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Risk management and policy implications forconcentrating solar power technology investments in
TunisiaDamien Bazin, Nouri Chtourou, Amna Omri
To cite this version:Damien Bazin, Nouri Chtourou, Amna Omri. Risk management and policy implications for con-centrating solar power technology investments in Tunisia. Journal of Environmental Management,Elsevier, 2019, 237, pp.504-518. �hal-02061788�
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Title
Risk management and policy implications for concentrating solar power technology
investments in Tunisia
Authors’ names and affiliations
Emna Omria,b,*, Nouri Chtouroua, Damien Bazinb
a University of Sfax, Faculty of economics and management of Sfax, LED, Airport road, Km
4, 3018 Sfax, Tunisia
b Côte d’Azur University, CNRS, GREDEG, France
* Corresponding author
E-mail address: [email protected]
Tel.: + 216 50 768 421
© 2019 published by Elsevier. This manuscript is made available under the CC BY NC user licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Version of Record: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301479719302002Manuscript_9acb6cabe9709326a997e63db4a6381b
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Abstract
Concentrating solar power (CSP) is a promising technology in Tunisia. However, its diffusion
is facing many barriers which deter investments. Through the analysis of a CSP plant in
Southern Tunisia by using the Global Risk Analysis (GRA) method, we try to analyze the
main risks faced by investors. The main objective of this research is to identify and analyze
the risks faced by CSP investors in Tunisia and develop strategies that should be adopted to
accelerate the process of diffusion of this technology.
This analysis allows us to conclude that the CSP project is very exposed to political, financial,
physical-chemical, legal, and strategic hazards. Moreover, we show that among the four
phases of the project, the preparation phase is the most vulnerable to hazards.
In fact, the GRA method makes it possible to determine the list of the major risks, such as the
risk of not obtaining permission to build a CSP plant, the risk of non compliance with the
deadline, the risk of failure to achieve the expected performance, the risk of insufficient
access to capital, and the risk of conflicts with local residents.
In order to de-risk CSP technology in Tunisia, we propose some strategies, such as
strengthening the public-private partnerships, using participatory approaches, creating local
employment, etc.
Keywords
Concentrating solar power; Investment risks, Global Risk Analysis; Tunisia
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1. Introduction
While the benefits and advantages of energy for economic development are multiple and well
known, it is rather the damages related to our energy-intensive societies that deserve the
greatest attention. According to a recent report prepared by the Renewable Energy Policy
Network for the 21st Century (REN21, 2018), the total final energy consumption was
dominated by fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) by about 79.5%, in 2016. Therefore,
energy demand is mainly covered by the use of fossil fuels which are the main sources of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
In fact, the increase of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere is the main cause of climate
change. As a result, the prevention of the catastrophic consequences of the climate change
requires the stabilization of the atmospheric concentration of these GHG and especially the
carbon dioxide (IPCC, 2007). In this case, the challenge for all countries is to implement a
transition to a safer and less carbon emitting energy system without hampering economic and
social development (IEA, 2007). The transition to renewable energies (RE) is the evident
solution to satisfy the increasing demand while respecting the environment and ensuring a
green economic growth (Omri et al., 2015a).
Moreover, many recent reports have indicated that transition towards RE has already started
as a result of the increase of the installed capacity and cost competitiveness of wind power
and solar PV (IRENA, 2018; REN21, 2018). In fact, the year 2017 presented a new record-
breaking for the RE sector since it is marked by an impressive decrease of the costs, the
expansion of investments, and the development of the installed capacities (REN21, 2018).
Solar energy is one of the most promising RE due to its competitive costs and its abundance
in many countries (Astolfi et al., 2017; Sindhu et al., 2016). The two main solar technologies
are the concentrating solar power technology (CSP) and the solar photovoltaic technology
(PV) (Mekhilef et al., 2011).
The comparison of the corresponding costs of the different RE options is often based on the
use of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). This comparison leads to the fact that PV is more
competitive than CSP (IEA, 2014; Pietzcker et al., 2014).
Joskow (2011) criticized the use of LCOE because it undervalues dispatchable power plants
compared to the intermittent electricity generating technologies. In fact, while PV is an
intermittent generating technology, CSP plants can generate dispatchable power when they
are equipped with thermal storage systems. In this case, it is possible to store heat energy
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obtained during the day in order to be transformed into electricity at night, which facilitates its
integration into the existent electricity grid (Brand et al., 2012; Trieb et al., 2014).
In fact, CSP technology with a thermal storage represents one of the few renewable
technologies that can offer dispatchable electricity (IEA, 2010; Lilliestam et al., 2018).The
assessment of the benefits and of the economic advantages of the CSP dipatchability was
detailed in many studies, such as that of Poullikkas et al. (2010).
Although dispatchability is a very important asset for CSP technology, the grid stability
aspect regarding the increasing penetration of RE should be treated seriously. In fact, the
increase of the proportion of RE in the electricity mix can face many operational challenges,
such as the voltage stability of the grid and the load balancing. Hence, it is necessary to ensure
the flexibility of the grid and the development of the necessary transmission infrastructure.
Unlike CSP, solar PV is an intermittent technology which, in order to become dispatchable,
needs a separate storage system like batteries. Nowadays CSP with a thermal storage is less
expensive and more competitive than PV with batteries. However, the maintaining of this
advantage in the future is not certain and depends a lot on the future evolution of the costs of
PV cells and batteries (Lilliestam et al., 2018).
Therefore, it is clear that CSP technology with a thermal storage has many advantages
compared to the solar PV and wind power. However, the reality shows that solar PV and wind
power are winning the battle and there is a risk that CSP technology will remain in its small
niche if the support from policymakers remains insufficient (Lilliestam et al., 2018). In fact,
in 2017, the cumulative PV capacity reached 402 Giga watt (GW) compared to just 4.9 GW
for CSP (REN21, 2018).
Hence, despite the advantages of CSP technology, the achievements are modest. This fact
proves that the widespread diffusion of CSP technology is facing several obstacles (del Rio et
al., 2018; Haas et al., 2018) and requires an adequate support policy to take off (Lilliestam et
al., 2018).
In fact, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is one of the most favorable regions
for large-scale solar energy deployment. Moreover, the high direct normal irradiation (DNI)
in North Africa can make this region a major exporter of the electricity produced by CSP
plants in the desert and then transmitted to Europe (IEA, 2010). For these reasons, the
feasibility and financing aspects of the export of electricity produced by CSP technology in
North Africa have attracted the attention of several researchers, such as Kost et al. (2011),
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Trieb et al. (2012, 2011), Viebahn et al. (2011), Williges et al. (2010), etc. Moreover, the
advantage of the thermal storage can make the electricity produced by CSP plants an
important component of the future electricity mix. Therefore, the African deserts will be a
source of baseload and dispatchable power (Pfenninger et al., 2014; Trieb et al., 2014).
For these reasons, there are many studies that focus on CSP technology in the MENA region,
especially the barriers and risks hindering its large scale development (Komendantova et al.,
2012; Lilliestam et al., 2012). Morocco has attracted the attention of many researchers.
However, to our best knowledge, there has not been yet any study that deals with barriers and
risks of investing in CSP technology in Tunisia.
In fact, Tunisia enjoys a great potential of solar resources and many suitable factors for large
scale deployment of CSP technology (Balghouthi et al., 2016). However, there are no
achievements that are in harmony with the enormous solar potential of this country. In 2017,
the cumulative installed capacity of solar PV accounted for about 47.1 Megawatt electric
(MWe) and there has not been yet any large-scale operational CSP plant in Tunisia (IRENA
Resource, 2018). Nevertheless, there are many planned plants, such as a parabolic trough
plant of 50 MW and another one of 2,500 MW using a power tower technology. Although
these projects were planned many years ago, the construction has not begun yet.
Furthermore, despite the advantages that can be offered by the use of CSP technology in
Tunisia, achievements in this field are inexistent. This fact leads us to set the following
questions: what are the most challenging barriers that hinder CSP investments in Tunisia? In
other words, what are the risks of investing in CSP technology in Tunisia? And what are the
effective policy measures to mitigate these risks?
To answer these questions, we used a risk management approach and particularly a Global
Risk Analysis (GRA) method in order to assess the risks concerning the case of a CSP plant
that will take place in the South of Tunisia.
As a consequence, our study is structured as follows. The theoretical background is presented
in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the current status of CSP technology. The Barriers facing
the CSP expansion are detailed in section 4. Then, section 5 describes the case study of the
CSP plant, introduces the GRA method that will be applied, and explains all the steps required
for the application of this method. The results are described in section 6 along with a related
discussion and suggestions in terms of policy implications. Finally, the concluding remarks
are provided in section 7.
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2. Theoretical background
Climate change is a serious threat to the well-being of future generations and economic
growth. To deal with this threat, it is necessary to reduce GHG emissions by using adaptation
and mitigation measures in order to move to a low carbon economy (IPCC, 2007). However,
the current energy system appears to be highly dependent on fossil fuels and the process of
transition to RE is relatively slow mainly in the heating, cooling, and transport sectors
(REN21, 2018).
This section will focus on the transition to RE, the barriers facing this process, particularly the
“carbon lock-in” effect, and finally the importance of RE policy in eliminating these barriers.
2.1. The transition to RE
RE satisfy the same needs as conventional energies. Indeed, they can be used to generate
electricity; in this case they can supply electricity to farms, homes and buildings. RE can also
be used for heating, cooling, and transport (REN21, 2018). Besides, RE can offer rural areas
the opportunity of access to clean and decentralized energy sources (OECD, 2012).
In recent years, the transition to RE has been motivated by two main reasons. The first one is
linked to the growing concern with sustainable development (Elum and Momodu, 2017;
González et al., 2017; Omri et al., 2015b). The second reason concerns the great attention
given to the concepts of “green recovery” and “green growth” since the economic crisis of
2008 (Omri et al., 2015a).
The reduction of GHG (Goh and Ang, 2018) and the creation of green jobs (Fragkos and
Paroussos, 2018) are among the most known advantages of the transition to RE. Although the
benefits of RE use are well known and efforts for large-scale exploitation are provided in
many countries, fossil fuels still dominate (REN21, 2018). In fact, theoretical arguments and
empirical research studies indicated that the current energy system is locked-in a complex
context of high-carbon technologies and infrastructures (Arentsen, et al., 2002; Davis et al.,
2010; IEA, 2011; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Schmidt and Marschinski, 2009).
Moreover, despite the awareness of the damage caused by the use of fossil fuels, the
industrialized economies are in a locked-in position in favor of fossil fuels (Unruh, 2000) and
attempts to turn to RE are facing many barriers (Painuly, 2001). In fact, the main barrier to the
rapid diffusion of RE is the carbon lock-in effect which creates a market and policies that can
slow down or even block the spread of RE technologies, even though they have many
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environmental and economic benefits (Unruh, 2002; 2000). This concept will be explained in
the following sub-section.
2.2.The carbon lock-in effect
The technological lock-in effect has been increasingly explained by many researchers since
the mid-1980s (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1990; David, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995;
Perkins, 2003). The explanations given for the existence of the technological lock-in effect
are: the existence of technological paradigms and the increasing returns to adoption.
