e.g. deck load reduction, global orlocal strengthening.
1.4 Benefits of risk-based approach for SIM
1.4.1 Risk-based approaches allow owners/operators todevelop inspection strategies which prioritized the struc-tural items the most at risk. This results in:
• an overall reduction in risk
• a cost optimization as the approach aims at providingan effective inspection plan
• an effective data collection as data need not be col-lected for all the structural items but higher priorityshould be given to those more at risk. Thus, more effortcan be spent on those structural items, which allowsmore accurate information to be collected
• and an understanding and acceptance of current risk asthe approach is based on the assessment of the currentcondition of the structure under study.
1.5 Issues for jacket offshore structure
1.5.1 The implementation of a risk-based approach for theSIM of jacket offshore structures raises some specific issues,described in the following sections.
1.5.2 Availability of the platform's data
Some useful data (e.g. fabrication and installation data,baseline inspection records or other previous inspectionrecords) may not be available, especially for ageing plat-forms. This is mostly because those records don't exist orbecause the operator is not aware of what data he has,where those data are being kept and who is in charge ofdata management.
There are two main ways to deal with missing data:
• The first and recommended option is to consider surveyto collect the necessary information. This option is moreexpensive but it will provide accurate data on the plat-form condition and allow for an accurate risk levelassessment.
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• The second one is to perform the risk analysis usingappropriate conservative assumptions where the infor-mation is missing. This option is simple but could resultin a rough risk assessment.
1.5.3 Accuracy of the risk assessment
Platform collapse failures are rare events. Therefore, thereare little data to develop comprehensive collapse failurestatistics of jacket platforms like other items such asmachinery or equipment.
In an attempt to compute the risk level accurately, model-based quantitative methods are used. However, these meth-ods usually require more data and more computationaleffort. Moreover, care should be taken in formulating themodel of the damage mechanism and in selecting the prob-abilistic distributions that represent the uncertaintiesinvolved. It is usually recommended that a knowledgeableperson be involved in implementing such methods.
Most often a relative risk ranking approach is used. It con-sists in assessing the risk level based on experience withother structures taken as a benchmark. In this case, detailedquantitative assessment is not necessary, but simply assign-ing scores to the structural items with respect to relevant fac-tors that influence the risk level can be well enough. Thescoring process can be carried out in a systematic way witha dedicated mathematic formulation or by gathering experts'opinion through dedicated workshops or meetings. Even ifthis relative risk ranking does not allow the ideal inspectionstrategy to be determined, it shows on what structural itemsthe risk management effort should focus: the higher rankedones.
1.5.4 Relationship between risk level and inspection frequency
There is no objective means to link the results of a relativerisk ranking assessment to an inspection plan, especially toan inspection frequency, as the risk values are not absolute.In this case, risk-based inspection strategies rely on:
• standards' requirements or recommendations, whichgather the good practices of the dedicated industry
• and experts' opinion, who could provide inspectionstrategies all the more suitable as their level of expertiseis higher.
However, relative ranking can allow different inspectionstrategies to be compared, by simply measuring theirrespective risk impacts, in order to find the best one. In thiscase, the ability of the risk ranking process to properly com-pare inspection strategies should be validated first.
1.6 Risk-based SIM framework
1.6.1 The overall SIM process consists of four primary ele-ments: DATA, EVALUATION, STRATEGY and PROGRAM(see Fig 1):
• DATA relates to the implementation of a data manage-ment system for collecting, compiling and updating theplatforms' data.
• EVALUATION aims at assessing the impact that newplatforms' data have on the structural integrity and leadsto carry out risk categorization and structural analysisfor the assessment of fitness-for-purpose and to considerrisk reduction actions when the estimated risk level ishigher than an acceptable limit.
• STRATEGY relates to the development and the imple-mentation of inspection strategy and possibly risk reduc-tion actions from the results of the evaluation step.
• PROGRAM refers to the execution of the inspection andthe possible risk reduction scope of work, including therequirements for the recording and the reporting of theinspection findings.
The SIM process provides the opportunity for owners/opera-tors to adopt risk principles to develop in-service inspectionstrategy according to the framework depicted in Fig 2.
