Risks in Arctic offshore field developments

Ove T. GudmestadUniversity of Stavanger, Norway

The 4th Norway Russia Arctic Offshore Workshop

Joint research and innovation for the petroleum industry working in the Arctic

Oslo 18th June 2009

Reference to relevant Petromaks project

Presentation of work carried out in the project: Design for operations, maintenance and support (OMS) of complex production facilities in remote, harsh and sensitive environment

A joint research project between University of Stavanger and University of Troms, project leader Markeset, University of Stavanger

A competence building project financed by The Research Council of Norway (Petromaks program) & EniNorge

Key issues in this project

Design (technical concepts and solutions, operations and maintenance concepts)

Complex production facilities (top side, subsea, pipeline)

Remote location (Long distance to market, far away from major populated area)

Harsh environment (cold, snow, storm, icing, dark) Sensitive environment (fishing grounds, cold water

temperature, slow breakdown of spills) Operational processes (technical and

management/administrative, topside and subsea , offshore/ onshore)

Maintenance processes (technical and management/administrative, topside and subsea, offshore/ onshore)

Support processes (operational and maintenance logistics, product support, industrial support services)

Objectives and limitations

1. We will discuss the risks involved in marine operations in cold climate and arctic regions

2. We are concerned with the additional challenges the marine industry is facing when moving into cold regions

3. We will consider work in the ice free part of the Barents Sea all year round

4. We will also consider summer seasonal work in areas with winter ice

Arctic Conditions Characteristics, DNV

Areas which are subject to physical conditions that differ significantly from those found in the Norwegian Sea. The most significant criterion is the presence of sea ice, for which borders can be illustrated as proposed by DNV in the Barents 2020 project:

i) Spitsbergen - usually ice every winterii) Norwegian Sea - generally ice freeiii) Franz Josef Land - usually ice every winteriv) North East Barents Sea - usually ice every winterv) Novozemelsky - in betweenvi) Kola - in betweenvii) Pechora - usually ice every winterviii) White Sea - usually ice every winter

Sub-area ii (the coast off Norway and Murmansk) is generally ice free, whereas other sub-areas usually have ice every winter or are classified as in-betweens.

Extreme challenges, Polar lows

1. During Polar lows there are rapid changes of wind; say from 15 kts to 45 kts in less than 15 minutes, with maximum wind speeds of 70 kts.

2. Polar lows are difficult to predict and meteorologists cannot forecast the weather with reasonable accuracy (in situations where polar lows might occur, i.e. when there are winds from the north) for more than 9 to 12 hours.

3. In other situations when the weather is unstable, Polar lows may occur within few hours

4. Polar lows do in general occur in the period from October to May and the monthly frequencies of Polar lows in the Barents Sea are up to 15, recorded for the period 1999-2007, (Noer, 2009). Occasionally, Polar lows occur outside this period of the year

Polar Lows, potentially of large concern

Small, rather intense low pressure systems in the Arctic Formed at sea in cold air outbreaks

winter time. Often rapid development Gale or storm force winds, seldom

hurricane. Heavy snow showers, icing, changing

wind direction. Life span 6h to 1-2 days Diameter 100-500 km

Polar Lows are a rare special case of strong troughs, lack of models and data to predict these polar lows

Will climate changes influence on intensity of polar lows?

Extreme challenges (cont.)

4. Icing is caused by sea spray, under cooled rain, snow and atmospheric icing

5. There are occasions of rapid icing on offshore platforms and vessels caused by sea sprays (for example in an outside temperature of -15oC, the accumulation of ice was 110 tons of ice in 17 hours, Lset, 2009).

6. Ice is freezing on instruments, wiring and mechanisms; there are slippery surfaces, evacuation means may become non accessible, etc.

7. Low visibility is normal due to ice fog, lack of solar radiation, frosting of windows, etc.

8. There is potential for the pollution of a pristine clean environment. This requires more stringent design measures and operational procedures than elsewhere.

Icing on Melkya, Northern Norway, January 2006 (from Finnmark Dagblad)

Reoccurring deficiencies

1. Deficient risk assessment and understanding of risk,2. Insufficient information regarding risks,

extrapolation from other areas/ similar operations are not always possible,

3. There is no risk in my project4. Deficient distribution of responsibility and lines of

communication,5. Lack of implementation of required safety barriers6. Deficient hand-over / communication7. Procedures not followed,8. Deficient follow-up by operator, etc.