The first explanation of the technological lock-in effect is the fact that the features and the
orientation of technological progress are strongly influenced by the cognitive framework of
the actors in the technological community. Nelson and Winter (1977) used the term
“technological regime” to characterize these frameworks, while Dosi (1982) used the term
“technological paradigm”. Although the terms used are different, their senses are quite
similar.
According to Perkins (2003), the consequence of the existence of these mental frameworks
called technological paradigms or technological regimes is that the efforts made to bring
forward the efficiency of technology often focus on specific and well-defined directions
which are based on past accomplishments, common beliefs and state of knowing of the
technological community. This situation can create powerful exclusionary effects on
innovative technological possibilities and solutions outside the “dominant technological
paradigm”. This “exclusion effect” was explained by Dosi (1982).
The second explanation given to the technological lock-in effect, which is strongly linked to
the first one, is the presence of increasing returns to adoption which represent a positive
feedback process and make an adopted technology more attractive than a new one. This idea
was well explained by Arthur (1989) and David (1985) who believe that in a situation where
many technologies are competing, the existence of increasing returns implies that the
technology that has benefited from initial adoption advancement may eventually be more
performing. There are generally four classes of increasing adoption returns that are involved
in the technological lock-in effect. These four classes are: economies of scale, learning
economies, adaptive expectations, and network economies (Arthur, 1994).
Recently, the technological lock-in concept has interested many researchers who are involved
in the fields of technological change and the environment. These researchers highlighted the
negative effects of the use of fossil fuels on climate change and the barriers facing
8
industrialized economies in moving to a low-carbon energy system. This problem is caused
by the carbon lock-in effect (Kemp, 1994; Mattauch et al., 2015; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Unruh,
2000).
Indeed, since the 1990s, a growing interest has been given to the effect of carbon lock-in,
which is considered as an obstacle to the transition to low-carbon technologies (Ayres 1991;
Freeman and Soete 1997; Kemp 1994; Unruh 2000). Mattauch et al. (2015) confirmed that the
major obstacle to the transition to a low-carbon economy is the carbon lock-in effect. They
considered that fossil fuels dominate the market although their alternatives, mainly RE, are
dynamically more efficient.
On the other hand, Pinkse and Buuse (2012) considered that past investments in fossil fuels
can influence the perception of decision-makers in oil companies about the risk-return couple,
bringing them to see more opportunities in their previous trajectory than in the less familiar
RE trajectory.
It should be emphasized that the carbon lock-in situation is not a permanent situation but
rather a persistent state that creates barriers to fossil fuel alternatives (Unruh, 2000). Indeed,
this effect is manifested in reality by a situation in which investments in RE projects face
several barriers of different types (economic, institutional, financial, social, etc.) which
represent significant risks for investors. In the next sub-section, we will focus on the necessity
of RE policy to eliminate these barriers and to accelerate RE development.
2.3.The role of RE policy
Policy makers either in the developed or developing countries are promoting RE technologies
by implementing specific policies which include fiscal incentives, targets, public support, and
new regulations. By the end of 2017, 179 countries had set RE goals (REN21, 2018).
The main barrier to RE diffusion is its high cost compared to conventional sources (Mezher et
al., 2012). Therefore, the expansion of the RE sector requires government support either
through fiscal incentives, targets, public financial support, and regulations to encourage
investment in this sector (REN21, 2018), or through other instruments, such as the elimination
of perverse subsidies and the internalization of negative environmental externalities caused by
fossil fuels (Unruh, 2000).
Although the costs have significantly declined in recent years, RE technologies still require
support schemes to keep this trend. In fact, in 2017, the global weighted average LCOE of
onshore wind plants reached USD 0.06/kilowatt-hours (kWh), while for utility-scale of solar
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PV was around USD 0.10/kWh. However, CSP technology has been dragging out for many
years, by having a global weighted average LCOE around USD 0.22/kWh (IRENA, 2018).
Despite the abundance of RE resources, their share remains modest due probably to the small-
scale production, the insufficient learning effects, and the lack of institutional support. The
government policy based on goals, strategies and instruments is very important for the
development of RE. In fact, Research and Development (R&D) subsidies and the creation of
market niches are recommended to stimulate these new options (Kemp, 1994).
Researchers and analysts who studied and evaluated RE support systems used many different
ways to describe and classify them. The most used typology is the one that differentiates
between price-based and quantity-based instruments (Menanteau et al., 2003). In fact, the
instruments and mechanisms used to accelerate the diffusion of RE are various, they include:
Renewable Porfolio Standard (Xin-gang et al., 2018), Green Certificates (Hustveit et al.,
2017), Feed-in Tariffs (Böhringer et al., 2017), and Renewable Obligation (Nock and Baker,
2017).
3. Current status of CSP technology
CSP plants produce electricity by using heat. In a similar manner as a magnifying glass,
mirrors concentrate the direct solar radiation on a receiver filled with a heat transfer fluid. The
heat absorbed by the fluid is used to produce steam that drives a turbine to produce electricity.
Unlike solar PV technology, CSP technology has the advantage of storing heat energy for
later conversion into electricity. In this case, the production of electricity in the absence of
sunlight is possible by using thermal energy storage systems. This characteristic enables CSP
plants to provide dispatchable power.
The CSP plants can be divided into four different technology types: parabolic troughs, linear
Fresnel mirrors, central receiver systems, and dish Stirling systems. The CSP market is still
dominated by parabolic troughs.
Areas favorable to the development of the CSP technology are regions that enjoy a maximum
DNI, such as the MENA region, Central Asia, South Africa, South of Spain, etc. The solar
limit required for potential sites is set at a DNI of at least 2,000 kWh/m²/year due to economic
constraints.
Unlike most natural resources, solar energy in the form of DNI exists in all continents. In
addition, the populated areas are quite close and can be connected to those regions that have
10
excellent solar conditions. Indeed, the electricity produced in the sunniest areas of the planet
can be transmitted by means of high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines over several
thousand of kilometers.
With the exception of Spain and the United States of America (USA), which are leaders in
CSP technology, very few countries have large CSP facilities connected to the national
electricity grid with a capacity of more than 50 MW. These countries are China, India,
Morocco, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The new CSP installed capacity in 2017 was 100 MW and the global installed capacity
reached 4.9 GW by the end of 2017 (REN21, 2018). On the other hand, Spain and the USA
continue to be the leaders in terms of existing CSP capacity, but the growth of the CSP market
is driven outside of these traditional markets and directed to new emerging markets, such as
South Africa, India, China, and Morocco.
With the exception of Morocco and the UAE, which are key drivers of CSP expansion, the
development of CSP technology in the MENA region is still below expectations regarding the
enormous potentials in these countries. However, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, many CSP
facilities are under construction which can shift the CSP activity from Spain and the USA to
the MENA region in the next few years. In fact, the MENA region is one of the most
favorable regions for the large-scale deployment of CSP technology. Moreover, this region is
characterized by exceptional geographical features, such as high DNI, low precipitation,
especially in desert areas, and the existence of flat and unused lands that are not far from
power grids and roads. So, this region is very convenient for the widespread deployment of
CSP technology and the export of the electricity produced to Europe using HVDC lines.
The economic impacts resulting from the development of a local industry of CSP technology
in North Africa was explained in many papers. For example, Kost et al. (2012) demonstrated
that the development of a CSP market in North Africa will positively influence the local
economies and significantly contribute to the national gross domestic product. They actually
found that total generated revenues from the potential market size of CSP plants could attain
120 Billion Euros by 2030.
4. Barriers to CSP expansion
The cost of CSP technology is one of the most prominent barriers to its large scale diffusion
(del Rio et al., 2018). Therefore, support policies must be implemented in order to make
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investment profitable for existing firms, encourage new entrants to the CSP market, support
innovation, and make CSP technology more competitive.
Lilliestam et al. (2018) considered that the CSP industry is facing two crucial risks. The first
one is that many experienced firms leave the CSP market, which leads to the loss of a lot of
tacit knowledge, know-how, and experience. The second risk is that developers and operators
ignore innovations by using well-known components in order to avoid technology risks. This
attitude is a great barrier to cost reduction.
On the other hand, the financing risk is among the risks that have attracted much attention.
For example, Lilliestam et al. (2012) considered that, among the major barriers to scaling-up
CSP technology, there are the expansion of electricity transmission lines and financing risks.
In fact, the lack of experience with CSP investment in most emerging economies increases
financing risks. Indeed, these countries are suffering from small financial markets, which are
not convenient for financing large scale CSP plants, especially in terms of high interest rates
and the absence of debts with long maturities (Stadelmann et al., 2014). In this case, reducing
these risks is necessary to encourage developers and scale-up private investments.
Technical risks are also of a great importance. Indeed, Amato et al. (2011) carried out a very
original study by assessing the risks associated with business interruption and loss of assets
resulting from the emergence of undesirable internal or external events. These authors
identified a list of critical hazards, such as malfunction of the orientation system, turbine
failure, turbine leakage, salt solidification, and orientation system stopping.
In fact, there are many other country-specific analyses that focused on the barriers that
hamper the development of CSP technology in some countries, such as Chile (Haas et al.,
2018) and China (Zongxian et al., 2012), or some other regions, like the European Union (del
Rio et al., 2018) and the Sub-Saharan Africa (Labordena et al., 2017).
On the other hand, the MENA region has attracted the attention of many researchers. For
example, Komendantova et al. (2012) conducted three stages of interviews with experts to
investigate their perceptions of risks in the case of CSP projects in North Africa. The results
of unstructured expert interviews showed that bureaucratic procedures and corruption have
been identified as significant barriers by more than half of all the interviewed experts. Other
risks, such as the instability of national regulations, the low level of political stability, and the
absence of guarantees from national governments, have also been identified as significant
barriers.
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Although political corruption and bureaucracy are considered as the main concerns of
investors in North Africa (Komendantova et al., 2011), the availability of water in the MENA
region is also a serious challenge that should be taken into account (Balghouthi et al., 2016;
Belgasim et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2016). In fact, CSP plants require a large amount of water for
the cooling process and for cleaning mirrors. However, in arid locations where the annual
irradiance levels are high, there is a scarcity of water. This problem can possibly be solved by
the use of dry cooling technology. For example, Trabelsi et al. (2016) showed that a CSP
plant with dry cooling can reduce water consumption by 93.3%.
Morocco is the country of the MENA region that has attracted much attention over the past
few years. For example, Wiesinger et al. (2018) evaluated a very important technical risk
which is the erosion effect on the glass due to airborne sand and dust in two sites in Morocco.
This risk can increase the losses of optical energy and also the operation and maintenance
costs.