Figure 1 : SIM process
DATA EVALUATION STRATEGY PROGRAM
Managed systemfor the archivaland retrieval ofSIM data andother pertinent
records
Evaluation ofstructural integrity
and fitness-for-purpose:
development ofremedial actions
Overall inspectionphilosophy and
strategy andcriteria for in-
service inspection
Detailed work scope for inspection
activities andoffshore execution
to obtainquality data
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Figure 2 : Framework for developing risk-based in-service inspection strategy
However, before starting the risk-based SIM frameworkitself, some key issues have to be addressed:
• The objectives of the risk assessment should be clearlystated (e.g. risks understanding, reducing costs, estab-lishing risk criteria).
• The team involved in the risk-based SIM process has tobe formed and the competencies, roles and account-abilities of its members have to be defined.
• The scope of the risk-based SIM should be defined. Risk-based SIM could be applied to a fleet or to a platformincluding eventually its individual structural details. Forthis purpose, an initial screening could be performed toidentify the structural items that are most susceptible tofailure under the design event. Those structural items canbe a group of platforms when the analysis is performed ata fleet level or a group of structural details when the anal-ysis is performed for one platform only.
• The settings of the risk-based SIM have to be defined,namely:
- the applicable standards or codes
- the inspection plan period
- and the period of validity of the results and whenthey have to be revisited.
• A type of risk assessment should be selected (e.g. quali-tative or quantitative) with respect to the objective of therisk assessment.
• The resources and time required have to be estimated.
2 Collection of data
2.1 Purpose
2.1.1 The collection of data and information aims at pro-viding the necessary input:
• to assess the potential factors and their respective influ-ence on the platform's susceptibility to failure
• to give values to the required inputs for the calculationof the likelihood and consequence of failure
• to assist in inspection planning.
2.2 Typical data
2.2.1 SIM data are divided into two broad categories: plat-form's characteristic data and platform's condition data:• The platform's characteristic data is the baseline data
that represents the structure at installation. The charac-teristic data includes:- general platform data- design data- fabrication data- and installation data.
• The platform condition data represents the changes tothe characteristic data that may occur during the life ofthe platform. The condition data includes the following:- in-service inspection data- damage evaluation data- corrosion protection data- SMR data- platform modifications- condition monitoring data- and operational incident data.
The list of typical platform's data for the SIM process pro-vided in the API-RP-2SIM is repeated in appendix for infor-mation.
2.3 Source of data
2.3.1 The main sources of data are the following:• design report including initial drawings• fabrication report• installation report• most recent engineering assessment report including
drawings• site conditions report including metocean climate data
and soil data• in-service inspections records• cathodic protection records• incidents investigation reports
Risk reductionactions
(if required)Inspection plan
Reassessment
Risk ranking
Consequenceof failure
Likelihoodof failure
Collectionof data
Risk assessment
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• modification, strengthening and repairs records
• industry or in-house failure data.
If other risk/hazard analysis results are available, they mayprovide valuable data to the risk analysis for the SIM, e.g.process QRA consequence analysis.
2.4 Quality of data
2.4.1 In order to ensure relevant risk analysis:
• up-to-date data should be used including most recentengineering assessment report and last inspection records
• the input data should be validated by knowledgeablepersons to avoid abnormal data or inaccurate inspectionmeasurement to be used
• the potential impact of the conservative assumptionsmade in case of missing or incorrectly measured datahas to be understood
• sensitivity analysis should be carried out whenever pos-sible to identify the data, the uncertainties of whichaffect more the risk results and which need more care
• and reference to the standards and codes which wereused for design and for in-service inspection should bemade, as they might contain requirement for ensuringquality of data.
3 Risk assessment
3.1 General
3.1.1 Risk is defined according to API-RP-2SIM as the com-bination of the likelihood of some event occurring during atime period of interest (e.g. one year) and the consequences(generally negative) associated with the event.
Sometimes the terms probability or frequency are used,instead of likelihood. Likewise, the term severity is used,instead of consequence.
The API-RP-2SIM defines the failure of a jacket platform asthe collapse of the platform or its inoperability as the resultof the occurrence of an extreme design event (e.g. extremestorm, hurricane, ice movement or earthquake, etc.). Thefactors that could render a jacket platform vulnerable to itsextreme design event are
• an accidental event (e.g. fire, blast, vessel impact,dropped object,…)
• or the degradation of one or many structural components(especially primary structural components) by fatigue orcorrosion.