Improving resilience of marine operations

1. Facilitate improved understanding of hazard management by all personnel,

2. Propose a clear distribution of responsibilities for hazard management,

3. Propose provision of so called faint signals (Hollnagel et al. 2006) of the potential weaknesses in the hazard management system,

4. Identify specific hazardous aspects of working in arctic conditions and suggest management procedures to secure that the necessary barriers are present during executions of marine operations in cold climate regions.

5. Improve weather forecasting services in cold climate areas

Resilience requires two types of foresight

1. The first comes from learning from the past and present experience. This includes evaluation, learning and dissemination of industry generic and facility specific incident data, and keeping alive existing knowledge. This is needed to identify potential failure modes and consequences (e.g. risks due to operating in non-chartered waters). Reference also training and experience.

2. The second type of foresight is associated with processing of faint signals. These signals can include symptomatic events, suspected trends and gut feelings (Hollnagel et al. 2006). This is needed to identify potential non obvious failure modes and consequences (e.g. sinking in harbour due to ballast procedure short cuts)

Explorer, which struck an iceberg in the Antarctic Ocean. Notice: The captain had NO experience from Antarctic ice conditions

Improved comprehension of hazards Hazard Bow Tie

Types of barriers

Improving barrier integrity Barrier failure model

Secondarybarrier 1 -

Control of decay mode 1

Barrier decaymode 1 -

Underlying causeof failure

Secondarybarrier 2 -

Control of decay mode 2

Barrier decaymode 2 -

Underlying causeof failure

Primary barrierThreat - Directcause of failure

H Hazard

H.02 Initiatingevent (accident)

R igging c hec ked inenc los ed area

P roc edural c ontrolE xternal pres s ure

Adherenc e tow ave/w ind w indow

S tric t adherenc e toLO LE RC om petent pers onnel

Lifting P re R is kAs s es s m ent C hec klis tFaulty rigging

C olour c oding of liftingequipm ent

Adherenc e tow ave/w ind w indow

S tric t adherenc e toLO LE R

C hec k for froz en ordam aged w ires

E ns ure c ranec om ponents are ic e

free

Faulty c rane /c om ponent

S upervis ionE ns ure w orking

c onditions appropriatefor Arc tic

P erform anc e affec ted by high s tres s

P ers onnel protec tedfor Arc tic c onditions

O perational reviewIns uffic ient c om petenc e

B anks m an ac tivelym onitors lifting

operationsC om m unic ationLifting p lansLifting P re R is kAs s es s m ent C hec klis tHum an error

C om petent B anks m anVis ual ins pec tion ass oon as the load is

lifted off the dec k

S tric t c ontrol ofpre-s lung goods

ons horeFaulty s ling

Lifting outs ide w eatherw indow

S upply boat m otionexc eeds the c riteria

Inappropriate bas ketus ed

A Arc ticre lated haz ards

A.01 Lifting failure

Barrier Decay Modes and Secondary Barriers

A nom aly reportingand m anagem entO IE / IM -S P P -010

C orrosion inspect.(exte rna l and inte rna l)

I& F M C oor /IM -S P P -002

Opera tiona l (bestp ractice ) review

OS E O /B C A -RM -005

Incorrect inhib ito rs /usage

Use o f co rros ioninhib ito rs

P IE / IM -S P P -006

C om m issioningreview

OP E / M OD -IM P -002

D esign review(HA ZOP , e tc.)

E TL / M OD -E NG-011

Incorrect m ate ria lspecifica tion / usage

H2S resistant s tee lsare used in designP IE / IM -S P P -004

D esigned fo rfo reseeab le

opera ting cond itionsE ngC oor /M OD -E NG-002

C orrosion / e rros ion /de te rio ra tion

Opera tingprocedures

A Tech /P D S -P D S -012

P la tfo rm C ontro lS ystem

OM E / P C -P M R

P rocedura l contro l

RE / M OD -C LO-006

Inadequate testing

Opera tiona l reviewOS E O /

B C A -RM -005

Inadequatem aintenance

E S D system

P A / M M -M P O-001

D esigned fo rfo reseeab le

opera ting cond itionsA IM / IM -S P P -001

Opera ting beyonddesign lim its

C ontro l o f intrus ivem aintenance and

re-insta tem entO IM / HS E -003

Iso la tion standardand p roceduresP A / HS E -028

C orpora te aud it

O IM / B C A -RM -002d

Inadequate com pliance m onito ring

S upervis ionC A M /

C A T-E S C -003

P rocedura l reviewA Tech /

P D S -P D S -002

Inadequate taskspecifica tion

M anagem ent o fchange

A ssM / M GT-001

S upervisionC A M /

C A T-E S C -004

Lack o f sa fe ty culture

P TW system

P A / HS E -021

Too lbox ta lks

P A / HS E -023

Risk assessm ent

P A / HS E -010

E rro r duringm aintenance

T Toxic gas re lease

T.01b S our gasrise r topsides

re lease

Energising lines of defence Linking hazard protection to personnel activities

Risk estimation Risk matrix estimation criteria

1

10-7 10-5 10-3 10-1 10

People Environment Assets Reputation Extremely unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Probable Frequent