On the other hand, Medina et al. (2015) showed that, for the case of companies without an
earlier presence in Morocco, uncertainty, insecurity and informality are the main obstacles
affecting the decision to invest in the CSP sector. Regarding companies that are already active
in Morocco, financial and legal barriers are of a great importance. For the same case of
Morocco, Mahia et al. (2014) conducted a survey in order to examine the potential of CSP
market and barriers for establishing a CSP manufacturing industry. They also showed that
policy related barriers, such as the absence of fiscal and legislative framework for CSP
development, are more crucial than entrepreneurial or market barriers. However, other studies
discussed rather risk reduction strategies. For example, Frisari and Stadelmann (2015)
examined the importance of national policy makers and international finance institutions in
de-risking CSP technology in India and Morocco. Some other studies focused on de-risking
CSP investments in the MENA region. For example, Schinko and Komendantova (2016)
employed an LCOE model in order to analyze the impacts of a de-risking approach on the
cost of electricity from CSP in four specific North African countries (Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia). They showed that in order to have a weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) in North Africa equivalent to that in Europe, the CSP costs should be reduced by
39%. Trieb et al. (2011) proposed long term power purchase agreements as a de-risking tool
for CSP investments in the MENA region.
13
Although the studies that addressed risks for the case of CSP technology are multiple and
treated many countries, Tunisia has not received yet the attention of researchers and there is
no study that deals with CSP barriers in Tunisia.
In addition to that, the existing scientific literature has used expert interviews, literature
reviews, surveys, and scenario analyses, but the GRA method has not been used yet for the
case of a CSP project. In fact, using this method in an environmental study is new and
innovative since there is only one published study that applies the GRA method for the case
of a wind farm, which is that of Desroches et al. (2016). Actually, this method is usually used
for studies in the field of chemistry, industry, and mainly medicine, such as the one by
Mazeron et al. (2014).
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to fill in this gap by making two contributions to the
existing literature: i) treating the barriers to CSP deployment in Tunisia; ii) using the risk
management approach and particularly the GRA method for the case of a CSP project.
5. Method and data
In this section, we will briefly introduce the case studied which concerns a CSP plant, then we
will describe all the steps of the GRA method, and we will finish by applying this method to
analyze all the risks that hinder the implementation of this CSP project.
5.1.Case study: a CSP project in Tunisia
We chose to study the case of the first CSP export project between the Sahara region and the
South of Europe. This CSP power plant will be established in Southern Tunisia, which is
characterized by a favorable solar radiation level of 2,500 kWh /m2/year.
The installed capacity will be 2,250 MW: a first stage of 250 MW and a second stage of 2,000
MW. This mega CSP project consists of the construction of a CSP power plant using the solar
tower technology with thermal storage, the transmission of the produced electricity to Italy
using underground and sea cables, and finally the electricity sale in the European energy
market.
The British developer of this CSP project estimated that the overall cost will be around 10
billion Euros. Once operating, this project will have many positive impacts on the Tunisian
economy in terms of job creation and implementation of an industrial area devoted to solar
technologies in Southern Tunisia since most of the components will be locally manufactured.
14
Table 1
The main features of the CSP project.
Location South of Tunisia
Annual generation 9,000 Gigawattheure (GWh)
Area 10,000 hectares
Technology CSP tower technology with thermal storage
Storage equipment Molten salt
Status Partially permitted
In fact, the feasibility study of this project began in 2009, however, until now, the
construction has not started yet. The project is a perfect illustration of the existence of many
barriers to the investment in CSP technology in Tunisia. In order to analyze all the barriers
and risks faced by the developers, we used a risk management approach and especially the
GRA method that will be explained in the next sub-section.
5.2.The GRA method
The GRA is a global analysis method which is used to appreciate and manage risks of
different natures, such as company’s risks, project risks, and product risks, following an
invariable process. Its specificity depends on the nature of the considered system and the
mapping of the considered hazards and not on the actual analysis process.
The GRA is the name given by Desroches (2013) to the up-to-date Preliminary Risk Analysis
(PRA) method which was developed in the 1960’s in the aerospace industry and recently
extended to many other sectors, including military, chemistry, transport, medicine, and more
recently the environment. This analysis is particularly used in health organizations and civil
aviation. This paper presents the first application of the GRA for the case of a CSP plant.
In fact, the GRA is a priori (proactive), an analytical, bottom up, and semi quantitative risk
analysis method (Desroches et al., 2016) which implements all the risk analysis and
management steps in compliance with the ISO 31000:2018 norm (an international standard
that provides principles and guidelines for risk management). Besides, it includes context
establishment, risk identification, risk assessment, initial risk reduction (prevention/
protection), and residual risk assessment and management (monitoring/insurance taking). It
can be used for the management of risks of different natures, such as enterprise risk, project
risk, and product risk (Desroches, 2013).
Moreover, the GRA is based on the accident scenario presented in Fig.1. An accident scenario
is defined as a sequence or a combination of events ending up in an accident (A) that has
consequences (S). This scenario begins with the occurrence of a contact event or an
15
exposition factor (EF) which creates the exposition of the system (S) to a hazard (H) and
therefore, creates a hazardous situation (HS). Then, the exposition of the hazardous situation
(HS) to an initiating or a triggering factor (TF) leads to the accident (A). Finally, the
occurrence of a circumstantial event or an aggravating factor (AF) defines and characterises
the occurrence, the nature, and the severity of the consequences (S). The causes (hazard,
contact event, and trigger event) are related to the parameter “likelihood” of the risk. The
nature and the intensity of the consequences are related to the parameter “Severity” of the
risk.
Fig 1. Accident scenario (Desroches, 2013).
The GRA process (Fig.2) contains three consecutive steps: the system GRA, the scenario
GRA and the risk management. The first step consists in: (i) defining the perimeter of the
studied system which is the CSP project divided into phases and sub-phases (Appendix A);
(ii) identifying all the hazards that could potentially affect the implementation of the project in
a hierarchical list composed of generic hazards (generic categories), specific hazards (sub-
categories specifically to the system) and hazardous elements/events (translation of the
specific hazards in terms of events or elements); and, finally, (iii) identifying the interactions
between hazardous events and sub-phases of the system leading to hazardous situations. The
structure of the mapping of hazardous situations is made by the crossed juxtaposition of the
system and the mapping of hazards. The hazard/system interaction is the factor that generates
hazardous situations. The interactions should normally be considered as determinists.
The second step, which is the scenario GRA, consists, first of all, in defining the risk
assessment parameters, such as the severity and likelihood scales (Table 3 and Table 4). The
•
Unwanted Event (UE)
or
Accident
(A)
5
• Consequence(S)
7
Aggravating factor (AF)
6
System
Hazard(H)
1
Contact Event
(CE) or Exposition Factor (EF)
2
• Hazardous
Situation(HS)
3
Trigger Event
(TE) or Triggering Factor (TF)
4
16
severity scale is based on 5 levels of decreasing severity. In compliance with basic principles
of dependability, levels S5 and S4 are related to safety whereas levels S3 and S2 are related to
the performance of the system (reliability/availability). Concerning the likelihood scale, it is
semi-quantitative and based on 5 levels of likelihood, which can be associated with a scale of
system-dependent return periods.
Once the assessment scales are identified, the criticality matrix can be built (Table 6). Finally,
the scenarios are identified and described, and the associated initial risks are assessed. If
needed (initial criticality C2 or C3), initial risk reduction actions are identified in terms of
prevention (decrease of the likelihood) and protection (decrease of severity) and the
subsequent residual risk is assessed. Again, if needed (residual criticality C2), residual risk
management actions are defined in terms of risk control/monitoring and insurance taking
(Appendix D. Scenario_GRA).
The third step, which is risk management and result dissemination, comes after data
performing. Therefore, risk mappings are built (Kiviat and Farmer diagrams, but only Kiviat
diagrams are presented in this paper) based on the statistical treatment of the analysis. The
minimal, average and maximal risks are represented per hazards and per phases. Then, the list
of 5 to 10 major risks is elaborated. Moreover, the practical management of risks is made by
the drafting of action sheets and the development of an action follow-up table for initial and
residual risks. The software used to perform this analysis is the version 2.091 of StatCart
GRA developed by MAD-environment.
Fig.2. The GRA process.
The GRA method requires in-depth knowledge of the studied system, which is the CSP
project. For this reason, this method has been applied during a six-month internship at the
National Agency for Energy Conservation (ANME: Agence Nationale pour la Maîtrise de
1. System GRA
•System description
•Hazard mapping
•Hazardous situation mapping
2. Scenario GRA
•Severity and likelihoodscales
•Criticality matrix
•Scenarios identification and assesment of associatedinitial and residual risks
3. Risk management and results dissemination
•Overall results for initial and residual risks
•Risk mapping per hazard
•Risk mapping per system element
•List of top risks
•Initial risk reduction plan
•Residual risk management plan
17
l’Energie), which is the leader in the institutional organization of energy efficiency and RE in
Tunisia. This internship has facilitated meetings with several experts, especially during the
numerous congresses organized by the ANME during the training period. In addition, this
internship has been an opportunity to benefit from the knowledge and advice of experts and
engineers who are working at the ANME. We have also conducted open interviews with the
chief executive officer of the project. In addition, we have used a review of the data provided
by the ANME, the state electricity utility STEG (STEG: (Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité
et du Gaz), and a compilation of secondary sources (books, scientific articles, reports prepared
by international organizations, press articles, etc.), as well as a feedback from similar projects,
such as the case of the CSP plant in Morocco.
Based on professional advice from experts, managers and engineers in the field of RE as well
as experience feedback, we have been able to carry out all stages of the GRA which require a
multidisciplinary team. The use of the GRA method for this case is adequate for two main
reasons. The first one is that this method is a priori (proactive) risk analysis method so, it can
be used to analyze risks of a project or an activity before it takes place. This is adequate to
this case study since the construction of the CSP plant has not begun yet. The second reason is
that the construction of this CSP plant was postponed many times and since 2009, there has
been no real progress, which proves that the implementation of the project faces several
barriers and risks that hinder its implementation. Hence, a risk analysis using the GRA
method is needed to identify the main barriers.
5.3.The application of the GRA method for the case of a CSP project
In this sub-section, we will apply the two first steps of the GRA process, which are the system
GRA and the scenario GRA, to the case of the CSP project while the risk management step
which comes after data processing will be explained in the result section.
5.3.1. System GRA
The system GRA contains the following steps: the description of the CSP project (Appendix
A), the elaboration of the hazard mapping (Appendix B), and finally the elaboration of the
hazardous situation mapping (Appendix C. Mapping_HS).
5.3.1.1. Description of the CSP project
The first required step is a detailed description of the CSP project. In fact, a deep analysis of
the CSP project enabled us to divide it into four main steps (feasibility study, preparation,
construction, and operation), 20 phases, and 51 sub-phases (Appendix A).
18
5.3.1.2.Elaboration of the hazard mapping
The list of generic and specific hazards has been established similarly to the one proposed by
Desroches (2013), and the hazardous events have been determined according to the
characteristics of the CSP project in terms of technology, operating methods, required
resources, etc. Finally, we got 14 generic hazards (political, environment, insecurity, image,
management, strategic, technological, communication and crises, legal, financial,
infrastructure and premises, materials and equipment, information system, and physical-
chemical) detailed in many hazardous events which can affect the sub-phases of the CSP
project (Appendix B). In fact, the hazardous events were identified by reviewing many
studies, such as those of Gabriel (2016), Otieno and Loosen (2016), Painuly (2001),
international reports, press articles, feedback from similar CSP systems (for example, the CSP
plant Noor in Morocco), and especially discussions with experts working in the ANME and
with the chief executive officer of the project.