Risk-based in-service inspections intend to control specifi-cally the second type of failure cause. However, data fromaccidental events that have occurred should also be consid-ered, if they exist, in defining the frequency and scope ofrisk-based in-service inspections.
API-RP-2SIM provides general guidelines for assigning a riskcategory to a given platform. Owner/operators may decideto adopt more detailed risk categorization. This requiresfactors relevant for the platforms' susceptibility to failureand for the impact of failure to be considered.
3.2 API risk categorization for existing plat-forms
3.2.1 API defines a general risk categorization for existingplatforms as the product of their exposure category andtheir likelihood of failure category.
3.2.2 Exposure categoriesThe exposure category of an existing platform is given interms of life safety exposure categories and consequence offailure categories, accounting for possible environmentalconsequence and economic losses. It should be determinedby the more restrictive of either life safety or consequence offailure using the exposure category matrix provided in Tab 1.
Table 1 : Exposure category matrix
The life safety exposure should consider the maximumanticipated environmental event that would be expected tooccur while personnel are on the platform. It is divided intothree main categories:
• S-1: Manned-Nonevacuated category refers to a plat-form that is continuously (or nearly continuously) occu-pied by persons accommodated and living thereon andfrom which personnel evacuation prior to the designenvironmental event (e.g. winter storms, sudden hurri-canes, and earthquakes) is either not intended orimpractical.
• S-2: Manned-Evacuated category refers to a platformthat is normally manned except during a forecast designenvironmental event and requires that all of the follow-ing hold:
- reliable forecast of design environmental event andweather condition before the occurrence of suchevent not likely to inhibit an evacuation
- planned evacuation prior to a design environmentalevent
- sufficient time and resources to safely evacuate theactual platform and all other platforms likely torequire evacuation.
• S-3: Unmanned category refers to a platform that is notnormally manned or a platform that is not classified aseither manned-nonevacuated or manned-evacuated e.g.emergency shelters.
The consequence of failure should consider the anticipatedimpact to the environment, and the possible economicimpact through losses to the owner (platform and equip-ment repair or replacement, lost production, etc), the antic-
Life safety category
Consequence of failure category
C-1 High
C-2 Medium
C-3 Low
S-1 Manned - nonevacuated L-1 L-1 L-1
S-2 Manned - evacuated L-1 L-2 L-2
S-3 Unmanned L-1 L-2 L-3
L-1 : HighL-2 : MediumL-3 : Low
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ipated losses to other operators (lost production throughtrunk lines), and anticipated losses to industry and govern-ment. It is divided into three main categories:
• C-1: High Consequence of Failure category refers to:
- major platforms and/or those platforms that have thepotential for well flow of either oil or scour gas inthe event of failure
- platforms where the shut-in of the oil or scour gasproduction is not planned or not practical prior theoccurrence of the design environmental event
- and platforms that support major transport linesand/or storage facilities for intermittent oil shipment
• C-2: Medium Consequence of Failure category refers toplatforms that would be shut-in during the design eventand requires that:
- all wells, that could flow on their own in the eventof platform failure, contain fully functional subsur-face safety valves (SSVs) compliant with API specifi-cations
- oil storage is limited to process inventory and surgetanks to pipeline transfer.
• C-3: Low Consequence of Failure category refers tominimal platforms where production would be shut-induring design event and requires that:
- all wells, that could flow on their own in the eventof platform failure, contain fully functional subsur-face safety valves (SSVs) compliant with API specifi-cations
- oil storage is limited to process inventory.
3.2.3 Likelihood of failure categories
The likelihood of failure of a platform depends on key struc-tural characteristics e.g. the deck elevation, structural con-figuration given by the number of legs and the bracingsystem, while existing damage or deterioration may indicatea reduction in the platform's strength, thus an increase inthe platform's likelihood of failure.
The API allows qualitative, semiquantitative or quantitativemethods to be used in categorizing the likelihood of failureof a platform. However, no specific guidance is provided toimplement such methods, but general guidelines aredefined for three categories of likelihood of failure.
• The High Likelihood category refers to platforms that arelikely to fail in the design event, meaning that theirreserve strength ratio (RSR) against the 100-year envi-ronmental design event is less than 1 in their presentcondition and overload may lead to wave-in-deck load.
• The Medium Likelihood category refers to platforms thatare not expected to fail in the design event (with a RSRlarger than 1), but which can sustain damage thatrequires inspections after occurrence of the environ-mental design event.