A B C D E

Minor injury Minor damage Minor damage Slight effect 1 A1 B1 C1 D1 E1

Loss time accident

Significant damage

Significant damage Minor effect 2 A2 B2 C2 D2 E2

Single or few serious injuries

Severe damage

Severe damage Major effect 3 A3 B3 C3 D3 E3

Single or few fatalities Major damage Major damage National effect 4 A4 B4 C4 D4 E4

Many fatalities (5 or more)

Catastrophic damage

Catastrophic damage

International Effect 5 A5 B5 C5 D5 E5

Increasing Likelihood >

Increasing Likelihood (Median Values) >

Simple risk assessment for heavy lift operations

Risk evaluation for increased resilience Barrier acceptance criteria

Evaluated Risk Criteria

Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for all threats

Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for each identified consequenceRequires a minimum of two effective primary barriers in place for all threats

Requires a minimum of one effective primary barrier in place for each identified consequence

Requires a minimum of one effective secondary barrier all barrier failure / decay modes

Requires a minimum of three effective primary barriers in place for all threatsRequires a minimum of two effective primary barriers in place for each identified consequence

Requires a minimum of one effective secondary barrier all barrier failure / decay modes

Acceptable

Tolerable (ALARP)

Intolerable

Accounting for arctic conditions

1. Main marine installation work only during summer months

2. High pressure on personnel due to short season3. Planning horizon only 9 to 12 hours4. Extension into fall season might be needed

Secure good weather forecasts and wait on weather

Only for activities that will not cause catastrophic failures

5. Winterisation:

Equipment placed in enclosed areas

Heat tracing to avoid icing

Heated water for fire water

Personnel protection from cold

Slippery surfaces

Frozen or iced equipment

Vessel toapproach

platform at safe speed and

Weathercriteria

adjusted forArctic

Insufficientvisibility

CompetentMaster and

crew members

Op.Coordinatorcontrols theapproach

Mastercompetent forsaling in Arctic

conditions

Vessel changesagreed route due

to 'bergy bits'

Vesselapproach

(route) agreedwith Op.

Permissionrequired for

entry into 500m zone

Supply boatmaneuvre failure

Supply boat ispositioned

against wind &current

Vessel iscertified,

surveyed andISM acredited

Ensure harware is ice free

All hardwarecertified for

Arcticconditions

Supply boatsystem failure

Ice braker onstandby in

critical season

Weathercriteria

adjusted forArctic

Vessel trappedby drifting ice

Master ensures manoeuvrabilit

y of vessel

Supply boattrapped against

platform bydrifting ice

A Operations in

A.03 Supply boatfailure in safety

zone

Bow Tie with Arctic Barriers

Conclusions

1. Improved comprehension of major hazards

Operating personnel

Engineers and designers

Management team2. Involvement in safety management system

Emphasis on understanding the Arctic barriers3. Increased resilience of the safety management system

Invite the Devils advocate to identify risk4. Need for implementation of Arctic barriers5. Need for improved weather forecasts6. The bow-tie method presented is an excellent tool to

identify needs for barriers

Notice: the present work has been carried out in close cooperation with Dr Trbojevic of Risk Support, London

Reference to relevant Petromaks projectKey issues in this projectObjectives and limitationsSlide Number 5Arctic Conditions Characteristics, DNV Extreme challenges, Polar lowsPolar Lows, potentially of large concernExtreme challenges (cont.)Icing on Melkya, Northern Norway, January 2006 (from Finnmark Dagblad)Reoccurring deficienciesImproving resilience of marine operationsResilience requires two types of foresightExplorer, which struck an iceberg in the Antarctic Ocean. Notice: The captain had NO experience from Antarctic ice conditions Improved comprehension of hazardsHazard Bow TieTypes of barriersImproving barrier integrityBarrier failure modelBarrier Decay Modes and Secondary BarriersEnergising lines of defenceLinking hazard protection to personnel activitiesRisk estimationRisk matrix estimation criteriaSimple risk assessment for heavy lift operationsRisk evaluation for increased resilienceBarrier acceptance criteriaAccounting for arctic conditionsBow Tie with Arctic BarriersConclusions