5.3.1.3.The hazardous situation mapping
The sub-phases of the CSP project have been confronted to the hazardous events in a double
entry table in order to obtain the hazardous situation mapping (Appendix C. Mapping_HS).
The development of the hazardous situation mapping is the fundamental cornerstone of the
analysis since it requires a rigorous and detailed work, and especially a thorough knowledge
of the studied project. In addition to that, the determination of hazardous situations is the key
step that will be used to determine risk scenarios, risk maps and the list of the major risks.
Fig. 3. The elaboration of the hazardous situation mapping.
19
In fact, each interaction between a hazardous event and a vulnerable element of the system
represents a hazardous situation which has been evaluated, when relevant, by assigning a
priority index. Then, the hazardous situations have been classified into three priority levels
according to the priority indexes explained in Table 2. For example, when the interaction
between the vulnerable element of the system and the hazardous event is strong and the
evaluation and treatment of this hazardous situation is needed immediately, we put a priority
index “1” in the cell.
Table 2
The interactions between the hazards and the system.
Priority
Index (Ip) Interaction Hazard/System
Decision to perform an
analysis, an evaluation and
treatment
Blank or 0 No interaction
1 Strong to very strong interaction Immediately
10 Strong to very strong interaction Later
2 Weak to medium interaction Afterwards
Source: Desroches et al. (2016)
In our study, we have been able to identify 169 hazardous situations, which have been divided
into 33 hazardous situations with a priority index “1” (19%), 62 hazardous situations with a
priority index “2” (37%), and 74 hazardous situations with a priority index “10” (44%). Then,
we have only analyzed hazardous situations with a priority index “1”.
5.3.2. Scenario GRA
The scenario GRA contains the following steps: the elaboration of severity and likelihood
scales (Table 3 and Table 4) and criticality matrix (Table 6), and the identification of all
possible scenarios according to the process explained in Fig.1 in order to obtain the scenario
GRA (Appendix D. Scenario_GRA).
5.3.2.1.The severity and likelihood scales
The risk assessment is based on two aspects:
- The severity of consequences (S), which is based on a severity scale (Table 3) composed of
5 levels: S1 (insignificant, which corresponds to no real impact on mission or safety), S2
(minor or significant, which corresponds to the mission degradation without any impact on
safety), S3 (major or severe, which corresponds to the mission failure without any impact on
safety), S4 (hazardous or critical, which corresponds to safety degradation), and S5
(catastrophic, which corresponds to safety failure).
20
- The likelihood of occurrence (L) which is based on a likelihood scale (Table 4) composed of
5 levels: L1 (extremely improbable), L2 (improbable), L3 (remote), L4 (occasional), and L5
(frequent).
The severity and likelihood scales have been developed in a working group that takes into
account the experience feedback of similar projects, the data collected from different sources,
and the knowledge of each member of the multidisciplinary group.
Table 3
Severity scale.
Severity level Severity name Severity index Description of consequences
S1 Insignificant 1 10 No impact on the system performance or safety
11 Insignificant reduction in performance without impact on
activity
12 Inconsequential operational constraints
13 Temporary unavailability of structure or equipment
14 Injury on duty without work stoppage
S2 Minor 2 20 Degradation of the system performance with no impact on
safety
21 Unavailability of services or equipment on the scheduled date
22 Unavailability of equipment, premises or staff less than one day
23 Injury on duty with work stoppage less than 21 days
24 Controllable pollution
S3 Major 3 30 Significant degradation or failure of the system performance
with no impact on safety
31Significant performance degradation
32 Very degraded or failed activity
33 Significant operational constraints
34 Significant damage to infrastructure or goods
35 Injury on duty with work stoppage for more than 21 days
S4 Hazardous 4 40 Degradation of the system’s safety or integrity
41 Severe injury or temporary disability
42 Partial destruction of infrastructure or assets
43 Significant damage to the environment
44 Temporary staff disability
45 Delay in project implementation
S5 Catastrophic 5 50 Significant degradation or failure of the system safety or its loss
51 Loss of life or disability
52 Total destruction of infrastructure or assets
53 Irreversible damage to the environment
54 Huge financial loss
55 Permanent discontinuation of the project
The likelihood scale (Table 4) contains 5 likelihood levels associated with a recurrence
period. Recurrence periods are determined according to the temporality, lifetime and technical
characteristics of the CSP plant.
Table 4
Likelihood scale.
Likelihood levels Level name Likelihood index Likelihood description
L1 Extremely improbable 1 Less than once per 25 years
L2 Improbable 2 Between once per 25 years and once per 5 years
L3 Remote 3 Between once per 5 years and once a year
21
L4 Occasional 4 Between once a year and once a month
L5 Frequent 5 More than once a month
5.3.2.2.The criticality matrix
The risk criticality represents the function of decision: C = fd (S,L). The definition domain of
fd is 25 couples (S,L) and its domain of values is {C1,C2,C3}. The criticality is the result of a
decision function linked to a scale of political, social, human values, etc. (Desroches et al.,
2016).
The first and most important step is to divide all the project risks into three categories
according to their criticality. The criticality classes are: acceptable (C1), tolerable under
control (C2), and unacceptable (C3) of respective colors: green, yellow, and red (Table 5).
Each criticality class corresponds to a well-defined action.
Table 5
Criticality scale.
Criticality
level Risk level Decisions and actions
C1 Acceptable Nothing needs to be done.
C2 Tolerable under control No action to reduce the risk is mandatory, but a close monitoring
needs to be implemented in terms of risk management.
C3 Unacceptable The risk needs to be reduced, otherwise, the activity must be
stopped partially or totally.
Source: Desroches et al. (2016)
The criticality matrix (Table 6) is a two-dimensional presentation that presents the two
components of risk: likelihood versus severity. It allows the association of a criticality level to
each severity-likelihood pair. Thus, a severity level S5 associated with a likelihood level L5
corresponds to a maximum criticality level C3.
Indeed, by defining the domain of unacceptability, we delimit the domain in which the risks
must absolutely be refused and by defining the domain of tolerability or acceptability, we
delimit the domain in which all the risks must be with or without a treatment.
Table 6 Criticality matrix.
Severity
1 2 3 4 5
Lik
elih
oo
d 5 1 2 3 3 3
4 1 2 2 3 3
3 1 1 2 2 3
2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
22
Likelihood and severity scales and criticality matrix have been used to evaluate all the risk
scenarios according to the severity of consequences and likelihood of occurrence and, then,
have been prioritized by criticality. The criticality of each scenario has been determined and
all scenarios have been divided into 3 categories of criticalities: C1, C2, and C3. Corrective
actions have been set up in order to reduce initial risks. Once the categorization of initial risks
was done, corrective actions are proposed to reduce scenarios with criticality C3 and C2. The
criticality of residual risks has also been re-evaluated by according a new level of criticality
that integrates the impacts of the corrective actions implemented to initial risks. (Appendix D.
Scenario_GRA).
6. Results and discussions
Once the scenario GRA is elaborated by using the hazardous situation mapping, the
assessment scales and the criticality matrix, we move on to data performing by using the
version 2.091 of StatCart GRA developed by MAD-environment.
The application of the GRA method to the CSP project enables us to analyze the risks that
impede the implementation of this project. The results are explained in details in this section.
We have just analyzed the hazardous situations with priority index “1” given the serious
impacts they may have on the CSP project. The scenario GRA has allowed us to identify 33
risk scenarios from the 33 hazardous situations of priority index “1”.
In order to present the main results, we start with the distribution of hazardous situations by
type of generic hazard, which enables us to identify the type of hazard that is likely to cause
the highest number of hazardous situations and risk scenarios. We find that the political
hazard creates the highest number of hazardous situations, which means that the political
hazard must be taken seriously by the developers of this project (Table 7). Concerning the
distribution of hazardous situations by project phase (feasibility study, preparation,
construction, and operation), we conclude that the preparation phase of the project contains
the highest number of hazardous situations (12 hazardous situations among the 33 analyzed
hazardous situations). Therefore, this phase is the most affected by the different types of
generic hazards and requires the most attention (Table 8).
Then, we present the distribution of risk scenarios per initial and residual criticality classes
(C1, C2, and C3). We note that the risk reduction actions explained in the scenario GRA
(Appendix D. Scenario_GRA) allow us to move on from 10 initial risks with C3 criticality
(Table 9) to no residual risk with C3 criticality (Table 10).
23
Afterwards, we present the Kiviat diagram which provides a representation of minimal,
average and maximal risks per hazard and per phase while integrating at the same time
criticality. According to this diagram, the risks resulting from the legal hazard have the
minimum, medium and maximum risk indexes with C3 criticality (unacceptable), which
means that the risks caused by the legal hazard must be taken very seriously by investors
(Fig.6). We also note that the initial risks arising from the preparation phase have an average
risk index with C3 criticality, which confirms the vulnerability of this phase (Fig.7).
Finally, the GRA method allows us to determine the list of top risks, such as the risk of not
obtaining permission to build the CSP plant, the risk of non compliance with deadlines, the
risk of failure to achieve the expected performance, the risk of insufficient access to capital,
and the risk of conflicts with local residents. We explain in details the main causes of the top
risks and the convenient strategies and actions that we propose to reduce them.
6.1. Distribution of risk scenarios per type of generic hazard and per project
phase
We note that the political hazard is likely to cause the highest number of hazardous situations
and risk scenarios (10 scenarios). The physical-chemical, financial and strategic hazards
generate respectively 4, 3 and 3 risk scenarios (Table 7).
These findings are in line with the results of most studies, especially with regard to the
importance of political and financial hazards in the MENA countries. However, this study
emphasizes the physical-chemical hazard which is often neglected in RE projects.
Table 7
Number of identified hazardous situations and analyzed scenarios per generic hazard.
Type of hazard Index Number of
hazardous situations
Number of risk
scenarios
Political POL 10 10
Environment ENV 2 2
Insecurity INS 1 1
Image IMG 1 1
Management MAN 2 2
Strategic STR 3 3
Technological TEC 1 1
Communication and crises COM 1 1
Legal LEG 2 2
Financial FIN 3 3
Infrastructure and premises INF 1 1
Materials and equipment MAT 1 1
Information system IS 1 1
Physico-chemical PCH 4 4
24
The 33 hazardous situations of priority index “1”, which are grouped per generic hazard type,
are shown in percentages in Fig.4. This representation shows two groups of hazards that can
be classified according to their relative importance:
- Hazards with prime importance: political (30%), physical-chemical (13%), financial (9%),
strategic (9%), environment (6%), management (6%), and legal (6%).
- Hazards with medium to low importance: material and equipment (3%), information system
(3%), infrastructure and premises (3%), communication and crisis (3%), technological (3%),
insecurity (3%), and image (3%).
Fig. 4. Distribution of hazardous situations per generic hazard.
It is therefore clear that the CSP project is too exposed to political hazard since the latter
generates the greatest part of hazardous situations. This is quite logical given the current
situation in Tunisia which is characterized by political instability following the 2010
revolution and the birth of a young democracy.
Table 8
Number of identified hazardous situations and scenarios analyzed per phase of the project.