• The Low Likelihood category refers to platforms that arevery unlikely to fail in the design event (with sufficientreserve strength) and are tolerant to any damage or over-load that does occur in the environmental design event.
3.2.4 Risk matrix
The risk matrix may be used to present the risk categoriza-tion results. Generally, its rows represent the likelihood offailure categories while its columns represent the exposurecategories. It is sectored into regions corresponding to riskcategories.
The API provides an example 3 x 3 risk matrix (Tab 2) withsymmetrical risk categories that can be used for platformsrisk categorization as follows:
• Risk Level 1 refers to platforms that should be consid-ered for a major focus of resource, including anincreased inspection frequency and intensity and/ormore detailed engineering.
• Risk Level 2 refers to platforms that should be consid-ered for a moderate focus of resource.
• Risk Level 3 refers to platforms that should be consid-ered for a less focus of resource, including a reducedinspection frequency and scope.
Table 2 : Risk categorization matrix example
3.3 Factors to consider for specific risk assessment
3.3.1 General
Owner/operators may decide to adopt specific risk categori-zation e.g. further subdivide exposure and likelihood of fail-ure categories to adopt a more complex risk matrix or usedetailed risk assessment techniques. General guidance isprovided in the sequel on the factors to consider when aspecific risk assessment is to be set up.
3.3.2 Likelihood of failure factors
Three basic elements have the potential to influence thelikelihood of failure of a jacket platform:
• the expected extreme loads over the platform's lifetimeor service life
• the strength or capacity to bear those extreme loads
• the management system of inspection, analysis andrepair.
In fact, a change in the anticipated extreme load such as alower deck elevation or an increase in the topside load mayincrease the likelihood of failure. Likewise, existing damageor deterioration may reduce the system capacity, and there-fore, may increase the likelihood of failure. The manage-ment system of inspection, analysis and repair reflect theability of the owner/operator to detect existing damage forexample; thus a poor management system increase theuncertainties in the detection of such damage, which maylead to an increase in the likelihood of failure.
Exposure category
Likelihood category
Low Medium High
High Risk level 2 Risk level 1 Risk level 1
Medium Risk level 3 Risk level 2 Risk level 1
Low Risk level 3 Risk level 3 Risk level 2
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Therefore, the assessment of the likelihood of failure shouldbe based on relevant factors that affect the platformstrength, the expected extreme loads and the managementsystem in place.
• The jacket platform strength may be affected by the fol-lowing factors:
- the deck height
- the framing configuration
- the number of legs
- the water depth
- the foundation stability (e.g. piles, grouted piles,mudmat)
- the existing damages and/or deterioration
- the scour
- the debris
- and the performance of the corrosion protection sys-tem.
• The loads applied to the jacket platform are affected bythe following factors:
- the operational metocean loads (e.g. wave, wind,tides, currents and ice)
- the extreme metocean loads
- the platform orientation
- the platform weight
- the equipment and material layouts
- the size and the number of appurtenances (e.g. ris-ers, conductors)
- the active geological processes (e.g. earthquakes,fault planes, seafloor instability, shallow gas)
- and the marine growth.
• The performance of the management system to inspec-tion, analysis and repair is usually evaluated through aquestionnaire and is affected by the following factors:
- the asset integrity management (AIM) and thehealth, safety and environment (HSE) policy
- the existing procedure for inspection, repair andanalysis as well as for the qualification of personnelinvolved in such activities
- existing management of change (MOC) process
- existing data management system and availability ofplatform's characteristic and condition data, includ-ing design, fabrication, installation and inspectionsdata
- the level of confidence in structural analysis results.
3.3.3 Assessment of the likelihood of failureThe assessment of the likelihood of failure accounts for:• the as-installed condition of the platform which repre-
sents the baseline likelihood of failure• the present condition of the platform• the history of maintenance carried out on the platform• and the analysis results and assumptions for the subse-
quent structural assessment to the original design.
The baseline LoF is assessed with respect to:• the original design criteria in terms of the strength and
loads factors listed above, including the degree of con-servatism in the metocean criteria and the degree ofstructural redundancy
• the structural analysis results and assumptions from theoriginal design
• the inspection findings and the strengthening modifica-tion and repair (SMR) carried out during fabrication,transport and installation and their effects on thestrength factors.