Phase of the project Index Number of hazardous situations Number of risk scenarios
Feasibility study A 3 3
Preparation B 12 12
Construction C 8 8
Operation D 10 10
Concerning the identified hazardous situations and the scenarios analyzed per project phase
(Table 8), the results show that the preparation and operation phases of the CSP project
contain the highest number of hazardous situations. The preparation phase is the phase the
most exposed to the 14 generic hazards since it generates 12 hazardous situations of priority
index “1”. This is due to the complexity of administrative, legal and financial procedures
required to have all the necessary authorizations and agreements. Indeed, this phase is
POL
30%
ENV
6%
INS
3%IMG
3%
MAN
6%STR
9%TEC
3%
COM
3%
LEG
6%
FIN
9%
INF
3%
MAT
3%
IS
3%PCH
13%
25
decisive for the implementation of the project. Moreover, for more than 6 years, the project
has been blocked in this phase without any progress towards the phase of construction. These
results demonstrate the delicacy of the preparation phase and its high vulnerability to the
different classes of generic hazards.
The 33 hazardous situations of priority index “1” grouped per project phase are shown in
percentages in Fig.5 in which the preparation and operation phases contain respectively 37%
and 30% of all the identified hazardous situations, while the construction phase contains 24%
and the feasibility study contains just 9% of all the hazardous situations.
Fig. 5. Distribution of hazardous situations per project phase.
6.2.Distribution of risk scenarios per initial and residual criticality
The following tables (Table 9 and Table 10) present the number of risk scenarios analyzed
according to the “severity-likelihood” couple, as well as before and after the actions of
reduction of initial risks presented in the scenario GRA (Appendix D. Scenario_GRA). We
note that before starting these actions (Table 9), we have one initial risk with C1 criticality
(acceptable), 22 initial risks with C2 criticality (tolerable under control), and 10 initial risks
with C3 criticality (unacceptable).
Table 9
The criticality matrix for initial risks.
Severity
1 2 3 4 5
Lik
elih
oo
d 5 1 2
4 4 7 6
3 7 2 2
2 2
1
33
C1 1
C2 22
9%
37%
24%
30%Feasibility study
Preparation
Construction
Operation
26
C3 10
33
The risk reduction actions allow us to reduce the criticality of initial risks by reducing the
likelihood or the severity, or both at the same time in order to have residual risks with C1
(acceptable) or C2 (tolerable under control) criticality and no residual risk with C3 criticality
(unacceptable). This is well respected in our analysis since we have 23 residual risks with C1
criticality (acceptable), 10 residual risks with C2 criticality (tolerable under control), and no
residual risk with C3 criticality (unacceptable) (Table 10).
Table 10
The criticality matrix for residual risks.
Severity
1 2 3 4 5
Lik
elih
oo
d 5 1
4 2
3 4 7 6
2 5 5 2
1 1
33
C1 23
C2 10
C3 0
33
6.3.Risk mapping per hazard
The Kiviat diagram provides an overview of the risks associated with the CSP project and
facilitates their comparison. In fact, it provides a detailed analysis of the initial and residual
risks per generic hazard or per project phase. This representation allows us to make the
appropriate decisions according to the general context and the vulnerability of the project.
The axes of the diagram represent the 14 generic hazards. The minimum, average and
maximum indexes of the different initial and residual risks are positioned on these axes. The
Kiviat diagram also shows the three risk criticality areas (C1, C2 and C3, respectively with
the colors green, yellow, and red).
27
Fig. 6. Kiviat diagrams of initial and residual risks per hazard.
According to the left-sided Kiviat diagram in Fig.6, we notice that the initial risks descended
from environmental, political, physical-chemical, financial, and legal hazards have a
maximum risk index of C3 criticality. Thus, the risks arising from these types of hazards must
be a priority for project developers and managers in order to avoid serious consequences.
Among these generic hazards, only the legal hazard can cause initial risks with a minimum
risk index of C3 criticality. This leads us to note that the legal hazard must be taken very
seriously by investors, since the risks resulting from this hazard have the minimum, medium
and maximum risk indexes with C3 criticality. Thus, even if the share of risks arising from
legal hazard is not very high (only 6% compared to 30% for political hazard and 13% for
physical-chemical hazard), this hazard can cause risks with catastrophic and therefore
unacceptable consequences for the project.
The right-sided Kiviat diagram in Fig.6 provides an assessment of the effectiveness and
magnitude of risk reduction actions. After the implementation of the initial risk reduction
actions, we can make the following remarks:
- None of the residual risk indexes (minimum, average or maximum) has a C3 cirticality.
Thus, the risk reduction actions implemented have succeeded in bringing all the risk indexes
to C2 or C1 criticality levels. This result proves the effectiveness of the applied actions.
28
- The residual risks arising from political, financial, legal and environmental hazards have an
average risk index of C2 criticality. Thus, the residual risks arising from these hazards are
tolerable under control and therefore require control actions, such as insurance.
- The residual risks resulting from the legal hazard have a minimum risk index of C2
criticality. Consequently, even after the implementation of the initial risk reduction measures,
the residual risks arising from the legal hazard should always be under the continuous control
and monitoring by applying control measures.
6.4.Risk mapping per project phase
In the case of the analysis per project phase, the axes of the Kiviat diagram (Fig.7) represent
the 4 phases of the project (feasibility study (A), preparation (B), construction (C), and
operation (D)) that have been presented and explained in the detailed analysis of the project.
The axes also contain the minimum, average and maximum risk indexes corresponding to
each phase of the project. The Kiviat diagram also shows the three criticality areas.
Fig. 7. Kiviat diagram for initial and residual risks per project phase
According to the left-sided Kiviat diagram in Fig.7, we notice that the initial risks that emerge
from the four phases of the project have maximum risk indexes with C3 criticality. Thus, all
the four phases should be a priority for project managers in order to avoid serious
consequences. In fact, among the four phases, only the initial risks arising from the
preparation phase (B) have an average risk index with C3 criticality. This result confirms the
vulnerability of this phase, which requires more importance than the other three phases.
29
After the implementation of the initial risk reduction actions (right-sided Kiviat diagram in
Fig.7), we can make the following remarks:
- None of the residual risk indexes (minimum, average or maximum) from the four phases has
a C3 cirticality. Thus, the risk reduction actions implemented have succeeded in bringing all
the risk indexes to criticality levels C2 or C1. This result proves the effectiveness of the
applied actions.
-The residual risks arising from the preparation (B) and construction (C) phases have a
residual average risk index of C2 criticality. Consequently, the residual risks arising from
these phases are tolerable under control and require control actions, such as insurance. This
observation leads us to stress the high vulnerability of the preparation phase to generic
hazards.
6.5.List of major risks and recommendations
The GRA method allows us to determine the list of top risks. We will explain in details in this
sub-section the main causes of the top risks and the convenient strategies and actions that we
propose to reduce these risks.
The list of top risks identified in the present study is in line with many studies dealing with
barriers to CSP investment in the MENA region. In fact, previous studies have pointed out the
importance of financing barriers (Lilliestam et al., 2012), the bureaucracy and corruption
(Komendantova et al., 2011), and the regulatory risk which can delay obtaining a permission
(Komendantova et al., 2012). However, we find that the risk of conflicts with local residents
is a serious risk that should be taken into account by developers. This result is in contrast with
the analysis of Hanger et al. (2016) which shows that community acceptance is almost
universal for the case of the CSP plant Noor in Morocco.
Concerning the risk of failure to achieve the expected performance because of the use of
tower technology with dry cooling, this result is in contrast with the analysis of Trabelsi et al.
(2016) which proves that due to the high DNI in Southern Tunisia, CSP plants with dry
cooling are technically and economically competitive with the wet cooled CSP plants.
Nevertheless, this research deals with parabolic trough technology and not tower technology
which is used in our case study.
The major risks that can affect the CSP plant, their causes and the main actions that we
propose to reduce these risks are explained as follows:
30
• The risk of not obtaining a permission to build a CSP plant
This risk results from the absence of a legal framework for the export of electricity produced
from RE, in Tunisia, and the complexity of approval procedures. Moreover, the political
instability since the revolution and the lack of visibility in the medium and long-term are all
factors that have aggravated the situation.
In order to eliminate this legal barrier and have a suitable legal framework for this project,
the project managers have initiated, since 2010, discussions with the government officials in
order to develop a new regulation suitable for this project. Fortunately, after many years of
waiting, a new law which authorizes the export of green electricity was approved in 2015.
• The risk of non compliance with deadlines
These delays can be caused mainly by bureaucracy, corruption, long and complicated
administrative procedures, administrative inefficiency, delays in signing contracts, and a poor
estimation of the processing time.
Moreover, uncertainty and unexpected events are linked to any large scale project so, there is
always the possibility of delays. In Tunisia, this risk is more frequent due to bureaucracy and
corruption, therefore, the project managers should set realistic deadlines taking into account
the Tunisian context. In addition, many delays are predictable and quite common to all RE
projects in the developing countries so, they can be expected and integrated into the schedule
in advance. Finally, the project managers should be very proactive and have a great
experience concerning large scale projects in Tunisia.
• The risk of failure to achieve the expected performance
This risk can be caused by the use of tower technology that is not widely used in the MENA
region, as is the case for the parabolic trough technology. It can also be caused by the use of
dry cooling that has not been widely experienced yet. In addition, there is a lack of experience
feedback in Tunisia, since it is the first CSP project of a large size.
In order to reduce this risk, feedback from similar projects will be very useful. In fact, the
CSP tower technology is used today in several countries, such as India, Spain, South Africa
and the USA. Recently, the project Noor III using the same technology (CSP tower with
molten salt storage) has been successfully implemented, which will help us to have a very
interesting feedback from a country very similar to Tunisia. The conclusion of insurance
31
contracts, the use of internationally renowned suppliers and the use of preventive and regular
maintenance are also highly recommended.
• The risk of insufficient access to capital
This risk is caused by the high cost of capital, the short pay-back periods of credits and the
lack of private sector participation. This risk is very common in many developing countries
and can be reduced by the following measures:
-Strengthening the public private partnerships (PPP) to finance large CSP projects. In fact,
PPP are an interesting solution for Tunisia, which suffers from serious budgetary constraints
and does not have the means either to cover the financial losses of public enterprises or to
invest in the renovation and extension of its electricity network. To ensure the success of PPP,
Tunisia must put in place a strong business climate that attracts investors. This requires
reducing administrative procedures to access markets, establishing a solid and stable financial
system and appealing to international assistance funds, such as the Public-Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF).
-The implementation of feed-in tariff mechanism. This mechanism was very effective, in
many countries, both in stimulating installed capacity and in developing local industry. In
fact, tariffs should be set at a level that ensures the cost-effectiveness of RE projects. As a
result, the market risk incurred by the project developer is inexistent and the profitability of
the project depends essentially on cost control and attainment of maximum performance.
-Requesting the assistance and the support from international financial institutions and
development agencies to reduce the costs of financing this project. In fact, they generally
offer low-rate loans for longer periods compared to commercial banks.