Then, the present condition and the maintenance historyadjust the baseline LoF accounting for the effects of the cur-rent values of the strength and loads factors compared totheir design values.
When the available data allow it, one uses comparison ofthe actual platform to reference's ones in the assessment ofLoF. In this case, one can consider:• the platform age in comparison to recent platforms• the original design code in comparison to current
design practices• learning from other similar platforms.
3.3.4 Consequence of failure factorsThe consequence of failure is the impact that a platformfailure has on:• the health and safety• the environment• the business• and the company reputation.
In order to evaluate the CoF, the following factors have tobe considered:• the platform functionality or type• the manning level or the number of personnel on board• the platform location e.g. distance to the shoreline• the production rate• and the anticipated financial costs due to production
lost, cleanup, replacing the platform and redrillingwells, etc.
3.3.5 Assessment of the consequence of failureThe value of the CoF measures the level or the significanceof the impact of failure. Its evaluation is relatively easier in arisk-based SIM study than in a traditional risk analysis forwhich a detailed consequence analysis is required. • When a qualitative risk assessment is adopted, descrip-
tive qualitative values are assigned and the overall CoFrating is the most conservative in terms of safety, envi-ronment or economic consequences.
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3.4 Risk ranking
3.4.1 Once LoF and CoF are developed, the risk rankingprocess consists in rating the platforms' risk levels fromlower to higher risk levels with respect to LoF and CoF.
The results of the risk ranking are presented in simple for-mats to decision-makers and inspection planners to helpthem prioritizing the inspection efforts. The common for-mats are the risk matrix, the risk plot and the risk indextable.
For the purpose of inspection planning, the risk levels arecategorized. There is a general consensus on the criteria tocategorize the risk to safety and environment and such cate-gories are set out in dedicated standards. However, forfinancial risks, companies generally will develop their owncriteria. Cost-benefit analysis is a useful mean to achievethis.
3.4.2 Risk matrix
The risk matrix is very effective mean to present the riskranking results. It uses a categorization of the LoF and theCoF. The platforms' risk levels are positioned into the boxesof the risk matrix. Different sizes of matrices may be used(e.g. 3 x 3, 5 x 5, etc.) along with different numbers of riskcategories (e.g. 3, 5, etc.).
The risk matrix is sectored into regions corresponding to riskcategories. Many risk matrix format can be encountereddepending on the risk acceptance criteria. Fig 3 showssome typical examples of risk matrix format. A symmetricalrisk matrix gives the same weight to both LoF and CoF. Anunsymmetrical risk matrix assigns especially more weight toCoF to reflect the risk aversion of a company. Special riskmatrix format may be adopted that may classify the boxhaving lowest LoF and highest CoF in critical risk region toreflect the fact that lower LoF are usually inaccurately esti-mated and therefore high consequence structures withlower LoF are to be classified into the critical risk region.
Table 3 : Example of risk index table
3.4.3 Risk plotThe risk plot is better suited to present the risk rankingresults, should numerical risk values be more meaningful tothe stakeholders. It is often drawn using log-log scalesallowing categorizing the risk levels with iso-risk lines. (SeeFig 4).
3.4.4 Risk index tableThe risk rankings can also be displayed in terms of a riskindex in a tabular form (Tab 3). The risk index is the ratio ofthe actual risk level to the acceptable risk threshold allow-ing the risk levels to be simply categorized with respect tothat acceptable risk threshold.
Figure 3 : Example of risk matrix formats: (a) symmetrical, (b) unsymmetrical, (c) special
Platform LoF CoFRisk level
Risk index
Cate-gory
P − 7 100 83 8283 0,83 V
P − 18 93 88 8132 0,81 V
P − 17 97 79 7671 0,77 IV
P − 9 75 97 7231 0,72 IV
P − 4 76 94 7179 0,72 IV
P − 13 65 98 6371 0,64 III
P − 1 99 52 5159 0,52 III
P − 16 58 77 4433 0,44 II
P − 19 89 40 3597 0,36 II
P − 11 31 87 2675 0,27 I
P − 14 22 91 2017 0,20 I
P − 8 54 33 1775 0,18 I
P − 6 18 81 1443 0,14 I
P − 10 78 15 1151 0,12 I
P − 5 77 9 663 0,07 I
P − 15 7 77 537 0,05 I
P − 2 5 60 292 0,03 I