• The risk of conflicts with local residents
This risk can be caused by the opposition to the implementation of the CSP plant and
nimbyism. In order to reduce this risk, we propose the following measures:
-The use of participatory approaches which have several advantages. First of all, the
participation of the various actors in the decision-making process gives some legitimacy and
transparency to this decision and thus reduces the risk of non-acceptance of the decision by
these same actors. In addition, the participatory approach allows decision-makers to have
access to a very interesting database that concerns the preferences and expectations of
different actors, especially, in terms of local employment and development of the region. In
32
fact, it is essential to organize public consultations to collect the different issues and the main
occupations of the local population and discuss these concerns with stakeholders in order to
satisfy the expectations of the citizens.
-The creation of local employment is recommended. Local employees must be privileged,
especially, during the construction phase which requires a high number of low-skilled
workers. Indeed, the project can increase the activity of small and medium-sized local firms
for the supply of the materials and the necessary equipments for the construction work, the
housing and the restoration of the workers. Hence, it is also highly recommended to set up an
employment commission to study the best way to promote local employment and organize
short-term training for young graduates in order to acquire new skills and qualifications
required for this project, while trying to achieve parity between the employment of women
and men.
-The communication about the RE sector must be adequate and effective. Indeed, citizens and
all the actors involved in the RE sector should have the necessary and up-to-date information
on the objectives of the government, the means implemented, the regulatory and legal
framework, and the achievements made. In order to ensure such communication, an updated
website, discussion forums, and workshops at national and regional levels should be set up.
7. Conclusion
The application of the GRA method for the case of a CSP plant in Tunisia helped us to
analyze in depth, the types of hazards that most affect the project, the phase of the project that
is the most vulnerable to hazards, and the major risks that hinder its implementation.
The results of the analysis by generic hazard type show that the project is very exposed to
political, physical-chemical, financial, and strategic hazards. The political hazard generates
30% of all hazardous situations, which means that the political situation in Tunisia has a
negative influence on the realization of this project. The Kiviat diagram shows that, even
though the legal hazard generates only 2 hazardous situations, it should be taken very
seriously by investors since risks resulting from this hazard have the minimum, medium and
maximum risk indexes of C3 criticality (unacceptable).
With regard to the analysis per project phase (feasibility study, preparation, construction, and
operation), the two phases of preparation and operation contain the highest shares of
hazardous situations, which makes them more exposed to the 14 generic hazards than the
feasibility study and the construction phases. The Kiviat diagram demonstrates that, among
33
the four phases, only the initial risks arising from the preparation phase have an average risk
index of C3 criticality. This further proves the vulnerability of this phase, which requires
more attention than the other three phases. In fact, this phase encompasses all administrative
procedures relating to authorizations for the construction and connection to the electricity grid
and may even last for many years. In Tunisia, the case is even more serious as the project has
been blocked in this phase for more than 6 years.
In addition to that, the GRA enabled us to identify the list of major risks that may affect the
CSP project which are: the risk of not obtaining permission to build the CSP plant, the risk of
non compliance with the deadline, the risk of failure to achieve the expected performance, the
risk of insufficient access to capital, and the risk of conflicts with local residents. Then, their
causes and the main actions proposed to reduce them are explained. In fact, in order to reduce
these investment risks, we have proposed many measures and strategies, such as the
strengthening of the public private partnership to finance this project, the use of participatory
approaches, the creation of local employment, and the recourse to international financial
institutions and development agencies to reduce the costs of the project.
The list of top risks identified in the present study is in line with many studies dealing with
barriers to CSP investment in the MENA region which pointed out the importance of
financing barriers, the bureaucracy and corruption, and the regulatory risk (Komendantova et
al., 2011, 2012; Lilliestam et al., 2012).
However, we found that the risk of conflicts with local residents is a major risk that should be
taken into account. This result is in contrast with the analysis of Hanger et al. (2016). We can
explain this difference by the fact that the electricity produced by the CSP plant studied in this
paper is intended for exports while the other cases deal with CSP plants producing electricity
to strengthen the national grid and satisfy the national demand. In fact, producing electricity
to be totally exported is seen by many citizens as an exploitation of national energy resources
by the countries of the North.
We also found that the risk of failure to achieve the expected performance because of the use
of tower technology with dry cooling is a major risk, which is in contrast with the result found
by Trabelsi et al. (2016). This contrast can be explained by the fact that these authors treated
parabolic trough technology, which is a more mature and used technology than tower
technology that will be used for the CSP studied in this paper.
34
It should be noted that, over the past few years, Tunisia has begun many structural changes in
the RE sector in order to de-risk and promote this sector. In fact, a new law for RE was
approved in 2015. This law authorizes the exportation of electricity from RE and encourages
citizens and local communities to produce green electricity. However, the distribution of
electricity remains under the monopoly of STEG.
Furthermore, in order to create a favorable climate for PPP, a new law for PPP was adopted in
2015. This law is supposed to facilitate, clarify and organize PPP procedures and, above all,
ensure an efficient management of the contractual risks that are frequent in this complex type
of contracts. Therefore, the objective of this law is to provide a unified legislative and
institutional framework that encourages private investors.
Even though Tunisia has made some progress, mainly in terms of legal framework, there are
still several challenges and obstacles that slow down the development of CSP technology and
RE in general as it is demonstrated by the present analysis.
However, like any research work, this study has limitations. Indeed, it is limited to a semi-
quantitative study (since there are the severity and likelihood indexes). In addition, it remains
general with no focus on financial risks, which are among the most serious and worrying risks
for investors in the RE sector.
Although, it is very important to use the GRA method at the beginning of a project to give an
overall view of the risks that may occur, this is not enough since the GRA should also
accompany the whole life of the project and therefore must be revised and completed as the
project progresses. The other disadvantage of this method lies in the subjectivity in risk
assessment. Indeed, the estimation of the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of
consequences in order to deduce the criticality remains a very subjective process.
In addition, this case study cannot be generalized to all CSP projects in Tunisia, since each
CSP project remains unique and different and has specific risks, but this study remains very
important and gives a general and an approximate idea of the barriers that may be encountered
by future CSP investors in Tunisia.
In order to overcome these limitations, in future research studies, it will be highly
recommended to complete this research by the quantitative AGR method (AGRq). The use of
this method will be very interesting in the case of availability of probabilities related to risk
factors. The main contribution of this method is the possibility of having a probabilistic
representation of the risks and a financial evaluation of the cost/risk ratios.
35
Acknowledgments
We are especially grateful to Prof. Alain Desroches from Ecole Centrale Paris who
generously shared with us his knowledge on risk management and Global Risk Analysis
method as well as to Dr. Sébastien Delmotte from MAD Environnement (www.mad-
environnement.com) for his helpful suggestions and practical advice about the use of the
SATATCART GRA software.
Appendixes. Supplementary material
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Appendix A. The CSP project depicted in steps, phases and sub-phases.
Steps Phases Sub-phases
Feasibility study (A) Site identification Determining available sites
Site selection
Resource estimation Estimation of solar radiation
Estimation of the electricity generated
Estimation of the possibility of connection Estimation of power that can be connected to the grid
Determining interconnection costs
Economic study Project cost estimate
Estimation of potential demand
Estimation of the project profitability
Environmental study Study of the geological characteristics of the site
Preparation (B) Technical study Solar resource characterization
Fixing the technical characteristics of the mirrors used
Determining the necessary equipments
Environmental and social study Study of environmental impacts
Study of social impacts
Selection of partners Identification of partners
Sharing roles
Coordination between partners
Creation of a project team
Elaboration of a financing plan Determination of the overall cost of the project
Identification of available financial assistance
Determining the amount of potential subsidies
Determining the necessary loans
Fixing the repayment terms
Completing the necessary administrative
procedures
Real estate negotiation
Building permit application
Choosing the legal structure of the project-carrying unit
Signing contracts
Tariff agreement
Determining an action plan Organization of working meetings
Identification of project duration
Determination of construction phases
Determination of start up and completion dates
Mobilization of required human resources Organization of job interviews
Communication Communication with the local community
Project media coverage
Construction (C) Installation Ensuring access roads to the site
Site development
Site water supply
Acquiring the necessary equipments
Solar field's construction
Generator construction
Construction of the energy evacuation device
Construction of the storage structure
Installation of associated infrastructure
Preparing connection to the national electricity grid
Preparing the necessary infrastructure
Implementation of HVDC lines between Tunisia and Italy
Operation (D) Generation of electricity Collection of solar radiation using mirrors
Concentration of the sunlight on a receiver
Heating a heat transfer fluid
Production of heat in the form of steam
Steam drives turbine/generator to produce electricity
Storage of heat in molten salt
Connection to the national electricity grid
Export of electricity to Italy
Loan repayments
44
Appendix B. The hazard mapping.
Generic hazards Abbreviation Specific hazards Hazardous events
Political POL International No more world bank support for CSP projects
Decrease in fossil fuel prices
Setting grade by rating agencies
Non-compliance with the European regulatory
framework for electricity
National Bad choice of installation site
Complexity of bureaucratic procedures
Corruption
Bad governance of public enterprises
Political instability
Lack of guarantees from the government
Revolution
Political uncertainty
Increase of subsidies for fossil fuels
Recurrence of strikes and sit-ins in Tunisia
Recurrent changes in government
Uncertain government policies
Lack of transparency
Lack of infrastructure
Environment ENV Natural Sandstorm
The depth of the Mediterranean sea
Strong wind
Erosion
Earthquake
Lightning
Insecurity INS Computer Computer virus
Identity theft
Material Terrorism
Unavailability of equipments
Image IMA Media Lack of media support for the project
Lack of awareness of the benefits of RE
Unfavorable testimonials on social media
Management MAN Organization Bad organization of work
Insufficient site observation period
Unrealistic project implementation schedule
Underestimated time of file’s processing
Delay in construction
Unavailability of project managers
Human resources Technical consultants not experienced in the
field of large projects
Insufficient staff training
Poor proficiency in English
Poor proficiency in Arabic
Non-recruitment of local staff
Poor knowledge of the activity
Human factor Failure to follow safety instructions
Uncomfortable working conditions
Bad decision
Overwork
Stress
Strategic STR Cooperation Poor cooperation with the African Development
Bank
Poor cooperation with the energy transition fund
45
Poor cooperation with the World Bank
Bad choice of partners
Poor cooperation with STEG-ER
Poor cooperation with local authorities
Technological TECH Process Poor choice of the technology used
A technology at R&D stage
Computer Very complicated hardware
Communication
and crises
COM Internal Absence of crisis communication unit
Lack of a participatory approach
Lack of written communication
Poor management of alerts
Lack of schematic panels
External Poor relationship with local residents and the
local community
Poor relationship with partners (conflicts of
interest)
Lack of communication about safety
instructions to local residents
Lack of communication about the project's
benefits
Poor involvement of stakeholders in decision
making
Legal LEG Criminal liability Legal action by the local population
Lack of precision in contracts
Non-compliance with terms and conditions of
contracts
Civil liability Absence of regulatory compliance
Regulation Lack of a stable legal framework
Regulatory framework does not allow export of
RE electricity
Internal rules Failure to comply with internal terms
Non respect of charters (landscape charter or
others)
Financial FIN Subsidies Delay or absence of subsidies
Credits Inability to repay credits
Increase in the interest rate
Exchange rate fluctuation
Delay in obtaining credits
Budget High investment cost
Inflation
Poor estimate of predicted budget
Under-estimated construction cost
Expenses Unexpected expenses
Infrastructure and
premises
INFRA Premises Premises unsuitable for the storage of fragile
products
Premises unsuitable for the storage of hazardous
products
Materials and
equipment
MAT Logistical Telephone network failure
Defective pieces
Absence / Mismanagement of stocks
Absence / Mismanagement of warehouses
Maintenance Absence of preventive maintenance
Absence of maintenance fund
Mismanagement of preventive maintenance
46
Information
system
IS Network Internet connection cut
Data Incomplete or wrong data
Data classification error
Loss of files
Poor experience feedback
Unavailability of data
Failure to anonymize data
System System does not respond to the situation reality
Software Very complicated software
physical/chemical PCH Electrical Overvoltage
Power cut
Insufficient electricity
Mechanical Noise
Fall
Explosion
Vibration
Thermal Fire
Hot spot
Hydraulic Overpressure
Leakage
Breakage
Chemical Pollution
Corrosion
Chemical reaction
Explosion
Oxidation
Flammability
Biological Toxicity
47
Appendix C. Mapping_HS
Cartography and risk management of a concentrated solar power plant Feasibility study (A) Preparation (B) Construction (C) Operation (D)
33 62 74
Sit
e id
enti
fica
tion
Res
ou
rce
Est
imat
ion
Est
imat
ion
of
the
po
ssib
ilit
y o
f co
nn
ecti
on
Eco
no
mic
stu
dy
Env
iro
nm
enta
l st
udy
Tec
hnic
al s
tudy
Env
iro
nm
enta
l an
d s
oci
al
study
Sel
ecti
on
of
par
tner
s
Ela
bo
rati
on
of
a fi
nan
cing
pla
n
Co
mp
lete
the
nec
essa
ry
adm
inis
trat
ive
pro
ced
ure
s
Det
erm
inin
g a
n a
ctio
n
pla
n
Mobil
izat
ion
of
hu
man
reso
urc
es
req
uir
ed
Co
mm
un
icat
ion
Inst
alla
tion
Pre
par
atio
n o
f th
e co
nn
ecti
on t
o t
he
nat
ion
al e
lect
rici
ty g
rid
Pre
par
ing
the
nec
essa
ry i
nfr
astr
uct
ure
Imp
lem
enta
tion
of
HV
DC
lin
es b
etw
een
Tun
isia
an
d I
taly
Gen
erat
ion
of
elec
tric
ity
Conn
ecti
on
to
th
e n
atio
nal
ele
ctri
city
gri
d
Exp
ort
of
elec
tric
ity
to
Ita
ly
Lo
an r
epay
men
ts
GENERIC HAZARDS SPECIFIC HAZARDS DANGEROUS EVENTS OR ELEMENTS
Det
erm
inin
g a
vai
lab
le s
ites
Sit
e se
lect
ion
Est
imat
ion
of
sola
r ra
dia
tion
Est
imat
ion
of
the
elec
tric
ity
gen
erat
ed
Est
imat
ion
of
po
wer
that
can
be
connec
ted
to t
he
gri
dD
iscu
ssio
n w
ith
th
e n
etw
ork
op
erat
or
on
inte
rcon
nec
tio
n c
ost
s
Pro
ject
co
st e
stim
ate
Est
imat
ion
of
po
tenti
al d
eman
d
Est
imat
ion
of
the
pro
ject
pro
fita
bil
ity
Stu
dy o
f th
e g
eolo
gic
al c
har
acte
rist
ics
of
the
site
So
lar
reso
urc
e ch
arac
teri
zati
on
Fix
ing
the
tech
nic
al c
har
acte
rist
ics
of
the
mir
rors
use
d
Det
erm
inin
g t
he
nec
essa
ry e
quip
men
t
Stu
dy o
f en
vir
on
men
tal
imp
acts
Stu
dy o
f so
cial
im
pac
ts
Iden
tifi
cati
on
of
par
tner
s
Sh
arin
g r
ole
s
Org
aniz
atio
n o
f co
ord
inat
ion
bet
wee
n
par
tner
s
Cre
ate
a p
roje
ct t
eam
Det
erm
inat
ion
of
the
over
all
cost
of
the
pro
ject
Iden
tifi
cati
on
of
avai
lable
fin
anci
al
assi
stan
ceD
eter
min
ing
the
amoun
t o
f po
tenti
al
sub
sid
ies
Det
erm
inin
g t
he
nec
essa
ry l
oan
s
Fix
ing
the
rep
aym
ent
term
s
Rea
l es
tate
neg
oti
atio
n
Buil
din
g p
erm
it a
pp
lica
tion
Th
e ch
oic
e o
f th
e le
gal
str
uct
ure
of
the
pro
ject
-car
ryin
g u
nit
Sig
nin
g c
on
trac
ts
Tar
iff
agre
emen
t
Org
aniz
atio
n o
f w
ork
ing
mee
tin
gs
Iden
tifi
cati
on
of
pro
ject
du
rati
on
Det
erm
inat
ion
of
con
stru
ctio
n p
has
es
Det
erm
inat
ion
of
star
t up
and
com
ple
tion
dat
es
Org
aniz
atio
n o
f jo
b i
nte
rvie
ws
Co
mm
un
icat
ing w
ith t
he
loca
l co
mm
unit
y
Pro
ject
med
iati
zati
on
Sel
ecti
on
of
a dev
elop
er i
n c
har
ge
of
con
stru
ctio
n
En
sure
acc
ess
road
s to
th
e si
te
Sit
e dev
elop
men
t
Sit
e w
ater
su
pp
ly
Acq
uir
ing
the
nec
essa
ry e
qu
ipm
ent
So
lar
fiel
d's
con
stru
ctio
n
Gen
erat
or
con
stru
ctio
n
Con
stru
ctio
n o
f th
e en
ergy
ev
acu
atio
n
dev
ice
Con
stru
ctio
n o
f th
e st
ora
ge
stru
ctu
re
Inst
alla
tion
of
asso
ciat
ed i
nfr
astr
uct
ure
Coll
ecti
on o
f so
lar
rad
iati
on
usi
ng
mir
rors
Con
centr
atio
n o
f th
e fl
ux
on
a r
ecei
ver
Th
e re
ceiv
er h
eats
a h
eat
tran
sfer
flu
id
Pro
du
ctio
n o
f hea
t in
the
form
of
stea
m
Ste
am d
rives
tu
rbin
e/gen
erat
or
to p
rod
uce
elec
tric
ity
Sto
rag
e o
f hea
t in
molt
en s
alt
Political
International
No more world bank support to CSP projects 10 10
Decrease in fossil fuel price 10 10
10
Rating agencies 2 1
Non-compliance with the European regulatory framework for electricity 2 1
National
Bad choice of installation site 10 2 2 2 10
The complexity of bureaucratic procedures 2 2 1 10
Corruption 10 10
Bad governance of public entreprises 1 1 2
Political instability
Lack of guarantees from government 2 10
1
2
Revolution 2
Political incertainty
Increase in subsidies for fossil fuels 10 2
Recurrence of strikes and sit-ins in Tunisia 10 1
Recurrent changes in government 10 1
Absence of decision or late decision by the tunisian government 1 2
Lack of transparency 10 10
Absence or delay of decisions on improving access roads 10 1
Environment Natural
Sandstorm 1
The depth of the Mediterranean sea 1 10 10
Strong Wind 10 2 2 2
erosion
Earthquake
Lightning
Insecurity
Computer Computer virus 2 10
Identity theft 2
Material Terrorism 2 10 2 1
Theft of equipment
Image Media
Lack of media support for the project 10 2
1 Lack of awareness of the benefits of renewable energies 2
Unfavorable testimonials on social networks 2
Management
Organization
Bad organization of work 2 10 2 10
Insufficient site observation period 1 10
Unrealistic project implementation schedule 2
10 10 2
Underestimated time of file's processing 2
Delay in construction 2 2
Unavailability of project managers 10 2
Human ressources
Technical consultants not experienced in the field of large projects 10 10
Insufficient staff training 2
Poor proficiency in English 10
Poor proficiency in Arabic 2
Non-recruitment of local staff 2
Poor knowledge of the activity
Human factor
Failure to follow safety instructions 10
Uncomfortable working conditions
Bad decision 10 1
Overwork 2
Stress
Strategic Cooperation
Poor cooperation with the African Development Bank
Poor cooperation with the energy transition fund 2 2 2
Poor cooperation with Desertec 2
Poor cooperation with World Bank 2
Bad choice of partners 2 2
Poor cooperation with STEG-ER 1 1 1
Poor cooperation with local authorities 10
Technological Process
Poor choice of the technology used 2 2
A technology at R&D stage 1
Computer Very complicated hardware
Communication and Crises Internal
Absence of crisis communication unit
Lack of a participatory approach 2 2
Lack of written communication
Poor management of alerts
Lack of schematic panels 10
External Poor relationship with local residents and the local community 1
48
Poor relationship with partners (conflicts of interest) 10
Lack of communication of safety instructions to local residents 2 2 10
Lack of communication about the project's benefits
Poor coordination with funders 10 10 10 10
Legal
Criminal liability
Legal action by the local population
Lack of precision in contracts 10 2
Non compliance with terms of contracts with partners 2
Civil liability Absence of regulatory compliance
Regulation Lack of a stable legal framework (for export or import of RE) 10
1 2
1 10 2 2
Regulatory framework does not allow export of RE 2
Internal rules
Failure to comply with internal terms 2
Non respect of charters (eg : landscape charter or other)
Financial
Subsidies Delay or absence of subsidies 2 10 10
Credits
Inability to repay credits 10
Increase in the interest rate 10 1
Exchange rate fluctuation
Delay in obtaining credits 1
Budget
High investment cost 1 2 2
Inflation 2
Poor estimate of predicted budget
Under-estimated construction cost 10
Expenses Unexpected expenses 2 2
Infrastructure and premises Premises Premises unsuitable for the storage of fragile products 2 2
Premises unsuitable for the storage of hazardous products 1
Materials and equipment
Logistical
Telephone network failure
Defective pieces 2 2
Absence / Mismanagement of stocks
Absence / Mismanagement of warehouses 10
Maintenance
Absence of preventive maintenance 10
Absence of maintenance fund
Mismanaged preventive maintenance 1
Computer system
Network Internet connection cut
Data
Incomplete or wrong data 10 10 2
Data classification error 2 2
Loss of files
Poor experience feedback
Unavailability of data 10 2
Failure to anonymize data
System System does not respond to reality of the situation 10
Software Very complicated software 1
Physico-chemical
Electrical
Overvoltage
Power cut
Insufficient electricity
Short circuit
Mechanical
Noise 1 10
Fall 2
Explosion 10 1
Burst pipe
Bad clogging
Vibration
Thermal Fire 10 2
Hot spot
Hydraulic
Overpressure 1
Leakage 2
2
Breakage
Chemical
Pollution 2 1
Corrosion 10
Chemical reaction
Explosion 10
Oxidation
Flammability
Biological Toxicity 10
P1 3 12 8 10 33
P10 15 22 9 16 62
P2 15 24 18 17 74
49
Appendix D. Scenario_GRA
Generic Hazard
System Hazardous Situation
Contact Cause Unwanted Event Trigger Cause
Existing risk treatments including detection or alert means
Consequences G i
L i
C i
Risk reduction actions and implementation accountable
PE G r
L r
C r
Management of residual risk
POL A Slow procedures STEG is in a monopoly position
Failure to obtain a construction permit
The Tunisian regulatory framework does not allow the export of renewable energies
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A1 A2 A1: Initiate discussions with government officials to change the regulatory framework and facilitate procedures with STEG A2: The formation of a team of specialists to discuss all the necessary points with the STEG officials.
2 4 2 2
P1 P1: Continuous monitoring of the progress of discussions with the government
MAN A An erroneous estimate of the resource
First experience in the tunisian desert
Overestimation of the project performance
A site observation period of less than one year
Absence of means
54Huge financial loss
5 2 2
A3 A4 A3: Requiring a site observation period of one year A4: Hiring experienced professionals to assess the total energy output of the facility
3 2 2 1
STR A
The requirement of exorbitant costs for connection to the grid
STEG is in a monopoly position
The increase in the cost of the project
The bureaucracy
Absence of means
31Unacceptable performance degradation
3 3 2
A5 A6 A5: The sale of part of the electricity produced to the national market A6: Using the mechanism of feed in tariff
2 2 2 1
POL B The discouragement of private investors
Degradation of Tunisia's sovereign rating by rating agencies
Few financing funds are interested in a project in Tunisia
Political instability
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 4 2
A7 A8 A7: The choice of solid financial partners A8: The cooperation with the World Bank and the African Development Bank
2 2 3 1
POL B Slow administrative procedures
Poor governance of tunisian public administrations
Delay in granting authorization for the construction of the solar power plant
Recurring changes in government
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A9 A10 A9: To form a team of tunisian experts to accelerate administrative procedures A10: To prepare a plan describing the procedures for obtaining the various permits and authorizations required
2 3 3 2
P2 P2 : To establish a checklist of the various permits and authorizations required
50
POL B An unreliable action plan
Lack of transparency
An unfeasible action plan
The tunisian revolution
Absence of means
12Acceptable operational constraints
1 5 1
POL B Lack of visibility in the short and medium term
Political uncertainty
No detailed and final action plan
Regulatory barriers
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 4 2 A11 A11: Continuous adjustment of the action plan
2 2 3 1
POL B Slow administrative procedures
Lack of a clear political commitment for renewable energies promotion
An increase in the project cost
Lack of transparency
Absence of means
31Unacceptable performance degradation
3 5 3
A12 A13 A12: The formation of a crisis unit in charge of communication with the political decision-makers and the public administrations A13: To minimize expenses during the preparation phase (travel, premises...)
2 3 3 2
P3 P3 : To implement a procedure for continuous monitoring and evaluation of progress in administrative procedures
POL B An increase in the project cost
Increase in spending
Increase in capital spending
Lack of political will
Absence of means
54Huge financial loss
5 3 3
A14 A15 A14: Minimize all costs in the preparation phase A15: Decrease the number of staff during the preparation phase
2 3 3 2
P4 P4 : To establish a plan for monitoring the application of austerity procedures
ENV B Lack of experience feedback
The first project for the transmission of electricity with a depth of 2,000 m
Uncertainty about the success of this first experience
Technology in research and development phase
Absence of means
32Very degraded or failed activity
3 3 2
A16 A16 : Obtain manufacturer's necessary warranties that HVDC cables support the 2,000 m depth
2 2 2 1
MAN B Wrong choice of cooling system
Taking into account only the environmental aspect
The choice of dry cooling which is less effective than wet cooling
Water scarcity in the desert
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 4 2 A17 A17: Continuous monitoring of the efficiency of dry cooling
2 2 2 1
STR B Delay in signing contracts
STEG is in a monopoly position
Failure to meet deadlines
Poor estimation of file processing time
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 3 2
A18 A18: Develop clear contracts that define in detail the responsibilities of each party
2 2 3 1
51
LEG B Difficulty to find convenient partners
Political instability
Difficulty in attracting private investors
Lack of a regulatory framework which allows the export of renewable energies
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 5 3
A19 A20 A19: Accelerate discussions with government A 20: Organize seminars with private investors and members of government to discuss and ensure the government's willingness to change existing regulations
2 3 3 2
P5 P5 : Put private investors up to date with all the advances made in discussions with the government
LEG B Slow discussions with policy makers
Lack of political will
Failure to meet deadlines
Absence of firm decision
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A21 A22 A21: Intensify discussions with policy makers to change regulation A22: Try to give the maximum guarantees to the government on the expected benefits of this project on local employment
2 3 3 2
P6 P6 : Exercise continuous control over the progress of the discussions and the obstacles to be overcome
FIN B Huge funding requirement
A huge project Difficulty in raising funds
No participation of the Tunisian government in the financing
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A23 A24 A25 A23 : Construction by phases A24 : The recourse to the World Bank A25 : The recourse to the African Development Bank
3 3 4 2
P7 P8 P7 : Reduce construction and assembly costs P8 : Reduce maintenance costs
POL C Delay in delivery of necessary equipment
Poor Organisation
Discontinuity in the construction phase
recurring interruptions in the installation
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 3 2
A26 A27 A26: implement a preventive action plan A27: Recruit a stock manager
2 3 2 1
POL C Access roads not suitable for large trucks
The slowness of procedures
Road accidents
Road traffic due to the construction site
Absence of means
23Injury on duty with work stoppage less than 21 days
2 4 2
A28 A29 A30 A28: Organize handling operations during off-peak period A29: Set up traffic signs and signs of speed reduction A30: Heavy and light vehicles must show a recent technical inspection
1 2 3 1
ENV C Hard working conditions
Absence of barriers around the site
Temporary cessation of work
Lack of permanent drainage
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A31 A32 A31: Establish barriers around the site A32: Inform drivers and employees if weather forecasts indicate the possibility of sandstorms
1 3 4 2
P9 P10 P9 : Permanent drainage of the site P10 : Continuous monitoring of weather forecasts
52
IMG C
Confrontations with local residents who are against the installation
Lack of participatory approach
Conflicts of interest
The existence of inhabitants who use the site for camels
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 4 2
A33 A34 A35 A33: Collaboration with local authorities A34: Setting up focus groups A35: Inform the shepherds at the beginning of the project to adapt the movements of their flocks
1 2 3 1
FIN C Funding difficulties Non-compliance with project specifications
Failure to meet construction deadlines
Temporary stop of the construction
Absence of means
45Delay in project implementation
4 4 3
A36 A36: Prepare an activity report and an interim financial report every six months
2 3 3 2
P 11 P11 : Financial audit to ensure conformity between the specifications, progress of implementation, disbursements and loan agreement
INF C
The existence of hazardous products in warehouses
Storage of fossil fuels and molten salt
Soil pollution Leakage Absence of means
24Controllable pollution
2 4 2
A37 A38 A37: Impervious storage area which is equipped with retention of adequate volumes A38: Develop an environmental monitoring program
1 1 3 1
PCH C Noise Significant equipment requirements
Difficult working conditions
Increase in dust and releases to air
Absence of means
23Injury on duty with work stoppage less than 21 days
2 4 2
A39 A40 A41 A39: Keep vehicles of the construction site in good condition A40: Equipping workers with acoustic protection A41: Watering of the access roads to limit the dust lifting
1 1 3 1
PCH C Degradation of air quality
Machines and trucks
Air pollution Long construction time
Absence of means
43Significant damage to the environment
4 3 2
A42 A43 A44 A42: Construction site machinery and trucks must be well maintained A43: Trucks must comply with current exhaust-gas emission laws A44: Implementation of a specification relating to the standards of the construction site
1 3 2 1
53
POL D
Non-compliance with the electricity purchasing regulations of european countries
Lack of follow-up of all changes in European legislation
Temporary cessation of activity
Slow discussions
Absence of means
33Significant operational constraints
3 3 2
A45 A45 : A detailed analysis of all the opportunities and threats presented in the various countries interested in buying the electricity produced
2 2 3 1
INS D The possibility of acts of violence by extremists
The existence of extremist groups that are against foreign companies
Delay in project implementation
Lack of political stability
Absence of means
34Significant damage to infrastructure or goods
3 3 2
A46 A47 A48 A46 : Regular communication between project representatives and local stakeholders A47: Create a positive perception of the project (employment, reputation of the city ...) A48: Underwriting political risk insurance with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank)
2 2 2 1
STR D Bad service of STEG
Absence of clauses that penalize STEG in case of bad service
Recurrence of conflicts
Lack of precision in contracts
Absence of means
31Unacceptable performance degradation
3 4 2
A49 A49: Define clearly the responsibilities and penalties of each party in case of non-compliance with commitments
1 2 3 1
TEC D Not achieving desired performance
HVDC cables never used for this depth
Non-compliance with commitments
Technology in research and development phase
Absence of means
32Very degraded or failed activity
3 3 2
A50 A50: The recourse to known manufacturers to manufacture cables that support this depth
2 3 1 1
MAT D
Decrease in the frequency of preventive maintenance
Cost reduction strategy
Recurrence of breakdowns
Absence of a maintenance fund
Absence of means
21Unavailability of services or equipment on the scheduled date
2 4 2
A51 A52 A51 : The creation of a maintenance fund A52 : A maintenance plan will be established annually and updated monthly
2 1 3 1
FIN D Inability to repay credits
Exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations
The increase in debts
Economic crisis Absence of means
54Huge financial loss
5 2 2
A53 A54 A53: Conclude a SWAP contract A54: Conclude a contract of Forward Rate Agreement
3 3 2 1
CS D Fault on the part of employees
Short training period
Recurrence of mistakes
The language used is English
Absence of means
31Unacceptable performance degradation
3 4 2 A55 A55: Require excellent knowledge of English
1 1 3 1
54
PCH D The use of fossil fuels
Keep molten salt at high temperature
Fire Leakage Absence of means
42Partial destruction of infrastructure or assets
4 3 2
A56 A57 A58 A59 A56: Absorbent material will be available near the transformer and warehouses A57: No smoking A58: Installation of fire extinguishers A59: Underwriting of fire insurance
3 3 2 1
PCH D Pressure and heated running of the tribune
Existence of high pressure steam
Explosion The presence of flame or fire
Absence of means
52Total destruction of infrastructure or assets
5 3 3
A60 A61 A62 A63 A60: Electrical appliances A61: No smoking A62: Installation of fire extinguishers A63: Develop a fire safety management plan
3 4 2 2
P12 P13 P12: Access to the construction site prohibited to the public P13: A buffer zone of at least 10 m wide will surround the entire project
COM D The lack of acceptance of local residents
The noise of the building site
Complaints from local residents
Road traffic
Inform local residents of the start of the work and the duration
33Significant operational constraints
3 4 2
A64 A65 A64: Set up a complaint management unit for local residents A65: Use local human resources who have the required skills
1 3 2 1
